NOMINATION OF WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000100280001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 13, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN

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NOMINATION OF WILLIAM J. CASEY
HEARING
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM J. CASEY, TO BE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-9992 O WASHINGTON : 1981
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(Established by S. Res. 4
00, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.)
BARRY GOLDWATER
, Arizona, Chairman
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN,
New York, Vice Chairman
JAKE GARN, Utah
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky
JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
DAVID DURENBERGER. Minnesota
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., Delaware
LLOYD BENTSEN, Texas
HARRISON H. SCHMITT, New Mexico
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee, Ex Officio
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex Officio
JOHN F. BLAKE, Staff Director
ABRAM N.'',SHUL5KY, Minority Staff Director
DORTHEA ROBERSON, Clerk
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CONTENTS
Page
Statement of Chairman Goldwater .............................................................................. 1
Opening statement of Senator Moynihan ................................................................... 1
Introductory remarks .............................................................................................. 2
Former positions ....................................................................................................... 2
Research Institute of America, Statement of Leo Cherne ................................ 3
Advisory Committee of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency ............................................................................................................ 3
Export-Import Bank .......................................................................................... 3
OSS European theatre intelligence ............................................................... 4
Murphy Commission ........................................................................................ 4
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs ............................................ 4
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board ....................................... 5
Alfonse M. D'Amato, U.S. Senator from the State of New York ........................... 6
Opening statement of Chairman Goldwater ............................................................... 6
Changes ...................................................................................................................... 7
More human resources ............................................................................................ 8
Legislation, working relationship .. ..................................................................... 8
Opening statement of Senator Huddleston ................................................................. 9
DCI responsibilities .................................................................................................. 9
Opening statement of Senator Chafee ......................................................................... 10
Prepared statement ................................................................................................. 11
Statement of Senator Wallop ........................................................................................ 12
CIA, danger to national security ........................................................................... 12
Biography of William Joseph Casey ............................................................................. 113
4
Statement of William J. Casey ...................................................................................... 14
World War II activities ...........................................................................................
Civilian activities ...................................................................................................... 15
Goals as CIA Director .............................................................................................. 16
Intelligence failures ................................................................................................. 17
Pledge ......................................................................................................................... 18
Statement of Senator Biden ........................................................................................... 19
Prepared statement ................................................................................................. 19
Statement of Senator Moynihan ................................................................................... 20
Annual intelligence estimates ............................................................................... 20
Gray area ................................................................................................................... 21
Letter of Stanley Sporkin ....................................................................................... 22
Reporting to committee ........................................................................................... 25
Panel discussion:
Unleash the CIA ....................................................................................................... 25
Leaking ....................................................................................................................... 26
Guidelines for professions ....................................................................................... 27
Intelligence profession .............................................................................................. 28
Collection capability ................................................................................................ 31
Perception and understanding ............................................................................... 32
Formulation of policy .............................................................................................. 33
Keeping secrets ......................................................................................................... 35
Statement of Senator Jackson ....................................................................................... 36
Prepared opening statement .................................................................................. 36
Intelligence analysis ................................................................................................ 37
Panel discussion:
Deputy Director of CIA ........................................................................................... 38
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IV
Panel discussion-Continued Page
Counterintelligence .................................................................................................. 40
Covert action ............................................................................................................. 41
Views .......................................................................................................................... 42
Opinions ..................................................................................................................... 43
"Significant anticipated intelligence activities................................................... 45
Reporting to committee ........................................................................................... 46
Plugging leaks ........................................................................................................... 48
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUPPLIED FOR THE RECORD
Statement of Daniel K. Inouye, member of Intelligence Committee ..................... 50
Office of Government Ethics: Letter to Chairman Goldwater from Jackson
Walter, director ............................................................................................................ 51
Committee vote on Mr. Casey ........................................................................................ 51
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NOMINATION OF WILLIAM J. CASEY TO BE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TUESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1981
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 318,
Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Barry Goldwater (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Chafee, Lugar, Wallop, Moynihan, Huddleston,
Biden, and Jackson.
Also present: Senators Kasten and Hart.
Also present: John Blake, staff director; Abram Shulsky, minor-
ity staff director-committee and Senate staff.
STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN GOLDWATER
The CHAIRMAN. It being 10 o'clock, the meeting will come to
order.
And I would ask the photographers if they would hurry up and
take care of Mr. Eastman.
I am going to ask Senator Moynihan to introduce Mr. Casey. Mr.
Casey, as you know, is being heard this morning for the approval of
this committee to be the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Senator Moynihan, we welcome you as a member of the commit-
tee and as a Senator from the home State of Mr. Casey. So you
may proceed.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MOYNIHAN
Senator MOYNIHAN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a very
special personal privilege both for me and for my distinguished
colleague, Mr. D'Amato, to introduce this distinguished American
to you.
I would say to you, Mr. Chairman, that were there more men
such as William Casey in this Nation, a President would have less
difficulty filling his Cabinet or any other positions that a President
might have to fill. It is the distinguished quality of this man that
he has, in one form or another, served every American President
since Franklin Roosevelt, when he joined the U.S. Navy in the
Second World War.
His career is too well known to require any recitation from me,
save to make the somewhat sad observation, what the French call
fin de ligne, Bill Casey will surely be the last member of the OSS
to direct the CIA. It will be a fitting conclusion to his own career,
which began as an aide first to William J. Donovan in Washington,
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and then, in the final and climactic days of the Second World War,
to Col. David K. Bruce. A career so begun could only lead to the
distinction that has accompanied it throughout.
But rather than hear me on the subject, Mr. Chairman, although
I have a statement I would like to introduce into the record, Mr.
Leo Cherne, of the Research Institute of America and of the Inter-
national Rescue Committee and a long associate of Mr. Casey's, has
prepared an extensive statement about his career, of which I would
like to take the opportunity to read two passages only, asking that
the full statement be put in the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.
[Introductory remarks of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
follow:]
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS OF SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN (D-N.Y.)
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor for me to join with Senator D'Amato in introducing
to you Mr. William J. Carey, Whom President-elect Reagan has selected for the vital
post of Director of Central Intelligence.
We have noted that, as the Intelligence Community is now structured, the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence has, three roles: he is the President's senior intelligence
adviser, he is the manager of the Intelligence Community, and he is the Director of
one of the components of the Intelligence Community, the Central Intelligence
Agency. I believe-and I trust that this hearing will confirm that belief-that in
Mr. Casey, the President-elect has found a man superbly well qualified to fulfill
each of those responsibilities.
Mr. Casey is manifestly a man in whom the President-elect places the greatest
possible trust. He is also a man who, with a long and distinguished career in
government and in the private sector behind him, will not be subject to any
temptation to soften or shade any unpalatable truths which the President should be
told.
Mr. Casey's managerial. experience goes back to the late 1930's and the early days
of World War II, when, as a young lawyer working for the Research Institute of
America, he was called upon by various government agencies to assist in drafting
the regulations which controlled the allocation of strategic materials. Since that
time, he has held numerous positions which have tested his managerial talents.
Finally, Mr. Casey has a long experience with intelligence matters and with
foreign affairs. This experience ranges from the latter part of World War II, when
he served in the Office of Strategic Services (the OSS) as the Chief of Intelligence
Operations in the European 'Theater, to the recent past, when he served as a
member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In addition, he has
been a member of the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, the Presi-
dent of the Export-Import Bank and a member of the Murphy Commission, a
Presidential Commission which studied the organization of the government for the
conduct of foreign policy.
Nor has his foreign affairs experience been totally governmental. As a member
and as President of the International Rescue Committee, he has been engaged in
important humanitarian efforts in many different parts of the world, efforts which
require a deep understanding of how the world works and the creativity and
imagination to discover ways of helping people whom the official authorities of the
world's powers are all too often willing to forget.
Thus, Mr. Chairman, it is indeed an honor for me to introduce to the Select
Committee on Intelligence this distinguished son of New York. Thank you.
Senator MOYNIHAN. The first passage has to do with Mr. Casey's
position on the General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
Mr. Cherne writes:
As a member of the Arms Control and Disarmament Advisory Committee to
which he was appointed in 1969, William Casey made a vital contribution to what
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may be the most important function of that Commission, the preparation for the
negotiations which led to the first SALT Agreement between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. He drew upon his substantial intelligence experience to emphasize the
importance of verifiability in the control of strategic weapons. There can be no
doubt that this emphasis significantly contributed to those aspects of the SALT I
Agreement which dealt with verification-since direct inspection was resisted by the
Soviet Union. It seems clear that the advisory contribution by Casey helped spur
the arrangement whereby both nations tacitly accepted the unimpeded use of satel-
lite observation to provide an equivalent, though by no means as reliable, instru-
ment to assure compliance.
And second, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention that it was
at a time when Mr. Casey was a member of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board that the decision was made, a very
courageous decision by the then-Director of the CIA, the Vice Presi-
dent-elect today, Mr. Bush, to enter the mode of competitive analy-
sis. I refer to the "A-Team/B-Team exercise," of which this commit-
tee has inquired and about which Senator Wallop and I have had
further comments.
This idea of subjecting community analysis to competition was
very much a part of the work of William J. Casey. I hope that he
will tell us if he plans to continue it. But Mr. Cherne testifies to his
having been in at the beginning of this mode, which holds such
promise to the intelligence community.
Clearly, Mr. Chairman, We have a man of the greatest distinc-
tion, and I am honored to have had the opportunity to introduce
him to this committee.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, Senator Moynihan.
And this letter from Leo Cherne will be made a permanent part
of the record.
[The complete statement follows.]
STATEMENT OF LEO CHERNE, RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA
This Statement was prepared on January 12, 1981 at the request of Mr. Abe
Shulsky, staff member of the Senate Committee on Intelligence. It brings up to date
my evaluation of the work of William J. Casey since his period of service as
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. His governmental activities
since then have been extensive and this Statement, therefore, is intended to high-
light the intelligence aspects of the several responsibilities he has carried in recent
years.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
As a member of the Arms Control and Disarmament Advisory Committee to
which he was appointed in 1969, William Casey made a vital contribution to what
may be the most important function of that Commission-the preparation for the
negotiations which led to the first SALT agreement between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. He drew upon his substantial intelligence experience to emphasize the
importance of verifiability in the control of strategic weapons. There can be no
doubt that this emphasis significantly contributed to those aspects of the SALT I
Agreement which dealt with verification (since direct inspection was resisted by the
Soviet Union). It seems clear that the advisory contribution by Casey helped spur
the arrangement whereby both nations tacitly accepted the unimpeded use of satel-
lite observation to provide an equivalent, though by no means as reliable, instru-
ment to assure compliance.
The subsequent appointment as Chairman and President of the Export-Import
Bank by definition involved him in the work of that agency to provide funding for
vital industrial and other projects overseas, including the Soviet Union and some of
the Warsaw Pact countries. In contrast to the activities of private banks and of
international lending institutions, the Export-Import Bank, as an instrument of the
U.S. Government, implicitly carries the responsibility to assure that the significance
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of the loans it granted would neither injure the national security nor militate
against the national interest. This was at a time when it can be reasonably said
that U.S. economic intelligence, though it existed, was not a highly developed form
of intelligence. As the principal officer of the Bank, Mr. Casey was exposed to the
essentiality of economic intelligence and to our adequacies and inadequacies in this
field.
OSS EUROPEAN THEATRE INTELLIGENCE
Little is known of one of the major contributions William Casey made during the
period when he played key roles in shaping and directing intelligence for the
European Theatre through his OSS headquarters in London during World War II.
One of the signal contributions he made to the preparations for D-Day and to the
variety of actions designed to break the back of the Nazi war machine was the use
of economic intelligence toward those ends. He assembled a small team of distin-
guished U.S. economics to do a definitive economic reconstruction of the German
economy, with particular emphasis on which aspects of that economy would prove
most significant if impeded or destroyed in the weakening of the German war
machine. This work involved substantial controversy, not only with our British
allies but with much of military leadership of the allied effort.
Casey's pioneering efforts prevailed in time for the necessary bombing and under-
ground activities to take place. Within a remarkably short time after these actions
were taken, the Casey-led concept was validated.
If Ambassador Robert Murphy were alive, he would speak eloquently of the
contributions which William J. Casey made as a member of the Murphy Commis-
sion on the Conduct of U.S. Foreign Policy. Once again, within the councils of that
Commission, Casey both drew upon his substantial knowledge of analytic intelli-
gence, with particular emphasis on economic intelligence during a period when the
inter-related economies of the modern world were exerting an ever-increasing role
in our foreign policy.
It is relevant at this point to add that there is one pervasive misunderstanding of
the U.S. intelligence activities in the European Theatre during World War II, to
which Casey made so substantial a contribution. Those activities ran the entire
gamut of clandestine activities conducted both by the allied armed forces as well as
by the multitude of underground national groups throughout Europe. They includ-
ed, by definition, the intelligence needed to select vital targets to indentify the
significance and location of the threatening new German weapons systems-the V-1
and the V-2 bombs-an understanding of the progress Germany was making in the
perfection of nuclear weapons, and the use of bombing and internal sabotage de-
signed not simply to assure the safety of allied forces during the Normandy land-
ings, but to identify the most significant targets for all of those purposes.
As important as were the disabling actions involved, was the complex, tenacious
and extremely effective intelligence which weighed the relative cost-benefit of the
various means proposed to perform these indispensable tasks. Public and even
military awareness necessarily focuses on dramatic events. Of greater significance,
however, was the remorseless analytical process which preceded and helped identify
those destructive actions which would have the largest significance. It is not an
overstatement to say that modern analytical intelligence owes an enormous debt to
the efforts which Casey led.
I must explain how I am aware of the details of these events, of the controversies
which they involved, as well as of the significance of the various forms of intelli-
gence which were pioneered during that interval. As a personal friend, I have had
the opportunity to read an unpublished detailed memoir prepared by Bill Casey
covering the entire work of the OSS in the European Theatre during World War II.
I deeply regret that this memoir has not been published. I have urged that that be
done. Indeed, I know of no work on intelligence which more illuminates the breadth
of disciplines which are envolved in effective intelligence and better demonstrates
the importance of rigorous analysis in the performance of intelligence in peace or
war.
UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
The very nature of this position involved Casey as Undersecretary in every aspect
of information and intelligence essential to the economic aspects of the State De-
partment's work. He was not only an active consumer of the output of the Office of
Intelligence and Research in the Department, but an important contributor toward
the further improvement of that work. Since I was a member of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board when he was Undersecretary, I had occasion to
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
My largest opportunity to observe William J. Casey's view of intelligence, his
extraordinary devotion to it, and his unequalled understanding of all that modern
intelligence implies came as a result of the President's Foreign Intelligence Adviso-
ry Board. I had been a member of that Board since April 1973. My own background
made it inevitable that I would pay particular attention to analytical intelligence
and particularly economic intelligence. Several events, including the oil crisis in
October 1973, persuaded that Board of the increasing importance of economic intel-
ligence. In fact, that Board, more than a year prior to my becoming a member, had
already alerted the President to the importance of improving this area of our
intelligence.
In February 1976, President Ford enlarged the membership of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. William J. Casey was one of the several new
members added to the Board in the process. The full membership of that Board was
as follows:
Leo Cherne, Chairman.
Gordon Gray.
Ambassador Robert Murphy.
Dr. John Foster.
John Connally.
Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce.
Edward Bennett Williams.
Leslie Arends.
General Lyman Lemnitzer.
Stephen Ailes.
William J. Casey.
Dr. Edward Teller.
Robert Galvin.
Admiral George Anderson.
Dr. Edwin Land.
Dr. William O. Baker.
In this distinguished and experienced company, William J. Casey was one of the
several members who made an especial pronounced contribution. There is virtually
no work of the Board in which he did not participate-but there were several to
which he made a particular contribution. His entire background uniquely suited
him to advance the Board's critical understanding of economic intelligence and to
evaluate the work being done within the intelligence community in that field. Of
particular significance were financial intelligence, petroleum intelligence, agricul-
tural intelligence, trade of high technological capability.
The responsibility of the board to the President and those directly serving him,
required us to evaluate intelligence products from the point of view of the top
policy-making consumers. Casey's exceptional background led to his playing a sub-
stantial role in the improvement of the vital connection between the producer and
consumer of intelligence.
For a number of years the Board had been less than wholly satisfied with the
analytic process, and especially critical of some aspects of the preparation of the
national estimates. This dissatisfaction had, for some time, led the Board to press
for alternative means with some potential for improvement. Finally, the President
accepted the Board's recommendation that an experiment be conducted using com-
petitive analyses. Under the leadership of Robert Galvin, a subcommittee of the
Board pursued this undertaking. Particular contributions to that undertaking were
made by Dr. John Foster and William Casey and the Board's Executive Secretary,
Lionel Olmer.
So much is misunderstood about that experiment that it is important to add that
though the Board played the catalytic role of bringing the experiment about, the
actual conduct of the work and the selection of several teams to pursue that
experiment was entirely the responsiblity of the CIA.
The final effort of the Board involved a large undertaking to identify the future
needs for intelligence. A number of outside experts were invited to contribute to the
Board's study. These included former DCI's, major consumers of intelligence, distin-
guished leaders from the military community, and others. Here again, Casey s
background, experience and constant concern with the acuity of analysts played a
substantial part in that undertaking.
Several other matters are not referred to in this public Statement, and some
aspects-of the foregoing have been necessarily abbreviated for reasons of security.
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I conclude this Statement with the strong personal view that it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to find a lifetime experience coupled with wisdom, courage and
probity equal to that which William J. Casey will bring to the Office of Director of
Central Intelligence when confirmed by the Senate.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator D'Amato, would you care to say some-
thing?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR D'AMATO, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF NEW YORK
Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege for me to join
my distinguished colleague, the vice chairman of this committee, in
introducing Mr. William J. Casey of New York, a friend of long
standing. And as the record before you shows, and from the re-
marks that have been made by Senator Moynihan, Mr. Casey has
served in a bewildering number of important positions, both in and
out of Government, and the experience he has gained from this
long and diverse career,' involving many aspects of international
relations will, I am confident, serve him well when he confronts
the widespread and challenging responsibilities of the directorship
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Throughout his career 'Bill Casey has had a remarkable ability to
understand quickly the most difficult and complex problems. He
has pursued each goal with tenacity and skill. And a recent article
of the Los Angeles Times said about Bill Casey, "An able fellow
who does not suffer fools lightly. Always a man of great activity, he
has left behind him a wake composed of perhaps 10 parts contro-
versy and 90 parts admiration."
And so it is Bill Casey, a New Yorker's New Yorker. I am
confident that he will bring to the Central Intelligence Agency the
expertise and determination to make the agency the finest of its
kind in the world. And how so desperately we need that kind of
leadership. And the people of this Nation will be able to rest easier
with their vital interests 'in the hands of Bill Casey.
I am delighted, Mr. Chairman, to have the opportunity to offer
my wholehearted endorsement to this nomination and appreciate
the opportunity to speak in behalf of an outstanding American,
William Casey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN GOLDWATER
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.
Before we hear from Mr. Casey, I will say that the financial
disclosure statement has been received, and the Office of Govern-
ment Ethics says that Mr. Casey is in complete compliance. [See p.
51.]
We have the FBI report, and it's been reviewed by myself and by
Senator Moynihan.
A short statement of my own before we begin the hearing, Mr.
Casey, to give you my views on how I approach intelligence. And
any member of the committee who might like to add something is
perfectly welcome, too.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence begins its hearings
today to consider the norlrination of William J. Casey to be Director
of the Central Intelligence.
We know accurate and timely intelligence constitutes the Na-
tion's first line of defense. Consequently, the responsibility of the
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Director of Central Intelligence is one of maximum importance.
Intelligence issues for the 1980's begins with leadership.
One of the most pressing issues facing the intelligence communi-
ty is the need for strong, stable, and experienced leadership. The
intelligence community has been in turmoil since the early 1970's
as a result of frequent changes in leadership, studies by Senate
committees, a series of investigations, and organizational restruc-
turing.
The new DCI should be a broadly experienced professional who is
familiar with the intelligence community's present strengths and
weaknesses. There is a critical need for stability and a clear under-
standing of where the community needs to be in the future and
how it's going to get there. And although not perfect, the organiza-
tional arrangements and management processes within the com-
munity are adequate.
Some minor changes probably are in order, but wholesale
changes are neither warranted nor desired. Some areas that should
be examined include the following:
The National Security Council's role in management of the intel-
lingence community: The community includes highly complex orga-
nizations such as the National Security Agency and elements in
the Department of Defense as well as the CIA, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the counterintelligence functions of the FBI, and
intelligence functions of State, Treasury, and other departments
and agencies.
What are the needs and resources of the community? The DCI's
role in the community resource management: Should the DCI
maintain his sole and exclusive authority over resource decisions?
Should such decisionmaking be elevated to the National Security
Council level? Should it be returned to an executive committee
process?
The intelligence commmunity staff: Should it be substantially
reduced in size and scope?
I believe a long-range strategic planning process should be estab-
lished and enjoy a high priority within the intelligence community.
Over the past decade intelligence capabilities have been allowed to
erode. And because of past successes, competing demands and re-
source constraints, we have been mortgaging the future of today's
needs, and the future keeps getting pushed further away.
A number of areas need sustained attention and an infusion of
resources. We need to reestablish a robustness in the intelligence
system, particularly in technical collection capabilities. We must
maintain a robust and flexible mix of capabilities to overcome the
unexpected losses in a timely fashion.
We must also begin to lay the groundwork for decreasing our
dependence on foreign territories for critical intelligence missions.
We need to expand and improve the analytic capabilities within
the intelligence community. In almost every instance in recent
years, so-called intelligence failures have been the result of short-
comings in analysis. We must expand and strengthen the analytic
corps and their support systems. We need to be able to attract good
people and establish a long-term management commitment to im-
proving analysis through career incentives, training, investment in
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improving data bases, and ADP support, and critical but construc-
tive product evaluation: Overall management of the production
process also needs continued. improvement.
Human resource collection activities need to be expanded and
strengthened in key areas around the world. We need much better
coverage and reporting on long-term political, societal, and econom-
ic trends in these areas. We need to increase investment in new
technologies that offer possible breakthroughs or major advance-
ments in intelligence capability.
We cannot afford to continue to rely on past successes. We must
press the state of the art to stay ahead of our adversaries. A
number of new technologies are ripe for advancement, but because
of bureaucratic politics or the lack of resources or money, they
have not been pursued vigorously.
The intelligence community should be given special considera-
tion when establishing governmentwide policies, not that they
should be necessarily exempted, but certain policies can have seri-
ous impact on intelligence if not clearly thought through and close-
ly monitored.
Two that come quickly to mind are manpower and space. The
intelligence community has undergone a substantial manpower re-
trenchment, and some kind of hiring restriction continuously since
the mid-1970's. During the same period, the overall level of Federal
employment has grown substantially. The retrenchment, plus the
hiring restrictions, has had serious impact on hiring as well as on
retaining good. people and the community's ability to do its job.
U.S. space policy has profound implications for intelligence capa-
bilities. Any new developments for space launch and exploration
should consider the impact it may have on military and intelli-
gence missions.
LEGISLATION, WORKING RELATIONSHIP
Among other issues awaiting actions are: the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act should be modified so that the FBI and CIA are grant-
ed some relief from its provisions. And I wish to emphasize that
the public identification of CIA operators in the United States or
abroad must be made illegal, and we must attach proper penalties
to it. Legislation to accomplish this will be a priority for the 97th
Congress.
Also, we need strong language proficiencies at all intelligence
agencies overseas. The rash of trials of FBI personnel, congression-
al investigations, mood of Congress, and so forth, has inhibited
intelligence operatives around the world from exploiting targets of
opportunity. Such operations have required the approval of scores
of people. This must be altered to regain the confidence of our
allies and our agents. A number of operatives are spending an
inordinate amount of time in developing defensive memos in antici-
pation of investigations or criticisms of their actions. This must be
changed to emphasize initiative in action.
And finally, there must be a close working relationship between
the committee and the Director of the Nation's intelligence system
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if the important task of protecting the life and liberty of the
American people is to succeed. Such trust between the legislative
and executive branches provides assurance to the American people
that the necessarily secret activities of national security are being
conducted in the interest of our democratic society.
Those are my comments, Mr. Casey, on the way I view intelli-
gence. And I might say that my interest in intelligence, while not
as thorough as yours, goes back to the times when the OSS was an
active organization.
If any of the members of the committee would care to comment
on what the chairman has said?
Senator Huddleston has an opening statement. Would you like to
make it a part of the record, or would you like to state it?
Senator HUDDLESTON. It's very short, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HUDDLESTON
Senator HUDDLESTON. I might say, Mr.-Chairman, that my inter-
est in intelligence goes back just about as far as yours. I was very
interested in the activities of the OSS, too, having been a tank
gunner in Europe in World War II, and very concerned about what
we knew about the other side. And we're very pleased to learn of
the activities of the designee during that very critical period in
time.
But more recently, I have been a member of the Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence since it was formed, and prior to that, the
Investigative Committee on Intelligence from its inception. I have
developed a very healthy respect for our intelligence operations
and, at the same time, I think, reasonable concern about the
manner in which it operates. And I am thoroughly convinced that
we need the very strongest, most efficient intelligence operation
that we can possibly provide.
Since the Select Committee on Intelligence was established, the
relationship between this committee and the Director of Central
Intelligence has been excellent. In order to do the tasks assigned to
it by the Senate, the committee has had full access to the product
of the intelligence agencies and has relied on the DCI to keep the
committee fully apprised of all significant intelligence activities.
The next DCI will stand in a new position in his relations with
this committee and its counterpart in the House. This past October
the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 became law. Now what had
been a working relationship has been codified in statute. Under the
Oversight Act the intelligence community has responsibilities it
must uphold in dealing with the two intelligence communities, just
as the intelligence committees have responsibilities to the commu-
nity.
The law now requires the DCI and other heads of intelligence
agencies to keep the committees fully and currently informed and
to respond to their requests for required information. The commit-
tees are to get prior notice of significant activities. But in special
cases, notices can be given to only a small number of committee
members. The committees are responsible for the protection of the
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information they are given and, by inference, for making certain
that the community gets the legislative and budgetary support it
requires to do its job.
The bill had bipartisan support on both sides of the Hill. It was
supported by the White House and all the affected agencies. Last
week, General Haig told the Foreign Relations Committee:
I am aware that the Congress has established procedures for informing the Senate
Intelligence Committee of all intelligence activities, including any significant antici-
pated intelligence activity. The Reagan administration intends to follow those proce-
dures.
In sum, the Congress and the executive branch have entered into
a partnership to insure that we have the best possible intelligence
apparatus. I look forward to working with Mr. Casey, once his
nomination is approved, to achieve this aim.
An effective intelligence service, however, requires recognition of
the inviolability of sensitive intelligence sources and methods. If we
cannot observe the secrecy of intelligence material, we jeopardize
the safety of individuals, hundreds of millions of dollars in invest-
ment, and the national security itself.
Policy issues are being fought by selective disclosures to the
media, and the leaks continue unabated even during the time of
transition. I believe that during the past several months I have
seen the intelligence activities and security information politicized
far beyond any time during my term as a Senator. And I for one
refuse to believe that so long as such issues as the verification of
the SALT Treaty or the need for a new manned bomber are contro-
versial, that these irresponsible leaks must continue.
This committee has done its best to stem the flow, and certainly
most of those in the intelligence community and the executive
branch with access to classified material are dedicated, patriotic
citizens. They handle their responsibilty admirably and respect the
conditions under which they work. Yet, the leaks persist, and we
have seen a very determined effort by some to influence policy
decisions in this country or to reflect favorably or unfavorably
upon various individuals through selective leaks of security infor-
mation.
I hope that, during the course of these hearings, Mr. Chairman,
that we can hear from Mr. Casey a determination that he will do
whatever is in his power to stop these kinds of abuses.
Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Huddleston.
I think Senator Chafee has a few words he would like to say.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHAFEE
Senator CHAFEE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have a statement which I
would like to be made part of the record. First of all, I would just
like to say how fortunate I believe the Nation is that Mr. Casey has
responded to the call of the President-elect to serve in this very,
very important position. As has been pointed out, Mr. Casey has
had an extraordinary background. In looking at his biography in
the book that was given' us, it just very modestly says, from 1942 to
1945 he was in the US. Navy Reserve as chief of intelligence
operations, OSS, European theater.
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Now, that says an awful lot when you're chief of the intelligence
operations for the OSS in the European theater at the age of 30. It
shows the extraordinary ability that Mr. Casey has. And he is a
person who, in every job he has undertaken, has excelled at it.
As Mr. Casey moves into his new position, I look forward to the
close cooperation between this committee and Mr. Casey, and I
certainly hope that he will give his active support to a couple of
pieces of legislation, which you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, which I
have been deeply interested in; namely, legislation to protect the
identities of our clandestine intelligence officers from unauthorized
disclosure.
Last year, the identities protection bill was reported from this
committee by a vote of 13 to 1. Unfortunately we did not have a
floor vote on it in the fall. But I am hopeful that again we can
report it out from this committee and have a vote on it successfully
on the floor. And we count on the active support of Mr. Casey in
those efforts.
Also, as you mentioned in your opening statement, Mr. Chair-
man, I believe it's appropriate to consider and to pass legislation
dealing with some limitations on the Freedom of Information Act
as it applies to the clandestine service, to the CIA. And, again, we
look forward to the support of Mr. Casey in these efforts.
So, Mr. Chairman, I think the future of this Agency is in excel-
lent hands, and I believe that we will have a very close and
successful working relationship with Mr. Casey.
Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Senator Chafee follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN H. CHAFEE
Mr. Chairman, I would like to add my welcome to Mr. Casey to our hearing this
morning. Mr. Casey, let me say how happy I am that you are here with us and let
me also take this opportunity to welcome you back to the ongoing process of
strengthening American intelligence, an effort which for you began long ago and to
which you have contributed significantly in many ways during the course of your
distinguished career. I look forward to working with you in your new duties as you
continue these efforts to strengthen this vital first line of our national defense. I
believe there is much to be done for our intelligence services: increasing support for
collection; improving the quality of analysis so that the President and other policy
makers receive accurate, unvarnished and timely analysis, renewed emphasis on
national strategic counterintelligence, and most importantly, restoring the morale
and espirit of our intelligence community. I know that the Members of this Commit-
tee look forward to working closely with you on these problems.
There are as well, of course, a number of critical legislative proposals which we
will be considering in this session of the Congress. Most important will be legisla-
tion to protect the identities of our clandestine intelligence officers from unauthor-
ized disclosure. In the last session this Committee reported out an effective identi-
ties bill by a vote of 13-1. I feel certain that we will be able to bring this bill to the
floor and see it passed in the near future.
Also I believe we will move quickly to consider appropriate legislation to reduce
the threat to national security which is posed by applying the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act to our clandestine service. And we of course stand ready to respond to your
legislative agenda, particularly in the area of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I wish to assure Mr. Casey that we will do everything
possible to remove, in the words of the Republican platform "those ill-considered
restrictions . . . which have debiliated U.S. intelligence capabilities while easing the
intelligence collection and subversion efforts of our adversaries."
Mr. Casey, I very much look forward to your testimony, your confirmation, and
our mutual efforts to rebuild and improve our intelligence capabilities.
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The CHAIRMAN. Are there any Senators on the Democrat side
who wish to say anything?
Senator Moynihan has a statement I think we will wait for.
Senator Wallop?
Senator WALLOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mine is very short.
Mr. Casey, it is a pleasure and a privilege for me to see you here,
and I echo the words that Senator Chafee and others have spoken
of you.
You may recall when first we met I spoke at your request at a
meeting of your fellow veterans of the OSS, and you may also
recall at that time that I painted a rather bleak picture of the
current state of American intelligence. American intelligence is a
house built on the foundations which you and your fellow veterans
of OSS helped establish in this country. You may recall also that I
urged the audience to begin to take an active interest and role in
intelligence affairs so that the house whose foundations they laid
might be rebuilt. I am: glad to see at least one person in that
audience heeded the request. I am happy to see you here.
It is customary at moments like this to predict that the nominee
will enjoy great success! If anybody can bring great success, I am
sure that you can. You bring enormous skills and great integrity to
this job. But I do not make any prediction as to the likelihood of
success.
Instead, I wish you luck and offer you support, mine and I am
certain that of the cominittee's, because I think you will need as
much as you can get of, both. You will need both because you are
taking over an Agency which, in many respects now, is unequal to
its tasks, whose task is growing in size and importance every year,
and too many of whose top people seem more inclined to bureau-
cratic infighting than to quality work. And so I think, even with
great insight and determination and support, you're going off to try
a very difficult task against long odds.
CIA, DANGER TO NATIONAL SECURITY
One of my colleagues on this committee has called the CIA a
danger to national security. And indeed, few things have contribut-
ed so to the danger that this country now finds itself as the CIA's
faulty national estimates over the last decade and decade and a
half. When the Soviets were beginning the greatest strategic build-
up of all time, the CIA said the Soviets were unlikely to try to
match us in numbers of 'missiles. When the Soviets approached our
numbers, the CIA said they were unlikely to exceed it substantial-
ly. When they exceeded it substantially, the CIA said that the
Soviets would not try for the capability to try to fight and win a
war against us. And now that the Soviets have nearly achieved
such a. capability, the CIA's estimates tell us the Soviets cannot be
sure it will work.
I could go on and on with such examples. But my point is simple:
Something is deeply and dangerously wrong. Some things the Con-
gress did do to bring about this state of affairs, and some things the
Congress can do to relieve it. But Congress was not the prime
mover of the decline. Congress did not cause the CIA to be so bad
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at analyzing intelligence. And, by the same token, the Congress did
not cut the CIA's counterintelligence service to a shadow of its
former self. And Congress did not indeed bring clandestine collec-
tion or covert action to its current sad state of capability. These
developments originated in CIA. If they are to be reversed, they
will have to be reversed above all in CIA.
My point is, Mr. Casey, that you will be facing powerful trends,
long since in place within the intelligence bureaucracy. These
trends have brought about a sort of revolution on American intelli-
gence. In my opinion, unless they are reversed, that revolution will
prevail. For the sake of the country, I hope it does not. For the
sake of the country, I hope things will change in American intelli-
gence. And for the sake of the country, I am very grateful that you
are about to take over that Agency.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.
As an aside, I just couldn't help commenting on Senator Hudd-
leston's remarks about leaks. We are very proud on this committee
that we haven't had them from the committee. But there are
certain areas of the press that have leaked rather profusely. But I
have to say that President-elect Reagan has discovered the proper
way to handle that. He has made the chief leaker a part of his
administration. That's one way to handle that.
Mr. Casey, I am going to put in the record at this point a very
brief outline of your background from the time of your birth in
New York City. You may proceed now.
[The biography of William Joseph Casey follows:]
WILLIAM JOSEPH CASEY
March 13, 1913.-Born in New York City.
1934.-B.S. Fordham University.
1937.-LL.B. St. John's Law School.
1938-49.-Chairman of Board of Editors, Research Institute of America.
1942-45.-U.S. Naval Reserve, LT Chief, Secretariat, and Chief of Intelligence
Operations, OSS, Eureopean Theater.
1947-48.-Special Counsel, Senate Small Business Committee.
1948-62.-Instructor in tax law at NYU.
1953-70.-Chairman of Board of Editors, Institute for Business Planning.
1950-71.-Law partner, Hall, Casey, Dickler and Howley, NYC, and predecessor
firm.
1966.-Republican congressional candidate from Third District of New York; lost
in primary to Steven Derounian.
1969-70.-Member, President's Task Force on International Development.
July 1969-April 1971.-Member, General Advisory Committee, Arms Control &
Disarmament Agency (ACDA).
1970-71.-President, International Rescue Committee.
April 1971-February 1973.-Chairman, SEC.
February 1973-March 1974.-Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
March 1974-January 1976.-President and Chairman, Export-Import Bank.
March 1974-January 1976.-Member, Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Murphy Commission).
March 1976-May 1977.-Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(PFIAB).
1976-80.-Member of board of directors: Gamble-Skogmo, Litco Corporation, the
Trib, et cetera.; Member, advisory board to American Stock Exchange; Counsel to
law firm of Rogers & Wells; Member, International Rescue Committee.
March 1980-November 1980.-Campaign Manager, Reagan Presidential cam-
paign.
Affiliations.
Veterans of the OSS, Association of Former Intelligence Officers.
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Publications.
Tax Sheltered Investments; Lawyers Desk Book; Forms of Business Agreements;
Accounting Desk Book; Tax Planning on Excess Profits; How to Raise Money to
Make Money; How Federal Tax Angles Multiply Real Estate Profits, and others.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. CASEY
Mr. CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, it is
an honor for me to be here today to meet with you and to discuss
my qualifications for the post for which President-elect Reagan has
nominated me.
I want to say at the outset that I believe it to be vital that this
Nation have a strong and' effective intelligence organization with a
wide range of capabilities and with the flexibility to adapt and
focus them on whatever exterior threats or problems confront the
President, the National Security Council, Congress, the executive
branch, all of us.
I would like to assure the Senators who have spoken and ex-
pressed their views about the serious problems that confront the
intelligence community in times of rebuilding, performance, secu-
rity, that I am determined to correct these problems, improve
performance. And I believe that, with the support of this commit-
lee and the support of the intelligence community, we shall be able
to do that.
At the outset, 1 would also like to say that it may be helpful to
outline the experience which has formed my views on intelligence.
In World War II, I was a naval officer. I had intelligence assign-
ments, first in Washington as an aide to Gen. William J. Donovan,
then a director of the Office of Strategic Services, and subsequently
in London as an aide to Col. David K. E. Bruce, the commanding
officer of that organization in the European theater of war with
General Eisenhower commanding.
WORLD WAR II ACTIVITIES
Our activities there consisted primarily of working with British
and French intelligence and supporting French resistance forces to
develop support for the Allied armies as they invaded and liberated
France. When it became clear in the fall of 1944 that the war
would not be won in France but that there would be hard fighting
in Germany, I became engaged in shifting what had been a French-
oriented organization to one that could function effectively in Ger-
many.
When we were surprised by the Hitler counteroffensive in the
Ardennes, in what became known as the Battle of the Bulge, I was
appointed chief of secret intelligence for OSS in the European
theater. In this capacity, I was charged with sending observers to
railroad and military centers in Germany to report on the move-
ment of German forces, on targets suitable to air attack, and
similar military. information.
I would like to say that from that experience it was clear that
intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities that were brought
to bear against the enemy were worth many German divisions,
that they saved many lives and much time and much treasure,
much blood.
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It is also clear that America entered that conflict without any
significant intelligence capability, that it was able to perform-we
were able to perform-in the intelligence and counterintelligence
contributions to the conduct of the war in Europe were based
primarily on the long tradition, experience, the personnel that it
created, and on the British system, which was our tutor and our
mentor.
I say that because today it is clear that the American intelli-
gence system occupies that role. It is a repository of many of the
capabilities which do not exist elsewhere. And that emphasizes in
my mind the absolute imperative nature of maintaining that capa-
bility as the best intelligence system in the world, building on it,
and constantly improving it.
Now, for a few years immediately after World War II, I worked
with General Donovan, with General Quinn who is here today,
other colleagues in wartime intelligence in urging that our Nation
needed a permanent central intelligence. And in studying how such
an organization should be organized and function.
CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES
Since that time I have spent my private working life as a practic-
ing lawyer, as an author, editor, and entrepreneur. All of these
activities involving somewhat the same kind of gathering, evalua-
tion, and interpretation of information which good intelligence
work requires. I maintain an interest in foreign policy and national
defense. As a founding director of the National Strategy Informa-
tion Center, I worked on the establishment of chairs and professor-
ships in national security on some 200 campuses throughout the
United States.
During 1969 President Nixon appointed me to the General Com-
mittee on Arms Control, on which I served during the preparation
and negotiations for SALT I. This experience impressed upon me
the vital significance of good intelligence in establishing adequate
defense in negotiating arms control arrangements and in verifying
that those arrangements are being observed.
I became a consumer of intelligence in another capacity as
Under Secretary of State in 1973 and 1974. And as a member of the
Commission of the Organization of the Government for the Con-
duct of Foreign Policy, known as the Murphy Commission after its
chairman, Robert Murphy, a distinguished diplomat of long stand-
ing, I took a special interest in the organization of the intelligence
community and improving the relevance and quality of analysis
and developing a more effective relationship between producers
and consumers of intelligence.
In 1976 President Ford appointed me a member of the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. There my special inter-
ests were a greater concentration in improving economic intelli-
gence and the experiment in competitive analysis of Soviet strate-
gic intentions, the potential capabilities of Soviet air defense, and
the accuracy of Soviet missiles, all of which I believe demonstrated
the value of some form of competitive analysis.
Now, there is no need for me to describe to this committee the
varied and complex challenges that confront our Nation, the com-
plexity of the political, military, and economic forces with which
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we must deal, or the importance of good intelligence to the formu-
lation and execution of effective policies.
GOALS AS CIA DIRECTOR
And if I am confirmed for the position for which I have been
nominated, it will be my purpose to provide for our policymakers
in the Congress as well as the executive branch timely and accu-
rate information, analysis, and estimates on which they can rely in
establishing the defensive strength we need in seeking arms limita-
tions and developing and maintaining satisfactory relations with
other nations and in competing in an increasingly interdependent
and competitive global economy.
Our foreign policies and defense strategies will never be better
for long, than our intelligence capabilities. In an era of increasing
military vulnerability, effective intelligence is of far greater impor-
tance than it may have been some years ago when we had clear
military superiority. Anticipating potential problems and threats,
understanding the reasons behind events, and foreseeing all the
potential opportunities, both diplomatic and military, will be criti-
cal to successful international relations over the next decade. We
are in a period, I believe, where investments in intelligence capa-
bilities will yield major returns.
Generally, there was a poor public perception and understanding
of the value of the American intelligence community to the secu-
rity of the free world. The CIA, in particular, suffers institutional
self-doubt. Many of its most competent officers have retired or are
about to retire. The morale of much of the agency is said to be low.
Too often, the agency has been publicly discussed as an institution
which must be tightly restrained, stringently monitored, or totally
reorganized. Little has been done in recent years to stress publicly
the critical role which the intelligence community has to play in
the formulation and execution of our Nation's foreign policies and
defense strategies.
Too many have worked to reduce the feeling of self-worth of
intelligence officers. Too few have worked to motivate the best
minds in the country to see the intelligence profession as one
which is desperately needed for our national security.
Now, while members of the community realize they cannot re-
ceive public recognition for particular tasks well done, they right-
fully expect the support of the government which they serve. All
too often, their failures are widely publicized, but their successes,
by their very nature, are generally hidden.
We need to make it clear that while we work to improve the
intelligence community, it has our full trust and confidence, that
the intelligence profession is one of the most honorable professions
to which Americans can aspire, and that we have an appreciation
for the dedication and professionalism of its members. We should
call our young Americans to serve their country in intelligence
work. We should ask American scholars to serve their country by
sharing their scholarship and insights with those in the community
who are responsible for preparing the analyses used to develop
foreign policy and defense strategy.
In the months ahead, this Nation will continue to confront major
international crises. This is not the time for another bureaucratic
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shakeup of the CIA. Instead, it is a time to make American intelli-
gence work better to become more effective and more competent,
and to make the members of this establishment respect it and
honor it.
In almost every instance in recent years, so-called intelligence
failures have been the result of shortcomings in intelligence analy-
sis and sometimes in policy conclusions. The necessary relevant
information, the facts, were generally available. But frequently,
either good analysis or sound conclusions did not follow.
To be truly beneficial to consumers, the data collected must be
subjected to critical and insightful analysis, conducted by trained,
competent professionals with a rich background in the subjects
required. The issues with which we have to deal require the best
analytical capabilities applied to unclassified as well as classified
sources.
The attractiveness of intelligence analysis as a profession, part
time as well as full time, needs to be increased. We need to tap the
insights of the Nation's scholars in the effort to upgrade the qual-
ity of intelligence analysis.
We must search for new and better ways to get continuing input
from the outside world in order to gather information available
inside and outside of Government and to get the best analysis of
the full range of views and data available. A revival of the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board can contribute substan-
tially to this.
And there are many other possibilities. When I was Chairman of
the SEC, I created a large number of task forces made up of
members of the SEC staff and people experienced in various phases
of the investment industry, assigned to report on regulatory needs
for new forms of investment and trading.
By minimizing paper and regulatory burdens, on making invest-
ment analysis more widely available to public investors, and simi-
lar subjects, we were able to gather insight and perspective which
was just not available in Washington. And I believe that the same
opportunities exist in the academic community and in the business
community to make American governmental intelligence function
more effectively and come to more reliable and realistic conclu-
sions.
It's not enough, however, to have good information and accurate
assessments. The findings and the views of the intelligence commu-
nity must be forcefully and objectively presented to the President
and the National Security Council. I assure you that I will present
these views without subjective bias and in a manner which reflects
strongly held differences within the intelligence community. It will
be my purpose to develop estimates which reflect a range of likely
developments for which policymakers must prepare in a manner
which emphasizes hard reality undistorted by preconceptions or by
wishful thinking.
As we look back at the recent past, we should remember how
early intelligence reports on Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, on
Soviet divisions preparing to enter Czechoslovakia in 1968, on Arab
preparations to attack Israel in 1973, were obscured by judgments
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that it would not be sensible for these weapons and divisions to
have other than defensive or training purposes.
Alternative possibilities and their implications must be fully set
forth in our assessments so they can be reflected in our prepara-
tion and in our policies. To carry out this assignment, the intelli-
gence community needs both public support and the full participa-
tion and cooperation of the Congress.
I am pleased that after a period of turmoil, the executive and
legislative branches have now institutionalized their arrangements
in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1981, as Senator Huddles-
ton has described. And I pledge to conduct the relations of the
intelligence community with the Congress in a consultative mode. I
pledge care and diligence to protect the legal rights of American
citizens.
I pledge to work closely with Congress on this as well as in
monitoring and improving the performance of the community, par-
ticularly for the intelligence committee study of U.S. intelligence
products, procedures, and budgets, Congress will provide a valued
independent source of review to ensure we are achieving all that is
humanly possible and that Congress will be in a position to provide
any necessary legislation or other action to improve our perform-
ance.
I will cooperate fully in facilitating the oversight through which
Congress can insure that, the community operates within the limits
of the law. This will provide the American people with additional
assurance that U.S. intelligence will fully respect their civil liber-
ties and further strengthen public confidence in the performance of
the intelligence community.
We-the Congress, and the agency, the community-have a
common purpose in assuring ourselves of a comprehensive intelli-
gence system of unqualified preeminence, operating efficiently and
within the requirements', of our laws.
I expect to conclude, as I review the organization, the structure,
and the performance of the community, that there are some steps
which should be taken to improve our intelligence performance. If
confirmed, I will promptly and in consultation with the members of
the intelligence community and the Congress, review without pre-
conception, the system, our intelligence system as it has developed,
as it now exists, and determine how I believe it is working and how
that performance can be improved.
Many Senators and Congressmen have put forward a number of
suggestions to protect the identities of U.S. intelligence officers and
provide relief from some aspects of the Freedom of Information
Act. I, too, share the concerns that led to these actions, and I hope
that the Congress will complete the important work initiated in the
last session.
I will examine how we are utilizing the resources that we have
to produce intelligence:; Are we attracting enough of the best
people and providing them with the best possible training; and are
we providing adequate "incentives so that we can keep the most
competent of those we have?
I know you and your :counterpart committee in the House, and
academic experts outside of Congress, have been studying these
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matters. As I complete and as I carry on and complete my evalua-
tion, I would plan to review my findings with you as soon as
possible to determine how we can build on our strengths and to
reduce areas of weakness.
That, Mr. Chairman, is my statement. I welcome any questions
that you and other members of the committee may have.
The CHAIRMAN. Before we start questioning you, it is necessary
for me to swear you in. Would you rise, please, and hold up your
right hand?
Do you swear that the answers you will give to the questions
asked will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you, God?
Mr. CASEY. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BIDEN
Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, before we begin questioning, I
apologize for being late. I was questioning General Haig.
May I ask unanimous consent that the opening statement I had
be inserted in the record as if read, and explain to the chairman
that I will be in and out because we're still questioning General
Haig. But thank you for the indulgence.
The CHAIRMAN. I'll see you there this afternoon.
Senator BIDEN. You're going to testify. I'll certainly be there, Mr.
Chairman, when you testify and promise to ask no hard questions.
[The prepared statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BIDEN
Mr. Casey, I would like to add my congratulations on your nomination for the
Directorship of Central Intelligence. My statement will be brief because, after all,
the point is to hear from you today. But I would like to specify two items that I feel
are vitally important to the Senate's consideration of your nomination and ask that
you keep these two in mind as you phrase your observations and responses today.
As you might guess, and as we discussed in our meeting last week, the first item
is that of Congressional oversight of United States' intelligence activities. Congres-
sional oversight greatly expanded under a Republican Administration-President
Ford's. The relationship between the Congressional intelligence committees and the
intelligence agencies is young and still fragile. It has been clearly beneficial in both
improving the agencies and in protecting the civil liberties of American citizens.
The agencies now know that they must face scrutiny by representatives of the
American people. As these representatives, in turn, are held to increasingly strict
accountability by the electorate for expenditures of tax dollars, they are more
inclined to examine the agencies with a sharp eye for cost effectiveness and compe-
tence. This feature of Congressional oversight seems only to enhance the motivation
of the intelligence community to produce timely and useful information.
Equally important, however, is the incentive that Congressional oversight pro-
vides for the intelligence agencies to adhere strictly to the law and the Constitution
in respect to the civil liberties and privacy of Americans. The self-contradiction of
those who in the name of protecting American ideals would scorn and secretly
assault some of the most important of those ideals-I refer to civil liberties protect-
ed by the Constitution-is both obvious and worrisome. Such contradictory thinking
encourages only the replication of qualities of totalitarian societies. It portends
diminishment of those basic libertarian ideals of American life which distinguish
this country and which the true conservative wishes to uphold.
The Congressional oversight provision enacted into law last year requires that the
intelligence committees be kept fully and currently informed of all intelligence
activities and that they be furnished any information or material concerning those
activities. I support a strict interpretation of the Congressional oversight authorities
that the law now grants. I would not support a nominee for Director of Central
Intelligence who did not recognize the role Congress must play in intelligence
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20
activities or who has given reason to believe that he would willfully withhold
information or documents from the authorized Congressional oversight committees.
My second item of concern is the imperative that intelligence activities must be
conducted in a nonpartisan way. The issue areas over which intelligence ranges-
from strategic arms monitoring to international commerce-are too important to
receive less than objective coverage, free from partisan political distortions. The
price eventually paid by the United States for twenty-five years of non-objective
coverage of Iran is richly documented.
Although inevitably foreign policy is shaped with an eye to political realities, it is
essential that the information on which both Congress and the Administration base
policies be objective. If it is not, if this information is politicized, then again we will
replicate a feature of totalitarian societies, the potentially sinister manipulation of
information to deceive the public: and undermine public trust.
An example of the need For objective intelligence regards the Soviet Union. Soviet
aggression is real. The Soviet arms buildup is troublesome. But to respond appropri-
ately, we need accurate intelligence which portrays Soviet weaknesses as accurately
as Soviet strengths. The Soviet economic base is disastrous. The social welfare of
'ioviet citizens is grim. Degrees of disillusionment with Soviet aid policies and
racism range from Egypt and Spmalia's to Iraq and Angola's. Intelligence reports
must understand the weaknesses as well as the strengths of potential adversaries
and not exaggerate either. Paranoid delusions provide no better basis for foreign
policy than complacent shortsightedness.
Mr. Casey, if you can kept these two issues of authorized Congressional oversight
and of the need for nonpartisan intelligence activities toward the foreground of your
remarks today, I will be better able to assess your nomination.
The CHAIRMAN. I think before we start questioning 1 would like
to ask Senator Moynihan either to read an entire paper he has or
any parts of it he cares to, and the entire paper will be made a
part of the record
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MOYNIHAN
Senator MOYNIHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I can just
preface that exercise by saying to Mr. Casey that I think that was
a superb opening statement and that your pledge of care and
diligence in protecting the legal rights of American citizens is what
we hoped to hear from you; your pledge to cooperate fully in
facilitating the oversight through which Congress can assure that
the intelligence community operates within the limits of the law is
what we wished to hear from you; and your statement that you are
concerned with the quality of the performance of the intelligence
community is what we hope you will do.
I would like to extend, if I can, just a moment the statement of
Senator Huddleston about the concern on this committee, which
has, to my knowledge, not previously been made public in that
way, as to the degree to which genuine security information was
leaked out of the executive branch-our own experience is of the
last administration, so it'doesn't mean it's unique to that one; it's
the only one we know-as part of a policy competition. That
seemed to us very destructive.
ANNUAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
To try to raise a level of recognition, last May 15, as you would
agree, sir, the most important product-or would you agree-the
most important product, of the intelligence community are the
a_ ual estimates which are presented to the President, and you
spoke about them, the national intelligence estimates, the NIE, and
I see you do agree. They are the most sensitive materials the
community produces, the most important.
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Last May 15 I put the intelligence estimates into the Congres-
sional Record, not in their original form, and I have never seen
them in their original form, but as they had been presented to
various newspapers by the White House. And one newspaper had a
slightly different version than another, and finally Mr. Burt felt he
had to straighten it all out and say this is what the national
intelligence estimate said. Mr. Burt is reportedly to become a
member of the administration, and that's how he did it.
That troubled us a great deal. It did trouble us. I hope it troubles
you. And I just ended my statement by saying on the floor that
Congress is attending to its purposes in seeking oversight of a
responsible and effective intelligence community. So long as that
effectiveness is undone by the very officials who are to be served by
the community, that effort of the Congress cannot succeed.
And I would hope you would let it be known that this committee
thinks a lot of people were less than responsible in their behavior,
and that no matter how well you do your work, if you're to be
undone by the people you do it for, it's a futile exercise.
But that is beside the purpose, and the chairman has been kind
enough to let me ask this question. As you know, Mr. Casey, we
adopted last year in the Intelligence Authorization Act for the
fiscal year 1981, we codified the oversight responsibilities of this
committee and the reporting responsibilities of the intelligence
community.
You remarked that our system begins as modeled on the British
intelligence operation, Second World War, the only one that we
had access to when we had none. But how very differently we have
evolved.
The 1981 intelligence oversight law is unique in the world. There
is no nation in the world where there is such a relationship be-
tween the intelligence community and the legislature. In Great
Britain there would not be three members or four members of the
Parliament who would even know your name, and you would cer-
tainly not be appearing before television cameras.
But, now, we have dealt with this in a different way, enacting as
law the responsibility of the executive branch, the responsibility
that falls on you, to keep this select committee fully and currently
informed of all intelligence activities which are the responsibility
of, or engaged in by, or carried out for or on behalf of any depart-
ment, agency, or entity of the United States, including any signifi-
cant anticipated intelligence activity.
We allow that latter category to be restricted to the ranking
members, the chairman and vice chairman of this committee, and
the majority and minority leader, but that's a very explicit require-
ment.
Now, there is, however, a gray area. In the preamble we say that
this must be done consistent with the President's duties under the
Constitution and consistent with his responsibility with due regard
for the protection of unauthorized disclosure of classified informa-
tion and information relating to intelligence sources and methods.
So since we say it must be done consistent with, we concede the
point that there may be occasions when it's inconsistent. But when
such judgments should arise, we have another section of the law
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22
which says when information is withheld under that preambular
provision, there must come a point in timely fashion when the
President does inform us of what took place, and therefore there is
no exception to our being informed.
Now, I'd like to ask your judgment, sir, about your intention,
your pledge which you ;gave us to comply with this law, and ask
you about your pledge in the context of that measure of ambigu-
ity-we couldn't get it' out-as between the President's constitu-
tional responsibilities and our right to enact laws. Because as you
know, there has been an occasion in a long and distinguished
career in which it has been charged that you have not been forth-
coming to the Congress; with materials requested by the Congress,
and have been, in one way or another, asserting not executive
branch privilege so much as the privilege of an independent agency
to withhold active investigative files. And this took place when you
were Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Now, as you expect us to have done, we looked into this matter
prior to this hearing, and I took the liberty of getting in touch with
Mr. Stanley Sporkin, Who is the Director of Enforcement of the
SEC, who has been there a very long while and is, I think, a
distinguished public servant by anyone's standards, to do what
cannot have been the easiest thing for him to be asked, to judge
your performance as Chairman of the Commission with respect to
two specific matters, that of withholding from a House committee,
materials concerning the ITT Corp., and passing those materials
instead to the Department of Justice. And then with respect to the
investigation of Mr. Vesco and the fraudulent activities in which
he was involved for Investors Overseas Services, IOS, if I recall.
Now, Mr. Chairman,! I have a letter here from Mr. Sporkin
which I ask be included in the record. It's a very extensive one. It
is five pages, single typed. But I want it to be stated that with
respect to the enforcement actions involving the International
Telephone & Telegraph' and Mr. Robert Vesco, it indicates in the
most emphatic terms that your behavior was, in the judgment of
Mr. Sporkin, above reproach.
[Letter of Stanley Sporkin follows:]
Hon. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN,
Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
My DEAR SENATOR: This is in response to a request made by a member of the staff
of the Committee for information concerning the handling of certain aspects of the
Commission's investigations and subsequent enforcement actions involving Interna-
tional Telephone & Telegraph Corporation ("ITT") and Robert Vesco during the
tenure of William J. Casey as Chairman of the Commission.
The information requested with respect to the ITT matter revolves around the
circumstances surrounding a Congressional inquiry and the Commission's referral of
its investigative files to the ! Department of Justice. The files contained certain
important documents submitted to the Commission in connection with a Commis-
sion staff inquiry. At the timh ITT made the documents available to the Commis-
sion, I was aware of Congressional interest in them and requested from ITT's
counsel that whatever documents were furnished to the Commission would also be
tendered to the Congress. A tender of these documents was made to, but not
accepted by, the Senate Judiciary Committee then considering the nomination of
Richard Kleindienst, to be Attorney General of the United States.
It was my judgment as the supervisor of the Commission's ITT investigation that
the documents should be conoidered by the Department of Justice in conjunction
with an inquiry then underway by it. Indeed, some time before the Commission
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formally referred its files to the Department of Justice, I had a discussion with a
senior official of the Department of Justice. He did not express an immediate
interest in the matter. I should point out that the Commission has explicit statutory
authority to refer matters to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution and
it does not have to wait for a specific request from the Department of Justice.
Another question raised with respect to the ITT matter regards a Congressional
inquiry with respect to active Commission investigations. Such inquiries generally
have had an adverse impact on our enforcement program as well as the rights of
innocent individuals. Enforcement agencies need the ability to fully complete and
assess the results of an investigation before determining an appropriate course of
action. Premature access to, and exposure of, raw investigative data can often
adversely impact an investigation. Generally, we have requested congressional com-
mittees to delay their inquiry until the Commission's investigation has been com-
pleted. These requests are normally honored by the Congress and indeed there have
been few instances where a committee of the Congress has insisted on obtaining
access to the Commission's investigative data prior to the completion of the Commis-
sion's interest in the matter. A request made by the Special Subcommittee on
Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of
Representatives, for access to the Commission's investigative files was considered
and denied by the Commission. An inquiry into the Commission's handling of the
ITT matter was conducted by that Committee. I am enclosing a copy of my testimo-
ny before that Committee.
The information requested with respect to the Vesco matter relates generally to
two areas. One area deals with communications between Mr. Casey and Harry
Sears, a counsel for Vesco. There is little information that I can provide to you on
the basis of personal knowledge with respect to Mr. Sears other than to inform you
that Mr. Sears did appear before the staff of the Commission as counsel for Mr.
Vesco, along with other counsel. Moreover, at the Commission staff's request, he
specifically became counsel of record for Mr. Vesco.
The second area pertains to a request to postpone the testimony of certain
witnesses in the Vesco investigation. This request apparently originated with a
White House staff member. The request for a postponement was relayed by Mr.
Casey to me since I was the Commission's staff member in charge of the investiga-
tion. At the outset I should make it clear that the request for a postponement was
not granted and the testimony took place as scheduled.
After a full discussion of the request, I advised Mr. Casey that the scheduled
testimony of the two witnesses could not be postponed and that it would be inappro-
priate to accede to the request in any way. Mr. Casey's determination not to
overrule my decision demonstrated the confidence that he had in his trusted subor-
dinates as well as his own sound judgment in regard to the requested action.
It is unfortunate that the various press accounts in the past of Mr. Casey's role in
the Vesco case seem to emphasize the two areas I have just discussed. There has not
been a comprehensive statement of the very positive and important role that Mr.
Casey played in the Vesco case, which was a major Commission investigation. Mr.
Casey's role in the case, which I discuss below, demonstrates that his actions were
in accord with the Commission's best traditions; namely, to discharge its obligations
to protect public investors.
Once Mr. Casey learned that the Vesco matter involved serious violations of the
federal securities laws, he directly involved himself in aggressively pursuing the
investigation. In his typical impatient style, he constantly urged me to devote my
entire efforts to the case and he pressed the staff to complete the investigation and
to proceed with the appropriate enforcement action as soon as possible.
Realizing the massive nature of the case and its implications throughout the
world financial communities, Mr. Casey had the foresight to seek the cooperation of
other affected governments. As the investigation was being completed, he was
instrumental in urging that the Department of State make the necessary arrange-
ments to have the Commission's staff meet with officials of other governments in
order to explore the serious international ramifications of the case and to obtain
their assistance in protecting what remained of investor assets.
Through these efforts, shortly after the civil injunctive action was instituted in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the Com-
mission was able to arrange for the freezing of over 100 million dollars of investor
assets located in Canada. In a virtually unprecedented action, on the day the case
was instituted, senior officials of the Commission were dispatched to Great Britian,
Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Canada to enlist the aid of these foreign govern-
ments. Mr. Casey even directed that one of his top legal assistants accompany the
staff on one of these sensitive missions.
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It was through these and other similar efforts participated in by Mr. Casey, that
the Commission was able to establish a committee of officials from various interest-
ed foreign governments to oversee the recoupment of investor funds. To date, over
400 million dollars have been recaptured for investors throughout the world. This
action is one of the most impressive and important enforcement cases in which the
SEC has ever been involved.
Mr. Casey's involvement and support in this matter continued after the action
was brought. In November 1972, the Commission received a temporary setback
when its motion for preliminary injunctive relief was denied by the District Court
in New York. When Mr. Casey learned of the adverse decision, he immediately
called me in London, England at 2 a.m. to report what had transpired and to discuss
the nature of the Commission's response.
I advised Mr. Casey that, in my opinion, the matter was so important that he
should fly to New York and pesonally represent the Commission in the U.S. District
Court and to urge the court to conduct a rehearing and to grant the Commission's
request for immediate relief. Mr. Casey informed me that he had already tentatively
arranged for Commissioner Loomis, the former General Counsel of the Commission,
to personally represent the Commission at the rehearing motion. Mr. Casey agreed
with the urgent need to bring to the attention of the Court the important and
serious nature of the case by having the Commission represented by a senior
Commission official. However, Mr. Casey believed that Commissioner Loomis, be-
cause of his many years of experience as General Counsel of the Commission and
his excellent litigation background, would be a better courtroom advocate for the
Commission. I completely concurred in his perceptive analysis and strategic assess-
ment concerning the presentation of the Commission's case before the Court. Ulti-
mately, Mr. Casey's direction was fully implemented, Commissioner Loomis present-
ed the argument and the Commission's rehearing effort succeeded.
I relate these events to illustrate two significant aspects of Mr. Casey's involve-
ment in this important matter. First, it demonstrates perceptive and thoughtful
analysis by Mr. Casey, who having been with the Commission less than two years at
the time, was able to make such an imaginative and wise decision. Second, the
extreme interest and aggressive determination of Mr. Casey enabled the Commis-
sion to bring the case to a successful and speedy conclusion. The actions of Mr.
Casey that I have described were unprecedented by any other Commission Chair-
man. Further, his entire conduct is simply inconsistent with any suggestion that
Mr. Casey intended in any way to befriend or assist Robert Vesco.
One further point. As I reflect upon the Casey years at the Commission, I can
truly say they were some of the finest moments that I have experienced during my
19 years on the Commission's staff. Mr. Casey was an able Chairman and a fine
person. I am grateful for the,'' opportunity to have served him during his term as
Chairman of the Commission. If I can be of any further assistance to you, please do
not hesitate to call me.
Sincerely yours,
;YVANLEY SPORKIN.
Senator MOYNIHAN. With respect to the Vesco matter, Mr. Spor-
kin states that your conduct was more than legal behavior, it was
more than responsible behavior; it was, in his judgment, exemplary
behavior. I would like to read two paragraphs at the end of the
letter in which Mr. Sporkin says:
I relate these events to illustrate two significant aspects of Mr. Casey's involve-
ment in this important matter. First, it demonstrates perceptive and thoughtful
analysis by Mr. Casey. who having been with the Commission less than two years at
the time, was able to make such an imaginate and wise decision. Second, the
extreme interest and aggressive determination of Mr. Casey enabled the Commis-
sion to bring the case to a successful and speedy conclusion.
The actions of Mr. Casey that I have described were unprecedented by any other
Commission Chairman. Further, his entire conduct is simply inconsistent with any
suggestion that Mr. Casey intended in any way to befriend or assist Robert Vesco.
One further point. As I reflect upon the Casey years at the Commission I can
truly say they were some of the finest moments I have experienced during my 19
years on the Commission's staff. Mr. Casey was an able Chairman and a fine person.
I am grateful for the opportunity to have served him during his term as Chairman
of the Commission.
Now, I'm sure it's most welcome for you to hear that. This com-
mittee will welcome its being stated. But it doesn't entirely deal
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with the point we are most concerned with. It addresses much of
that point. We are prepared to learn that you were an exemplary
chairman, and you were, and energetic and innovative; but how do
you feel about telling this committee things we need to know and
you would just as soon not more than two people in the world
know?
REPORTING TO COMMITTEE
Mr. CASEY. Well, Senator, I intend to comply fully with the spirit
and the letter of the Intelligence Oversight Act. I intend to provide
this committee with the information it believes it needs for over-
sight purposes. I believe the detailed implementation of that gener-
al intention is something we will work out as we go along.
I would intend to follow the practices that have been worked out
with the President, the incumbent of this office or the office for
which I've been nominated. And there are some reservations of
constitutional authority that relate to the President's constitution-
al authority.
I cannot conceive now of any circumstances under which they
would result in my not being able to provide this committee with
the information it requires. I would obviously have to be subject to
and discuss with the President any particular situations which I
cannot now foresee, and I would do that in a way that this commit-
tee would know about.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, I thank you, sir. I heard you say that
you could not conceive any circumstances in which you could not
share information with this committee.
Mr. CASEY. I said I cannot now conceive.
Senator MOYNIHAN. You said not now conceive, and not for noth-
ing did you go to the Fordham Law School. They taught you
prudence. But you have been in this community for 40 years, so
when you say that you cannot now conceive, you are speaking from
experience; and I take that to be a straightforward answer, and I
thank you for it. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any questions, Senator?
Senator HUDDLESTON. Of the designee? Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead. Ten minutes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. All right, sir.
UNLEASH THE CIA
Mr. Casey, one of the buzz phrases that has appeared in recent
months has been "It's time to unleash the CIA." I don't know
whether you've used that phrase or not. I just wonder what is your
view of the meaning of "unleashing the CIA" and what do you
think is meant by it?
Mr. CASEY. Well, Senator, I have not used that phrase. I like to
think in terms of increasing the ability of the organization to
initiate and carry out its obligation to perform the thing that it's
required to do.
I suppose the term "unleash" is used to apply to suggest that
there are ways to ease restrictions, to make them perhaps less
cumbersome without infringing in anyway on the rights that
belong to American citizens. I think that I will want to review the
Executive order. I will want to discuss the existing Executive order.
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I will want to discuss the way it has operated and the degree to
which the restrictions and the mode in which they have been
applied may impair the effectiveness of the organization in carry-
ing out the obligations that are placed upon it, to see whether
there is some way to minimize the restrictions which may impair
performance.
I will certainly discuss any ideas that I have in that respect that
I develop out of those consultations with the members of this
committee, and they will not clearly be implemented without the
concurrence of the President and the input that this committee can
provide.
Senator HUDDLESTON. At any rate, you don't perceive at this time
that there is a need to eliminate restraint to the extent that CIA
operatives around the world are free to freelance and initiate ac-
tions on their own without proper authority and without being
certain that they are within the scope of the Government's objec-
tives and laws relating to the CIA.
Mr. CASEY. Certainly not.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You referred to the Executive order. Do
you anticipate that there will be a new Executive order?
Mr. CASEY. Well, there's been discussion of a new Executive
order. I haven't made hp my mind. I've heard a lot of pros and
cons, and I really haven't had an opportunity to study and consider
it, and I really can't fully study and consider it without getting the
advice of those individuals in the intelligence community who have
operated under the existing Executive order.
Senator HUDDLESTON. And you have indicated that if such an
undertaking is made to develop a new Executive order, you would
consult--
Mr. CASEY. It would be in consultation with this committee and
its counterpart in the House.
LEAKING
Senator HUDDLESTON. Now, several of us have expressed concern
about the matter of leaking and what seems to me to be a new
development of leaking or specific purposes of influencing policy.
And I agree entirely with Senator Moynihan that this has occurred
on both sides of the political spectrum to a large degree, I think, in
recent months.
Do you have any specific plans to deal with that problem, both
within the administration and without the administration?
Mr. CASEY. I don't have any specific plans. I intend to strongly
exercise the obligation of the Director of the CIA to establish and
enforce security standards. And I share the general view that's
been expressed on the ether side of the table here that leaks are
intolerable, the kind of purposeful leaks that have occurred cannot
be tolerated, and that you cannot maintain an effective and suc-
cessful intelligence service if the people who are providing informa-
tion feel it is not secure.
Certainly we must reestablish in the minds of the intelligence
service of other nations who are important to us, who provide
substantial input, that t is essential to the judgments that need to
be made that we're running a secure and leakproof outfit.
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Senator HUDDLESTON. What role have you played, Mr. Casey, in
the transition team?
Mr. CASEY. Well, I've been chairman of the executive committee
of the transition. I have not had any operational control or direc-
tion. I spent most of my time catching up with my law practice and
assessing the financial damage that I sustained during the cam-
paign, and chairing an interim foreign policy advisory committee
which reviewed the whole scope of our foreign and national secu-
rity concerns.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Were you responsible for or have any part
in the employment of Mr. David Sullivan in the transition team?
Mr. CASEY. No.
Senator HUDDLESTON. And do you have any plans for utilizing
Mr. Sullivan in the intelligence makeup?
Mr. CASEY. I don't have any plans because I don't know him.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, he is an individual who was with the
CIA and is no longer with the CIA because of disclosing classified
information. I thought it was curious that he would wind up on the
transition team.
Mr. CASEY. Well, the transition team was kind of an amoeba-like
creature. They were established primarily under the direction of
Mr. Timmons, and they were able to go out and add their own
advisers to a degree, so that a lot of people popped up that we
didn't know.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Casey, there are some who believe that
certain professions must appear to be independent of Government
control in order to perform their functions, in some cases functions
protected by the first amendment.
The current guidelines require that the CIA not use journalists,
or clerics, or academics as agents, with certain exceptions. Do you
think these kinds of guidelines are advisable?
Mr. CASEY. I have to say that I start out in thinking about that
problem with the feeling that no American should be deprived of
the opportunity to serve his country in any way he can by virtue of
his occupation or profession. At the same time, I recognize the
sensitivity with respect to certain professions, and I intend to
adhere to the regulations and procedures that now apply to the
relationships with members of those professions while I study and
find out how those regulations work. And again, if I come to the
conclusion that they can be liberalized or modified in a way which
will improve the performance of the intelligence community, I will
consult with this committee before considering a change.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Casey, the Heritage Foundation and
the report of the Republican National Committee last summer
suggested that the CIA be broken up into several smaller units,
including a quite small independent, clandestine service.
What are your views on that proposal?
Mr. CASEY. Well, I had a prior occasion to study those recommen-
dations. When I served on the Murphy Commission, a presidential,
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congressionally-appointed commission to study the organization of
the Government for the conduct of foreign policy, we went through
the whole range of ideas with respect to breaking up or reorganiz-
ing or reconstituting the intelligence community.
We came to the conclusion, which I shared, that fragmenting the
organizations then existing would be counterproductive, would not
be a wise thing to do. Now, I realize that a lot of time, a lot of
water has passed under the bridge, and I would like to take the
stance, my state of mind today is that I will go in and approach
those possibilities without any preconception, review them again.
1 would also say, to complete my perspective on that problem,
that I think it's important that we focus and concentrate on get-
ting the community to perform and be quite cautious about reorga-
nizations which might disrupt the opportunity to improve and
make its performance more satisfactory. That s going to be my
primary focus.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you believe that the DCI should retain
the control that has been given it through the Executive order over
the resources and tasking of the entire intelligence community?
Mr. CASEY. I think if he's required to give leadership to the
entire community, which I think is necessary that it be made to
work as a cohesive whole, that those authorities are in general,
essential. However, I am not wedded to the way they are being
exercised. I think it may be possible to exercise those authorities in
a more general way and to focus the DCI's attention and effort on
making the wheels and cogs mesh rather than attempting a degree
of detailed management, day-to-day management, which may or
may not be possible at all.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, sir.
Mr. CASEY. My general style in this has been to set objectives
and give people authority to go after those objectives, hold them to
their performance, and not get into detailed management. If they
don't perform, then you get somebody else.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you. My time is up.
Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Casey. In another forum
Senator Biden and I have been visiting with General Haig and
thinking through the foreign policy problems that he faces and
that we all face, and certainly your statement is of, I think, pro-
found significance that the success of the security of our country in
fact accounted to foreign policy and is so critically dependent upon
intelligence, upon the information that comes to policymakers. And
it's important that they be right, but they have a very difficult
time being right without having some basis upon which to make
those judgments.
The critical question that I want to ask of you is that granted
that premise, and it may or may not be understood by the public, I
think the point of your statement is it really does need to be
understood, so that as you point out, intelligence will be thought of
as an extremely important profession to which young people might
be willing to devote their lives, to which the very best in American
scholars would be willing to devote their time and effort.
Demonstrably it does not appear that that has been the case in
recent years, and this is maybe one reason you have highlighted
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this. In short, some of us who have taken a look at analysis in the
intelligence area, while giving full credit to people who are doing
their best, have come to the conclusion that that is not the best our
Nation can produce. Analysis is not the thing that can be churned
out as if we were doing an inanimate object production. It is the
product of the very best of human minds.
And the question is, how are these persons going to be attracted
to the intelligence community? This is an anonymous service. The
very best of the analysis may never be known except by historians
years later. And when we consider even in this town the number of
people doing political analysis and the wide variety of opinions
they come to with regard to American politics which is close at
hand, makes the problem of getting people to do something on Iran
or Afghanistan or the Soviet Union or what have you even more
critical.
Have you given some thought to how, through your leadership or
through other people you might appoint to help you in this respect,
there can be a massive turnaround in the opinion of the intelli-
gence community by people and American scholars who are the
very best, and who might be willing to do something for their
country, or American young people, American middle-aged people,
for that matter, American old people, who are really the very best,
who will want to volunteer? We're not having a great, high success
in a conventional military situation.
On what basis do you believe you can attract people who are
really top flight to this most critical of professions?
Mr. CASEY. I think the analytical profession, as opposed to ana-
lyst, in the intelligence community has to be made more attractive.
I think that one of the things that happens is in the promotion
path, that in order to reach the higher grades people have to
establish themselves and get experience as analysts frequently drift
off into management, where that's the career path.
I think we have to establish a career path and make it attractive
psychologically, socially, and in every other way, for a person to
become, seek to become, the most knowledgeable person on the
political currents and the composition of Iran, as you mentioned,
that you have and can find anywhere.
Now, we're not always going to succeed in that. And that will
take time. At the present time, I believe and I know that there are
scholars in the academic community, there are researchers and
analysts in the business community, there are people who have
been abroad in marketing and dealing with other countries, and
there are people who live in other countries who are here, who
know the country not only its habits and mode of thought, not only
in their intellectual way but in their gut, in their instinct, they
have a feel for it. And we have to find a way to tap that kind of
knowledge and that kind of experience.
Now, what the modus operandi is: How we do it in an effective
way and an acceptable way, I am not able to spell out now. But I
am certain in my mind that we have to get the input of people who
have experience and have acquired knowledge over a lifetime, or a
lifetime's worth of knowledge, in the psychology and the political
composition and the other things that result in the kind of conduct
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and the kind of thinking that prevails in public policy in those
countries.
I think that there are scholars, Middle Eastern scholars who
have been brought in by people who wanted to get a better under-
standing of the turmoil, the political changes in Iran, who really
had a great deal more insight than some of the people we've been
able to bring into the intelligence community who have had to
undertake these responsibilities in some cases without the lan-
guage ability and without even having been in the countries.
Now, we're going to have to make compromises as we go along,
but we have to be very vigorous, very alert in supplementing and
really bringing back people who have greater experience, to serve
as a base for training and developing new analysts in the commu-
nity. I think we have to reach in every way we can to overcome
those deficits.
Senator LUGAR. I know it is unfair to ask for a fullblown plan
today of how this is to be done. The purpose of my asking the
question is to highlight in this hearing what I see to be a critical
problem in your effectiveness, because I think you will have to
determine, and you have in your other capacities in life, what kind
of style of leadership you personally will offer as well as what you
will ask of various of your subordinates, if you will not be up front
in these situations.
In other words, it seems to me, even after we have the objective
of trying to get the very best of scholars, to attract young people, to
turn around American public opinion, that calls for enormous ad-
vocacy, really, a sense of drama that clearly has not been present.
And you may wish to do that or maybe others will help, maybe, in
this committee.
But somehow, it seems to me that we've been wrestling, for
example, in the committee with the problem of how we would
verify the SALT II Treaty, if we had gone that route, or how we
should verify SALT III. It may be absolutely critical in terms of the
life and death of people in this country that those skills be focused
and, furthermore, that we use our very best imagination any-
where-and there are 225 million of us-to figure out what to do.
And it would be an alarming problem if we don't get the people
and, secondly, the American public doesn't appreciate why it was
necessary to devote that time and effort to it.
Or, in the case of Iran, when we think of all of the turmoil and
the trauma of our country over that, it is too late then to wonder
why there weren't people who understood the language, the
Moslem culture, all the. rest of it, although at this particular junc-
ture, certainly, you could point out how critical that might have
been in terms of decisions we would have made or deployments we
might have done to have saved the grief that has afflicted our
country.
I know these are points well known to you, but I did want to
take the opportunity of this confirmation hearing simply to make
them again, because I think they are the essence in the success of
our intelligence picture:
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COLLECTION CAPABILITY
Mr. CASEY. I think it's interesting, going back over sort of a
recent history, you find that the big leaps in improving our collec-
tion capability came from the thinking that someone like Jim
Land, the president of Polaroid, brought to the PFIAB, and Bill
Baker, the leading scientist at Western Electric brought to the
whole business of electronics and communications intelligence.
So, you've got to reach out. You've got to reach out. I think I did
that very successfully with the SEC, as I said in my opening
statement, in bringing in a lot of people from the industry who just
had insights and a feel for the way things actually work that you
just don't get if you spend your life trying to regulate in a distant
way. You've got to be involved to know how things work and how
the problems are and how they could be made to work better.
And I think there are huge areas in scientific and technical
requirements as well as in the political and economic activities of
the intelligence community in which we have to be more vigorous
and aggressive in reaching out to the private sector.
Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wallop.
Senator WALLOP. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I just thought we would go
down to Senator Biden for a question.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have two on this side and two on that
side.
Senator WALLOP. Fair enough.
The CHAIRMAN. Let him sit down there. He's better off here than
at the other hearing.
Senator BIDEN. I will leave now, Mr. Chairman, if you like.
Senator WALLOP. Mr. Casey, pursuing a little bit Senator Lugar's
line of questioning, I think it's fair to say that the American public
does not have an adequate recognition of the Nation's need for a
viable and strong intelligence community. The country recognizes
the need when things go wrong, a rescue mission in Iran that
failed, perception of intentions in Afghanistan, or something else.
But overall and from day to day, we are constantly under the
influence of people who would have us believe that this country
can operate without such a mechanism, who to go back to the old
nostrum that gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail, that
somehow or another it is an anathema in a free society. And now
you have corporations in this country, and other institutional
groups within this country, who are asking to be removed even
from consideration for voluntary participation in America's neces-
sary intelligence activities by charter legislation.
How do you view that? Is there something we can do or some-
thing you would hope to do as director of CIA to change this
dangerous mobility?
Mr. CASEY. Well, you know, I think that there was a time when
the American public did have high respect and did recognize the
value of our intelligence service. I think it still does down deep. I
think what has happened is that the surface perception has been
modified by the charges that the CIA and other organizations have
become rogue elephants and that you had to focus on reining it in
and monitoring and regulating and controlling it.
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I think that that perception-I hope that perception has
changed. I think that a good job has been done in that regard.
Maybe it went a little further than it needed to, but we can
continue to evaluate that. I think we have to restore the perception
that the American intelligence community has really the largest
and, 1 think, one of the finest scholarly communities in the world.
There are more people with advanced degrees there than there are,
I believe, in any university or any other institution worldwide.
And I think we can do a lot to enhance that perception and take
the focus off the alleged misdeeds that go well back into the past,
and maintain the perception that I think now exists that there is a
better degree of congressional oversight, that there is cooperation
between the Congress representing the people and the intelligence
community discharging its obligation and performing its task.
And I think that as we improve and get the kind of support that
is needed from the rest of the community-the business communi-
ty, the academic community-to overcome some of the deficiencies
that Senator Lugar has highlighted, I think there will be a restora-
tion of mutual trust and confidence between the intelligence com-
munity and the rest of the American business and academic com-
munity. I think all that will help.
Senator WALLOP. That's really true, I guess. I mean, any such
organization within a free society will have a difficult time, be-
cause, obviously, your successes remain relatively unknown and
your failures are often the only things that ever reach the public's
attention.
It seems to me that we must do something to raise the Nation's
perception of the valuable contribution which intelligence makes to
national security. I mean, we simply cannot exist as a country
without a capable intelligence community.
Mr. CASEY. Well, I think that there could perhaps be a wider
perception and understanding of the magnitude of the intelligence
activity that's carried on here and worldwide by our major adver-
saries.
Senator WALLOP. Well, I also think, that many people don't
recognize the other kinds of services that the intelligence commu-
nity can provide to the country. I note your speech in here to the
American Bar's conference on law, intelligence, and national secu-
rity regarding economic intelligence and some of the major failures
that the country has suffered in that field. Surely, that s a matter
of concern to anybody in a country whose major economic capabili-
ty to compete within its own market-never mind world markets-
is declining.
Maybe those are areas that we ought to address in the public
perception of what an intelligence community does, that it's not
only government-to-government combat and scurrilous alleys in the
cities of the world, but these are the requirements of a mature
nation to exist and to compete in the world.
Would you agree with that generally?
Mr. CASEY. Yes; I do. And I might elaborate a little further. This
has become an increasingly competitive world, and, you know,
unless we can compete more effectively in things like autos and
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steel and new energy sources which are vital to defense, you can't
have tanks, planes, or any other kind of industrial mobilization
capability without strong strength in these critical industries. And
we've been losing. And I think that's why we're losing and what
needs to be done, the kind of competitive abilities that's permitted
other nations to take these markets away is a legitimate object of
intelligence.
I think, also-and I took a particular interest in this when I was
on the PFIAB-that we should know a more precise measure of the
degree to which the kind of financial and trade and economic aid
we ve provided to some of our adversaries has permitted them to
put a heavier concentration of their output and their manpower
into building up the military machine which, in turn, forces us to
match them, and it really sucks substance out of the economy and
the ability to maintain and increase the public living standard.
So, there is a correlation between the economic and the military.
I think it's something that needs to be stressed more clearly and
forcibly.
Senator WALLOP. Well, in line with that, would you anticipate a
more active and forceful role of the DCI with regards to technology
transfer?
Mr. CASEY. Well, I really can't-I wouldn't want to say that it
would be more forceful or active, because I don't know quite how it
is, how it functions, and how it does relate to the responsibil-
ities--
Senator WALLOP. But you would have no hesitation in expressing
the real reservations of the community about the transfer of given
technologies that perhaps has not been viewed from the perspective
of the community, would you?
Mr. CASEY. Well, there certainly have been transfers of technol-
ogy which I haven't approved of. Now, whether that responsibility
can be put-or the degree to which that responsibility can be put
on the community, I really don't know. This is decided at-I have
been involved in it at the State Department-this is decided at an
interdepartmental level, and the Department of Defense is usually
on one side and State and Commerce and others are on the other
side.
And I don't know the degree to which the intelligence input is
counted or is important now. But I think it should be, and I would
seek to see that it is.
Senator WALLOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.
Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Casey, you come to this task in many ways better prepared
than anyone in my 8 years' experience on this committee. I shall
begin by complimenting you on your statement. I think it was a
very good statement. But there are a few things I would like to
pursue with you, if I may.
It seems, as I said, in my limited experience here in the Senate,
that most times the personal relationship of an individual office-
holder to the President has more effect upon the formulation of
policy than the institutional relationship that person might have.
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To be more specific, we have seen, to my chagrin, where the less
important job of national security adviser, than the job of Secre-
tary of State, the degree" of the personal relationship effects policy
more than the degree of the institutional relationship. And you are
a very close friend of the President of the United States of Amer-
ica. You have been his friend for some time, as I understand it.
You were a chairman of his campaign. And all of us, being political
animals, know very well that that is a relationship, if it lasts,
which is one that is the closest of all. You've been there when he's
been way down; you've had to figure out how to buoy him up.
You've had to help when he's way up to pull him down. And
consequently, you have a very close personal relationship.
So, I would suspect that your role, a very important role, as DCI,
coupled with your personal friendship, you may have more person-
al influence upon policy than other DCI's have had-we haven't
had DCI's very long-other heads of CIA have had, not only in
terms of influencing policies as they relate to the intelligence com-
munity, but also affecting policy as it relates to a broader range of
foreign-policy options.
You cited one, transfer of technology. There is a raging debate,
has been for some years, as to whether or not our allowing the
Soviets to be in a better position to meet their economic needs is
beneficial or detrimental to our interests.
The prevailing school of thought, I think, in past Republican-
recent past-Republican administrations and Democratic adminis-
trations has been we're better off if they are economically better
off; our national interests are better off. And you express a view
that at least indicates you may have a different perspective on that
issue than is the prevailing view.
Now, I am very curious that, in light of the fact that you have
not only been a producer but a consumer of intelligence material
from your days in the OSS straight through to you're a member of
the Advisory Committee on U.S. Arms Control, Export-Import
Bank, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, and you've also been
in an advisory capacity as an outsider looking at the agency. You
have been on the Murphy commission; you have been on President
Ford's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. And you mentioned a
new board or commission that you are on and have been in the last
couple of months relating to the intelligence community and for-
eign policy in the Reagan administration.
So if anyone should be prepared to answer questions as it relates
to his personal views as to the makeup of the community, I would
think you are more qualified than anyone we have ever had before
us.
Now, it's in light of your background and your relationship to
the President that I ask some of the following questions.
I would like to first begin by asking you what has become sort of
a-it's not a very high-sounding phrase, but reporters will come up
to me and all of us up here, and say, "Well, what report card would
you give so-and-so or such-and-such an institution?" And unfortu-
nately, the last administration, in a sense, institutionally codified
that phrase "report card."
So I am going to ask you, since you've obviously had an opportu-
nity to view inside, outside, and around this committee, this intelli-
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gence committee, what report card would you give us-not as
individuals, but as a committee-in keeping the secrets, keeping
the faith, so to speak? How good have we been at that?
KEEPING SECRETS
You clearly have looked at it. You've investigated it. You have
an opinion about it. And it would be very helpful to me and, I
hope, to some of us, to have you share that view.
Mr. CASEY. Well, you know, I don't like to disagree with you,
Senator, but the truth is I thought I'd let this committee investi-
gate me before I undertook to investigate it. So I really don't know
more than I can pick up in the newspapers, and my general im-
pression is that the committees of the Congress have performed
well in maintaining security and maintaining the confidences that
have been placed in them.
I don't know. I can't think offhand of any significant transgres-
sion in that respect on the part of this committee.
Senator BIDEN. Well, its not an idle question, and I am not
trying to have you compliment or insult this committee just for the
sake of hearing the compliment or the insult. But there is a raging
debate going on that the Congress as a whole and this committee
in particular should not have access to certain documents and
information.
The Heritage Foundation, which has been referred to, members
of what would be referrred to as the "political right," who are on
the transition team, who are part of the base from which the
President-elect was nominated and elected President, have been
arguing for some months and years that this committee should in
fact not really exist.
We have tended to counter by saying, "The leaks ain't coming
from here, old buddy. They've been coming from other places." Yet,
I think the public perception, I think it's important that I get you
to respond in terms of how I view whether or not you will be
forthcoming with this committee-and I am only one vote-the
public perception has been built that somehow the Congress is not
capable, and this committee in particular is not worthy, of being
privy to the most important-all-the secrets of the Nation.
And I am very interested to know what your view is. If you have
a different view than that, I would like to know that.
Mr. CASEY. Well, it seems to me that that issue has raised, and it
has been debated, and there have been reasons to be concerned
about the leaks that came from various congressional committees.
But I think that has been resolved in the Oversight Act of 1981.
I think the general perception is that the public and, I think,
most observers believe that a working consultative relationship
between the appropriate congressional committees and the intelli-
gence community can be beneficial and that a sharing of informa-
tion to facilitate that consultative relationship and to permit the
Congress to discharge its oversight responsibilities is acceptable
and is a way of life under which we're going to conduct ourselves.
Senator BIDEN. In your experience, do more leaks come from this
committee and the Congress or from the Defense Department?
Mr. CASEY. I really have trouble answering that. I think there
were some leaks from the Defense Department of which I was very
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36
critical during the campaign that seemed to be deliberate leaks for
political purposes, and it was so charged. I haven't seen anything of
that kind. I would be shocked if any of that kind did come from
this committee, and I don't in any way expect it.
So I would have to give this committee a better report card right
here than the Defense! Department.
Senator BIDEN. I appreciate that.
Senator Jackson suggests-and I agree-but I guess I am getting
in the wrong area. I got a note that says, "Time." My last note
would be, "Pull the rhicrophone closer so Senator Jackson and I
can hear your responses."
Thank you very much. I will be back for more questions.
Mr. CASEY. I have it in my lap now.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACKSON
Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask
unanimous consent to', include at the outset a brief opening state-
ment. I didn't want to take the time of the committee.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.
[Prepared opening statement of Senator Henry M. Jackson fol-
lows:]
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON
Mr. Casey, it is a pleasure to have you with us today. You are taking over the
leadership of this nation's intelligence community at a critical time in our country s
history. When the United States had overwhelming military superiority over the
Soviet Union, our intelligence capabilities were important. However, in an era of
parity, or "essential equivall?nce, the need for first rate intelligence on which to
base our foreign policies and defense strategies becomes critical. In fact, in such
circumstances as we find ourselves today, a dollar invested in intelligence may
return a higher yield than a 'dollar invested in weaponry.
I believe that we have not devoted the level of resources to America's intelligence
capabilities that the times rdquire. We need to develop a better balance among our
collection means. We need td fund promising technologies, and we need to reinvigo-
rate our human collection capabilities, especially for critical parts of the world.
But more than collection,! we need to rebuild a first-rate intelligence analysis
capability. The Congress, and this Committee in particular, has taken the lead in
pressing for higher quality intelligence analysis. I would like to see the Administra-
tion assume the leadership in this area. Our country requires today an intelligence
community that attracts and keeps the finest analytic minds available. We need
more and better analysts. Arid we need to tap the research and knowledge of our
nation's top scholars. As I have said in public on a number of occasions, there is no
better way Amricans can serve their country than for them to contribute to our
intelligence capabilities.
The needs are clear; we have the right kind of Congressional oversight of intelli-
gence in place; and we in the Congress stand ready to assist in an across-the-board
reinvigoration program. I look forward to working with you in this area, Mr. Casey.
Senator JACKSON. Mr. Casey, I have been following intelligence
matters for the last 30 years up here. And we go round and round,
and in the last analysis we get back to analysis. It's a people
problem. I have observed that our ability to collect, thanks to
modern science and technology, is improved enormously. Would
you agree?
Mr. CASEY. Yes, I do.
Senator JACKSON. Yet, there are situations, I know, without get-
ting into it here in this open session, where an important scholar
in our country has provided more accurate analysis without access
to any classified information, and was able to predict quite accu-
rately what did happen.
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And I just want to say amen to a very fine statement that you
made here in the opening remarks. And I think everyone ought to
read it, and the country ought to take to heart your statement on
page 5 where you say:
We should call on young Americans to serve their country in the field of intelli-
gence. We should ask American scholars to serve their country by sharing scholar-
ship and insights with those in the community who are responsible for preparing
the intelligence analyses used to develop foreign policy and defense strategy.
I think the tragedy in. this country is that "intelligence" has
become a dirty word. Yet the truth is that in the Battle of Britain
it was the dons, as you know, from Cambridge and Oxford that
played such a critical role in analysis, including the breaking of
the codes.
We just, with all our might and all our power, need to have our
young people understand that there is no greater calling than to go
into the intelligence field, which needs the disciplines that are
offered by our schools-all of them. There is virtually no discipline,
would you agree, that's not involved--
Mr. CASEY. That's correct.
Senator JACKSON [continuing]. In the need to analyze the infor-
mation?
We get all this information out on the table, and then we always
ask, "What does it mean?" And it is in this area, I think, where the
great building needs to take place. These are things that we should
talk about publicly and need to reiterate them over and over again.
And this country does have the scholars.
I think when one asks right now of the State Department, "Who
is your expert on China, on the Soviet Union," you will get a
blank. I find that I get some of my best scholarly input outside the
United States. The days of the Chip Bohlen's and the Tommy
Thompson's were a sort of a golden era in foreign policy and
foreign relations. And I just think we can do better. And I, having
worked with you here these last few weeks on President-elect's-I
don't recall the exact title--
Mr. CASEY. It's IFPAB, Senator.
Senator JACKSON. Well, we keep changing it. But anyway, it's
foreign policy assessment.
Mr. CASEY. Board.
Senator JACKSON. And which I want to commend you unto my
colleagues that Mr. Casey has been a masterful chairman, and
we're looking at the whole world with all its problems.
It seems to me that one of the most important things the new
administration can do is to really carry on a crusade to enlighten
our people, to understand-and especially the young, yes, and the
professors as well-of the importance of a good intelligence organi-
zation. Not for war, but for peace. Wars can be prevented if we
have an accurate assessment of what's going on. And it can be one
of our most formidable tools in achieving peace.
So I don't know how you do it in detail. I think you've indicated
you don't have an immediate prescription.. Is that right?
Mr. CASEY. Well, I don't think there is, I mean, a total prescrip-
tion. I think you just have to work at it and reach out and bring in
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and bring in all the talent and all the scholars and all the exper-
tise and experience you can.
I think also, Senator, if I might just say a couple of things that
your comments have raised in my mind, I think the idea there is
any one best scholar is a fallacy. You know, one fellow is right at
one stage, and then someone over here who has it at another stage.
You've got to reach out and get a range of opinions.
I think the process of doing a lot of negotiating to get an esti-
mate and get that estimate expressed in words that are agreed
upon and negotiated is frequently misleading, because the policy-
maker, the fellow who has to make a decision, he doesn't know
what exactly he's going to be faced with, he doesn't know whether
that estimate is going to be right or wrong. So if he's doing his job,
he's got to prepare and adapt to meet a range of possibilities. And
so he's got to get the range of opinions and range of possibilities
and get them properly analyzed and properly reflected and
presented.
Senator JACKSON. I would agree with you. The need for dissent,
the need to be able to advocate extremely unpopular points of view
within the intelligence community is absolutely essential.
As I look back 30 years, I would say that the greatest single
intelligence failure and diplomatic failure of our country in this
century is the failure to understand China. The idea that somehow
China was Russian because it is Communist. The hardest vote I
cast was to vote for Tito in 1948 in the House, after the Yogoslavs
shot down three American planes 3 months earlier. And yet, we
know that we created and supported a heretic in the Communist
church and its caused them no end of trouble since.
And I do believe that the need for dissent and to be able to voice
those unpopular views within the. intelligence community are vital.
And I think of China, in particular, as a classic example of the
failure of American intelligence.
Well, I guess I was the, witness, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much.
I want to commend the President-elect for your appointment.
Not only have you had the experience, but I think you ve got the
savvy.
Mr. CASEY. Thank you, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Jackson.
I find myself in complete agreement with the statement by Sena-
tor Jackson.
I have just a couple for you, Mr. Casey. Are you giving any
thought to an assistant?
Mr. CASEY. A lot of thought, yes.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CIA?
The CHAIRMAN. I think I would be correct in informing you that
Admiral Robert Inman is held in very high regard by this commit-
tee, in fact by every intelligence person I know around the world.
And we, I think, again Speaking for the committee, do not want to
see just some political person sent over here to be your assistant. I
don t think you need much assistance, but I think Admiral Inman
would be a great addition to your staff if you could see a way to
put him on it.
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Mr. CASEY. I hope he can see his way to come. I have, I think,
Senator, a great need for assistance, and the most experienced and
professional assistants that can be found, because, as you know,
this job, you wear a lot of hats. You've got the community to worry
about, you've got the Agency, you've got the estimates, you've got
the consultation with the consumers, the White House, the Nation-
al Security Council.
So I am looking for experience and talent so I can have the
support to properly do the things that we have been talking about
this morning.
The CHAIRMAN. I raise the point because I read in the paper that
there were quite a few others being considered for your assistant,
and I never heard a word of any of them. And we know Bobby
Inman.
Mr. CASEY. I didn't see that list. I will have to get that list.
Maybe some of them might be good.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I won't even tell you where I saw it. Now,
one other thing. It's been mentioned time and again here, but I
think one of the greatest weaknesses that we suffer is in our
overseas work. And I think this came about through the wrong
activity of the Church committee and other committees of Congress
which has directed assault on the intelligence family to the point
that I find in traveling that the overseas offices are afraid to
engage in covert activity without first thoroughly discussing it with
the home office for fear that their futures will be jeopardized.
Now, I don't want you to explain in detail what your feelings are
about it, but I think I speak for many people interested in the
profession that if we don't have overseas offices free to act covertly
without going back home, we're going to get in the same kind of a
fix we were in in Vietnam when pilots couldn't attack targets of
opportunity.
So I wish you would give that some thought. And if you would
like to talk to the committee further about it, I know the commit-
tee would be very happy to talk with you.
Mr. CASEY. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, I may ask the committee-it's coming up
12 o'clock, and we don't want a recess-do any of you have any
other questions?
My second in command here has a question.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, if I may, Mr. Chairman, an observa-
tion. I think, first, to suggest what the chairman has said about
Admiral Inman I cannot but think is the near-to-unanimous view
of this committee. And certainly, it would be mine and you are
making it your choice. And you and the President will make it.
I wondered if I could make an observation about Senator Biden's
remarks, because I think that they could have been misinterpreted
when he said, "Do you think that there has been more leaking
from the Defense Department than from this committee?" That's
sort of comparing Niagara Falls to an old tin roof, you know. But
we don't ask you to make that judgment until you ve had experi-
ence.
But I wonder if it wouldn't be inappropriate for me to say if the
time comes when you think that anything serious has been com-
promised by virtue of information given this committee, I would
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hope you would say so. I hope you will tell us. And if you feel so,
tell the Nation. We're not immune from your criticism. We have
been very vigilant, I think. But if we have not been successful and
it's your judgment that we haven't been, you tell us, because this
matters.
Mr. CASEY. You can be sure I won't be bashful about that,
Senator.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Senator MOYNIHAN. I would like to just ask one question to bring
us home for just a minute. And that is to say, Have you given any
thought to how we can improve our counterintelligence activities?
We have been concerned with this. We observed what appears to be
widespread Soviet interception of American telephone communica-
tions. We saw some very-some phenomenally successful espionage
in the Boyce-Lee affair in California and the Kampiles affair. And
then we saw Mr. Boyce escape from prison, and it turns out-you
may not know this; I certainly didn't-that when you escape from
a Federal prison you are pursued by Federal marshals, which is to
say when you escape from Federal prison you are free. [Laughter.]
And if you don't know it and I don't know it-and Mr. Boyce
obviously knows it because he now gives interviews to the New
York Times about what it's like, how he visited Mexico, he's going
to Canada, he's here in the Rocky Mountains here for the moment,
the skiing is good, say "Hello" to the folks.
Counterintelligence is a question, is it not, sir? I think there is a
demonstrable increase in Soviet activity and bloc activity. And that
may require some reorganization. I just put that to you as some-
thing the committee is concerned about without having fixed views.
Mr. CASEY. Well, I am'very concerned about that. That relates, to
the question of security that's been raised, leaks that has been
raised. And also, the danger that someone is successful in oper-
ations that have been conducted by our adversaries can deceive us
and mislead us at enormous cost and enormous risk.
So I don't know exactly what needs to be done. With respect to
strengthening our counterintelligence capability, I have understood
that it had been severely diminished, loss of experienced people
and that kind of thing. And it's certainly, Senator, one of the first
things we have to try to rebuild.
Senator MOYNIHAN. I thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Huddleston.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Casey, I too want to commend your
opening statement. I found it reassuring. And my study of your
resume indicates to me you are not only a man of your word but a
man with the resourcefulness, ingenuity, and personal resolve to
carry out your objectives,
We've been talking about the perception that people have of
intelligence and the need for intelligence operations. I would sug-
gest that a part of the popular conclusion about CIA is the fact
that a delineation has not been made between intelligence-gather-
ing or information-gathering and covert action, which our chair-
man has discussed a minute ago. I don't think anybody-certainly
nobody I come into contact with; maybe my folks in Kentucky are
smarter than others-have any concern at all about having the
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greatest informational gathering and analysis operation that you
can possibly have.
I don't think we get into any trouble gathering information in
the world, even though we do it in a secret way and we do it in all
kinds of ways, because every country expects every other country
to engage in gathering information. A lot of that gathering is very
unglamorous and unintriguing and undangerous. It's just reading
newspapers and listening to radios and trying to pick up scuttle-
butt at embassy parties.
But covert action is a different thing. We know it's anything
from putting a news article in a foreign paper to carrying out a
full-scale war. And it ought to be treated differently, I think. And I
think when you lump all these kinds of activities in just the term
"intelligence," you're not really getting at the problems that we're
confronted with.
COVERT ACTION
Every committee I have been on in the Congress has concluded
that we ought to have covert action in certain circumstances. And
the Executive orders provide for it. And indeed, it does go on.
You were a member of the Murphy Commission, as has been
indicated already, which was the Commission on the Organization
of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. I think it
concluded its work about 1976. And it had in its findings and
recommendations sections dealing with intelligence, and particular-
ly with covert action. I would like to quote from it, if I might, just
briefly:
Many dangers are associated with covert action. But we must live in the world we
find, not the world we might wish. Our adversaries deny themselves no form of
action that might advance their interests or undercut ours. In many parts of the
world, a prohibition on our use of covert action would put the United States and
those who rely on it at a dangerous disadvantage. Covert action should not be
abandoned but should be employed only when such action is clearly essential to
vital U.S. purposes and only then after careful high-level review. Covert action
should be authorized only after collective considerations of their benefits and risks
by all available 40 committee members. In addition, covert acts should be reported
to the proposed joint committee of the Congress on national security or to some
other appropriate congressional committee.
I would just inquire if you subscribed to those statements at the
time the report was issued and whether you do at the present
time?
Mr. CASEY. Yes, Senator, I did subscribe to that recommendation.
And it generally reflects my views today.
Senator HUDDLESTON. And one other statement that was made by
that report, "A new era of cooperation between the executive and
congressional branches in foreign relations is vital to the security
of our Nation and the peace of the world." And you subscribed to
that, then?
Mr. CASEY. Amen. Yes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden, did you have anything?
Senator BIDEN. Mr. Murphy, these hearings are difficult-I beg
your pardon, Mr. Casey. You can call me "Bidden." [Laughter.]
Mr. Casey, I realize these hearings are difficult in the sense that
we are seeking to get a sense of how you are going to run an
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agency. And we ask specific questions and you in turn, in order to
keep your options open, as you should, must give general answers.
But you gave an answer to the last question of Senator Huddles-
ton when he quoted from the Murphy Commission and you said,
that generally reflects my view. Can you give us an exception to
that general rule?
Mr. CASEY. Well, what I had in mind when I inserted the word
"generally"-I do not know if I can exactly quote the paragraph-
was the condition there that covert action should be used only
when it is of the greatest importance. Now, I believe there has
been a kind of redefinition. It has become a word of art and there
has been included in the concept of covert action, as I understand
it, either by regulation or law or in some way, a specified range of
things, some of which ':are not of the greatest importance. I would
not want to exclude them, and that is the only reason I put in the
word "generally."
There are some things, now, I think when we are thinking about
strong covert action when you try to intervene in the internal
affairs or to influence" an election, as we did in Italy in 1948, I
think that kind of thing you only do when it is of the highest
interest to the United States and when the President and the
appropriate authorities perceive it to be.
Now, there are other things of a lesser nature which have now
been included in the concept of covert that I do not think we had
in mind in framing that language.
Senator BIDEN. Can you give me an example of one of those
things, as you did with the situation in Italy?
Mr. CASEY. I do not 'think I should in open session. I would be
glad to give you an example privately, as I think I did when we
talked the other day, involving a minor journalistic effort.
Senator BIDEN. Well, the reason why I followed it up is, as you
can tell from various comments on this committee, there is at least
a slight difference in perception of what the degree of accountabil-
ity is that should exist.: And as I understand and read the Murphy
Commission report, really what we are talking about is account-
ability, accountability of the agency.
I thought that the thrust of whether or not the congressional
committee exceeded what it should have, the whole thrust of the
Congress involvement in investigating the intelligence community
was, the conclusion reached, one of the conclusions reached, was
that most times when the Agency or individuals in the Agency got
themselves in trouble it was because there was not anybody ac-
countable. There was not anyone who you looked to. There was not
one person who banged the gavel and said yes or no.
That was one of the major reasons why the Congress, in conjunc-
tion with the executive branch, one of the conclusions reached, was
that most times when the Agency or individuals in the Agency got
themselves in trouble it was because there was not anybody ac-
countable. There was not anyone who you looked to. There was not
one person who banged the gavel and said yes or no.
That was one of the major reasons why the Congress, in conjunc-
tion with the executivee branch, in effect created the job you are
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now being questioned about, that is, the DCI. It was for account-
ability.
And your experience goes back a long way, my understanding is
as far back as the inception of intelligence operations in this coun-
try. It sort of grew out of Pearl Harbor, when a commission was set
up to investigate, why we were unprepared.
But it would seem to me that if we looked over the history of the
past 40 years, accountability has significantly improved the effi-
ciency of the Agency, not only the efficiency but the effectiveness
of our intelligence operation. There seems to be a school of thought
out there that that accountability is somehow inhibiting the
Agency.
As a matter of fact, it is interesting to note that an internal
Nixon administration study of the intelligence community conduct-
ed in 1971, 4 years prior to the Church committee, concluded,
quote:
The operations of the intelligence community have produced two disturbing phe-
nomenon. First is an impressive rise in size and costs. Second is an apparent
inability to achieve commensurate improvement in the scope and overall quality of
intelligence products.
Throughout our career as a committee-I have been on this
committee since its inception-we have striven, I think it is fair to
say, to improve the intelligence community. And the point I guess I
am trying to make is one in which I would be interested to know
your views, is that, rather than leashing or destroying or disman-
tling the intelligence community, the Congressional Oversight
Committee has not interfered with its effectiveness and in fact has
positively effected its activities.
And I wonder if you can give us your opinions on the view that I
just stated?
OPINIONS
Mr. CASEY. I think that the relationship between the community,
its leaders, and this committee should not retard, or I do not see
how it would retard, and can only improve by infusing new ideas
and demanding higher standards of performance.
Having said that, I would like also to supplement it by saying I
think that there is a potential built-in conflict between perform-
ance and accountability, which can be handled. Senator Goldwater
properly stressed the potential danger of requiring examination
and approval of everything that is done in a far-flung operation of
anything that the U.S. Government is involved in has a danger of
impairing initiative and making it impossible to do things that are
important and beneficial, but need to be done now.
There are targets of opportunity. I think the way you have to
handle those dilemmas is establishing workable guidelines within
which your people can function and operate within standards that
are acceptable. Then if something is done that exceeds those guide-
lines, then you have got to deal with that. You have got to know
about it, you have to get it reported on, and you report on it.
But I think there is a point at which rigid accountability, de-
tailed accountability can impair performance, and I think that that
should be recognized.
Senator BIDEN. Do you make a distinction between covert and
clandestine activities?
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Mr. CASEY. I have not thought about it, but I understand the two
words differently. Covert primarily brings to my mind unacknowl-
edgment--
Senator BIDEN. I beg your pardon?
Mr. CASEY. Nonacknowledgeability. Clandestine activity is one
that is secret, that is not necessarily nonacknowledgeable.
Senator BIDEN. To illustrate the way in which we have tended to
deal with it on this committee-I can make a hypothetical case. If
we were eavesdropping on the planet Mars, the folks who live on
Mars, and we planted a receiver in the president of the planet
Mars' ready room, that would be a clandestine activity.
If in fact we planted a person in there who had as his goal the
objective to do something to or about, to alter the action that the
president of Mars was about to take, that would be a covert activi-
ty. That is generally how we treat it.
Mr. CASEY. It might also be clandestine.
Senator BIDEN. It might also be clandestine. But the reason I
raise it is not unimportant. We had a little bit of a fight-at least I
do not think it is unimportant.
We had a little bit of a dilemma with the last administration as
to whether or not a clandestine activity which could have a great
impact upon our foreign policy and whether or not we were
dragged into or out of a conflict should be treated in the same way
as a covert activity.
Everyone acknowledged we should be made aware, within the
scope of the rules of the committee, of any covert activity. But
some suggested that they not require the administration, if they
were planting a bug in the president of Mars' ready room, that we
should be aware of the fact that we had a clandestine operation
underway.
And I am wondering whether or not you have a view as to our
right to be aware of major consequential clandestine activities that
the agency has underway or would have underway under your
situation.
Mr. CASEY. Well, my off-the-top-of-my-head response to that is
that a major, sensitive clandestine collection operation which could
entail embarrassment or danger if it did not work is the kind of
thing that ought to come to your attention. Other things that are
more routine as a practical matter of doing business you would not
expect to have brought to your attention unless something went
wrong with them, and in this case you would expect to have it
reported to you.
Senator BIDEN. My time is up. I will come back on the second
round. Thank you-or the third round.
The CHAIRMAN. Are here any other questions that other mem-
bers of the committee would like to pose?
Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman, can I just make one short
comment? I just point out that intelligence gathering and analysis
is not an exact science.
No matter how well we operate, no matter how efficient we get,
no matter how many good minds we get to study a problem, there
will always be instances where we miscalculate, or where the best
intelligence in the world could not prevent situations from develop-
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ing around some spots in the world adverse to the interests of the
United States.
What happens so frequently every time something happens that
is not in the national interest is that there is a great cry that there
has been an intelligence failure, when in fact in many cases it has
not been an intelligence failure at all.
So I think we have to keep in mind that we are not going to get
to the point where we can control all of the events all over the
world, regardless of how good our intelligence might be.
Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the commit-
tee's plan is. I have, not in an effort to delay, at least 15 to 20
minutes more questions. And I will not ask the questions if anyone
on the committee thinks they are inappropriate as I frame them,
and I will not pursue it.
But I would like to-I know it seems like you are trying to work
out a time problem here, and I have at least 15 more minutes of
questions that relate to substantive areas, not any fishing expedi-
tion.
The CHAIRMAN. There is a time problem. Would the Senator like
to submit the questions in writing? Because I quote rule 5.5:
The Committee vote on the confirmation shall not be sooner than 48 hours after
the Committee has received transcripts of the confirmation hearing, unless the time
limit is waived by unanimous consent of the Committee.
And it would be the Chairman's idea that within 48 hours of this
time we would poll the committee to find out what vote they care
to make. But many of us have hearings coming up shortly that we
have to be prepared for and other commitments. So I suggest that
submitting the questions in writing might be a more appropriate
form.
Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I suspect it will take longer to
answer them in writing and further delay our ability than if I just
take the next 15 minutes and ask them. I give you my word, I have
no intention of objecting. I agree to any unanimous consent re-
quest.
We are now at 19 minutes after. How about if I agree to stop
asking questions by 20 minutes of 1, and then if I have any left I
will submit them, but I will not even attempt to submit them-it
will certainly take longer and take more of the committee's time
for me to submit them in writing and have them answered in
writing.
The CHAIRMAN. You have until 25 minutes of 1. Go ahead.
Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
By now I know, as they say in the South, I know how y'all felt
being in the minority.
The CHAIRMAN. You will get used to it.
Senator BIDEN. I hope I can act responsibly.
Mr. Casey, back to the point I was making about the distinction
between clandestine and. covert. The reason I did that is that we
have a law that covers them both, and I just wanted to know your
view, rather than refer to the law.
"SIGNIFICANT ANTICIPATED INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES"
The law that we have passed points out that there are different
ways in which intelligence can be gathered. The oversight provi-
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sions speak to, quote, significant anticipated intelligence activities,
end quote. They include more than just covert operation.
Now, I want to make sure that I understand. Do you agree with
the interpretation, that the phrase "significant anticipated intelli-
gence activity" includes more than merely covert activity?
Mr. CASEY. Yes.
Senator BIDEN. Fine, thank you. In the interest of getting this
finished up, I will try to go pretty quickly here.
You know, it was raised very forthrightly by Senator Moynihan,
the issue of ITT and the letter received commending you on your
chairmanship at that time and the manner in which you handled
that issue. We are all aware you have been confirmed twice since
that whole thing came up by other committees. My recollection is I
voted for you on those occasions.
But I do think there is a distinction, a difference that is worth
being made here. And that is that the difference between congres-
sional oversight of the intelligence agencies and the oversight of
the SEC is that, A, with the exception of the FBI, the intelligence
community does not have investigative files for law enforcement
purposes; and, B, there, exists a statute authorizing this oversight
committee to be furnished all information, which we have already
discussed.
Now, the debate usually surrounding prior committee confirma-
tions of you as it related to ITT surrounded whether or not you in
any way impeded the pursuit of justice. And I think it is kind of
hard to argue that you impeded the pursuit of justice when you
gave the Justice Department the files.
But there is a different issue at issue here, and that is whether
or not under similar circumstances, if this committee were seeking
to gain information which statutorily you would be required to
give, whether or not you would do what was done there, and that is
transfer those files to 'another agency, in this case the Justice
Department, in order to prevent us or inhibit us from gaining
access to those files.
REPORTING TO COMMITTEE
Even though that would not be impeding a criminal prosecution
in any way, it would be a direct attempt to delay the right of this
committee to have access to information. And I would assume from
the way you have been so forthcoming that you would not counten-
ance doing that; would you?
Mr. CASEY. No, I could envision no circumstances under which
that would come up. This was a special circumstance where I was
chairing a Commission ''which had responsibilities of an oversight
nature to the Congress and responsibilities to protect potential
criminal prosecution to the Justice Department, and those two
obligations came in conflict.
It had been traditional practice and a longstanding practice of
the Commission not to deliver information from open investigative
files. What was done was an act of the whole Commission, voting
unanimously.
Senator BIDEN. By the way, I for one do not question what you
did there. I just wanted to make the point.
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Mr. CASEY. Well, I see no analogy at all, no common circum-
stance.
Senator BIDEN. Fine. Also, you know, the present Executive
order-you indicated, at least I thought, there is no new order on
the shelf ready to be pulled off. You haven't made your mind up
about that.
The present Executive order requires that improper intelligence
activities be reported to this committee. Would you envisage any
Executive order that would not require that? It may also be re-
quired in the law. Is it also in our statute? Well then, that answers
that question.
Do you feel that that also should apply to improper, as opposed
to illegal, as distinguished from illegal activities of the intelligence
community? Let me put it another way.
Do you think in your role of trying to build the morale of the
Agency that, if you are required to come to this committee and say,
hey fellows, you know, the Agency really blew it and such and such
improper activities have occurred-what impact do you think that
would have on your effectiveness to do what you feel has to be
done with the Agency?
Mr. CASEY. None.
Senator BIDEN.. None. All right.
All right. Then I assume-and I think it is important to ask it
for the record-you would have no reluctance to report to this
committee or to comply with existing legislation, even if it would
prove to be an embarrassment to the President of the United
States?
Mr. CASEY. No.
Senator BmmEN. I am almost there, Mr. Chairman.
Now, one of the areas of conflict that exists-and it is very
difficult, and I do not expect you to be able to answer this, but I
expect you to consider it-is that in the good old days, from my
perspective, when the Democrats were in control, I happened to
have been chairman of a subcommittee on the Judiciary Commit-
tee, which I now rank on, and the corresponding interest on this
committee and on the Foreign Relations Committee, of which I am
a member, that relates to international drug trafficking and orga-
nized crime.
And what I have found in our studies and discussions with
agency people, the State Department people, and with FBI agents,
DEA agents, Customs agents, et cetera, is that neither State nor
the intelligence community views the international drug traffick-
ing or organized crime activities as something that really comes up
on their scope. It is not really much of a priority.
And I am not suggesting that it should be. But I would like to
ask you whether you would be willing to have someone under your
command look into and be willing to speak with me and others
about the ability to greater coordinate the issues relating to inter-
national drug trafficking.
You are uniquely situated. The FBI has concerns that would
impact upon the foreign involvement of organized crime, not
American citizens. Would you be willing to talk with me and
others about that?
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48
Mr. CASEY. I will look into that and talk to you as soon as
possible.
Senator BIDEN. I appreciate that very much.
Now, one of the issues I raised this very morning with General
Haig related to the whole question which has been raised here
about leaks and particularly the leaks that occurred in the transi-
tion team. And by the way, they occurred in a Democratic adminis-
tration. That is not to suggest that somehow you had done any-
thing improper if they occurred.
But what is disturbing is what Senator Moynihan has pointed
out. Leaks have been a way through which there has been a very
conscious effort to affect policy, to put pressure on your own man,
whether your man at that time was a Democrat or a Republican.
It seemed clearly that the leaks that we referred to with regard
to the transition team were definitely done to influence policy, to
put the new President, the President-elect, in a position that would
make it difficult for him to take a position different from that
which was leaked.
Now, I asked the question, and I ask it of you: We have been
arguing here in this committee-debating is a better word, I
guess-off and on for the past year the question of what-and in
the Judiciary Committee-the question of what actions we should
take, if any, as a Congress to help plug up those leaks. And some
have suggested, not many, but some have suggested that if we
cannot find the person who leaked the information, many times, as
in the case of the New York Times correspondent; referred to,
many times we can find the person to whom it was leaked, because
he or she waves the paper, prints it in, puts their bylines on it, and
says: Here, this is classified, this is top secret. And some could
argue that it is injurious to the national interest.
Now, if we can identify that person, should we begin to try to
take action against that person? Because sometimes it is so hard to
find who leaked the information. We can at least find the one who
published the information. Should we take action against the
person who published the information if it is clearly detrimental to
U.S. interests?
Mr. CASEY. That is a question on which I do not think I could
come up with a position on the spur of the moment. It has been
litigated in the courts. There has been developed a sort of a jour-
nalistic privilege comparable to an attorney's privilege. And cer-
tainly I am concerned. If the national interest is seriously injured,
it certainly warrants then the protection of a journalistic source.
But that is such a complicated question, with so many consider-
ations and so much precedent, that I do not think I would want to
take a position at this time.
Senator BIDEN. Mr. Casey, I am not asking you to take a policy
position. I am not asking you to speak for the President of the
United States. I am not even asking you what you will do when
you are Director.
But I am asking you, a man who has a wealth of experience by a
factor of four more than I and many members of this committee,
what your personal view is.
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Mr. CASEY. I do not have a considered personal view and I do not
want to express an unconsidered personal view.
Senator BIDEN. One of the mild, I would acknowledge, but one of
the concerns raised that I think should be on the record is whether
or not, because of your background as a producer of intelligence,
having occurred at a time, a period of time when there was much
less sophisticated technological capability than that which exists
today, that having been the case, that you might have a tendency
to naturally rely more on human intelligence sources than on-
hold on, let me check a minute. I have to see whether I can use a
phrase.
[Pause.]
Senator BIDEN. I know what it is. I just want to make sure that I
can say it.
Rather than on signals intelligence or other forms of intelligence
gathering, whatever. Do you feel that you will have that inclina-
tion or do you feel comfortable with the more sophisticated means
of gathering intelligence than human source intelligence?
Mr. CASEY. I certainly do. I think they are exceedingly valuable.
Indeed, I think as I reflect on World War II, the technical means,
the overhearing of the signals, were much more important than
the human means. The human means were supplementary. And
the real trick in intelligence is in putting them all together, getting
the mosaic, and then forming a judgment about what it all adds up
to.
So I do not think you can exclude any source that will provide
the links that might give you the right answer. I certainly think
the technical means are terribly important, but they certainly do
not eliminate the need for human source information, overt and
covert.
Senator BIDEN. Do you think there is a need to drastically in-
crease the number of human source intelligence people? I am
getting right there on time, with 15 minutes gone.
Mr. CASEY. I do not know. I do not know what we have.
Senator BIDEN. Well, at the expense of ruining the man's reputa-
tion, I would like to concur with Senator Goldwater. We do agree
on a lot of things and one is that the absolute best, unquestionably
the absolute best person in every respect that has ever testified
before this committee is Admiral Inman. In my opinion he is the
single most competent man that exists in the entire United States
intelligence community.
I think you would be well served if you ended up considering
him. And I tell you what: When you get a problem-I am probably
building our own demise here-you send him up. He knows a way
around us. That is the only drawback to him. But he is super
competent, forthcoming, honest, and very, very, very good.
Mr. CASEY. I share that view, Senator, strongly.
Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Senator, for your indulgence.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I hope you apply the same reasoning
to General Haig.
Senator BIDEN. I just hope General Haig has those competent
people behind him.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from New York?
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50
Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of Admiral
Inman's future in our community, I wonder if the Senator from
Delaware would amend his remarks to say that Admiral Inman is
the second most capable person in the community.
Senator BIDEN. He may become the second most. Right now he is
the most capable.
We have an expression in my State, and you are very familiar
with it, being involved in political affairs, Mr. Casey. It goes, "I will
campaign for you or against you, whichever will help the most." If
it is concluded that it would help for me to be against Admiral
Inman, I will so insert.a statement to that effect.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to make two other
quick remarks. One is to say that I am sure Senator Biden will
agree, there is not a trace of disposition in this committee to hold
journalists responsible) in any way for the behavior of public offi-
cials. We are concerned about the behavior of public officials and
that is where our concern stops.
And second, Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me, Senator
Inouye would have wished to be here. He was our first chairman.
Ile has not been well. He is getting over it. But he asks to send his
regards to you and excuses to the chairman. Thank you.
Mr. CASEY. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you.
Does anybody else have any comments? I said that real quietly.
We will poll you, according to the rules, some time in the after-
noon on Thursday as to your disposition toward our candidate. '
And I want to thank you, sir, for being here. You have done a
splendid job.
And with that, the committee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL K. INOUYE
Mr. Casey, I would like to join my colleagues in welcoming you to this hearing on
your nomination to be the Director of Central Intelligence.
As I am sure you are aware, the post for which you have been nominated is one of
the most important in the United States Government. Timely and accurate intelli-
gence is not only this country's first line of defense, but in these perilous times is a
major means of preserving world peace.
The most important duty of the Director of Central Intelligence, and the purpose
of the vast and complex national intelligence system which he manages and directs,
is to provide to the President and the national leadership-both in the Executive
and Legislative branches-the best analytic judgments available on the plans and
intentions of foreign governments. Independence of mind, mature judgment, and a
strong analytic interest are important qualities that must be possessed by the
Director Central Intelligence if he is to fulfill his mandate. The Director of Central
Intelligence must insure that national intelligence is not only effective but that it
functions within the Constitution and laws of this great nation.
As the first Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I take a great deal of
pride in the relationship that has developed between the Congress and the Execu-
tive branch on intelligence matters. We have evolved from an adversarial relation-
ship to a relationship characterized by mutual respect for our separate duties and
responsibilities under the Constitution. This relationship has served to strengthen
the U.S. intelligence system, and I am sure it will continue under the able leader-
ship of my distinguished colleague from Arizona.
Mr. Casey, I look forward to working closely with you and your staff on the many
crucial matters that are likely to face this nation in the months ahead. The
' See page 51.
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intelligence community performs a critical function for this country-a function
that largely goes unrecognized in times of lessened tensions in the world. It deserves
the respect and support of all Americans who value the security that they enjoy.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS,
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
Washington, D.C., January 12, 1981.
Hon. BARRY GOLDWATER,
Chairman, Select Committee of Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. -
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,
as amended, I enclose a copy of the financial disclosure report filed by Mr. William
J. Casey. President-elect Reagan has announced his intent to nominate Mr. Casey
for the position of Director, Central Intelligence Agency.
We have reviewed the report and have also obtained advice from the agency
concerning any possible conflict in light of the agency's functions and the nominee s
proposed duties. Based thereon, we believe that Mr. Casey is in compliance with
applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest.
Sincerely,
J. JACKSON WALTER, Director.
Goldwater
Moynihan
Garn
Chafee
Lugar
Wallop
Durenberger
Roth
Schmitt
Huddleston
Inouye
Jackson
Leahy
Bentsen
COMMITTEE VOTE ON MR. CASEY
ROLLCALL VOTE
AGAINST PRESENT
Biden
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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release January 20, 1981
The President today nominated William J. Casey of Roslyn Harbor,
New York, to be Director,of Central Intelligence and to be a
member of the President's Cabinet.
Mr. Casey was Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Office of
the President-elect,. Chairman of the Interim Foreign Policy
Advisory Board, and a member of the Transition Appointments
Committee.
He is counsel to the law firm of Rogers & Wells of New York and
Washington.
Born March 13, 1913, Mr. Casey attended Fordham University where
he received his undergraduate and LL.B. degrees.
During World War II, Mr. Casey served as an aide to William B.
Donovan in the Washington headquarters of the Office of Strategic
Services, as Chief at OSS London headquarters, and as Chief of
Secret- Intelligence for General Eisenhower's Theatre of War.
From April 1971 to January 1976 Mr. Casey served as President and
Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, Under-
secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. From 1969 to 1977 he served
on a number of Presidential Commissions, including the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Commission on Organization
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, the General Advisory Committee
on Arms Control, and the Presidential Task Force on International
Development.
Mr. Casey is a director of Capital Cities Communications, Long
Island Lighting Company, and Long Island Trust Company, and
chairman of the Executive Committee of the International Rescue
Committee, and co-chairman of the Citizen's Commission on Indo-
Chinese Refugees.
Mr. Casey is married to the former Sophia Kurz, and they have a
daughter, Bernadette.
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