KREMLIN WATCHERS HAVE ONE PROBLEM: TOO LITTLE TO WATCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000100440005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 11, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
WASHINGTON - With Soviet Pres-
ident Konstantin U. Chernenko in
frail health and Moscow apparently
tracing for a renewed leadership
contest, attention again has focused
en the small band of American gov-
ernmental and academic experts
who make a career of trying to pene-
trate the Kremlin's cult of secrecy.
Known as, Kremlinologists, these
specialists handicap the obscure So-
viet power race much the way a
horse player tries to pick winners at
the track.
It is a dicey job at best, and even its:
practitioners acknowledge that
there are wide gaps in their knowl-
edge. One academic expert on the
Soviet Union dismisses the whole
process: "Anyone who pretends to
know the full views of the Soviet
elite is practicing voodoo science."
Nevertheless, it is an important
job. Even leaders who hold power for
a short time can have a profound
influence on Soviet policy and Wash-
ington-Moscow relations. So it is
clear why U.S. policymakers consid-
er it vital to know as early as possible
just who is up and who is down in
the Kremlin.
"'I think the Sovietologists are
asked by the press and policymakers
to perform miracles of prediction
that would not be demanded of them
if they were analyzing American
politics," said Thane Gustafson, di-
rector of the Soviet project of
Georgetown University's Center for
Strategic and International Studies.
"Pundits hedge their bets on
changes in IU S.) congressional com-
mittee chairmanships, but Sovietolo-
gists are criticized when they guess
wrong."
The Kremlinologist's task is almost
unbelievably difficult. There are no
more closely held secrets in the Sovi-
et Union than those involving the
inner politics at the top levels. of the
Communist Party.
"Ilasicaily the technique is three
yards and a cloud of dust," Gustafson
said. "It involves painstaking exami-
nation of the minute differences in
the way the Soviet press covers the
activities of the leadership. Watch to
see who is. in the pictures in the
newspal?r r, Keep track of television
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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
GT D:1mw 11 February 1985
Kremlin watchers
. , problem:
[LL[ 1,' rN ~G _ A E R1E
X_ too little_to wr--w-otch
coverage."
II)' Norman Kempster Pure Kremlinology is a specialized
A &rec. r,,-,,s segment of the larger study of the
Soviet Union. Most academic experts
on university campuses and at think
tanks insist they are not, in the strict
sense of the word, Kremlinologists
because they do not have the time or
the patience to do the tedious work
that is required. Most Kremlinolo-
gets work for the US. government,
primarily the CIA and the State De-
partment's intelligence and Re-
search Bureau.
The main sources of information
are Soviet newspapers and the tran-
scripts of radio and television broad-
casts, along with the speeches of par-
ty leaders. Very little information of
interest to the Kremlinologist is clas-
sified.
Harry Gelman a former CIA ana-
vst who is now on the staff of the
Center for the Study of Soviet Inter-
national Behavior at the Rand-
Uni-versity of i ornia, LoS nge es,
said much Soviet press coverage is
pure propaganda.
But, be said, "when you get a
speech by one leader asserting that
certain circles have a mistaken view,
that's" very informative, and it isn't
the kind of thing they say for people
outside. It, is indicative that a real
argument is going on. Sometimes
people disagree on the significance
of these things, but this is the son of
thing we look for."
"The Soviet society is divided into
neat compartments," said Dimitri K
Simes, a Soviet defector who is on the
staff of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. "The compart-
ment that is particularly closed to
outsiders is the party apparatus.
"In the 40 years since World War II,
there have been lots of defectors and
emigres - some quite close to power
- but they were journalists, academ-
ics and' intelligence officers - but
not a single party apparatchik."
Malcolm Toon, former U.S. ambas-
sador to the Soviet Union who served
three diplomatic tours in Moscow,
recalled the confusion that accompa-
nied the ouster of Nikita S. Khru-
shchev as communist Party leader in
1964.
"The next day there was supposed
to be a big celebration in Red
Square." he said. "The embassy had
political officers stationed around
the city to watch for the portraits
going up. About 6 p.m., our man in
Red Square_ saw a big portrait of
Khrushchev going up. About an hour
later be saw it coming down. Even
sitting in Moscow, reading the press
and watching television, you could
not be sure.
"The White House was annoyed
because we did not predict the
change, but I said: 'If Khrushchev
himself did not know, bow could an
.
American official know?"'
The big question today among
Kremlinologists is who will succeed
Chernenko, 73, should the Commu-
nist Party leader die or be forced to
step down because of ill health. The
two leading candidates are thought
to be Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 53, and
Grigory V. Romanov, 60, both mem-
bers of the Politburo.
Toon does not think it matters very
much.
"You can be sure that There will
not be much of a change no matter
who takes over," he said. "I think it's
a mistake to get too excited about
Gorbachev taking over. Whether it's
Gorbachev or a man a little bit older
like Romanov, you are talking about ,
people who have been identified
with the collective leadership for six
years. Unless you have a radical
change in the composition of the
Politburo and a radical change in the
Central Committee, I don't think you
will see a major change in policy."
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, former coun-
selor at the State Department and
before that chief of the department's
Office of Research on the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, said:
"Western analysts seem to attach
themselves to an individual Soviet
leader as the person to watch in the
future. This now seems to be Gorba-
cbov." .
But Sonnenfeldt, a guest scholar at
the Brookings Institution in Wash-
ington, said the opinions of Western
analysts often reinforce each other,
sometimes masking signs that point
in the other way.
"It's a very occult business," be
said.
American Kremlinologists try to
divide candidates for Soviet leader-
ship along policy lines. Current
thinking classifies Gorbachev as a
reformer and Romanov as a conser-
vative.
But Simes, the Soviet defector, said
he thinks such classification often
misses the point. Personality often
has more impact than policy, he said,
and distribution of other party jobs
may be more important yet.
"Just like, on Capitol Hill, it's most.
-1y personality and patronage," he i
sii]d.
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