BUM RAP FOR THE CIA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000100720058-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 58
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100720058-1
ARTICLE APPEARED
n,w Perr I T)
cQMMNTARY
C ORI) t jL\'LJ
The CIA anuears to be more a victim of
sensat.ona; journalism rather than an
indirect accessory to a mass muroer.
Approved For Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100720058-1
 Approved For Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100720058-1
L
f Ater a headline itnr\ anti .i
Icad editorial in. Tit tlusir
trigfon POSI la,t week
charging the CIA with indt-
I eni involvement in the muruerous
%larcn car bombing in Beirut.
nn;rni, of "beam to Amen punc-
tuated the funeral oration, for the
victims, and the State I)epartment
;,icrted U.S Emoassies in the Middle
Last to the danger of violent retali-
attur. against Americans
From the welter of accusations,
denials.ant; explanations left behind
by this iournaiistic coup. the real
sequence of events is grauually
beginning to emerge. As Inc rules
and motives of the principal players
become more clearly understood,
the CIA appears to be more a victim
of sensational journalism rather
than an indirect accessory to a mass
murder.
In contrast to the Post's implica-
tion of CIA involvement. all l:.S offi-
cials with knowledge of these events
from Secretary of State George
Shultz, on down are unanimous in
denying that the agency hac any con-
nection. direct or indirect. with Inc
Lebanese intelligence team that
arranged the car bombing.
All informed American officials
agree that the CIA did not in any way
train the Lebanese who planned and
carried out the bombing nor did it
'nave advance knowledge of the
event.'. ypical of the official reaction
is the comment by Robert B. Oakley,
the director of the State
Department's office for counter-
terrorism. who found the Posts han-
diing of the story -outrageous"
but in retrospect it is easy to see
how the Post's investigative report-
ers were led astray oy startling dis-
coveries trey made after the
bombing For example. they
unearthed for the first time the fact
that President Reagan had secretly
directed the CIA last December to
train. and support Lebanese intelit-
gence teams for the purpose of using
violent action to pre-empt and abort
terrorist activity aimed at American
targets.
s permitted by law in cases of
Aextreme sensitivity. this pres-
idential finding was reported
not to the whole memnership of the
Senate and House intelligence Com-
mittees, but only to their chairmen
and vice chairmen, in spite of such
extra precautions. this highly-secret
information was somenow icakce to
the Pnst either from the Congress or
from the executive hrancn, and the
lei has fueled a growing demand
for a radical review of the whole con-
itru,sIonaj oversight prucc,,
\lcanw'htlc. w'rt" cytdcn.e pit III),
top-secret presidential Jlreitl\'e in.
nand. t~ was natural fo; tnc Pu11
reporter, to assume at ica,t ?omc
indtrec' avenC' connection t. tin Inc
nombitic attack on one of the ,u,-
pecicd icrrnrist stronr_nold, fill' in
tact tie ,ti.:h connection extsled for
two separate reasons
First. the top professional intel-
ligence officers in the CIA had long
been skeptical of any attempt to
recruit and train anti-terrorist Leba-
nese hit squads for fear they might
get out of control in the anarchy of a
disintegrating society. Only very
reluctantly did these intelligenc
pros accept the new responsihilttN.
and they would have preferred con-
centrating on the counterintelli-
gence penetration of the terrorist
organizations as a better way of
ensuring an effective defense.
hnwevt.i p.+?ci uI' the opportumt\
it wa, t ivcl' It appeal up tile line
where the iL .. ment nueh' nave
been dificrcni ~ rt c aJ the fact were
on the table
( nrd .11 t'vc"
dicutcd Cnirinirtt't
Moreover, once the presidential
order had been issued, the agency
operators in the field found the Leba-
nese security services so fractured
by political and religious nvalnes
that no recruitment or training had
been undertaken by March 8 when
the car bomb exploded. In a sense,
this event was looked upon, by CIA
officers as a reprieve because it viv-
idly demonstrated all the dangers of
indiscriminate violence they had
been predicting.
In the aftermath of the Beirut
massacre. the presidential finding
in favor of pre-emptive counterter-
roristr, was rescinded and the
agency let off the hook for having to
carry it out.
One other facet of the American
intelligence relationship with Leba-
non may have misled the Post
reporters. For more than 20 years,
the CIA maintained a routine liaison
relationship with Lebanese intelli-
gence as with the intelligence ser-
vices of other non-communist
countries. An exchange of visits and
some training was involved but this
had nothing to do with recruiting
and -training counter-terror nit
sduacs.
I n the light of this background. it
does seem that the Post story was
inflated to suggest conclusions
well beyond what the facts could
support and that the CIA got a bum
rap. In the process. American lives
may have been neediessiy endan-
gered.
In fai:-ness to the top editors of the
Post. it should be pointer out that the
pre,? spokesman for toe CIA
strongly ub)ected to the story when
it was read to him 24 hours before
punitcatiun. In the absence of CIA
i)ii entor William Casey. the agcnc).
Approved For Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100720058-1