EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS BY GEORGE BUSH DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AT CLEVELAND CITY CLUB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000100040013-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 25, 1976
• Content Type: SPEECH

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EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS BY
GEORGE BUSH
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT
CLEVELAND CITY CLUB
25 JUNE 1976
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EXCERPTS
YOU , If'VE= ALL HEARD AND READ INNUMERABLE CHARGES AND
ALLEGATIOI;: 'GAINST THE CIA A:JD THE INTELLIGENCE COE1i1Ur.IITY
AS A "lNOLE, I HOPE THAT YOU DO NOT CONE TO BELIEVE
UUJFOIiiJDID ALLEGATIONS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY HAVE APPEARED INN
PRINT OR BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN REPEATED SO OFTEN,
MANY OF THE ALLEGATIONS WERE UTTERLY BASELESS, MANY
OTHERS WERL BLOWN OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO REALITY, MD
IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE MISTAKES AND BAD JUDGMENTS HAD
BEEN MADE, THE AGENCY ITSELF HAD MOVED TO CORRECT TIHEf1
LONG BEFORE THEY BECAME PUBLIC,
ALL OF THIS PUBLICITY, THE INVESTIGATIONS, THE CHARGES
HAVE HAD MANY NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES BUT THEY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED
ONE IfiPORTA'JI T NING, THEY HAVE MADE- THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE
A PROPER SUBJECT FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION. THEY HAVE BADE IT
CLEAR TO THOSE OF US I N I NTELLI GE'ICE THAT WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY
TO ENSURE THAT THE Af11EERI CAN PEOPLE UNDERSTAND THE I NTELLI GEJCE
PROFESSIO I AND ITS VITAL ROLE IN EJSURING OUR NATION' S
SECURITY. 111E PEOPLE MUST KNOW THAT CIA IS DEDICATED TO
LIVING WITIINd THE LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS OF THIS
COUNTRY.
PART OF ASSEJMING THIS RESPONSIBILITY IS ACCOMPLISHED BY
FACE-TO-FACE TALKS, AS I All DOING HERE TODAY, ANOT1-IER
PART IS ACCOMPLISHED BY ENSURING THAT THE PEOPLE`S ELECTED
REPRESIE:f,TATIVES I-11 CONGRESS HAVE THE INFORMATION THEY
NEED TO PERFORM THEIR ROLE OF OVERSEEING THE INTELLIGENCE
COf IIU JITY,
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2
THE CIA AND THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WELCOME
STRONG AND EFFECTIVE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, AS A
PRACTICAL MATTER, WE HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO GAIN FROM IT. WE
GAIN THE ADVICE AND COUNSEL OF KNOWLEDGEABLE MEMBERS, WE
GAIN THE ASSURANCE THAT YOU, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE CONFIDENT
THAT YOUR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IS CLEARLY ACCOUNTABLE TO
BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND THE CONGRESS.
LET ME GIVE YOU AN IDEA OF THE EXTENT OF THIS ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY BY CITING A COUPLE OF FIGURES. I PERSONALLY HAVE APPEARED
28 TIMES BEFORE VARIOUS CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES SINCE I
BECAME DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON JANUARY 30, IN
ADDITION TO MY APPEARANCES, DURING THAT SAME TIME OTHER SENIOR
OFFICERS OF THE AGENCY HAVE BRIEFED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND
COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBERS SOME 65 TIMES. AND, 19 MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS HAVE VISITED THE AGENCY ON SEVERAL OTHER OCCASIONS
FOR BRIEFING SESSIONS,
WE WANT TO COOPERATE TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH
THE CONGRESS, BUT CONGRESS MUST ALSO DEAL RESPONSIBLY WITH
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. CONGRESS MUST ENSURE
THAT OVERSIGHT ENHANCES, RATHER THAN HINDERS, THE VITAL
OPERATIONS OF OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES,
ONE IMPORTANT WAY THE CONGRESS CAN DO THIS IS BY
CENTRALIZING THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR OVERSIGHT OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THIS WAS ONE OF THE MAIN POINTS
OF PRESIDENT FORD'S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS ON FEBRUARY 13,
I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS IT AGAIN.
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THE SENATE HAS NOW ESTABLISHED A PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE. IT IS CHAIRED BY SENATOR
INOUYE OF HAWAII; SENATOR BAKER OF TENNESSEE IS THE VICE-
CHAIRMAN. THIS IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, BUT IT
IS NOT CONSOLIDATED OVERSIGHT. I NOW REPORT TO THREE OTHER
SENATE COMMITTEES, ALTOGETHER THERE ARE SEVEN CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES INVOLVED IN THE FORMAL OVERSIGHT PROCESS. IN
ADDITION, SOME ELEVEN OTHER COMMITTEES OR SUBCOMMITTEES
HAVE MADE OVERSIGHT CLAIMS AND BEEN GIVEN ACCESS TO SENSITIVE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION$
THIS RAPIDLY BROADENED ACCESS TO SENSITIVE MATERIAL HAS
CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE PAST YEAR'S UNPRECEDENTED
NUMBER OF LEAKS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. SUCH
LEAKS ARE DAMAGING AND CAN HURT AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE
CAPABILITIES FAR INTO THE FUTURE. COMPLEX AND EXPENSIVE
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SYSTEMS CAN BE COUNTERED,
DEDICATED AND COURAGEOUS MEN AND WOMEN WHO RISK THEIR LIVES
IN THE SERVICE OF THIS COUNTRY CAN BE EXPOSED AND DESTROYED.
AND WE WILL NEVER KNOW HOW MANY POSSIBLE SOURCES OF VALUABLE
INFORMATION DID NOT COME FORWARD BECAUSE THEY FEARED THAT
WE COULD NOT KEEP THEIR SECRETS.
AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, I AM CHARGED BY
FEDERAL STATUTE WITH PROTECTING BOTH THE SOURCES OF OUR
INTELLIGENCE AND THE METHODS BY WHICH WE COLLECT INTELLIGENCE,
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I AM DEAD SET AGAINST OVERCLASSIFICATION, AND I AM TAKING
STEPS TO SEE THAT ONLY TRUE INTELLIGENCE SECRETS ARE
CLASSIFIED. I AM TOTALLY COMMITTED TO ENSURING THAT SECRET
STAMPS ARE NEVER USED TO HIDE FAILURES OR ABUSES, BUT
I AM EVERY BIT AS DETERMINED TO SEE THAT LEAKS, CARELESS
TALK, OR A DESIRE FOR A SENSATIONAL HEADLINE DO NOT RESULT
IN THE SENSELESS DISCLOSURE OF OUR REAL INTELLIGENCE SECRETS,
I SEEK TO COOPERATE WITH THE CONGRESS TO THE MAXIMUM
EXTENT POSSIBLE, I WANT CONGRESS TO BE A CONSUMER OF
INTELLIGENCE -- SHARING IN THE FRUITS OF OUR EFFORTS IN
ORDER TO BE BETTER ABLE TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES,
CONGRESS MUST ALSO HELP US TO KEEP OUR TRUE INTELLIGENCE
SECRETS,
NOW LET ME TURN TO ANOTHER MATTER OF VERY SERIOUS
CONCERN TO ME. I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE OF ALLEGATIONS THAT
HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE PRESS REGARDING THE AGENCY'S SUPPOSED
"SUBVERSION" OF THE PRESS. BECAUSE A FREE PRESS IS
FUNDAMENTAL TO THIS REPUBLIC, I PARTICULARLY WANT TO BE SURE
THAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOES
IS IN ACCORD WITH REALITY, NOT WITH SENSATIONAL HEADLINES.
HISTORICALLY THE CIA HAS HAD RELATIONSHIPS WITH
INDIVIDUALS IN MANY WALKS OF AMERICAN LIFE. THESE RELATION-
SHIPS, MANY OF A VOLUNTARY AND UNPAID NATURE, HAVE REFLECTED
THE DESIRE OF AMERICANS TO HELP THEIR COUNTRY, SUCH
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RELATIONSHIPS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED WITH THE CLEAR INTENT
OF FURTHERING THE AGENCY'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE MISSION,
THEY HAVE NOT BEEN AIMED AT INFLUENCING OR IMPROPERLY
ACTING ON ANY AMERICAN INSTITUTION,
ON FEBRUARY 11 OF THIS YEAR, I ISSUED A POLICY
STATEMENT THAT SAID, IN PART: "EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, CIA
WILL NOT ENTER INTO ANY PAID OR CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP
WITH ANY FULL-TIME OR PART-TIME NEWS CORRESPONDENT
ACCREDITED BY ANY U.S. NEWS SERVICE, NEWSPAPER, PERIODICAL,
RADIO OR TELEVISION NETWORK OR STATION. AS SOON AS FEASIBLE,
THE AGENCY WILL BRING EXISTING RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDIVIDUALS
IN THESE GROUPS INTO CONFORMITY WITH THIS NEW POLICY,"
I HAD THOUGHT THAT THIS STATEMENT WOULD BE MORE THAN
CLEAR, BUT THE MEDIA HAS CONTINUED TO WONDER WHETHER THERE
WERE SOME LOOPHOLES LEFT. THE POLICY I SET OUT ON FEBRUARY 11
IN REALITY REPRESENTED A VOLUNTARY LIMITATION ON OUR PART OF
PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, WE DID THIS
BECAUSE WE ACCEPT THE GENUINE CONCERN OF THE MEDIA, AND
BECAUSE WE, TOO, WISH TO AVOID EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF ANY
IMPROPER USE BY THE AGENCY OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR FREE
PRESS,
LET ME MAKE THESE ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS WHICH RESPOND
TO VARIOUS QUESTIONS RAISED ABOUT MY FEBRUARY 11 POLICY
DIRECTIVE, WITH REGARD TO THE WORD "ACCREDITED," WE MEAN
ANY FULL OR PART-TIME EMPLOYEES -- INCLUDING STRINGERS -- OF
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AMERICAN OR FOREIGN NATIONALITY WHO ARE FORMALLY AUTHORIZED
BY CONTRACT OR BY THE ISSUANCE OF PRESS CREDENTIALS TO
REPRESENT THEMSELVES AS CORRESPONDENTS FOR AN AMERICAN
NEWS-GATHERING ORGANIZATION OR WHO ARE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED
(ACCREDITED) BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TO REPRESENT AN AMERICAN
NEWS-GATHERING ORGANIZATION,
FURTHER: THE CIA WILL NOT USE FULL-TIME AMERICAN
JOURNALISTS OR STRINGERS FOR ANY INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES. I
MUST STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION I
EMPHASIZED ON FEBRUARY 11 THAT CONTACT IS PERMITTED WITH
JOURNALISTS'OR ANY OTHER AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO VOLUNTARILY
SEEK CONTACT WITH THE AGENCY AT HOME OR ABROAD FOR THE
PURPOSE OF TRANSMITTING ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS INTELLIGENCE
OR COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SECURITY INFORMATION WITHOUT FINANCIAL
REMUNERATION OR OTHER FAVOR. MY INTENTION IN CONTINUING TO
AUTHORIZE SUCH CONTACTS IS OBVIOUS: IT IS TO PERMIT
INDIVIDUAL JOURNALISTS, OR MEMBERS OF ANY OTHER PROFESSION
OR GROUP, TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT AS AMERICAN CITIZENS TO
REPORT INFORMATION VOLUNTARILY AND WITTINGLY TO THEIR
GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE AGENCY. I BELIEVE YOU WILL AGREE
THAT NO ONE SHOULD UNEQUIVOCALLY DENY ANY AMERICAN CITIZEN,
INCLUDING JOURNALISTS, THIS RIGHT.
BY THE SAME TOKEN, NEITHER CAN WE BETRAY THE TRUST
IMPOSED ON US BY SUCH INDIVIDUALS TO WHOM WE HAVE MADE
COMMITMENTS OF CONFIDENTIALITY, IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT
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I SIMPLY CANNOT REVEAL THE IDENTITIES OF ANY SOURCES WHO
HAVE WORKED WITH US, WHETHER THEY BE JOURNALISTS OR
MEMBERS OF ANY OTHER GROUP, THOSE IN A PROFESSION WHOSE
MEMBERS ARE WILLING TO GO TO JAIL RATHER THAN REVEAL A
SOURCE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE CLEARLY DEFINED
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE LAW TO PROTECT OUR SOURCES, THE
PRESIDENT RESTATED AND REEMPHASIZED THAT RESPONSIBILITY IN
HIS RECENT EXECUTIVE ORDER.
THE AGENCY RECOGNIZES THE SPECIAL STATUS AFFORDED THE
PRESS UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION, AND WE WILL REMAIN COMPLETELY
WITHIN THE GUIDELINES I HAVE SET FORTH.
THE PRESS AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BOTH SEEK
KNOWLEDGE. CLEARLY, THE ALTERNATIVE TO ACTING ON THE BASIS
OF KNOWLEDGE IS ACTING ON THE BASIS OF IGNORANCE, AN
INFORMED CITIZENRY AND INFORMED NATIONAL LEADERS ARE
ESSENTIAL. AND THAT IS WHY A FREE SOCIETY MUST HAVE A FREE
AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS, IT IS ALSO WHY A FREE SOCIETY MUST
HAVE AN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM SECOND TO NONE$
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GEORGE BUSH
I Cleveland City Club Q&A
L t June 25, 1976
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MAN: We can all agree on intelligence gathering by the
CIA, but there's been much criticism of the CIA by people in
other countries that there's actual interference in their affairs
[unintelligible].
GEORGE BUSH: I would simply say that the CIA mission of
foreign intelligence has, as the Senate Committee report reveals
[unintelligible] controversial situations. It will continue to
be controversial situations.
Out of the President's Executive Order, new procedures
to govern and control covert actions have been implemented, faith-
fully implemented. The 40 Committee, the former 40 Committee, now
named the Operations Advisory Group, has been elevated to the level
of [unintelligible]. The Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense,
NSC advisers, Director of Central Intelligence, the President him-
self approves of any covert activity that's undertaken.
Covert activity used to be a major percentage. I believe
it was 50 to 60 percentage points of the total intelligence budget,
and today it's two percent.
My own view on covert activity is that this country should
use it carefully, think out carefully the consequences, but that no
President should be denied the capability of a covert -- denied a
covert capability.
Now, the Senate report exhaustively talked about Chile
itself. There were clearly some things that in retrospect were
wrong.
But in terms of the present, which I try to focus on; in
terms of the future, which I'm determined to help shape, I think
this country should retain a strong covert capability, carefully
used, fully reported to the United States Congress.
May I add a disclaimer before the next question, so if
I appear to be ducking a question, you'll know that that's exactly
what I'm doing.
[Laughter]
There are many areas which normal questions, proper ques-
tions would get into the area of sources and methods of intelligence,
and some of those I simply must ask your indulgence in commenting
on. And one of the tough things about my job is, unlike any other
head, there are many more of these areas where you, you know, legi-
timately should say, "No comment," because of the restraints placed
on me by the law.
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So I hope, If I can't answer this next question respon-
sively, or the next or the next, that you will have some under-
standing. I'll.try to be very frank and simply tell you I can't.
MAN: You said in your presentation that only true intel-
ligence secrets are classified. If you take those words "true
intelligence secrets" alone, any one of the three is subject to
very broad interpretation. How do you -- how can you more closely
define what is classified information?
BUSH: Well, what I meant to say, if I didn't, was only
those things should be classified, only those should be classified,
'cause I will agree with many that there is overclassification
right now. The President saw this very clearly and promulgated
In this Executive Order that the Director of Central Intelligence
ought to do something about declassifying.
What I think -- the only way I know to do It Is what we're
undertaking now. We have underway two major declassification
efforts, one of them headed by a very able and very -- a Ph.D., as
a matter of fact, a very well educated man with a long history in
the Intelligence side of the business; Ianother a community effort
which would Include some input from all elements of the community,
looking at the information and trying to establish if it is.
Congress itself has some insight into this, through these
two tremendous hearings, and we welcome suggestions from, as I've
made clear, the committees of Congress, some suggestions from them
as to what it should be.
But your question's a tough one and a good one, because
there is such activity involved. And what we must do is simply not
overclassify. And we're -- I'm determined to take that part of my
mandate just as seriously as I do the part that would protect
secrets.
But again, it's a tough one, because what one would think
shouldn't be classified, because it's on sourcing, might be classi-
fied, might lead to a source that would be cut off from other infor-
mat1on.
So, it's a highly complex issue. We are looking at It
as objectively as we can. We are determined to do something about
it.
MAN: Mr. Bush, recently in The Washington Post, and on
your relation -- CIA relationship with [unintelligible] -- you're
reported as saying that you had, quote, talked privately with a
number of members of the fourth estate, although not all of them
were totally happy with the situation as It is, and I have met
with considerable class understanding. One top figure in the
national media told me privately that he thought that after issuance
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of my statement that no more could probably be demanded of us.
Well, who are the members of the fourth estate whove
you've been quietly giving you your quiet, quote, understanding
to [unintelligible]? And who is the top figure in the national
media who says he is satisfied with the CIA position?
BUSH: I'm not going to go into sources. I'll simply
say this: that we had a meeting yesterday with people from the
National News Council, came down, at the request of this inves-
tigatory body. They will report to the National News Council.
I hope that out of that comes the real understanding. But I am
not going to cite individuals who people can then turn on and
ask them why they are taking this view, contrary to the view of
some of their colleagues.
I've been asked to reveal the names of reporters who
worked for agencies, you know, by the agencies themselves, 10
years ago or today. And we're not going to do that. We're not
going to go Into naming sources, even of sources of this nature.
Whether we have the credibility to have one believe that
in a letter I wrote, which subsequently has been widely dissem-
inated, or not, that's a problem we may have to face. But when
it gets down to naming names and naming [unintelligible], I simply
am going to stop short of that.
MAN: In this age of tension, as a former Ambassador to
the U.N., what reforms or [unintelligible] would you like to see?
BUSH: Well, that is a problem I haven't addressed my-
self -- I haven't had the time to even think about in the last
six months nor address myself to in some time.
My view about the United Nations -- and again, please
permit the parameter that this is a personal view. The last thing
we need is somebody to say, "The Central Intelligence Agency has
a view on U.N. Charter reform."
[Laughter]
...article appeared by a CIA analyst the other day, and
It said, "This is a personal view of this individual." It said it
twice in the front of the Foreign Policy magazine. And the next
thing I knew, I was projected into a big debate with Henry Kiss-
inger over whether we were trying to change policy from the Central
Intelligence Agency.
I'm determined to stay out of it. I'II take a chance on
this one. But if it comes out that the CIA Director, not George
Bush, ex-U.N. Ambassador, feels this way, I will -- there's nothing
I can do about it, but I hope that the reporting will reflect these
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continuous disclaimers. I'll make [unintelligible] answer the ques-
tion, too.
My view of charter reform for the United Nations is that
It's Impossible at this time. And the reason it is Impossible is
it cannot be accomplished without big-power unanimity. And the
Soviet Union, for a long time, has opposed charter reform. And
until that changes, you're not going to have any action.
Just as in the political arena at the United Nations,
until the big powers, the five veto-holding powers agree on some-
thing, you don't get political action.
So I would have to simply say I don't think, though charter
reform is needed, and it would be needed, in my view, in the area
where you have a more realistic voting pattern in the General
Assembly; that's where it's needed. And my own recommendations
would come that that's where it should be considered. I'm not
naive enough to believe that's where it will be implemented, because
it won't happen until you have major-power agreement, and there's
a difference of opinion among the major powers on that one.
But that's the place I'd go, so a country with a population
of 850,000 people will not have exactly the same weight in the
General Assembly as a country of 800 million people, in terms --
or responsibility for the economic end of It won't have the same
power, you might say, in the General Assembly as the small ones.
These are the personal views of George Bush, former Ambas-
sador to the United Nations.
MAN: [Unintelligible] Was there any arragements with the
Mafia on [unintelligible]. Was there any arrangements with Lucky
Luciano and the Mafia in the Invasion of Italy and Sicily?
The second question is with regard to Cuba invading Angola.
I understand 200 of these are being evacuated every week. This
would take about two years. Are they merely replacements, or are
they going tomorrow into someplace else?
BUSH: On the first question, sir, the CIA wasn't in
business at the time of the Burma Road, during World War II
[unintelligible], nor the invasion of Sicily; and that I can say
without fear of contradiction.
[Laughter]
...very fascinating question about a fascinating part of
our history. Whether there was some U.S. intelligence involved in
any way at that point, sir, I just simply can't answer. But in
terms of CIA, we came into the business after World War Ii.
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Now, the question of the Cubans in Angola. This Is one
that's right on our plate, it is one where we are concerned.
The Secretary of State, from a policy standpoint, has
made very clear that we want to see the Cuban military forces out
of Angola. There is some indication that some have been removed.
There is some Indication that Cubans from Angola have gone into
other countries in Africa.
We think -- without sounding mysterious or hiding behind
my previously announced policy of not being as forthcoming as I'd
like, we think that we know -- have a good indication of where most
of them are. And without specifying which countries, they are pre-
sent in quite a few countries in Africa.
MAN: Mr. Bush, I'm over here. I was interested in your
remarks that several committees of Congress know the details of the
CIA budget. Apparently that has not worked for control, because
the Rockefeller Commission did find the interference with foreign
governments and their leaders and domestic spying by the CIA on
some 300,000 Americans, all of which would be illegal.
What you say [unintelligible] as a minimum control that
the overall budget, not detailed figures, but the overall budget
of the CIA ought to be made public, and that this in fact could be
done because, after all, most -- probably the biggest bulk of in-
telligence work Is public or overt work, in any case.
BUSH: First, I'm glad, sir, that you recognize that most
of it is overt, analysis. There's not so much of it [unintelli-
gible], the collection system and a lot of things like that. But
as I indicated, covert is an infinitesimal, a very small percentage
of the total budget.
I -- you cited abuses by the CIA. I don't believe that
the publication of a total budget figure would have any effect
whatsoever on -- had that total budget figure been published in
the past, would have had any effect whatsoever on the abuses of
the past, the legitimate ones, nor -- you know, I've indicated
many of the things that have been alleged simply didn't happen
and the CIA didn't do, as the Senate Committee points out.
My view on the publication of the budget figure is that
it's wrong. I went to the Senate Committee and testified that
even the publication of the total figure was wrong, not because
that figure itself would be a tremendous revelation over what we
were doing and how it worked, but that the subsequent comparisons
would be.
If a whole new method of collection of intelligence, upon
which this country depends to know the capabilities of Soviet
missiles, for example -- and that's the kind of serious business
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we're involved in -- If a whole new collection system were put into
effect in one year, and there was a hump in that total figure that
would maybe have no more defintion than that, raise it from X
billion to X+I, something of this nature, I believe that those
significant programs that we have developed could have been at
least hinted at through total figure changes.
Now, if you say, "Can you testify under oath that the pub-
lication of a total budget figure is going to be detrimental to the
national security per se?" I couldn't do that. But it's the nose
under tent, it's the -- it's my view that the budget numbers which
are given, as I say, in infinite detail to several committees in
the United States Congress -- and you're right. It hasn't always
been this way. It is now, I can guaranty it -- that the total
figure would be detrimental for that reason, and the people should
look to their elected members of Congress to give infinitesimal
scrutiny to our agency and to the intelligence community. That's
the best protection for the people, given the constraints we feel
in terms of -- given the constraints I feel, at least, supported,
I might add, by the President and by most of the leadership.
The Congress voted on this twice, the Senate 2-to-I, the
House 2-to-I: "Don't make public any budget figures." And that's
why they did it. And so that's our position, then, and I hope
that that position doesn't get eroded away.
MAN: Mr. Bush, my problem with the CIA has to do with
activities which are illegal activities in foreign nations, which
are illegal in this nation, are illegal in the nation in which
they're conducted, which we would resent If they were done In this
nation by a foreign nation, and the justification [unintelligible]
doing it is unworthy [unintelligible].
BUSH: Well, sir, I think I expressed my comment when I
expressed my belief that the United States must retain a covert
action capability., I strongly support, as does everybody at the
Central Intelligence Agency, the prohibition [unintelligible]
on, say, assassinations. That's no question, no problem. The
CIA didn't do what it was alleged to do. There was some planning
at some levels [unintelligible]. It's written and rewritten, and
there's been some facts and there's been a lot of fiction on it.
I must confess to you that in taking this job and dis-
cussing it with children and family and people with, I hope, a
high sense of ethical and moral judgment, particularly the young
people, I had to wrestle very hard with this.
We're living In an unlovely world. Everybody doesn't
play by the rules.
I would accept that because someone else does it this way,
that's not necessarily good enough for the United States.
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If you have any doubt that we're living in a rough world,
I could refer you to several published books [unintelligible]
things like this.
Sometimes there are unlovely things in intelligence. But --
perhaps it's pure rationalization, but I thought it out in a family
contact, [unintelligible] contact, contacts with police and [unin-
telligible] openness in terms of the CIA, and recognized that in
this one field of our endeavor, sometimes one condones something
that in a pure utopian world one would condemn. And that's no --
that's no plea for inordinately silly or brutal operations abroad.
Not at all.
I simply say we must retain a covert capability, and some-
times in the business of espionage, spying, and these kinds of
things, one runs Into conflict with either one's personal values
or one's values of his nation. And yet intelligence has been a
[unintelligible], has been a fundamental part of our history. I
was looking at some of the things in -- in 200 years ago, the use
of intelligence by Washington and others, and it's there. And
Kung Fu, the great Chinese philosopher, pointed out five or six
hunred years before Christ, the way you win battles and win for
your principles is not always through arms, not always through war,
but sometimes through intelligence.
So, I know it's not satisfactory, but, gosh, it's not an
easy problem. And that's the way I, at least, have sorted it out
personally.
MAN: Mr. Bush, 22 years ago it was my pleasure to attend
a seminar at St. Augustine's College at Canterbury, England. One
of the speakers was an Anglican Bishop who had returned from India.
He was strong in his denunciation of certain missionaries who were
quietly asked to leave India -- I cannot say whether they were
American missionaries or not -- but that they were acting as in-
telligence agents for a foreign country.
Do you feel that that hypocrisy should be [unintelligible]
by any intelligence agency, of enlisting missionaries to do their
work?
BUSH: I had problems when I came to the CIA with relation-
ships, perhaps the relationships with the press, as I've indicated,
for constitutional reasons. I had similar problems with the use of
missionaries, which has been scattered, but nevertheless [unintelli-
gible]. And therefore I unilaterally changed the policy of the
Central Intelligence Agency to say that we would not use church
people in that kind of a basis, and that's the way the policy of
the CIA head. And I don't mean to be sanctimonious about it or
anything else. I just felt that journalism, freedom of the press,
and church and state separation under the Constitution is correct.
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Having said that, if a missionary is living in a troubled
corner of the world and he comes and says, "I have some information
that I want to give to you, sir, give it to you voluntarily, will-
ingly," and he thinks he's helping his country, we're going to
accept that information.
MAN: Mr. Bush, you took over CIA in February, and you
also mentioned in your speech that you have been testifying about
28 or [unintelligible] different times at different congressional
committees, [unintelligible] committees, and so on.
Now, my question is this: Can CIA do its job, or you, sir,
and your agency, are you taking to try to find out what are the
[unintelligible]? For four months being the head of CIA, being
questioned and testifying one month of that time, it's a little bit
over done. Are you tempted sometimes to find out the real reasons,
what are the real reasons behind this overdoing and this type of
a screening of your agency by our Congress?
BUSH: I don't think there's anything other than meets the
eye for their intent to grill the CIA. I have been up there 28 times,
as I've indicated. It's too much.
We need consolidated oversight. I want to report as fully
as possible. I support the concept that many senators and the Senate
leadership, for example, supports, that we need consolidated over-
sight In the Senate, consolidated oversight in the House, If we're
going to protect, and the Congress now wants to, legitimate national
security information. It's too much. And I have many other respon-
sibilities.
But I don't impugn to them anything wrong in the terms of
motive in getting me up there, and I will continue to cooperate to
the fullest.
I hope that Congress will come to grips, though, with the
problem of consolidated oversight, and will not stand for this pro-
liferation -- when I say oversight, it sounds like I'm worried about
people knowing what we're doing. What I want to do is to find a
way to communicate fully what we're doing and not endanger the
security of this country by some one person going off and making --
and disclosing willfully, for perhaps for matters of great con-
science, something that can [unintelligible]. And that's the way
I feel about It.
And I had some difference with Congress. And I have a
mandate, under the law, to do this, and I'm going to keep It. And
I'm simply not -- no matter what they do, until that law is changed,
I'm going to protect the sources and methods of intelligence. And
I ask the support, and I think I've got it, of the American people
in this regard.
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[Applause]
MAN: Mr. Bush, several City Clubbers have asked me to
ask you this question [unintelligible] should be asked at this
time. There's been much publicity in the newspaper in the last
few days about the CIA's Involvement In Cuba at the time of the
assassination of President Kennedy to the effect that the assas-
sination of President Kennedy was merely in retaliation for an
attempted assassination of Fidel Castro by the CIA.
Would you care to comment?
BUSH: As I say, I'm glad you asked that question. I...
[Laughter]
I thought it might come up.
[Laughter]
Therefore I wanted to read a quotation from the committee
report. It says it has not uncovered -- the committee report
stressed that it, the committee, had not uncovered -- this is a
quote -- it had not uncovered any evidence sufficient to justify a
conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President
Kennedy.
I believe that the CIA, going back from 1976, looking back
for whatever lo those many years, has given full cooperation to
not only this committee, but to other committees of the Congress on
this question. I will continue to insist that our people give full
cooperation.
I have no judgment beyond -- that would counteract the
committee's report that there has no -- It has not got evidence of
any such to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to
assassinate President Kennedy.
And having said that and having added to the Kennedy
assassination the many other subjects we're asked to investigate,
I think the thing I can do [unintelligible] Is to be responsive,
through staff, to inquiries of this nature, to keep my sights set
on the present, cooperating with the Congress at this point, being
sure that we live within the constitutional constraints imposed on
us by the Constitution and by the law; and then looking to the
future to see that we have, in this troubled world, where we have
some awful tough stuff happening, an intelligence capability that
is second to none. I want to look ahead.
Thank you very much.
[Applause]
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