STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI NOMINEE FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000100220009-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 27, 1978
• Content Type: STATEMENT

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
Embargoed for Release
Until 10:00 a.m.
27 January 1978
Nominee for Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
27 January 1978
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI,
NOMINEE FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
27 January 1978
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear
before this committee to discuss my qualifications for the position of
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. I also appreciate the opportunity,
Mr. Chairman, for this early hearing, as well as the courtesy and
professionalism with which this Committee and its staff have conducted the
investigation that preceded this hearing.
I would also like to thank Senator Schweiker for appearing today, and both
him and Senator Heinz for their kind words about my qualifications.
The Committee has my biography, so I will not review my career except
to say that I am fortunate in having had diversified Government experience,
including service in domestic as well as foreign affairs agencies. The positions
I have held during the last eight years have afforded me the opportunity
to work closely with the Congress, including several members of this Committee,
on a wide range of issues. I have learned how important a cooperative
relationship between the Executive and the Congress is to the effective
functioning of our Government. I, therefore, pledge myself -- if confirmed--
to work closely with this Committee, its counterpart in the House, and with the
respective Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees which have budgetary
oversight of intelligence agencies.
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
As I reflect on the responsibilities of the position for which I have been
nominated, I am impressed with the importance of the issues the Intelligence
Community and this Committee face. Many of them are basic to the survival
of our democratic institutions. On the one hand, we must continue to
improve our intelligence effectiveness. In part this means protecting
information from public disclosure lest such disclosure undermine this
effectiveness. On the other hand, we all recognize the need for accountability
of our intelligence agencies and for safeguarding the basic freedoms of
our citizens. This may mean making more information available about
our intelligence organization. The challenges posed by these often conflicting
needs are obvious and very familiar to this Committee.
As far as I know, no other modern society has attempted such a
fundamental, difficult and complex task. Yet, I am confident that these
problems can be resolved. I am confident that we can succeed in striking
that balance which will enable a necessarily secret agency to accomplish
its mission and still remain true to the principles of an open and free
society -- a society in which the rights of the individual are paramount.
On January 24th, President Carter signed a new Executive Order. It
strengthens coordination within the Intelligence Community. It establishes
procedures within the Executive to enhance cooperation with the
Congress. It erects safeguards against abuses such as those that have
recently come to light and that have troubled us all. At the invitation
of the President, this Committee actively participated in the drafting of
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
that Executive Order. If confirmed, I will cooperate with this Committee
as it exercises its oversight responsibilities to ensure compliance with
the Executive Order.
Contrary to allegations in the Lisbon Communist press, I have never been
on the CIA payroll; but as a Foreign Service officer I have had a working
relationship with the Agency and have been a user of the Intelligence product.
I have also been involved in intelligence budgets, and I am familiar with both
the problems and the benefits of interagency coordination. Thus, I approach
the position for which I have been nominated with a certain set of perceptions,
assumptions or perhaps even biases depending on your point of view.
I think it appropriate to present them to the Committee .
First, I am absolutely convinced that good decision-making requires
good intelligence. I have seen good intelligence reports turn a potentially
unsuccessful policy into a successful one. I have also seen the undesirable
effects of poor intelligence. We must continue to set high standards for
ourselves to ensure the careful collection, precise reporting, critical
analysis, and concise and clear presentation that are the ingredients
of success of any intelligence organization.
Second, I know from my experience as a reporting officer how
painstaking a process it is to develop an overt relationship of confidence
with foreigners who are constantly subject to a propaganda barrage which
distorts our motives and which questions our strength of purpose.
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
To develop a relationship which enables our government to obtain information
in sensitive areas is an even more painstaking, delicate and sometimes
risky process. We need to recognize, more than we do, that human
intelligence collection is a slow step-by-step process which often takes
years of seed work to develop a fruitful source. It is a highly professional
skill.,
Third, in my experience with domestic programs, I have seen how the
rights of citizens can be ignored or even abused by insensitive Government
machinery -- even in so-called open agencies. I was a strong advocate
of the controversial OEO legal services program for that reason. I have also
seen in foreign governments how excessive secrecy and/or lack of an adequate
machinery for accountability can turn a foreign intelligence agency from
a national asset into an instrument of oppression. We must constantly
strive to avoid this danger in our own country.
Fourth, I have become a strong advocate of interagency coordination.
In the domestic area I was keenly interested in the Federal Regional Council
system. In the foreign policy area, I have seen the constant temptation
to compartmentalize our information-gathering process. Duplication, false
confirmation and faulty decision-making are the inevitable results of this
tendency. In several of my assignments overseas, I established or implemented
procedures for coordination between the collectors of intelligence and
Embassy reporting staffs. I believe this enhanced the value of the product
to Washington users. The coordinating role given the Director of Central
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
Intelligence by the new Executive Order is a positive step in resolving
this problem.
Fifth, and perhaps most important, I have had the privilege of working
with intelligence professionals from the lowest to the highest level.
While I did not normally know their sources and methods, nor, did I need to,
I was able to benefit greatly from their information and to appreciate the
motivation, objectivity, self-sacrifice and physical and moral courage with
which they approached their sensitive and, at times, dangerous jobs.
Human nature being what it is, we all seek recognition. Most of us can
receive it openly. Not so the intelligence professional. His or her
reward must come from the quality of his product and its value to the
user. He or she must draw satisfaction from the fact that they are serving
their country in ways that sometimes even their family cannot know. This,
I submit, is the essence of patriotism.
I confess to a strong reaction when the Lisbon press produced a
so-called expose' by a former CIA employee, pinpointing addresses of alleged
CIA officers in Lisbon, even to the point of telling people which way
to turn to reach a particular apartment when they get off the elevator.
I watched understandably worried officers uproot their families and move
from house to house, finally leaving the country before the end of their
normal tour. If confirmed, I would appreciate an opportunity to have
a dialogue with this Committee on ways to deal with this type of cold-blooded
irresponsibility while still protecting the basic rights of American citizens.
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
The role of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence has varied both
in scope and authority throughout the history of the CIA. While one can
never be precise about one's anticipated responsibilities, I believe it important
that I try to describe to the Committee as best I can how Admiral Turner
and I intend to operate. I might note that Admiral Turner and I have
discussed this subject in-depth, and that I accompanied Admiral Turner
when he described my responsibilities to the President.
Simply stated, we intend to adhere closely to the National Security
Act of 1947 which established a single Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence "who shall act for and exercise the powers of the Director
during his absence or disability." Both Admiral Turner and I agree that
the single deputy concept is most effective. This means that when Admiral
Turner is away, I will assume his Community-wide responsibilities as
well as his CIA responsibilities.
As a practical matter, Admiral Turner and I have discussed how
we will divide our time. I will assume the day-to-day operating responsibilities
of the Agency. I will, of course, discuss all major policy questions
with Admiral Turner, but he and I anticipate that I will be able to take
much of the Agency decision-making and, to a lesser extent, representational
responsibilities off his hands, thereby freeing him to devote more of
his attention to his Community-wide responsibilities .
This does not mean that Admiral Turner will not continue to interest
and involve himself in CIA. On the contrary, we anticipate that this will
enable him to delve more deeply into basic policy questions and to have
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
more substantive contact at all levels. For example, we have already
discussed a program that will enable Admiral Turner to make regular
visits to the Agency's overseas establishments. Nor does it mean that
I will not concern myself with Community questions. With the new Executive
Order, it is essential that I remain abreast of what is happening to the
Community in order to fulfill my responsibilities as the day-to-day
manager of the CIA and to substitute for the Director of Central
Intelligence in his Community responsibilities in his absence. But it
does mean that we will have different areas of emphasis, at least initially.
I believe that this arrangement should present no problems to the NSC, the
Community, the CIA or the Congress. On the contrary, it should enable
us to be more responsive to all four.
During my visits with several members of the Committee, questions
have been raised about the personnel reductions that have been directed
by Admiral Turner. I am sure the Committee will understand that I cannot
make a judgment on such a difficult and sensitive issue until I am actually
on the job. When I do, I will present my views to Admiral Turner.
I can, however, make a generalization or two.
My past experience indicates that all agencies tend to continue with
staff long after program requirements have altered, and that constant
pressure from the top is necessary to make sure that all employees are
being suitably challenged. Top level attention is also needed to ensure
that each employee has a career development program and that suitable
opportunities are available for him when he reaches the most productive
years of his career. I recall the so-called "grade creep" exercise of
several years ago which documented conclusively that all Departments
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7
and Agencies have a tendency to bunch up at the top and to take the
shape of a pear rather than a pyramid. In the foreign affairs area, this
phenomenon tends to be more prevalent in headquarters than in the field
offices .
At the same time, I have learned the importance of communicating
fully and personally to employees the reasons for managerial, organizational
or personnel alterations. They must understand how the changes will enable
them better to perform their mission. Admiral Turner fully shares this view
and has devoted a substantial amount of time to doing this . Should this
Committee confirm me, both of us intend to devote even more of our
time to this effort.
Let me close, Mr. Chairman, by underscoring that I feel a keen
sense of mission in approaching the responsibilities I will assume should
the Senate confirm me . I am pleased at the prospect of working with
Admiral Turner, whom I respect and admire. I am also pleased at the
prospect of working with this Committee. I am confident we can meet
the challenges as we move ahead together to strengthen our nation's
intelligence capacity.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee for your
attention. I am now ready to respond to your questions.
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100220009-7