SO WHY DID THE U.S. FLEE THE WORLD COURT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000200740025-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: December 28, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/29: CIA-RDP91-00587R000200740025-4
WASHINGTON POST
28 December 1985
So Why Did the U.S. Fleer the World Court?,
In his effort to resuscitate the administration's unproven
charge that Nicaragua supplies arms to Salvadoran rebels,
and to duninish the strength of Nicaragua's suit against the
United States in the World Court, Col. Lawrence L. Tracy
of the State Department's Office of Latin American Public
Diplomacy distorts the testimony presented in that case
and misrepresents Nicaragua's legal arguments (Free for
All, Dec. 211. Even an office of "public diplomacy" should
exhibit some respect for the truth.
Tracy can he refuted with a single question: If the
United States has such an ironclad case against Nicaragua,
why did it flee the World Court like a fugitive from justice?
If Nicaragua is as terroristicaily inclined and the United
States as innocent of wrongdoing as Tracy says, then
surely the United States would prevail in a court of distin-
guished jurists whose majority comes from countries allied
to or friendly with the United States. After all, this is the
same court that ruled 15-0 in favor of the United States
five years ago when it sued Iran over the taking of Amer-
ican hostages.
Ironically, Tracy's own letter provides the answer to the
question, and reveals the glaring weakness in the U.S.
case: there is simply no reliable evidence that Nicaragua
provides material support to Salvadoran rebels, and Tracy
fails to cite any.
For almost five years the administration has been mak-
ing this charge against Nicaragua: indeed, it is the sup-
posed justification for American armed intervention, via
the contras, in that country. As the testimony in the World
Court case showed, the United States has spy planes and
satellites over Nicaragua 24 hours a day looking for arms
shipments, among other things. The most sophisticated
electronic surveillance gear is employed to listen in on all
radio and telephone conuituuications inside Nicaragua. And
the U.S. Embassy in Managua houses a large CIA contin-
gent.
With all of this intelligence collection going on, it is in-
conceivable that Nicaragua could pass arms to anyone
without detection. And detection would inevitably result in
interception of arms shipments-which would constitute
real proof of Nicaraguan arms trafficking. Yet despite five
years of trying and millions of dollars in manpower and
equipment devoted to this effort, there has never been a
significant interception of arms emanating from Nicaragua.
David Machlichael, a CIA intelligence analyst from April
1981 to April 1983, testified that he saw no reliable evi-
dence whatever of any arms trafficking by the Nicaraguan
government during that period.
Nevertheless, it was during the same period that the
CIA drew up its covert plan to create the contra army and
to destabilize the Nicaraguan government, a plan that
President Reagan approved and Congress funded. What is
Tracy's response? He cites no actual evidence of Nicara-
guan arms trafficking, only the opinions of administration
officials and members of Congress that Nicaragua is guilty
of this offense.
Tracy does not disclose the information on which these
opinions are based. But we do know the source. And ex-
perience teaches that the CIA is just as capable of playing
dirty tricks oil Congress as it is on Nicaragua. One need
only recall Sen. Barry Goldwater's angry letter to CIA Di-
rector William Casey complaining that the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee was deceived about CIA plans to mine
Nicaragua's harbors.
Even if there were proof of Nicaraguan complicity in
supplying arms to Salvadoran rebels, it would not justify,
under international law, the mining of Nicaragua's harbors
or the creation, direction and sustenance of a contra army
dedicated to the overthrow of Nicaragua's government::
The U.N. and OAS charters expressly prohibit all such,
uses of force, unless they are necessary in self-defense tp
repel an armed attack, which is not remotely the case
here. In any event, Reagan himself has admitted that the
objective of these U.S. actions is to'"remove" the Sandin+
istas from power, to make them "cry uncle," and not
merely to stop a supposed traffic in arms. Such an objec-
tive has nothing in common with legitimate self-defense.
Tracy completely misrepresents Nicaragua's legal argu-
ment when he says that Nicaragua's lawyers have ac-
knowledged that proof of Nicaraguan arms trafficking
would defeat Nicaragua's case: All of our briefs and plead-
ings to the court say precisely the opposite. Tracy obvj-
ously did not read these for himself. It is true, as he says,
that Nicaragua's lawyers cautioned Nicaragua against filing
its World Court suit if it were engaged in arms trafficking.
But this advice had nothing to do with the merits of Nica-
ragua's suit, only with the potential damage to our client's,'
international credibility stemming from U.S. proof tha
Nicaragua was engaged in such behavior. We can say with
some confidence that Nicaragua would not have filed tlr
suit, and risked its credibility, if it had anything to hide in
terms of arms trafficking.
Nicaragua's American lawyers did not accept their
client's assurance of its innocence at face value. Nor, how-
ever, -were they willing to accept the administrations`
charges in the absence of proof. The actions of both coun-
tries speak louder than their words. Nicaragua went to the
World Court. The United States ran away.
-Paul S. Reichler
The writer is a Washington attorney who represents
Nicaragua in the World Court and on other matters.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/29: CIA-RDP91-00587R000200740025-4
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