DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI ADDRESS TO THE COMSTOCK CLUB, INCLUDING Q&A SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000100200006-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 11, 1978
• Content Type: SPEECH

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI
Address to the Comstock Club, Including Q&A
Sacramento, California
if August, 1978
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
CHAIR: ...Wednesday afternoon we received the very
disturbing news that Admiral Turner's father had taken a turn
for the worse and that he would not be able to be with us
for our speech today. He did send his Deputy Director to
us, and we will hear his message today. And the note from
Admiral Turner reads as follows.
"I sincerely regret that a serious illness in my
immediate family has forced me to cancel my appearance before
the Comstock Club. I hope you will invite me again.
"Ambassador Carlucci and I share the task of
directing the country's intelligence community. We also
share the same philosopy and are working towards the same
goals. I know you will enjoy hearing what he has to say."
We will introduce the former Ambassador to Portugal,
Ambassador Carlucci, in just a few moments. I'll introduce
the head table to you now. On our immediate right is Paul
Henry, our immediate past president.
[Applause.]
On our far left, Mr. Bruce Johnston, board member,
who also served under Admiral Turner. And that's the reason
he comes back for the second time at the head table.
[Applause.]
Mr. Richard E. White, special agent in charge of
the FBI, Sacramento Division.
[Applause.]
And I'll introduce the next gentleman, who is chairman
of the day, in just a moment.
I know that you will also be delighted to know that
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
in the audience is Herbert E. Hetu, special assistant to the
Director of Center Intelligence. Herbert, will you please
stand up.
[Applause.]
There is the man who helped in the press conference
downstairs a few minutes ago. I want to tell you there were
some questions down there that I think you're going to be
hard pressed to find as poor a bunch of questions as the
press asked. But do the best you can.
On each of your tables, there are membership blanks
and also the yellow sheets by which to write your questions.
Please write them legibly and we'll do our best to get them
up here in time for answers.
Our guest speaker has an early airplane flight
out of here, so we're going to have to do the best we can
to keep this meeting crisp, succinct and try to have it over
promptly at 1:30. This program will be broadcast by Station
KJAY, 1430 on your dial, Monday, August 14th, starting at
1:00 PM.
The next meeting of our club will be Monday, August
28th at the Wood Lake Grand Ball Room: General John W. Roberts,
Commander of the United States Air Force Air Training Command,
whose subject "We the People...."
All right, let's see. Our chairman of the day today
is Alan W. Coppes (?), who is the plant manager of Proctor &
Gamble here in Sacramento. He was born in Cleveland Heights,
Ohio and received degrees as long as your arm here from Lehigh
and Rutgers Universities. He's been with Proctor & Gamble
since graduation from college. He's been in five different
plants in the United States, plant manager of three plants
in the New York area prior to coming to Sacramento. He served
in the U. S. Army from January, 1954 to '56. He's the past
president of the Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce, Sacramento
chapter of United Way; past president and director, Sacramento
Safety Council, and many, many other important committees and
agencies in Sacramento. But most important, he's a member of
the Comstock Club and will introduce our speaker today.
Al Coppes.
[Applause.]
AL COPPES: Thank you, President Bell. Ladies and
gentlemen.
For many years, in fact from the days of Mata Hari
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
to the recent age of [word unintelligible] and 007, the world
of spies and espionage, counterintelligence was viewed by all
of us, at least all of us who weren't part of it, as a very
fascinating and romantic factor in the 20th Century and
centuries before. Somehow I question whether any of us,
perhaps other than our guest speaker today, can explain it.
That's all changed in the face of the past few years. Today
domestic and foreign intelligence and investigative activities
of the federal government are operating under clouds of sus-
picion, storms of criticism, damned if they don't disclose
everything to the Congress, or many of their activities,
double-damned if they do.
This abrupt change in public opinion is something
which has got to be a matter of concern, I think, to all of
us,. And although he can honestly say it didn't happen on his
ship, our distinguished guest speaker is one who must feel
displeasure to a very marked degree.
Very briefly I'd like to relate to you something
of his background so that you can have a better appreciation
as to why he is especially suited to his current position as
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for the United States.
A native of Scranton, Pennsylvania, Frank Carlucci
graduated from Princeton University in 1952. He served as a
lieutenant junior grade in the Navy from '52 to '54; attended
the Harvard Graduate School of Business from '54 to '55, and
then spent one year with the Jansen Company in Portland, Oregon.
That was just before the age of the binkini bathing suit, and
he didn't find enough of an attraction to keep him with Jansen;
joined the Foreign Service, therefore, in 1956 and was assigned
to the position of Vice Counsel and economic officer in Johannes-
burg, South Africa. He had a number of assignments in Africa and
in South America, and in 1969 returned to the U. S. as Assistant
Director for Operations for the Office of Economic Opportunity.
From January to September, 1971, served as Director of the OEO.
In 1971, he was appointed Associate Director, Office
of Management and Budget, followed by appointment as Deputy
Director of that agency. From 1972 to '74, he served as Under-
secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
He was appointed United States Ambassador to Portugal in
December, 1974 and served in that position for three years.
Ambassador Carlucci was nominated by President
Carter, confirmed by the Senate and sworn in as Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence on February 10th, 1978,
just a few months ago.
It's a particular pleasure for me to introduce to
you at this time Ambassador and Deputy Director Carlucci.
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
[Applause.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: Thank you very much,
M. Coppes, for the introduction. Mr. President, distinguished
guests, and ladies and gentlemen.
After those comments on my leaving Jansen to join
the Foreign Service, I can't resist the temptation to let you
know that the Foreign Service has its livelier moments as well.
I hadn't intended to tell this, but you oblige me to. And the
story has absolutely nothing to do with the theme of my remarks
today..
But back in 1961 when I was a junior Foreign
Service officer serving in Zaire, then known as the Congo,
we had a visit from three United States senators -- Senators
Gore, Hart and Neuberger. And I was serving as escort offi-
cer. And I arranged for the President of the Congolese Senate,
a man named Richard Cummergo (?), to invite them to his house
for lunch. In Congolese society, at least in those days, you
very seldom saw their wives. But as we came up to the door,
Cumrnerego came out and he had a woman at his side. So I in-
troduced her as his wife. We were having cocktails. Another
woman came in, shok hands all around and went over and sat
down next to the first one. Senator Gore turned to me and
said "Who's she?" And I said "I don't know. Maybe she's
his wife." And he said "I thought you introduced that other
woman as his wife." And I said, "Well, I don't know; let
me ask him." And he says "Well, they're both my wives."
And with that the interest of the American senators picked
up considerably. Maureen Neuberger stood up and came over.
And Cummergo said "No, mom, you mustn't get excited about
this. You have to recognize that over here in the Congo our
customs are very different than yours. For example, where I
come from, up in a backwoods district of the Congo, I'm a big
tribal chief. And as a tribal chief, I would normally be en-
titled to five or six wives. But since I'm a Catholic, I have
only two."
[Laughter.]
I'm very pleased to be able to substitute for Admiral
Turner today. As much as I know, he wanted to be with you.
Because I think it's terribly important that Stans and I come
out and talk to the people of our country about the very funda-
mental debate that we are in in the United States today concerning
our intelligence agencies. We are the only country that I can
think of in the history of the world that has ever tried to define
the role of a secret agency in a free society. And that's a very
hard task. And it's doubly hard because you can hear about our
failures, but you very seldom hear about our successes. Indeed,
almost by definition, if an intelligence success becomes public,
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
it is then a failure.
The challenge is a difficult one. But I think it
can be done, and I think we are making some progress. I
think we're also making progress by making public some of
our problems, in helping the American public to understand
just what we do, just what are you getting for your tax dollar.
I'd like to review just briefly with you today some
of the progress and some of the problems, as I see them. First
of all, the intelligence business is very little 007 type stuff,
if any at all. It's a very painstaking business. But it's
really quite simple. It's simply a matter of putting together
the best available information so that the policy-makers can
make the best possible decisions. We in the intelligence
business are not politicians. We simply assemble the facts,
which are often drawn from public sources, and analyze it and
present conclusions to the policy-makers.
To give you a dramatic example of the importance
of this prosaic function, I think most historians are now
inclined to agree that had the available information been
pulled together in November and December, or December of
1941, Pearl Harbor would not have happened. The information
was there, but there was no organization to put it all together
and to present it to the President. And you see what happened.
And indeed, the Japanese carrier task force had orders to turn
back if they were spotted. And if they could have presented
their information, it would have been easy to spot them.
As a result of this experience, the OSS and successor
organization, the CIA, were founded. And it is not unnatural
that throughout that period and throughout the period of the
so-called Cold War, the emphasis of the intelligence agencies
was on the military capacity of the potential adversary. Then
in the 1960s, as the CIA and some of the other agencies were
beginning to grow like Topsy, the agency became involved in
operational activities, some of which, quite frankly, in my
judgment, personal judgment, it was ill-equipped to handle.
And the results of that are all too familiar to all of you.
The abuses that were committed, although, if you trace them
back, a large part were the abuses originated at the political
level, and the CIA was being responsive to the political level.
But be that as it may, the abuses were clearly real.
I think we've gone into an entirely new era, not
just from the standpoint of checks and balances, but from
the standpoint of the nature and the mission of the intelli-
gence function. Sure, we're still interested int he strategic
capability of the Soviet Union. We have to be for our own
survival. But there's lots of other things that we have to
be interested in as well. We have to be interested in Africa,
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
for example. But you can't, like we used to in the old days,
look at one country in isolation. You can't say "What is the
situation in Ethiopia?" Why? Because you've got to think
of Somalia; you've got to think of Kenya. What about the
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen right across the water?
How are the Saudis reacting? And you move on down to the
Sudan, which touches on Zaire, which gets you into the An-
golan situation, which, in turn, moves you over to Zimbabwe,
and on up you go, all of the way to Afghanistan. Now, I'm
not saying there's some grand design that's going on in
these areas. But I am saying that what happens in one
country very clearly impacts quickly on another country.
It's no longer enough to just have an analyst who can deal
with country "X." You have to look at problems on a regional
basis..,
Also, we have to look in our analysis to bring
more issue oriented types of questions. One of the things
that we're all interested in today is the question of nuclear
proliferation. How do we keep track of what other countries are
doing, some of them clandestinely, in this field? There's SALT.
Irrespective of what your view might be on the current negotia-
tions, I think we all hope that sooner or later we can have a
SALT treaty. But a SALT treaty is only as good as our capacity
to monitor. And that gets back to the intelligence function.
And we can take two others areas, which, unfortunately,
in the world of today seem to be growth areas, terrorism and
narcotics. If you're going to deal with the terrorists, you
have to have the intelligence on what they're up to. And
our intelligence information can help our Drug Enforcement
Administration deal with the narcotics problem around the
world, because it clearly is not an isolated phenomenon.
And finally, you can't look at the security of
the United States today without looking at our dependence
on other areas of the world, examining such questions as the
growth rate in the Federal Republic of Germany. We're looking
at the question of oil reserves. And as many of you may be
aware, we put out a highly controversial study on this. Whether
you agree with us or not, you have to agree that a study of these
matters is fundamental to our long-range interests.
So intelligence-wise, these are different times;
they're exciting times. Never, may I remind you, has there
been so much interest on the part of the executive branch, on
the part of the Congress in our intelligence work. And that
offers an opportunity. But, yes, we are still living in a
crisis of confidence. And that crisis in confidence makes it
very difficult for us to take full advantage of those opportuni-
ties. Certainly government needs to be accountable. And certainly
people like Woodward and Bernstein do an outstanding service in
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
what they do. And certainly we want to encourage journalists to
be investigative journalists. But I don't think we should become
paranoiac with an obsession about uncovering one thing after
another. Sure, it's important to set up systems of accounta-
bility. Don't misunderstand me. But it's equally important
in a certain period of time to build, and to build requires
that we restore confidence in our government's institutions.
And I speak to you as a government servant of some twenty-
five years standing, who is proud to be a government servant,
but who is quite frankly distressed at this lack of confidence
and is looking for ways to rebuild it.
And as far as this administration is concerned and
the intelligence community, I think a very great start has been
made along those lines. An extremely tight system of checks
and balances have been built in. And I think it would be
virtually impossible for the kind of abuses that occurred in
the past to repeat themselves. The President has reorganized
the intelligence community under an executive order, putting
the community at large,the general community, under the director-
ship of Admiral Turner and myself as his immediate subordinate,
which means a better allocation of resources. We have authority
over budgets of the other intelligence agencies, including the
intelligence portions of the Defense Department and the State
Department, to try and get duplication down to a minimum and,
more importantly, to try and get a common sense approach.
This same executive order sets up a system of checks
and balances to make certain that there're a full range of
guarantees for the civil liberties of all Americans. And as
a further check, the President has created the Intelligence
Oversight Board, consisting of three distinguished Americans,
Torn Farmer, former Governor and Ambassador Bill Scranton, and
former Senator Albert Gore, which reports only to the President.
It's independent of the intelligence agencies, and which can
receive, and has the power to receive, any complaints of wrong-
doing anywhere in the intelligence community, which means that
any one of our employees can go directly to the Intelligence
Oversight Board without consulting us and say "I think there's
something wrong going on here." And the Intelligence Oversight
Board has full authority to investigate it and to make its re-
port to the President.
There's also a confirmation process, and we seem to
have forgotten that in this day and age. I myself went through
some thirty days of investigation by seven Senate staffers,
fulltime, ten hours of hearings and a unanimous vote. I frankly
think that that entitles me to a measure of confidence. But
I haven't found that that's the case. I find that people say,
"Oh, that's meaningless, because it was meaningless in the past."
But I can assure you that the confirmation process, at least
as it concerns the intelligence agencies, is not meaningless.
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
And finally there's the question of congressional
oversight. And as you may be aware, the Congress has organized
itself into two intelligence committees. They are select com-
mittees, hand-picked committees with outstanding senators and
congressmen on them. They have set up the necessary security
safeguards, and they are exercising very close oversight over
us? They have access to any information they need to exercise
this oversight. And we welcome it. We think it's helpful.
We think this is the best way to restore public confidence
in our intelligence agencies.
And finally there is the question of charter legis-
lation the Congress is considering. Many of our colleagues
in other countries think that charter legislation for an in-
telligence agency is just an impossible task. Here, too, we
have agreed. We think the charter legislation would be help-
ful:; would be helpful in restoring confidence and would be
helpful in setting guidelines for our employees and their
Ieaders.
So by and large, I think things are moving in the
right direction. But there are some problems that I would
Iike to mention to you.
I think we have to have clearly a greater appreciation
on the part of the American people that secrecy is the heart of
intelligence operations. No man is going to put his life in
your hands by giving you information if he thinks he's going
to read that information in the press or if he thinks his
name is going to be compromised. It's simply axiomatic.
It's also axiomatic that the more people who have access to
the information, the greater is the likelihood of compromise.
And we are frequently criticized by the press for
excessive secrecy. And I'm willing to concede that there
may well be a considerable amount of overclassification in
government. And we're making a determined effort, as I in-
dicated earlier, to declassify everything that we can. But
I would just hope that my journalist friends would argue just
as vigorously for the protection of intelligence sources as
they argue for the protection of journalist sources. To me
the principle is the same, except in the cases of intelligence
sources, we are frequently dealing with people's lives.
We're also in the age of glorification of the whistle
blower. And I think every agency of the federal government ought
to have an outlet for grievances, for dissent, for complaints
right up to the top. But that doesn't mean in government that
everybody can do his own thing. I can remember in the old days
I once had some difficulty with an agency employee; asked him to
do something; he said no. And I said "Well, don't you work for
me'?" And he said "No." I said "But you're in OEO. You work
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
for rne." He said "No, I don't. I work for the poor, not for
you." Well, if everybody's as determined, we will not have
a single source anywhere in the world.
There has to be a process. There's no effort in
this process to prevent criticism of the agency. But nobody
can simply enter the agency and write a book and make a profit
from the secret information that he learns there. We simply
have to have some constraints. And the Issue is not whether
Mr., Snepp revealed classified information or not. The issue
of who is to make the judgment of whether it was classified.
Should responsible leadership of the agency, confirmed by the
Senate, make the judgment, or should each individual employee?
There's also the point of the Freedom of Information
Act as it applies to our intelligence agencies. Mind you, I
think the principle of the law is a good principle, and I'm
not attacking the Freedom of Information Act. And if we said,
well, we don't think we can give you that information, we have
twenty days to appeal, and then they can take us to court.
And it's not as far-fetched as it seems. We've had requests
for information from foreign embassies, from East Germany.
And we spend about $550.00 for a freedom of information re-
quest. And we put 190 man years last year into responding to
freedom of information requests, some of them from -- a great
many of them from outside from a man named Mr. Agee, who is
the CIA turncoat that some of you may have read about in the
papers lately, who down in Havana announced a campaign to expose
all, CIA personnel and agents, inviting people to write in, and
in fact, in this publication, inciting them to violence; setting
up an organization in DuPont Circle for this purpose. And here
we have another anomaly. If Mr. Agee were giving out agricultural
information from the Commodity Credit Corporation or certain types
of information from the Department of Commerce, or maybe certain
banking information from the U. S. government, there would be
immediate criminal sanctions. But in the case of national
security information, you have to prove intent to commit es-
pionage. And there's no way when somebody leaks information
to the public that you could really make a good espionage case.
So we are, in effect, powerless, absent some legis-
lative remedy, to deal with this kind of thing, this kind of
maliciousness that literally puts the lives of our people in
danger.
That's the downside. But I want to go back and end
up on the upbeat note.
Yes, the adversary is strong. And he's getting stronger
in the military and intelligence sense very day. We need to be
alert. And yes, we have had problems in the U. S. intelligence
community. But in my judgment and the judgment of the Director,
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
we still have the finest intelligence organization, intelligence
community anywhere in the world. And with support from the
American public, groups such as yourself, I think we can keep
it the world's number one intelligence organization and so
so and still maintain the necessary checks and balances that
preserve the civil liberties of all of our citizens.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
CHAIR: Thank you, Mr. Carlucci. If you'll return
to the podium now, we'll start you off with a couple of easy
ones and then work up to the toughies a little later.
We have knowledge of the CIA, KGB and Interpol. How
many other intelligence agencies are there?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, there're about
a hundred and -- what? -- fifty countries in the world. I
can't think of a country that doesn't have an intelligence
organization of some sort or another; some very small and in-
effective; others quite large and very effective. Intelligence
is a very old profession, and I think it's going to be with us
for quite some time. Sure, there've been technological improve-
merits. But we're still going to need a human collection capacity,
because all the machinery in the world can't tell you what's in-
side someone's mind, what their intent is.
So I suspect that every country is going to want to
have an intelligence capability for some time to come.
Q: Who decides what information the Senate and con-
gressional oversight committees need?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: In effect, they do. The
President's executive order says that under his direction, the
intelligence agencies will keep the oversight committees fully
and currently informed. They let us know what information they
need.
Should a disagreement arise, there is a procedure under
Senate Resolution 400 for the entire Senate to meet, in camera,
and to vote on whether the information they want or that they've
been given should be released to the public. So far that's
not been used. So far we've had no cases where we've had a
difference with the Senate committee or the House committee on
what information should be provided them.
They're fundamentally interested in information that
will enable them to do an effective job of oversight. And that
doesn't mean getting down into every little detail, knowing where
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
-11-
the agent is. It means knowing what our allocation of resources
are, what the nature of our product is, what our shortcomings are.
It's a much broader dialogue than that.
Essentially, the answer to your question is that
they make the request, and we respond.
Q: A recent article in the National Union con-
cludes that --? a quotation -- "that the old CIA belongs to
history." End of quotation. In view of the many disclosures
of CIA abuses in recent years, do you believe you or anyone
can balance the demands of openness in a free society against
the needs of national security? Do you agree with the public
disclosure of overall CIA budget?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, the answer to
that question is, yes, I think we can strike that balance.
Sure, the constant investigations have taken their toll. But
I think the corrective mechanism, the system of checks and
ballances, as I've described them, is now in place. And I
think we can have an effective organization that gives us the
necessary national security guarantees and still makes avail-
able to the American public a fair amount of information.
Obviously, we cannot make available sensitive infor-
mation on our sources and methods. But we can make available
some of our assessments that do not reveal these sources and
methods. So I am optimistic that we can strike the right
balance.
Do I agree with the public disclosure of the CIA
budget? Our position is that if the Congress decides that
for reasons of establishing credibility in their process
that they need to reveal a single budget figure, we could
live with it with revealing that single figure. We would not
support, indeed we're opposed, to revealing any further data
on our budget. The reason is quite obvious, because the more
data you reveal, the more information it gives to our potential
adversaries.
Q: What freedom does the CIA have to inform other
nations about upcoming acts of violence by neighboring states,
for example the invasion of the Shaba Province in Zaire?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: One of the characteristics
of the intelligence business is an exchange of information among
friendly intelligence services. It's one of the most sensitive
aspects of our operations, for understandable reasons, so I
can't go into it in any detail.
But the answer is, yes, with friendly governments we
do exchange intelligence assessments. They give us information.
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
And by the way, we get a portion of our information, comes from
friendly governments. We, in turn, provide them with informa-
tion. All of this is done within the appropriate security
constraints. Of course, we don't want to give information
to a government if we don't have confidence that they can
maintain it securely. But there is a rather large exchange
of information between intelligence agencies.
Q: What is the criteria for becoming an agent or
employee of the CIA, particularly as an operative?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I would like to
think that the criteria are about the same as those to be
a success in most any other profession. We like people who
have judgment, who can make sound decisions. We like people
who can write well, can articulate issues. But I would be
the first to admit that there are certain strains in the
intelligence business that make it more difficult -- people
who have to live overseas, in some cases under assumed names.
It's hard when you come home at night and you can't tell your
family what you've been doing during the day. Indeed, in some
cases, families don't even know what an intelligence officer's
actual job is. And this is why the outstanding characteristic
that we seek is dedication. The salary isn't very high. It's
a standard government salary.
So the overriding motive is to serve the national
interest. And I must say, and I know I speak for the Director
as well, since I've been in the intelligence community, in
particular in the CIA, I have yet to see as dedicated a group
of people who have stood up well under the public attacks and
who continue to be dedicated to doing the best job they can
for their fellow Americans.
Q: We have time for just two more questions. Former
CIA official John Stockwell wrote that the CIA recruited mer-
cenaries to fight in Angola before Cuba or Soviets were there.
True or false?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I really would not
like to get into commenting on Mr. Stockwell's book, since
its my understanding that there is a lawsuit being brought
on this specific area, on this subject. And obviously we
cannot comment on anything under litigation. Also, obviously
we in the agency are giving consideration to the possibility
of a lawsuit against Mr. Stockwell since he broke the oath
that he signed with us not to publish a book without submitting
it to us for review.
Suffice it to say that I have read the book. I have
had people who are close to the subject read the book. And
we find a substantial number of inaccuracies in the book.
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2
-13-
Q: The last question, and this is really a tough
one: did you pick up the whole Russian submarine or did
it break in half?
[Laughter.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I have to plead ignorance
on that. From what I've read in the newspapers, it broke in
half. And I think when that happened, I was in Portugal, so
I had nothing to do with the submarine.
[Laughter and applause.]
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200006-2