THE HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000201000001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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THE HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE
U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Received the National Intelligence Study Center award
for best scholarly article In 1986.
Reprinted from the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, Volume 1, No. 1, 1986
Published by Intel Publishing Group, Inc.
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The Historical Underpinnings of
the U.S. Intelligence Community
Many Americans believe that the United States first became informally
involved in intelligence activities with the establishment of the Office of
Strategic Services during World War II and then formally with the establish-
ment of the Central Intelligence Agency following the war.
Actually, the United States has been involved in intelligence operations
from the time of the American Revolution. In its early days, intelligence was
conducted on a highly personal and private basis by talented amateurs
responsible solely to the President. Only much later did intelligence become
conducted by professionals serving the government's top echelon decision-
makers.
Probably the reason that the early history of U.S. intelligence has re-
mained so obscure and unpublicized is attributable to the conflict arising
from our traditionally avowed commitment to an open society fostering a
free flow of information and our recognition of the secrecy demands of
political realities and expediencies. Trying to reconcile political realities with
ideological commitments makes us so uncomfortable that we strongly tend
to ignore the conflict by carefully compartmentalizing our thinking or by
looking the other way as we sweep the evidence under the rug.
Habitually, Americans associate secrecy with privilege and sinister maneu-
vering, both of which go against their grain. As a result, the paper trail
documenting secret intelligence activities surfaces only in bits and pieces
combed from such unconventional sources as narrowly circulated memoirs
and quietly commissioned reports stored in archives.
There are those today, for example, who view national intelligence activi-
ties as an un-American anomaly, of recent vintage and consumed by ex-
The author served as the Curator, Historical Intelligence, CIA, from 1974 to
1984. Currently, Editor of PERISCOPE, Journal of the Association of
Former Intelligence Officers
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cesses. Yet, thirty years ago, at the height of the "cold war," other critics
saw the intelligence service as too restrained.
In 1954, for example, the President's Commission on the Organization of
the Executive Branch, chaired by former President Herbert Hoover, found
the intelligence services of that day inadequate for needs in a dangerous
world. The commission's recommendation was this:
It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed
objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There
are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do
not apply. If the U.S. is to survive, long-standing American concepts of `fair
play' must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counter-
espionage services. We must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our
enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than
those used against us....'
For many in the intelligence community those orders posed moral and
ethical problems, which restrained full implementation. Others, accepting
the actuality of the growing Soviet threat, agreed with the commission's
premise. As time went on, the community's marching orders were patched
and repatched in an effort to strike a delicate but realistic balance with the
American way of life. Yet, twenty years later, during the congressional
investigations of the 1970s, there would be denunciations for missteps
during those early years. The political pendulum had swung and blame was
dispensed broadly. Much of the intelligence community was dismantled,
funds and personnel were cut and restrictive guidelines imposed. Our na-
tional preparedness suffered.
In the history of intelligence - particularly its development in the United
States - one finds deeply-rooted traditions and precedents often forgotten
(or unknown, unfortunately) by those employed in its service and in the
political leadership that must direct it and provide oversight.
The oldest intelligence report extant is found on a clay tablet dated about
2000 B.C. The Holy Bible recounts no less than eleven episodes of espionage,
including the detailed collection requirements in the familiar instruction of
the Lord to Moses to send spies into the land of Canaan.
Early citations reveal an understanding of intelligence as applicable today
as when first written. Sun Tsu [ c. 500 B.C. ] tells that: "Those who know the
enemy as well as they know themselves will never suffer defeat.... What
enables the wise sovereign and the good general... to achieve things beyond
the reach of ordinary men is foreknowledge."2
Even more direct is the instruction found on a clay tablet dating back to
1370 B.C.: "Bring me back reliable information."3
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In the history and legends of early military leaders one may find all the
familiar accoutrements of the intelligence craft: cover stories, codes and
ciphers, intelligence networks, and the like. Consider, for example, the
chronicle of Hannibal, in which Polybius records: "For years before he
undertook his campaign against Rome, he had sent his spies into Italy and
they were observing everyone and everything. He charged them with trans-
mitting to him exact and positive information regarding the fertility of the
trans-Alpine plains and the Valley of the Po, their populations, their military
spirit and preparations and, above all, their disposition towards the govern-
ment of Rome."4
Recent discoveries of the intelligence service reports of the Caesars indi-
cate that the secret service was noted for the cover employed by its agents.
Wearing sandals, rough caps and coarse woolen cloaks, they traveled afar by
foot or donkey, pretending to be at the lowest level of the Roman bureau-
cracy - grain inspectors - when, actually, they reported to the Emperors.
They also had a secret, one that remained so for 1,500 years. It was not
until 1972, while Italian archeologists were digging in the foundations of the
Church of St. Stephen-in-the-Round, that their secret headquarters was
uncovered. The archeologists expected to find the remains of Nero's famed
Merdellum Magnus, a round marketplace. Instead, they found a luxurious
rest center for Caesar's spies. The secret facility, researchers tell us, operated
under the rather undistinguished cover name of "Castra Peregrina" or
Pilgrim's Camp, but according to one archeologist it was luxurious, not as
drab as the name might imply: "When we lifted the pavement of the old
church, we stumbled on the two rooms... the floors were paved with rich
mosaic. The white walls were painted with cherubs and floating garlands."
Even at leisure, Caesar's "grain inspectors" were on call for debriefing and
assignment. The archeologists tell us the spy headquarters was located about
five minute's walk to the secret entrances of the emperor's palace.'
Several centuries later, the victory of William the Conqueror at the Battle
of Hastings demonstrated the importance of such aggressive intelligence
techniques as deception and disinformation, and in Britain, we find the
first formal employment of espials6 during the reign of Henry VI.
During the mid-seventeenth century, which marks the birth of England's
New Model Army, a new senior emerged in the form of the scoutmaster, a
man appointed to "discover the whereabouts and intentions of the enemy."
The scoutmaster's duties as "chief reconnoitier of the army" have some
parallel with those of present-day chiefs of military intelligence. Said Henry
VIII: "It is the office of the Scoutmaster when he cometh to the field, to set
and appoint the scourge; he must also appoint some to the high hills to view
and to see if they can discover anything. Also the said Scoutmaster must
appoint one other company of scourgers to search and view every valley
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thereabouts, that there be no enemies laid privily for the annoyance of said
camp, and if they do discover any, they are to advertise the Scoutmaster and
he must either bring, or send word, to the high marshal of their advertise-
ment, with speed."7
In 1622, Sir Francis Bacon offered additional insight into King Henry's
intelligence service:
Hee was careful and liberall to obtaine good Intelligence from all parts
abroad. Wherein hee did not onely use his Interest in the Leigers here, and his
Pensioners which hee had both in the Court of Rome, and the other Courts of
Christendome; but the Industrie and the Vigilancie of his owne Ambassadors
in Forraine parts... Requiring likewise from his Ambassadors an Answere, in
particular distinct Articles, respectively to his Questions. As for his secret
Spialls, who hee did imploy both at home and abroad, by them to discover
what Practices and Conspiracies were against him, surely his Case required it:
He had such Moles perpetually working and casting to undermine him.
Neither can it be reprehended. For if Spialls bee lawful] against lawfull
Enemies, much more against Conspirators, and Traitors.8
The title of Scoutmaster was not lost to another intelligence officer, Robert
Baden-Powell, when centuries later he established the modern scouting
movement.
Historians commonly begin accounts of the development of modern
espionage systems in the West with the successes of Sir Francis Walsingham
(1530-1590), who became associated with Queen Elizabeth's secret service
in 1568. Other students of intelligence focus on the intrigues of Frederick
the Great (1744-1797) as the first espionage system. I disagree.* I believe
that credit for developing modern intelligence should go to the first Duke of
Marlborough (1650-1722) - the "first Churchill" - whose foreign intelli-
gence service was credited with being the best in Europe at the time. Al-
though this achievement was ignored tactfully in the BBC dramatization of
his life, I suggest that Marlborough demonstrated a professionalism with
which modern day intelligence officers would find kinship. Consider, for
example, his observations about management of intelligence:
I cannot suppose that I need say how essential a part of the Service this
[intelligence] is, that no war can be conducted successfully without very
early and good intelligence, and that such advices cannot be had but at a very
great expense. Nobody can be ignorant of this that knows anything of secret
correspondence, or considers the numbers of persons that must be employed
*Walsingham's secret service activity was almost solely domestic. I define intelligence, as we know it,
to refer basically to foreign activity.
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in it, the great hazard they undergo, the variety of places in which such
correspondence must be kept, and the constant necessity of supporting and
feeding this service, not to mention some extraordinary expenses of a
higher nature, which ought only to be hinted at.9
THE AMERICAN SERVICE
Washington is the unquestioned father of American military intelligence. A
glimpse at the inventory of his military library, accumulated during the years
between his disasters in the French and Indian War and his victory in the War
of Independence, reveals it to be well-based in intelligence theory. One of
the French editions, for example, forecasts quite accurately the intelligence
methods he would employ during the American Revolution, including the
successful deception operation that preceded his defeat of the British at
Yorktown.
From a present day perspective it is a bit ironic to recognize that the
origins of our foreign intelligence undertakings rest in the Continental
Congress. It was that body, fulfilling the executive responsibility in addition
to the legislative, that established our first foreign intelligence directorate -
the Committee of Secret Correspondence - in November 1775.10
The Continental Congress protected intelligence sources and methods
by authorizing deletion of the names of those employed by the committee
or with whom it had corresponded." The members of the committee used
this power wisely. When a courier brought word that France would provide,
covertly, the arms, ammunition, and funds that were needed desperately,
two of the committee's members, Benjamin Franklin and Robert Morris,
noted: "We agree in opinion that it is our indispensable duty to keep it a
secret, even from Congress.... We find, by fatal experience, the Congress
consists of too many members to keep secrets."12
Their view was sustained by future Chief Justice John Jay, who cautioned
that public discussion of the transactions of the committee should be limited
to what "may be necessary to promote the common weal, not gratify the
curiosity of individuals."13
On 12 June 1776, the Continental Congress adopted the first secrecy
agreement for government employees. The oath read: "I do solemnly swear,
that I will not directly or indirectly divulge any manner or thing which shall
come to my knowledge as (clerk, secretary) of the board of War and
Ordnance for the United Colonies... So help me God."14
The Congress also adopted a more stringent oath for itself, declaring
that each member "considers himself under the ties of virtue, honor
and love of country, not to divulge, directly or indirectly those things which
required secrecy. And, that if any member shall violate this agreement, he
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shall be expelled this Congress and deemed an enemy to the liberties of
America, and liable to be treated as such. "15
The Congress also extended the umbrella of confidentiality to its secret
journals. It sheltered sensitive intelligence and foreign relations matters in
this way, and imposed strict controls on the maintenance, access and copy-
ing of the records.16 This led to Congress's first confrontation with the prob-
lem of what to do about government employees who breached that secrecy.
The talented patriot writer, Tom Paine, was the first to test the system.
In one of his pseudonymous "Common Sense" columns, Paine misused
sensitive intelligence information gained through his post with the Foreign
Affairs Committee. Paine was fired outright and the Congress passed a
patently false resolution refuting his disclosure of covert assistance by
France.'?
The crusading oversight bodies of the 1970s (Church committee and Pike
committee) would have been appalled at the activities authorized by the
Congress's founders. For example, they devised and implemented covert
action operations, approved non-attributed black propaganda, and on learning
of abuses in mail opening did not bring it to a halt. Rather, it issued firm
instructions narrowing the scope of who was authorized to do so.18
This was a time when money (including congressional salaries) was "not
worth a continental," and many members were forced to accept the humilia-
tion of secret charity from the French Minister as the only recourse to
returning home. Yet, despite these money problems, the Congress found the
way to fund intelligence operations in gold and silver, and permitted the
deletion of the names of intelligence sources to whom the specie was paid.19
Even the Declaration of Independence reflects the Congress's use, on an
unattributed basis, of indications and warning intelligence - the charge
leveled at George III that the king "is at this time Transporting Armies of
Foreign Mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolation and
tyranny." That item was based on copies of the agreements reached by
George III with German princes for the provision of mercenaries - we lump
them all together as the Hessians - to supplement his own Hanoverian forces
destined for America. The documents had been smuggled from London to
Philadelphia via Canada by George Merchant, arriving on 18 May 1776 as
Jefferson was drafting the Declaration.20
The Congress also learned the hard way about excessive compartmenta-
tion. Working with American sympathizers on Bermuda, Robert Morris
engineered a highly successful "smash and grab" raid on the Royal gun-
powder magazine there. But he neglected to tell General Washington of the
mission. Washington, then in Boston, learned quite independently of the
powder store and launched his own raid without telling Congress. By the
time Washington's men arrived in Bermuda, the gunpowder was long gone
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and the Americans ran into a hornet's nest of British warships. This says
something about the need for a central intelligence agency.21
Our founding fathers were quite pragmatic when it came to intelligence
matters. They authorized gifts and the payment of gratuities for foreign
figures to be influenced, permitted the expenditure of public monies for
what today is called "operational entertainment," and dedicated ships
under control of the secret bodies of Congress, not the Navy. The ships were
used for conveying secret intelligence and war materiel acquired clan-
destinely. 22
There was also a strong element of tradecraft in the use of codes and
ciphers, chemical secret writing and letter-drops in intelligence communica-
tions between the Committee of Secret Correspondence and its agents
abroad. Recognizing the need to learn of thinking abroad, the Congress
established a program to gather foreign publications for analysis.23 Counter-
intelligence operations approved by the Congress included coercive recruit-
ments, penetrations, and many of the untidy aspects of that work. And
when it found U.S. laws inadequate to punish Benjamin Church, Surgeon
General of the military hospital at Boston, for spying on behalf of the
British, the Congress enacted our nation's first espionage law. (The legisla-
tion was cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in its adverse ruling against
German saboteurs during World War II.)24
Members of Congress and its agents met secretly with representatives of
European states to arrange various levels of support for our cause. Sweden,
for example, agreed to provide sanctuary for American privateers when
pursued by the British. The King of Prussia struck a propaganda blow when
he charged the German princes a fee for transiting cattle as they marched
their troops to ports of embarkation for America. During the covert action
period, Spain contributed the equivalent of a million pounds, and France
drove itself to near-bankruptcy by providing secret assistance before the two
nations entered the conflict with troops and ships. During this secret phase
France provided an estimated 90 percent of our gunpowder, the bulk of
cannon and weapons, and the officers and engineers needed to turn minute-
men into soldiers.25
Even then the Congress was concerned about the Russian menace. Because
we hoped to pay for our foreign military procurement with tobacco, William
Carmichael of Maryland, an agent of the Committee of Secret Correspon-
dence, was tasked with determining if Russian tobacco exports posed a
threat to our plans. He reported the following from Amsterdam in November
1776: "You have been threatened that the Ukraine would supply Europe
with tobacco. It must be long before that time will arrive. I have seen some
of its tobacco here, and the best of it is worse than the worst of our ground
leaf. Four thousand pounds have been sent here this year."26
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Carmichael was undisciplined, but a good agent. While in Paris he was
suspected of having been recruited by the British while meeting with them at
French direction, and was sent home. Later, while serving the State Depart-
ment in Spain, those charges continued to haunt him and the suspicion was
broadcast widely. When British intelligence records of the period became
available in the mid-1800s, scholars learned how thoroughly Benjamin
Franklin's Paris station was penetrated - but not by Carmichael. In the
wartime documents the British complain about some of Carmichael's opera-
tions and bemoan the fact that their "pitch" to him had been rejected.
Despite this "new" evidence, there are some fairly current works that repeat
the old charges. I suggest this stresses the need to exploit enemy records
(captured or otherwise) for counterintelligence information, no matter how
long after the facts?
My favorite achievement of the Continental Congress grew from the ill-
fated military and covert action operation led by Benjamin Franklin and three
Marylanders, Samuel Chase, Charles Carroll, and Father John Carroll, to
acquire Quebec as the fourteenth colony. On 26 February 1776, and by
secret resolution, the Congress dispatched Fluery Mesplat, his printing equip-
ment, and family, to Canada "to establish a free press... for the frequent
publication of such pieces as may be of service to the cause of the United
Colonies."
The American political operatives and their military forces were forced
to withdraw, but Mesplat, undetected, remained. There he established the
first French-language press in Canada and Quebec's first newspapers, one of
which, the Montreal Gazette, is still published today. It might be described
as U.S. intelligence's longest-running proprietary and covert action opera-
tion, although one might suspect that somewhere along the line we lost
control of it.28
Before leaving the period of the Revolutionary War, there is one other
precedent to be noted from that conflict. It has affected all intelligence
officers, and others, at one time or another - travel vouchers. Yes, even for
his famous "early warning" operation, Paul Revere had a travel order and
had to submit a travel voucher to the Committee of Safety. His claim
included such expenses as boarding the colony's horses, printing some
leaflets, and the like, but it was in regard to something else that Revere
ran afoul of the bureaucrats. After waiting months for the voucher to
be processed, Revere got it back only to find they had reduced his per
diem.29
With victory over Britain, the new nation began writing its Constitution.
The Constitutional Convention provided in Article One for the continuation
of the secret journals, and over the objections of George Mason of Virginia
wrote it in such a way that there could be no pressure for short-term de-
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classification. It also tackled the problem of intelligence. A citation from
The Federalist might best illustrate this. Jay wrote:
There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the
persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those
apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by
mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both de-
scriptions who would rely on the secrecy of the President, and who would
not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular
general assembly. The Convention have done well, therefore, in so disposing
of the power of making treaties that although the President must, in forming
them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to man-
age the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.30
Another important issue resolved by the Constitutional Convention
was placing foreign intelligence in the hands of a civilian entity, the Depart-
ment of State, rather than the military.
After George Washington took office, the founding fathers were true
to their word; the President was, indeed, the manager of intelligence. When
Washington asked for a "competent fund," the Congress understood, and on
1 July 1790, it gave the President the Contingent Fund of Foreign Inter-
course, the so-called secret service fund. It also permitted accounting by
certificate, the same procedure delegated to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence by the Central Intelligence Act of 1949.31
Actually, Washington had already dispatched an agent abroad in antici-
pation of the funding authority to do so. The agent was Gouverneur Morris,
who thus earns the distinction of being our first intelligence agent abroad
under the Constitution.32 Of him, William MacClay said: "He has acted in a
strange kind of capacity, half pimp, half envoy, or perhaps more properly a
kind of political eavesdropper."33
Washington's secret service fund for the first year was $40,000. By the
third year it had risen to one million dollars, or 12 percent of the national
budget. Much of the money was for ransoming American hostages held in
Algiers, for paying off foreign officials and, in effect, "buying peace." 34
Washington's Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, recognized the need
for intelligence and the importance of good cover for secret aides. In a letter
to James Madison dated 27 May 1793, Jefferson (not without whimsy)
said: "We want an intelligent and prudent native, who will go to reside in N.
Orleans as a secret correspondent for 1,000 dollars a year. He might do a
little business, merely to cover his real office. Do point out such a one.
Virginia ought to offer more loungers equal to this, and ready to do it, than
any other state."
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During his presidency, Jefferson received intelligence from France suggest-
ing that Napoleon would be willing to coerce Spain into yielding the Floridas
to the United States for seven million dollars, with Napoleon pocketing most
of the money. Jefferson sought, and in secret session the Congress appro-
priated an even greater secret discretionary fund of two million dollars. It
was used to start negotiations from which Napoleon later backed out.35
Earlier, Jefferson had convinced the Congress to appropriate a sum of
money "for the purpose of extending the external commerce of the United
States." This cryptic language was intended to mask the funding of the
Lewis and Clark expedition, which (despite what the schoolbooks tell us)
was planned as an intelligence mission to enter the territories of foreign
states with whom we were at peace, for the purpose of locating and mapping
fortifications.36
In 1806, the United States considered it essential to conduct another
military reconnaissance, the entire territory drained by the Arkansas and
Red Rivers. Selected to lead this intelligence mission was Lieutenant
Zebulon Pike, a reliable young officer who, the previous year, had conducted
an exploration of the upper course of the Mississippi River. The cover story
selected for the mission was that the expedition was returning a party of
Osage Indians to their homelands. If intercepted by Spanish forces, the party
was under instruction to say it was traveling to the American outpost at
Natchitoches, lost its bearings and had gone off course.
On 3 December 1806, Lieutenant Pike first saw the inspiring peak in the
Colorado Rockies that was later to bear his name. Shortly thereafter Pike's
party of trespassers was captured by the Spanish and taken first to Santa Fe,
then to Chihuahua, while the Spaniards considered what to do with them.
Ultimately, they were released and made their way to Natchitoches, arriving
the following July.
Not surprisingly, when Pike's party returned east they were enmeshed in
political controversy, not honors. The War Department was particularly
sensitive about any discussion of an espionage mission into friendly territory
and, four years later when Pike resolved to publish his journal of the expedi-
tion, it was over the Department's objection.
When the War of 1812 broke out, the man who had been an embarrassing
lieutenant only five years earlier was commissioned a brigadier general. In
April 1813, at age 34, he was killed at the Battle of York (Toronto). Yet,
because Pike had kept accurate journals and maps of both his reconnaissance
and the journey as a Spanish captive, when the Mexican War broke out some
30 years later, his were among the few reliable military intelligence docu-
ments concerning the Mexican territory.37
During Madison's administration, intelligence and other government
secrets gained the added protection of formal document classification;
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"secret," "confidential," and "private." A fourth level was not added until
World War I, when "top secret" was created to contend with "most secret"
information received from Britain.
Madison, like his predecessors, recognized the need for intelligence,
dispatching secret agents to South America, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, and
Turkey. But, as with Jefferson, his eyes were on the Floridas, and in 1810
he sent agents to West Florida to convince American settlers that if they
separated from Spain, they would be welcome to join the United States.
The settlers responded as expected, adopted a "lone star" flag, captured
Baton Rouge and declared West Florida "free and independent." Within two
days of receipt of reports of the "lone star" declaration, Madison proclaimed
American control over the territory and sent troops.
Madison then took on the rest of the Floridas, dispatching General George
Mathews on the secret mission. Mathews was a veteran of the American
Revolution, a former member of Congress and a recent governor of Georgia.
His instructions were "to take over the Floridas from General Folch if the
Spanish are willing to surrender them."
Mathews opted once again for the "lone star" revolution tactic,
and in March 1812 a group of patriots, which included Georgia milita
in mufti and other volunteers and support by American gunboats,
occupied their first town and moved on to San Marcos near St. Augustine.
They failed in their second conquest attempt but, undaunted, organized
a government, chose a governor, and ceded East Florida to the United
States.38
In Washington the situation had changed. President Madison had paid
$50,000 for the letters of John Henry, a British spy, which exposed British
efforts to woo the Federalists.39 The documents had been well-publicized,
the New England Federalists embarrassed and the British thoroughly
denounced for intervention in our domestic affairs. Arriving in Washington
when it did, news of Mathews' action permitted President Madison to share
the embarrassment he had engineered. The British had been doing only a
little bit of spying and buying; General Mathews had successfully incited
a revolution, seized the territory of a nation with whom we were not at war,
and employed U.S. naval forces to boot.
Although there had been secret Congressional approval for launching
Mathews' mission,40 the President had no option but to reprimand him and
to promise return of the land to Spain. He did not return it, and Andrew
Jackson administered the coup de grace during the War of 1812.
It was also during Madison's term that a successful, if unholy, alliance
was made with gangsters of the period for intelligence purposes. The pirate
Jean Laffite and his men were used to scout, spy and sometimes fight for
General Jackson in Louisiana.41
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In 1818, the question of declassifying the secret journals first arose.
Recognizing the role of the executive, the Congress permitted the President
to withhold from declassification those matters related to foreign affairs,
including foreign intelligence, that he deemed necessary to require continued
protection. Thus, the published secret journals of the revolution, (declassi-
fied in 1818) and the confederation period (declassified in 1820) - much
like the information released these days under the Freedom of Information
Act - are incomplete and fragmentary. Even then, there was embarrassment
to some - for example, disclosure of the unanimous secret resolution of
Congress authorizing the Secretary of State, for reasons of national interest,
to open any letter in any post office, except those to and from members of
Congress.42
From time to time, there had been rumblings in the Congress about secret
agents and the sums to support them, but it was not until March 1818 -
nearly 29 years after President Washington had sent his first secret agent
abroad - that the issue erupted in the Senate as a purely political one. By
then the framers of the Constitution and founders of the Republic had
retired or had died. The issue was raised by young men, examining the
system they had inherited. One, Henry Clay, objected to including in the
public appropriations bill monies for three individuals, saying he felt the
Contingent Fund was primarily, if not exclusively, to be used for such secret
agencies. The Congress affirmed this, struck the money from the appropria-
tions bill and added it to the Contingent Fund.43
The matter arose again in 1825 with Adams as President and Clay, Secre-
tary of State. The opposition condemned sending official observers to the
Panama Congress. Several members of Congress suggested from the floor that
secret agents - spies paid from the Contingent Fund - should have been
sent instead."
Six years later, in 183 1, the appropriations bill was again at issue, this
time over treaty commissioners. To put an end to queries, the administration
moved to transfer money from the appropriations bill to the secret service
fund. The opposition objected, saying it did not mind the Contingent Fund
being used to pay secret agents, but that treaty commissioners were another
thing. They lost, and the issue was again buried in the secrecy of the Contin-
gent Fund.4s
During these debates, the first full public statement of the purpose of the
secret fund surfaced. Senator John Forsyth, later to be Secretary of State
to Presidents Jackson and Van Buren, declared: "The experience of the
Confederation having shown the necessity of secret confidential agencies in
foreign countries, very early in the progress of the Federal Government, a
fund was set apart, to be expended at the discretion of the President on his
responsibility only, called the Contingent Fund of Foreign Intercourse....
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THE HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
It was given for all purposes to which a secret service fund should or could
be applied to the public benefit. For spies, if the gentleman pleases. ..."46
Later challenges were defeated in 1838 and 1842, with one buried and the
second settled by removing payment of Department of State dispatch agents
from the sanctuary of the secret fund.47
The early years of our republic contain a number of fascinating intelli-
gence episodes, carefully detailed in the so-called "secret agent bundles"
(formally "Documents Relating to Special Agents of the Department of
State") in the National Archives.
In one bundle, for example, one may find a storybook-type agent, George
Bethune English. English, a former lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps, had
resigned his commission to become a Muslim officer in the Turkish Army,
and served in Ismail Ali's campaigns into the Sudan. On his return to the
United States, he was recruited by President Monroe to return to the capital
of Islam as a secret agent. His mission was to determine the receptivity of the
Ottoman Empire to a commercial treaty with the United States and its
consent to our desire to trade on the Black Sea. Representing himself as an
American named Musselman, English managed "quietly and without observa-
tion" to obtain a copy of the Turkish treaty with France.48
Another agent launched by President Monroe in 1823 was Alexander
McRae, who was sent to Europe to report on the possibility of European
intervention in South America. McRae's letter of instruction contained this
admonition, one not unfamiliar to those in the intelligence profession:
"You will assume no public character, but take passports of a private citizen
of the United States.... And you will take proper precautions for avoiding
any appearance or suspicion of your being employed by a public
agency .... 1149
Much has been written about Joel Poinsett's mission to purchase Texas
from Mexico for five million dollars. Most forget that it was a failure,
choosing only to recall that on Poinsett's return to the United States he
introduced our popular holiday flower. His successor, Anthony Butler, was
also a failure, but he did it magnificently. He attempted to bribe Mexican
officials into selling Texas and when that failed he came up with the unique
idea of an unrepayable loan to Mexico with Texas as collateral. Although it
was denied at the time, the Mexican government also accused Butler of being
behind attempts to recruit so-called "colonists" to revolutionize Texas.5?
After Santa Anna's defeat in 1836, the question arose in Washington
about diplomatic recognition of the Texans. A secret agent was sent to
inquire into the political, social and economic conditions in the new
republic, their military strength and financial resources and the ability of
Sam Houston's government to meet its international obligations. The agent,
Henry W. Morfit, came back with the word, in effect, "They're not ready
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yet," leading Jackson to recommend to the Congress that the U.S. stand
aloof to Sam Houston's overtures. By March of the following year the situa-
tion had changed and the United States finally recognized the Republic of
Texas."
Another of President Jackson's agents is worth noting, if only because the
case reflects how little our fledgling nation knew about the world. Edmond
Roberts was assigned to investigate secretly the operations of the British East
India Company. He sailed for the Far East in 1832, rated as the captain's
clerk on the sloop Peacock. Only the ship's captain knew his true status.
Unfortunately, information at the Department of State regarding the coun-
tries he would visit was not very extensive or exact. In fact, titles and
identities of some of the national leaders he was to approach were unknown
in Washington. Simply, he was given a quantity of passports with blank
spaces so that he might enter the necessary information on the spot. And,
since he might be able to negotiate a treaty here and there, he was furnished
with a supply of letters of credence with similar blank spaces. By the time
Roberts died in Macao four years later, he had concluded treaties with
Siam and the Sultan of Muscat! 52
President Tyler also had a bit of controversy over the natural combination
already mentioned: Texas, secret agents and the Contingent Fund. Duff
Green, a leading newspaper publisher and businessman, was sent to England
to collect intelligence and engage in a bit of covert action related to the
possible annexation of Texas. One of his letters about Texas was published
in the British press, naturally not over his own name. The letter created such
a stir that the Congress asked Secretary of State Calhoun to identify the
writer and summon him before Congress. Calhoun replied that he couldn't
ascertain the identity of the writer.
Congress tried again, closer to target, asking if Duff Green had been
employed in Europe. Calhoun must have winced before responding, saying
there was "no communication whatever either to or from Mr. Green, in
relation to the annexation of Texas, to be found in the files of the Depart-
ment."
The next inquiry was to the point: Was Duff Green paid money from the
Contingent Fund appropriated by the Congress? By then the Senate had
already rejected the treaty of annexation, and the secret no longer needed to
be held. President Tyler answered that although he was not required to tell
the Senate whom he paid from the Contingent Fund, he would oblige just
this once. Yes, Duff Green had been employed to collect information about
a negotiation being contemplated, but later abandoned. You will note that
he did not answer the original question: Who wrote the controversial
letter?53
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Tyler, after leaving office, was not to hear the last of his Contingent Fund.
It was charged in the Congress that Tyler's Secretary of State, Daniel
Webster, had used some $17,000 from the fund for propaganda in the U.S.
religious press to win support for an unpopular treaty with Canada. By
deposition, Tyler told the investigating committee that what they were
probing was a secret matter and Webster had been deputized to carry it out.
The committee backtracked. It said it had no intention of investigating the
acts of presidential secret agents or of judging the propriety of using them
within the United States. 14
The full House wasn't mollified. It called on President Polk to surrender
the accounts of all payments from the fund during Tyler's administration.
Polk refused disclosure, noting:
The experience of every nation on earth has demonstrated that emer-
gencies may arise in which it becomes absolutely necessary for the public
safety or the public good to make expenditures, the very object of which
would be defeated by publicity... In no nation is the application of such
funds to be made public. In time of war or impending danger the situation of
the country will make it necessary to employ individuals for the purpose of
obtaining information or rendering other important services who could never
be prevailed upon to act if they entertained the least apprehension that their
names or their agency would in any contingency be revealed.ss
Polk's statement, for the first time in the nation's history, gave public
recognition to the clear linkage between "obtaining information," or collec-
tion, and "rendering other important services," undefined. It is rather like
the phrase "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelli-
gence affecting the national security..." found in the National Security Act
of 1947.
Polk had good reason to defend the integrity of the Contingent Fund and
to include "rendering other important services" in addition to collection. He
was then using the fund for agents to Mexico and to California for what we
would now call covert action to assure that California and Texas would drop
into the U.S. bucket.
As war clouds thickened, Polk received an intelligence report that Mexico
might cede California to Britain, effectively and permanently blocking
American dreams of stretching to the Pacific. He authorized Thomas Larkin,
a Massachusetts businessman, to assure the Californians that "Should Cali-
fornia assert and maintain her independence, we shall render her all the kind
offices of our power, as a sister Republic." Should the question of annexa-
tion arise, Larkin was empowered to say that the United States had no such
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aspirations, "unless by the free and spontaneous wish of the independent
people of adjoining territories."
Larkin was instructed to propound these ideas secretly, but back in
Washington the opposition got it all wrong; they claimed that Larkin had
been instructed to produce a revolution in California and Col. John Fremont
had been given authority to sustain it.56
The war with Mexico broke out in 1846, and once more President Polk
turned to a secret agent, this time Moses Yale Beach, a journalist and one of
the founders of the New York Associated Press. Beach traveled to Mexico,
using a British passport, and under instruction "never to give the slightest
intimation, directly or indirectly, that you are an agent of this Government."
Beach is said to have done well. He met with prominent Mexicans and
became actively involved in the political and social life of Mexico City, all
with the objective of seeking a way toward peace, a task some historians
say he almost accomplished. Interestingly, the suspicious American press
never unmasked his mission.57
President Taylor also had his spy flap, and handled it with a flourish. It
surfaced in the Congress that he had dispatched an agent to take soundings
of the Hungarian revolt, and perhaps do a bit more if it looked as though the
Magyars would win. They didn't, and the Congressional leak resulted in a
strong note from the Austrians saying that had the American agent been
apprehended, he could have been treated in a manner traditional for spies.
President Taylor, in angry response, defined a spy as one sent by one belliger-
ent against another to gain secret information for hostile purposes. The
United States was neutral in the conflict, ergo the man was an observer, not
a spy. Furthermore, the President of the United States took great offense at
the suggestion this country would employ spies.58
President Pierce, as Polk, made extensive use of agents and covert action.
One of the most innovative plans was one to acquire Cuba from Spain.
Spain had refused to part with the troublesome island, and a scheme was
devised to force them to sell. It called for cooperative European money-
lenders to call in their loans to the Spanish Crown, pressuring Madrid to sell
Cuba to the United States as a means to raise the needed cash. The plan went
well until leaked to the New York Herald. 59
In another ploy aimed at the same target, President Pierce acquiesced to
the formation of an exile army in New Orleans for the "liberation of Cuba."
When political realities forced Pierce to end his support of the proposed
invasion, he used positive intelligence on Cuban fortifications to convince
an old friend, who was the leader of the rebel army, to call it off.6o
To demonstrate the problems Pierce faced, one need only look at one
intercepted letter brought to his attention. In it were British plans to sell
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guns to Costa Rica for use in a war with Nicaragua, which would have the
effect of driving out the Americans there. Pivotal then, as now, were the
Miskito Indian S.61
President Buchanan had his spies, too. Francis J. Grund, the newsman
credited with being the father of the sensational style of journalism, served
in Europe as a roving spy-at-large, investigating a number of issues of concern
to the President. He was authorized to reveal his true status only to U.S.
ministers in whatever countries he visited, but to all others he was to be only
an interested and inquisitive private citizen.62
Hours could be spent on the Civil War: the exploits of the civilian Pinker-
tons in uncovering plots against the Union; the military men of Lafayette
Baker's secret service; overhead reconnaissance by Professor Lowe's "Aero-
naut Corps" of balloonists; and President Lincoln's fascination with com-
munications intelligence. (He wrote the Emancipation Proclamation in the
War Department telegraph office to keep it a secret from others in the White
House who might have leaked advance knowledge of the plan.)63
For the first time since the American Revolution, the United States was
unsparing in staffing and funding its intelligence activities abroad. Evidence
of this includes:
1. Agents with some ten million dollars to engage in preclusive purchasing
in Britain, a measure to block similar Confederate purchases of materiel.
2. Some two dozen agents in Britain and on the continent to identify secret
sales and ship construction as part of British and French covert support of
the Confederacy. The Federal Intelligence Service, as it was called, had
little difficulty in recruiting clerks in business houses and shipyards to
obtain the information.
3. Seizure on the high seas of a Scots-registry ship with a British crew sailing
with false documentation for a fictional destination because we knew from
our agents that it was actually being delivered to the South. The ship was
held in a neutral port throughout the war. When the conflict ended, rather
than expose the intelligence on which its capture was based, the U.S.
apologized and agreed to a small compensation.
4. Secret negotiations to recruit General Garibaldi to accept senior rank in
the Union Army in order to increase immigrant enlistments. Initially, his
terms were excessive and could not be met. When the General finally made
the necessary concessions, he was no longer needed; the tide of war had
turned and immigrant enlistments were up.
5. Operations into Canada to thwart Confederate operations being launched
from there and to build a case for claims against the Canadians and British
for assisting the Confederacy covertly. Lincoln and Secretary of War
Stanton, for example, dealt personally with a "doubled" courier who
served as a vital link between Canada and Richmond.64
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The conflict was not without the type of unauthorized disclosure that has
plagued other national endeavors and endangered the lives of many. To see
the effect of one leak during the Civil War, for example, we turn to an angry
letter by Major General Joseph Hooker to the Secretary of War. Referring to
a leak in the Washington Morning Chronicle, Hooker complained:
Already all of the arithmeticians in the army have figured up the strength
of sick and well, as shown in this published extract, as belonging to this army.
Its complete organization is given, and in the case of two corps, the number
of regiments. The chief of my secret service department would have willingly
paid $1,000 for such information in regard to the enemy at the commence-
ment of his operations, and even now would give that sum for it to verify
the statements which he has been at great labor and trouble to collect and
systemize.65
An investigation disclosed that the information had been given to the
newspaper by a member of the Surgeon General's staff. In his defense, the
offender wrote:
... to his entreaties for news as to the health of the army, I let him copy
the letter, directing him, however, to omit the address and signature, and any
marks which might denote the official and thus attach to it importance or
credibility .... In this connection it might be stated the only newspaper
reporters who visit this office belong to the New York Times and the Wash-
ington Chronicle, both of which I believe to be loyal papers, and incapable of
using to the public injury information that they might obtain....65
Hooker was right and the leaker was wrong. The newspapers, although
seen by the leaker as "loyal," had indeed used the information to the public
injury. In the National Archives one may still examine General Robert E.
Lee's report to the Confederate Secretary of War citing the Chronicle article:
According to Lee, "Taking the report... his aggregate force, by calculation,
amounts to more than 159,000 men. 1165
A landmark court decision regarding the nation's intelligence service stems
from the Civil War. William A. Lloyd, under personal contract to President
Lincoln, was sent south to collect tactical and political information. He was
to be paid $200 a month, but when the war ended and he returned north,
his case officer had been assassinated and he was reimbursed for expenses
only. He took the matter to the Court of Claims seeking additional compen-
sation.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in deciding the case, acknowledged that the
President had the authority to employ secret agents, that all such agent
contracts were binding on the government, a:'d that the sums should be paid
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from the Contingent Fund. Yet, because Lloyd had taken the matter to the
courts, it ruled against him, stating:
The service stipulated by the contract was a secret service; the information
sought was to be obtained clandestinely and was to be communicated pri-
vately; the employment and the service were to be equally concealed. Both
employer and agent must have understood that the lips of the other were to
be forever sealed respecting the relation of either to the matter. This condi-
tion of the engagement was implied by the nature of the employment, and is
implied in all secret employments of the Government... If upon contracts
of such matters an action against the Government could be maintained in the
Court of Claims ...the whole service in any case and the manner of its dis-
charge with the details of its dealings with individuals and officers, might be
exposed to the serious detriment of the public. A secret service, with liability
to publicity in this way, would be impossible... The publicity produced by an
action would itself be a breach of a contract of that kind, and thus defeat
recovery...."
In this decision are the roots for the so-called "Glomar defense;" that is,
the government is not admitting such information exists, but if it does
indeed exist, it would be properly classified and could not be disclosed. The
Supreme Court decision put it this way:
It may be stated, as a general principle, that public policy forbids the
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would in-
evitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as
confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be vio-
lated ... Much greater reason exists for the application of the principle to cases
of contract for secret services with the Government, as the existence of a
contract of that kind is itself a fact not to be disclosed."
After the Civil War, Presidents continued to dispatch agents, with Canada
a favorite destination. In 1869, for example, President Grant dispatched
James Wickes Taylor to the area of the Red River rebellion in Canada to
determine if sentiment existed for the annexation of the Selkirk area, or
even more, by the United States. It didn't exist. The dissidents did not want
to leave Canada; they just wanted to be a second Quebec.67
In 1881, the Army devised the idea of "hunting and fishing leave," a
means by which officers could be dispatched to conduct terrain reconnais-
sance, yet provide some degree of official deniability. 61 Captain Daniel
Taylor performed such a reconnaissance along the St. Lawrence River in
1881, and in 1890, Lt. Andrew Summers Rowan (of later "message to
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Garcia" fame) did a detailed reconnaissance of the entire line of the Canadi-
an Pacific Railway.
Perhaps one of the most daring, as well as most publicized, intelligence
missions of this type was that of 1 st Lieutenant (later Brigadier General)
Henry H. Whitney to Puerto Rico in 1897. Whitney infiltrated Puerto Rico
by signing on as a crew member of a British tramp steamer. Before his
arrival, however, the story was leaked and newspaper articles discussed his
secret mission at length. Forewarned by the American media coverage,
Spanish authorities conducted an extensive search of the ship on its arrival,
but failed to detect or apprehend him. He not only landed safely, but was
able to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the southern part of the
island."'
The need for such intelligence was great, and in 1902, the Military Infor-
mation Division of the Army instructed commanding officers of a number of
frontier posts to send secret tactical reconnaissance missions into Canada
for mapping purposes.70 ("Hunting and fishing leave" existed in Army
regulation, in one form or another, until 1928.)
This period saw heightened interest in military intelligence. The Office of
Naval Intelligence was formed in 1882, followed by the Bureau of Military
Intelligence (Military Information Division after 1901) in the Army in 1885,
the year that President Cleveland also authorized the posting of military and
naval attaches at our foreign legations.71
But perhaps the best evaluation of this period is that of Thomas Miller
Beach, a British intelligence agent who served under cover in the United
States from 1867 to 1888, as part of a network the British and Canadians
maintained along the border and in such cities as Chicago, Detroit, and
Buffalo. In his memoirs, Beach provides this critique of the American
service: "America is called the Land of the Free, but she could give England
points in the working of the Secret Service, for there, there is no stinting of
money or men."72
The Spanish-American War was a time of testing for Naval Intelligence,
and its hastily assembled networks had a successful track record in collect-
ing both political and strategic intelligence. But, with the end of the war and
demobilization, the networks were all but scrapped; few saw the need for an
energetic and continuing intelligence capability.73 Proof of this is found in
the emasculation of the Military Information Division in 1908, when it was
assigned to what might be called a map and document library function at the
Army War College. As with Presidential agents, when military intelligence
missions were required, personnel were recruited ad hoc.
An example of this was a joint intelligence mission launched in 1909. Two
military officers were sent on a two-year reconnaissance of Taiwan, the
Ryukyus, the Japanese home islands, Korea, and Manchuria. Commander
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Joseph "Snake" Thompson of the U.S. Navy Medical Service and 1st Lt.
Consuelo A. Seoane, 3rd Cavalry, traveled under assumed names and South
African nationality, posing as naturalists while mapping Japanese fortifica-
tions and coastal facilities. To enhance their cover, they collected specimens
and maintained bogus diaries of botanical finds (for the benefit of Japanese
surreptitious entry teams) and checked in regularly with British consular
authorities to affirm Crown protection due South African nationals.74
Similarly, when communications intelligence about the Mexican Army
was desired, the task was given to the Arizona National Guard. They were
quite successful in the assignment, crossing the border and stringing a land-
line "tap" to a Mexican military telegraph pole.75
There were those who recognized the need for an informed military
intelligence establishment, but their efforts were not always wise or success-
ful. Shortly before World War I, for example, the Commandant of the Com-
mand and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, acting on the suggestion
of the Chief of the War College Division, determined to prepare a regular
intelligence publication for appropriate Army distribution. The first issue,
which drew on intelligence reports forwarded to the Command and General
Staff School, resulted in a strong note of protest from the British. One item
in the new publication, they said, had been given to the U.S. military attache
in London only after securing his solemn promise to maintain it with utmost
secrecy. The promising intelligence publications program came to a complete
halt. 76
There were the inevitable feuds as well. In January 1916, the Director of
Naval Intelligence complained to the Chief of Naval Operations that the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy was attempting to usurp the control of the
DNI over intelligence by organizing his own secret intelligence bureau. The
Navy intelligence chief asked, unsuccessfully, which office held responsi-
bility for coordination of intelligence activities within the Navy Department.
The DNI survived the crisis, but what of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
who dabbled in intelligence? Franklin D. Roosevelt went on to become the
Constitutional manager of intelligence for the nation."
The U.S. declaration of war against Germany in World War I stemmed
from an intelligence success, the interception and decoding by the British
of the infamous Zimmerman telegram. President Wilson sought the declara-
tion after unilateral confirmation of the proposed collusion of Germany and
Mexico detailed in the encrypted message.
That conflict also saw the establishment of the nation's first permanent
combat intelligence system. On 31 August 1917, General Pershing created
the Intelligence Section, General Staff, and by the end of the year had
ordered creation of a Regimental Intelligence Service. Training began
immediately and by mid-1918 an Army Intelligence School had been estab-
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lished in Europe. Regimental and battalion S-2's were given the manpower
and the sole purpose of collecting intelligence. This wartime precedent led
to the inclusion of intelligence sections at the battalion, regimental, and
brigade level when the Army was restructured at the end of the war. Albeit
the poor intelligence officer at the battalion level also found himself detailed
as adjutant, plans and training, and supply officer.78
During the postwar years there were proposals that something be done
to coordinate intelligence. One plan called for the creation of a Bureau of
Intelligence with a director appointed by and responsible to the President.
Too many turfs would have been trod on, and the plan was doomed.
Another concept was a clearing house, without a central bureau, to com-
pare reports and to assign investigations. That plan was shelved when the
MID pointed out that it was already serving as such a clearing house, receiv-
ing and indexing reports from the various intelligence components. Pro-
prietary interest set the stage for a disaster yet to come.79
This is not to say the various components in the intelligence arena were
ineffective. Each toiled away in its own environment, producing the intelli-
gence necessary to meet individual command requirements. I will not
belabor here the fact that one of the critiques of Pearl Harbor was that there
was too much of this individual "noise," and no one to pull it together. Nor
did the intelligence components act in concert; each was vulnerable to the
budgetary and political whims of those above.
One telling example of this is the demise of the State Department's code-
breaking office, the so-called "Black Chamber." After Henry L. Stimson had
been in office for a few months as Herbert Hoover's Secretary of State,
Herbert Yardley, who operated the "Black Chamber," felt it was time
Stimson lost some of his innocence. He sent Secretary Stimson copies of an
important series of diplomatic messages, which had just been decrypted.
Stimson was shocked. To the new Secretary of State, the "Black Cham-
ber" was a violation of the principle of mutual trust on which he conducted
both his personal affairs and foreign policy. In his memoirs almost two
decades later, he explained he was guided then by the belief that the way to
make men trustworthy was to trust them. He was dealing as a gentleman
with other gentlemen sent as ambassadors and ministers from friendly
nations, and "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."
Stimson withdrew all State Department funding from the 10-year old
operation, and on 29 October 1929, the "Black Chamber" was closed and
its staff dispersed. Fortunately for the nation, the Army saw it as time to
consolidate its code-making and code-breaking in a small Signal Intelligence
Service created the following year. (Although Stimson said he never re-
gretted the decision to close the "Black Chamber," by 1940 the world had
changed, and so had the Secretary of War. In that post, Stimson found no
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ethical objection to the vital intelligence being gained through the crypto-
analysis known as MAGIC.)80
We were back in the ad hoc mode that had seemed to plague our national
intelligence effort after every war. When an estimate of the German Air
Force was needed, Charles Lindbergh was prevailed on to destroy his reputa-
tion with a "good will" visit to Germany and its military air bases. (The
estimate he penned for the signature of the U.S. Military Attache in Berlin
was wrong, despite his good intentions. The Germans had shuttled aircraft
about from field to field so that at each visit Lindbergh was, unknowingly,
counting the same planes.)81 When the President needed information on
German rearmament he turned to scholars, businessmen, industrialists, and
reporters to serve as executive agents, just as other Presidents had done
before him. Dilettantes agreed to hike through Germany, observing what the
President had asked them to observe.
The disaster came and the nation was unprepared politically and mili-
tarily.82
There is a lesson in all this, and none said it better than President
Woodrow Wilson in discussing his dilemma at the time of the Zimmerman
Telegram:
You have got to think of the President of the United States as the chief
counsellor of the Nation, elected for a little while but as a man meant con-
stantly and every day to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States, ready to order them to any part of the world where the
threat of war is a menace to his own people.
And you cannot do that under free debate. You cannot do that under
public counsel. Plans must be kept secret.
Knowledge must be accumulated by a system which we have condemned,
because it is a spying system. The more polite call it a system of intelligence.
You cannot watch other nations with your unassisted eye. You have to
watch them with secret agencies planted everywhere.
Let me testify to this my fellow citizens, I not only did not know it until
we got into this war, but did not believe it when I was told that it was true,
that Germany was not the only country that maintained a secret service.
Every country in Europe maintained it, because they had to be ready for
Germany's spring upon them, and the only difference between the German
secret service and the other secret services was that the German secret service
found out more than the others did, and therefore Germany sprang upon the
other nations unaware, and they were not ready for it. 83
Documents cited herein concerning special agents are drawn from Records Group 59, "General
Records of the Department of State," National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Pre-
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fixes used for identification include NARA (SM) for Special Missions, NARA (Inst) for Instructions,
NARA (Con) for Correspondence, etc. No attempt has been made to list all correspondence on a given
subject, only that which relates to the appointment of a particular agent and his mission. Special
Missions carried out by U.S. Navy officers prior to 1886 may be found in Naval Records Collection,
NARA Record Group 45; later dates may be found in NARA Record Group 80. Journals, Secret
Journals and Diplomatic Correspondence of the Continental Congress are cited only by date because
pagination varies between published editions.
'Report of the President's Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Report of the Special Study Group [Doolittle Committee] on the Covert Activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency, September 30, 1954 cited in LEARY, William M. [Ed.], The Central
Intelligence Agency: History and Documents. University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1984.
pp. 143-45. The report also states without equivocation, "As long as it remains national policy,
another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary organi-
zation more effective, more unique and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the
enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient and secure accom-
plishment of this mission." The Special Study Group was chaired by Gen. James (Jimmy) H. Doo-
little; other members were William B. Franke, Morris Hadley and William D. Pawley.
'The Samuel Griffith translation (1963) reads: "Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise
general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary
men is foreknowledge."
'Mursilis to Hattu-Zitis, cited in Jock Haswell's Spies and Spymasters: A Concise History of Intelli-
gence, (London, 1977), p. 7.
' Hannibal's intelligence operations are examined in Francis Dvornik's Origins of Intelligence Services,
(Rutgers, 1974), pp. 52-72.
'Los Angeles Times, 4 May 1972, "Headquarters of Old Rome's Spies Found."
`Haswell, loc. cit., p. 26. The King's espials were actually domestic informers, not foreign intelligence
agents.
'Haswell provides a detailed chronology of the development of Britain's intelligence and internal
security services. The title of Scoutmaster was apparently combined with other titles. "One of the
earliest holders, Thomas Nevyson, died on 11 July 1590, and on his tomb in the sanctuary of Eastry
Church he is described as 'Provost Marshal and Scoutmaster and Captain of Light Horse of the
Lathes of St. Augustine."' Ibid., p. 32.
'Sir Francis Bacon, The Historie of the Raigne of King Henry the Seventh. (London, 1622).
'Haswell, loc. cit., p. 48. Marlborough was speaking in defense of his intelligence expenditures of
some #340,000. Political foes accused him of misappropriation.
"Journals of the Continental Congress, 29 November 1775.
"Journals. 10 May 1776.
"Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1 October 1776.
"Correspondence, Jay to Morris, 6 October 1776. There is no question that Jay suspected Richard
Henry Lee of leaking the information: "...a copy of letter from A.L. to that committee has lately
been sent by a member of Congress to a gentleman of his acquaintance who is not a member of
Congress... You will be pleased, therefore to make no other use of this information than to induce
the greater caution in the committee. For as to binding certain members in the House to secrecy by
oaths or otherwise would be just as absurd as to swear Lee (no matter which of them) to look or feel
like Ned Rutledge."
"Journals, 15 May 1975, 12 June 1776.
"Secret Journals, 9 November 1775.
"Ibid. 20 May 1776, 1 June 1781.
"Journals, 12 January 1779. The resolution claimed "indisputable evidence... that his Most Christian
Majesty... did not preface his alliance with any supplies whatever sent to America." Payne's article
appeared in the second of five installments of "Common Sense to the Public on Mr. Deane's
Affair," Pennsylvania Packet, 2 January 1779. For the French Minister's report of the affair see
Despatches and Instructions of Conrad Alexandre Gerard, 1778-1780, John J. Meng, ed., (Balti-
more, 1939), Gerard to Vergennes, pp. 470-475.
"Ibid. 20 November 1775, 30 December 1775, 16 April 1776.
"Secret Journals, 27 April 1779.
10 Lyman H. Butterfield, "Psychological Warfare in 1776," in Proceedings of the American Philo-
sophical Society, vol. CXCIV, p. 234.
"The story of the "Bermuda Gunpowder Plot" at St. George's war retold graphically on four postage
stamps issued by Bermuda on 27 October 1976, the 200ti, anniversary of the raid.
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"Gifts requested by Silas Deane, an American agent in Paris, ranged from "a few barrels of apples, of
walnuts, of butternuts, etc." to "a narrowhegansett horse or two" for the Queen. Correspondence,
28 November 1776. The first recorded "operational entertainment" approvals were to "promote
the happiness" and to "provide for and entertain Sachems or warriors of the Six Nations" in an effort
to win them to the Revolutionary cause. Journals, 11 November 1775, 19 November 1775. Initially
the packets authorized by Congress were to be used for carrying instructions and copies of inter-
cepted letters to America's agents and correspondents abroad. Journals, 16 November 1775.
"Correspondence, 21 December 1776. "...contrive to send us in regular succession some of the best
London, French, and Dutch newspapers, with any valuable political publications that may concern
North America."
"Journals, 21 August 1776. This legislation, reported by the Committee on Spies, was limited to "all
persons, not members of, nor owing allegiance to any of the United States of America... found
lurking as spies." On 27 February 1778, the Congress broadened the espionage provisions to include
any "inhabitant of these states," who, by giving intelligence, etc., should aid the enemy in the killing
or capturing of loyal citizens. The penalty: "suffer death by the judgment of a court-martial, as a
traitor, assassin, or spy." The U.S. Supreme Court cited this initial legislation and the execution of
Major John Andre and some seventeen other spies during the American Revolution in denying seven
German saboteurs leave to file a petition of habeas corpus: Six of the German agents were executed.
"By the end of 1777, the French had shipped two and a quarter million pounds of gunpowder, or
90% of the total from all sources. Marcel Villanueva in The French Contribution to the Founding of
the United States, notes that between 1771 and 1781 France had to borrow 600,000,000 livres
from Swiss Bankers to finance its support of the Americans; the cost to France was two and a half
times greater than its national budget. J. B. Perkins, The War of Independence, places the cost at
$772,000,000; a U.S. Treasury official has equated that amount to two and one-half billion dollars
in 1976 dollars. Of the 44,177 Frenchmen who served in the land and naval forces supporting the
Americans, 2,112 were listed as fatalities.
"Correspondence, Carmichael to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, 2 November 1776.
"The records of William Eden, acting chief of British intelligence activities in France, were recovered
and reproduced by Benjamin F. Stevens in his Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives
Relating to America, 1773-1783 (London, 1899). Among documents such as those lamenting the
failure to recruit Carmichael are reports of successful penetration of Benjamin Franklin's Paris
offices, surveillance reports, intercepted mail and the like.
"Secret Journals, 26 February 1776.
For "riding for the Committee of Safety," Revere claimed five shillings a day; it was reduced to four
shillings in the voucher approved by the Massachusetts House of Representatives, 22 August 1775.
(Copy provided by the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, Boston.)
70 Federalist, No. 64.
"Annals of Congress, 1 Cong., II, 2292; Stat. at Large, 1, 128.
"NARA (Corr), Washington to Morris, 13 October 1789.
"Journal of William Maclay, E. S. Maclay, ed., (New York: 1890), 401 p.
"1 Stat. 128, Act of 1 July 1790; 1 Stat. 345, Act of 20 March 1794; The purposes for which Wash-
ington and his successors used the Contingent Fund had the indirect approval of the Congress
through its annual appropriation to the Fund.
"Alexander deConde, A History of American Foreign Policy (New York: 1971), pp. 120-21.
"T7ee American Heritage History of the Great West (New York: 1965), pp. 62-63.
"Zebulon Montgomery Pike, An Account of Expeditions to the Sources of the Mississippi and
77trough the Western Parts of Louisiana, to the Sources of the Arkansas, Kans, LaPlatte, and Pierre
Juan Rivers; Performed By Order of the Government of the United States during the Years 1805,
1806, and 1807. And a Tour Through the Interior Parts of New Spain, When Conducted Through
These Provinces, By Order of the Captain General, in the Year 1807. (Philadelphia, 1810).
"deConde, pp. 121-125; NARA (Dom. Let.) To Col. McKee and Gen. Mathews, joint appointment
and instructions, 26 January 1811, 29 January 1811, 29 June 1811.
"Documents from Henry, the British Spy!!, Eben. Seaver, ed., (Washington, 1812).
"Secret Resolution and Act of 15 January 1811, cited by deConde, p. 122.
In 1815, Lafitte was pardoned by President Madison as a reward for his service; he resumed his
privateering two years later.
"Secret Journals of The Acts and Proceedings of Congress, From the First Meeting 77tereof to the
Dissolution of the Confederation, By the Adoption of the Constitution of the United States, Pub-
lished under the direction of the President of the United States, conformably to Resolution of
Congress of March 27, 1818, and April 21, 1820, (Boston, 1821).
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"Henry Merritt Wriston, Executive Agents in American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: 1929), pp. 219-
224.
"Ibid., pp. 224-237.
"Ibid., pp. 237-258. Wriston notes that the debates were held in Executive Session and that the
security seal was removed on only parts of the debates for the purpose of publication.
"Ibid., pp. 241-242.
"Ibid., pp. 258-264.
"NARA (SM) To English, 2 April, 1823; J. Q. Adams Memoirs, VIII, 62.
"NARA (SM) To McRae, 15 December 1823.
S?NARA (SM) To Butler, 24 August 1829; deConde, 181-182.
"NARA (SM) Forsyth to Morfit, 23 June 1836.
67 NARA (SM) Livingston to Roberts, 14 February 1832; Second Mission, 5 August 1832.
"NARA (Instructions, GB), To Edward Everett re Green, 13 June 1843 (No instructions to Green
have been found); Wriston, pp. 708-711.
34deConde, pp. 158-159; Report, Select Committee, House, No. 684, 9 June 1846; Tyler Deposition,
1 June 1846, reprinted in the Congressional Globe, 11 June 1846.
"Polk, Serial 485, Doc. 187, 1-5; Diary of James K. Polk, 1845-49, M. M. Quaife, ed. (Chicago,
1910), 1, pp. 328-336.
"NARA (SM), Buchanan to Larkin, 17 October 1845; Polk, Diary, III, 395, 399.
"NARA (SM), Buchanan to Beach, 21 November 1846.
"NARA (SM), Clayton to A. Dudley Mann, 18 June 1849 and 15 June 1850. Hulssemann, Austrian
Legation, Letter, Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., App. 45; Webster Response, Congressional
Globe, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., App. 45-48.
"Roy Franklin Nichols, Franklin Pierce: Young Hickory of the Granite Hills (Philadelphia: 1969),
details the hopes and ultimate failure of this and other attempts by President Pierce to acquire Cuba.
"Nichols, "Pierce knew that Quitman was again preparing to invade Cuba. Despite popular clamor
this must not be. Quitman was called to Washington and showed the plans of the Cuban fortifica-
tions. The general then realized that he could not hope to succeed, and quit."
"Nichols, 461
"NARA (SM), Cass to Grund, 18 June 1858.
"Homer David Bates, Lincoln in the Telegraph Office: Recollections of the United States Military
Telegraph Corps During the Civil War (New York: 1907).
"NARA (Instructions, Belgium) To Sanford, 26 March 1861. Henry S. Sanford directed federal
espionage in Europe. John Murray Forbes and William Henry Aspinwall were the financiers sent by
the Navy to Europe with the ten million dollars in bonds. For the Garibaldi assignment to Sanford,
(Instructions, Belgium), 27 July 1861. Also see, Herbert Mitgang, "Garibaldi and Lincoln,"
American Heritage, vol. 25, No. 6, October 1975, pp. 34-39, 98-101.
"Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, War of the Rebellion, Series I, vol. XXV,
part II, serial no. 40, pp. 239-241, 790.
"92 US 105, 105-107 (1876), Enoch Totten, Admr., App., v. United States.
67 NARA (SM), Fish to Taylor, 30 December 1869.
66U.S. Army Regulations, 1881, paragraph 89.
66 R. A. Alger, The Spanish American War (New York: 1901).
70NARA, Records of the WDGS, Memo, Adj. Gen. for Lt. Gen. Commanding the Army, 17 March
1902, AWC 639-14.
71 John Patrick Finnegan, Military Intelligence: A Picture History, (Arlington: History Office, U.S.
Army Intelligence and Security Command, 1985) p. 5. This excellent work focuses on the period
1880 to date.
71 Henri Le Caron (pseud.), Twenty Five Years in the Secret Service: The Recollections of a Spy
(London, 1982). See also, John A. Cole, Prince of Spies: Henri Le Caron (Boston, 1984).
"Jeffrey M. Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First Intelligence
Agency, 1865-1918 (Annapolis, 1979), pp. 66-67.
"Consuelo A. Seone, Beyond the Range (New York: 1960).
75 Sidney Forrester Mashbir, I Was An American Spy (New York: 1953), p. 38. "On my first mission
- crossing the border near Naco to tap Calles' private telegraph line, which ran between Cananea
and Agua Prieta - I promptly botched the job. The Mexicans discovered our wire. On our next
attempt, however, we were successful... and thereafter messages were intercepted and decoded as
fast as they went through."
7'R. H. VanDeman, Notes on the History and Development of the MIS Maintained and Written by
Major General R. H. VanDeman, USA (Ret) Beginning in 1949, unpublished memo of 8 April 1949.
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"Dorwart, citing Oliver Memorandum to CNO Benson, 26 January 1916, file 20961-616, ONI Con-
fidential Correspondence.
"Paul R. Scott, "The Birth of the 2's: Combat Intelligence in the American Expeditionary Force,"
in Military Intelligence, July-September 1980, pp. 24-26.
"William R. Corson, The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire (New
York: 1977), p. 59.
'?Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: 1947),
p. 188; David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (New York: 1967), pp. 7, 360.
I am indebted to Col. Russell J. Bowen for alerting me to Truman Smith's unpublished manuscript,
Air Intelligence Activities With Special Reference to the Services of Col. Charles A. Lindbergh,
which he located in the Lindbergh Collection, Yale. Smith served as Military Attache in Berlin at
the time.
""The American Army's long neglect of intelligence training was soon reflected in our initial under-
takings. For too many years... we had overlooked the need for specialization in such activities as
intelligence... Had it not been for the uniquely qualified reservists who so capably filled many of our
intelligence jobs throughout the war, the Army would have found itself badly pressed for competent
intelligence personnel." (General Omar Bradley in Life, 9 April 1951.)
"Woodrow Wilson, "War and Peace," Speech delivered at the Coliseum, St. Louis, Missouri, 5
September 1919.
Errata
Volume 1, No. 1 - "The Historical Under-
pinnings of U.S. Intelligence" by
Edward F. Sayle.
Page 3, paragraph 6: Should read:
"Even before the formation of
England's New Model Army in
mid-seventeenth century, a new
senior....
Page 4, footnote: "heavily" should be
substituted for "almost solely;"
"basically" should be deleted.
Page 11, line 2: "World War II" is
correct, not World War I.
Page 13, paragraph 3, line 8: Sentence
should read: "Representing
himself as a garbed American
Moslem, English....
Page 20, line 5: Date should read
"1898."
Page 25, footnote 37: Add "Bidwell,
Bruce W. History of the Mili-
tary Intelligence Division,
Department of Army General
Staff (1774-1941), typescript
1954 (now available in published
form from University Publica-
tions of America, Frederick,
Md., 1986, p. 13.
Page 26, footnote 72: Date should be
1892.
Our apologies to authors and readers.
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