SOVIETS LEAD IN LASER BEAM WEAPONS FOR SPACE SHIELD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 10, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
STAT
ARTICLE APPEARED
Soviets lead
WASHINGTON TIME
10 February 198
"Things are progressing at a
rather incredible rate:' Lt. Gen.
James A. Abrahamson, director of
the Strategic Defense Initative Of-
fice, said in a recent interview.
Many U.S. officials are confident
that America can build an effective
missile shield before the end of the
century. But their official public
forecasts are hedged by caution.
"There's a lot of science yet that
we have to do, and even more en-
gineering;' Gen. Abrahamson said at
a November press conference. "But
I'm confident that the job can be
done. The real question is just how
fast and what is the best way."
The enthusiastic reports have
done little to quell the debate over
SDI.
Powerful political voices oppose
the very idea of ballistic missile de-
fense and some scientists remain
skeptical of the claimed scientific
advances.
Their skepticism contrasts
sharply with the optimism of the
March 1983 speech in which Mr.
Reagan called upon scientists "to
turn their great talents to the cause
of mankind and world peace, to give
us the means of rendering these nu-
clear weapons impotent and obso-
lete:'
Four prominent opponents of SDI
ripped into Mr. Reagan's proposal in.
an article appearing in the winter
1984-85 issue of "Foreign Affairs,"
that has become holy writ in the anti.
SDI ranks.
The authors were former National
Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy,
Sovietologist and former Ambassa-
dor George F. Kerman, former De-
fense Secretary Robert S. McNa-
mara and Gerard Smith, chairman
of the Arms Control Association and
chief negotiator of the 1972 SALT I
treaty.
"We believe the president's initia-
tive to be a classic case of good inten-
tions that will have bad results be-
cause they do not respect reality,"
they wrote, "What is centrally and
fundamentally wrong with the
president's objective is that it cannot
be achieved:'
The core of their case was that a
100 percent effective missile de-
fense shield is technically impossi-
ble. A shield less than perfect is
worse than no shield at all, because
it will encourage the Soviets to build
more missiles to overwhelm it, and
deal arms control a fatal blow.
But supporters of SDI say a mis-
sile defense need not be perfect to be
effective. In any case, they say, the
Soviet missile defense program is
roaring ahead. The SDI program has
proven its worth in the arms control
field by spurring the Soviets to re-
turn to stalled talks in Geneva, the
supporters argue. Eventually, it will
lead to massive reductions in offen-
sive nuclear arms, phased in while
both sides are sheltered behind de-
fensive shields.
For now, most opponents concede,
the pro-SDI forces are ahead in the
debate. Congress has approved an
ambitious research program, orig-
inally scheduled to spend $27 billion
between 1985 and 1990 but pruned
by about one-fifth in each of the last
two fiscal years.
SDI critics say the president has
the edge only because he hasn't put
a specific system for deployment on
the table. That won't happen until
the early 1990s. Once specific pro-
posals are made, opponents say, the
debate will get much hotter. The
American people then will have to
decide two grand questions: Can it
be done? Should it be done?
Americans already have seen a
cartoon version of the debate in tele-
vision ads produced by SDI
proponets and opponents. But the
arguments that will ultimately de-
termine the fate of SDI involve not
cartoons, but the world of nuclear
strategy and arms control.
In that dark and mysterious
world, two basic camps are power-
fully divided by widely different
views on two key issues:
? The nature of the Soviet Union,
its military force and its intentions
for the use of that force.
? The reach and grasp of modern
science and technology.
The camps drew battle lines over
these two issues long before Mr. Rea-
gan's 1983 speech. Many of the same
people slugged their way through a
similar debate in the late 1960s and
early 1970s.
The opponents of ballistic missile
defense won that debate. Their vic-
tory is enshrined in the 1972 SALT I
Anti-ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty,
which forbids either country to de-
velop, test or deploy a national ABM
system - the kind SDI envisions -
or any of its components.
To understand the ABM treaty,
one must refer to the grim logic of
nuclear deterrence, and the concept
of "mutually assured destruction"
(known as "MAD") on which it is
based.
For a decade after World War II,
the United States held an effective
in laser beam
weapons for
space shield
By Tom Diaz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Soviet labor battalions have worked for years in the cold
clear air of the high mountain near Dushanbe in the Thjik
Socialist People's Republic, patiently hacking a giant military
facility out of the rock at 7,000 feet.
gust as patiently, U.S. soy satellites orbiting overhead have
photographed the progress of the work. Its significance only
recently has become clear to intelligence analysts.
There at the top of the world, where the Soviet union bor-
ders Afghanistan, the Soviets are building what U.S. officials
now believe will be a powerful
laser-beam weapon capable of
knocking down U.S. satellites
and perhaps ballistic missiles.
A senior administration of-
ficial, who asked not to be
identified, said the Dushanbe
site underscores the lead the
Kremlin enjoys in key areas of
the high technology that is be-
ing explored by the U.S. Stra-
tegic Defense Initiative, the
missile defense program pro-
posed by President Reagan in
March 1983.
"They have some very in-
teresting facilities right now
which we do not fully understand, but which have the potential
in a few years of giving them at the very least, strong ground-
based, directed-energy [laser] capabilities against satellites, if
not a beginning and emerging capability against ballistic mis-
siles:' the source said.
The site at Dushanbe, he said, "hasn't yet put out a single
photon'
"But it's a big, big construction site that has been under way
for a long time," he said. "It appears to be a major directed-
energy facility composed of multiple elements, and our best
estimate today is that it could well be a ground-based laser."
He and other U.S. officials believe the Soviets will be the
first to deploy a working laser weapon, despite the great pro-
gress the United States has made in its SDI research program,
popularly known as "star wars."
Continued
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
monopoly on nuclear weapons and,
most importantly, the means to de-
liver them. Even after the Soviets got
their own nuclear bombs, they could
not seriously threaten the U.S. main-
land with them.
But that changed with the coming
of intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) in the mid-1950s and,early
1960s. Nuclear bombs could now be
hurled across thousands of miles.
Each side could destroy the other as
a functioning society in less than an
hour.
Tb some, that fact became a virtue
in the peculiar logic of the nuclear
age.
Since both nations could destroy
each other with their missiles,
strategists could pursue two basi-
cally different paths: devise
defenses against missiles, or de-
velop a strategy that took advantage
of the "balance of terror."
For a while, both paths were pur-
sued.
The first U.S. anti-ballistic missile
defense contract was signed in 1955.
Eventually, in the late 1960s, the Pen-
tagon proposed defensive systems
known as Sentinel and Safeguard.
But these systems were rejected
after it was decided that the offense
could overwhelm the defense by
sheer numbers more cheaply than
the defense could expand.
"Back in the mid-'60s, the possi-
bilities of defense were question-
able," retired Army Lt. Gen. Daniel
0. Graham, head of Project High
Frontier and a longtime advocate of
missile defense, said in a recent in-
terview.
The consensus that the defense
could be overwhelmed was "incor-
rect:' he said. "But there was a great
deal of logic to it:'
U.S. strategists turned away from
missile defense to MAD, under
which each side theoretically deters
the other with the raw threat of re-
venge. .
"The sheer terror of things was
supposed to maintain the balance.
But ... both sides had to agree to this
mutually assured destruction thing:'
Mr. Graham said.
The logic of MAD demands that
both sides keep roughly the same
ability to inflict the punishment of a
second strike on the other's pop-
ulation, an ideal situation that
strategists call "stability."
ICBM defenses, such as those be-
ing explored by SDI, are considered
"destabilizing" by those who believe
in MAD. If only one side has a de-
fense, they reason, it could decide in
a crisis to unleash a surprise attack,
counting on its defense to protect it
from whatever "ragged" retaliation
the other side could mount. If both
sides have missile defenses, both
will build stronger offenses, to be
sure they can penetrate the other's
defense, and also will be tempted to
attack first in a crisis.
But offenses that are too powerful
also unbalpnce MAD. If one side has
an overly powerful arsenal, capable
of destroying hardened military tar-
gets, it might be tempted to strike
first in order to wipe out the other's
retaliatory capability.
The ABM Treaty, based on the
MAD theory, was supposed to have
sealed a two-part deal between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
Ballistic missile defenses were for-
bidden. And the two sides would ne-
gotiate a halt, eventually a reduction,
in offensive arms.
But supporters of SDI charge that
the ABM deal broke down from the
start.
"We never had this consent sys-
tem... We never had consensual vul-
nerability," Fred Ikle, undersecre-
tary of defense, said in a recent
interview. "In the United States, peo-
ple liked the delusion that we had a
consensus with the Soviet Union:'
In fact, Mr. We said, the world did
not enjoy the ideal state of "stabil-
ity" the ABM Treaty was supposed
to introduce.
"The Soviets rejected [MAD] out
of hand from the very moment that
the United States started touting it:'
Mr. Graham said. "They have in fact
spent more money on strategic de-
fense of the homeland than on offen-
sive weapons, and on offense they
have spent not for terrorizing nu-
clear weapons, but for weapons that
can do a military job - a first strike,
accurate missile force:'
This combination of "first strike"
offensive capability and growing de-
fensive capability, SDI advocates
say, will put the Soviets in a position
of strategic superiority by the
mid-1990s unless the United States
does something to change the equa-
tion.
So long as the United States
abides by the 1972 deal, they argue,
it can keep up with the Soviets only
by developing more and better offen-
sive weapons to counter the Soviet
defense. But that path is morally and
fiscally bankrupt, SDI supporters
argue, and it was to offer a future
president other options that Mr. Rea-
gan made up his mind to pursue SDI.
They believe key defensive tech-
nologies have advanced so far that it
may now be possible to build
defenses that cannot be over-
whelmed by cheaper offensive steps.
"As of now, the technology favors
the defense, according to Mr. Gra-
ham. "This is not accepted in a lot of
places, but it is absolutely true."
SDI advocates say the failure of
the ABM Treaty has proven that
arms control as an end in itself can't
be relied on. While arms control still
has a role, the only way to end the
arms race is to pursue a defense so
vigorously that the Soviets will
agree to drastic cuts in both sides'
offensive arsenal.
But opponents of SDI reject the
version of the last 14 years offered
by Mr. Ikle and Mr. Graham.
"It's a serious misassessment of
what actually happened said John
D. Steinbruner, on a year's leave
from his post as director of foreign
policy studies for the Brookings In-
stitution.
He and others argue that the So-
viets generally have kept the ABM
Treaty bargain. Soviet offensive de-
ployments have been no more
threatening than comparable U.S.
deployments, they say.
"The Soviets did buy the deal ac-
tually more fundamentally than we
did ... and they have met the terms
of the treaties, by and large, all the
major provisions of them:' Mr. Stein-
bruner said.
They concede that the Soviets
have been guilty of some arms con-
trol violations. But, they say, these
are not serious enough to justify
abandoning the ABM Treaty, and in
the process throw the "arms control
process" overboard.
As for technology, the critics say
that every defensive move can be
met by a Soviet countermove, al-
though most agree that the United
States should continue ABM re-
search as a hedge against a possible
scientific breakthrough by the Sovi-
ets.
The answer, they argue, is to fir
the ABM Treaty so that it can re
strain development of new high
technology defensive weapons, and
to negotiate better offensive arms re -
ductions agreements.
Tbmorrow-. Soviet advances
Continued
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
J
S1~RA SE
DEFN'
nrlA
^ Part 1 TODAY: From Mad to
Sanity - An inquiry into why the
SDI program was proposed, in-
cluding an in-depth look at the nu-
clear strategy it proposes to
change.
p Part 2 FEB. 11: Red Dawn -
What the Soviets are doing in their
own SDI program, a look at the
buildup in Soviet offensive weap-
ons, and their violations of the
ABM Treaty.
^ Part 3 FEB.12: Can it be Done?
- Is any missile shield possible? A
look at the debate over whether a
missile shield must be perfect - or
only good enough.
Part 4 FEB. 13: High Tech - A
review of some of the development
SDI officials say make them op-
timistic the job can be done.
C Part 5 FEB. 14: Arms Control
and the Allies - Will the SDI pro-
gram "gut" the ABM Treaty, and
should we care if it does?
This shows that some ICBMs aimed at the western United States would be destroyed
(upper left), while another might make it through on a path over Alaska (red arrows).
The U.S. defense might employ satellite sensors (top, near center) to detect missiles and
-track them with radar, infrared or other means. Other layers of warning devices in space would
have several different hinds of sensors.
With an attack under way, ground-based laser weapons like the one shown in Alaska (small
circle at center) would fire laser beams into space at the speed of light. The beams would hit
relay mirrors (upper right corner) and be redirected to fighting mirrors and from there toward a
missile (upper left).
Meanwhile, satellites hovering over the Soviet Union might also fire clouds of small.
high-speed rockets at the rising missiles.
Other layers of defense might include electromagnetic rail guns (lower center, with the U.S.
flag) firing small, high-speed "smart rocks" and neutral particle beam weapons directing lethal
streams of small atomic particles (bottom).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
Ar i C,.c
ON PACE
WASHINGTON TIMES
11 Soviet space age weaponry
is central to U.S. research
By Tom Diaz
.
uments describing the new pro ect
Soviet scientis
ts were working on.
American intelligence analysts
pored over photographs and doc-
It wasn't exactiv like anything the
Americans had seen e ore. en it
hit them.
The Soviets had a new way to
make laser eaam ea ons.
The idea was so good that U.S. sci-
entists working on the Strategic De-
fense Initiative, the missile defense
program initiated by President Rea-
gan in March 1983, are now trying to
copy it.
Known as the "phased-array la-
ser;" the Soviet technique uses many
small, closely coordinated lasers, ar-
ranged in a pattern known as an "ar-
ray.' to build one large, powerful la-
ser beam, according to a U.S. source
who has had access to top secret in-
formation about the program.
The Soviet concept differs from
the approach in the U.S. laser-
weapons program. So far as has been
publicly revealed, the United States
has sought to make single laser
sources more powerful, rather than
combining the power of many small
ones.
"I can't comment on that," Lt. Gen.
James A. Abrahamson, head of the
SDI program, said in a recent inter-
view when asked about the report.
The innovation is not the first
time or the only area in which the
Soviets have pulled ahead of the
West in space weapons technology.
Soviets scientists are regarded as
having a clear lead in the field of
particle-beam generators. Particle
beams are perhaps the most lethal
of the non-nuclear candidates for
space-age weaponry.
In fact, the Soviets invented two
devices - the "ion induction linear
accelerator" and the "radio fre-
quency quadropole" - that are cen-
tral to current U.S. designs.
"Soviet research and develop-
ment of those technologies that
could support a particle beam
weapon have been impressive. a
CIA staff paper written in March
1985 concluded. "Work on ion
sources has been spectacular."
e artic a earn and laser work,
U.S. intelligence officials sav. are
part of a massive effort the Soviet
Union has been pursuing for at least
two decades to research exotic tech
nology for military applications
such as misst e e ense.
According to a 1985 Pentagon re-
port on Soviet military power, pre-
pared by the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the Soviets have "over
10,000 scientists and engineers"
working on laser weapons alone.
"They have devoted several times
the resources the United States has
over the past decade and a half to
high-power laser weapons develop-
ment;' a defense official said in a
recent background interview.
"The Soviets didn't come upon
this kind of development the way the
United States did," the official said.
"The United States was investigat-
ing a lot of different technology ...
but it was really not focused toward
a weapons program. The Soviets on
the other hand have been working
for a long time and, so far as we can
tell, primarily toward weaponization
of these kinds of devices"
Much of the Soviet strategic de-
fense work is being done by scien-
tists who have signed newspaper ad-
vertisements, and are regularly
quoted in Western news outlets, op-
pnsing the SDI, popularly known as
"star war:,.' as dangerous and desta-
bilizing.
Western intelligence officials say
the Soviet Union has mounted one of
e most extensive "disinformation"
an propagan a campaigns in its
iisuir\ in an effort_t_o stop the Amer-
ican program.
According to the CIA staff report,
many o f ose who signe a letter
published in the The New York
tines ast year denouncing t e U.S.
SD program either "have been in-
strumental in the development of
both conventional and exotic ballis-
tic missile defense systems" or
"have spent their careers developing
strategic offensive weapons and
other military systems."
or example, the so-called "Com-
mittee of Soviet Scientists in De-
fense of Peace and Against Nuclear
War," which issued a report widely
published in the West critical of the
U.S. program, is headed by Yevgeniy
P Velikhov. Mr. Velikhov is fre-
quently put forth as a Soviet
spokesman against development of
missile defense.
However, according to a report on
the Soviet program issued last Octo-
BAEAR~ CLE
GENERATORS
The most lethal of non-nuclear
candidates for space age
weaponry. this device produces a
stream of invisible sub-atomic
particles traveling at or near the
speed of light.
Upon striking an enemy missile
or warhead. the beam destroys
the electronic control system that
guides the missile or controls the
precise sequence of steps
necessary to set off a nuclear
charge. rendering it inoperative.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
ber by the Pentagon and the State
Department, Mr. Velikhov has been
a "central figure in the development
of [Soviet] high-energy laser weap-
ons," and was formerly director of
the Institute of Atomic Energy lab-
oratories at Ti-oitsk, "where lasers
for strategic and tactical applica-
tions are being developed"
Administration officials say the
Soviet program is an important rea-
son, but by no means the only one,
why the United States must have its
own missile defense research pro-
gram.
"It's very clear that the Soviets
are developing exactly these same
defenses," said George Keyworth, a
private consultant who until last De-
cember was President Reagan's sci-
ence adviser. "Eventually they will
succeed. And when they do, don't
fool yourself - they'll blackmail us
to our knees. "
SDI opponents say they agree that
the country must continue research
to guard against Soviet scientific
breakthroughs.
"There are two parts to this pro-
gram - there's a research compo-
nent and a developing-and-testing
component;' said John E. Pike, asso-
ciate director for space policy of the
Federation of American Scientists,
which opposes SDI. "We probably
ought to be doing much of the re-
search program. But I think the case
for doing any of the development and
testing is very, very difficult to
make. "
Mr. Pike and other opponents of
SDI downplay the significance of the
Soviet effort. They say SDI advo-
cates tout Soviet scientific cap-
ability to drum up support for the
U.S. program, but downplay the
same capability when asked about
Soviet ability to match U.S. missile
defense with countermeasures to de-
feat it.
"The advocates of ballistic missile
defense are in universal agreement
that there is a major gap between
Soviet and American capabilities;'
Mr. Pike said. "They just can't agree
if we're ahead or behind.
"First, my suspicion is that there
may not be 10,000 people under
those [laboratory] roofs, and I know
for sure that they are not putting in
8-hour days," he said.
"Secondly, you have to assume
that those 10,000 people are as pro-
ductive as they would be in the
United States, and that's clearly not
the case:' he said. "We've got good
computers and they don't.... You've
got to factor in some divisor to make
that equivalent to the American ef-
fort.
"Then you have to ask yourself the
question, 'What are these people
working on?"' he said.
According to Mr. Pike, the Soviets
lead mainly in areas that the United
States has explored and found less
promising.
"The Soviets are continuing to put
a great deal of effort into dead-end
technologies," he said.
But the Soviet strategic defense
research program is only a part of
how the Soviet Union fits into the
SDI debate. Other aspects that ad-
ministration officials say are even
more important are a massive
buildup of the Soviet missile force
and Soviet preparations to deploy
their own anti-missile system, in vio-
lation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Mis-
sile treaty.
Many supporters of SDI argue
that the Soviet offensive arsenal has
taken on an ominous "first strike"
capability that has dangerously
tilted the balance of rough
equivalence between retaliatory
forces that is the foundation of the
logic of "mutually assured de-
struction" (MAD).
Since the SALT I 1972 ABM
Treaty was signed, they say, the So-
viet Union has relentlessly deployed
new generations of missiles.
"What they have done is to con-
stantly upgrade and expand their of-
fensive nuclear capabilities," said re-
tired Army Lt. Gen. Daniel O.
Graham, a former head of the De-
fense Intelligence Agency and for-
mer deputy director of the CIA who
now heads High Frontier, a pro-SDI
organization. "Soviet attempts both
to perfect a first strike capability
and to expand the force have been
going on without letup since the
signing of SALT I.
"For instance, in 1972, when we
entered into the [Salt I] agreement,
the Soviets were in the process of
replacing their second-generation
intercontinental ballistics missiles
with their third generation, [and]
their second-generation nuclear
missile subs with a third genera-
tion;' he said. "Now they're into their
fourth generation of those same
weapons"
The last new ICBM the United
States deployed was the Minuteman
III, in 1970. The Soviets have com-
pletely deployed three since then -
the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 - are in
the process of deploying two more
- the SS-24 and SS-25 - and are said
to be developing two newer models.
Among the offensive weapons U.S.
analysts are worried most about are
308 of the SS-18 (Model 4) missiles.
The SS-18s, world's largest and most
powerful intercontinental ballistic
missiles, are stationed in six missile
fields scattered across the central
underbelly of the Soviet Union.
Each carries 10 nuclear war-
heads, the limit under arms control
treaties, but could carry as many as
30. Each warhead has 20 times the
power of the nuclear weapons used
in World War II, and can be indepen-
dently aimed, with great accuracy,
to strike a different target.
The SS-18s are only part of the
1,400 ICBMs in the Soviet ground-
based ICBM arsenal. But they typify
a feature of the Soviet buildup that
keeps some U.S. defense analysts up
at nights.
"The SS-18 Mod 4 was specifically
designed to attack and destroy
ICBM silos and other hardened tar-
gets in the United States," according
to a Pentagon report on Soviet mili-
tary power.
The SS-18 "silo-busting" cap-
ability illustrates an important
point. One nuclear warhead may be
just like any other nuclear warhead
to the man on the street. But strate-
gic planners recognize differences
among weapons.
Weapons that can threaten only
"soft" targets, like cities, are called
"countervalue" weapons. They need
only be moderately accurate to do
their job, and can be delivered in no
great hurry. They fit the logic of
"mutually assured destruction" ide-
ally, since they threaten mainly de-
fenseless populations.
Those that can threaten "hard"
FIRST
STRIKE
CAPABILITY
Analysts say Soviets
already have enough
ICBMs to disarm the
United States by surprise
attack on its few
"counterforce" weapons -
those with the speed and
accuracy to threaten
military targets, such as
steel and concrete
hardened missile silos and
command bunkers - while
the United States is limited
more to "countervalue"
weapons - slower and
moderately accurate; a
threat mainly to
defenseless population
centers.
A_
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
targets like missile silos and com-
mand bunkers that have been pro-
tected by layers of steel and concrete
are known as "counterforce" weap-
ons. They must have accuracies
down to hundreds of feet.
Counterforce weapons that can be
delivered swiftly enough - like
ICBMs, which arrive on target about
30 minutes after launch - give the
side that owns enough of them a first
strike capability. That is, they could
be used in an attempt to disarm the
other side by a surpise attack on its
best nuclear weapons, the ones that
could hit back at the attacker's hard-
ened sites.
The Soviet nuclear force, many
U.S. defense experts say, now has
this capability.
"The Soviets already have enough
hard-target-capable ICBM re-entry
-vehicles today to attack all U.S.
ICBM silos and launch control cen-
ters and will have larger numbers ...
in the future," two CIA officials, Rob
at M. Gates and Lawrence K.
Gershwin. told the Senate Armed
Services committee last year.
The U.S. missile force doesn't
have the number of accurate war-
heads necessary to threaten such a
first strike on military assets, ana-
lysts say.
Besides building up a first-strike
force, SDI supporters say, the Soviet
Union has also violated the ABM
Treaty. Indeed, to some analysts it
appears to be making ready to
"break out" of the treaty with a sud-
den deployment of a nationwide
anti-ballistic-missiles system.
"The Soviets agreed [to the
treatyl because we were 20 years
Ahead of them in technology," said
Gen. Graham. "Of course, they
promptly started to violate it to try
to catch up technically."
Among a number of Soviet ABM
Treaty violations most often cited is
construction of a large phased array
radar near the city of Krasnoyarsk
in Siberia, The site of the radar, well
inside the Soviet interior, violates a
treaty provision that requires ra-
dars that might possibly be used for
ABM defense systems at more vul-
nerable locations nearer national
borders.
The CIA is worried about these
and of er Soviet missile defense ef-
forts.
"We are particularly concerned
that the Soviets' continuing develop-
ment efforts give them the potential
for widespread ABM deployments
Mr. Gates and Mr. Gershwin told the
Senate. "The Soviets have the mayor
.components for an ABM_sy_st_e_m___tFat
could be used for widespread ABM
deployments well in excess of ABM
Treaty limits."
he combination of a first strike
missile capability and a ballistic
missile defense, SDI advocates say,
would give the Soviets clear nuclear
superiority. That would be
translated into worldwide political
muscle over the United States. The
idea of such superiority isn't to use
it in war, they say, but to use it much
the way the United States used its
power in 1962 to force the Soviets to
withdraw missiles from Cuba.
But opponents of SDI say the ad-
ministration and other SDI support-
ers exaggerate the significance of
the Soviet buildup and the impor-
tance of Soviet treaty violations.
"The alleged buildup did occur,"
said John D. Steinbruner, of the
Brookings Institution. "But it was
provided for under the terms of the
treaties. The whole design of the
SALT treaty was to impose a ceiling
on plans and let them work through,
and the Soviets did not add any
`MUTUALLY
ASSURED
DESTRUCTION'
The advent in the mid-1950s and early
'60s of Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles - which can hurl nuclear
bombs across thousands of miles -
took away the United States' effective
monopoly of nuclear weapons,
allowing the Soviets to seriously
threaten the U.S. mainland. Each side
gained the capability to destroy the
other as a functioning society in less
than an hour, providing the "virtue" of
a "balance of terror" by which each
theoretically deterred the other with
the raw threat of revenge.
PHASED ARRAY
LASER
A Soviet technique that U.S.
scientists are now trying to copy,
this device would use many
small, closely coordinated. lasers,
arranged in a pattern known as
an "array," to build one large,
powerful laser beam.
A laser heats, melts or
vaporizes the outer surface
layers of a missile rendering it
inoperative. Some "pulsed" lasers
hit with enough force to cause a
shock wave that would shake the
missile apart.
launchers to their force structure
after the treaty was imposed.
"Indeed they, as best as we can
interpret what their intentions were,
probably reduced the then-planned
deployment," he said. "They've
really met the major terms of the
treaty."
Mr. Steinbruner agreed that con-
struction of the Krasnoyark radar is
"almost certainly a presumptive vio-
lation."
"But, on the other hand, had they
asked in advance we almost cer-
tainly would have agreed because
it's not an unreasonable place intrin-
sically to put the thing," he said. "So
the issue is an important matter, but
almost entirely one of procedure."
And Mr. Pike said he doesn't think
the Soviets will be able to "break
out" of the ABM treaty within the
foreseeable future.
"It's a question at two levels," he
said. "The first is the extent to which
the Soviets would like to have a dam-
age limitation capability, and they
clearly would. The second level is
the extent to which they have any
reasonable hope within any relevant
time frame of doing so, and I think
the answer is clearly not."
'Ibmorrow: Can it be done?
STRATEGIC
DEFENSE
INEI'IATTVE
O Part 1 YESTERDAY: From Mad
to Sanity - An inquiry into why the
SDI program was proposed, in-
cluding an in-depth look at the nu-
clear strategy it proposes to
change.
^ Part 2 TODAY: Red Dawn -
What the Soviets are doing in their
own SDI program, a look at the
buildup in Soviet offensive weap-
ons, and their violations of the
ABM Treaty.
[^ Part 3 TOMORROW: Can it be
Done? - Is any missile shield pos-
sible? A look at the debate over
whether a missile shield must be
perfect - or only good enough.
D Part 4 THURSDAY: High Tech -
A review of some of the develop-
ment SDI officials say make them
Optimistic the job can be done.
^ Part 5 FRIDAY: Arms Control
and the Allies - Will the SDI pro-
gram "gut" the ABM Treaty, and
should we care If it does?
3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
ARTICLE APPEE. ED
ON PAGE 1M.._-
The accidental launch:
atomic age nightmare
By Tom Diaz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
President Reagan, on a visit to the
North American Air Defense Com-
mand Center deep in the Colorado
Rockies, asked what would happen if
- by accident or at the order of a
missile commander gone berserk -
the Soviets launched just one inter-
continental ballistic missile aimed
at the United States.
What could we do about it?
Nothing, he was told. Absolutely
nothing.
If for some bizarre reason a 10-
story-tall SS-18 missile thundered
out of its silo carrying 10 deadly nu-
clear eggs aimed at 10 different
points in the United States, the pres-
ident and all of his men could do
nothing but wait for the 30 minutes
it would take for nuclear hell to
unfold.
That episode convinced Ronald
Reagan that a president ought to
have a choice.
But is there a choice? Can a shield
be built to stop not only one missile
fired by mistake, but the thousands
that would be hurled in anger in a
nuclear war?
The answers are "yes;' "no:' and
"maybe," depending on what one
thinks a ballistic missile defense
must do to be effective and
worthwhile.
"Whether strategic defense is fea-
sible ... depends on the purpose of
det'ense Richard L. Garwin, an IBM
scientist and professor at Columbia
University who strongly opposes;
President Reagan's Strategic D.'
fense Initiative, wrote last sutu lr
in a paper presented at a conference
in Stockholm.
And like most questions involving
the SDI program, the question of its
purpose is as much one of politics
and strategy as science and technol-
ogy,
The technical problem a missile
defense faces is straightforward but
complex.
A ballistic missile is basically a
rocket engine, a tank full of fuel and
a nose cone or "shroud:' In the
shroud is a platform called a "bus:'
On the bus are up to 10 nuclear war-
heads, nestled in bullet-shaped pro-
tective shields called "re-entry vehi-
.,- a?u VVI1VIi-auvn a1US -
decoy warheads and other devices to
confuse the defense..
When a missile is fired, it rises for
three to five minutes through the at-
mosphere on a brilliant, hot flame.
When the missile breaks out of the
Earth's atmosphere, the bus goes
through a series of intricately
planned twists and turns for about S
minutes, aiming and releasing the
individual re-entry vehicles and
penetration aids.
The resulting "threat cloud" of
warheads and decoys streaks si-
lently through the cold void of space
for about 20 minutes. ICBM re-entry
vehicles follow simple "ballistic"
courses, like the paths of bullets, to
their targets.
But in a real attack, the Soviets
would fire as many as 1,400 missiles
carrying thousands of warheads and
tens of thousands of decoys.
A missile defense system would
have to first see the rockets as they
left their silos. Satellites equipped
with various kinds of sensors, such
as radar and infrared, would pick up
the missiles and their flaming tails.
The Soviets might precede an at-
tack by lobbing a few nuclear bombs
into space, trying to blind the sen-
sors and disrupt communications by
a wave of radio-busting energy
called "electromagnetic pulse:' or
EMP.
In any case, a decision would have
to be made, and made quickly. Is this
an attack? The information on which
this decision would be made would
be flashed through a complex "bat-
tle management" network of com-
puters and human decision points.
That network would have to re-
main working throughout the entire
attack.
If it were an attack, the system
would then identify targets, assign
them to specific defensive weapons
and transmit orders to begin firing.
All of what has been described in
this "real-attack" scenario must take
place well within the first three to
five minutes, so that as many rockets
as possible could be blasted out of
the sky while they were still in the
"boost phase:' fat with multiple war-
heads and before their decoys are
deployed.
At this stage, lasers might flash at
the speed of light through space,
bouncing off of fighting mirrors to
strike rockets like silent lightning,
causing their skins to weaken and
fuel cells to explode. Or small rock-
ets with "smart" warheads could be
fired in swarms from satellites in
space.
The system would face a different
challenge for those missiles that
made it through the boost phase un-
scathed and dispersed warheads
and decoys from their buses.
Then the problem would be "dis-
crimination:' picking. hundreds of
real warheads out from thousands of
clever fakes, designed to confuse the
defense. Particle-beam weapons,
rail guns hurtling "smart rocks" at
blinding speed, lasers and other
weapons would blast away at the real
targets.
The battle management system
would have to keep score, making
sure that precious seconds weren t
wasted on fake or dead targets
and that no live target slipped
through the cracks.
Finally, ground-based defenses
would take over in the last-minute of
the warheads' lives. As the threat
cloud entered the atmosphere, the
lighter decoys would be stripped
away and burned up by the atmos-
phere. The final problem would be to
destroy any remaining warheads,
with extremely fast non-nuclear
missiles, high enough in the atmos-
phere to assure that even if they are
set off by "salvage fuzing" they
would do no harm.
Can all this be done?
The answer depends on whether
one believes that the defense must
be able to stop every warhead fired
at it to be worthwile.
In the March 1983 speech with
which he kicked off his. SDI initia-
tive, Mr. Reagan said. "I call upon
the scientific community ... to give
us the means of rendering these nu-
clear weapons impotent and obso-
lete:'
Critics say by using the phrase
"impotent and obsolete:' Mr. Reagan
gave the impression that the SDI
program is aimed at a shield that
will stop every one of thousands of
Soviet nuclear warheads that would
be hurled at America in a nuclear
war.
"What the president is selling the
American public is the idea that if
we will just spend enough money ...
somehow or another nuclear weap-
ons and maybe even the Russians
Ontinued
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587ROO0100460001-2
2
will just go away;' according to John
E. Pike, associate director for space
policy of the Federation of Amer-
ican Scientists, which opposes SDI.
"[This is) the notion that somehow
or other the Star Wars program is
going to put some kind of magic As-
trodome over the country;" he said,
"so that if the Russians were silly
enough to attack us, then everybody
could go out in the backyard, and
stretch out on the lawn chairs, pour
some lemonade, pop a couple of
beers, and watch this laser light
show for 10 or 15 minutes and then
go in and watch it on the evening
news in the calm confidence that not
a single warhead landed:"
That, Mr. Pike said, is technologi-
cally impossible. Even a 99 percent
effective defense would allow a
dozen or more warheads to land on
America. A dozen warheads could
wipe out a dozen cities, and destroy
America as a funtioning society.
"It's clearly not going to protect
the population;" Mr. Pike said in an
interview.
That leaves a so-called "leaky" de-
fense, which even critics concede
can be done.
"Of course, SDI becomes a lot eas-
ier to accomplish as one departs
from what was the president's
dream;" Mr. Garwin, the Columbia
University professor opposed to
SDI, wrote recently. "But it is a dif-
ferent SDI from the one which was
projected and justified ... as being
able to fulfill the president's dream"
He and other critics say a "leaky"
defense would cause the Soviets to
speed up the arms race, making re-
lations between the powers more un-
stable and war more likely.
"An obvious Soviet response to
SDI would be to proliferate their of-
fensive systems and to take various
measures to be able to overwhelm
any level of U.S. and allied defense,"
John B. Rhinelander, former legal
adviser to the SALT I delegation, told
a House foreign affairs subcommit-
tee last year.
And if the SDI program is not
about a perfect, people-saving de-
fense, opponents argue, then it is
just another version of "mutually as-
sured destruction" [MAD], because
a "leaky" shield makes sense only
for missile silos and other military
facilities, the instruments of re-
venge.
Finally, critics argue, even if a
perfect defense were possible, it
wouldn't protect against other ways
of delivering nuclear bombs, such as
bringing them into the country in
suitcases.
"The suitcase bomb problem sug-
gests that you can go on piling addi-
tional layers of shingles on the roof;'
Mr. Pike said, "but you're just not
going to be able to put a door on the
house:'
Most administration officials and
scientists agree that a 100 percent
perfect defense is not possible, cer-
tainly not in the foreseeable future.
But, they say, the argument over
the possibility of a "perfect" defense
misses the point. A "leaky" defense,
even one that could be sure of stop-
ping only, say, 50 percent or 60
percent of missiles aimed at U.S.
missile silos, would be an effective
shield worth building.
Why?
Because if such a defense were in
place, Soviet war planners could not
be sure of two things, both of which
are critical to planning a first strike
attack on the United States: How
many Soviet missiles would get
through, and which ones.
And, they add, defenses with
much higher effectiveness - as
great as 99 percent - can be
achieved with new high-tech weap-
ons.
A panel of scientists, the Eastport
Study Group, addressed this point in
a major report for the SDI program
in December.
"This panel does not expect small-
scale ... or early technology deploy-
ments that might occur during the
1990s to provide a 'near-perfect' de-
fense. Rather, initial deployments in-
fluence our strategic position
largely in their ability to intercept
enough incoming warheads to have
the same effect as reducing the size
of the Soviet force;" the report said.
"At the rate at which relevant
technologies - sensors, weapons,
computing, and communication -
are developing, a strategic defense
system of the 2000-2010 decade
could start to provide a sufficiently
effective defense that no Soviet plan-
ner could be reasonably assured of
the 'success' of a ballistic missile at-
tack;' it said..
That's enough, proponents say, to
virtually guarantee that Soviet lead-
ers would not risk an attack, since
they couldn't be sure that the United
States would not have enough mis-
siles left to wipe out the Soviet Union
with a counter-attack. And as tech-
nology develops, tighter defenses
can, be built.
As for the "suitcase bomb" prob-
lem; t aF"T-accorm to former top
CIA aide Herbert M.Meer is "like
arguing against a cure for cancer
because peop a would still die of
heart attacks:'
Once one gets beyond "Astro-
domes" and into less-than-perfect or
"leaky" defenses, the key question is
cost effectiveness.
Can a missile defense be built so
cheaply that the Soviets couldn't -
or wouldn't even think they could -
afford to counter it by building more
offensive missiles, flooding it with
decoys, or destroying its compo-
nents, especially those based in sat-
ellites?
"I can't stress too strongly the fact
that this program is driven by coun-
termeasures," Gerold Yonas, the pro-
gram's chief scientist, told the
American Society of Mechanical En-
gineers last December. "It's a pro-
gram driven by the potential Soviet
response. Not only do we have to pur-
sue the technology of defense, but
we have to fully understand what the
countermeasures will be.
"In order to make all of these re-
sponses not acceptable to the Sovi-
ets, we have to be able to have defen-
sive capabilities that are more
effective, are lower cost, and can be
done easier than these countermeas-
ures;' he said.
Some SDI supporters, like retired
Army Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham,
say such a cost-effective defense can
be deployed now, using "off-the-
shelf" technology.
"We are convinced the technology
exists today;" Gen. Graham said.
"What we like to see is a sort of Ken-
nedyesque speech that says, 'By the
end of this decade we will; instead of
'Well, we'd like to research this. 'The
program today is an absolute delight
for people in white frocks.
"We don't say off the shelf 'hard-
ware;" Gen. Graham said. "We say
off-the-shelf 'technology.' That
means that you do not need scienti-
fic breakthroughs. The problem is
an engineering problem, not a scien-
tific problem."
One scientist who has closely fol-
lowed SDI and become one of its
strongest advocates, Robert Jas-
trow, professor of earth sciences at
Dartmouth College, also believes
that near-term deployment is possi-
ble. He describes this idea he in a
book, "How to Make Nuclear Weap-
ons Obsolete." He says many within
the SDI organization agree with
him.
"But the administration's position
on deployment makes it impossible
for them to say this;" he said in an
interview.
"The technology of the homing in-
terceptor, using radar or infrared is
well developed;" he said. "The prob-
lem is to get the weight and the cost
down, which is not. one of research
but of some development and fur-
ther engineering. I was told we could
Continued
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587ROO0100460001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587ROO0100460001-2
13.
have this defense in place, deployed,
five years from the time we say,`Go,
that is, in the early 1990s?'
Some administration officials
agree that a defense could be de-
ployed in the short term. But, they
say, the technology on which it would
be based is not advanced enough,
and would merely encourage the So-
viets to build up their offense to over-
whelm it.
Gen. Graham disagrees.
"It is my conviction, that the Sovi-
ets are building strategic offensive
weapons as fast as they can do it,
right now. How the hell are they go-,
ing to speed it up?" he said.
But the administration doesn't ap-,
pear likely to propose an immediate,
deployment. Instead, the SDI pro-,
gram will continue to explore reP
atively exotic technologies, such as.
lasers and particle beams, which of-'
fer the prospect of major;
breakthroughs in cost and effective
ness to leapfrog offensive missile,
technologies and countermeasures:
the Soviets might develop.
For their part, SDI officials are;
walking a middle road between en-,
thusiasm about the advances that'
have been made and concern about.
"hyping" the program. Their official'
answer is that the program is still;
one of research, proceeding upon a;
measured path at a measured pace,
until it is able to present specific'
options to a future president, prob-,
ably in the early 1990s.
"This is a very, very systematic;
program that is being done by real,
professionals, built around tradi-,
tional scientific methods;' Lt. Gen.:
James A. Abrahamson, the pro-;
gram's director, said in an interview.
"The bottom line is that the pro-,
gram is indeed coming along well;'-
he said at a recent press briefing. "It;.
is at ... on the technical side, the'
most inventive stage and we are see-;
ing invention and innovation come,
along at just an incredible pace....'
It is that invention that will really,
make this program possible:'
C
NSE
ENHUTIVE
o Park 1 MOt W: From Mad to
An ,inquiry into why the
ram was
look at
in-
nu-
s
proposes
0 P*42 YESysaw: Red Dawn
- What the Soviets are doi in
it own SDI PMgram, a look at
tt1e b in Soviet of nswe
NOW 11111 Wd #** V"W" of
ft ABU VOW
^ Part 3 TODAY: Can it be Done?
_' - Is any missile shield possible? A
look at the debate over whether a
missile shield must be perfect - or
only good enough.
d Part4 TOMOA IOW. High Tech
-Areview of some of the ckvelop-
Ment SDI oftioide say make them
oc thejcib can be done.
d Part 5 fl vt Arm Conoco
and the Affies - Will the SDI pro-
gram `?u" the ABM Treaty, and
should we care it it does?
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587ROO0100460001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
%RED AN PAGE ?~'^"'
WASHINGTON TIMES
13 February 1986 F~LL U L
a `star wars' s stem
Building of y
poses high for scientists
drama ? The defense will hto have
Fourth of five parts SDI officials stress that the enor- anticipated all sorts have a "counter
could r-
mity of the task shouldn't be under- measures" that the of
By Tom Diaz- estimated. But they say they are op- vent against it. It must cost less to
THE WASHINGTON TIMES timistic that the accelerated build the defense than t overcome
such defense than to es.
research effort is yielding concrete build
.It is the high drama of science, results, even though it is only in its with ts are amining a
two learned men locking horns in a second year as a centrally managed SDI whole range scientists are mining a of sensors
continuing debate. program. and other hardware for the system.
Robert Jastrow, the scientist who The program still is far away
founded NASPis Goddard Institute from recommending a specific over- Some, like ground-based rockets
for Space Studies and is now a pro all plan, or "architecture:" That with heat-seeking warheads, are
based on relatively "mature" tech-
mouth of earth sciences at Dart- won't be done until the whole range
mouth College, says a missile de- of possible weapons, sensors, nology. Others, like lasers and neu-
fense can and should be built. "battle-management" computer sys- tral particle beams, are pushing at
Richard L. Garwin, an IBM scien- the edges of technology.
terns and other support systems has One of the most important gains
tist and physics professor at Colum- been explored and the best potential
bia University, says the only kind of candidates for development and so far, SDI officials say, is that the
missile shield that can be built would program's accelerated funding has
eventual deployment are picked out. stimulated rapid advances in tech-
dangerously destabilize the balance "You need to appreciate the scope
of nuclear power. of the problem facing the architec- nologies that would otherwise have
The two have debated for several ture contractors:' a senior SDI of- remained dormant or progressed
years across the pages of newspa- very slowly.
ficial said in a background inter- -We're like a watering can in a
de and ciefic journals. And the view. "We've given these people five garden:' one official said. "You
debs bate has tatiaken on a sharp, some blocks of fine-grained marble and sprinkle a little money here and
say personal, tone as each puts his asked them to sculpture the most in- amazing things happen much more
reputation on the line in a world of tricate structure in the world. than anyone thought possi-
some critical peers. "Right now it can be said that qquiuickly kly th:"
rough shape is emerging from problem that both sides
Meanwhile, the head of President this marble, but the Congress and A major ped bothlo sides
Reagan's Strategic Defensive Initia- the public would like to know the agree has to ro
tive says most critics who say a high- details of the cuticles on the fin- a battle-management system that
technology defensive missile shield gers:' he said. "We aren't there yet. can survive in combat. Critics argue
is impossible aren't qualified to We're still at the macro trade-off that developing the computer pro-
judge the matter level, still trying to understand the gramming necessary to run such a
"First of all, there are a large overall issues." system is impossible, because it will
involve tens of millions of lines of
number of them who don't under- There are, however, some basic er instruction that can't be
stand the program:' Lt. Gen. James points on which there is general c cornput o cand must can't
A. Abrahamson said in a recent in- agreement about the kind of system tested s usu.
a panel in combat
its s first
terview. "They don't know what the SDI program might propose: flawlessly
scientists con
they're talking about. They really ? It will probably consist of sev- But a rto the SDI office
just don't know what we're doing." eral different kinds of weapons and cluded in a report ep that the SDI office
He said there are a "few" sincere sensors. A variety of devices pro- last D management
critics, some of whom have access to tects against an unforeseen type of sources s and . es
classified information about the pro- offense. or "countermeasure" hardware and battle- a software the hard-
gram, "who understand the pro- against the defense. Also, some within the capabilities of theehahd-
gram;' weapons may work best in a space
"Those are the ones who I have environment, others from the could be developed within the next
some very sincere regrets about:" ground. several years."
Gen. Abrahamson said. "I have to ? The overall "architecture" prob- Mr. Jastrow believes the comput-
ably will include several layers of ing challenge can be met, and he
wonder where the scientist stops independent weapons, sensors, sup- points to such massive computer
and the political theorist or the mili- port devices and battle management programming jobs as that on which
tary strategist in the scientist takes systems. Layered defense protects the nationwide phone system is
over." against catastrophic failure of one based as evidence that the task isn't
"Obviously, none of us can ever be layer, and several layers increase the unprecedented.
totally objective about anything:" he chances of shooting down incoming SDI officials are confident the
problem can be solved and they
said. "But I think that is happening weapons. developments in several
and interfering with their scientific ? The "boost phase" defense will point 'other to key
areas they say make is more
judgment:" be the most critical layer of the de-
fense. This is the first phase of a likely than even a year ago that a
nuclear missile's flight, when all of high-technology defense can be de-
its warheads and decoys are still on ployed.
board. CCntu':ed
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
Among them are:
? Missile lethality testing. Re-
searchers have found that ballistic
missiles are less sturdy than was
thought in the past. Based on tests of
laser beams and projectiles fired
against mock-ups of missiles and
components under simulated flight
stresses, SDI officials have learned
that they had set standards too. high
in the past when they estimated such
things as the amount of power a laser
would have to deliver to a missile in
order to destroy it.
? Ground-based lasers. The emer-
gence of a dark horse called the
"free-electron laser," advances in
devices called "rubber mirrors" and
the successful test of a idea called
"adaptive optics" have encouraged
many in the SDI program to believe
that a cost-efficient system can be
built that could knock Soviet mis-
siles out of the sky.in their most vul-
nerable stage, the "boost phase:"
Most authorities agree that hit-
ting missiles in the boost phase is the
key to an effective missile defense.
They are easy to spot because of the
rocket flame. Killing one missile in
the boost phase would wipe out not
only as many as 10 warheads, but
hundreds of decoys that would have
to be picked out in later phases.
But the boost phase occurs far
away from U.S. territory. Because of
the Earth's curve, defensive weapons
intended to attack during the boost
phase must be stationed over Soviet
territory - and thus vulnerable to
attack themselves - or must be able
to strike with great speed over long
distances.
Laser weapons, which operate at
the speed of light and can retain
their power over great distances, are
prime candidates for this job.
In their present state of develop-
ment, however, the equipment to
generate laser beams is too big to put
into space economically.
The beams could be generated on
the ground, shot through the atmos-
phere, bounced off mirrors and re-
flected onto the missiles - all at the
speed of light. But the atmosphere is
full of disturbances that would dis-
tort laser beams as they are fired up
to space.
SDI scientists are enthusiastic
about a technique for correcting this
distortion, known as "adaptive op-
tics." Basically, a smaller beam is
fired down through the atmosphere.
It picks up the distortions. The out-
going laser beam is then distorted
before it leaves the ground to corre-
spond to the existing distortions.
Thus, the beam in effect straight-
ens itself out, adapting to the distor-
tions, as it rises.
The key to making the
adjustments are so-called "rubber
mirrors," which aren't actually
made of rubber but of many individ-
ual surfaces which can be indepen-
dently and rapidly contorted many
times a second to distort the beam.
Officials say great progress has
been made in techniques to make
strong rubber mirrors cheaply. If
the mirrors can be made cheaply
and strongly enough, hundreds of
them could be put into space, far
more than would be actually needed,
thus ensuring that enough would
survive to thwart a Soviet attack.
They also are encouraged by un-
expected progress in power levels
that have been made in one kind of
laser, the free-electron laser, which
wasn't highly thought of as a leading
contender before the program
started.
One of the problems in a ground-
based laser is that some kinds of la-
ser beams are absorbed in the at-
mosphere - a different problem
from the distortion that adaptive op-
tics corrects. The free-electron la-
ser, however, can be "tuned" to laser
frequencies that pass readily
through the atmosphere. SDI offi-
cials also think ii will be able to gen-
erate high enough power levels to be
useful as a weapon.
? Interactive discrimination. One
of the biggest problems a defense
would face in the mid-course phase
is sorting out thousands of decoys
from warheads.
Most attention in the past has
been given to passive ways of doing
this job of "discrimination" For ex-
ample, infrared sensors could scan
the "threat cloud" of incoming war-
heads and decoys, picking the rel-
atively warm re-entry vehicles out
from the cold background of space.
Some existing sensors can pick out
the heat of a human body from a
thousand miles in space.
However, decoys can be given
many of the same characteristics as
warheads, such as shape, they way
they reflect radar and even to some
degree the amount of heat they radi-
ate. Passive sensors also can be
"blinded" by setting off nuclear ex-
plosions in space.
Now SDI scientists are exploring
"interactive discrimination;" under
which the threat cloud would be ac-
tively probed. Decoys and real war-
heads would respond to these probes
in different ways, telling the defend-
ers which ones to shoot down and
which ones to ignore.
For example, decoys will be
lighter than real warheads. If they
were the same weight, only a few
could be carried in each bus.
One interactive measure taking
2,
advantage of this that scientists are
looking into is hitting objects in the
threat cloud with neutral particle
beams, a kind of "ray gun" device.
Materials give off specific rays and
sub-atomic particles when hit with
such a beam. By measuring these,
sensors could in effect weigh each
object. The light decoys could then
be ignored.
? Power supplies. Defensive
weapons in space would require
great amounts of power in sudden
surges. Power can be generated in
space with nuclear reactors, for ex-
ample. But the problem is how to
store it over long periods, then re-
lease it in one quick surge.
One way to store power is in de-
vices called capacitors. But the size
of conventional capacitors required
to store sufficent levels of power
would be far too big to put into space.
As part of the attack on this prob-
lem, an SDI contractor literally has
created an entirely new material for
use in capacitors, which hAs dras-
tically reduced their potential
weight. Efforts are continuing to
make further size reductions.
Another idea being explored is a
sort of flywheel in space. Something
like a bicycle wheel without spokes,
the wheel could be kept spinning at
high speed in the weightless vacuum
of space, storing up vast amounts of
"kinetic" energy. When power is
needed, the wheel would be quickly
braked. Its kinetic energy would be
converted in the process to a surge
of electrical power.
? Aerospace plane. Underlying
the entire SDI program is the ques-
tion of cost, since any effective pro-
gram must be cheaper than the cost
of stacking on more offense or coun-
termeasures. And a big cost factor is
that of putting objects into space.
The only way to do that now is
lifting them up with rockets, but SDI
officials recognize that unless
present costs can be cut by a factor
of 10, that method just won't be effi-
cient enough. So they have been
studying ways to cut rocket propul-
sion costs and make spacelifts less
"manpower intensive."
But another approach also ap-
pears promising to many.
"A more revolutionary but higher
risk approach ... may be possible by
the development of a fully reusable,
air-breathing launch vehicle capable
of horizontal takeoff and landing:'
Brig. Gen. Robert R. Rankine Jr., the
Air Force's special assistant for SDI,
told the American Society of Me-
chanical Engineers at a seminar last
December. "Such a vehicle is called
the aerospace plane:'
Such a plane - also known as a
"transatmospheric plane" - would
operate at "hypersonic' velocities of
from 4,000 to 8,000 mph, and could
accelerate directly into orbit.
Continued
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
"Such a revolutionary advance
would be similar to that experienced
in the leap from propeller-driven to
jet-powered aircraft," Gen. Rankine
said, and could bring the costs of
getting objects into space low
enough to meet SDI objectives.
Mr. Jastrow agrees.
But Mr. Garwin, and other critics,
dismiss these advances as not sig-
nificant or as showmanship Put on
by the SDI program to persuade
Congress and the American people
to continue to support it.
"I have seen [the transatmos-
pheric plane] proposal in my role as
government adviser for about 20
years,' Mr. Garwin wrote recently.
"It is just that people are more gull-
ible now than they were when it was
presented before:'
.As for adaptive optics, there is
really nothing new' he wrote.
"There is only a demonstration paid
for and publicized by the SDI... .
The problem here is providing for
the survival of that mirror."
Mr. Garwin added that the free-
electron laser "is a very interesting
technology, but it has' many prob-
lems in being scaled up to the powers
required for killing boosters."
The Union of Concerned Scien-
tists, a group strongly opposed to
SDI with which Mr. Garwin works
closely, has consistently argued that
any conceivable missile defense
could be defeated by the Soviets be-
cause the satellites it depends on
could be knocked out of the sky with
anti-satellite weapons and such
things as "space mines:'
UCS also has argued that the So-
viets could defeat a missile defense
system by building so-called "fast-
burn boosters," rockets that burn so
quickly that the crucial boost phase
would be completed before the de-
fense could react by sensing and
identifying targets.
However, Mr. Jastrow says that
fast-burn boosters have so many dis-
advantages - such as difficulties
they cause in targeting warheads
and the cost of developing a whole
new missile force - that they cannot
be considered a serious counter-
measure.
SDI officials say they are consid.
ering all of the objections the UCS
has raised, along with many others
that the program's opponents
haven't throught of.
One proposed weapon
consists of electrons
passing through
alternating positive
and negative
"wiggler" magnets to
produce a laser beam
capable of shooting down
an enemy missile.
DIl UC
n"T
'T! E
0 Punt 1 MORAY: From Mad to
Sanity - An inquiry into why the
SDI program was proposed, in-
cluding an in-depth look at the nu-
clear strategy it proposes to
qNnge.
3.
0 Part 2 TUESDAY: Red Dam--_
What the Soviets are doing in their
own SDI program, a look at the
buildup in Soviet offensive weap-
A om and Mw BM violatbrts of the
Treaty.
0 Part 3 211TE : Can it be
Dons? - Is any missile shtetd pos.
sbfs? A look at the debate over
whether a missile shield must be
perfect- or only good enough.
^ Part 4 TODAY: High Tech - A
review of some of the development
SDI officials say make them op-
timistic the job can be done.
Q Part 5 TOMORROW: Arms
Control and the Allies - Will the
SDI program ?gur the ABM Treaty,
and should we care if it does?
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
ARTICLE ~.. cD
ON PAGE '-!?--
WASHINGTON TIMES
14 February 1986
If nothing else, `star wars'
dot Soviets to resume talks
By Tom Diaz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
When Soviet arms control negoti-
ators stalked out of the strategic
arms reduction talks at Geneva in
December 1983, they gave their U.S.
counterparts a tough message.
Don't call us; we'll call you.
The Soviets were miffed because
they had lost an intensive propa-
ganda and diplomatic campaign to
stop the deployment in Western Eu-
rope of new U.S. Pershing II mis-
siles, intended to counter Soviet
SS-20 missiles.
But within a year the Soviets had
feelers out, and in January 1985
agreement was reached to resume
the talks.
What changed? Many say the So-
viets were driven, or pulled, back to
the arms control table because they
realized President Reagan's Strate-
gic Defense Initiative was becoming
a reality. They wanted to stop it.
The two sides agreed to add a new
category - "preventing an arms
race in space" - to the agenda at the
arms control talks. In effect, SDI, or
"star wars," became an official sub-
ject of the arms control debate.
But opinion over SDI is no more
widely split than on its effect on
arms control.
"Will the SDI contribute to arms
control and progress in arms con-
trol? " Keith B. Payne, executive vice
president of the National Institute
for Public Policy, asked a House For-
eign Affairs subcommitee last year.
"It already has. We have seen that
the Soviet Union came back from its
... 1983 walkout of arms control ne-
gotiations for the expressed purpose
of halting, stopping or otherwise de-
grading the U.S. SDI."
But critics of SDI say the pro-
gram eventually will gut the 1972
SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Tl-eaty,
which they describe as the corner-
stone of arms control agreements
with the Soviet Union.
"In my view, the basic choice is
between arms control and a quest for
defensive systems such as SDI,"
John B. Rhinelander, former legal
adviser to the SAIX I delegation,
said at the same hearing. "You can-
not have both:'
"Development and deployment of
large-scale ballistic missile
defenses would not require modifi-
cation of the ABM treaty, but rather
its renunciation:' Thomas K. Long-
streth, an associate director of the
Arms Control Association, said at
the same hearing.
Basically, the ABM treaty forbids
either side to "develop, test or deploy
ABM systems or their components.'
But it doesn't forbid "research:"
That being so, the question is
when does research become "test-
ing" or "developing?" And when do
individual pieces of systems become
"components?"
The legal problem is complicated
further by an "agreed statement" at-
tached to the treaty which provides
that "in the event ABM systems
based on other physical principles
... are created in the future, specific
limitations on such systems would
be subject to discussion" between
the two countries.
Are lasers, for example, "based on
other physical principles?"
Internal debate within the admin-
istration as to the meaning of that
clause erupted into a public fracas
last fall.
Some within the administration
have pushed for a "broad" interpre-
tation of the statement, under which
such "exotic" technologies as lasers
and particle beams wouldn't be cov-
ered at all by the treaty.
But others, primarily arms con-
trollers, argued for a "restrictive"
interpretation that treats exotic
weapons just like existing technol-
ogies, for purposes of the limits on
development and testing.
The dispute spilled out into the
open after former National Security
Adviser Robert McFarlane an-
nounced in a television interview
that the administration had decided
to follow the "broad" interpretation.
Within a week, Secretary of State
George Shultz announced a pres-
idential compromise that in effect
reversed Mr. McFarlane.
Even though the United States be-
lieves the broader interpretation is
correct, Mr. Shultz said, it will follow
the restrictive interpretation.
According to administration offi-
cials, that decision stands without
serious challenge for the time being.
But opponents and supporters
alike agree that if the United States
decides to deploy a missile defense
system, the ABM treaty sooner or
later will have to be renegotiated.
Some opponents of SDI say the
United States already has pushed
dangerously close to the limits of the;
treaty and wants to force the Soviets,
to walk out of the treaty and take the!
blame for it.
"The thrust of the administra-
tion's argument ... is that the United
States should hold the Soviets to a!
strict standard of treaty compliance
while allowing freedom of action for
all its own ABM programs using un-
tenable legal justifications," Mr.
Longstreth testified. "And it is a
policy designed to erode and ulti-
mately terminate the ABM treaty."
However, many supporters of SDI
treat the 14-year old treaty with less
reverence.
"We should look at the ABM
treaty as a decrepit document, even
if the SDI weren't being considered,"
said retired Army Lt. Gen. Daniel 0.
Graham. "It tried to legislate ... the
mutual-assured-destruction theory,
which nobody likes. It was an at-
tempt to freeze a whole bevy of tech-
nologies at 1970 levels.... That's just
something you can't do with a piece
of paper. It's been overtaken by tech-
nology."
Gen. Graham also rejects the idea
that the ABM treaty has been the
"cornerstone" of arms control.
"I always ask,'What has it done?'"
he said. "You have to speculate that
the Soviets could have built up faster
in offense than they did, and I doubt
that "
Mr. Payne agreed in his testimony
before Congress.
"The United States established
two conditions for judging the
critical success of the ABM treaty,"
he said. "Would that treaty be fol-
lowed within five years by more
comprehensive agreements? And
would those comprehensive
agreements cap and reduce on a
long-term basis the retaliatory
threat?
"Let me suggest that neither of
those conditions have been met:"
The administration takes a longer
view of the problem, insisting that it
will stay within the limits of the
treaty in the research program, and
that it will sit down to talk with allies
and the Soviet Union alike before
Cc ,...~;hd
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
any commitment is made to go be-
yond the treaty's boundaries.
The question of the Western allies
is another bone of contention be-
tween supporters and opponents of
SDI.
Opponents generally have argued
from the beginning of the program
that it would run into strong opposi-
tion from the Europeans for several
reasons:
? It would gut arms control, which
Europeans see as an important re-
straint on the Soviet Union.
? It would "decouple" the U.S. nu-
clear deterrent from defense of Eu-
rope, on the theory that, if the United
States were protected by a missile
shield, it would no longer be inter-
ested in defending Europe with its
own nuclear weapons.
? It would "make the world safe
for conventional war," on the theory
that once the Soviet Union and the
United States were both safe behind
their respective nuclear shields, the
Soviet Union would then be able to
use its massive conventional forces
- most of which face Western Eu-
rope.
In fact, many of these pressures
have slowed the process of "signing
on" allies in support of the program.
And recognition of the sensitivity
the Western allies have for arms con-
trol questions was a major factor in
the decision to opt for a restrictive
interpretation of the ABM treaty.
But, administration officials say,
the other arguments are being re-
futed as analysts more carefully
think through the kind of world a
strategic defense system would
bring.
"As more papers are being written
about it, both in Europe and the
United States, by respected tacti-
cians and strategists - as opposed
to scientists getting out of their field
- what's happening is that people
are understanding the contributions
that defense can make;' said Lt. Gen.
James A. Abrahamson, head of the:
SDI program.
"One of the early images was we
are going to build ... anAstrodome'
defense over the United States that
leaves Europe out in the cold," he
said. "Well, that isn't at all what
we're trying to do. What we are in-
deed trying to do is to research and
see if we can make, not only techni-
cally feasible but affordable, a de-
fense that will work against ballistic
missiles of all ranges, for the de-
fense of our allies and ourselves:'
Moreover, said Fred C. Ikle,
deputy secretary of defense, the Eu-
ropean allies are realizing that the
Soviets will advance their own SDI
program in any case.
"Looking at the long distance, the
future into the next century, the So-
viet Union is going to go ahead with
ballistic missile defenses anyhow,
whether we have SDI or not," he said.
"It may be more slowly, it may be
more clandestinely, but they are
moving in that direction:'
Mr. Ikle said another fact is per-
suading European planners that
even a modest, partially effective
missile defense deployed in Europe
could be worthwhile.
"Very small nuclear missile
attacks will look very unpromising
to the aggressor if there is a de-
fense;" he said. "Now, a Soviet mili-
tary planner could see that with a
limited number, maybe 50 Soviet
SS-20s, he could essentially destroy
the entire NATO military structure
... and do relatively little damage to
the cities.
"But, if you have active defense,
even of limited perfection, it might
require the entire SS-20 force to ac-
complish that task:' Mr. Ikle said.
"So you increase the threshold, for
nuclear attack by a partially effec-
tive ballistic missile defense:'
In spite of predicitions by domes-
tic critics that the Europeans would
run away front SD!, the trend is in
the opposite direction.
Last November, for example,
Great Britain and the United States
signed a formal agreement setting
out a framework within Which Brit-
ish countries will be able to partici-
pate in SDI contracts.
Several West German delegations
also have visited the United States to
look over the program, and many of-
ficials believe the Germans will sign
a similar agreement this year.
Moreover, officials say, serious
talks are going on with other allies,
including Belgium, Israel, Italy and
Japan. And although France has of-
ficially ruled out its formal partici-
pation in the program, French com-
panies are actively seeking
contracts.
Gen. Abrahamson said the pro-
cess is one of slow, steady diplomacy.
"This isn't something you just run
into gayly and say,'Let's all go do this
thing; this will be fun: " Gen. Ab-
rahamson said. "The process has
been a little bit slow for me ... but
it's been a matter of communica-
tion."
In addition to visits to the United
States by allied delegations to exam-
ine the program, U.S. teams have vis-
ited allied countries.
"It's a matter of understanding
not only what we're doing but where
they can contribute," Gen. Abraham-
son said.
"I believe that within this next
year we will have much broader in-
volvement:' he said. "Some of the
nations will do this with over-arching
agreements, as we have established
with the British. Some will be much
less former"
But some critics, such as John E.
Pike, associate director of space
policy for the Federation of Amer-
ican scientists--wiucn opposes the
SDI program-- claim that the ad-
ministration's program of signing on
allies is largely a propaganda ploy.
Mr. Pike said in an interview that
he believes the allies will agree to
cooperate because they don't want to
be left behind in the surge of techno-
logical growth the SDI program will
bring.
But, he said, they will be disap-
pointed by both the size of the con-
tracts they get and the terms under
which the United States allows them
to participate.
"The political effect of these
failed expectations cannot help but
further reduce European support i
for the SDI and the administration's
current posture at the Geneva arms
control negotiations;' Mr. Pike told a
House Banking subcommittee in
December.
Most observers, including oppo-
nents, agree that the SDI program
will stay on track during the rest of
Mr. Reagan's presidency. Sources
close to the president said repeat-
edly that it is a program about which
he feels strongly and is personally
committed.
And the Defense Department has
ranked the program at the top of its
formal priorities in highly classified
"Defense Guidance" planning doc-
uments.
Two serious questions lie ahead,
however, that are beyond the admin-
istration's direct control: What ef-
fect will the new Gramm-Rudman
balanced-budget law have? What
will happen when a new president is
in the White House?
"Gramm-Rudman means one
thing, and that will be a cut of some
predictable ... or reasonably pre-
dictable kind of number," Gen. Ab-
rahamson said. "What I can't predict
is what Congress will do to us sep-
arately.... After all, the cuts that we
have suffered this year without
Gramm-Rudman are of much larger
magnitude"
Gen. Abrahamson said the pro-
gram "still has problems" in Con-
gress, but it has "very strong sup-
porters" who have helped keep it on
track.
Opinion is split on what might
happen if a president less commit-
ted to the program than Mr. Reagan
takes office.
Many of the program's opponents
predict that once Mr. Reagan leaves
office, the program will go the way
of the Safeguard and Sentinel ABM
systems proposed in the 1960s.
But supporters like George A.
Keyworth, Mr. Reagan's science ad-
viser until last December, believe
that the president has so changed
the direction and momentum of stra-
tegic and popular thinking that the
program will never be reversed.
"The Strategic Defense Initiative
marks the beginning of the end for
the weapon of mass destruction.'
said former top CIAsaide_Herbert E.
Meyer
2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100460001-2