REPORT WARNS THAT MOROCCO KING COULD FALL
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91-00561R000100070011-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 9, 2012
Sequence Number:
11
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 26, 1979
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP91-00561R000100070011-2.pdf | 100.63 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100070011-2 -STAT-1
AP :ARED
o / PAGE . 4 '7 -
Cousluld Fall
THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
26 October 1979
pr-%rt Warns Th. al
By Walter Taylor
Washington Star Staff Writer
The already shaky throne of King Hassan II of
Morocco is being further undercut by an "unwin-
nable" war in the Sahara and could be toppled
within a year, a secret U.S. intelligence report
warns.
At the very least, the report says, the war and a
combination of other domestic and foreign policy
problems is undermining Hassan's- authority and
encouraging more open political opposition
"The overall threat to- the monarchy is serious;
and the political falloutfibm an unwinnable Saha-
ran war is the most likely catalyst for a direct chal-
lenge to the king," the report says. The document,' called an Interagency Intelli-i?.
gence Memorandum and prepared at the State
Department; is an analysis of the political situa-
tion in Morocco, compiled from- reports from the
CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies.
It was made available by a source-critical of the
Carter administration's decision this week to sell
new American weapons to Hassan to fight.
Algerian-backed Polisario- insurgents in the
Sahara.
The announced decision to sell the weapons,
which include reconnaissance airplanes and at-
tack helicopters, already has sparked debate in
Congress because the United States, while main-
taining- close ties with Morocco, does not recog-
nize its Saharan claims..--...
Critics of the sale. have evoked comparisons.
.with past efforts of"the"United States to prop up.
friendly monarchs and dictators like the Shah of
Iran and Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza
in the face of popular opposition. , - ....ue. " . -.-
Supporters of U.S. aid to Hassan arg that
Morocco is combating-.an external threat;. not. a:
revolution- from within the:country, and that the
United States must stand behind one of its closest
friends in the Arab world.
The president's national security advisers re.,
portedly were split."over~the.,.arms sale and
whether. it would encourage,. or discourage,. Has-.
71
san to seek a negotiated settlement:`
Similarly,' while--reflecting. agreement on-the
seriousness of the threat to his regime, the intelli-
gence document portrays a U.S. intelligence com-1
munity divided on the question of Hassan's ability
to overcome it. - . '
.-.-,The intelligence and research. bureau. of the
State Department, according to the report, be-
lieves-"that Hassan - a shrewd politician who
apparently continues to enjoy the backing of. the
country's security forces - will reassert effective
leadership and continue in-power for the next
several years.'.'.
The report says the Defense Intelligence Agency-
agrees with that assessment, "although only to the
point of believing that Hassan will continue in.
power 'at least over the next year' rather than'the
next several years.
The CIA had a considerably gloomier"analysis of
the king's. prospects for retaining his throne.
The summary says that the agency believes
"that the ineffectual leadership displayed by the
king since mid-1978 is likely to continue. If it does
..'. Hassan will lose control of events - probably
within a year-and eventually his throne."
The National Security Agency concurs'with this
view except for the phrase "probably within a
year,". the report says..
Besides the Saharan war, the analysis cites-
"fundamental ; socioeconomic problems" in_
Morocco, Hassan's "heavy reliance" on security -
forces and "widespread corruption among govern-
ment officials" as factors weakening. the king's.
hold on power:,
? Yet, the report concludes, resolution of the'
Saharan war "would greatly improve- (his)
chances of remaining in power-over the next.
several years.":
-If the king were deposed. Morocco could be`ex-!
pected to"accelerate" its drift from."its uncom;.
[Qtably close identification with-the West," the
report says. But such a drift, it says, would occur
even if Hassan remains in power.. N,.:,,,,
"King Hassan is already tempted to weaken his .
close ties with the United States," it says
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100070011-2