BRIEFING THE 'JUGULAR' NEWSLETTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000400070002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 30, 1983
• Content Type: NSPR

ARTICLE Ay _ proved For Release , ,6/1 8 T ~DP91-00901RO
ON P:J~ ____ . 30 August 1983
WASHINGTON TALK
Briefing
The `Jugular.' Newsletter
Washington is awash with
newsletters. Hundreds of
them scrutinize the minu-
tiae of Government affairs for clients
in industry and for subscribers inter-
ested in almost everything from air
pollution to tax havens. And now
there is "Early Warning," a $1,000-
a-year monthly newsletter for "key
decision-makers" who want to know
about "matters of jugular concern."
Everything about the nine-month-
old venture carries hush-hush over-
tones. "Personal and confidential" is
written on mass-distribution letters
recently sent to solicit subscribers.
On this basis, it is not surprising that
Arnaud de Borchgrave, one of the
publishers and writers, said the news-
letter itself was "ultraconfidential."
According to Mr. de Borchgrave, this
means that if you subscribe, you
should not make copies on the office
copying machine.
The newsletter is published by Mid-
Atlantic Research Associates, con-
sisting of Mr. de Borchgrave, former
chief foreign correspondent for News-
week; John Rees, who publishes In-
formation Digest, another newslet-
ter, and Robert Moss, a former editor
at The Economist.
"Early Warning" promises to
scoop the daily news media on domes-
tic and foreign news, as seed through
the eyes of "former intelligence offi-
cers, including ranking defectors
from the K.G.B. and its proxy serv-
ices and former government officials
recently in sensitive positions." Mr.
de Borchgrave said he recently of-
fered early warnings on such things
as Libya's troop buildup before its in-
vasion of Chad and a currency deval-
uation in Venezuela.
"After studying our track record,"
Mr. De Borchgrave wrote to potential
subscribers, "Bill Casey of the C.I.A.
took several subscriptions."
William J. Casey, the Director of
Central Intelligence, is on vacation,
but Dale Peterson, an agency spokes-
man, said that no copies of the news-
letter had arrived in the director's of-
fice, although he said Mr. Casey could
be receiving them at home.
Mr. Peterson said he was not famil.
iar with "Early Warning," but that
even if he were, he would not be able
to comment on its contents.
The Report on Reports
A er writing legislation, Congress
has to know how it works in the
real world. Consequently,
many laws require Government
agencies to make reports on enforce-
ment status, on significant mistakes,
on plans to spend large hunks of
money and even reports on reports.
The Clerk of the House recently
filed a report listing about 3,000
mandatory reports. The General Ac-
counting Office, which regularly re-
ports on wasteful reporting, knows of
a couple thousand other reports,
which, altogether, cost more than $80
million a year to produce.
"I like the report the C.I.A. has to
write whenever they off someone,"
said Dan Buck, an aide to Represent-
ative Patricia Schroeder and an avid
reader of the House Clerk's report on
reports. He was referring to a State
Department report entitled, "Illegal
intelligence activity; significant in-
telligence failure; corrective action."
Some reports are theoretically
available to the public, but it requires
dogged research, starting at the
House Documents Room. Most re-
ports, however, are deemed confiden-
tial.
A sampling: "Certain. expenses of
,the President and Vice President,"
"Audit of the House Beauty Shop,"
"Advance report on proposed mili-
tary or paramilitary operations in
Angola," "Americans incarcerated
abroad," "Audits of undercover
operations," "Means of preserving
and conserving intangible elements
of the nation's cultural heritage,"
"Failure to compile a role of mem-
bers of tribe who possess Kickapoo
blood," "Activities of the Gold Star
Wives of America," "Annual report
of Little League Baseball," "Sum-
mary and review of the continuing
study of rape," "Efforts to reduce
paperwork and reporting."
Periodically, Congress passes a
law to toss out some of the less useful
studies. Recent cuts from the annual
publication list include $7,000 worth of
reports on the Tule Elk herd in Cali-
fornia and $5 million worth of reports
on Federal employee training pro-
grams.
Michael deCourcy Hinds
Warren Weaver Jr.
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ELECTRONIC NEWS
29 August 1983
DR. NO - CIA director William Casey has written TRW
president Stanley Pace threatening to drop the firm from in-
telligence agency procurements, citing the firm's troubles on
high priority CIA and White House programs. TRW's problems
with the secret SAFE program have been reported, but the
firm also ran into trouble on Program 9646 and CAMS-2
classified projects, as well as work in the White House Situa-
tion Room. Neither the CIA nore TRW are talking about the
letter...
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ARTLCLE API'E1I M
ON PAGE q__-P11? /pr WASHINGTON POST
28 August 1983
aurence Barrett, Time
magazine's distinguished
senior White House
Intelligence Report
Because of voiume of mail received, Parade regrets.it cannot answer queries.
PARADE'S SPECIAL
correspondent, popped in on
us not too long ago to discuss
Gambling With.Histon,, his superb
book dealing with Ronald Reagan's
accomplishments and failures in his
first two Presidential years. Barrett's
book, incidentally, was the first to
reveal the purloining of President
Jimmy Carter's briefing papers during
the Reagan-Carter race of 1980.
We asked the knowledgeable,
insightful journalist of 25 years'
experience if he-would play-with
us the "name-association game," in
which one party mentions a name . .
and the other responds quickly with a
thumbnail description. Herewith the
White House names we dropped and
Barrett's verbal pickups:
Ronald Reagan-"The most
ideological President of our generation
or perhaps the last two generations
.. much underestimated insofar as
his grit is concerned ... often too
rigid for his own good and the
country's good ... the biggest thinker
and conceptualizer even though a
lot of people don't understand that.
This Administration is still running
very heavily on Reaganism for its
philosophical fuel."
Nancy Reagan-"Without
question, the most misunderstood lady
of the last generation ... a shrewd
woman who has influence on her
husband ... knows the kinds of
things he does well ... good political
instincts of her own ... has a very
fine nose for staff matters,
appointments ... was very
instrumental, for instance, in the
appointment of James Baker as chief
of staff."
Lloyd Shearer ?1983
James Baker (White House chief
of staff)-"The best political
tactician in the White House. .: expert
at legislative affairs and public
relations at a high level but not very
good at the finer points of policy."
Michael Deaver (deputy-chief
of staff}-"The man closest to Ronald
Reagan... probably the most..
altruistic member of the official
household but still a little
uncomfortable in his governmental
role.. the ultimate generalist...
very good at politics and public
relations. He has not immersed himself
in the hard business of governance
... flies very much by instinct, just
the way his principal [Reagan]
does."
William Clark (national security
adviser)---"AA perfect loyalist to his
principal and one of the most cunning
inside maneuverer whom I've met
in politics."
Edwin Meese (counselor to the
President)-"A good and virtuous
man who's been forced to play
somewhat out of his league."
George Shultz (Secretary of
State)--"A temperate influence who
has helped Reagan in a number of
situations but has been much.slower
to take hold in the grand sense ... is
finally beginning to emerge as the
foreign policy power, although -Clark
now contests that somewhat."
Caspar Weinberger (Secretary of
Defense}-"I think he is probably
the least effective Secretary of Defense
since Louis Johnson, the difference
being that Truman fired Johnson fairly
early, and I don't think Reagan will
part with Weinberger."
William Casey (director,
Central Intelligence Agency)--"I
think most people are disappointed
in his performance... He's been an
embarrassment to the Administration
outside the CIA because of his stock
deals, because heltadn't reported
clearly all his assets."
David Stockman?(director, Office
of Management and Budget)-"A
kind of intellectual gypsy who has
wandered from one branch of
conservatism to another ... brilliant
in many ways... certainly knows
the budget and fiscal process better
than anyone in this Administration
... has suffered. I think, from a certain
immaturity.. .got too high too fast, .
and some problems resulted."
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ON PAQE . WASHINGTON TIMES ~ 44.
25 August 1983
WUMM RUSHER
____
as Ronald Reagan
gotten a fair
press? That ques-
tion can probably
never be fully dis-
entangled from
Washington Post
political reporter
Lou Cannon's immortal response:
"I think he's had a fairer press than
he deserves."_ But preliminary
reports on a study currently being'
conducted by the Media Analysis
Project at Geroge Washington Uni-
versity suggest that what Cannon
accidentally implied is substantially
closer to the truth than what he was
trying to say.
The Media Analysis Project is
studying coverage of all "policy
news" by nine of the nation's major
news sources (the three network
evening news programs and the
three national news magazines,
plus The New York Times, The
Washington Post and The Wall
Street Journal) during the first 100
days of 1983. The focus is on "soft
news" - editorials, columns, com-
mentaries and feature reports.
Only one of the four parts of the
project involves Reagan. and the
preliminary report published in
the June,'July issue of Public Opin-
ion (the magazine of the American
Enterprise Institute) concerns only
quantitative findings from the net-
work evening news programs for
the first two months of 1983. But
William Rusher is the publisher
of the National Review.
.at hone.
-9
negative." (Stories scored as "neu-
tral" totaled 5,800 words.)
The authors warn that this may
overstate the case a bit, since many
of the longest feature pieces con-
t
i
d
a
ne
only one or two clear neg-
even this brief advance peek at the
study and its conclusions is at the inferences about Reagan. On
fasci-
th
h
study
e ot
er hand, the Only two "favor-
nating.
'
According to the report's authors able" stories involving Reagan
(Michael Robinson, Maura Clancey f
(and they were only avorable at that) were both com
and Lisa Grand), all of whom are mentaries by NBC's John Chancel-
also involved in the project, "Ron- lor. Aside from those two, there
ald Reagan has received dispropor- wasn't a single "policy news" story
tionately critical and negative on any of the network evening news
press from the national media.... programs during the first two
No matter how we counted, the months of 1983 that the project
results cameout` the. same;.:bad= ,._analysts could-identify as-"favor-
press for Reagan and for His-admin-
bl
"
"
istration.
As the authors point out, this
finding is all the more interesting
because it directly contradicts
recent charges by both the Colum-
bia Journalism Review and PBS's
Inside Story, among others, that
Reagan has adroitly rendered the
media impotent.
But let the statistics speak for
themselves. The researchers iden-
tified just under 100 "stories" (net-
work commentaries or features
more than 21/2 minutes long) on
policy issues. Of these, 46 men-
tioned Reagan. And of the 46, two-
thirds "were easily classified as
explicitly favorable or unfavor-
able."
And just what do you suppose
were the proportions, pro and con?
"Twenty-seven pieces were
directly negative toward Reagan."
Exactly two were favorable.
What was the actual word count?
"Stories in which Reagan was
treated, favorably totaled 400
words.... Stories in which Reagan
was treated unfavorably totaled
8,800 words - a ratio of 22 to 1.
a
e
to Reagan.
And incidentally, this analysis of
the coverage of Reagan does not
include the (overwhelmingly neg-
ative) coverage of such members of
his administration as CIA Director
William Casey, or EPA's Anne Gor-
such Burford and Rita Lavelle,
unless Reagan was specifically
mentioned in the story
So, if you think you're noticing a
lot of negative reporting about 1
President Reagan on the evening'
news, you're absolutely right. As a
classic example, the authors cite
ABC's feature report on Reagan's
first two years. Over a picture of
the president, a brilliantly colored
graph traced the growth of unem-
ployment, while on the sound track
Reagan's voice could be heard pro-
claiming the end of the recession.
"Sardonic Sam" Donaldson then
summed it up: " ... there is a con-
sensus in Washington that unless he
changes his game plan, eco-
nomically, (his) grade for the next
two years will almost certainly be
an F'
Take a look at the economy these
days, and give Sam an F
AT
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ON FAQZ.,..:...(_-7._.- WASHINGTON POST
23 August 1983
$TAT
Secret Army intelligenceTIT~ifiived
On After 1980 Iran Mission
By George C. Wilson
%Ysrungwn Past Staff Writer
When the Carter administration
wwt,r~ to slip U.S. Army officers
into Iran to help prepare for an at-
tempt to rescue the American hos-
tages held there in 1980, the Army
created its own Intelligence Support
Activity (ISAI to carry out this co-
vert mission.
Three years later, after Congress
thought it had closed down, the ISA
stall exists and is growing, shrouded
in secrecy. Its critics, including for-
mer CIA director Stansfield Turin r
and some members of the intelli-
gence oversight committees in Con-
gress, argue that it is unnecessary
and potentially troublesome for the
limy to have its own intelligence
arm.
A four-star general, who. spoke
about the ISA's origins on the con-
dition that he not be identified, said,
"We had some assets that the CIA
needed for humint," referring to
human intelligence. "So we made
them available for the (hostage] res-
cue operation.
"After that raid was aborted, we
decided to keep the organization in-
tact. Casey is all for it," he said, re-
ferring to CIA Director William J.
Casey.
Other sources said the ISA ?began
in 1980 with a budget of $2 million,
which has tripled since then, al-
though it still is small compared
with those of the CIA or the Penta-
gon's Defense Intelligence Agency.
They said that the ISA is run by
Col. Jerry M. King out of a building
in the Arlington Hall military com-
plex in Arlington.
Army Secretary John 0. Marsh
Jr.'s desk calendars, which were ob-
tained by The Washington Post,
show that he discussed the ISA with
Maj. Gen. William E. Odom, assist-
ant chief of staff for intelligence, and
other senior Army officers in at least
nine selarate meetings last year.
An Army specialist stationed at
Fort Bragg, N.C., said in an inter-
view that he is on call for special as-'
? s ignments by the ISA.. Congressional
critics said that the'ISA's real size
and budget are difficult. to determine.
because it can call on such specialists{
stationed throughout the world after,
selecting them by computer.
The Department of the Army. hiii'
refused to discuss this or other as-
pects of the ISA. However, in re-
sponse . to inquiries from both con-.
gressional intelligence committees
and the, press, the Army denied that
the ISA is operating in Central
America, as was alleged recently by
numerous?callers to the congression-
al committees.
Asked about the continued exis.
tence and growth of the ISA long
after the aborted hostage rescue mis-
sion. a member of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence said, "I
thought we killed that snake."
Turner, who served as President
Carter's CIA director, said "It's not a
good idea" for the Army have its
.. .own intelligence agency. ,
"First, I don't think that the mil-
itary is very adept at this kind of
clandestine, covert activity," Turner
said. "Second, it's a had idea to set
up a competition in this activity.",
If both the Army and the CIA are
operating agents and doing other co-
vert work, he said, "they're likely to
run into each other in hack alleys
overseas. They will be bidding
against each other for information
and agents.] There's not room for
two agencies to compete for clandes-
tine resources."
"The military can't have all the
resources they think they need
under their own control," Turner
said. "They have to share commu-
nications satellites and intelligence
networks because the country can't
afford to let everybody have his own
intelligence system.
"The military has got to under-
stand that there has to be cooper-
ation. Satellites are too costly and
spies are too costly for everybody to
have his own intelligence. operation.
The military trying to get out of
,reach of the decision-makers isn't
good for the country. It's part of a
general mood of the military trying
to get its own. of everything."
Retired Lt. Col. James G. (Bo)
Gritz told the House Foreign Affairs
subcommittee on Asian affairs last
March that a special Army, outfit. he
- called "the activity," which other.
sources said was a reference to the
ISA, was interested in helping him
with an operation named Grand
Eagle to rescue American servicemen
who he' said he believes are being
held captive in Laos.
According to Gritz' testimony, the
ISA withheld its support after be-
coming embroiled in jurisdictional
disputes within the intelligence com-
munity.
"Jan. 4, 1982, 1 received a tele-
phone call at my home in Califor-
nia," Gritz testified. "The chief of'
that activity on the phone said to
me: Bo, I have been ordered to put
Grand Eagle back on the shelf as if
it never existed. There is something
here that we cannot see but we can
certainly feel. There are still t.-,o
many people that do no want to see
POWs ]prisoners of war] returned.'
"The activity was a field unit and
would have put an American across
into Laos to verify, using various re-
cording means, the presence of
Americans thought to be at specified
locations" in Laos, Gritz told the
su bcommit.tee.
Army officials later denied that
the ISA sponsored any of the Gritz
forays into Laos.
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s
Oh
PAGE /Q 21 August 1983
War by
Other Means
By Bradley F. Smith.
TEM SHADOW WRSSIOBS
O. S. S. and the Origins of the C. 1. A.
507 pp. New York:
Basic Books. $20.75. .
By PH U" TAUBMAN
that Otto von Hapsburg, the pretender to the Austrian -
imperial throne, be received at the White House and .
asked to contact possible pro-Allied groups in Hun- .
gary. The only problem, as Mr. Smith points out, was
that "the Hapsburgs were anathema to the Czechs and
Yugoslavs as well as to the Soviets.- The plan was.
promptly abandoned.
In the end, Donovan and the O.S.S. made covert
operations into a respectableand respected form of in='
teuigence activity. As Mr. Smith writes, ..It seems rib.
vious that O.S.S. was more influential in its impact on
people's ideas and imagination -than in its practical
wartime achievements." And he concludes, "Whether
myth or not; the O.S.S. claim to independent shadow
? warfare :prowess strengthened Wash ggton's belief
that it could retain superpower status-.cheaply and
THERE is something serendipitous about the re-
cent spate of books about William J. "Wild Bdl"
Donovan, the World War I hero who became
Washington's spy master during World War II. and
laid the foundations forthe Central Intelligence Agen-
cy. It is not that the books reduce the Donavan legend
to more human dimensions, although that was.long
overdue and "The Shadow Warriors" performs the
historical refinement without disrespect for Dono-
van's accomplishments. Nor is it some new insight
into bow the Office of Strategic Services, which Dono-
van created and directed, made the Governmentmore
receptive to the establishment of a centralized intelli-
gence -organization, though that too is amply-ex-
plained in Bradley F. Smith's book. The unexpected
dividend is the pertinence of the story to current:for-
eign policy and intelligence issues, particularly the
Reagan Administration's extensive use of covert ac-
tivities as an instrument of foreign policy..
Mr. Smith, who teaches history at Cabrillo College
in California, has done an exhaustive job of research
on the O.S.S. and Donovan. If anything. he may have
stuffed too much detail into his book. In some sections,
the story slows to a crawl with re struct wLc of h...
example, Donovan proposed to President Roosevelt .
veteran. In other places, he adopts the kind of forced
prose that one associates with a doctoral thesis. But
these flaws may be forgiven because the book offers
an honest, lively portrait of an important American
and the contributions, good an' bad, that he and the
O.S.S. made to the American intelligence system. .
William Donovan, if not the father of United States
covert operations, surely was their-patron saint:-He
was an indefatigable promoter of clandestine efforts
to influence the internal affairs of other nations. t- -
ing World War II, he produced a blizzard of such
proposals, some brilliant, some harebrained. The use
of O.S.S. agents to help coordinate the sabotage activi-
ties of the French resistance with Allied forces during
and after the invasion of Normandy was successful,
and Allen Dulles, the O.S.S. chief in Switzerland who
later became the director of the C.I.A., used Bern as a
base of operations to support resistance groups in
France and Italy. But for every success there was a
failure or a seriously flawed plan. In March 1942, for
reaucratic battles that could interest only an O.S.S.. from Donovan's script when they argue that covert
helped lead the United States into making Its central i
intelligence agency into something that it hoped could
shadow warfare
William J. Casey, the current diiectnrof Central In-,
telligence, is a Donavan disciple. He worked for Dono-
van in the O.S.S., supervising American agents who
operated behind German lines, and lies long been a
leading member of the Veterans of Strategic Service,
'a group that has celebrated the achievements of Dono-
van and supported American intelligence activities.
But, as "T'he Shadow Warriors" makes -clear; more
than shared experience links the two men. Under Mr.
Casey's direction, the Central Intelligence Agency has
set In motion a series of covert operations in Central
America that would probably make Donovan proud.
"Donovan and the
_
0. S S. made covert
operations respectable."
The advocates of these efforts, involving Nicaragua,
operations are the ideal way to protect American in-
terests in.areas where diplomacy has failed and overt
military action is too risky.
. There are also disquieting parallels between the
original justifications for shadow warfare offered by :
Donovan and the explanations given by current offi-
cials for the use of covert actions against Nicaragua.
Mr. Smith reports that an early Donovan work about
Nazi subversive activities in the United States, '.Fifth
Column Lessons for America,'' grossly exaggerated
the threat in an-effort to shake the American public
out of its isolationist complacency. While no one has.
suggested that the Reagan Administration's descrip-
tions of Soviet and Cuban interference in Central
America are fraudulent, critics have accused the Ad-
ministration of selectively disclosing intelligence in-,
formation favorable to its policy.
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 ^L: APPLARID i r YORK ~7,~-
OJ+ FAGS Approved For Rele j%;e $ /SL1~ $ I i3P -009 00 00
: On Language
By William Safire
Clause Wits
The Teeny-Weeny
Master Spy
As everyone who gathers
intelligence knows, some-
times the smallest bit of in-
formation is significant when
juxtaposed with a huge mass
of data. How is this minuscule
(not miniscule) bit of data
best described?' Computer
..operators speak of bytes,
which are the equivalent of
characters on a typewriter:
"Character" is a word made
up of nine bytes, or charac-
ters. Other -disciplines have
other words, such as peewee,
pint-size and infinitesimal.
At the C.I.A. in this modern
era, the preferred term of art
was used by Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence William J.
Casey. In a letter to Senator
Carl Levin, before agreeing
to put his financial holdings
into a blind trust, Mr. Casey
disputed Senator Levin's ar-
gument that the C.I.A. chief
had unique access to informa-
tion: "That really doesn't
hold water," Mr. Casey
wrote. "lt takes only a teeny-
weeny bit of information to
exploit, if one has that pur-
pose. .
Tiny, the Oxford English
Dictionary tells us, had a
nursery form of teeny in the
early 19th century, which.
then became teeny-tiny and
ultimately -developed, in the
189D's, to' Leeny-weeny and
teentsy-weerrtsy. The phrase
has traveled well into the 20th
century.; dissatisfied travel-
ers on T.W.A have derogated
the -transworld carrier as
"Teeny-W eery liirlines. "
Director Casey is to be com-
mended for 'his use of such a
vivid, if childlike, reduplica-
tion in his characterization to
the Senate of the diminutive-
ness of data, Be has also
vigorously denied any know)-
edge of passing along pur-
lomed Carter :documents in
what has been dubbed
"Debategate," but which will
be remembered as "Mole-
hill," if the scandal turns out
to be ircy-bitsy. ^
EX CIRP7
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CE,.TQ-1 n4~F~~Fd~~:Se6eaeo:2005/11/28: CIA-RDP91WO9Q1 R000400070002-8
10 August 1983
Mr. Casey,
John Scali of ABC News called to reiterate
his long-standing request for an interview with
you on background to discuss the international
situation. You have in your files aformal
uch a
memorandum from February, 1983 requesting l
briefing. You also talked to Mr. Scali on the
phone on 6 July.
Please let us know if you would like us to
accept or decline such a meeting.
STAT
ACCEPT AND ARRANGE:
Director of Central Intelligence Date
DECLINE:
Date
Director of Central Intelligence
FORM USE PREvIOUApproved For Reel - ase
,7q 610 EDITIONS
? STAT
A i
DC1
EXEC
F;c~a
i (Numb. each comment to show from whom
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4 August 1983
Gig rr ue r Q 1% S
Reagan's Foreign-Policy Ineptitude
The reasoning at the time went: Where
Perspective on Politics better to draw a line than in our own back-
d' It should be 1attive] easy to of
re
by Norman C. Miller
WAS;-INGTON-At a time when Presi-
dent Reagan's gunboat diplomacy in Cen-
tral America is arousing fears of another
Vietnam-,N-De war, it is a bit amazing to
find the Republican Party chairman prais-
ing the president for effectively practicing
'.quiet diplomacy."
Chairman Frank Fahrenkopf writes in a
current GOP publication that the president
is doing nicely in world affairs because he
recognizes that "the diplomatic art means
little more than getting things done as
quietly, persuasively and pleasantly as
possible." According to Mr. Fahrenkopf,
Mr. Reagan assiduously avoids the dan-
gers of "noisy diplomacy, which at best is
no diplomacy at all but rather sometimes
successful' bullying (that) rarely builds re-
spect, friendship and agreement."
Thus. it seems that not even the party's
public-relations promoters can keep up
with the unpredictable, confusing and
scary turns in the president's foreign poli-
cies. It's a small but telling sign of the in-
competence characterizing Mr. Reagan's
conduct of foreign relations.
Most immediately, in dealing with Cen-
tral America, the president has succeeded
only in scaring the American people by
dispatching flotillas of warships to patrol
the coasts of Nicaragua and ordering thou-
sands of troops into Honduras for extended
maneuvers. Responding to a public uproar,
Mr. Reagan says plaintively that these
massive military deployments are no big
deal. It is a ridiculous statement, serving
only to feed fears that the president him-
self doesn't understand what he is doing.
Centra; A ,erica is a perfect example of
President Reagan's inconsistent and inco?
herent approach to foreign policy making.
Back at the beginning of the Reagan ad-
ministration. then Secretary of State Alex-
ander Haig pumped up the Central Ameri-
can crisis as a major Lest of U.S. ability to
halt Soviet-inspired troublemaking.
According to Mr. Haig, the Soviets and
the Cubans were masterminding and sup-
plying Nicaraguan-backed rebels in El Sal-
vador who were bent on toppling the right-
wing government. Mr. Haig made.a,zreaL Central American
to-do about this for quite a while, and for a palibnow in the
-
larger purpose than just concern about El i hands action. This officials w has sh a bias toward dds
Salvador going communist. The larger pur- tary put the
witth friends as well as foes in U.S. at the region.
pose was to show the Soviets that the Rea- The Contadora group of Latin American
gan administration was led by tough guys nations-Mexico, Panama, Colombia and
who wouldn't tolerate Soviet adventur- Venezuela-is hamstrung in its efforts to
ism. get Central American peace negotiations
started.
y g
} ar
the Soviets and their Cuban and Nicara-
guan clients to back off, it was thought.
Successful elections in El Salvador in
March 1982 were hailed as proof the Rea-
gan policies were working.
Then the White House and the higher
levels of the State Department more or
less forgot about Central America.
(Though, evidently, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency stepped up covert aid to
right-wing rebels-bent on overthrowing the
Marxist Nicaraguan government.) The
tempestuous Mr. Haig was pushed out and
cool, calm George Shultz came aboard a
year ago to run foreign policy.
The problem was that Mr. Shultz had
little foreign-policy experience; Central
America was just one of many complicated
issues he didn't know much about. And he
Is D ownright Scary
The reckless Reagan approach has even
had the extraordinary effect of scaring the
generals at the Pentagon. In a cascade of
leaks, they have indicated their fear that
.the administration may blunder into a
Vietnam-type war in Central America.
Last week's House vote to terminate co-
vert aid to the U.S.-backed guerrillas fight-
ing the Nicaraguan _government was a
clear statement of the lack of support for
the Reagan policy. It is simplistic to attri-
bute the House action to partisan politics
in the Democratic-controlled House, al-
though partisanship was one factor. A
president who had clearly and convinc-
ingly explained his policy would have ral-
lied enough public support to carry the
House along-
-As it is, the administration itself doesn't
seem to know the ultimate aim of its Cen-
tral American policy. Is it only to protect
El Salvador and other nations from a
Marxist military threat, as the president
insists, or is it aimed at overthrowing the
Nicaraguan government as other officials
had his hands full trying to put out fires.
The European allies were rebelling
ain
t th
ad
i
i
'
ti
ill-
i
d
s
e
n
stra
on
ve
ag
m
s
conce
: hint? Whatever the answer, the existence
and futile effort to ipeli
a n ra of the basic question at this late stage
minto tawith
ff atul
ne a
o
V geeme , demonstrates the administration's lack of
the Soviets. The arms-control talks in Ge- competence in managing vital forei
neva were going badly, with the Soviets icy problems. >fi pol
scoring propaganda points by painting Mr.
Reagan as an insincere bargainer bent on
a dangerous escalation of nuclear weap-
onry. The Israeli-Lebanese War erupted,
and the administration was swept into a
desperate effort to establish still-elusive
peace in the Mideast.
Then, several months ago, the Central
American problem was rediscovered. Al-
most immediately, the White House asked
Congress for much more military aid for
El Salvador, and in April President Rea-
gan addressed Congress to underline the
importance of saving El Salvador from a
Red menace.
A skeptical Congress became more wor-
ried as policy control gravitated into the
hands of William Clark, the national secu-
rity adviser, and William Casey, the CIA
director. They are among the high admin-
istration officials least respected on Capi-
tol Hill, and with reason. Neither is well-
versed in foreign policy; they hold their
posts only because of their personal ties to
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000400070002-8
 Approved For Release 2005/11/28: CIA-RDP91-00901R
A.r.T 17LE
ox PLGE
WASHINGTON POST
4 August 1983
Mohutu Condemn Libyan
Role an Chad
Bc Ian Black
\': as71111EWU11 PDSL 51:111 \Vrlt?'1
The White House and the State Department
-.Joined with-visiting President Mobutu Sese Seko
of Zaire yesterday in condemning Libyan inter-
vention in Chad, while efforts continued to per-
suade F rance.to play a bigger military role in the
defense of"the central African country.
Pentagon officials said that about 30 U.S. Red-
eve antiaircraft missiles have arrived in Chad and
that four American military advisers would use
French intermediaries to train Chad's army in
their use.
There were also .reports that the aircraft carrier
USS Coral Sea has delayed its departure from the
Mediterranean to stay with a U.S. carrier battle
group operating off Libya.
Officials yesterday dismissed Libyan threats to
sink the carrier USS Eisenhower, part of the same
battle group, after an incident. Monday between
U.S. and Libyan planes over the Gulf of Sidra.
State Department spokesman John Hughes
said the United States had "no response except to
sav that we recognize a 12-mile territorial limit
and