SATELLITE IMAGES ON TV: THE CAMERA CAN LIE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000100190001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 14, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
WASHINGTON POST
Q~3 "~-Mi:-t1-. 14 December 1986
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EARED
Satellite Images on TV:
The Camera Can Lie
By Dino A. Brugioni
W HEN ARTHUR C. Lundahl, the
director of the National Photo-
graphic Interpretation Center,
showed the aerial photos of Russian medi-
um-range missiles in Cuba to President
John F. Kennedy, the president turned in
his chair and looked Lundahl straight in the
eye and asked, "Are you sure of this?"
Lundahl replied, "Mr. President, I am as
sure of this as a photo interpreter can be
sure of anything. I think you will agree that
we have not misled you on any of the other
subjects that we have reported to you."
Lundahl spoke with the full knowledge
that a professional photo interpreter has of
the difficulties involved in analyzing aerial
and satellite reconaissance photographs.
Such photographs, correctly interpreted,
have proven invaluable to intelligence gath-
ering.
But now the technology has become
available commercially, and the television
networks-lacking Lundahl's experience or
appreciation-have begun using satellite
photos without, not to put too fine a point
on it, knowing what they are doing. On. no
fewer than four recent occasions, the net-
works have drawn wrong conclusions from
satellite photos or been snookered by fake
photographs or film.
For instance, after the Chernobyl disas-
ter, all three major networks acquired
LANDSAT imagery as a source of informa-
tion. Both CBS and NBC called the George-
town Center for Strategic and International
Studies for expert analysis. They, in turn,
were referred to me by other experts fa-
miliar with my career at the CIA, where I
worked between 1948 and 1982 as a photo-
interpretation specialist.
The first call I received was from CBS. I
was asked if I had seen the imagery of Cher-
nobyl. I had, I said.. I was told that Dan
Rather was going on the air at 4 p.m. stat-
ing that there was evidence of two reactor
meltdowns based on the LANDSAT imag-
ery. I replied, "Only an idiot would make
such a statement."
Nevertheless, Dan Rather did go on the
air that afternoon and repeated on his eve-
ning news broadcast that two reactors had
melted down. Shortly after, NBC called,
saying that Tom Brokaw was also going on
the air with LANDSAT photos and would
state that two reactors had melted down.
Again, I repeated that my analysis of the
imagery clearly showed only one "hot spot"
in the reactor area. The other, some dis-
tance away, was not of the same intensity
and could be from another heat source or
possibly a reflection of heat. Before his eve-
ning news broadcast was over, Brokaw said
that reports were being received that may-
be only one reactor had melted down.
The NBC call was followed by one from
ABC. When I asked who had analyzed the
imagery, ABC replied that it had received
the news from the Pentagon. NBC had said
it got the information from "a public rela-
tions type." The CBS caller couldn't tell me
where she had gotten the information.
Shortly after the showing of the LAND-
SAT photos, while watching CBS and ABC,
I saw a movie film, supposedly of Cherno-
byl, depicting smoke rising from the affect-
ed reactor. Looking at the film, I could tell
immediately that it wasn't Chernobyl. First,
'there was a mountain range in the back-
ground. Chernobyl lies along a river plain.
Second,the film showed a rather large city.
Chernobyl is a small town. Third, the hous-
ing was distinctly European, not Russian.
I immediately called Ted Koppel's office,
where I had worked on "20/20" several
years ago and on "Nightline" programs in-
volving reconnaissance, informing his office
that the film was a hoax. I explained that
any competent analyst comparing the movie
.film with either the LANDSAT or SPOT
imagery would have discovered the hoax.
Later, after being informed by Italian
sources that the film was of Trieste, CBS
and ABC acknowledged the error with some
chagrin on the air.
Current technology allows photographs
.,to be made that exploit different bands of
the light spectrum. This multisensor imag-
_gry has proven to be an invaluable resource
,in many disciplines besides intelligence
gathering. The media have recently discov-
ered the American-owned LANDSAT and
the French-owned SPOT satellite imagery
and unfortunately have been showing them
with blatant misanalysis. Television news
needs to be as sure of its reporting to the
;American public when using aerial photos
or multisensor imagery as Lundahl was to
President Kennedy.
Unfortunately, network television has not
exercised that kind of care in its reporting.
So far, no grave damage has been done as a
result of the erroneous reports that have
appeared, but we cannot be sure that con-
tinued careless reporting will be without
consequence.
Imagery's value as an intelligence tool
has been proven time and again since being
used in World War II. The credibility of im-
agery-derived information was established
through intensive application to many crises
and events during and after World War II.
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.i'hrough determined efforts, careful devel-
opment and the disciplined application of
basic principles of photo exploitation, im-
agery has developed a degree of credibility
unmatched by any other intelligence
source.
Yet the value of imagery as an intelli-
gence tool is determined by the quality of
the analysis. It is incredible that the media
in their haste to be first on the air have suc-
cumbed to reporting important events using
aerial photography or multisensor imagery
based on incomplete and inadequate anal-
ysis and source evaluations, including re-
liance on amateurs and untrained imagery
analysts.
Imagery analysis is performed by an ex-
perienced technician using photo transpar-
encies viewed on sophisticated microstereo-
scopes that have magnification powers sim-
ilar to those of a microscope. He is sup-
ported by Photogrammetrists who can
measure and enhance objects of concern.
The analyst is also provided with a variety
of information from other sources such as
maps, charts, photographs and reports to
aid his analysis.
T o my knowledge, none of the major
TV networks employs a trained and
experienced imagery analyst. The
most sophisticated piece of equipment I've
seen employed by news reporters and news
executives has been a hand-held magnifying
glass. This lack of expertise with imagery
on the part of the news reporter and news
executive allows for the acceptance of un-
verified information, and too often they be-
come "suckers" for photo fakery.
A few weeks after the Chernobyl foul-up,
several networks showed SPOT photo-
graphs of the Soviet nuclear proving
grounds at Semipalatinsk and claimed that
the Soviets were preparing to resume nu-
clear testing. They showed photos of what
was described as a "drill site." Looking at
the photo, any competent imagery analyst
would have pointed out that the arrange-
ment and the cable scars terminating at the
site would have proved that it was not a drill
site but rather an instrumentation site,
common to all nuclear proving grounds. I
called a CBS executive's office and pointed
out the error but there was no retraction.
Recently, a network called and asked, as if
it were brand new, if I had seen the SPOT
photos of the Soviet Tyura Tam space shut-
tle's long runway and facilities. I replied that
r had not seen the photos but I doubted that
there was anything new about them. Aviation
Week and Space Technology had published
LANDSAT photos of the long runway and
facilities in the magazine in 1983.
I also pointed out that the facilities had
been photographed by a U.S. space shuttle
mission and that there was a good description
of the Soviet space shuttle program along
with an artist sketch of the Tyura Tam fa-
cility in "Soviet Military Power," a Depart-
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ment of Defense publication. I added that the
Library of Congress could provide reams of
information on the Soviet space program.
Yet this network was still trying to find-
or manufacture-a news story to justify us-
ing the newly-available photos. This perhaps
is the greatest danger-the indiscriminate
use of quality photography to create a sub-
stantive story where none exists. This kind of
perversion of the technology is anathema to
the imagery-intelligence analyst in reporting
information derived from aerial photography
or multisensor imagery.
Another network, reporting on the aerial
photos taken of the air strikes on Libya stat-
ed no Libyan military aircraft were hit. Yet
analysis of the photos of Benina Airfield
showed. clearly that five Mig-23 Floggers
were destroyed along with 3 MI-8 combat
helicopters.
Apparently in error or on the theory that
any old picture will do, a network recently
reporting on a Soviet experimental laser air-
craft having burned in the Soviet Union
showed, of all things, imagery taken during
the U.S. attack on Libyan transports.
The networks have also become in-
creasingly sloppy in their research and
in their presentation of graphic infor-
mation. For example, one network, reporting
on the Soviet SS-20 mobile surface-to-sur-
face missile showed film clips of SA-5 sur-
face-to-air missiles being trundled through
the streets of Moscow. Another network
used a film clip from Soviet sources of a Scud
short-range missile being fired. The truth,
and it should be reported, is that the Soviets
have never shown their SS-20 publicly. I
might add, however, there is an artist's
sketch of the SS-20 also in "Soviet Military
Power." When I called this error to the net-
work's attention, I was told in so many words
that a missile is a missile. In essence, the
truth is compromised or sacrificed to achieve
a heighten drama.
Newspapers and magazines publish letters
to the editor or print retractions to stories in
which possible errors have been made. To
date, the TV networks have not retracted
any of their mistakes on the misanalysis of
aerial photography or multisensor imagery.
In fact, they have acted with disdain when
the mistakes are called to their attention.
The basic criteria for accurate photograph-
ic analysis have not changed. The imagery
interpreter must apply all of his acumen and
often a variety of sources to verify what he
sees on the imagery before reporting his re-
sults. Above all, he must be sure of the facts.
It is all too evident that the media in report-
ing recent events using aerial photography
and multisensor imagery have done an ex-
tremely poor job. Aerial photogrpahy and
multisensor imagery are too important
sources of information and credibility for the
analysis to be left to amateurs.
The networks, before reporting on infor-
mation derived from imagery, should also
ask, "Are you sure?' If not, a great disservice
is being done to the whole field of imagery
interpretation, and more importantly, to the
American people.
cy"
Dino A. Brugioni is a former senior official
and a reconnaissance and imagery
interpretation expert for the CIA. He was
also the CIA'' resident expert on photo
fakery.
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