NO NEWS IS GOOD NEWS FOR CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000100010019-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: April 10, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/28: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100010019-2
LONCMIONT TIMES-CALL (CO)
10 April 1985
No news is good news for CIA
By BARRY BORTNICK
Times-Call Staff Writer
BOULDER - No one is per-
fect, including the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. But while CIA
failures always grab headlines,
the agency's successes never
make news, and for Helen Boatn-
er, that is just fine.
Boatner, director of the office
of management planning and
services for the CIA, spoke on
CIA intelligence before an audi-
ence at the Conference on World
Affairs Tuesday morning.
"Failure has many fathers, but
success is an orphan," Boatner
said. Failures get publicity, but
success occurs when a bad event
is prevented, she said.
While intelligence failures
such as the fall of the Shah of
Iran and the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War are well documented in the
public domain, successes, such
as the agency's surveillance of
Soviet weapons systems or pre-
dicting the Chinese would devel-
op nuclear weapons, are not for
public consumption, Boatner
said.
In general, Boatner praised the
agency for bringing good infor-
mation despite working under
public and political pressure. She
said intelligence gatherers often
are put at odds with policy mak-
ers because their information
can limit the choices a policy
maker has, and does not provide
certainty, which policy makers
often demand.
To be effective, the CIA must
have accurate, timely and objec-
tive information, Boatner said.
On a seminar discussing CIA
failures, Newton "Scotty" Miler,
a member of the CIA from 1947-
1975, said the CIA can expect fail-
ures when its leaders become
embroiled in policy making and
have a biased interest in their
policy rather than serve as intel-
ligence gatherers.
Further, Miler said all intelli-
gence agencies suffer failures
because of enemy disinforma-
tion. or prejudice by a policy
maker. Miler gave an example
from World War II when Josef
Stalin was told the Germans
planned to invade Russia. But
Stalin refused to believe the
news.
Both Miler and Boatner said
the agency suffered in the 1970s
because of reduced funding and a
reliance on technical intelligence
rather than direct human in-
volvement in information gather-
ing.
Commenting on one of the
CIA's more noted failures, the
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962,
Boatner said the agency had not
investigated the possibility of So-
viet missiles in Cuba. because all
intelligence indicated the Soviets
were not prepared for a mayor
confrontation with the United
States. "We reached the wrong
judgment for solid reasons."
Boatner said. "We looked at the
condition of the Soviet military
and said they were not prepared
for a confrontation, and we were
right.
"There is always room for im-
provement, but overall we are
doing a good job for the coun-
try," Boatner said.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/28: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100010019-2