'FEAR DETECTOR' TESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100030034-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: October 21, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100030034-1
ARTICLE APIPEA ff WP.SHING 01N1 POST
ON PAGE J ~'i Oc sober 19SS
`Fear Detector' Tests
JOHN DE LOREAN'S first be detector test was
administered on Sept. 17 by his own defense team
experts, and the former auto executive now charged in
a cocaine case passed with flying colors. 'I'hecond
test was given this week by the FBI's top polygraph
expert; ,and. Mr. De Lorean failed. Surely this says
something about the reliability . of be detector .tests
and indicates why most courts will not admit-.them:as
evidence in-criminal trials. As one expert told a House
subcommittee this week, "The instrument itself can-
not detect deception. It's more ?of a fear detector than-
die detector."
Why then does the administration persist in its
decision .to expose to the possibility of these tests
some 2.5 million civilian and military federal employ-
ees and 1.5 million employees of government contrac-
tors with security clearances? Under an executive
order issued last March and clarified by the Justice
Department's Richard Willard in congressional testi-
mony Wednesday, all these individuals could be com-
pelled to take the tests in an investigation of crime or
administrative misconduct-meaning leaks.
Mr. Willard suggests the tests also can be admin-
istered as a condition of employment or of access to
classified material and, on occasion thereafter. to
randomly selected individuals as a condition of
maintaining access. All this for about 4 million
people whose conduct has given no indication that
they are anything but loyal, trustworthy citizens.
No less offensive is the other half of the secrecy
directive issued last spring. it would require
prepublication clearance of material prepared by
any current or former government -employee with
access to "sensitive compartmented information."
More than 113,000 federal employees in various
agencies would have to sign lifetime prepublication
agreements and to submit for-elearange.any material
"prepared for disclosure to others" that might contain
classified information or information regarding intelli-
gence activities, sources or methods. The regulation
covers written material ranging from letters to the edi-
tor, to pamphlets. to fiction. Oral statements based on
written outlines must be cleared. So must material
prepared by "a ghost writer, spouse or friend" with
the assistance of the government employee.
The sweep of these directives and their potential
for censorship and official abuse are staggering. Con-
sider-one special case--political appointees forced to
submit material for prepublication review to their suc-
cessors. There is simply no evidence that trusted peo-
ple in the government, including those who had re
sponsibility for the nation's security, have been abus-
ing that trust. to an extent that warrants this whole-
sale censorship apparatus. The security directive itself
poses a far greater threat to the country's liberties,
free institutions and central values.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100030034-1