CIA OFFICIAL SAYS 'NOTHING' MEANS SUCCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000100010021-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: April 10, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/28: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100010021-9
Y
BOULDER DAILY CAMERA
10 April 1985
CIA official says `nothing'
means' success's
By TODD MALMSBURY
Camera Staff Writer
When the Central Intelligence
Agency fails to provide timely,
accurate information to the
nation's leaders, the error often
makes headlines.
But when the agency is suc-
cessful, few people are aware,
CIA official Helene Boatner told
more than 100 people at the
University of Colorado's World
Affairs Conference Tuesday.
"Our successes rarely get at-
tention," lamented Boatner, di-
rector of the agency's office of
management. "Our greatest
successes occur sometimes
when nothing happens."
?Boatner noted some of the
agency's more spectacular fail-
ures during the past three dec-
ades and listed successes for
which praise has been elusive.
She defended the CIA's record
in a field where some failures
are as certain as death and
taxes."
"There's always room for im-
provement, but overall I think
we're doing a good job for the
country," said the 22-year CIA
veteran.
Some of the CIA's best-known
errors include the failure to
predict the overthrow of the
Shah of Iran in 1978 and the
Egyptian attack across the Suez
Canal in 1973. Other major
events missed by the CIA in-
clude the 1968 Tet offensive in
the Vietnam War and the de-
ployment of Soviet missiles that
led to the Cuban missile crisis in
1962. question
"There's isn't any 4
we've made major errors
Boatner said.
Successes include predictions
of the launching of the first
Soviet satellite in 1957, worsen-
ing relations between the Soviet
Union and China in the 1960s,
the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan in 1979, Soviet reluctance to
invade Poland in 1981 and the
decline of Soviet oil production
in the 1980s.
The result of other intelligence
provided by the CIA is harder to
judge, Boatner said.
During the bloody 1971 India-
Pakistan War which led to the
creation of Bangladesh, the CIA
reported that India was prepar-
ing to totally "destroy the Paki-
stani Army." When U.S. leaders
confronted India, the claim was
denied and no all-out attack was
launched.
"Who knows what effect" the
CIA information had, Boatner
asked.
"Often we're dealing with
fragmentary information and
we're dealing with parties that
are trying to conceal what they
are doing," she said.
Boatner said the role of intelli-
gence "is to contribute to the
formation of foreign policy that
has a chance of succeeding.
"Notice that I didn't say 'good
or bad'. That is a decision of the
president.
"Intelligence is very seldom
able to convince a skeptic, but it
can convince .an ,open-minded,
person."
She cited CIA reports of Soviet
arms shipments to Central.
America as an example of.
intelligence that an "open-mind-
ed person" would accept.
Congressional probes in the
1970s, while critical of much of
what the ..CIA had done, also
found that the agency was "bad-
ly underfunded and under-
staffed." The CIA now has a
larger budget, including more
money for travel, conferences
and recruiting on campuses.
"We don't make policy, we
carry it out," Boatner empha-
sized. Decisions on what the CIA
does "are made at the highest
levels of U.S. government."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/28: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100010021-9