DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI ADDRESS AND Q&A ROTARY CLUB, PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000100190002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 16, 1979
• Content Type: SPEECH

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Deputy Director Frank Carlucci
Address and Q&A
Rotary Club, Petersburg, Virginia
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DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: ...Now the demand is
increasingly for regional analysis. There are very few problems,
as you look around the world, that relate to one country alone.
An integrated analysis. We found that we can't divorce poli-
tical developments from economic developments, or, indeed, from
social developments. This is one of the big lessons of Iran.
So analysis has gotten much more sophisticated.
At the same t i me, there are new areas which i ntrude
on our intelligence capability: the question of treaty moni-
toring. We're all focusing on SALT these days. There are
some nine treaties under negotiation which will require careful
monitoring if we are to be certain that the other contractual
party abides by the strictures of the treaty. Or non-prolifera-
tion, an issue of extreme importance to our country and to the
world. And there are countries which are trying to develop a
nuclear bomb capability in a covert way.
The narcotics problem. The best way to deal with
a narcotics problem is to prevent it from reaching our shores.
And that's very much an intelligence issue. Or terrorism. We're
all concerned about terrorism. Fortunately, it hasn't hit the
United States as much as it has hit other countries. But our
people overseas are susceptible to it. And I can say unequivo-
cally that our intelligence has saved the Iives of some of our
people overseas, including the lives of ambassadors.
So all these require a new sophistication, both in
analysis and in collection.
And you hear a lot these days about our impressive
technical capability, our satellites and what have you. And
indeed, they are impressive. Unfortunately, the more we talk
about them, particularly as part of the SALT ratification pro-
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cess, the more defensive measures the Soviets can take. But
the technical side of the business really can only tell you,
if you're lucky, what is happening right now, or what hap-
pened a few hours ago, or a few days ago. It can't tell you
plans and intentions. The only way that you can find that out
is through what we call human intelligence, through good old
espionage; spying, if you will.
And I'd like to take just a few minutes to try and
describe to you what that's a I I about, because there have been
a lot of distortions, ranging from the concept that we do nothing
but intrude on the Iives of Americans to the sort of 007 concept
of intelligence. Sure, there are risks involved in what our
people do. But by and Iarge, it's a very painstaking and some-
what prosaic business. We try to establish a relationship with
people who could not be reached through our normal diplomatic
relations or through the activities of, say, our military at-
taches; people who are, for one reason or another, sensitive
targets. And we go about that process much as many of you who
are businessmen would go about establishing a business relation-
ship. You try to spot who you think might be a productive asset;
try to develop a relationship with him; and, if you do, you try
and cement what is very similar to a business, contractual re-
lationship, whereby that person performs a service for us; that
is, provides us with information that we request. And sometimes
in return, we will provide him with a salary. Now I say "some-
times" because, in most cases, you'll find that the principal
motivation is ideological. There are other motives, of course.
And frequently where financial remuneration is required, it's
s i mp l y because of the risk that the individual takes. He wants
some money put aside in case he has to flee his country, or es-
tablish a new life somewhere else.
Now there is one particularly important aspect to that
contractual relationship that we want to establish. And that is
confidentiality. Confidential contracts aren't new in our coun-
try, not new in the business world. They're particularly important,
in fact they're absolutely essential, to the functioning of a good
intelligence organization. Nobody is going to put their Iives,
their reputations, indeed, in some cases, their family's safety
in your hands if they think they are going to be revealed. And
revealing an intelligence source Is a very simple business. You
may see some innocuous sentence in a newspaper about what a
particular communist party may be doing. But a good counterin-
telligence officer can take that one sentence and pinpoint the
source very easily. If you gain a reputation of not being able
to protect your sources and your methods, you might as well give
up the intelligence.
Now unfortunately, this country is gaining the reputa-
tion around the world of being unable to keep a secret. And I
say this to you in all candor. I get it everywhere I go. I've
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visited some 25 to 30 countries overseas since I've been in this
job. There's a pervasive feeling that if they supply information
to u s , sooner or later i t w i l l get out and w i l l be traced back
to them.
And I think this is a very serious phenomenon. It
has several aspects to it. It arises because of the frequent
leaks in the U. S. government. And I dare say in twenty-some
years of service in the U. S. government, I've never seen it
I l e a k i e r . i er- . We've seen one leak after another with regard to
the SALT process. Whether it's for policy purposes or public
relations purposes doesn't make any difference: the damage is
done.
We are compelled, as an intelligence organization, to
distribute our information far more widely than we should, both
within the executive branch and in the Congress. Also, we've
seen a recent phenomenon where some former members of the CIA
take pen in hand and write a book. Now we b e l i e v e that when
somebody comes into an organization like the CIA, he should
undertake a contractual obligation not to use the information,
the s e n s i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n he i ncurred in the process of h i s
employment, for financial gain in writing a book. We do not
restrict former employees from writing books. But we do ask
that we review these books for sensitive information. That was
the issue in the case of Frank Snepp, recently brought to trial.
And the question is not can he write a book or are we seeking
censorship. The question is who ought to determine what is
sensitive intelligence information? Every former employee or
should it be the organization?
And fortunately, the courts have ruled so far that
it should be the organization. And we i ntend to adhere and re-
quire our employees and ex-employees to adhere to the contracts
that they have signed.
We also have some former employees, one of whom I
would classify very candidly as a traitor, named Philip Agee,
who worked for the CIA for several years and then has dedicated
h i mse l f to writing exposes of our people; that is, exposing the
names of our people overseas and doing it in such a tendentious
way that they are clearly earmarked as targets. I remember he
did one such expose when I was in Portugal. Not only did he
g i ve the names of the a l l e g e d CIA people, but he gave their
addresses and said "When you get off the elevator, turn right,
and its third door down the corridor." Obviously we had to
move families, and we've had one man assassinated in Athens.
And this puts our people in real jeopardy.
Agee and his friends put out a bulletin called "Covert
Action" right down in DuPont Circle in Washington. And we f i nd
that there's very little that we can do about it. There are
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some thirty laws in the U. S. government making it a criminal
offense to give out such information as tax information, commodity
futures, commercial information. But there is no such law with
regard to national security information. The only laws under
which we could prosecute is the antequated 1917 Espionage Act,
which obliges us to prove intent to harm the United States.
And those of you who are I awyers here know how d i f f i cu It that
is to prove.
Not only do we have trouble in dealing with problems
such as Philip Agee under our existing Iaws, but indeed I find
that there are some laws that actually help them. One such law
is the Freedom of Information Act. Now I support, and have sup-
ported in other agencies in which I've worked, the concept of
freedom of information. I think the information in our agencies
ought to be available to American citizens. But when it comes
to an intelligence organization, it is almost a contradiction
in terms. I think some of our information should be available,
but not our most sensitive information l ead i ng back to sources
and methods.
But under this statute, we've been required, for example,
to devote four man years to providing information requested by Mr.
Agee. We spend about $2 1/2 million answering some 4,000 requests
a year, some of them from ch i I dren, some of them on form I etters.
Each request costs the taxpayer about $800.00, much of which --
most of which comes out of this process is useless, except for
particular individuals. We've had one person working full-time
supplying information for one author. Indeed, we are obliged to
provide information to foreigners who request it. The other day
we had a request from the Polish Embassy under the Freedom of In-
formation Act. If the KGB were to write us, we would be obliged
by the law to respond in ten days.
I would respectfully suggest that this is a subject
that needs intensive review by our legislators.
Or you may ask us "Well, that's well and good; you've
told us your problems, but how about the abuses? What kind of
checks and balances have you established?" And that's a fair
question. My own view is that the abuses have been exaggerated.
But that's neither here nor there. It's a public perception, and
we have to deal with that perception. And I think it is desirable,
highly desirable to have an adequate system of checks and balances
on our intelligence community. And a lot of progress has taken
place in that area. President Carter has issued an executive order
laying down guidelines, standards for our intelligence community.
And our executive order has the force of law as far as we're
concerned. We've made some internal modifications, stepped up
our inspection procedures, our audit procedures, our procedures
for dissent. The President has established an Intelligence Over-
sight Board, consisting of three distinguished Americans: Tom
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Farmer, former Senator Albert Gore, former Governor Bill Scranton.
Anybody in the intelligence community or anywhere in the country,
anybody in this room, if they think there's an abuse being carried
out by any of our intelligence agencies, can go to the board, in
confidence, and the board reports only to the President and has
full authority to investigate the abuse.
We also have very effective congressional oversight.
Two select committees, a House and Senate committee, which have
sizable staffs, can go into our affairs in great detail. And we
welcome this oversight. We think it's been constructive. We
don't always agree. But we respect the guidance we have from
the Congress.
We think one more thing needs to be done. We would
like to have charter legislation for the intelligence community.
That is, legislation which establishes our authority and gives
us g u i de l i nes on what our 1 i m i tat i ons ought to be, what k i nds of
activities we ought to be conducting and what kinds of activities
the Amer i can people think we shou l dn't engage in. We are now in
an intensive dialogue with Congress on such legislation. And I'm
hopeful that if we can't get it this session, we can make a good
effort at it during the next session of Congress.
Before closing, let me mention one other subject which
has been an intensely emotional subject when people talk about
the Central Intelligence Agency. And that's the whole question
of covert action. Covert action, stated simply, is the capability
to influence events in another country without doing so publicly.
And I think the need to do this kind of thing is evident. Usually
the example that's cited is Chile. But there've been many other
instances where th i s kind of activity has been carried out in a
very constructive way, ways in which we have helped support demo-
cratic forces, pro-Western governments against very heavy activities
by the enemies of the West and the enemies of democracy. But to
blame the CIA for the abuses of covert action -- and I wi I I con-
cedE; the point that there have been abuses -- is about I i ke blaming
the U. S. Army for the invasion of the Dominican Republic or the
Marines for the landing in Lebanon, if you don't like those events.
But the fact is that the CIA does not develop policy. It's not a
policy agency. It implements policy. And what you want to quarrel
with is not the tool, but the policy.
But in reaction to covert action, we have established a
procedure which virtually makes covert action a contradiction in
terms. If this country wants to engage in a covert action, we have
to have a presidential finding, and then we have to brief seven
committees of Congress. That's approximately 140 congressmen, to
say nothing of staffs. And any one of those people can leak the
covert action, and then it is no longer a viable activity.
The Congress has decided, and the administration has
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decided, that the country ought to have the capability to carry
out covert action. If we're going to have that capability, we
need to devise better procedures to deal with getting the action
underway.
I'm sometimes asked, alI in all, how we're doing vis-a-
vis our adversaries. Despite the problems that we face, my own
judgment is that we're doing well. Sure, we don't put the re-
sources into the intelligence business that the Soviets do. They
have a lot more people around the world than we do. I happen to
t h i n k that our people are better. We are certa i n l y ahead of them
on the technical side. Moreover, much of the success of the in -
telligence business is on the analytical side, and there I think
we're clearly ahead, if for no other reason than we, as Intelli-
gence organizations, can encourage competition and dissent. And
you don't find much competition and dissent in the Soviet Union.
Indeed, their analysis has obviously got to be skewed for ideo-
logical reasons. Much of the intelligence business is bringing
bad news. And we have no trouble bringing bad news to President
Carter. But I would not like to be the bearer of iIl -tidings in
the Kremlin.
My own assessment is that both in terms of relevance
and accuracy, we are a healthy organization. We have problems.
We are going to need to deal with those problems if we are to stay
healthy. And in dealing with these prob I ems, we're going to need
the continuing support of groups such as this.
Thank you very much.
[Applause; end of Side 1.1
CARLUCCI: I obviously can't go 'into the details of our
monitoring capability. And i is not the f unction of the Centra I
Intelligence Agency to determine whether the treaty is verifiable,
because that entails political considerations, the question of
how you would enforce it and the question of our own response
capability.
So that question is better left to people like Secretary
Vance and Secretary Brown.
We can address our monitoring capability. We have done
that with the Congress. About al I I can say in a public forum is
that we have a very substantial monitoring capability. Nothing is
ever fool-proof. But we have a far-flung and very good network.
I think the Congress was favorably impressed, but it is up to them
to make the judgment on whether that capab i l i ty, coupled with the
political considerations, is what they would judge to be an adequate
verification capacity.
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Q : I want to know if anything is being done or can be
done to obtain from Congress a modification of the Freedom of
Information Act insofar as the CIA is concerned? That seems to
me to be a very odious situation insofar as your organization is
concerned.
CARLUCCI: It's one of our highest priorities, that and
legislation that would enable us to deal with the Philip Agee kind
of problem. And I have testified on the Hill on this and received
a sympathetic hearing. I've testified before the Select Committee.
I've been invited to testify before the Government Operations Com-
mittee. The Justice Department, I think, is going to support us
in our efforts. We're attempting right now to get an administra-
tion position on the issue.
So I think we're beginning to develop some support for
change.. As you can appreciate, it's an intensely emotional issue
on the Hill. I would expect change to come immediately. We're
not asking for massive changes of the thing. But I would hope
that if not this session, next session we could get some changes
of the statute.
Q: Have you been able to fill the intelligence gap
that the papers said existed when the Shah or Iran situation
occurred to your satisfaction?
CARLUCCI: Well, first of all, let me say that I think
the press comments on the intelligence -- so-called intelligence
gap there have been greatly exaggerated. It is true that we did
not predict the dimensions of the upheaval in Iran. Indeed, I
know of now intelligence service, including the Israelis, which
d id.,
We did, though, accompany with some anticipation the
steady erosion of the Shah's authority. We have, though, as a
result of the Iran experience reassessed both our collection
and analytical capability. We think that more attention needs
to be paid to broad social movements, and we're trying to close
that gap.
So in short, I think we could have done better. But
that has been said. But I think we have profited by the I esson .
Q: Also the monitoring. I think several monitoring
facilities had to closed in Iran. Has that gap been filled?
CARLUCCI: I'm not really at liberty to discuss that
in any detail. The answer is, no, not yet, but we're working on
it.
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Q: A related question, sir. With the lessons learned
from Iran, can you discuss how they are used in Afghanistan?
CARLUCCI: I don't think it would be appropriate for
me to talk about any particular country. One of the things that
we're doing is working in closer cooperation with the State De-
partment, political reporting officers, economic reporting officers
overseas, with our military attaches overseas. We're trying to
focus their collection efforts more directly than they've been
focused in the past. And I think we're making good progress.
Q: [.Inaudible.]
CARLUCCI: Well, if we're referring to the same program,
if my memory serves me correctly, the event on which that program
focused took place some 15 to 20 years ago. Maybe you're more
familiar with it. It really falls in the category of ancient
history. But there has been a statute passed which pertains to
r e a l l y HEW on l i m i t i ng experimentation, which lays out standards
for human experimentation. And while it's principally directed
at HEW, it also app l i es to us. And the k i nd of things that were
done under the joint experimentation program could no longer be
done.
In addition, I think we've established the kind of
controls in the C IA to prevent anyone from going off and doing
that kind of thing on the i r own .
So I think we've corrected the insufficiency.
CHAIR: Any other questions? Well, Frank, thank you
very much for your very informative talk. And we certainly want
to wish you an awful lot of luck in heading up the CIA.
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