NOMINATION OF GEORGE BUSH TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000100050001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 98
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 27, 1976
• Content Type: OPEN

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27 JANUARY 197 T; o ,v
that it requires unusual intellectual ap-
plication and extraordinary discipline
and restraint not found in ordinary gov-
ernmental agencies. It raises the question
NOMINATION OF GEORGE BUSH TO within the agency as-to whether common
BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL IN political pr an such log rolling,
o
TELLIGENCE back slapping, , and compromise are are to
be the order of the day at Langley. It
Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, this raises the question outside the Agency
afternoon the Senate will consider the. as to whether we have altered our orig-
nomination of George Bush to be the inal view that intelligence operations, at
Director of the Central Intelligence least in theory, ought to be committed to
Agency., a priesthood bound by vows of political
I have. to say, Mr. President, that I chastity.
consider the nomination of George Bush In short it makes the Agency suspect.
as Director of the Central- Intelligence And the CIA is one agency of Govern-
Agency to be a regrettable nomination. ment which, like Caesar's wife Pompeia,
I think it is an imposition on the Senate, cannot afford to be suspected. When
I think it is an imposition on the Central viewing the Agency we can be a little
Intelligence Agency, and not least of all, more understanding of Julius Caesar's {
I think it is an imposition on George harsh judgment that "* * * I will not
Bush. I have told the President per- that my wife be so much as suspected."
sonally that I feel that in sending this This is the problem for George Bush,
nomination to the Senate, he has posed but it is by no means a personal prob-
for me one of the most difficult questions lem. It is a disqualification which to my
that I have confronted in' 15 years of mind would apply to all chairman of.
congressional service. , _ -political parties, forever barring them
My concern is not that George Bush from two specific offices of public trust:
might become a candidate for Vice Presi- the -directorships of the CIA and of
dent. As a matter of fact, I would be glad the*. FBI. It is a disqualification that
to vote for him for Vice President. In would operate impersonally to disqualify
1968 I urged that he be considered- for Lawrence O'Brien, Ray Bliss, Fred Har-
the Republican ticket, although at that ris, or Henry Jackson should any specu-
as
time he, was a freshman Member of the lative President -ever think of the
House of Representatives. In any event, potential directors. I think if the rule
he has publicly disqualified himself from were to be logically and consistently ap-
political activity in the foreseeable fu-' plied, it could disqualify George Bush.
ture. Nor do I think that George Bush This is a very hard conclusion for me
would use the powers of the Director of. to reach, because for me it is a personal
the CIA to manipulate domestic politics problem. George and Barbara Bush are
to foster such a candidacy to the 'ad- personal friends. They have been loyal
vantage of the incumbent party. Thee when times were difficult and good com-
mere suspicion that he would do so would pany when there was a chance to relax
be enough to disqualify him without fur- and enjoy a few happy hours.
ther debate; but he is an honorable man, It is a decision of the sort that tears
and I do not harbor any such suspicion. Senators apart; but to make the choice
It is not George -Bush's future that and cast a vote on a matter as critical
concerns me about. his nomination. It as this on the basis of friendship and
is his past that I worry about. amiability would be to suggest that our
Government can no longer make de-
It ;seems to me that in his past George cisions grounded on hard facts. If this
Bush has acquired an obstacle to his were the whole story, I would have to
confirmation that is virtually insur- vote against George Bush's confirmation
mountable. It is all the more difficult for notwithstanding my affection for him.
him, because, I suspect, that it was not a. But it is not the whole story. We are
voluntary acquisition. I refer, of course, not acting under normal circumstances.
to his term as chairman of the Republi- My work on the select committee has
can National Committee.. - given me some insight into the enormous
As a member of the Select Committee and agonizing current problems of the
to Study Intelligence Operations= I have intelligence community.
learned more than a little about the in- The CIA is in some degree in disarray.
telligence business. It is highly subjective Its activities have been disrupted.' The
and very sensitive. Nuances matter. Ap- safety of its personnel is more than
pearances are important. normally in jeopardy. The morale of the
To place at the head of CIA any per- Agency must be restored. A reorganiza-
son who has previously been at the head tion and-"revitalization of the Agency is
of a partisan political organization is necessary at once if the Government is to
singularly inappropriate. It negates the obtain the information it requires to in-
concept that intelligence is something sure the security and welfare of the
apart from ordinary .political activity; American people. The lessons learned
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from the cathartic experience through
which the Agency has passed must be put
into practice without delay. Any pro-
longed further agitation within and
about the Agency could delay the proc-
ess of reconstruction beyond the danger
point. Eyebrows raised in both friendly
and hostile foreign governments would
become serious doubts and the essential
element of confidence could slip away
from us.
Zo this then is the real dilemma of the
a, itua.tion. The. Senate must choose be-
tween taking a step that Is generally con-
ceded to be dubious or even wrong in
principle, or the Senate must uphold
principle at the very real risk of creating
a serious chink- .in- our national armor,
and it is not an easy choice. .
I think it should be noted that it is
not a choice. of George Bush's making
either in its remote origin or in its im-
mediate impact. He was reluctant to sur-
render his. post as; Ambassador at the
United Nations. to become. chairman of
the Republican National Committee. He
did so because he was pressed by Presi-
dent Nixon, and very few Americans can
withstand an urgent presonal draft by
the President of the United States. -
I do not. have. a sense at this time that
his appointment as Director of the CIA
represents the. fulfillment of any deep
personal wish. or cherished personal am-
bition. I- believe that it also is the re--
spouse to a Presidential draft.
The Senate ought to have a different.
choice, or better yet, ought not to be con-
fronted with this one at all. If the Presi-
dent's advisers were more faithful to his
real - interests.- 1. do not think that we
would be faced with this issue. But such a
wish cannot be, entertained in the real
world. We are faced with it and must deal.
with it... . .. ..
dictable, but their form and shape and Bush, he will perform with integrity and
the time they would consume is not pre- understanding. and that the lessons of
dictable. It is too hard to guess what the Church-Tower committee will not
might be involved, and the,stakes are too be lost on him, especially, to repeat, or on
high to permit us a guessing game. the agency, in general.
I shall, therefore, with reservations, Speaking of the Church-Tower com-
vote to confirm the nomination of George . mittee, I wish to compliment the mem-
Bush to be the Director of the Central bers of that committee because that
Intelligence Agency. - committee has not been responsible for
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I any leaks-and I have inquired into this
have listened with interest to the well matter-during the whole tenure of.its
thoughtout conscientious remarks of existence. By and large it has acted on
the distinguished Senator from Mary- a basis of unanimity. The only split was
land. When I use the word "conscien- last week when there were divergent
tious" I use it in its best sense because if views between -the chairman and the
there is a conscientious Senator in this ranking Republican member as to what
body, it is the Senator from Maryland kind of an oversight committee should
(Mr. MATH SSI: - "- - - be created once the Church-Tower com-
Recognizing all the questions which he mittee goes out of existence. - -
has raised, it is my intention, neverthe- - Mr. President, it would be my hope
less, to vote for the confirmation of that such responsibilities would not re-
George Bush to succeed Mr. William E. vert back again to only the three sub-
Colby, as Director of the CIA. I do so on committees, because they have not dok e
the basis of his service in the House. of a very-good job in exercising- their re-
Representatives, on the basis of his serv- sponsibility of oversight, and that is a
Ices as the U.S_ Ambassador to the conservative statement..
United Nations, and on the basis of his I hope that a standing committee of
services as- the chief of the U.S. Liaison- the Senate will be selected and, if pos-
Of ice to the Peoples Republic of China- sible, the House agreeing, a joint com-
The question has been raised about mittee, to the end that there can be -
his position as chairman of the-Republi- better rapport between Congress and the.
can National Committee. I have given CIA and the other intelligence agencies,.
that consideration. To the best of my to the end that, where the facts sup
knowledge, while he was chairman of port it, those agencies can be supported;
that committee, that committee was not to the end that unfair charges against-
involved in any way, shape, or form with them can be done'away with or faced
the Watergate affair. up to in instances where they are un-
Perhaps a politician in that job might able to speak for themselves.
be a good thing, if he- is a. respected and - So it is with no trepidation on my part
honored member: of that species. We that I support the President's nomina-
have not had -any politicians heading. tion of George Bash -to the office of Di-
the CIA up to this time but rather non- rector of the Central Intelligence Agen
politicians, and it is through some of cy: His will not be an easy job.
them, that-some of the difficulties, now I am delighted that the Senator from
being investigated and inquired into, Maryland has made the statement he
have arisen. I have an idea that what the has, because that, - too, will serve as P.
select committee, the so-called Church-: warning and that, too, I believe, will
months that would-be required to recruit Tower committee, has been able.to do strengthen George Bush in the position
and investigate anew Director and to, will serve-as a Warning to the CIA. In. which he will assume if Congress sees-
nominate and confirm him is time-that- general, and to the man,- in particular, fit th confirm the-nomination of the
we may not-, have.. A- continuing proper who heads- it,-,and that there will be President.
public debate over the conduct of our in- - nothing more In the way of shenanigans.
teuigence operations could become a very in the years ahead. - . - , -,
noisy and nasty political brawl if we add -1-think that George Bush will go into
at this time a new controversy over the that position, if he is confirmed by the
rejection of the President's nominee for Senate. with the knowledge that- he is,,
Director. in a-certain sense, on the spot, and he
The risk of further deterioration of our - will bend over backwards to perform, to
intelligence capacity is just too great. - - the best of his ability, in line with what
The nomination of George Bush will' he considers to be the intent,-not of a
have to be confirmed with all of the res President, but of Congress.
ervations. that I have tried to express, -Incidentally, may I say that I believe
because it seems to me that his confimma- there has been too much emphasis on the I - -
tion represents the lesser of two evils.. CIA in the hearings conducted by the
At least we are aware of the existence Church-Tower - committee : and not
of the taint of partisan politics. We have enough emphasis on the intelligence
surfaced it; - we - have identified . it, and community, in general, where we will"
we have raised the alarm about it. We find most of the personnel and, I would
know it Is there and certainly George not doubt, most of the expenditures as -
Bush knows It is there. It can be moni- well,. even though since 1969 all the in-
tored, and it will be closely observed both - telligence agencies, with a few excep-
within and without the Central intelli- tions, have reduced their personnel by
gence Agency. something on the order of 43 percent. -
On the other hand, the extent of thee- I do not approve of the names of CIA - -
risk involved in a new confrontation can- . members being published in the news- ,
not be estimated.-Mr. Colbyhas deliv--. papers.-It is a horrendous thing- to do I
ered his valedictory, and he Is ready to . because, in an underworld phrase; it, in
leave. His bags are packed, .. - - . - . effect, puts a "finger" on them and makes
The eruption of new factors and new-. them more- vulnerable. But I do antici-
Issues, if this debate is continued, is pre- pate that, If the Senate confirms Mr. .
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NOMINATION OF GEORGE BUSH TO BE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
HEARING
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
QN
NOMINATION OF GEORGE BUSH TO BE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-620 WASHINGTON : 1976
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JOHN C. STENNIS,
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
IIOWARI) W. CANNON, Nevada
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire
HARRY F. BYRD, JR., Virginia
SAM NUNN, Georgia
JOHN C. CULVER, Iowa
GARY HART, Colorado
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
Mississippi, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOHN TOWER, Texas
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia
ROBERT TAFT, JR., Ohio
DB+ WEY F. BARTLETT, Oklahoma
T. EDWARD BRASWELL, Jr., Chief Counsel and Staff Director
JOHN T. TicER, Chief Clerk
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CONTENTS
Page
Tower, John W., a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas---------------
I
Stennis, John C., chairman, introductory statement--------------------
2
Prepared statement________________________________________
4
Thurmond, Strom, a U.S. Senator from the State of South Carolina-----
&
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Bush, George, of Texas, nominee to be Director of Central Intelligence---
7
Nomination reference and report_____________________________
5
Biographical information___________________________________
5
Responses to written questions of Senator Strom Thurmond_ _ _ _
12
ARTICLES
"Strategic Intelligence-Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job", from:
Army, April 1973; by Maj. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham_______________
16
DECEMBER 16, 1975
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Church, Frank, a U.S. Senator from the State of Idaho----------------
47
Bush, George, statement resumed___________________________________
64
Cohen, David, president, Common Cause------------------
83
Prepared statement----------------------------------------
86
Heisler, Edward, Socialist Workers 1976 national campaign committee---
88
Ackerman, E. C---------------------------------------------------
92
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NOMINATION OF GEORGE BUSH TO BE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MONDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1975
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :05 a..m., in room 1114,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Stennis, Symington, McIntyre, Byrd of Virginia,
Hart of Colorado, Leahy, Thurmond, Tower, Goldwater, and Bartlett.
.Also present : T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff di-
rector; W. Clark McFadden II, counsel; John T. Ticer, chief clerk;
Phyllis A. Bacon, assistant chief clerk; Edward B. Kenney, John A.
Goldsmith, Don A. Lynch, and Francis J. Sullivan, professional staff
members; Roberta Ujakovich, research assistant; and Doris E. Con-
nor, clerical assistant.
Also present: David A. Raymond, assistant to Senator Symington;
Charles Stevenson, assistant to Senator Culver; Rick Inderfurth,
assistant to Senator Hart; Doug Racine, assistant to Senator Leahy;
and William L. Ball, assistant to Senator Tower.
The CITAIRMAN. Members of the committee, the chairman proposes
that we receive a statement from Senator Tower of Texas, on behalf
of the nominee, Mr. Bush of Texas. I have a short statement as chair-
man and then I will ask the gentleman from South Carolina, Senator
Thurmond, for a brief statement. I understand Mr. Bush has a state-
ment that I have not read, but I will call on him then. After that, we
will proceed with questions.
We are pleased to have our visitors and we are also glad to have the
press, radio, and television. Everyone will have to remain quiet, other-
wise it will nullify the cause you have, for being here. That will be. a
mutual undertaking for all of us and I am sure everyone will observe
the rule. It is the price of staying in the hearing and I think it is a very
cheap price to pay, especially when it serves your own purpose.
Senator Tower, we will be glad to recognize you, sir. You may
proceed with your statement.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN TOWER, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Senator Towi,:R. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is a great pleasure for me to be able to present to this committee,
on which I am proud to serve, my fellow Texan, George Bush, who'
has been nominated for the Office of Director of Central Intelligence.
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I believe that George Bush is eminently qualified. He is a native of
New England, has a distinguished war record, received his formal
education at Yale, then displayed the eminent good judgement to
move to Texas, where he has spent all of his adult life.
Mr. Bush has been very successful in the areas of petroleum re-
sources development and drilling, always public spirited and always
involved in public affairs. He resigned his corporate responsibilities
in 1966 to run for the House of Representatives. He was reelected
without opposition in 1968. Mr. Bush has served as the permanent
Representative to the t lnited Nations, and he has served as chairman
of the. Republican National Committee.. He has served as chief of the
TT.S. Liaison office Peking, People's Republic of China.
George Bush has served always in every capacity with great dis-
tinction. and he was recognized early in his public career for his
enormous accomplishment of being the first freshman Congressman
to he appointed to the Ways and Means Committee in some, 50 years
prior to that time..
T believe the fact: that he has a good intellect and good mind, an
ability to marshal facts and reduce them to manageable proportions
and draw the appropriate conclusions, and in view of his proven ad-
ministrative ability I think lie has all the equipment necessary to make
for this country one of the most outstanding Directors of Central In-
tel Iigenc.e that we have ever had.
f am, therefore, pleased and proud to have the opportunity to present
him to the committee and to urge that the committee recommend
favorably h is confirniat ion to the Senate.
'['hank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CTT.vTRMAN. Thank yon. Senator Tower. as I said in the begin-
ning, is a valuable member of our committee. We are glad to have him
appear in this special capacity.
Senator Jackson is unable to be here this morning but according
to his nl ins w i ll be here this afternoon.
I do not, think there is any chance of toting on this nomination
today but. for some who cannot be here, I will say that we will not
be voting today. I am sure that is agreeable to all the membership.
STATEMENT OF JOHN C. STENNIS, CHAIRMAN
Members of the committee, I have a short introductory statement
written on the back of an envelope, so to speak. I also haws a prepared
statement that is partly historical about reviewing the enactment. of the
original National Security Act of 1947. I want to say a few words here.
My desires and wishes would be, that there not be any secret intelligence
agenev at all, the Central Intelligence Agency, but my judgment and
experiences tell me that we must have such an agency. This is a new
and different concept of government, as I see it, from anything we have
bad heretofore. Soon after the end of World War II we realized that
we nust? have an intelligence gathering agency. Much of its work
would have to be carried out in secret. Thus, we enacted as a part of the
National Security Act of 1947, provisions for the creation of this
Agency.
As I staid, this statement is more or less for the record and for the
information of the public at large if the media should see fit to use
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it. Later, with the joining of NATO and other commitments, and I
was here when these things happened, we were further convinced
that. such an agency, properly managed, was not only necessary but
would be very useful in carrying out those commitments which
were considered a part of our own national security. In spite of some
bad things that have happened from time to time in different admin-
istrations, I know as a fact that the CIA has rendered very valuable
services to our Government, to our national security.
Our Government, and this includes the Chief Executive and at least
a 'major segment of the legislative branch, must have the benefit of
what is going on in other countries, be they friendly or unfriendly.
It is frightening to me to think of any President trying to proceed
without intelligence of the nature that I have mentioned. Of necessity
that power is given to this Agency under law and is placed largely in
the hands of the Chief Executive, whoever he may be.
First, "through these hearings, we can emphasize the absolute neces-
sity of a clear consciousness on the part of the Chief Executive of the
Nation of this special.power" and of the care and personal attention
the President must give to this special and exceptional power and
also give to the individual whom he selects to act for him under this
law. I hope these hearings will emphasize that point. That is a fact
of life that we know now but did not know when the act was originally
passed.
It is a fact that the funds appropriated by Congress for this special
Agency are placed directly in the hands of the President of the United
States. In the final analysis, he is the one who directs the Agency in
the use of these funds.
Further, there must be a surveillance by the Congress of the exer-
cise of the power given 'and the funds provided to a President, 'any
President. This system of surveillance must be marked' out and car-
ried out more intensively in the future than in the past.
Again, I mention these points now just to make clear that even
though changes in the law and the system are needed, as I see it, pro-
posed changes are not now the main focal point of these hearings. They
are relevant and, of course, the question will be in order, but changes in
the law or the system would require quite extensive hearings indeed.
That is my. belief, that extensive hearings planned for that purpose
would be held on any major change of the law. The chief focal point
of our hearings beginning today relate to the nominee, the Honorable
George Bush of Texas. Mr. Bush is a gentleman that, so far as I know,
has an. honorable public career, a man of capacity and integrity. These
matters and others are all placed in issue by his nomination. I believe
this committee wants to make a full examination of his character, in-
tegrity, capabilities and other qualifications that pertain to the duties
of the Director of Central Intelligence and related matters.
I have a further statement, members of the committee, that is more
or less historical as to the law that I would like to place in the record
at this point, together with the nomination reference and report and a
biographical sketch of Mr. Bush.
[The prepared statement of Senator Stennis, together with the nom-
ination reference and report and biographical sketch of Mr. Bush
follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN C. STENNIS
The Committee meets this morning to consider the nomination of Mr. George
Bush to be Director of Central Intelligence. He is to replace Mr. William Colby.
Mr. Bush's nomination was forwarded to the Senate on November 4, 1975 and
referred to the Armed Services Committee on the same date. It has been only
within the last week, however, that Mr. Bush has been available to appear before
this Committee.
STATUTORY BASIS AND DESCRIPTION OF POSITION
The position of Director, Central Intelligence was established in ,section 102 (a )
of the National Security Act of 1947. The National Security Act of 7!)47 was the
culmination of years of studies, months of hearings, and weeks of deliberations
by the Armed Services Committee. It is this Act that set up the National Secu-
rity Council, restructured the defense establishment and created the Central In-
lolligence Agency (CIA). The Act was designed to provide a "national security
organization" in which intelligence could play a vital and effective role. By l> (w.
the Director of Central Intelligence was made the executive head of a new agency
for national intelligence-the Central Intelligence Agency. At the same time he
wvas to be under the National Security Council, the Director of "central intel-
ligence".
The National Security Act of 1947 prescribes various restrictions, powers, and
responsibilities for the Director of Central Intelligence. Because of the integral
relationship and overlap of the Intelligence Community and the Defense Depart-
ment, the law explicitly requires that both the Director and Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence shall not be military personnel and shall not be subject
to military control. The Director of Central Intelligence is given special discretion-
ary power to terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency
"whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests
of the United States". Furthermore, the Act grants special power to the Director
of Central Intelligence to have access to all intelligence of the United States
Government for correlation, evaluation and dissemination including information
of the F.B.I. as may he essential to national security.
Finally, it should be noted that under law, "The Director of Central Intel-
ligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure."
In addition to those provisions set forth in the law itself, executive orders and
practice have further underscored the overall leadership role of the Director
of Central Intelligence in the United States intelligence community. Under recent
Presidents, the Director of Central Intelligence has served as the Nation's
chief intelligence officer and principal advisor to the President and the National
Security Council on all intelligence matters.
By and large, the 1947 National Security Act has served this Nation well.
In recent years, however, I have concluded that the Charter of the Intelligence
Community should be revised. Indeed, in 1973 I proposed legislation which
would have made several changes to the National Security Act of 1947. Recent
investigative disclosures about past intelligence activities have highlighted the
need for some changes.
Any person confirmed to the position of Director of Central Intelligence must
be able to give momentum and direction to the necessary and inevitable changes
that will be made in U.S. Intelligence activities. The nominee must have the
ability to gain quickly an understanding of the Intelligence Comunity and
exercise effective control over it. He must possess an uncompromising objectivity
regarding intelligence matters and the courage and integrity to rise above
pnrochial interests.
As a matter of policy, the Democratic Caucus has adopted a requirement that
every nominee appearing before the Senate be asked to provide a personal com-
mitment to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted
committee of the Senate. Such a commitment will of course be expected of any
nominee to be Director of Central Intelligence. But the Director has a special
responsibility in his dealings with the Congress that goes far beyond a mere
commitment to appear upon request. Because intelligence must necessarily
i r(volve secrecy, the Congress is particularly dependent upon the personal integrity
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5
and responsiveness of the chief U.S. intelligence officer. The Director personally
must be forthcoming in keeping the Congress, or its chosen representatives
and throngh the appropriate rightfully deserve the confidence of channels, Congress adehe $ American people.
MR. BUSH'S BACKGROUND
air. Bush has had a distinguished career in public life. His first public office
was as a member of the House of Representatives in the 90th and 91st Congress
representing the 7th District of Texas. As a freshman Congressman, he was
appointed to the Ways and Means Committee. In 1971, President Nixon appointed
Mr. Bush to be Ambassador to the United Nations. At that time he appeared
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and was confirmed in the
Senate by voice vote for the UN ambassadorship. In January, 1973 he became
Chairman of the Republican National. Committee. Mr. Bush is Chief, United
States Liaison Office, the People's Republic of China and has served in this
position since September 1974.
NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT
IN ExECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE or TILE UNITED STATES,
November 4, 1975.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on
Armed Services :
George Bush, of Texas, to be Director of Central Intelligence, vice William
Egan Colby. DECEMBER 18, 1975.
Reported by Mr. Tower with the recommendation that the nomination be
confirmed, subject to the nominee's commitment to respond to requests to appear
and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON GEORGE Bus it
Born : June 12, 1924, Milton, Mass.
Education : Phillips Academy, Andover, Mass., 1937-41; Yale University, New
Haven, Conn., 1945-48: Bachelor of Arts, Economics, 1948; Phi Beta Kappa ;
Delta Kappa Epsilon ; Varsity soccer, 1 year ; Varsity baseball, 3 years ; captain,
two-time NCAA Eastern Championship Team.
Marital status : Married to former Barbara Pierce of Rye, N.Y., January 6,
1945.
Children : Four sons, one daughter. Military : Commissioned Ensign at age 18, Corpus Christi, Texas Naval Air
Station, June 1942; Active duty World War II, 1942-45; Carrier pilot, U. S. S.
San Jact n.to, 3d and 5th Fleet, Pacific. Shot down in combat 1944, Bonin Islands ;
Awarded Distinguished Flying Cross and three air medals ; Honorably discharged
with rank of Lieutenant (j.g.), 1945.
Profession : Oil field supply salesman, Dresser Industries, Midland, Tex., 1948-
51; Formed Bush-Overbey Oil Development, inc., 1951, Midland, Tex_ ; Cofounder,
Zapata Petroleum Corp., 1953, Midland, Tex.
Profession : Cofounder, first president of Zapata Off-Shore Co., 1934, Midland-
Houston, Tex.; Resigned in February 1966, to run for Congress.
Government : Candidate for U.S. Senate, Tex., 1964, 1970; Congressman, 7th
District, Tex., elected November 8,1966:
-Unopposed for re-election, 1968.
-Member, Ways and Means Committee, one of the few freshmen members of
the House ever selected for service on that Committee.
-Sponsor of legislation on ethics, setting priorities in federal spending and
bilingual education.
-Chairman, Republican Task Force on Earth Resources and Population.
-During 91st Congress, be was appointed by the Speaker of the House to
the 12-member House delegation to the Ninth Mexico-United States Inter-
parliamentary Conference.
Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, sworn
in February 26, 1971.
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-As Ambassador, he was a member of the President's Cabinet and a regular
participant in all Cabinet meetings, March, 1971-January, 1973.
-Uniled States, Permanent Representative at the 26th and 27th sessions of
the United Nations General Assembly.
-President's Representative at all meetings of the United Nations Security
Council, March, 1971-January 1973.
-Chief United States Representative to annual meetings of the United
Nations Economic and Social Council, Geneva, 1971 and 1972.
--United States Representative at February, 1972, meeting of the United
Nations Security Council in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
-President's Representative for special mission in.spection tour of 10 African
countries, February. 1972.
Chairman, Republican National Committee appointed January 1973:
-As Chairman, attended and was a regular participant in meetings of the
President's Cabinet, January, 1973-September. 1974.
Chief, U. S. Liaison Office, Peking, People's Republic of China, appointed
September, 1974.
Awards :
-Honorary Doctorate Degrees from Adelphi University, Austin College, Beaver
College, Northern Michigan University.
-Anti-Defamation League Man of Conscience Award, New York City, 1972.
-Selected by Texas .Tnnior Chamber of Commerce as one of "Five Outstanding
Young Men of Texas," 196.
Civic Affairs :
---Chairman. Houston, Texas Heart Fund, 1966.
--Chairman, Texas Heart Fund, 1967-69.
--Lifetime trustee, Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts.
--Community Associate, Lovett College, Rice University.
church :
Member and former vestryman, St. Martin's Episcopal Church, Houston,
Texas.
--Member of the Board, Episcopal Church Foundation.
The CIEATRMAN. Mr. Bush, we are glad to have you here. You have
been before Committees of .the Senate before. I remember one in Partic-
ular. You told me a few minutes ago that you do have a prepared state-
ment and the members have it before them.
I would like to recognize, now Senator Thurmond, the valuable rank-
ing minority member of our committee.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STROM THURMOND, A. U.S.
SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator THURMOrm. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bush, I am very interested in the work of the CIA. I have been
very concerned over what has been happening in this country, the atti-
tude of some people toward the, CIA and the other intelligence-gather-
ing agencies of our Government.
In fighting a war one of the most important things is known as the
G-2. The G-2 is a man who collects intelligence on. the enemy. In
peacetime, if our President, is going to make wise decisions, he must
have intelligence, he must have knowledge, he must have information
as to what is going on in different parts of the world and especially
with regard to potential enemies.
If you are confirmed for this position, it is my sincere hope that you
will not have your ardor lessened in the least because of this investiga-
tion of the CIA and other intelligence agencies. We have three mem-
hers, I believe, of this committee who are on the Select Committee on
Intelligence-Senators Tower, Goldwater, and Hart of Colorado. In
my judgment, it is extremely important, regardless of what some of
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the big newspapers and news media of every kind say, that you dedicate
yourself to gathering the information that the President of the United
States needs because be cannot act wisely unless he has it. It is vital to
our survival in my judgment. I hope that in the performance of your
duties you will not be discouraged in the least by the actions of some
people, especially some news media in this Nation.
In looking over your biography, I notice you are well educated. You
graduated from Yale, Phi Beta Kappa. You were an athlete, in var-
sity baseball, I believe, for 3 years, and captain of the team. You went
into the service at age 18, became an ensign, and served 3 or 4 years in
the Navy. You were, shot down in combat, awarded the Distinguished
Flying Cross, and three Air Medals, all of which to me. is impressive.
It is impressive to me because you have served your country in uniform
and you have been acknowledged by your country as being worthy of
decorations.
Then you have held important positions in government-Congress-
man. from Texas, I believe, for -three terms, Permanent Representative
of the United States to the United Nations, Chairman of the Republi-
can National Committee, and Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Peking, Peo-
ple's Republic of China.
I was impressed, too-it may sound like a little thing but it shows a
part of a man, an important part, I think-the fact that you served as
the chairman of the Texas heart Fund and that you serve as lifetime
trustee at Phillips Academy, and community associate, Lovett College,
Rice University.
I think all of this shows an interest on your part in hiunanity, in
civic development, love of your country, anal willingness to serve your
fellow man. From your experience and your intellectual integrity, the
reputation you bear for honesty, it seems to me that from all of this
experience and your personal qualities that you are. well qualified to fill
this important position. Speaking for myself, I shall be very pleased
to support you.
The CIIAInMAN. Thank. you, Senator. All right, gentlemen. If it is
agreeable with the canimittee we will now proceed with Mr. Bush.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE BUSH, OF TEXAS, NOMINEE TO BE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Buser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the commit-
tee. My particular thanks to m_y fellow Texan, Senator Tower. I am
pleased to be back in the United States. I am still on Peking standard
time so I am a little tired and I hope you will forgive me, Mr. Chair-
man.
My nomination was sent to this committee some time ago but I was
unable to leave China prior to- the President's trip to the People's
Republic.. The President left Peking on December 5 and Mrs. Bush
and I left on December 7.
I recognize that I am being nominated as Director of the CIA at
a very complicated time in the history of this Agency, and indeed in
the history of our country. In fact, having been in China for a year,
I did not fully realize the depth of the emotions surrounding the CIA
controversy until I came back here. But be that as it may, I have a
few fundamental views that I would like to set out in the brief state-
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nient ail then, sir. T will be happy to respond as frankly, as honestly
as I can to any of your questions.
First, my views of intelligence. I believe in a strong intelligence
{capability for the United States. My more than 3 years in two vital
foreign affairs posts, plus my attending Cabinet meetings for 4 years,
plus my 4 years in Congress, make me totally convinced that we must
see our intelligence capability certainly maintained and I would say
4rengtleamed. We must. not see the CIA dismantled.
Reporting and investigative reporting in the papers and investiga-
tive work proper by the Senate and the Mouse have brought to light
error abuses that have taken place over a long period of time. Clearly
things were clone that were outrageous. Some of them were morally
ofternsive. And these must, not be repeated and I will take every step
to see that they are not repeated.
I understand that Director Colby has already issued directives that
i i plement some of the decisions of the Rockefeller Commission, de-
e-eions designed to safeguard against abuses. If confirmed, I will do
all in my IioNver to keep informed personally, to demand to the highest
ethical standards from those with whom I work, and particularly
to sec that this ,Agency stays in foreign. I repeat, foreign, intelligence
U aru told that morale at, the CIA and indeed in other parts of the
intelligence. community is low. This must change and I am going to
do my hest to help change it. Some people today are driven to wantorih'
disclose sensitive inforrnatior-not talking here about the Congress-
coral- to the onoper oversight authorities of the Congress but to friend
av: l foe ;alike aroimil the world. In many instances this type of dis-
cl+a'mmre can wipe out effective operations, can endanger the lives of
pat riotic .11nericans and can cause enormous damage to our security.
1 ic~r the ioh of Director of Central Intellig-ronce, not as a maker of
foreign policy hat as one who should. forcefully and objectively pre-
-(e.mt to the Presifle.nt a ml. to the National Security Council the findings
711111 views of time intelligence community.
It is essential that these recommendations be, without political tilt.
1 is essn;aticrl that strongly held differences within this very large
community f presented. It is essential that without regard to exist-
inf poliev or future lxalicy. the intelligence e tirnates he presented---
coli) the article will lac 11)(.111 (led i11 the
record.
The article follows :'1
11?rmn : Army. April 19731
S'PILATP:aTn' I\T1;LTd1 ENCa:-Isis TT3IATIE('. TIlE '1'1Tfl1o T : A Sor:i Tsa's Jolt
I 11aa. (,en. Ihiniel tl. Graham']
In his landmark hook, The Soldier and the State, Professor Samuel P. Hunting-
loll draws our attention to an extremely important and sometimes neglected fact :
"The military institutions of any society are shaped by f:wo forces : a functional
imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security, and a social im-
perative arising from the social forces, ideologie, and institutions dominant.
within the ;society...."
So, the reason for the existence of our armed forces is to counter threats to our
security, and the function, composition end size of those forces depend on the per-
ception of threats by the national leadership. If the military profession loses its
role in describing these threats to national security, it surrenders much of its
influence in decisions about military strategy, military force structure and the
nature of its own armaments.
We have in the past ten year,,,, come perilously close to losing this, vital role.
The impact of the intelligence views of the Department of Defense was progres-
sively weakened between 1960 and 1970, and the voice of civilian agencies in all
facets of military intelligence became progressively more dominant. The military
budgets carried the onus of heavy outlays for intelligence collection, lout the key-
intelligence Judgments derived from this costly effort were for the most part made
in other agencies.
This situation can he too easily dismissed as the result of bureaucratic maneu-
vering, of "whiz kids" ignoring military advice, or of the general growth of anti-
military sentiment in and out of government. The fact is that the muting of the
military voice in military intelligence was largely of our own doing. Military pro-
fessionals---loth users and producers of intelligence-through failure to under-
stand the strategic intelligence function, downgrading of the role of intelligence
in general and sometimes ;abusing the intelligence process, have in the past pro-
duced the best arguments for taking the responsibility for threat description out
of military hands. Now is the time to face these facts, and to take the attitude and
the necessary steps to correct the situation.
one has little difficulty in arguing the need for good tactical intelligence among
military professionals these days. One prime lesson learned in Vietnam was the,
tact that superior military force cannot be brought to bear in the absence of good
intelligence. The Army has acted and is still acting vigorously to insure that good
tactical intelligence will be available to commanders in all levels of warfare.
however, we are concerned here with an area about which there is less :agree-
ment-st:rateuic intelligence.
Strategic intelligence is that which is used to make strategic decisions. This.
Net is often lost sight of among planners and decision-makers. There is o tendency-
I Afel. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, a 1946 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, now
deputy director for estimates in the Defense Intelligence Agency, has served in several
posts in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. and commanded the 319th Military Intelligence Battalion in U.S. Army
Pacific. In Vietnam he was chief of the Current Intelligence, Indications and Estimates
Division, Directorate of Intelligence Production, In the office of 12, U.S. bftlit iry Assistance
Command.
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to think of intelligence gathered by Washington-controlled resources as "stra-
tegic" and that gathered by the commands as "tactical" or "operational" intelli-
gence. This is nonsense, If intelligence is used to make tactical decisions, it is
tactical intelligence ; if it is used to make strategic decisions, it is strategic intelli-
gence. The means by which it is collected is quite beside the point. For example, in
1950, when front-line troops reported the fact that the Chinese were crossing the
Yalu, it was tactical intelligence to all levels of command in Korea, but strategic
intelligence to Tokyo and Washington. On the other hand, knowledge of a. new
surface-to-air missile in country X is strategic intelligence to national planners
but it is tactical intelligence to any air unit which may operate in the area.
It is extremely important to get this matter straight. If we don't, we will
continue to have expensive bureaucratic squabbles about intelligence resources,
based on spurious arguments about control echelons. Commands will jealously
guard intelligence resources on the grounds of "tactical" intelligence require-
ments and Washington intelligence agencies will fail to see that their refined
"strategic" collection systems are producing a great deal of tactical intelligence,
neglecting the need for quick dissemination to the commands.
The definitional dilemma is compounded somewhat by tactical decisions that
are often made in Washington. This fact of military life today means that mili-
tary intelligence organizations in Washington find themselves hip-deep in the
tactical intelligence business, traditionally the purview of commanders in the
field. Further, there is the unfortunate tendency among intelligence producers
and users to associate the term "strategic" exclusively with intercontinental
nuclear-strike matters. For instance, you would find few intelligence officers in
the targeting business who would not consider their product "strategic" intelli-
gence. In fact, it is not; it is essentially tactical intelligence stored up against the
contingency of executing the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan).
The general conceptual confusion between tactical and strategic intelligence
is jeopardizing the commanders' control of their intelligence assets. But a more
serious intelligence problem, in my view, is the danger of the military profession
as a whole losing the function of defining the military threat for the national
leadership. The basic problem is one of confidence in the military intelligence
product within the services, the Department of Defense and the other depart-
ments of government.
The intelligence products of greatest impact in the national decision-making
arena are the estimates. These contain the intelligence which most heavily in-
fluences strategic decisions. They are usually predictive in nature, pulling
together basic order-of-battle, technical, doctrinal, economic and political intelli-
gence to describe overall military postures of foreign powers. The estimates
project military threats from the present out two, five and ten years. Military
planners are heavily dependent on these estimates in force structuring, force
development and weapons development.
It is in this area that we military professionals have been in danger of losing
our shirts to civilian agencies. To put it bluntly, there is a considerable body
of opinion among decision-makers, in and out of the DOD, which regards threat
estimates prepared by the military as being self-serving, budget-oriented and
generally inflated. This gives rise to a tendency to turn to some other source
for "objective" threat assessments. The suspicion exists not only with regard
to broad strategic estimates---for example, trends in the manned bomber threat-
but to such detailed military estimates as the ability of the Soviet field army
to sustain itself in the field under various assumed levels of combat. The trend
toward independent analysis has been gathering over the past ten years and
there are now analytical staffs in the civilian intelligence community paralleling
those of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on almost every military intelli-
gence subject.
The responsibility for this situation to a. large degree rests with the military
side of the house, not with the civilian agencies. The lack of confidence in the
threat estimates emanating from military intelligence agencies which caused
users to request outside opinion in the early 1960s, is fully understandable. It
stemmed from a series of bad overestimates, later dubbed "bomber gap," "mis-
sile gap." and "megaton gap." These and other seriously inflated estimates of
less notoriety have hung like albatrosses around the necks of military intelli-
gence officers ever since.
In its first several years of existence, DIA was plagued by the prevalent
notion, even in the DOD staff, that the agency could not be counted upon for
an objective threat assessment. This suspicion was reinforced by the fact that
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DIA did not perform well in the estimating area. The agency was harried by a
combination of birth pains and the burgeoning demands for essentially teciical
intelligence in support of Washington-level decisions on the Vietnam war. The
estimates function simply muddled. along until the Agency was reorganized
in 1970 by Gen. Donald V. Bennett, USA. Meanwhile, planners and decision-
makers had become accustomed to going elsewhere for their threat estimates.
At first blush, it would appear that the blame for this situaation can be laid at
the feet of intelligence officers-first in armed services intelligence agencies
and then in DIA. But this is too simple; the military intelligence user must take
his lumps as well. Too often the user has not been content with an objective
judgment from his intelligence officer-he has wanted the answer that "supports
the program." While planner pressure on intelligence estimates is not nearly as
blatant or widespread as some quarters would contend, there has been enough
of it to rake it tough to regain full confidence in the military intelligence
effort.
In the service staffs the fact that the position of the intelligence chief is a
notch under the other key staff chiefs almost invites planner pressures on in-
telligence. It takes a pretty toughminded assistant chief of staff for intelligence
to defend an estimate that runs counter to the well-laid plains of the rest of the
general staff. In some ways, planner pressure is worse when it arises in the
;joint staff arena. Planners of all services "coordinating" an intelligence estimate
are quite capable of reducing it to lowest common denominator mush. There are
still some "old hands" in intelligence who are so inured to yielding before user
pressures that they automatically produce threat estimates designed to pleaase,-
or at least certain not to offend. These types :ire getting fewer, but they still exist.
When intelligence yields to consumer pressure. it cannot remain credible. When
intelligence estimates are reduced to bland judgments acceptable to all pl.i'rvers,
it is difficult to justify the expensive outlay of resources to collect intelligence.
Such inoffensive pap can be produced without evidence.
Fortunately, the somewhat dismal picture outlined above has brightened
measurably over the past few years. The stature of intelligence estimates pro-
duced by the military has increased considerably and the accusations of bias
have abated. Several factors account for this: DLA pulled up its socks and put
proper emphasis on the estimates job ; a new crop of more professional. less
conformist intelligence officers is available for estimating work and, most impor-
tant, there is a new appreciation of the intelligence function among our military
customers.
The Defense Intelligence Agency was reorganized in November, 1970. One of the
key changes was the establishment of a separate directorate charged with the
production of defense intelligence estimates. One of the prime reasons for this
move was the fact that there was, practically speaking, no way to discover the
views of the DIA director on important estimative matters. I)IA views, yvere
submerged in the text, of national estimates (NIE's) prepared at the Central
intelligence Agency (CIA) and coordinated with all Washington intelligence
agencies. or in the text of joint estimates which were coordinated with the
service planners. The only exception to this rule was the rare dissent to a national
estimate when a specific view of the DIA director was noted at the bottom of
the page. DIA's institutional anonymity was, in large part, a product of the
original service objections to the creation of the agency. "Running with the pack
was the one way to avoid collision with the individual services. It was bureau-
cratically much safer to have any substantive argument be between a service
and the "intelligence community" than between it service and DIA. The trouble
was that this attitude put civilian agencies in the position of final arbiters of
any disagreements inside DOD on threat definition.
The new I)IA directorate for estimates permitted proper attention to the
estimating function. Under the old setup. the estimates job was under the
directorate for production, which was also charged with answering the daily
intelligence mall. The heavy demand for current intelligence on Vietnam. the
Middle East and other crisis areas was too urgent and too time consuming to
permit much effort on the more scholarly problem of estimates. The new
directorate created an adversary process on substantive issues within DIA. The
estimators, who must defend DIA views in the DOD and national intelligence
arena, frequently challenge the results of analysis from the other I fA diree
lorates. This necessary friction causes key intelligence judgments to be thor-
oughly scrubbed internally, ensuring that DIA won't find itself out on a limb
defending a weak argument of some single analyst, a situation which prevailed'
all too often under the old setup.
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The new crop of analysts and estimators available to both the service intelli-
gence offices and to DIA are indispensable to a new effort to regain respectability
for military threat estimates. Intelligence specialist programs within the serv-
ices-and here the Army must be singled out as having the most effective
program-are paying off in the form of real professionals capable of making
objective assessments of the evidence on hand and defending the intelligence
product among their fellow officers. On the civilian side, the new generation of
analysts who have entered I)IAA are not afflicted with all overriding defensive
attitude about service intelligence opinions. Many of the old hands used to react
with arguments about the DIA "charter," rather than counter differing intelli-
gence views with good substantive analysis.
In the long run, however, the most telling factor in the improvement of military
intelligence estimates is the increasing awareness among consumers that the
only useful intelligence is objective intelligence. There was a time when the
rule-of-thumb for acceptability of threat estimates among planners was "the
bigger, the better." Intelligence estimates which failed to maximize enemy threats
in both sum and detail were likely to draw fire as "wishful thinking." More often
than not, military intelligence people came to heel under such criticism and
stumped hard for the "worst-case" view. These old attitudes are waning now
and simplistic demands for the scariest possible threat estimates are much less
prevalent among users. Some hard lessons have been learned.
Military planners have seen some unfortunate results of inflated estimates
over the past several years. With regard to Vietnam, it became painfully obvious
that "worst-case" assessments of enemy capabilities by Washington estimators
gave the erroneous impression that the more casualties we inflicted on the Viet
Gong and North Vietnamese, the stronger they got. When theater intelligence
tried to offset this by stressing the evidence of the telling effects of Allied opera-
tions on the enemy, the effort was branded as a lot of unwarranted, policy-
oriented optimism. In February, 1968, the communists corroborated the estimate
that they were in desperate straits by launching the militarily disastrous Tet
offensive. That fact was overlooked by almost everyone, however, most preferring
to believe-the new gloomy estimates (later proved grossly overstated) that the
VC, although defeated near the cities, had "taken over the countryside."
Many Pentagon planners have also learned that "worst-case" estimates can
be used to squelch military programs just as easily as to support them. A pro-
posed program can be made to look like a total waste if its opponents are given
free rein to postulate the size and sophistication of future threats to the system.
Overestimates of future Soviet strategic missile capabilities killed the U.S.
counterforce strategy at least four years before the strategy became invalidated
by real Soviet capabilities.
The advent of arms limitation agreements sharply underscored some additional
problems of Inflated intelligence estimates. The "horse-trading" aspect of these
negotiations raises the very real possibility of trading off actual friendly capa-
bilities for enemy "capabilities" existing only on paper in our own intelligence
estimates.
These examples lead to another important point that is beginning to be under-
stood in military planner circles : Estimates of future enemy forces and hardware
are by nature estimates of intent-not just of capability. The old arguments
about "capability versus intent" are heard less now in DOD. It remains true that
intelligence should emphasize capability in descriptions of current and near
future enemy forces. But the minute you tackle the usual problem of estimating
enemy forces (or hardware) a year or so into the future, you have entered the
realm of intent. For example, since World War II the Soviets have never, to
our knowledge, deployed forces or fielded hardware as fast as their total capa-
bility permitted. To estimate that they would do so with regard to some weapon
system or type of force in the future would make little sense. Indeed, all estimates
of future Soviet forces derive from an attempt to discern what part of their total
capability the Soviets intend to use in military programs and which programs
they intend to emphasize. This is not a very difficult-to-fathom verity of intelli-
gence estimating. It is remarkable how long it has taken some of our military
users to wise up to it.
While not all users of intelligence in DOD have learned the pitfalls of trying to
make intelligence "fit the program," most have. Today there is a much improved
market for objective Intelligence judgments and this is a most hopeful sign in
the field of military intelligence. When we get to the point where the strategic
intelligence officer knows that his prime customers are going to raise the same
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aunount of hell about overstatement as about understatement of threats, the
objectivity of intelligence estimates will be almost automatic.
Objective intelligence is a goal to be devoutly pursued by the entire military
profession. However. an important word of caution is in order: An objective
intelligence judgment is not necessarily a valid judgment. Validity depends on the
evidence available to the intelligence people and the quality of the analysis
applied to that evidence. Any planner or decision-maker not convinced that there
is good evidence and good analysis behind an intelligence judgment should feel
perfectly free to reject it. And the intelligence officer should not get his nose out
o!' joint if his product is not always accepted as gospel. However, the user can-
not insist that the intelligence officer recant and change his best judgment. If he
does this, he corrupts the whole system.
To sum up. I think that the time is ripe for the military profession to reassert
its traditional role in the function of describing military threats to national secu-
rity. Roth the military user and the military producer of strategic intelligence
have come a long way since the "missile-gap" days. DIA has hit its stride in the
production of respectable military estimates. While there will always be a legiti-
mate reason for independent judgments from outside DOD on issues of critical
importance to national decision-makers, there is no longer a need, in my judg-
iiient, to duplicate DIA's efforts in other agencies. The best assist the Army can
give to such an effort is to insist on objective strategic intelligence. cooperate with
l)IA in producing it, and put good officers in the strategic intelligence field.
Senator SYM NGTON. This article said in part:
If the military profession loses its role in describing these threats to national
security, it surrenders much of its influence in decisions about military strategy.
,uilitary force structure and the nature of its own armaments. We have in the
past 10 years come perilously close to losing this vital role. The impact of the
intelligence views of the Department of Defense was progressively weakened
between 1960 and 1970 and the voice of civilian agencies in all facets of military
intelligence became progressively more dominant. The military budgets carried
the onus of heavy outlays for intelligence collection. but the key intelligence judg-
ments derived from this costly effort were for the most mart made in other
a. enCies.
Now, T was involved in the creation of the National Security Coun-
eil, and doubt there are many here who remember the name of the first
E )ireefor of the CIA. The Agency was ('reeled as much by the thinking
of Secretary Forrestal as anybody, because, although he was all for the
ruilitarvv, he realized there must be some brake on the dcmtands of the
various services for the various new weapons systems being proposed
by various people.
When I read that the general who made these statements was going
over to the Central Intelligence Agency, I called up the. Director of the
Central Tntcligence Agency and asked if he knew about this speech.
Ife asked, "Have you read the speech?" I said, no, just the record.
And he said, if von read the speech. I do not think you would feel that
way about it.
So T read the speech and then wrote the then Director of the CIA.
the ITonorahle .Tames R. Schlesinger :
Dear Mina, as you can see by the attached. I have read the article in detail and
have extracted certain statements made hopefully not out of context. At the end
of the article as presented he states, and I quote, "there is no longer a need in
toy judgment to duplicate DIA's efforts in other agencies."
As you know, the Defense Intelligence Agency is part of the military setup.
Especially in that this article, and the fact that he is going to work for you in
the Central Intelligence Agency have created much comment down here. I would
hope we would get together soon re same. Sincerely.
Then T added a long-hand note, "Specifically where does this leave
t he CIA ?" The second paragraph is what I just read to you.
This letter was dated April 13, 1973. A few days or weeks later
Mr. Schlesinger became the Secretary of Defense. One of the first
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things he did was to take General Graham back into the Pentagon
and make him the Director of the DIA. To me that was questionable
based on what the man had written.
What I am getting at is this. You will feel entirely independent of
anybody, use your own mind, based on your own experience, when you
analyze what this country needs for its national security as against
your estimate of the threat.
Mr. Busii. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. I am very pleased to hear you take that posi-
tion. Knowing you and your family for many years, I accept every
statement you have made today as accurate. I believe you are well
qualified for the position. If you will stick to your guns, as you have
said you would do this morning, I see no reason why you cannot have
outstanding success in this position.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator Tower, did you have any questions?
Senator TowER. No ; I defer
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Goldwater?
Senator GOLDWATER. I do not have any questions, but because there
is a strong possibility that you might be asked about Vice Presidential
intentions by one member who is a candidate and another one who
might be, I thought it might help if one who has been around that
track, made a few comments on it. I agree completely with your
statement. You say, "I don't think any American should be asked
to say he would not accept."
And I do not think any American would. I do not mind telling
you that I recommended that you be Vice President to Mr. Nixon
and again to Mr. Ford. To your advantage they saw differently
than I did.
Now, Vice Presidents are not selected in the committee room of
the armed services. Maybe the way we do it is not the way it should
be done. I do not think it is. It may not be the best, but usually some
hotel room is the meeting place and I remember in 19:,56 when Mr.
Nixon was picked in a hotel room in Chicago. Then in 1960 another
hotel when Mr. Lodge was picked.
In my case I have forgotten whether it was my room in a hotel or
somebody else's room, but I called on the Members of the Congress and
asked who they would like me to name as Vice President and. they gave.
me the name of Bill Miller.
In 1968 in a hotel room in Florida, the Fontainebleau, I believe it
was
Sentor TowER. The Hilton.
Senator GOLDWATER. I don't remember where it was. I was so
many years ago.
From about 1 o'clock in the morning to about 5 o'clock in the
morning we met with Mr. Nixon and he finally said, could you live
with Mr. Agnew? So that is the way this job is going to be chosen
and it is not going to be done here. I hope none of our members
bedevil you about whether you will or will not because you might
ask them the question who asked you to run for President.. That would
be a good point. Do not ask me.
I just want to tell you, George, it is a real pleasure to have you
here. I know Senator Symington, your father and I all. started service
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in the Senate at, the same time, and you follow all the fine traditions
of your father. The only mistake you have ever made was moving
to Texas. [Laughter.]
The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you, Senator Goldwater..
Senator McIntyre?
Senator MCINTTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Bush, the key issue is, of course, the political back-
ground that you have already achieved, and it appears to me that
there are several ways to approach the issue. You have stressed that
your political background should be considered as an asset, especially
when contrasted or measured against the performance of some CIA
career men. I have, to admit this position does have some appeal. But
there is another strong and reasonable position that says that no one
with your political background and past should be considered. That
argument goes on to say that the FBI and the CIA are two posts
in Washington that have to be considered differently than Cabinet
posts.
Those positions, like the Supreme Court, should be insulated com-
pletely from politics and-if one agrees with this opinion-then
no matter how gnalifed you may be, you are disqualified because
of your background.
There is another position, too, and that is that a politician should
not be automatically disqualified if he possesses the other necessary
qualities. And certainly, Mr. Ambassador, it would be beneficial to
have someone who is sensitive to the public and who understands the
concepts of accountability to the people.
However, is it appropriate to have someone with a clear political
background at this time in the history of the CIA? Public confidence
in the CTA must he at a low point now after Watergate and the revela-
tions of political abuses in past administrations.
Now, as a firm believer in the importance of the CIA and the neces-
sity of its legitimate Functions, I do not want to see the agency further
weakened by the appointment of a person who is perceived, whether
rightly or wrongly, by the public as a political person.
Thus, at this particular time in the history of the CIA, this is the,
question that concerns me : Is it appropriate to appoint someone like
you? I would appreciate your reaction to this middle, position, this
third position, that, you should not be disqualified if you have the
other qualifications, but at this time in history, what are the public
perceptions going to be?
Mr. Basic. Senator McIntyre, it is my view that there should be
one criterion. I am not trying to tell you how to run your business,
but f think there should be one criterion. If you accept, that my
foreign affair-, backm?ound has been conducted without political favor,
and if you accept the premise that it does not hurt to have been in-
volved in politics, not wholly partisan but so you have a feeling for
the people, then it seems to me that I think if I tried to put myself
in your shoes that T would not be concerned about appearance or what
editorials say.
But does this man have the character? Does lie have the integrity
to do this job? And if you have a reservation in your mind about that,
I world understand your voting it down right now, but if you do
not, I would find it difficult for you to say, George, you are qualified,
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you have the political feel, but you are disqualified because other
people will not think it is all right.
So that would be my answer to that question, sir, and I hope you
find I do have it and I hope you find that in two rather sensitive
jobs-the minute I walked into them, politics was put behind me.
You take that United Nations mission-104 people-I do not think
you will find any one of them saying I did anything to politicize. I
Bate sitting here blowing my own horn but what I did was lift the
morale in the place and althougl:i there were understandable reserva-
tions about my qualifications when I went there, I think some of your
colleagues that served with me and the others would say that I (lid
a good job.
So I would hope you would put emphasis on my ability to do it
because I understand there is this "appearance." I just do not think
this committee should knuckle under to appearance if indeed I have
the qualifications.
So I would ask to be judged on my integrity and character as op-
posed to how somebody else might view a job.
Senator MoINrvRn. Let me ask you one very mean question that I
would not have thought of asking of a similar appointee, 5 years ago.
But in view of history, let me ask you this question.
You . said you were ridi ng a bicycle in Peking when you suddenly got
word of this appointment. You did not seek this appointment. I know
you told me that you felt that if the President wanted you to take this
vital position, that your sense of duty to the country and to the Presi-
dent was paramount and you accepted it.
Now, let us assume y ou are appointed. Let us assume we are moving
3 or 4 months down the campaign trail. You are not going to be im-
pervious to that fact. You are going to read the papers, I know.
What if you get a call from the President next July or August, say-
ing "George, I would like to see you." You go in the White House. He
takes you over in the corner and lie says, "look, things are not going
too well in my campaign. This Reagan is gaining on me all the time.
Now, lie is a movie star of some renown and has traveled with the fast
set. He was a Hollywood star. I want you to get any dirt you can on
this guy because I need it."
Now, what are you going to do in that situation? What can you do
and where would you go?
Mr. Busir. I do not think that is difficult, sir. I would simply say
that it gets back to character and it gets back to integrity ; and fur-
thermore, I cannot conceive of the incumbent doing that sort of thing.
But if I were put into that kind of position where you had a clear
moral issue, I would simply say "no," because you see I think, and
maybe-I have the advantages as everyone on this committee of 20-20
hindsight, that this agency must stay in the foreign intelligence busi-
ness and must not harass American citizens, like in Operation Chaos,
and that these kinds of things have no business in the foreign intelli-
gence business. Under my leadership they will not have, and so that
causes me no problem whatsoever because, as I have said, and I really
believe I am putting politics behind me on this. Again we get back,
Senator McIntyre, to my being able or not able to convince you of
that.
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That is the main thing. And then if I can convince you, then you
should no longer be troubled by that kind of question--I understand
your raising it but I think if I have the integrity you should not be.
troubled by the question.
Senator MCTNTYRF. But your answer is that yon would say no, Mr.
President.
Mr. BITSH. That f would----
Senator MclxTyr{F. That is:it.
Mr. Buser. T would say no, Mr. President. Yes, sir.
Senator McIxTyan. I think somehow, Mr. Chairman, the law should
require that when the CIA Director is asked to do something like that
he should report it to the U.S. Senate. As you may know, in almost the
same fashion this was done and the CIA Deputy Director agreed with
the telephone call because he said he knew it was the President of the
United States talking. That is ivlrv I asked the miserable question.
I cannot conceive that you would do it.
11r'. BUSH-r. Yes, sir.
Senator MCINTYRF. I talked to one of the former CIA Directors
just recently, and he said, "Tom, I had no place to go."
T do not know how true that is, but he said so.
Thank you very much. I will give you every consideration.
The CtrAiu r.k c. Thank you very mach Senator ejiityre.
Senator Bartlett, you are next.'
Senator BAR,rr,Fi-r. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
There. has been a lot of talk about different approaches and vehicles
to be established-oversight capabilities over the CIA. How would
you welcome much closer oversight as a, means that you meet your
goals and do a better job?
Mr. BuSTI. Senator Bartlett, my view on that matter is, that is a,
matter for the Senate to determine, whatever the oversight responsi-
bilities should be. One of the recommendations of the Rockefeller Coin-
mission was some kind of a joint committee and all I can tell you is
that I will closely cooperate with whatever authority is set up for the
Senate, the House, but I have no hesitancy in sa.yino- that T will fully
cooperate. I am sure there will be times, very frankly, when there
could be differences as to what may be disclosed, but T, will cooperate
to the best of my ability with whatever oversight authorities are in
existence now and with whatever oversight authorities the Congress
decides on for the future.
Senator BAUTLETT. What I was getting at, with your background in
Congress, do you feel it would be helpful in achieving the goals of CTA
to have committees better informed than they have been in the past on
a continuing basis?
Mr. Busx. I do, sir. And I would approach my .lob in that manner.
Senator BARTLFT?T. Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned on page Ci of
your statement :
Many of our friends around the world and some who are not So friendly are
wondering what we are doing to ourselves as a nation as they see attacks on
the CIA.
Where do you think the line should be drawn in the investigations
presently going on?
Mr. Busx. Well, it is a very hard question because I have been gone
and have not watched all the details. Certainly I have no problems
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with the congressional investigations per se. This is the prerogative
of the Senate. It is the prerogative of the House. They ought to do it.
I was somewhat alarmed when I turned on a television program the
other night and saw some individual on a British program wantonly
disclosing names of corporations that had cooperated with the CIA.
I do not find that useful to our security and intelligence or anything
else. I have no detailed knowledge of what these organizations do. I
just do not have that. I have not been briefed on that. But I just have
the feeling that there is something wrong when you pick up Playboy
magazine and read-which I do not do very often, Senator Bartlett.
[Laughter.]
And read a detailed expose naming names of CIA agents which
could endanger their families, possibly. But I do not like that. I think
those kinds of things confuse our friends and delight those not so
friendly who would like to know a great deal more about our
intelligence.
So in this statement I just wanted to get it out there. There are
some people that feel differently about it. I think you need a balance
between disclosure to the public and what I would consider wanton
disclosure that does not work in the interests of the United States.
Senator BARTLETT. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to say I applaud
what you have said about the comments that have been made in your
direction concerning your chairmanship of the Republican Party and
your being a politician. I think there can be real hypocrisy involved in
such attacks.
I think that politicians are like any other professional or other
people, they can be good or bad or in the middle. I think a person
should be judged on his own character and his own abilities and he
could have been or could not have been a politician and meet the test.
I really applaud you on that because I think that we could not have
people who wanted to serve in whatever capacity they might be asked,
or they wanted to be available to do their best and be unable to do it
because of some experiences in the past that were perfectly fine and
honorable but were so-called political. So I commend you very much.
Mr. Buss. Thank you.
Senator BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Bartlett.
Senator Byrd?
Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bush, we know each other and have had an opportunity to talk
and know each other's views. I think it is very important that our coun-
try have a strong intelligence agency. We are spending $90 billion on
defense. Most of the Members of the Congress feel that is necessary.
And indeed it is in my judgment. I also feel that a strong intelligence
agency is a very important part of the defense mechanism and I know
from talking with you that this is your view as well, as you have enun-
ciated it here today.
I think it is vitally important. also that the CIA be completely
divorced from partisan politics, and in reading and hearing your
statement this morning, it seems to me you have gone about as far as a
person can go in that regard. In your statement you say, "I recognize
the need to leave politics the minute I take on the new job if confirmed."
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Arid you also say, "If confirmed, I will take no part, directly or
indirectly, in any partisan political activity of any kind."
And then on the next page you say, "I will put politics totally out of
my sphere of activities."
So you have gone very far in your statement in that regard.
I have one question which is along the line of Senator Mclntvre's,
but it is ti, somewhat broader one, I suppose. I assume that if confirmed,
you would not permit the CIA to be, used by any individual or any
group for partisan. political purposes.
Mr. Br-sr-r. That is correct, sir.
Senator Brun. Mr. Chairman, I think the nominee has the judgment,
that he has the ability, and that he has the character to assume this very
important position. I was concerned when it was first announced be-
cause of the political aspects. But in thinking about it further, I am
convinced that-George Bush being the type of man that I know him
to be-I need no longer have that concern. I think the chairman
brought out. a very good point. If a person did have political ambitions,
this is about the worst place possible to use as a stepping stone.
Be that, as it may, I have no longer any concern about the nominee's-
position on these matters, and I shall be glad to support the nomination.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
Senator Hart?
Senator HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, along with Senators Tower and Goldwater, I have
worked for the last 101/9 months on the select committee looking into
the intelligence community. Those. of us who have been involved in that
experience feel strongly not just about this confirmation but about the
future of the intelligence structure of this country.
You have said, and I think it is admirable, that "things were done
that were outrageous and morally offensive. These must not be. re-
peated and I will take every step possible to see that they are not."
I would like to probe a little about what steps you would take to see
that they are not.
You have talked, and I think rightly so, about political insulation
but primarily along the lines of insulating the agency from your own
political background. I am more concerned about insulating you from
the rest of the political process, particularly in the white Mouse. What
those of us on the committee have, found out is that sometimes the
agenev was off on its own, but just as often it was operating under the
direction of political figures of various administrations in both parties.
What steps would you take to insulate yourself from the desires of
a President to promote his own political purposes or to conduct some
operation abroad that in your judgment was not in this country's
interests?
Mr. BUsrr. Senator, I do not know how one insulates oneself from
the wishes of somebody else. I mean I do not-if one has access he is--
this is going to he nitpicking here but it is hard to insulate oneself
from the wishes.
In terms of the execution of something I think is wrong I would
clearly-and it gets tough because the President has certain rights and
certain responsibilities over the intelligence community and certainly
over the Defense Intelligence Agency . where . he : is Nmmander-in;-
Chief of the. Armed Form, but again I would not myself from the President per se as an answer to the questto insulate
ion. I would
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insist that to the degree it was possible, given the timeliness of what-
ever the situation was, that the proper bodies of the National Se-
curity Council, have the right to act on these matters.
I think we need to study it. There is a wide range. of committees in
the intelligence community, some of which I am familiar with, many
of which I am not, and I think there are all kinds of ways to be sure
that what you do in the final analysis is properly recommended. But
once it was recommended and you get down to It moral question that
you disagree with, you in the final analysis after urging reconsidera-
tion or saying I want 24 hours to present the views of the intelligence
community or the CIA or whatever it is, in the final analysis you have
only one remedy. I think we both know what that is. That is to get out.
Senator HART. There is another one. That is to let the President
know where you stand on some of these things before you go. into
office. There is no doubt in his mind how far you are willing to let
the CIA go.
Mr. Buser. I accept that, sir; yes, sir.
Senator HART. Let its probe what you feel to be morally offensive
and outrageous. How do you feel about assassinations?
Mr. Buser. I find them morally offensive and I am pleased the Pres-
ident has made that position very, very clear to the Intelligence Com-
mittee and I think also Director Colby who I think knows about this,
I know he feels
The CrrATRMAN. Excuse me. What was your question?
Senator HART. The question was whether a Director of the CIA
can insulate himself from wrong political pressures by letting the
President know the bounds beyond which he will not go as director-
before he takes office.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. Buser. I accept that. I think it is an excellent suggestion and I
would be prepared to do it. I think in matters that did come up violat-
ing the rights of citizens in this country, I think if I continue to
emphasize we are talking about foreign intelligence, that will help.
There are some legitimate things that must be done domestically by
the CIA, in its own security, for example, but emphasizing foreign
intelligence could help with the problem that understandably troubles
thecitizens in this country.
Senator HART. I want to get to that, but let me pursue some of the
foreign techniques. What about supporting and. promoting military
coups d'etat in various countries around the world?
Mr. Busei. You mean in the covert field?
Senator HART. Yes.
Mr. Buser. I would want to have full benefit of all the intelligence.
I would want to have full benefit of how these matters were taking
place but I cannot tell you, and I do not think I should, that there
would never by any support for a coup d'etat; in other words, I can-
not tell you I cannot conceive of a situation where- I would not support
such action.
Senator HART. What about supporting. the overthrow of a govern-
ment that was constitutionally elected?
Mr.- Buser. I think we should tread very carefully on governments
that are' constitutionally elected. That is what we are trying to en-
courage around the world and -I feel strongly about that.
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Senator HART. What about paramilitary operations, providing
funds and arms to establish a government that we wanted?'
Nfr. llr;sn. I can see certain circumstances where that would be in
the best interests of the United States, the best interests of our allies,
the best interests of the free world.
Senator HART. How about providing money for political parties
and candidates in various countries?
Mr. Busx. I have a little more difficulty with that one but, again,
without having the benefit of the facts and what the situation is sur-
rounding it, I would not make a clear and definitive statement
whether that ever or never should be done.
Senator HART. You raised the question of getting the CIA out of
domestic areas totally. Let us hypothesize a situation where a Presi-
dent has stepped over the bounds. Let us say the FBI is investigating
y some people who are involved, and they go right to the White' House.
There is some possible CIA interest. The President calls you and says,
I want you as Director of the CIA to call the Director of the FBI to
tell him to call off this operation because it may jeopardize some CIA
activities.
Mr. Buser. Well, generally speaking, and I think you are hypothecat-
ng a case without spelling it out in enough detail to know if there is
any real legitimate foreign intelligence aspect, but generally speaking
the CIA should butt out of the domestic business and it certainly
ought not to be a domestic. police force and it certainly ought not to
be. involved in investigations domestically of this kind of thing.
Senator HART. That is the easy side.
Mr. Busrr. Well, it is not--
Senator HART. I am hypothesizing a case that actually happened
in June 1972. There might have been some tangential CIA interest
in something in Mexico. Funds were laundered and so forth.
Mr. Busrr. Using a. 50-50 hindsight on that case, I hope I would
have said the CIA is not going to get involved in that if we are talk-
ing about the same one.
Senator HART. We are.
Senator LEAHY. Are there others ?
Senator HART. There has been a doctrine operating between the
political structure and the intelligence community for many years
called plausible deniability. It is letting the President know just
enough about what is going on, but not enough so that when the es-
tion is asked, "Did you know this was going on?" he has some grounds
for denying that he knew.
How do you feel about that, particularly where major covert opera-
tions were involved?
Mr. Busx. I think the President should be fully involved and though
I understand the need for plausible deniability, I think it is extremely
difficult. I just do not think a President should be shielded when you
are dealing with something this important, from the totality of the
information. That is my own view on it.
Senator HART. Now, Senator Symington pointed out that too few
people in this country are aware that the Director of Central Intelli-
gence controls only about 15 or 20 percent of the intelligence budget.
Eighty percent of that is under the control of the Secretary of Defense.
Do you have any recomrnendatipns or thoughts on how one operates
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as the Director of the entire intelligence community and yet does not
control the vast bulk of their budget?,
Mr. Buser. No. I . will welcome the recommendations from your
committee or welcome the recommendations of the Pike committee.
I will welcome the recommendations that are being prepared as I
understand it in the White House now. I have been here a week and I
have no firm judgment on how that should be done. I would make a
general statement, though, that if it is determined by these recom-
mendations that the Director should have the authority, it seems to
me that the best way to have the responsibility is to have something
to say about the funds; and so I think in that area you might find
the answer. But, again look at and study, before I took a personal
position, the views of the various committees that are, studying these
matters. They have been on it for several months and I have been
back here 1 week, and I would be presumptuous, I think, to say these
are my final views.
On separating the Director of Central Intelligence from his CT 1
responsibilities, I have some general feelings on it. One is the Director
of Central Intelligence needs some kind of a base. He has one now
in CIA and I am not enthralled with the concept that everybody
has his empire and you are just floating around EOB someplace.
That is a. generalized concept, but if you are going to have the respon-
sibility, you ought to have some muscle, some authority, to do some-
thing about it with.
So I would hope whatever your committee recommends and what-
ever others recommend they do not set up some Director of Central
Intelligence and then not give him the tools to enforce these coordi-
nated activities through budgetary control.
That is very general, Senator Hart, but I do not
Senator HART. But I think what you are saying
Mr. Buser. I have no recommendations yet.
Senator HART. You would be willing to go to the mat with the
Secretary of Defense to get a little more authority over how that 80
percent of the intelligence budget is spent.
Mr. Buser. The answer is yes, sir, but particularly if yon are
supposed to have the responsibility for it, I think you must do that,
and I think I would be in a position t.o-I would not say have equal
standing because those are Cabinet positions, both State and Defense,
with policymaking functions. This is not, as, I conceive it, and I think
it is properly conceived as defined in the statute, a policy job; but I can
see. situations where I would want to forcefully present the views of
the intelligence community. even though they might be on. a different
direction from existing policy, and let somebody else make the policy,
but get those views in there.
Senator HART. How is my time,, Mr. Chairman?
The CIIAnRMAN. You have run over.
Senator HART. I had some other questions, but let me just make one
observation that I made to you when we visited in my office briefly, and
that is-leaving aside your qualifications, background, integrity, and
ability to convince us you will not politicize nor permit the CIA to
be politicized despite your political background-there is still. a
separate question all of us have to acknowledge. This is the precedent
s -620-76
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established by this kind of appointment. Despite your qualifications,
it, is a step in the direction that troubles many of us, but it does not
reflect on your personally one iota.
All. Br-sn. May I respond to that, Mr. Clairman?
The 0I AIRMAN* Yes, but make it as brief as you reasonably can. Mr..
Leahy has been waiting.
A1t. Br,srr. Senator Hart, I would simply appeal that you not make
judgments on your vole based on outside appearances, editorials, fear
of whether somebody is going to say a "politician,"' which I do not
think is a NO word taiere. I think it should be made on the basis of
qualifications and integrity and how it is going to be viewed a year
from now, 2 Nears from now, 3 years from now, and that is what I
appeal to you to do in determining whether I am fit to take this job.
Senator 11 ART. Mr. Bush, I do not make my judgments based on
editorials.
A1r. Bt STY. Yes.
The CrrAiIurAN. Senator Leahy.
Senator LCAIIY. '1'liank you, Mr. Chairman.
AIr. Ambassador, earlier in a statement made by Senator Stennis
as chairman of this committee, he said that he would question your
judgment, if you were using the CIA as it steppingstone to the Vrce-
I're.sidency. I might add that I would question your sanity if you wore
going to use the CIA as a steppingstone to the Vice-Presidency. I
~?.annot imaLCine a.ny worse way today to get into that. But I would
like to go into a couple of areas.
Mr. Beam. Yes, sir.
Senator LrATiY Senator Hart has asked you about political assassi-
nations and absent, 1 would assume-we will not get the question too
muddy-absent a declaration of war in a particular area, do I under-
stand your answer to be that you are totally opposed?
Air. Buser. Yes, sir.
Senator LEAIn-. To political assassinations?
Mr. BZ sir. I understand a directive has ,?'one out oil that. We would
not need it as far as I am concerned. I do indeed. It is appalling to toe.
The, CHAIRMAN. All'. Bush, excuse me a minute. Ise your micro-
phone, please.
Al r. Btsii. I am opposed to political assassinations and
Senator Li .iiiv. 1 understand there is a directive from President
Ford on that. Suppose you were serving under another President
:rud such. a request was made of you as CIA Director. What, would
von do ?
Mr. 1htiair. T would-I feel strongly enough about that, one-you
have precluded wartime--to say that would be the place where I got
rill' m lie t hanged his mind, one.
Senator 1 ii inv. Let ore follow up on a question asked by Senator
McIntyre. Besides resigning, would yon feel strongly enough about
that to report it to the proper oversight committees'? For example,
in the Senate, the Armed Services Committee?
Mr. Brrsr i. On that matter, yes, sir.
Senator LFAIIY. Then let me ask you
Mr. Bursa. Can I elaborate once more? I can see situations where I
might. resign.
Senator LEAI-IY. Certainly.
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Mr. Buser. Over something that I conceived to be a real moral prob-
lem but where the Chief-where the President had the legal right to
go through with it where I would not do that or I might quietly fade
away without calling a press conference or without making a scone-
but I would always faithfully try to testify before the appropriate
oversight committees of the U.S. Congress.
Senator LEA1IY. I am concerned over what is the best way for Con-
gress to carry on this oversight function. For example, can the Con-
gress carry on its oversight function if it has full control and debate
over the CIA budget or should they
Mr. Buszr. I think the proper investigative bodies of Congress, I
mean the proper oversight committees, should be informed on the
budget but I would oppose making the CIA budget public.
Senator LEATTY. I am concerned-I recall once in a debate in this
committee, and without giving out any secrets, having a whole series
of little items, $5 million and $10 million, and so forth, until we got
down to the bottom item of several hundred million dollars put in
there for miscellaneous use. Coming from a small state, that seemed
to be a lot of money, and I wondered exactly what it was. I am wonder-
ing how we can carry out this oversight.
Mr. Ambassador, do you feel the Congress has (lone an adequate
job of carrying out its oversight function of the CIA during, say, the
past 4 015 years?
Mr. Buser. I think many individuals in the Senate that I have talked
to feel that it has not and I would be inclined to go along with that.
But I again do not have, all the evidence on that that has come to your
committee.
Senator LEArHY. has this committee itself, the Armed Services
Committee, done an adequate job?
Mr. Buser. I am not,. about to sit here criticizing the Senate Armed
Services Committee, given the limited amount of information I have,
Your committee has had access to a tremendous amount of infc rma-
tion. I have had access tonone of it, and I do not know how many
meetings they have had and I just simply am not, going to criticize
this committee because I do not know how' many times you have met
on this. I have not been briefed.
Senator Towzn. Would the Senator from Vermont yield for a eorir-
ment from a member of the select committee, on that point? Senators
Ila-rt, Goldwater, and I serve on the Senate Select. Committee on Intel-
ligence. I think it would be useful for the committee to know, at this
point, that the select committee is at the moment considering various
oversight options to recommend to the Senate. That is currently oil-
going in the select committee and on the 20th of December the chair-
plan of the committee, the vice chairman, and myself, will testify
before the Government Operations Committee on this very matter. So
it is a matter currently under consideration.
The C ITAI1n AN. All right, Senator Leahy.
Senator LEA71Y. The Congress has this year carried out two fairly
substantial investigations of the CIA, both in the House and in the
Senate. Has that hurt the CIA in your estimation?
Mr. BLTSII. I have not been out there. I do not know what effect it
has had on the morale of_the CIA. I simply cannot answer that
question. Around the world I think some do not seem to understand
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runt constitutional process, and so perhaps it has raised some eyebrows.
I know it has in sonic other countries, but whether it has hurt it here,
I simply cannot say. To the degree it has encouraged the outside and
wanton disclosure.. and my understanding since I have been back here
for 6 clays is that these committees have both been very responsible
with classified information and I do not see how the charge can be made
that in doing its constitutional duty that it has hurt.
Senator LEANT. If the Congress had done a thorough, continuing,
ongoing oversight of the CIA during the past 5 years, would these
committees have been necessary?
Mr. Bursar. Probably it would not have been necessary.
Senator LE.vHY. Thank you.
Mr. Br sir. On the other hand, perhaps it is timely to have a review
that, will make some substantive suggestions. It is my understanding
that both committees are empaneled in order to suggest legislative
change and it is those suggestions that I would like to see and I would
certainly believe to the degree they are left for administrative decision,
T would consider them very, very thoroughly because I know people
have put in an awful lot of hard work on those committees.
Senator LEAnr. flow would you feel about taking the oversight
away from the present committees that have it and putting it into a
special joilit committee?
Mr. Buser. My 4 years in the Congress taught me one thing and that
is to let the Congress determine its own procedures, and I would sim-
ply bow to the will of the Congress and cooperate fully with what-
ever is decided by the Congress. I would cooperate.
Senator LEArrY. I am not on the Select Committee. Senator Part,
Senator Tower and Senator Goldwater are but could that be an effec-
ti ve way of carrying out the oversight of the CIA?
I am not lobbying for any particular method of doing it, ;11r. Am-
bassador.
Mr. BI?srr. I think it could and it is a recommendation of the Rorke-
feller Commission. I support that recommendation, but having said so
i would, if there is some new situation that comes forward, I would
he. glad to consider that-I will offer my full cooperation if I am con-
k rined to whatever vehicle Congress decides upon.
Senator LEAIrv. Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned the Rockefeller
Committee which has spoken of having a Presidential Advisory Com-
mittee on Oversight. i)o you support that ?
llr. Bast-r. There already is a Presidential Advisory Committee-
the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board-and it would have my full
cooperation, sir.
Senator LEAIIY. Well, that was going to be my next question.
The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was first established back
in the told-5Ws by President Eisenhower. It was the President's
hoard of consultants on foreign intelligence activities. I understand
the name was changed in 1961 by President Kennedy to the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).
There have been three different charters-1956, 1961 and 1969. The
contents were about the same.
This summer I had my staff look at the President's Foreign Intel-
ligence Advisory Board. I cannot really see where it, call carry out
much in the way of oversight functions. They have had a relatively
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small budget. They get almost all their information from the CIA, ac-
cording to their staff director on foreign intelligence matters.
According to their staff people down there, they point out that
their job did not include oversight and review of the CIA but rather
is confined to coming up with ideas which would improve our intel-
ligence efforts and they brought out one of them, the U-2. The Com-
mission report on the Board said it does not exert control over the
CIA. In fact, the CIA is the Board's only source of information about.
CIA activities.
Do you think that is really going to do an awful lot for us?
Mr. Busn. I think that depends on what these committees come up
with. If your implication is, and maybe I missed it in the question,
Senator Leahy, you said they rely on the Director of Central Intelli-
gence or the CIA for intelligence. I would oppose yet another intelli-
gence-gathering organization. So maybe I misread that. But I feel
that the Board has a useful function.
I notice one of the recommendations in the Rockefeller Commis-
sion is that the Inspector General should report any irregularities that
he finds to the President's Board and I think in those areas and per-
haps others that your committee can suggest it would be good. The
fact that they get their information from the existing intelligence
community does not trouble me because I do not think we need another
intelligence agency.
Senator LLATTY. I agree with you on the inspector general, but the
Commission also found that because of the CIA's compartment-
the way they have set up their compartments in there, their compart-
ments' secrecy and all, that the inspector general never even knew of
the illegal and improper activities which recently have come to light.
Would you, if you were the Director of the CIA, upgrade the staff
and responsibility of the Inspector General? Would you give him
access to all CIA Ales?
Mr. Bvsic. I think I read enough on that, sir, to answer affirma-
tively, yes, I would.
Senator LEATTY. Would he be allowed to report directly to the appro-
priate congressional oversight committee if one is set up?
Mr. BT7sir. I sure would want to be sitting next to him
I do not think that you need to be able to have absolutely everybody
go off freewheeling but certainly the inspector general should be made
available to these committees, but I would like to know -That was going
on, and it is my intention if confirmed for this job to know what is
going on as much as possible.
If you suggest, and I may be misreading it, that I would not know
what the testimony was or I would not know what he was doing, just
testifying
Senator LEATTY. I am not suggesting that at all.
Mr. Busii. So I would simply think, yes, he should be available. I
would like to know about it.
Senator LLA_nY. I am not suggesting you not know what he was talk-
ing about at all, Mr. Ambassador. I would not suggest that of any
agency head of their own inspector general.
What I was concerned about is that the inspector general in many
ways has far more time to look for these things than the Director does,
and I want to be sure that he has such access because in the past
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apparently he has not had such access and that is probably one of the
reasons we are facing this problem today.
Al r. Bus it. Let me tell you why I respond that way.
In the Rockefeller report there was a suggestion that he go directly
to the PF l AB. I have no problems with that. But I want to be in-
forrned. I want to know about it. And if he was saying what his sn;r-
ovstions were, I -would like as the Director, to know about it and then
also have the right to say whether I agreed or disagreed.
You have got to have a disciplined organization.
The (fl iimrAr. I am sorry Senator but your time has run over.
ion tnc.y ask one more question.
:`ena.t or CRAFTY. I will wait until the next go-around.
'Ile (%uA[RnrAN. All right.
itlr. Bush, some minutes ago on the proposition of having a request
from the executive department, be it the President or someone under
the President, you gave a response as to what your action would be.
Would you direct your first deputy, we will say, to report directly
to volt any request of that nature that he might receive?
Mr. Busrr. Yes. sir; I would.
10 hink il, is essential that the Director be informed of White House
requests.
The (IrA[RNTAN. )'VS.
Mr. Brrsii. And I do not, know how many they get over there. Some
of them I am sure are strictly routine, but certainly as a matter of
principle I think whether they come into the Counsel's office, the in-
spector ,general's office, the deputy's office, I would insist on being
informed.
11he ClTAIRNrA:c. 1 was directing the question mainly at matters of
;,crious importance and consequence. Would you apply that same rule,
them, to your chiefs of divisions? I do not know just what term you
niay use in the CL1 but I am thinking in terms of those who have
(~1 a a rue of various major operations. Would you instruct them, too?
-AIr. Birsir. Yes, sir.
'hhe CITAIRr[AX. It seems to me that is getting at the thing in such a
wa} as to make the total responsibility and authority yours.
11r. Buser. Yes, sir. I would.
The re arefour deputies in addition to the-and I would do that, the
,anae for the inspector general., the same for the General Counsel's
nfiiec.
The C1FAFRMAr. And to ensure that you are directing the policy on
Those kinds of questions-I am not hitting at any President-but to
++3a5aov that, von did have that. responsibility and power you would also
dirce't any others who are in key positions to give the same reports to
vrna.
M r. B r rSTI. I would, Mr. Chairman.
rl'?ze Cl-rArRWTArc. A matter that I have been concerned with for vears
is the fact that you are not only Director of the CIA but you are
Il)ireetor of all the central intelligence community which includes
u))(1ranons of the. I)LL and others, but still you do not have the author-
ity over them. You just have the authority over what I call the CIA
proper or hard core. That money is put in another budget. It is a
;cr~~rai.te matter.
ow, if you are confirmed, I want to strongly suggest that you take
iIhe lead in trying to get a workable, practical plan, because if you are
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going to have the responsibilities, you must have the authority. Did
I make that clear to you?
Mr. Busir. Yes, sir.
The CuAII rAN. That is your response to that?
Mr. Busii. My response, Mr. Chairman, is I hope I can find ways
to implement that suggestion.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Some very able men have tried and have under-
taken such a mission but due to the pressure of various other matters
have not come up with anything very practical. You already see that
problem facing you, do you not?
Mr. Bush. I see the problem, Mr. Chairman,. but I cannot in con-
science tell you I see the clear answer.
The CIIAI iMAN. No.
Mr. Bush. Because I see between the Defense Intelligence Agency
and CIA and others in the community, an enormous problem of co-
ordination, but I can pledge to this committee I will address myself
to it as best I can.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
It is a very delicate and sensitive matter by nature and then it is
a very practical problem, too, but I think it .can be handled. It just
takes some cooperation between the executive branch and the legislative
branch.
I have been impressed with your answers to Senator Leahy's ques-
tions, all of which were good, regarding the Inspector General. You
said you would want to be with your Inspector General, or be informed.
I Judge that it, is by no means that you would try to control what he
said, or anything of that kind, but feel that since the responsibility
rests on you, you would want to know and would be entitled to know,
I think, what his testimony was or what he was saying. Is that correct?
Mr. BusH. That was my point, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Wjrell, I have always advocated keeping the power
where the responsibility is and keeping the responsibility where the
power is. I said earlier ina brief opening statement that through these
hearings we can emphasize the absolute necessity of a clear conscious-
ness on the part of the Chief Executive of the Nation of this special
power that is vested in him under the act and of the care and personal
attention the President must give through this exceptional power and
also to the individual that he selects to act for him.
Quoting further I said "I hope these heari.ns will. emphasize that
point." I think the hearings have emphasized that point to you, to the
public, and to the President, in.the onestions that came from Members
other than me, and my time has expired. As I see it., it is an obligation
that you owe to the President especially, to keep him directly advised
of the enormous duties.
I believe it is almost beyond human comprehension, the ability the
President must, have, to reach his obligations. But this is a special law
and operates in a special way. It is not within the pattern of other
agencies as I see it., and the President, is going to need your help as
well as you need him. So you are conscious of your obligation in that
way.
Mr. Busir. Yes, sir; I am, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Not trying to protect him from things but to protect
the country, your position, and the obligation that you assume. Is that
the way you see it?
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Mr. Buslr. Yes, sir. I see it-I see that relationship clearly.
The Cu &ia TAN. Yes..
Mr. Busir. Some, have charged that because I know the President
personally, that would be bad for some reasons. I think it is good. If I
have the proper integrity for this job I think the intelligence com-
inunity is entitled to have its views forcefully, firmly presented to the
President and then have the policymakers take over. That is my con-
eept of this relationship. and certainly if there was wrongdoing or I
detected improper pressures from the white House, I think, 'because
of access, I wouldbe in a reasonable position to do something about it.
I ant not saying I am omniscient and would see right away that it
was good or had. I think there are some gray areas. But I would have
i lie access and I think I would use it not to do bad things suggested by
the White House but to see that. the CIA views are fairly presented.
The CHHAIRMAN. You would either correct those matters of any great-
ness at al I yourself or take it up with him.
Mr. BUSII. Yes, sir.
The CIAIRMAN. All right.
I thank you very much.
Senator Symington?
Senator SYMINOTON. Mr. Ambassador. several points you made this
mmiorning worried me a bit. I do not think you really meant it that way
wvlien you said ; maybe you were old fashioned, but you still believed in
patriotism.
I have watched my four grandsons, children of today-andb lieve
the youth of today are equally patriotic. I think leadership in the
executive branch-and I am not talking about any one adininistra-
t ion-and leadership in the Congress is more responsible for the recent
lack of desire. to join the armed services than anything, these "no-win"
war concepts, for example.
I would hope you would not think most of the youth of today are
not patriotic.
Mr. BTTSIT. I have four sons, one daughter. I have just as much con-
fidence. I do get concerned about what sometimes seems to be-well,
take the word "politician." The connotation of the politician has
changed, some of it with reason, some of it in my view without. I stand
here and say I think it is honorable. I know a lot of people do not. So
it is this kind of general feeling I have rather than any lack of con-
fidence in my four sons and I am sure yours, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. I wanted you to expand on that because I felt
I knew how you really felt about it. The basic problem, in my opinion,
in the United States today is "greed." As I watch many operations
a round this country I am saddened. The efforts for authority, the ef-
forts for votes. Often it has little to do with money, although there are
a. lot of people interested in getting as much money out of the Govern-
me.nt as they can. The record so proves. Most are not in Government.
Some are.
no I think. that is perhaps our great problem today, and the only
way we are going to solve it is through sacrifice. I do not know any-
body who is asking me to sacrifice anything. I watch people go 'by 2O