STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE ON S. 2284 THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACT OF 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000100220004-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 21, 1980
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ON
S. 2284
THE "NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACT OF 1980"
FEBRUARY 21, 1980
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MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM PLEASED TO BE HERE TODAY TO LEAD OFF
THE ADMINISTRATION'S TESTIMONY WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPOSED
C)NG.;ESSIONAL CHARTERS FOR THE I-NTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. FOR
THE ENTIRE THREE YEARS THAT I HAVE BEEN THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, I HAVE BEEN A STRONG SUPPORTER OF
THESE CHARTERS,
THE FIRST REASON FOR THIS IS THE FACT THAT THE GUIDING
LEGISLATION TODAY IS INCOMPLETE. IT IS THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ACT OF 1947 AS AMENDED. THE EVOLUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMIIMUNITY IN THE INTERVENING
YEARS HAS NOT CONFORMED WITH THE IMAGE WHICH THE CONSTRUCTERS
OF THAT LEGISLATION HAD IN MIND; CLEARLY, WE ARE NOT DOING
ANYTHING ILLEGAL OR IN CONTRADICTION TO THOSE LAWS, BUT THE
PICTURE THEY PORTRAY OF WHAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS
AND HOW IT FUNCTIONS SIMPLY HAS NOT WORKED OUT IN PRACTICE.
I BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE CONGRESS ENUNICATE
TO US AND TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHAT KIND OF AN INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY IT EXPECTS AND WANTS.
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SECONDLY, INTELLIGENCE IS BY ITS VERY NATURE A RISK-TAKING
BUSINESS. THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS OF OUR COUNTRY ARE
TRAINED TO TAKE THOSE RISKS ON BEHALF OF THE COUNTRY. THEY
DESERVE, I BELIEVE, AS EXPRESS A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT THEY
ARE EXPECTED TO DO AND NOT TO DO AS IT IS HUMANLY POSSIBLE
TO CREATE. THERE ARE DEFINITE LIMITATIONS AS TO HOW SUCH
AUTHORITIES AND RESTRICITONS CAN BE EXPRESSED, BUT WE OWE IT
TO OUR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS TO GIVE THEM THE BEST GUIDANCE
WE CAN, THEY WILL STILL NECESSARILY HAVE TO ASSUME CONSIDERABLE
INITIATIVE AND RISK ON THEIR OWN, BUT WE SHOULD PROVIDE THEM
ALL THE SUPPORT THAT IS POSSIBLE.
THIRDLY, IN THE LAST FIVE OR SIX YEARS WE HAVE BEEN
MOVING TO AN EXCITING AND IMPORTANT NEW CONCEPT IN THE WORLD
OF INTELLIGENCE, THIS IS THE CONCEPT OF CLOSE CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS. IT IS THE COMPLEMENT
TO THE AUTHORIZATIONS AND THE RESTRICTIONS WHICH SHOULD BE
ENUNCIATED IN A CHARTER, IN SHORT, THROUGH OVERSIGHT THE
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CONGRESS CAN AND SHOULD CHECK ON WHETHER THE AUTHORIZATIONS
ARE BEING USED TO GOOD ADVANTAGE AND WHETHER THE RESTRICITONS
ARE, IN FACT, BEING FOLLOWED IN THEIR SPIRIT AS WELL AS THEIR
LETTER. UNDER THIS CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE, IT IS POSSIBLE
TO AVOID SUCH DETAILED AND SPECIFIC RESTRICTIONS AS WOULD
HOBBLE OUR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS BEYOND USEFULNESS. THIS
NEW AND IMPORTANT CONCEPT OF THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF AUTHORI-
ZATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE ONE HAND, AND OVERSIGHT ON
THE OTHER, NEEDS TO BE CLEARLY ENUNCIATED BY THE CONGRESS.
ONLY THEN CAN THE CITIZENS OF OUR COUNTRY READILY UNDERSTAND
E-HOW THE CONGRESS IS EXERCISING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN AN
AREA WHERE, DUE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECRECY, THE. PUBLIC
CANNOT BE ADEQUATELY INFORMED TO MAKE ITS OWN JUDGMENT,
FOURTH, AND FINALLY, IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF OUR COUNTRY BE GIVEN GREATER
PROTECTION FOR ITS NECESSARY SECRETS. THERE IS NO ISSUE OF
HIGHER IMPORT TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE
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EFFORTS TODAY. THE CHARTER LEGISLATION IS A PROPER AND
IMPORTANT VEHICLE FOR PROVIDING THE NECESSARY PROTECTION TO
WHAT WE REFER TO AS.OUR SOURCES AND METHODS OF COLLECTING
INTELLIGENCE AND TO SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE. INFORMATION
ITSELF, ANY INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS THAT CANNOT CONDUCT
SENSITIVE OPERATIONS IN SECRECY CANNOT OFFER HUMAN SOURCES
ASSURANCES THAT THEIR COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES WILL
REMAIN SACROSANCT. IT ALSO CANNOT GIVE ASSURANCES OF WITH-
HOLDING FROM PUBLIC EXPOSURE PRIVATE SENSITIVE INFORMATION,
THE EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF WHICH IS OF GREAT VALUE TO OUR
POLICYMAKERS . WITHOUT THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE THESE ASSURANCES
WE SIMPLY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PRODUCE THE KIND OF INTELLIGENCE
THAT OUR NATION MUST HAVE IF WE ARE TO CONDUCT OUR FOREIGN
POLICY SUCCESSFULLY. THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN PROVISIONS
FOR ADEQUATE SECRECY ON THE ONE HAND AND SUFFICIENT CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT AND PROTECTION FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN CITIZEN
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ON THE OTHER IS A NARROW ONE. IT CAN BE DRAWN TO PROTECT
ALL OF THESE INTERESTS, BUT ALL THREE INTERESTS MUST BE KEPT
IN MIND IN THAT PROCESS.
WHEN THIS COMMITTEE INTRODUCED ITS ORIGINAL CHARTER
BILL S. 2525, SOME TWO YEARS AGO, WE ALL RECOGNIZED THAT AN
EXTENDED PERIOD OF NEGOTIATION AMONG INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
OFFICERS, COMMITTEE STAFF, AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN THESE
THREE INTERESTS. IT HAS BEEN A LONG AND ARDUOUS PROCESS.
BUT I BELIEVE THAT ALL THOSE WHO HAVE TAKEN PART IN THESE
NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS WE HAVE BEFORE
US TODAY. IT IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT THAT THERE HAS
BEEN AN EVOLUTION FROM AN EMPHASIS ON OVERLY SPECIFIC
RESTRICTIONS TO THE SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY.
UNFORTUNATELY, SEVERAL OUTSTANDING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
HAVE PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF A BILL WHICH COULD BE
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FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE
ADMINISTRATION. IN PART. THESE DIFFERENCES ARE OVER WHETHER
THE DRAFT BILL ADEQUATELY PROVIDES PROTECTION FOR OUR
NECESSARY SECRETS. OTHER DIFFERENCES RELATE TO WHETHER WE
WOULD HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY AND THE CAPACITY TO ACT WITH
NECESSARY DISPATCH IN CRISIS SITUATIONS. STILL. I CERTAINLY
AGREE WITH THE REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT THAT THE SUBSTANTIAL
AGREEMENT WE HAVE ALREADY ACHIEVED PLACES US WELL ON THE ROAD
TO RESOLVING THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES. LET ME ADDRESS
THOSE DIFFERENCES SPECIFICALLY.
FIRST. I AM TROUBLED BY THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BILL, I
BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT INTELLIGENCE CHARTER
LEGISLATION FOLLOW THE LOGICAL SEQUENCE OF DEALING SUCCESSIVELY
WITH AUTHORITIES. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT. AND THE SYSTEM OF
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY, I THINK THAT THE ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE OF S. 228L1 TENDS TO OBSCURE THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS
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SOMEWHAT BUT THAT THESE STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS CAN BE EASILY
REMEDIED.
SECOND, A COMPREHENSIVE CHARTER SHOULD CONTAIN AUTHORITY
FOR THE PRESIDENT TO WAIVE ANY PROVISION OF THAT ACT IN TIME
OF WAR OR DURING A PERIOD COVERED BY A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
UNDER THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO
CARRY OUT THE ACTIVITIES COVERED BY THE REPORT. THE ONLY
SUCH AUTHORITY IN S. 2284 IS FOR A LIMITED WARTIME WAIVER OF
THE PROHIBITION ON COVER USE OF CERTAIN INSTITUTIONS. THIS
IS INSUFFICIENT, S. 2284 STILL CONTAINS A VARIETY OF
RESTRICTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS, BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE
WHICH I N TINE OF WAR COULD IMPEDE NECESSARY ACTION. THE
ADMINISTRATION FAVORS A WARTIME WAIVER WHICH WOULD DEAL WITH
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WHILE AT THE SAME TINE PREVENTING ANY
POTENTIAL ABUSE BY REQUIRING NOTIFICATION TO THE SENATE AND
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES ON INTELLIGENCE WHEN THE PROVISION
IS INVOKED. THE PROVISION FAVORED BY THE ADMINISTRATION IS
SET FORTH IN AN APPENDIX TO MY STATEMENT,
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THIRD, THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES THAT THE REQUIREMENT
FOR REPORTING OF SIGNIFICANT ANTICIPATED INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING SPECIAL ACTIVITIES OR COVERT ACTIONS,
IS UNNECESSARY, IMPROPER AND UNWISE, CONSEQUENTLY, IT
CANNOT SUPPORT SECTIONS 142 AND 125 AS THEY ARE NOW WRITTEN.
TO BEGIN WITH, I BELIEVE THAT THIS COMMITTEE AND THE HOUSE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE HAVE BEEN KEPT FULLY AND CURRENTLY
INFORMED OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN BY THE INTELLI-
GENCE COMMUNITY. I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY COMPLAINT BY THE
h LECT COMMITTEES, OR OF ANY INADEQUACY WITH CURRENT OVERSIGHT
WHICH PREVENTS THE COMMITTEES FROM FULFILLING THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES.
IN ADDITION, IT WOULD BE IMPROPER TO ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE
SUCH REQUIREMENTS IN STATUTE. SUCH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
WOULD AMOUNT TO EXCESSIVE INTRUSION BY THE CONGRESS INTO THE
PRESIDENT'S EXERCISE OF HIS POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
THE ADMINISTRATION FAVORS ALTERNATIVE PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD
CONFIRM EXISTING OVERSIGHT ARRANGEMENTS BY REQUIRING THAT
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THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES BE KEPT FULLY AND CURRENTLY
INFORMED OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY,
SUCH PROVISONS WOULD CONTINUE THE CURRENT REPORTING STANDARD
UNDER THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT BY REQUIRING THAT SPECIAL
ACTIVITIES BE REPORTED "IN A TIMELY FASHION," BUT WOULD
LIMIT SUCH REPORTING TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES
ON INTELLIGENCE.
PRIOR REPORTING WOULD REDUCE THE PRESIDENT'S FLEXIBILITY
TO DEAL l'-4I TH SITUATIONS INVOLVING GRAVE DANGER TO PERSONAL
SAFETY, OR WHICH DICTATE SPECIAL REQUIRE'IENTS FOR SPEED AND
SECRECY. ON THE OTHER HAND, ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD HAVE
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES, OR WHICH WOULD BE CARRIED OUT OVER
AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME, SHOULD GENERALLY BE SHARED WITH
THE CONGRESS AT THEIR INCEPTION, AND I WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION.
TO MAKING THIS POINT IN THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
CERTAIN FACETS OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ARE BY THEIR
VERY NATURE RISK-TAKING VENTURES. BY RISKS I MEAN THAT
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EITHER THE LIVES AND REPUTATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS ARE AT STAKE
AND/OR THAT THE PRESTIGE AND POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES
WITH RESPECT TO OTHER NATIONS COULD BE ENDANGERED. THERE
ARE CLEARLY SITUATIONS IN WHICH I PERSONALLY WOULD NOT ASK
AN INDIVIDUAL TO ACCEPT SUCH RISKS TO HIS WELFARE OR PLACE
THE REPUTATION OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE. LINE IF I WERE
REQUIRED TO REPORT SUCH INTENTION TO MORE MEMBERS OF THE
CONGRESS AND THEIR STAFFS THAN I WOULD PERMIT PERSONS
W I T H I N THE CIA TO DE PRIVY TO THIS INFORMATION. MOREOVER,
,'!F. MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT RIGID STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
REQUIRI'1,1GG FULL AND PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION WILL HAVE AN INHIBITING EFFECT UPON THE WILLINGNESS
OF INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS TO COOPERATE WITH OUR
COUN RY. I N SHORT, I T MAY NOT ONLY BE A CASE OF MMEY UNWILLINGNESS
TO ASK INDIVIDUALS TO ACCEPT RISKS: THOSE INDIVIDUALS SIMPLY
MAY NOT BE WILLING TO TAKE THEM.
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OUR FOURTH CONCERN IS THAT SECTION 142 OF THE BILL
FAILS TO SPECIFICALLY MENTION THE DUTY OF THE DNI TO PROTECT
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS. OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT
FOREIGN SOURCES AND TO DEAL WITH FRIENDLY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY IMPAIRED BY THE SIGNAL THAT
THE OMISSION OF THIS LONGSTANDING PROVISION WOULD GIVE, THIS
LANGUAGE HAS BEEN A BACKBONE OF OUR ASSURANCES TO SUCH INDIVIDUALS
AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT THE DNI CAN AND WILL PROVIDE PROTECTION
FOR THEIR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS. ACCORDINGLY, THE ADMINISTRATION
FAVORS PROVISIONS CONCERNING OVERSIGHT OF SIGNIFICANT INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES THAT ARE DIFFERENT THAT THOSE OF S. 2234, AND
SUCH PROVISIONS ARE SET FORTH IN THE APPENDIX.
WHILE I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS AN ARGUMENT WHICH
SOUNDS MOST REASONABLE THAT THE CONGRESS SHOULD BE ENTITLED
TO ACCESS TO ALL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, I WOULD LIKE TO
POINT OUT THAT THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF SUCH A PROVISION IN
THIS LEGISLATION COULD BE VERY HARMFUL, TO BEGIN WITH, THE
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KINDS OF INFORMATION WE WOULD WISH TO WITHHOLD ARE THE
KINDS OF INFORMATION WHICH THIS COMMITTEE HAS SAGACIOUSLY
AND CONSISTENTLY INDICATED IT WOULD NEVER SEEK TO OBTAIN.
THE NAMES OF HUMAN SOURCES OF INFORMATION IS ONE GOOD
EXAMPLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE INCLUSION OF A PROVISION
THAT WOULD THEORETICALLY REQUIRE US TO PROVIDE SUCH A NAME
COULD HAVE A VERY CHILLING EFFECT UPON THE CONFIDENCE WE CAN,
INSTILL IN SUCH INDIVIDUALS THAT WORKING WITH US IS A
REASONABLY SAFE PROPOSITION. WE. ARE ASKING YOU FOR RELIEF
FROM THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT, FROM THE MORE ONEROUS
PROVISIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, AND FOR LEGISLATION
TO DEAL WITH INSTANCES OF THE REVELATION OF THE IDENTITIES
OF OUR PERSONNEL. ALL OF THESE MEASURES WILL BE OF GREAT
ASSISTANCE TO US IN DEVELOPING CONFIDENCE IN FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS
AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. THE INCLUSION OF A PROVISION FOR
ALL-ENCOMPASSING ACCESS TO OUR DATA WOULD RUN DIRECTLY
CONTRARY TO THESE STEPS AND WOULD IN LARGE MEASURE NULLIFY THEM,
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FIFTH, ANOTHER PROVISION OF THE BILL THAT STANDS OUT AS
AN EXAMPLE OF UNWARRANTED LIMITATION OF FLEXIBILITY IS SECTION
132, CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH CERTAIN
PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS, WHILE THE PROVISION DOES NOT PROHIBIT
RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF MEDIA,
RELIGi:JUS, OR ACADEMIC ORGANIZATIONS OR EXCHANGE PROGRAMS,
IT PROHIBITS THE ESTABLISHMENT OR MAINTENANCE OF ANY COVER
INVOLVING THOSE GROUPS. I SHARE THE VIEW OF CONGRESS THAT
THESE INSTITUTIONS PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN OUR DEMOCRACY
AND MUST HAVE THEIR INDEPENDENCE PRESERVED. THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ITSELF TOOK STEPS SOME TIME AGO TO
REGULATE INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THESE INSTITUTIONS
AND THEIR MEMBERS. OUR SELF-IMPOSED REGULATION FOR ALL
PRACTICAL PURPOSES PROHIBITS COVER USE OF THESE GROUPS OR
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PAID USE OF THEIR MEMBERS, SUCH PROHIBITIONS SHOULD NOT BE
ENACTED AS LAW, HOWEVER. THERE CAN ARISE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES
IN WHICH INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH MEMBERS OF THESE
INSTITUTIONS ARE NOT ONLY WARRANTED, BUT MAY BE THE ONLY
MEANS AVAILABLE FOR ACCOMPLISHING IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE
OBJECTIVES. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, INTERNAL REGULATIONS
PERMIT WAIVER OF THE GENERAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST THE USE OF
THESE GROUPS. I HAVE GRANTED SUCH WAIVERS ON RARE
KCASIONS. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THIS FLEXIBILITY THERE
SHOULD BE NO BLANKET PROHIBITION IN STATUTE. IN THIS
REGARD, IT MAKES LITTLE SENSE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN ACTUAL
INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH MEMBERS OF SUCH GROUPS AND
THE. ESTABLISHMENT AND USE OF COVER. WHILE COVER USE SHOULD
BE KEPT TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, CIRCUMSTANCES ARE CONCEIVABLE
IN WHICH SUCH USE WOULD BE THE ONLY MEANS AVAILABLE TO THE
GOVERNMENT I N A SITUATION OF THE HIGHEST URGENCY AND NATIONAL
IMPORTANCE, THE WAY TO DEAL WITH SUCH SITUATIONS IS THROUGH
INTERNAL GUIDELINES. THUS, THE ADMINISTRATION CANNOT
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SUPPORT SECTION 132 AS WRITTEN, COVER AND INTELLIGENCE
RELATIONSHIPS INVOLVING THESE INSTITUTIONS SHOULD INSTEAD BE
REGULATED BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH GUIDELINES. THESE GUIDELINES
WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE SELECT COMMITTEES, AS IS NOW
THE CASE.
SIXTH, A MAJOR SHORTCOMING OF S. 2284 IS ITS FAILURE TO
ADEQUATELY CONFIRM OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS, AND TO ENSURE THE NECESSARY SECRECY FOR
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. THERE ARE TWO MAJOR AREAS OF
CONCERN HERE. ONE IS THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE
OTHER IS THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF IDENTITIES OF
INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL.
WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS INAPPROPRIATE TO APPLY
GOVERNMENT-WIDE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
CONCEPTS TO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT MUST REMAIN
SECRET, WHILE THE BILL EXEMPTS CERTAIN CIA OPERATIONAL AND
TECHNICAL FILES FROM THE SEARCH, REVIEW, AND DISCLOSURE
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REQUIREMENTS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, EXCEPT FOR
REQUESTS BY U.S. PERSONS FOR INFORMATION ON THEMSELVES, IT
FAILS TO PROVIDE ANY RELIEF FOR NSA, THE FBI, AND OTHER
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COMPONENTS. THE SAME PROBLEMS WHICH
FACE THE CIA IN THIS REGARD FACE THE OTHER INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY COMPONENTS AS WELL. THE ADMINISTRATION FAVORS
COMMUNITY WIDE RELIEF, UNDER WHICH THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO EXEMPT OPERATIONAL AND
TECHNICAL FILES OF ANY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ENTITY FROM
THE FOIA, EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF REQUESTS BY U.S. PERSONS FOR
INFORMATION ABOUT THEMSELVES. THIS WOULD NOT PRECLUDE ANY
REQUESTS FOR FINISHED INTELLIGENCE, SINCE ONLY OPERATIONAL
AND TECHNICAL FILES COULD BE DESIGNATED FOR EXEMPTION. THE
ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL IS SET FORTH IN THE APPENDIX.
AN AREA OF EVEN MORE SERIOUS CONCERN IS THE
FAILURE OF S. 22844 TO EFFECTIVELY PROSCRIBE UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURES OF THE IDENTITIES OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS,
AGENTS AND SOURCES. SECTION 701 OF THE BILL WOULD MAKE THIS
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PERVERSE ACTIVITY AN OFFENSE ONLY FOR PERSONS WHO HAVE HAD
AUTHORIZED ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION THAT IDENTIFIES
INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL, IT WOULD NOT COVER ACCOMPLICES WHO
KNOWINGLY ASSIST IN THE COMMISSION OF THE SECTION 701
OFFENSE, OR OTHERS WHO MAKE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF
CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES. THIS FAILURE TO PROVIDE
ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO SERVE OUR
NATION IN DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS ASSIGNMENTS IS, IN MY
PL-RSONAL VIEW, ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS SHORTCOMINGS OF THE
BILL, TO ENSURE THAT THE INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE WE ARE
BUILDING TODAY REMAINS EFFECTIVE I N THE FUTURE, THE ADMINI-
STRATION FAVORS BROADER PROTECTION FOR INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL,
WE MUST WEIGH THE ABSENCE OF ANY LEGITIMATE PUBLIC PURPOSE
IN THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES
AGAINST THE REAL AND CERTAIN DAMAGE SUCH DISCLOSURES
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CAUSE, AND WE MUST ACCEPT THE NECESSITY TO DETER WITH
CAREFULLY CRAFTED CRIMINAL SANCTIONS THE UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURE BY ANYONE OF THE CLASSIFIED IDENTITIES OF OUR
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND SOURCES. THE ADMINISTRATION'S
PREFERRED STATUTORY LANGUAGE FOR SECTION 701 APPEARS IN THE
APPENDIX TO MY STATEMENT.
MR, CHAIRMAi, THE ADMINISTRATION ALSO BELIEVES THAT
AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
(FISA) I N ADDITION TO. THOSE PROPOSED BY S. 2284 ARE WARRANTED,
OVER THE COURSE OF THE CHARTER PROCESS SIGNIFICANT !NADEOUACIES
IN THE FISA HAVE BECOME APPARENT. THESE DEFICIENCIES WERE
NOT FORESEEN AT THE TIME FISA WAS ENACTED AMD THEY SHOULD BE
REMEDIED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS
INCLUDE:
MODIFICATION OF THE TARGETING STANDARDS TO
PERMIT TARGETING OF DUAL NATIONALS WHO OCCUPY SENIOR
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POSITIONS I N THE GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY FORCES OF
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RETAINING
UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP. FREQUENTLY THE ACTIVITY OF
SUCH PERSONS WHEN THEY VISIT THE UNITED STATES ON
OFFICIAL BUSINESS IS NOT SUCH AS TO BRING THEM UNDER
TI-: QUASI-CRIMINAL TARGETING STANDARD NOW FOUND IN
THE FISA r
B. MODIFICATION OF THE TARGETING STANDARDS TO
PE' IT TARGETING OF FORMER SENIOR FOREIGN GOVERN ENT
OFFICIALS EVEN IF THEY ARE NOT ACTING IN THE UNITED
STATES AS MEMBERS OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR FACTION.
AGA.I1, THIS PROBLEM WAS NOT ANTICIPATED AT THE TINE THE
FISA WAS PASSED, BUT VARIOUS SITUATIONS HAVE ARISEN IN
WHICH IT IS CLEAR THAT A FORMER FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL
WHO IS PRESENT IN THE UNITED STATES MAY HAVE SIGNIFICANT
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. UNDER PRESENT LAW SUCH
AN OFFICIAL CAN BE TARGETED ONLY IF A MEMBER OF A
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FOREIGN FACTION OR GOVERNMENT,
C, EXTENSION OF THE EMERGENCY SURVEILLANCE PERIOD
FROM 24 To 48 HOURS. RECENT EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT
THE 24-HOUR PERIOD IS INADEQUATE, LEADING TO THE
NECESSITY OF DELAYING IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY
SURVEILLANCES.
LANGUAGE TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AMENDMENTS IS SET FORTH IN THE
APPENDIX.
MR. CHAIRMAN, I BELIEVE THAT WE ARE IN THE MIDST OF AN
I f 1PORTANT EVOLUTION. WF ARE ATTEMPTING TO INTEGRATE THE
LEGISLATURE OF THIS COUNTRY MORE INTIMATELY INTO THE INTELLI-
GENCE PROCESS THAN HAS EVEN BEEN ATTEMPTED ANYWHERE BEFORE.
THIS NEW PROCESS HAS BEEN EVOLVING OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS
NOW, I KNOW THAT WE IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ARE PLEASED
WITH THE WAY THIS NEW RELATIONSHIP HAS DEVELOPED. I HOPE
THAT THE MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE. ARE ALSO. THE ENACTMENT
OF THIS LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD CHARTER OUR INTELLIGENCE
2()
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ACTIVITIES ANEW WOULD CODIFY THE PRACTICES V E HAVE DEVELOPED
AND ENSURE THEIR PERPETUATION, THE MOST IMPORTANT REMAINING
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THIS DRAFT BILL
CONCERN AREAS WHERE THE BILL GOES CONSIDERABLY FURTHER IN
R EG ULAT I i, .z MATTERS THAT ARE BEING HANDLED SATISFACTORILY,
IN THIS LIGHT, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT:
-- A STRONG SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
ALREADY EXISTS AND IS FUNCTIONING EFFECTIVELY.
THIS COMMITTEE AND ITS COUNTERPART IN THE HOUSE OF
REPR ESE "TAT IVES ARE KEY ELEMENTS I N THAT SYSTE=M .
--- EXECUTIVE= ORDER 12036 AND THE ATTOR!,!EY GENERAL
GUIDELINES WHICH HAVE BEEN ISSUED PURSUANT TO IT SET
FORTH RIGOROUS STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES. THE PROPER EXECUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE
ORDER AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES IS SUBJECT
TO CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.
21
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-- THE ONE AREA WHERE PRESENT PRACTICES ARE INADEQUATE
IS THE SECURITY OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND THE
PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS. AN
ADEQUATE LEGAL BASIS FOR SUPPORT HERE IS NOT NOW IN
EXISTENCE AND IS URGENTLY NEEDED.
I MAKE THESE POINTS BECAUSE THE CHARTER IS A COMPLEX
PIECE OF LEGISLATION, CAREFUL STUDY AND ANALYSIS WILL BE
REQUIRLD BY THOSE WHO HAVE NOT BEEN INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN
THE DRAFTING PROCESS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS. THIS IS, AS
'!E. ALL KNOW, A SHORT LEGISLATIVE YEAR, AND THERE. IS SOME
GUEST ION AS TO WHETHER BOTH HOUSES OF THE CONGRESS WILL BE
ABLE TO TAKE UP AND PASS THE CHARTER EVEN IF ALL OF THE
OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THIS COMMITTEE AND THE
ADMINISTRATION ARE SETTLED QUICKLY. IN THIS CONNECTION, LET
ME ONCE AGAIN EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF REMEMBERING THAT
THE CHARTER IS A CAREFULLY CONSTRUCTED WEB OF INTERRELATED
PROVISIONS, WHOSE DELICATE BALANCE MUST BE MAINTAINED,
INDIVIDUAL CHANGES WHICH WOULD UPSET THIS BALANCE MUST BE
22
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RESISTED, LEST OUR HARD-WON CONSENSUS BE JEOPARDIZED AND OUR
ENTIRE ENDEAVOR ENDANGERED,
MR. CHAIRMAN, THE PRESIDENT, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY,
AND I ARE COMMITTED TO THE CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE CHARTER
LEGISLATION. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THIS COMMITTEE WILL REPORT
OUT A BILL WHICH PROVIDES ESSENTIAL AUTHORITIES, REINFORCES
N";EEDEJ) GUIDELINES, ENSURES PROPER CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT,
CONFIRMS OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT II`NlTELLIGEN!CE SOURCES AND
1'`M:'= THODS, A ,D CAN BE ENACTED THIS Y;-AR.
23
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APPENDIX TO THE STATEMENT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Add the following new section in Title
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY IN WAR OR HOSTILITIES
Sec. 146. (a) The President may waive any or all of the
restrictions on intelligence activities set forth in this
Act during any per iod--
(1) in which the United States is engaged in
war declared by Act of Congress; or
(2) covered by a report from the President to the
Congress under the War Powers Resolution, 87 Stat. 555, to
the extent: necessary to carry out the activity that is the
subject of the report.
(b) When the President utilizes the waiver authority
under this section, the President shall notify the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
tives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
in a timely manner and inform those committees of the facts
and circumstances requiring the waiver.
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Amend sections 125 and 142 of Title I as follows:
CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION
Sec. 125. A report of the description and scope of
each special activity authorized under section 123(a)(1) and
each category of special activities authorized under section
123(a)(2) shall be made in a timely fashion to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate
Select committee on Intelligence in accordance with section
142 of this Act.
Sec. 142. (a) Consistent with all applicable authorities
and.duties, including those conferred by the Constitution
upon the executive and legislative branches and by law to
protect sources and methods, the head of each entity of the
intelligence community shall--
(1) keep the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence fully and currently informed of all intelligence
activities which are the responsibility of, are engaged
in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, that
entity of the intelligence community;....
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Add the following to subsection 304(j):
In furtherance of the responsibility of the Director to
protect intelligence sources and methods, information in
files maintained by an intelligence agency or component of
the United States Government shall be exempted from the
provisions of any law which require publication or disclosure,
or search or review in connection therewith, if such files
have been specifically designated by the Director to be
concerned with: The design, function, deployment, exploitation
or utilization of scientific or technical systems for the
collection of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
information; Special activities and foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence operations; Investigations conducted to
determine the suitability of potential foreign intelligence
or counterintelligence sources; Intelligence and security
liaison arrangements or information exchanges with foreign
governments or their intelligence or security services;
Provided that requests by United States citizens and permanent
resident aliens for information concerning themselves, made
pursuant to Section 552 and 552a of title 5, shall be
processed in accordance with those Sections. The provisions
of this subsection shall not be superseded except by a
provison of law which is enacted after the date of this Act
and which specifically repeals or modifies the provisions of
this subsection.
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Substitute the following for the provision in Title VII:
TITLE VII - PROHIBITING THE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
IDENTIFYING CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS ENGAGED OR ASSISTING IN
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES.
STATEMENT OF FINDINGS
Sec. 701. (a) The Congress hereby makes the following
findings:
(1) Successful and efficiently conducted foreign
intelligence activities are essential to the national
security of the United States.
(2). Successful and efficient foreign intelligence
activities depend in large part upon concealment of relation-
ships between components of the United States government
that carry out those activities and certain of their employees
and sources of information.
(3) The disclosure of such relationships to unauthorized
persons is detrimental to the successful and efficient
conduct of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
activities of the United States.
(4) Individuals who have a concealed relationship with
foreign intelligence components of the United States government
may be exposed to physical danger if their identities are
disclosed to unauthorized persons.
(b) As used in this Section:
(1) "Discloses" means to communicate, provide,
impart, transmit, transfer, convey, publish, or otherwise
make available to any unauthorized person.
(2) "Unauthorized" means without authority, right
or permission pursuant to the provisions of a statute or
Executive' Order concerning access to national security
information, the direction of the head of any department or
agency engaged in foreign intelligence activities, the order
of.a judge of any United States court, or a resolution of
the United States Senate or House of Representatives which
assigns responsibility for the oversight of intelligence
activities.
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(3) "Covert agent" means any present or former
officer, employee, or source of an intelligence agency or a
member of the Armed Forces assigned to duty with an intelli-
gence agency (i) whose present or former relationship with
the intelligence agency is protected by the maintenance of a
cover or alias identity, or in the case of a source, is
protected by the use of a clandestine means of communication
or meeting to conceal the relationship and (ii) who is
serving outside the United States or has within the last
five years served outside the United States.
(4) "Intelligence agency" means the Central
Intelligence Agency or any foreign intelligence component of
the Department of Defense.
(5) "Classified information" means any information
or material that has been determined by the United States
government pursuant to an executive order, statute, or
regulation, to require protection against unauthorized
disclosure for reasons. of national security.
(c) Disclosure of Intelligence Identities.
(1) Whoever knowingly discloses information
that correctly identities another person as a covert agent,
with the knowledge that such disclosure is based on classified
information, or attempts to do so, is guilty of an offense.
(2) An offense under this section is punishable
by a fine of not more than $50,000 or imprisonment for not
more than ten years, or both.
(3) There is jurisdiction over an offense under
this section committed outside the United States, if the
individual committing the offense is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States
for permanent residence.
(d) Disclosure of Intelligence Identities by Government
Employees?
(1) Whoever, being or having been an employee of
the United States government with access to information
revealing the identites of covert agents, knowingly discloses
information that correctly identifies another person as a
covert agent, or attempts to do so, is guilty of an offense.
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(2) An offense under this section is punishable
by a fine of not more than $25,000 or imprisonment for not
more than five years, or both.
(3) There is jurisdiction over an offense under
this section committed outside the United States if the
individual committing the offense is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States
for permanent residence.
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Add the following additional amendments to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978:
-- Section 101-(b)(2) is amended by deleting "or" at
the end of (C), changing the period at the end of (D) to a
semi-colon, adding "or" at the end of (D), and adding the
following new provision:
"(E) is a current or former senior officer
of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(1)
or (2)"
-- Section 105(e)(2) is amended by inserting
"search or" before all appearances of "surveillance,"
by inserting "physical search or" before all appearances of
"electronic surveillance," and by deleting "twenty-four"
wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "forty-eight."
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