SOVIET NAVAL PERSONNEL: QUALITIES AND CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T01298R000400080001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Soviet Naval Personnel:
Qualities and Capabilities
NAVY, DIA
Review Completed
Top Secret
SOV 85-10207CX
ecem er
ropy 3 4 7
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Soviet Naval Personnel:
Qualities and Capabilities
This paper was prepared by
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Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Strategic Forces Division, SOVA,
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Top Secret
SOV 85-10207CX
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Too Secret
Summary
Ir~lormation available
as 4f October 1985
was used in thia report.
Soviet Naval Personnel:
Qualities and Capabilities
The Soviets face many difficulties in operating a modern, high-technology
navy with a largely conscript force. They have attempted to minimize the
effects of conscript shortcomings through a system of highly centralized
decisionmaking, narrowly focused training, and reliance on setpiece battle
plans. Their approach has yielded mixed results.
The principal strengths of the naval personnel system are:
? Professional officer corps. Officers constitute less than one-fifth of the
Navy's personnel but provide most of the technical expertise needed to
run the fleet. They are an elite group, predominately drawn from the
urban, upper strata of Soviet society. They are mostly volunteers who
have been competitively selected for their academic talents, psychological
traits, and demonstrated loyalty to the state. On the whole, they appear
to be good engineers with a sound education in math, science, and the
theoretical aspects of their naval specialties. They also appear to be
motivated, hard workers with extensive "hands-on" experience in equip-
ment maintenance and operations.
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? Long-serving career personnel. Most officers and some warrant officers
serve in the Navy for at least 25 years. These men form a corps of
experienced personnel who know well the Navy's equipment, procedures,
and fleet operating areas. Their experience partially offsets the problems
resulting from the regular turnover of short-term conscripts.
? Tight control of personnel. Despite some glaring failures of discipline,
the party generally has been effective in maintaining its grip on the
Navy, checking dissident activity and securing the obedience of sailors-
a task made difficult by problems associated with a multiethnic force and
harsh service conditions. Sailors' activities are strictly regimented and
closely monitored. The system is highly dependent on the threat of
punishment, however, and provides little incentive for self-motivation.
? Selective unit manning. The Navy has been fairly successful in concen-
trating its best personnel in the most important jobs. Career inducements
are used to attract the better officers to the more critical Navy
components-personnel in the submarine force, for instance, are a cut
above the rest of the Navy. Ethnic reliability and competency problems
are controlled somewhat through a policy of largely staffing combat units
and key leadership and technical positions with Slavic personnel while
placing non-Slavs mostly into low-skill or less essential support tasks.
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The following deficiencies, we believe, will impair the Navy's wartime
performance:
? Poor quality of enlisted men. Limited career opportunities for petty
officers and warrant officers have prevented the Navy from attracting
either the number or quality of men needed to form a reliable cadre of
career enlisted personnel. Three out of four Soviet sailors are short-term
conscripts, who are usually young, unmotivated, and capable of perform-
ing only elementary, narrowly specialized tasks.
? Overburdened officer corps. Officers thus serve both as unit commanders
and as technical specialists who conduct much of the "hands-on"
equipment maintenance and operation. Officers are usually overworked,
and the almost total reliance on them to operate ships means that even a
few casualties among them could cripple a ship.
? Lack of cross-training. Both officers and enlisted personnel tend to be
narrow specialists. This inhibits their understanding of the interrelation-
ship and capabilities of various weapon systems that must operate
together to be effective in combat. Should combat casualties or other
circumstances make select personnel unavailable for duty, most Soviet
sailors would find it difficult or impossible to fill in.
? Low sustainability. Alack of emphasis on training in at-sea equipment
repair, safety, and damage control, together with the reliance on
overworked officers to operate ships, is likely to cause Soviet naval units
to have less endurance than their Western counterparts. If forced to
conduct prolonged sea deployments, they will be more likely to suffer
casualties from maintenance problems and mistakes made by fatigued
officers or less qualified relief personnel. In addition, the poor training of
naval reservists will hamper casualty replacements in a protracted war.
? Rigid operating patterns. The Soviets have exhibited a marked tendency
toward stereotyped training exercises, tight control of ships by higher
authorities, and an insistence on commanders conducting operations "by
the book" with no room for individual flair or variations. Such practices
discourage the development of initiative by tactical commanders and,
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during wartime, can lead to inappropriate responses, lost opportunities,
and a severe vulnerability to. communications interruption.
? Coverups. The Soviet naval personnel system encourages coverups of
deficiencies at all levels. Performance appraisals often emphasize quanti-
tative or time-oriented accomplishments at the expense of quality work.
We believe the Navy's personnel system, despite its weaknesses, is
adequate to support the limited naval operations required by Soviet war
plans. The Soviets have taken personnel limitations into account in
developing equipment, tactics, and operating procedures. Their war plans
do not require most of their naval units to conduct operations as complex
and demanding as those expected of the US and other Western navies.
Most of their fleet is intended to conduct defensive operations lasting only
a few weeks, in waters relatively close to Soviet shore facilities, and
characterized by setpiece combat situations. Under such conditions, per-
sonnel problems that would be serious in Western navies would be less
troublesome. If a war with the West became a prolonged conflict, however,
involving repeated combat situations over large areas and placing a
premium on tactical imagination and flexibility, we believe the personnel
shortcomings would make it difficult for the Soviet Navy to adjust.
The Soviet naval personnel system has been resistant to change over the
years. It is likely to face an increasing demand for quality personnel,
however, with the continued introduction of more sophisticated equipment.
In addition, recent fleet-level exercises suggest the Soviets are considering
wartime operations that will place increased demands on personnel-for
instance, to operate conventional takeoff and landing aircraft carriers, to
manage large surface task groups, and to extend sea control and sea denial
areas farther from the USSR. Weaknesses in their personnel system may
become more pronounced under such circumstances.
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The declining proportion of Slavs in the draft-age population will also
pressure the Navy's personnel system. We believe the Soviets will deal with
this problem by tightening restrictions on military service deferments and
possibly by improving preinduction training of Soviet youths.
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Scope Note
Availability of Manpower
Service Obligation
1
Demographic Trends
1
Educational Level
2
Preinduction Training
2
Training and Use of Conscripts
3
Selection
4
Specialty Assignment and Training
4
Unit Training
5
Extended-Service Careers
7
Training
8
Status
9
Career Prospects
9
Value to the Navy
9
Women in the Navy
10
Officer Careers
10
The Appeal of an Officer Career
11
Ways To Be Commissioned
12
Higher Naval Schools
12
Selection
12
Quality of Instruction
13
Graduates
13
Postgraduate Officer Education
15
First Assignment
16
Command Officer Selection
16
Ranks, Positions, and Career Tracks
17
Sea Training
20
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Morale and Discipline 28
Living Conditions 28
Discipline 30
Legal 30
32
33
Coverups 34
Discipline Problems 34
Drug Abuse 36
Theft and Corruption 36
Fighting 36
Desertion, AWOL, and Suicide 36
Implications 39
Low Sustainability 39
Slow Reaction Capability 39
Predictable Operating Patterns 39
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Scope Note Analysis of the fighting capabilities of the Soviet Navy usually emphasizes
the qualities and capabilities of its equipment. A thorough assessment of 25X1
the Navy, however, requires close scrutiny of its personnel system. This
study evaluates how the Soviets select, train, use, and motivate their naval
personnel.
The judgments expressed in this study are necessarily subjective because of
the nature of the problem and evidence on which they are based. The 25X1
limitations and biases of the evidence were considered in making the
assessments contained herein.
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Soviet Naval Personnel:
Qualities and Capabilities
Availability of Manpower
Service Obligation
All Soviet males between 18 and 26 are liable for
service in the armed forces. Most conscripts serve a
two-year term, but seagoing naval personnel serve
three years, which probably explains why many young
Soviets fear conscription by the Navy. Permanent
deferments, for medical problems or familyhardships,
are rarely granted.
Temporary draft deferments, which offer a number of
advantages, are sometimes available to university
students. The students are still liable for military
service after graduation, but for shorter terms than
nongraduates---one and a half or two years instead of
the usual two or three. Also, those who complete
college ROTC programs can be commissioned in the
reserves, so they can serve their commitment in the
preferred officer ranks. Some of these reserv' are
never called to active duty after graduation.
The availability and advantages of educational defer-
ments have been curtailed over the last decade. Soviet
draft laws were revised in 1977 and again in 1980,
resulting in longer service terms for college graduates
and fewer deferment opportunities
deferments for college are now available at on y
three or four academic institutions in the USSR,
suggesting that additional restrictions have been im-
posed since 1980.
demographic dilemma facing the military forces. In
1985, the number of draft-age males is expected to
decline to 2.1 million-a 20-percent drop from its
1978 peak of 2.7 million. The number is not expected
to reach the 1978 level again in this century. More-
over, the proportion of non-Slavic minorities among
18-year-olds-25 percent in 1970-is rising steadily
and is expected to reach nearly 40 percent by 1990.'
Non-Slavs generally are less educated than Slavs,
have more difficulty with the Russian language, and
come from rural cultures that make it more difficult
for them to adapt to atechnology-oriented service like
the Navy. In addition, the military leadership consid-
ers non-Slavic conscripts to be politically less reliable.
Because the Navy's manpower requirement is only
about 6 percent of the USSR's total annual conscrip-
tion, the demographic trend has not yet been felt by
the Navy to the same extent as it has by the other
services. In addition, the Navy may have a high
priority in the selection of conscripts. The Navy's 25X1
officer corps is almost exclusively Slavic and its
fighting units are predominantly so. Non-Slavic mi-
norities are usually relegated to construction and
sentry units where language and technical skills are
not essential. Nonetheless, the Navy is not immune to
the problems of the changing demographics. The
Soviet press has described problems of sailors who
cannot speak Russian serving aboard major surface
lar a antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
a
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ship in the Pacific Fleet had at least 24 nationalities
among its crew. Competition with other segments of
If enforced, the stricter policies are probably unpopu-
lar with the Soviet elite. Bribery of university and
draft board officials has been a common way of
obtaining preferential treatment in the USSR; the
new policies, however, would make it more difficult
for members of the elite to obtain deferments for their
children.
Demographic Trend?
The leadership's willingness to force such unpopular
measures on the upper strata of Soviet society pre-
sumably reflects its increasing concern about the
Soviet society for the declining number of Slavic
males in the manpower pool could induce
changes in the Navy's personnel system.
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Educational Level
The share of the current 18-year-old cohort with at
least a high school diploma is high by Western
standards. High-ranking Soviet officials have claimed
a steady rise in the educational level of recruits, and
the Chief of the Main Political Directorate for the
Army and Navy stated that virtually all now have at
least a high school education. Such statistics are
probably misleading, though; there has been much
criticism in the Soviet press of school officials who
relax graduation standards to increase the number of
awarded diplomas. Educational standards also differ
from those in the West, making direct comparisons
difficult. Soviet schools discourage students from ex-
ercising independent thinking or creativity, emphasiz-
ing instead the memorization of class materials. Prac-
tical exposure to technological subjects, such as
computers or automobile maintenance, is also likely to
be limited, particularly in rural schools
Soviet youths are exposed to a variety of military
training programs prior to service in the armed forces.
We believe the primary value of these programs to the
Navy is that they familiarize youths with military life,
foster an interest in hobbies and activities with mili-
tary applications, and encourage martial attitudes and
patriotism.
The primary organization for preinduction military
training in the USSR is the All-Union Voluntary
Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and
Navy (DOSAAF). Local branches are supposed to
conduct classes on military subjects, promote sports
and hobbies with military applications, and instill
young people with proper Communist attitudes to-
ward service in the armed forces as well as hatred for
enemies of the state. Activities are conducted at
sponsoring factories, farms, schools, and special
DOSAAF training centers.
Participation in DOSAAF is supposed to be volun-
tary, although in many cases young men may be
subjected to official or parental pressure to join in
order to demonstrate a willingness to conform to
socialist norms. Teenagers are sometimes advised by
their local draft board that they will soon be drafted
and things will be easier on them if they volunteer for
a DOSAAF class. Also, participation may be the only
way for young people to engage in certain recreational
activities such as driving, racing motorcycles, shoot-
ing, or amateur radio.
The quality of preinduction trainin apparently varies
widely. in some cases, it
is quite good. For example, DOSAAF conducts class-
es in technical subjects such as radio operations and
diving, which can run three to six months, full-time-
about the same length as basic specialty training in
the Navy. New draftees who have successfully com-
pleted such programs reportedly are able to skip basic
specialist training and report directly to their opera-
tional unit. The Soviet press has stated that one in
three conscripts already has a military specialty be-
fore Gallup.
Such figures, however, are not supported by the
frequent press
criticisms of the DOSAAF program. Moreover, mili-
tary officers have complained that DOSAAF-trained
specialists are poorly prepared for their service duties.
High-ranking DOSAAF officials have strongly criti-
cized the organization's leadership and quality of
instruction. Only 70 to 80 percent of the teaching
positions are filled, and there is an acute shortage of
teachers of specialized skills like diving. About half of
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the DOSAAF instructors are college educated, but
many are retired enlisted personnel with little formal
civilian or military education. Fleet Admiral G. N.
Yegorov stated in a 1983 Red Star article that 60
percent of DOSAAF instructors are veterans of
World War II-which would make most of them over
60 years old. Teachers have been criticized for con-
ducting classes by simply reading from service regula-
tion manuals. Teacher apathy probably is encouraged
by the lack of compensation and inadequate supervi-
has written extensively on military training topics. His
appointment may indicate increased Navy support for
preinduction training.
sion.
DOSAAF is a voluntary organization, with few paid
workers, and administration is often lax. Regional `
administrative committees frequently have been criti-
cized in the press for failing to direct or even visit
local chapters. Other problems noted
in articles on DOSAAF include a failure to conduct
classes in the Russian language, poor military disci-
pline by students and staff, grade inflation, inade-
quate facilities, lack of up-to-date training equipment,
and "fli n ttitudes" b students toward military
subjects. OSAAF
organizations are little more than amateur sports
leagues. The weight of our evidence indicates that the
quality of preinduction training is generally poor and
instances of higher quality are the exception.
As atechnology-oriented service, the Navy has a
strong incentive for improving the quality of preinduc-
tion training as a means of coping with the demand
for trained technical specialists. If more recruits could
be trained through quality DOSAAF programs, more
would be able to skip portions of their basic training
and report directly to their units upon conscription.
This would have the effect of indirectly lengthening
conscription terms-one way of partially compensat-
ing for the shortage of Slavic sailors.
In 1981, however, Fleet A mira egorov was name
to head DOSAAF, with a mandate for improving
technical training for young people. Yegorov served as
Deputy Commander in Chief for Combat Training
from 1967 to 1972 and was promoted to admiral
during that period. US attaches have described him as
an officer with a reputation for high competence who
About 75 percent of Soviet naval personnel are short-
term conscripts. When drafted, they are usually
young, unskilled, and unmotivated. The majority are
eagerly to being discharge
not happy about being drafted and look forward
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The Soviet Navy's answer to the problem of training
these men is narrow specialization. Whenever possi-
ble, naval equipment is designed to be easy to operate
and maintain. Soviet maintenance practices comple- 25X1
ment this design philosophy by leaving little to the
discretion of unit personnel. Stress on component
replacement, rather than repair, reduces the require-
ments on conscripts' abilities, according to Soviet
writings. Junior officers and warrant officers, rather 25X1
than conscripts, make most decisions about equipment
operation and do all "hands-on" technical work.
The classroom technical instruction program for en-
listed personnel is short, and on-the-job training is
emphasized. By getting draftees to their units soon
after induction, the Navy hopes to get as much useful
labor as possible out of them in the short period of
active duty.
Career naval personnel do not regard the conscript as
a true member of their service team
Conscripts are viewed more as temporary
workers providing short-term labor under the direc-
tion of the regulars. Therefore, naval authorities
believe there is not much point in expending signifi-
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cant time or effort on developing complicated techni- 25X1
cal skills. Instead, conscripts are expected to simply
do the elementary tasks assigned to them and not
make trouble. In effect, the Navy views draftees more
as part of a ship's machinery than its crew, and this
attitude is reflected in conscript training programs
and duty assignments.
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Selection
Local draft boards, or voyenkomats, maintain dos-
siers on all draft-age males that are supposed to be
used to place them in jobs for which they are best
suited. The dossiers contain an extensive profile of
each recruit, including school records, employer refer-
ences, political records, social contacts, relatives living
abroad, ethnic background, and health status. Twice a
year, representatives of the different services, known
as military buyers, review the dossiers to decide on a
service and service branch for each draftee. A Soviet
admiral told Western officials that the Navy has a
high priority in the selection process because its work
generally requires more educated, technically oriented
Specialty Assignment and Training
After afour- to six-week boot camp, recruits will be
assigned their naval specialty-the job they will prob-
ably hold for the rest of their service term. Conscripts
normally are not given a choice, and we believe that
failure to consider their individual talents and prefer-
ences reduces their effectiveness.
Fleet authorities base their decisions on background
records and simple selectivity tests; radio operators,
for example, have been chosen simply on their ability
to tap a pencil quickly or how fast they could write a
word legibly. Information in draft board dossiers on
premilitary training is supposed to affect specialty
assignments, but press articles indicate it is often
ignored.
honors-graduate telegraph operator
became a attery handler, and, in another example, a
ham-radio enthusiast was assigned to a ship's boiler
room.
The manning depots' penchant for putting "square
pegs in round holes" probably results in part from the
large numbers of recruits they process. Some 2.2
million people must be processed in the annual
draft-a large burden by any standard and one that is
particularly taxing for a Soviet bureaucracy that is
not known for its efficiency.
Most Navy recruits are sent to a five-month basic
specialist course after boot camp. Here, they are
supposed to become familiar with the equipment they
will be using in their units and learn basic theory and
skills related to their job. The theoretical instruction
may address topics such as the basic principles of
electricity, radar, engines, or submarine structure.
Depending on his specialty, a new sailor may also be
taught a skill like schematic diagram reading, circuit
tracing, knot tying, soldering, or Morse code. Many
also receiving some familiarization
quite often, training
centers do not have classroom models, mockups, or
equipment for recruits to practice on. Tests are some-
times so simple that everyone passes. A typical exam-
specialty training had consisted solely of
instructors reading from prepared lesson plans on
general naval topics, unsupported b teachin aids
and without tests or exams.
a different picture.
describe competent instructors who make good use of
slides, films, equipment mockups, and models. Class-
room instruction is sometimes supplemented by train-
ing on simulators for specialties like radar and sonar
operators.
The variance~~suggests that the quality of
naval specialty training is uneven. This is probably not
a serious problem, since the Soviets intend for the
most significant training to occur after a sailor has
joined his operational unit. Prior training does appear
to break recruits into the discipline of military life,
however, and most sailors bound for the more impor-
tant combat assignments, such as submarines, proba-
bly go through the better quality training centers.
Some recruits skip specialty training and report di-
rectly to their units after boot camp. Besides those
who have received equivalent training from
DOSAAF, they include about one out of four con-
scripts who are assigned to jobs for which special
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skills training is not necessary, such as sentries,
construction laborers, or warehouse workers. These
jobs are predominantly filled by recruits who are
considered to be politically unreliable, to speak Rus-
sian poorly, or simply to be less intelligent.
Unit Training
The most important part of conscript training is
conducted on the job by operational units. The Soviets
use a structured, Navy-wide system tied to the semi-
annual conscription cycle and geared toward rapid
assimilation of new personnel. A few months before a
group of draftees completes its service obligation, the
Navy brings in new recruits to receive their orienta-
tion from the sailors they are to replace.
As a result of this regular influx of new draftees, a
Soviet ship, at any given time, will have a fair number
of novices among its crew. These men contribute little
to the operation of their ships, and Soviet military
writings have indicated that in some cases they may
even hinder smooth operations. Training and supervi-
sion of the new sailors require a considerable amount
of time from experienced officers and warrant offi-
cers.
A new conscript is assigned to the specialist he is to
replace for an initial trainin eriod of about two
months. a conscript could
not leave t e Navy until his successor passed his
proficiency exam-a powerful incentive for dedicated
teaching. Testing standards, however, are sometimes
relaxed in the interest of expediency.
Enlisted personnel in the Soviet Navy are awarded
one of four specialist grades that are supposed to
signify their proficiency in their particular jobs. To
advance a grade, conscripts are supposed to pass an
examination by a committee of officers, although in
this case, also, lax testing proce-
dures. In the 1 s, t ~e average times to achieve
specialist grades were as follows:
3rd class 7 to 9 months
2nd class . 13 to 15 months
1st class 19 to 21 months
Master 6 to 8 years
In 1974, however, the Navy adopted the slogan "from
3rd to 1st in a year," indicating that the time to
achieve each step had been reduced to only six
Figure 1. Most training 4f conscripts is conduct-
ed on the,lob, in small groups, under the direc-
tion 4/'an ci/fcer or warrant 4fTcer. While e(Iec-
tive, this approach takes a signircant portion oI
the 4(fcer's time awavlrom his {nany other
months. A sailor usually achieves a 3rd class specialist
grade upon completion of the initial specialist training
period, although some do not receive this rade until
after they join their units. it often 25X1
takes about a year before they feel confident in their
specialty.
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Conscript specialists reportedly are assigned narrow
mechanical duties as a consequence of the naval
leadership's belief that they cannot be entrusted with
any significant decisionmakin res onsibilit . A t i-
cal example of this
(five-man crew, which centered
around one officer, as follows:
? Commander (junior lieutenant located enemy air-
craft, selected targets, and calculated their speed
and direction.
? Target plotter (seaman-plotted target from offi-
cer's calculation.
? Operator (seaman moved the radar up and down
on officer's orders.
? Operator (seaman moved the radar left or right
on officer's orders.
? Technician (seaman replaced any defective elec-
tronic modules.
During
times at practice targets.
Many other duties of conscript specialists are similar-
ly limited. Soviet sonar operators are not allowed to
identify contacts on their screens. Instead, they must
report the existence of a reading to an officer or
warrant officer on the bridge; who determines if the
contact is a viable target.
Unit training is required of a ship's crew before it can
be certified as combat ready. Such training allows
sailors to practice their skills and raise their specialty
grades, complete their assimilation into shipboard
routines, and gain needed experience in working with
others in their department.
A structured unit training program begins at the pier,
where the crew is instructed on standing watch and is
familiarized with department operations. The next
phase takes place in port and at sea and involves
systems testing, damage-control procedures, and a
general progression to full combat readiness. Training
then moves to short cruises, during which the crew
fires weapons occasionally and practices responses to
various conditions. Multiship exercises, simple at first
and later more complex, complete the training pro-
cess.
The Soviet unit training program uses simulators,
training ships, small-group demonstrations, and class-
room instruction. Military press articles
~ndicate that the most prevalent method of
instruction involves small-group training in equipment
maintenance and operations under the direction of an
officer or warrant officer. This approach probably is
effective, but press articles also indicate that it takes a
significant portion of the officer's time away from his
other duties. Given the officers' many other responsi-
bilities and their general attitudes toward conscripts,
they probably do not undertake this duty with enthu-
siasm.
Training simulators are especially attractive to the
Soviet Navy. They enable sailors to get hands-on
practice without putting wear and tear on combat
equipment. This reduces training costs and is in
keeping with the Soviet policy of limiting peacetime
use of equipment in order to conserve it for wartime.
Simulators also provide controlled environments that
facilitate competency evaluations based on preestab-
lished performance norms. Soviet military writings
have stressed the advantages gained from recording
training performances on tape for more accurate
evaluation and critiques. A recent Red Star article
praised advances in computers that enable entire
submarine crews to train together on simulators, using
complex scenarios; previously, the various crew com-
ponents had to train separately because of equipment
limitations.
The operational unit training program is driven by
"socialist competitions." At the beginning of every
training period, each sailor makes pledges detailing
the level of expertise he will attempt to achieve in the
coming year. These pledges become the criteria
against which his performance is judged. Competi-
tions are held among watches, departments, ships, and
so on, up to the fleet level. Results are used to
evaluate individuals and identify training deficiencies,
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but primarily the competitions are a management tool
to motivate sailors and stimulate improved perfor-
mance.
Peer pressure is the key to making the socialist
competitions work. The names of leaders as well as
laggards are publicized in an effort to appeal to the
Russian sense of sacrifice to the group. Such competi-
tions are probably effective motivators in the better
combat units, which have higher morale. It is evident
from
(frequent press criticisms,
however, that competitions are often characterized by
"formalism"-to achieve quantitative goals, units
only go through the motions of competition at the
new sailors a single specialty in light of the high
conscript turnover rate. Competing priorities for offi-
cers' time discourages them from teaching additional
skills to unmotivated conscripts who will be leaving
the Navy in a few months anyway. A ship's com-
mander who needs to inflate his percentage of cross-
trained crewmen in order to impress fleet authorities
can more easily meet his goal by relaxing the specia-
lists' examination requirements than by diverting
more of his officers' energies to teaching. For those
few conscripts motivated to do so, learning a new
specialty is probably not very difficult because of the
simplicity of naval conscript duties and because, in
most cases, it would be a specialty closely related to
the conscript's first one.
expense of quality work.
Increasing the number of conscripts with dual special-
ties is often one of the goals of a ship's socialist
competitions. Soviet naval writings pay much lipser-
vice to the benefits of having sailors learn additional
specialties and bestow praise on ships with a high
percentage of cross-trained sailors. Exemplary ships
are commonly cited as having a third of their crew
cross-trained in another specialty.
with rare exceptions,
enlisted sailors are not at all interested in learning
how to perform additional duties. Moreover, Soviet
naval officers are hard pressed to find time to teach
Naval enlisted careers traditionally have been held in 25X1
low esteem in the USSR, and retention of career
servicemen remains a serious problem for the Navy. 25X1
The actual reenlistment figures for the Soviet Navy
are not known, although evidence
indicate they are extremely low. Some Western ana-
lysts estimate that retention is as low as 1 percent.
Career petty officers and warrant officers make up 25X1
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Enlisted Ranks in the Soviet Navy
Senior warrant oJfcer
Warrant oJ~cer
Ship s chieJpetty oJfcer
ChieJpetty oJfcer
Petty officer 1st
Petty oJ~cer 2nd
Senior seaman
Seaman
Promotion through the enlisted ranks can be ex-
tremely rapid. Most conscripts will make at least
senior seaman or petty officer 2nd by the end of their
shipboard service, and a few even reach chieJ'petty
oJ~cer (although most at this rank are extended-
service personnel). Although an integral part of the
Navy, personnel in naval aviation, infantry, construc-
tion, coastal defense, and various shore support
branches use ground forces ranks.
Comparing Soviet Navy enlisted ranks, particularly
at the senior levels, to corresponding US Navy ranks
could be misleading. Soviet petty oJ~cers and war-
rant oJ~cers have considerably less training, responsi-
bility, and status than do most noncommissioned
personnel in the US Navy. Senior US enlisted person-
nel perform duties that, in the Soviet Navy, are more
entirely. Nonetheless, the pay benefits probably
prompt most career enlistees to opt for service as a
warrant officer.
Soviet press articles claim that only the best of sailors
may be chosen to become warrant officers.
however, that virtually anyone willing to sign the
five-year commitment is accepted. Prior to boot camp,
new draftees are offered the opportunity to go directly
to warrant officer school, but almost all reject the
offer. Most conscripts who complete their term of
service and reenlist are promoted directly to warrant
officer.
Training
The primary role of the warrant officer in the Soviet
Navy is to assist the officers by lifting some of the
burden of supervising and training conscripts and by
providing continuity and experience. Warrant officers
usually serve in the same specialty~ften on the
same ship-for as long as they remain in the Navy.
They are used to train new junior officers and con-
scripts and assist in maintaining equipment. They also
have some responsibility for maintaining discipline at
the subunit level, although
press articles indicate that most warrant officers are
poor leaders. The Navy provides little, if any, leader-
ship training to its career enlisted personnel,
olten performed by oJ~cer specialists.
only about 8 percent of the Navy's personnel total. In
Before they are sent to the fleets, warrant officers
usually receive training in special programs lasting
from six months to two years. Those with previous
naval experience (as conscripts or petty officers) some-
an effort to attract more enlistments, the Soviets
decreed in 1971 that petty officer ranks for extended
service personnel would be phased out and replaced
with the new rank of michman (warrant officer). The
new rank was introduced with much press fanfare, a
more distinguished uniform, and better pay and bene-
fits than petty officers received.
The Soviet Navy still has some petty officers among
its extended-service personnel, however. Warrant offi-
cers must initially serve five-year terms, whereas
petty officers need only enlist for two years. Some
conscripts probably were unwilling to commit them-
selves to the longer service terms, prompting the
Navy's decision not to phase out the petty officer rank
times are allowed to skip this training.
admissions standards for warrant officer
training are for appearances only and that, in fact,
because of the Navy's recruitment difficulties almost
anyone is admitted to the schools.
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military press articles suggest that
teaching staffs at warrant officer schools are of poor
quality and that schools lack adequate facilities,
instruction materials, and training equipment.0
much of the instruction was in
basic academic subjects such as algebra, writing, and
Russian grammar. The program was entirely self-
study, with every two cadets sharing one book. In
place of instructors, there was only a sergeant who
watched over the class to guard against discipline
infractions but provided no instruction or assistance.
Even the warrant officer training within the fleet
itself appears substandard. Ship commanders have
been criticized for ignoring warrant officer cadets
assigned to their ships on orientation cruises and for
using cadets on cleanup details, which teach them
little about shipboard equipment and operations. A
rear admiral admitted, in.a Soviet naval journal, that
some instructors at warrant officer schools are Navy
misfits who are not qualified to teach their subjects
and who often have never been to sea. The Soviets
attribute much of the problem to the Navy-wide view
that service at these schools is a dead end in terms of
career prospects. Apparently, this applies even to the
schools associated with the all-important submarine
fleet.
almost no one fails to graduate
from the warrant officer schools. In one example,
those who failed the final exam were encouraged by
school officials to retake it until a passing grade was
achieved. If the cadets still could not pass, transcripts
were altered to ensure they graduated anyway.
Status
The Soviet naval warrant officer also has a problem
with status. the attitude of
most sailors toward warrant officers
warrant officers were referred to as
"low-mentality freeloaders."
officers and conscripts look own upon, if
nose, warrant officers. They are viewed as
individuals who could not make it in the civilian world
and. who were not good enough to earn commissions.
They are widely viewed by conscripts as being corrupt
(press articles on corruption commonly mention war-
rant officers), brutal disciplinarians, and petty bu-
reaucrats who are fond of enforcing trivial regulations
Career Prospects
Career opportunities for extended-service personnel in
the Soviet Navy are dismal. These sailors are strongly
discouraged from transferring to another unit or even
changing ship departments. Although young warrant
officers can become officers if they display talent and
have the academic skills to pass the entrance exams
for higher naval school, such advancement appears
uncommon. Even if a candidate can pass the exams,
unit commanders are reluctant to lose a good warrant
officer and tend to discourage such attempts. Thus,
most warrant officers are locked into their ranks and
billets with little chance of promotion or transfer. Low
compensation has also been a problem. Despite regu-
lar raises, their pay has not kept pace with wages in
comparable civilian jobs.
When low status and limited career prospects are
added to the usual hardships and family strains
associated with Navy life, it is not surprising that few
choose to reenlist.
(many of the
more skiIle warrant o icers are emg ost to civilian
industry.
Value to the Navy
Despite the weaknesses in the warrant officer pro-
gram, the Soviet Navy depends on these personnel to
provide experience, continuity, and skilled assistance.
The Navy reasons that even people with little talent
are bound to acquire useful knowledge and skills if
they remain in the same 'ob for their entire career. [
Because of their experience, warrant officers can
become stabilizing factors in a unit. They are useful
for helping junior officers learn to maintain and
operate shipboard equipment. Perhaps most impor-
tant, warrant officers provide some relief for commis-
sioned officers from the time-consuming tasks of
maintaining equipment and training and supervising
conscripts. Red Star offered an example of a naval
aviation unit, whose personnel averaged age 28, in
which a 33-year-old warrant officer was the primary
source of experience~ven the captain turned to him
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and abusing their authority.
for advice.
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The value of warrant officers is demonstrated by the
Navy's willingness to relax standards whenever their
enforcement might drive career enlisted personnel
from the service. An article in Red Star addressed the
case of a captain 3rd rank who wrote a flawless fitness
report for a warrant officer in exchange for his
agreement to reenlist. No mention was made of the
serviceman's five serious violations of discipline or the
poor condition of his squad.
The Soviet Nary faces a paradoxical situation. War-
rant officers as a group are held in low regard by
sailors and officers alike, but their services are consid-
ered indispensable. We believe the naval personnel
system is squandering a potentially valuable human
resource by permitting such a discouraging environ-
ment to exist for its career enlisted. Many of the
sailors who could potentially fill petty or warrant
officer ranks will be lost to the Navy because there
are no attractive career prospects outside of the
officer ranks.
Women in the Navy
There appears to be only a small number of women in
the Navy; they almost always serve in the enlisted
ranks, holding jobs such as radio or telephone opera-
tor, typist, nurse, supply clerk, and cook. There are no
women in combat roles, and
females are not even given the basic training and
small-arms instruction that all males receive.
Naval careers do not appear to be popular among
married to career Navy men and probably only enlist
because civilian jobs are sometimes hard to come by
at remote garrisons. The Soviets have shown little
interest in inducing more women to enlist in the Navy
beyond the occasional low-key press articles praising
women sailors for their contributions as "combat
helpmates." In conversations with US naval person-
nel, Soviet officers have generally disparaged the
practice of allowing women to serve in the Navy.
In the future, however, the Soviets may be forced to
make changes in these practices. If greater career
opportunities were available to them, the Navy might
attract more educated women from Slavic back-
grounds who might help ease the problems resulting
from demographic changes in the USSR. Even if they
were not employed in combat billets, more women in
more responsible roles could free men now holding
support jobs for service in fighting units.
The backbone of the Soviet Navy is its professional
officer corps. Naval officers are an elite group, pre-
dominantly drawn from the urban, upper strata of
Soviet society. They are mostly volunteers who have
been carefully selected for their academic talents,
psychological traits, family backgrounds, and demon-
strated loyalty to the state. Almost all are career men
who enter the Navy with the intention of serving at
least 25 years. Officers make up about 17 percent of
the Navy's personnel.
There are substantial differences between Soviet and
Western views on the role of naval officers. In con-
trast to Western officers who delegate equipment
maintenance and repair to enlisted technicians, Soviet
officers serve both as commanders and as technical
specialists who conduct much of the hands-on work.
Because of the general inadequacies of Soviet con-
scripts, an officer is expected to be able to perform
virtually all of his enlisted subordinates' duties, in-
cluding routine maintenance.
Leadership in the Soviet officer system is reserved for
a select few who receive special preparation and
training. This is accomplished through the use of a
two-track career system: a command track for ship
captains and various squadron and fleet commanders,
and a specialist track for technicians and staff special-
ists. Commanding officers are chosen from those
junior officers who exhibit both technical know-how
and leadership skills in their first assignment. These
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naval officers because of their higher social class and
special chosen status.
Officer specialists and junior officers make up the
administrative level of the Soviet Navy. They are
valued more for their technical expertise than their
leadership skills, although they conduct low-level su-
pervision of enlisted sailors in addition to assisting
commanders as staff officers and special technical
troubleshooters. Many of these men perform functions
that, in Western navies, would be performed by petty
officers or warrant officers.
Specialist officers generally are slow to take initiative,
unwilling to deviate from established operating pat-
terns, and better at obeying than giving orders. Their
fear of deviating from established procedures is likely
to be greater than any urge to take advantage of an
opportunity.
The Appeal of an Officer Career
A career as a naval officer offers a number of
attractions in the USSR; status is a major one. The
Navy considers itself an elite force, and press articles 25X1
furnish evidence that the Soviet public
men are groomed for command through broad (by
Soviet standards) career assignments and higher
schooling. The rest of the officers are expected to
develop an even greater depth of knowledge of their
specialties and serve the fleet as career specialists and
staff officers.
Soviet naval officers, including those in command
career tracks, are more specialized than their Western
counterparts. While Western navies stress the devel-
opment of general line officers with a broad range of
fleet experience, the Soviets prefer an officer to serve
in one area-often on one ship-where he can develop
detailed knowledge of the capabilities and limitations
of his particular ship class.
The real authority and leadership in the Navy is
concentrated in the officers in the senior command
career track. These men generally are well trained,
experienced, and dedicated to the Soviet system,
which rewards them with high prestige and material
benefits. They have more self-confidence than other
views it as a select group, working in the forefront of
glamorous new technology. An officer career also
offers generous pay and health care, employment
security, an opportunity to travel beyond Soviet bor-
ders, and a good pension.
For the sons of naval officers, encouragement to
follow in their fathers' footsteps can provide an 25X1
incentive to join the Navy, and there is evidence that a
naval tradition continues in some Soviet families. The
importance of nepotism and other connections may be
a persuasive factor in some decisions to pursue an
officer career.
A prospective officer also faces a number of disincen-
tives. Virtually mandatory membership in the CPSU
and closer party supervision might dissuade some 25X1
from pursuing a commission. There are also the usual
problems that often accompany a Soviet sailor's life:
hardship posts in remote areas, family separations-
with resultant marital difficulties-and being forced
to live and work closely with lower-class conscripts.
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Ways To Be Commissioned
The majority of Soviet naval officers earn their
commissions by graduating from one of the higher
naval schools. The Navy sometimes drafts graduates
of other service schools to fill officer billets in naval
aviation or naval infantry units (in which case cadets
are not given a choice of service). A small percent of
active-duty officers are university and technical insti-
tute graduates commissioned through ROTC pro-
grams or officer candidate school (OCS) courses, but
these officers usually only serve their minimum ser-
vice requirement of one and a half or two years.
Qualified warrant officers may take the entrance
exams for higher naval school or be commissioned
through asix-month OCS program for technical
specialists. They, too, probably account for a small
fraction of career naval officers.
Higher Naval Schools
The higher naval schools are the Soviet Navy's equiv-
alent of the US Naval Academy at Annapolis. Each
school has afive-year program that awards an engi-
neering degree-except the political school, which has
a four-year program leading to a bachelor of arts
degree.
Naval aviation and naval infantry officers attend
joint-service schools operated by the Air or Ground
Forces. Officers bound for support billets (medical,
supply, or finance, for instance) also attend joint-
service schools. Cadets at nonnaval schools probably
receive little or no orientation to the naval aspects of
combat operations. One Soviet press article described
a young graduate of an aviation school on his first
shipboard assignment who was afraid of water and
who had not even received basic water-survival train-
ing.
The Soviet Navy apparently believes that the basic
instruction received at joint-service schools is suffi-
cient and that new officers can be broken into the
Navy's way of doing things once they join the fleet.
This probably impedes readiness somewhat by forcing
operational combat units to take time from other
duties to conduct the sort of basic training that would
take place prior to reporting in Western navies.
Table 1
Soviet Higher Naval Schools
M. V. Frunze
Leningrad
General officer
P. S. Nakhimov
Sevastopol'
General officer
Kaliningrad
Kaliningrad
General officer
S. O. Makarov
Vladivostok
General officer
S. M. Kirov
Baku
General officer
Leninskiy Komsomol
Leningrad
Submarine officer
A. K. Popov
Leningrad
Communications/sonar
F. Dzerzhinskiy
Leningrad
Engineering
V. I. Lenin
Leningrad
Engineering
Sevastopol'
Sevastopol'
Engineering
Kiev Political
Kiev
Political officer
Selection. Soviet naval officers appear to be drawn
largely from upper-class Slavic families. One
engineering school included only three or four Central
Asians out of a class of 150, with the majority of
cadets being of Great Russian origin. Eighty percent
were from urban areas, where better educated, upper-
class families tend to concentrate.
The Soviet press ~~indicate that admissions
to the higher naval schools are highly competitive and
that there is no shortage of applicants.
Frunze, the most prestigious school,
receives nine applications for every cadet. accepted.
Prospective cadets are required to furnish admissions
committees with a detailed autobiography that in-
cludes arecommendation from the Communist Party
or Komsomol and to take written and oral exams in
mathematics, physics, and Russian. Applicants must
also pass a psychological test, which is used to assess
such factors as emotional stability, motivation, rea-
soning ability, attention span, and reaction time. The
Chief of Soviet Naval Educational Institutions has
stated that psychological evaluations are of great
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1: t.
Figure 5. An ~cer school graduation ceremo-
ny. These men constitute an elite group, primari-
lydrawn from urban, upper-class Slavic jami[ies.
importance in the selection process and that the school
dropout rate has declined since their introduction. The
Air Force schools that furnish naval aviators also use
such tests.
Family connections can play an important role in a
young man's acceptance by one of the naval schools.
press articles have confirmed that the
entire admissions process can be bypassed for the sons
of high-ranking naval officers and party officials.
Such practices no doubt result in the admittance of
some persons who otherwise could not meet the entry
requirements.
Quality ojlnstruction. (faculty at
the higher naval schools as being generally well versed
in their disciplines. Most instructors are naval offi-
cers, although some civilians are used to teach mathe-
matics and science. An impressive ratio of one in-
structor per 10 cadets appears typical. Faculty
members tend to remain at the higher schools for long
periods, potentially leading some to lose touch with
the requirements of the operational fleet.
The curriculums at the higher naval schools are
slanted toward quantitative and scientific studies and
are much more specialized than the academic training
most US officers receive. Students specialize in one
area, such as navigation, gunnery, or communications.
At the Frunze general officer school, students spend
the first two years concentrating on math, natural
sciences, geography, and elementary navigation. In
the third and fourth years, more emphasis is placed on
naval subjects such as tactics, weapons technology, or
engineering. By the fifth year, students progress to
advanced tactics and navigation and prepare a thesis.
Practical training at sea (or field exercises for shore
specialists) is conducted during the summer between
regular terms. Special training ships are often used,
although cadets are placed on operational ships as
well. Some cadets serve several weeks on a ship of the
class to which they eventually will be assigned. Press
articles indicate that ship captains tend to regard
cadets as a nuisance to be avoided, and, apparently,
cadets on training cruises are sometimes ignored by
the ship's regular crew. Some practical training of
cadets is also conducted in naval yards and factories.
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political education in Marxism-Leninism, foreign lan-
guage study, and physical training. In addition, all 25X1
cadets go through atwo-month naval infantry course
covering such subjects as the use of small arms and 25X1
chemical warfare.
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The curriculums at the other higher naval schools are
similar to, but more specialized, than those at the 25X1
general officer schools.
(for the first
t ree years, a stu ents to e t e same standard
courses, most of which deal with naval propulsion
systems. At the beginning of the fourth year, the
cadets are assigned a specialty such as submarine
propulsion, surface diesel systems, or surface gas
turbine systems. Graduates of the engineering schools
are usually limited to careers as technical specialists.
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Graduates. The higher naval schools graduate narrow
specialists, not generalists. On the whole, they appear 25X1
to be good engineers with a sound background in
math, science, naval engineering, and the theoretical
aspects of their particular specialties.
~hese young officers, although they
unsure of themselves at first, are highly motivated,
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Figure 6
Education Options for Soviet Naval Officers
Evaluated jor command potential
Higher officer
advancement school
Naval Academy
command courses
General Staff
Academy
Higher naval school
postgraduate courses
for specialists
Naval Academy
specialist courses
hard workers who are not "afraid to get their hands
dirty" when it comes to working with shipboard
equipment.
The primary deficiency in new Soviet naval officers is
a lack of adequate leadership and managerial skills.
Soviet press articles indicate that junior
officers often have trouble dealing -with conscripts,
setting priorities, and organizing their time. The
leadership and management knowledge of naval
school cadets appears limited to experience gained on
cadet training cruises. This probably reflects the
Soviet belief that command training is more appropri-
ate later in an officer's career, and then only for those
who have demonstrated leadership ualities and are
destined for command assignments.
There also has been some criticism in the military
press of graduates of higher naval schools who lack
basic naval skills and are unable to put their theoreti-
cal knowledge into practice. One officer on his first
assignment was horrified to discover the shipboard
equipment he was responsible for was completely
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foreign to him, while another could not properly
operate a sextant. 0 faulted the higher
naval schools for not having good-quality training
This may account for some of the practical-
skill deficiencies experienced by junior officers on
their first assignments.
after about their first year, junior officers seem
to evelop confidence in their technical skills.
Postgraduate Officer Education
Once an officer graduates from a higher naval school,
he tends to stay on a ship for several years, so there is
not much opportunity for coursework ashore. Some
postgraduate programs exist for young officers
Correspondence and resi-
ent courses, me u mg precommand and various spe-
cialist courses, are apparently conducted by the high-
er naval or joint-service schools.
A midcareer course is conducted by the prestigious
Leningrad Naval Academy A. A. Grechko, the high-
est educational institution operated exclusively by the
Navy. The Academy takes officers under age 36 with
at least six to 10 years of fleet experience and
prepares them for commanding large ships or for
senior staff appointments. The majority of the stu-
dents are captains 3rd or 2nd rank.
The Grechko Academy has a high reputation in the
Soviet Navy, and attendance there is an important
step in attainin fla rank. The Academy is very
selective; in 1969 that
only 7 to 8 percent of all Soviet naval officers are able
to attend during the course of their careers. There are
four faculties: command, weapons, engineering/con-
struction, and electronics. The faculty includes a large
number of flag officers and receives the most modern
equipment available. In addition to its educational
functions, the school also serves as a think tank for
naval doctrine and technical matters.
The highest level of officer training is provided by the
General Staff Academy in Moscow. Its two-year
program covers tactical, operational, and strategic
employment of large units, fleets, and groups of
forces. Admission is limited to senior command offi-
cers from all services, and naval officers probably
account for only a small fraction of those attending.
Navy graduates go on to fill the highest command and
staff positions in the Navy and Ministry of Defense.
Through higher command postgraduate training, offi-
cers who have spent their careers on one class of ship
presumably are given a broader exposure to naval
operations. Through classes, seminars, war gaming,
and other school activities, they get the opportunity to
work with officers from varied service backgrounds.
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This perspective is probably further enhanced in
higher assignments, as the officers become involved in
Major Ship Departments
fleet-level staff and exercise planning.
First Assignment
A newly commissioned officer usually is assigned to a
billet that corresponds to his school specialty (naviga-
tion, gunnery, or engineering, for instance). Typically,
he will stay in one department on the same ship for
the next three to six years, progressing through
positions equivalent to assistant division officer, divi-
sion officer, assistant department head, and depart-
ment head. During this period, he is expected to
become well versed in the operations of his depart-
ment, with some assistance from more experienced
officers and warrant officers. In the Soviet system,
junior officers take the same specialty rating tests as
enlisted sailors to demonstrate their ability to perform
hands-on technical work.
An officer's initial assignment is ordinarily quite
hectic and provides a demanding introduction to Navy
life. Soviet press articles indicate that naval officers
generally are overworked, and, for the junior men
trying to learn the ropes, the pace must seem especial-
ly grueling. A new officer's principal responsibilities
are:
? To master his own specialty.
? To learn the general operations of his department.
? To replace or repair broken equipment and conduct
regularly scheduled maintenance.
? To train and supervise conscripts and lead unit
political meetings.
? To keep abreast of new technological developments
and pursue self-improvement courses.
? To handle the paperwork.
Like enlisted sailors, officers are encouraged to push
themselves harder through "socialist competitions."
The competitions are more effective motivators for
officers than for enlisted men, because the former
have long-term career prospects to consider.
1. Navigation
2. Gunnery/missiles
3. Mine/torpedo
4. Communications
5. Engineering
6. Aviation
7. Control
Command off cers are usually drawn from the navi-
gation, gunnery, control, and sometimes communica-
tions departments. Captains of surface vessels are
most often gunnery oJ~cers, while submariners are
typically navigators. There are few command oppor-
tunitiesfor en~ineerinQ officers. who tend to be career
specialists.
assessment, a ship's captain will consider factors such
as the junior officer's leadership qualities and success
in training and supervising conscripts; how effectively
he identifies priority tasks, organizes his time, and
performs under pressure; his status among fellow
officers; his standing in the socialist competitions; how
well he follows orders and conforms to established
procedures; and his technical expertise. A spotless
political record is mandatory to be considered for
Another factor that might well have an influence is an
officer's connections-particularly a relative or close
family friend in a high Navy or party position (one
Soviet officer said the surest way to be promoted in
the Soviet Navy is to be related to Admiral Gorsh-
kov). The evaluation of these factors is highly subjec-
tive, and the commanding officer (CO) of a Soviet ship
has wide discretion in choosing who, from among his
officers, will be given the opportunity for a career as a
commander.
Command Officer Selection
While junior officers perform their duties and work on
mastering their given specialties, their potential for
future command is evaluated by their ship command-
ers, adding further to the pressure of first assign-
ments. Soviet writings indicate that, in making this
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Table 2
Soviet Navy Officer Ranks
Seagoing Raeks
Ground Forces
Ranks e
Approximate US
Equivalent n
Admiral of the fleet of Marshal of the
the Soviet Union Soviet Union
Fleet admiral
Admiral of the fleet
Marshal
Admiral
Admiral
Colonel general
Vice admiral
Vice admiral
Lieutenant general
Rear admiral
Rear admiral
Major general
Commodore
Captain 1st rank
Colonel
Captain
Captain 2nd rank
Lieutenant colonel
Commander
Captain 3rd rank
Major
Lieutenant
commander
Captain lieutenant
Captain
Lieutenant
Senior lieutenant
Senior lieutenant
Lieutenant (junior
grade)
e Ground Forces ranks are used by officers serving in naval
aviation, infantry, construction, coastal defense, medical, chemical,
supply, shore engineering, and legal branches. Most seagoing
personnel use traditional naval ranks.
n Soviet officer ranks tend to equate more to their US counterparts
than enlisted ranks, although there is still a disparity. In the Soviet
Navy, rank and billet are separate; rank is based primarily on time
in grade. It is not unusual to find a young officer in command of a
major combatant with several more senior officers serving under
him-a situation that would not occur in the US Navy. By the
same token, some Soviet officers (junior officers and career special-
ists) have duties and responsibilities that would be performed by
petty officers or warrant officers in the United States.
At the end of the. evaluation and selection process, the
junior officers are categorized into two groups-those
who will remain specialists throughout their careers
and those who will be trained as line commanders.
Each career track has its own career-development
program.
Ranks, Positions, and Career Tracks
Rank and position are separate in the Soviet Navy.
Rank is mostly dependent on time in grade. Position is
based on an individual's leadership qualities, technical
background, and general experience and education.
Because the Soviets have a much different view of the
importance of age and experience than that of West-
erners, Soviet naval officers are often given significant
command assignments at an earlier age, then stay in
these positions to develop experience. It is not unusual
to find a young, relatively junior officer in a command
position with older, more senior officers serving under
him in various career-specialist billets.
The trend since the 1960s has been toward increasing-
ly younger commanders at the helms of Soviet ships.
Half of the Kara-class cruisers are now commanded
by captains 3rd rank between 31 and 34, and others
began the post at that rank and were promoted to
captain 2nd in the job. Most Krivak-class frigates are
commanded by captains 3rd rank who took command
as captain lieutenants (ages 27 to 30), and Kresta-
class cruisers are now commanded by captains 3rd;
they were once commanded by captains 1st. The
skipper of the aircraft carrier Kiev assumed command
of the ship when he was only 33.
indecision is increased.
Some young officers may find themselves in charge of
ships or ship departments before they have enough
experience at sea. This could prove dangerous in
combat or emergency situations, and it probably
contributes to accidents and equipment breakdowns
on Soviet ships. Experienced staff specialists can
provide assistance to inexperienced command officers,
but, in situations that call for quick reaction and
decisive action, the opportunity for confusion and
Fleet Admiral N. I. Smirnov has stated that flag
officers have a special responsibility to watch over
newly appointed commanders as they develop experi-
ence. This may partially account for the tendency for
a ship commander's authority to be superseded during
special situations (such as sea rescue operations, for-
eign port calls, and exercises) by embarked squadron 25X1
commanders or staff specialists or through rigid con-
trol from headquarters ashore.
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This tendency can be viewed as part of the general We cannot be certain how such usurpation of a ship
pattern characteristic of the Soviet command struc- captain's authority would affect Soviet wartime oper-
ture of important decisions being referred upward. ations at sea. While few Western captains would
This approach probably inhibits the development of a accept such a situation, it appears that the practice
young commanding officer's self-confidence and in- generally is accepted in the Soviet military, and the
stills in him a dependency on higher authority for
direction in demanding situations.
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implied lack of trust in the CO's abilities does not
necessarily result in a loss of face. However, if
squadron staff specialists were permitted to counter-
mand the CO's orders, the crew could begin to wonder
who was in control and the resultant loss of leadership
Admiral Gorshkov has commented that COs tend to
want to do everything~ther men are present on the
bridge as onlookers.
Although Soviet commanding officers are generally
familiar with all of their ship's departments, they are 25X1
expected to leave the expertise in each department to 25X1
the specialist officers. Fleet Admiral Smirnov wrote in
Morskoy Sbornik that the continued modernization 25X1
of complex naval equipment makes it too difficult for
a CO to have an expert's knowledge of every ship
could lead to chaos in a critical situation.
We believe the Soviet proclivity toward rigid shore
control of ship operations could be a serious problem.
Tactical decisions often are dictated by headquarters
staffs ashore, tying the hands of the on-the-scene
commanders. This reduces the ability of Soviet naval
units to react to unexpected enemy actions and rapid-
ly unfolding situations.
There are, however, a number of advantages to the
Soviet approach to training ship commanders. Be-
cause they stay on the same ship for four to 10 years,
most know their vessels well. Moreover, they can
establish a meaningful track record from which their
superiors can evaluate them, making it easier to
identify both star performers and incompetents. Be-
cause the Nary is willing to place young officers in
command billets, it is easier to encourage and reward
talented and energetic ones with challenging assign- .
ments.
A Soviet captain normally selects his own executive
officer (the second in command) and other assistant
commanders from among the ship's officers. An exec-
utive officer then has the opportunity to prepare for
his own command through an on-the-job training
program, which familiarizes him with all ship depart-
ments, making him something of a generalist by
Soviet standards. He must also qualify as a watch
officer and perform well at sea. Once qualified, the
executive will probably succeed his old CO as the
ship's captain. Thus the optimal career path for a
junior officer is from department head, to executive
officer, to commanding officer.
Soviet military writings have criticized the on-the-job
training for young commanders-to-be. Many COs are
reluctant to let their junior officers take over ship
operations because they don't want to deal with
problems that could result from their inexperience.
department.
Those officers who fail to be selected as commanders
can sometimes transfer to another, similar class of
ship as a department head, but more often they 25X1
become career specialists. A specialist officer might
be a department head for three to four years, attend a
specialist course ashore, and then return to his old
unit as a staff specialist. Failure to serve in command
billets does not limit an officer's promotion prospects
as it would in many Western navies. A career special-
ist can continue to advance in rank up to, and
including, flag rank.
Staff officers give much-needed experience to the
fleet, often assisting ship crews in preparing for sea
deployment, accompanying them on extended cruises 25X1
and exercises, and serving on inspection teams. Soviet
military writings have expressed some concern, how-
ever, that staff officers sometimes perform work that
should be done by regular crews and that the latter
become "witnesses rather than participants in the
events," thereby failing to gain needed experience.
Moreover, the Soviets have written that, in wartime,
such patronage would be impossible, as there are not
enough staff officers for all of the Navy's ships.
Soviet naval officers tend to be assigned to one ship
for long periods (up to 10 years in some cases). When
an officer is transferred, it is normally to another ship
of the same type, in the same department, and often 25X1
within the same fleet. Even when an officer changes
ship types, he is usually in the same department, with
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similar responsibilities. Soviet officers are not encour-
aged to cross-specialize; the Navy believes modern
naval technology is too complex for them to master
more than one specialty.
The primary advantage of this policy is that only a
limited number of officers on any Soviet ship are
likely to be in the initial stages of learning their duties
and familiarizing themselves with equipment. The
Soviets believe this is essential, given the complexity
of modern naval technology and the shortage of
qualified enlisted technicians to help run their ships.
On the other hand, Soviet officers' narrow focus and
lack of a broad range of fleet experience make it
difficult for them to fill in for one another when a
given officer is unavailable for duty. The system also
probably inhibits an officer's understanding of the
interrelationship and varying capabilities of different
ship classes that must operate together in combat.
Sea Training
The sea experience that Soviet naval officers receive is
strikingly different from that of their US counter-
parts. In general, the United States operates a
"steaming navy" with a high operational tempo. The
Soviet Navy, in contrast, conserves its equipment
during peacetime and emphasizes readiness to go to
sea, so that most of the time Soviet officers spend on
their ships occurs in port, at anchorages, or on short
cruises of a day or two.
US carrier deployments in the Pacific in 1984, for
example, averaged about eight months, with at least
five and a half to six months spent under way. A
Soviet Pacific Fleet carrier deployment will typically
run for only one to five months, with most of the time
spent in ports or anchorages. On average, only about
10 percent of the Soviet surface fleet ig devloved away
from Soviet home waters at one time.
An example of the lack of realism in Soviet sea
training is provided by a 1982 Red Star article
written by a submariner and a surface ASW officer.
The officers described an ASW exercise that followed
"cut-and-dried patterns." The ASW ship commander
"reduced his risks to the minimum" by repeatedly
waiting for the target submarine to move from "one
assigned point to the next." The submarine command-
er did not try to shake off his pursuer because only the
surface ship commander was evaluated for the exer-
cise. Moreover, the submarine's actions were all
planned in advance by the ASW staff to ensure that a
contact would be made.
Postexercise critiques of such training are of little
value to the participants, according to the article's
authors, because there is no opportunity for joint
analysis by submarine and surface ship officers. In
fact, it was in a chance encounter years later that the
two authors discovered they had once participated in
the same exercise. Only then did the ASW officer
learn that the submariners were critical of the ASW
staff for not designing a realistic exercise scenario.
the place," according to the article.
The Soviets apparently have difficulty reacting to the
unexpected during exercises and sea cruises. Soviet
military writings indicate that, in cases in which the
timetables of planned exercises are changed even
slightly, naval units are sometimes unable to adjust.
In one example, a crew failed an exercise when its
emphasis was changed from ASW to air defense on
short notice. In another case, atop-rated crew
botched a missile firing after a surprise inspection cut
an hour from the preparation time for the exercise.
Unable to adjust to the change of plans, the officers
and men "were nervous and making mistakes all over
The Soviet Navy trains its officers to calmly choose
the "correct" school solution to various combat situa-
tions, according to military writings. Watch officers,
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for example, are trained on simulators that present
operators with various sea combat events such as an
air attack, sonar contact, or a cruise missile attack.
Officers' responses are recorded on a magnetic tape,
which is compared to the school solution tape. An
officer's rating is based on how quickly he identifies a
situation and chooses the proper action. Through this
and other training methods, the Soviets hope to make
tactical decisions automatic and almost reflexive to
minimize the need for independent thinking by tacti-
cal commanders.
Ship repairs at sea by Soviet crews are very basic and
usually involve the replacement of defective compo-
nents rather than actual repairs. Soviet ships carry
few spare parts and have only limited shop equipment
on board. When breakdowns occur at sea, the ships
usually return to a repair yard where the work can be
done by specialists. Most peacetime naval operations
are not seriously affected by this policy, because the
Navy generally leaves most of its fleet in port and
limits most ship cruises to waters close to the USSR.Z
a low emphasis on damage-
control training in the Soviet Navy, and some crews
privately believe their ships would be lost if they were
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The low priority given to damage-control training is
illustrated in a 1983 Soviet military press article,
"Why a Training Ship Rests Idle." The article fo-
cused on a Pacific Fleet damage-control training ship
that was used only 35 percent of the time. Despite
Navy regulations requiring periodic refresher training
for career personnel, almost no officers or warrant
officers observed the requirement, and fleet authori-
ties showed no interest in enforcing it.
We believe a lack of emphasis on training in at-sea
ship maintenance, damage control, and crew safety
will limit the Soviet Navy's ability to conduct pro-
longed deployments during wartime. The Soviet ap-
proach is probably a reflection of both the belief that
a war at sea will be brief and destructive, with little
opportunity for repairs by crews, and a recognition of
the limitations of the conscript sailors that make up
most of the Navy's personnel.
Compensation
An officer's pay is based on rank, position, and length
of service with various allowances for hardship posts
and special duties or qualifications. Position pay
constitutes the largest share of an officer's income,
being roughly double the pay received for rank, and it
is awarded irrespective of rank. Thus a commanding
officer will receive more pay than an officer of equal
rank in a noncommand billet.
Pay allowances and other benefits are used to reward
officers serving in assignments that are important to
the Navy but which involve family hardship or are
dangerous or otherwise undesirable. Time served in
the submarine fleet or certain hardship areas counts
as double time for pension computation. Special bo-
nuses are given for remote area assignments, sea duty
(the biggest bonuses go to submariners on nuclear
boats), under-ice transfers, and equator crossings.
Special allowances are also given for flight duty,
raising specialty ratings, and belonging to a "combat
ready" unit.
Coveted assignments, higher promotion prospects, and
other career inducements are apparently also used as
an incentive to attract the best officers to critical
Navy components. The importance of the submarine
fleet, for example, is reflected in the dominance of
Key Naval Posts Held by Submariners, March 1985
Chief' of the Main Naval Stiff and First Deputy
Commander in Chief'
Commander, Northern Fleet
Commander, Pack Fleet
Deputy Commander in Chief jor Combat Training
Deputy Commander in Chiejfor Training
Chief ojStaff Northern Fleet
Chief ojStctff; Pack Fleet
Chief of Stgfj, Black Sea Fleet
ChieJ'ojStuJj, Baltic Fleet
First Deputy Chief of'Stctfj, Northern Fleet
Deputy ChiejojStafj, Pack Fleet
ChiejNavigator ojthe Navy
Deputy Head ojthe Directorate ojCombat Readiness
Fleet Navigator, Pack Fleet
Head of the Naval Academy
Head ojMakarov Higher Naval School
Head ojPopov Higher Naval School
Head ojLeninskiy Komsomol Higher Naval School
Head ojKirov School
Head ojNakhimov School
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Figure 8. As a result gJ'career inducements and selective manning
policies, Soviet submariners are a cut above other naval personnel.
submariners in a variety of key appointments. Subma-
riners and naval aviators are also promoted one year
ahead of other officers at each rank level up to captain
belong to the CPSU. Although
1st.
many join simply to further their careers, they are
nonetheless subject to party discipline, which exerts a
powerful control over their actions. Every officer 25X1
knows that, if he runs afoul of the party and is
expelled, his naval career will be over and his pros-
Purpose
The political infrastructure of the Soviet Navy is
distinctive. Its primary purpose is to monitor person-
nel and ensure that the Navy remains completely
subservient to the CPSU, although it is also responsi-
ble for boosting unit morale, increasing productivity,
and preventing discipline problems.
pects for a successful civilian career ruined.
The CPSU is represented directly by the zampolit, or
political officer, who serves as a combination of
secret-police officer and unit chaplain. After the
commanding officer, he is the most influential man
aboard a Soviet vessel. The political officer's principal
duties are:
? To be the "eyes and ears" of the party aboard a ship 25X1
and recruit an informant network among the crew.
The Communist Party's grip on the Navy is main-
tained through both direct and indirect methods.
Indirect control is achieved because virtually all ca-
reer naval officers and many career enlisted men
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Figure 9. Political meetings are an integral part
4f Soviet Navy life both ashore and at sea. As an
element gl'psychological control in a-totalitarian
state, the bombardment oJ'sailors with propagan-
da serves as a constant reminder oJ'the CPSU's
pervasive presence and authority
? To maintain political files on the officers and men
and screen candidates for promotion, service in
sensitive positions, or duty on foreign port calls.
? To conduct regular political meetings and indoctri-
nate the crew with Marxist-Leninist ideology, the
views of the CPSU leadership, and the history of the
Navy and the party.
? To be the information officer.
? To organize socialist competitions, motivate the
crew to work harder and observe regulations, and
instill a sense of duty and patriotism.
? To share the responsibility for maintaining unit
discipline with the commanding officer and to ad-
dress crew grievances.
? To serve as morale officer and sports/recreation
Political meetings are an integral part of Soviet Navy
life both ashore and at sea.
while enlisted
sailors are usually encouraged to join the party, they
are not ordinarily required to. Attendance at political
meetings, however, is mandatory regardless of rank or
party affiliation.
The captive audiences at these meetings are subjected
to regular doses of Marxist-Leninist dogma, and
various pronouncements by the regime are read and
discussed. New directives from naval authorities and
naval regulations are also addressed.
Political meetings play a central role in organizing a
naval unit's socialist competitions. In cooperation with
regular officers, the political officer helps ensure that
appropriate competition objectives are set and pro-
gress duly noted. Outstanding crewmen are lauded for
their efforts, while group pressure is exerted on those
not deemed to be carrying their weight.
political meetings at sea are
shorter and more businesslike, with considerably less
emphasis on ideological matters. On many ships, they
are little more than a medium for keeping the crew up
to date on news from home, sports scores, and the
TASS view of world events.
Effectiveness
Soviet writings indicate that the morale and ideologi-
cal motivation of officers and enlisted men are consid-
ered aprincipal ingredient of the military might of the
armed forces. How well the Navy's political infra-
structure disciplines and motivates its people is a
paramount factor in the naval morale equation.
We believe that, despite some glaring failures (such as
the mutiny of the Storozhevoy crew in 1975), the
Soviets generally have been effective in maintaining a
tight party grip on the Navy and in guarding against
subversive activities by real or potential dissidents.
Officer career advancement is dependent on unques-
tioned support of the political system, and this, in
turn, ensures that the most significant segment of the
Navy is co-opted by the party.
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The informant networks operated by political officers
also seem to serve their purpose.
in many units, everyone knows who the infor-
mants are and avoids them. It seems unlikely, howev-
er, that a Soviet sailor can always be certain that what
he says or does will not somehow get back to the
authorities, and this generally serves as an effective
deterrent to politically deviant behavior.
In its attempts to raise morale and instill enthusiasm,
the Navy's political structure achieves mixed results.
On the positive side, the political officer provides a
special avenue for crew grievances, and, in some
cases, he serves as a special counselor for young
sailors experiencing difficulty with Navy life. If he
uses his influence effectively, he can potentially help
crew morale by allowing sailors to feel they have a
well-placed officer to represent their interests.
press sources, for example, have described
cased sailors, unfairly denied liberty for extend-
ed periods, approached the political officer, who inter-
We doubt that the political propaganda and ideologi-
cal preaching to which Soviet sailors are regularly
subjected are likely to motivate them to work harder
or risk their lives in battle.
crews react with boredom and apathy to
the incessant dogmatic outpourings, a finding that is
consistent with
civilian popular
ion ~
new draftees were forced by senior sailors to sit
in the front at political meetings so the seniors could
sleep in the back).
Nonetheless, propaganda probably fulfills a useful
function in the Navy. As an element of psychological
control in a totalitarian state, the bombardment of
sailors with propaganda serves as a constant reminder
of the CPSU's pervasive presence and authority. As
an illustration of the psychological pressure exerted,
ship's return from a
cruise to ngo a, t ie crew istened in silence to the
Soviet state radio denouncing US criticisms of "total-
ly fabricated" Soviet naval deployments to Angola-
with no one even daring to joke about it.
Propaganda may have some effect on raising morale,
particularly in wartime or in periods of tension, if the
regular party line is supplemented by appeals to the
traditional Russian love for the motherland and suspi-
cions about the aggressive intentions of foreigners.
The value of propaganda to the Navy's morale in war
might well be related to whether or not the average
sailor could be made to believe his country was acting
in a defensive rather than an aggressive role. The war
in Afghanistan has shown that propaganda is not
effective in motivating Soviet soldiers in countries
where they are clearly invaders.
vened with the ship's captain.
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Political training often is viewed as a panacea by the 25X1
naval leadership. For many cases of discipline, mo-
rale, or unit performance problems, fleet authorities 25X1
.order more political training rather than remedies for
the specific problem.
Political training also takes time away from more
practical naval activities-a trade-off that the Soviets
appear willing to accept. Although we do not know
precisely how much time is devoted to political in-
struction, one unit spent three
hours a day, six days a week on it when they were in
port. A more common figure, however, is one three- to
four-hour meeting each week ashore, with short 20
minutes to an hour) daily meetings at sea.
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The political officer's function of reporting on the
political reliability and general competence of com- 25X1
manders potentially creates a conflict between them.
described cases of strained relations 25X1
where a ship's regular officers regarded the political
officer as an "unnecessary appendage" in an other- 25X1
wise technically oriented group. Usually, however,
there is a significant commonality of interest between
the two, because both are rated on their ship's
standing within the fleet. 25X1
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The Storozhevoy Mutiny
A startlingjailure o1'political control in the Soviet
Navy occurred in 1975 when the crew of the Krivak-
class frigate Storozhevoy, probably acting under the
direction ojthe ship s political officer, commandeered
the vessel and attempted to sail to Sweden.
We cannot be certain what caused the mutiny, al-
though
between officers and men aboard thefrigate were
strained and there was considerable dissatisfaction
over poor living conditions and extra duties. The
ship s political officer is said to have sided with the
crew during a confrontation over conditions.
rating.
A December 1974 Red Star article revealed that the
Storozhevoy had experienced serious discipline prob-
lems for at least a year prior to the mutiny. Early in
the 1974 training year, the Soviet Minister oJ'DeJense
and Politburo member Marshal A. A. Grechko wit-
nessed an ASW exercise while aboard the Storozhe-
voy and proclaimed that the frigate "had all the
requirements necessary to win~rst place" in the
socialist competition. By the end of the training year,
however, the shin had received only alourth place
crew during the mutiny and defection attempt.
have contributed to his willingness to side with the
A Red Star reporter was sent to investigate and later
wrote that, while the crew's naval skills were general-
ly good, the party's political work aboard the Storo-
zhevoy was poor. He criticized the political apparatus
for allowing the crew to `:/'all down on the ethical
front" and take up "liberal positions."He also
mentioned that the ship s oJ~cers had to be reminded
to occasionally visit the crew's quarters to talk with
the sailors. An article such as this would have
damaged the political officer's naval career and may
voy's crewmen (the political officer and a senior
seaman) were executed.
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inhibits local agriculture, food shortages can cause
morale problems for both sailors and their families.
Living Conditions
Life in the Soviet Navy is hard. Sailors generally put
in long hours with little time off. The largest and most
important fleets-the Northern and Pacific-locate
most of their base facilities in desolate areas with
harsh climatic conditions. The resultant morale diffi-
culties are made worse by an apparent unwillingness
on the part of the Soviet leadership to devote re-
sources to easing living conditions. Career personnel
fare better than conscripts, although they too suffer
from the effects of assignments in remote areas
particularly on their family lives.
Recreational facilities at most naval bases are practi-
cally nonexistent, so sailors depend on trips to the
nearest town for relief from boredom. Political offi-
cers, in their attempts to arrange for entertainment on
base, are hampered by the lack of available resources
and apparently confuse entertainment with indoctri-
nation. ASoviet admiral writing about the use of
films for entertainment, for example, listed the follow-
ing titles of films that were to be shown to various
ships and garrisons:
? "The Communist Party as the Organizer and In-
spirer of the Great October Socialist Revolution."
? "Lenin, the Founder of the Soviet State."
? "The Friendship of the Peoples of the Socialist
Community."
? "We Are Building Communism."
A 1982 press article described housing facilities at
naval bases that were plagued by poor construction,
leaking roofs, and no heat.
amounts is a problem for shore personnel throughout
the Navy, and, in remote areas, where a harsh climate
The Chief of the Northern Fleet Directorate for
Trade, writing in Logistics and Supply of the Soviet
Armed Forces, described some of the conditions that
interfere with the quality of food in remote areas:
? Suppliers consider the Navy bases a low priority.
? Aeroflot does not allocate enough aircraft to trans-
port produce.
? Northern Fleet bases lack sufficient food-storage
facilities.
? The Navy's food trucks are not insulated.
The Navy has attempted to ease the food shortages by
administering its own auxiliary farms in remote base
areas, but, because of the harsh climate, the results
have not been good.
Harsh living conditions and the monotony of isolated
outposts take their toll on the family life of married
sailors.
among a group of 20 young officers, half
of the wives who accompanied them to Kamchatka
(parents
had to mail money to their sons just so they could
afford to eat a decent meal in the servicemen's club.
Conscripts do receive a few token benefits, such as
exemption from income taxes and preferential admis-
sion to colleges and trade schools after their dis-
charge.
available to civilians,
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When Soviet sailors are fortunate enough to get
liberty, their lack of spending money greatly restricts
what they can do. In the Baltic states, they also
frequently face openly hostile civilians and occasional-
ly are even forced to travel in groups for safety. In the
rest of the USSR, relations between locals and Navy
Conditions at Sea. Living conditions at sea tend to be
Spartan, as Soviet ship designs generally do not 25X1
emphasize crew habitability. Conditions are cramped
by Western standards, and amenities such as air-
conditioning are not found on many vessels.
shortages of soap are common at sea, and 25X1
Figure 11. A sailor on liberty checks his watch.
Navy leave and liberty policies tend to be restric-
tive, as the Soviets prefer to keep sailors coned
to base or ship, where their activities can be more
attributed this in part to officer pay
scales, which enabled naval doctors to earn 10 percent
more than their civilian counterparts.
Leave and liberty are rarely granted for most con-
scripts; the general Soviet approach seems to be to
keep them confined to the base or ship, where their
activities can be more easily monitored and con-
trolled. Most conscripts get one 10-day leave period
during their term of service. Liberty policies vary
greatly from unit to unit. One
was allowed only one five-hour liberty every three
months in Severomorsk, although a more commonly
reported figure is one six-hour pass on weekends.
Career sailors receive 30 days of leave a year (45 if
they serve on nuclear submarines) and have evenings
free in home port.
one Northern Fleet captain authorized extra leave to
any sailor who caught 10 rats aboard his ship.
Liberty in foreign ports is rarely granted for Soviet 25X1
ship crews on distant deployments. At these ports,
sailors ordinarily go ashore in small groups escorted
by a junior officer or warrant officer. They are
carefully briefed by the political officer beforehand on
the dangers of contact with foreigners and are typical- 25X1
ly told that Western port cities are "false fronts"
designed to hide the true squalor of life for the masses
in capitalist countries. The visits are rather tame, by 25X1
Western standards, and often consist of organized
food at sea is much 25X1
usually short, and, in some cases, conditions ashore 25X1
may not be much better than conditions on ship.
or espri a corps at sea, where relations between
officers and enlisted men tend to be more casual.
a greater sense of teamwork 25X1
men are generally good.
sightseeing or museum visits.
Despite the conditions at sea,
many Soviet sailors prefer sea duty to shore assign-
ments, for a number of reasons. Soviet cruises are
better and is available in ample quantities. Ideological
indoctrination is kept to a minimum on cruises. In
addition, sailors receive bonuses for sea duty of extra
pay or special credit certificates for purchasing scarce
foreign goods in special import stores in the USSR.
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F~ect on Readiness. In wartime, the Spartan living
conditions probably would have little effect on combat
effectiveness. Russians have historically shown an
ability to accommodate hardships in war, and Soviet
civilians even in peacetime accept living conditions
that would appear harsh by Western standards.
In peacetime, however, substandard living conditions
sap morale, erode enthusiasm, and contribute to alco-
holism, AWOL cases, and other discipline problems.
The loss of training opportunities because of poorly
motivated sailors, for instance, indirectly affects the
Navy's wartime readiness-it certainly accounts for
some of the substandard operational performance
noted in this report.
The Soviets have written that the welfare of their
sailors is a component of the fleet's combat readiness,
itt a as een one to improve the situation.
Discipline
The Soviet naval leadership places little trust in its
sailors, and naval practices discourage sailors from
engaging in any activities that are not closely moni-
tored and controlled. Soviet military writings have
stated that "a high level of military discipline can be
achieved only when commanders and officers con-
stantly supervise the behavior of subordinates" while
maintaining a "strict regimentation of behavior" and
exact observance of naval regulations. To this end,
discipline is maintained through a variety of redun-
dant and overlapping informal, administrative, legal,
political, and clandestine controls.
Iit/ormal. In the Soviet Navy, senior conscripts rule
over junior ones. By tradition, new draftees are
forced, under the threat of physical violence, to serve
on cleanup details, do laundry, shine shoes, and
perform other menial tasks.
The informal hierarchy is tolerated and even encour-
aged by officers and warrant officers because it
lightens their already extensive supervisory duties. In
fact, senior sailors were
sometimes punished for bein "too eas " on first- ear
conscripts.
(this informal disci-
~'ine sometimes gets out of hand, with conscripts
being severely beaten and denied food. Such abuse
has been serious enough to attract the attention of
high-ranking naval authorities and has resulted in
some criminal prosecutions.
honor" composed of a sailor's peers.
Administrative. Commanders have considerable lee-
way in disciplining subordinates. Administrative disci-
pline generally deals with violations of military regu-
lations such as communications security, dereliction
of duty, and being absent without leave (AWOL).
Punishment options include assignment of extra du-
ties, denial of leave or liberty, demotions, or brig
sentences. A commanding officer sometimes delegates
minor discipline matters to a "military court of
Military journalists can also play a role in the investi-
gations process. By law, correspondents from Red
Star can subpoena and inspect official records per-
taining to allegations received in letters to their editor.
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Top Secret
Soviet sailors greatly fear
eing sent tote rig. Thefollowing description of a
typical brig
Prisoners sleep on boards, which are stacked
outside to freeze during the day. No blankets
are provided and cells are unheated-forcing
prisoners to huddle together for warmth. For
punishment, guards will fill a cell with water
and remove bed boards so that prisoners cannot
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Most naval brigs are overcrowded, and com-
manders often must bribe wardens to have one
of their sailors admitted. Upon arrival, a sailor
first has his head shaved~ne of the worst
consequences of a brig term because it is an
embarrassing stigma when sailors go on pass
after being released to their units. They also
have all nonissue clothing (usually sweaters from
home worn under uniform shirts) permanently
confiscated, along with belts and hatbands that
`could be used to attempt suicide.
A typical brig day begins with reveille at 0500
hours, followed by "physical training" consist-
ing of running around a room 100 times. Five
minutes is allowed for a breakfast of "terrible
food" (such as a soup made from fish and cereal)
in small quantities. Prisoners are forced to run
wherever they go.
The day's activities consist of some form of
strenuous work, such as unloading sides of beef
or cement bags from a truck. Work is accompa-
nied by constant harassment from guards, who
refer to prisoners as "brig rats.'; Typically, they
force prisoners to shovel snow and then move it
from one corner to another. Ten minutes are
allowed for lunch before a return to work de-
tails. After afive-minute dinner break, work
continues until 2300 hours when~nrisoners are
returned to their cells.
sit on the floor.
Suicides are common in some brigs, which has led to
speculation among sailors that some are actual!
murders committed by guards.
In addition to the brig, the Soviet Navy is known to
use 'disciplinary battalions" to punish serious of-
fenses such as striking an officer, murder, rape, or
being AWOL for extended periods.
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worse than the brig. Time served in these units is
considered "lost time, "which must be made up
through an extension of enlistment. Offenders who
return to duty from disciplinary battalions are usual-
ly described as cowed and broken. Their value to the
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In March 1984, Red Star received over 24,000 letters
from its readers pertaining to problems in the armed
forces such as corrupt officers and misuse of position,
in addition to numerous complaints about inadequate
living conditions for sailors and their dependents.
Although military correspondents possess no punitive
powers, their investigations and articles frequently
cause commanders to take corrective measures or
result in the filing of charges by the procuracy.~
Political. The Communist Party handles infractions
of party discipline, such as missing political meetings,
as well as nonpolitical offenses such as drunkenness,
theft, and going AWOL. Its punitive powers range
from placing bad marks on a sailor's political records
to expulsion from the party. The party is also indirect-
ly involved in military legal and administrative mat-
Despite the multiple controls on sailors and the strict
regimentation of their activities, the Soviet Navy is
beset by discipline problems. Conscripts often seem
motivated to work mostly out of fear of punishment.
As soon as their supervision is gone, work stops.
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think they'll thank you for a report like that?"
idealistic young lieutenant who decided to "report the
true state of affairs" in his unit. The ship's command-
ing officer admonished him by asking, "And do you
are a widespread and recurring problem in the Navy.
coverups of discipline and unit performance problems
press articles have
referred to many cases of falsification of unit mainte-
nance schedules, air traffic control logs, and records
on personnel drinking problems and AWOL sailors.
nstances of officers
coverups
The Navy's personnel system strongly encourages
commanders to cover up discipline infractions and
unit performance problems. Soviet military writings
state that, according to Navy policy, "the very fact
that a breach of discipline occurs on board a ship is
evidence of deficiencies in either the~organization of
the shipboard routine or the education and indoctrina-
tion of sailors or both." Reporting problems indicate
to naval authorities that things are not well and can
cause a ship to lose its standing in the socialist
competitions, which, in turn, can cost a commander
promotions, academy appointments, and other career
advancements.
A double standard exists regarding the reporting of
unit problems. Officially, officers are told to be honest
and can be punished if caught falsifying reports. In
reality, things operate much differently. A military
press article described an example-the case of an
providing sailors with test questions and answers
before an exam so they would look good in front of
fleet inspectors.
unable to correct the problem.
Although press
articles indicate that naval
authorities are concerne a out coverups, they appear
Discipline Problems
The Navy is plagued by the same types of problems
that trouble Soviet society in general-alcoholism,
corruption, poor work habits, and absenteeism. Mili-
tary discipline and close regimentation of sailors'
activities control these problems somewhat, but naval
authorities still have trouble keeping them from af-
fecting readiness.
Alcoholism. Heavy drinking has been part of the
the crimes committed in the USSR. It is also linked to
many of the Navy's discipline problems.
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in general, the Soviet Navy is
strict regar mgt a use of alcohol on duty and
disapproves of, but reluctantly tolerates, it off duty.
Commanders' policies vary greatly, however, with
some being virtually "dry" while others tolerate wide-
spread drinking both on and off duty.
all Soviet naval vessels except
submarines are officially "dry." In recognition of
their elite status and demanding duties, submariners
are allowed one lass of wine or shot of vodka per day
while at sea. alcohol abuse is not
a problem among submarine crews at sea because of
both strict discipline and a sense of pride and elitism.
strict unit punishment for alco-
hol abuse. sailors could be given six
months in a disciplinary battalion if an officer even
sus ected the use of alcohol on dut
authorized for cleaning equipment and consume all of 25X1
it, using water or gasoline for cleaning. On one ship, 25X1
there reportedly was a system for distributing the
cleaning alcohol based on rank. Cleaning fluids and 25X1
other substances with alcohol bases are sometimes
filtered through gas masks (rendering the masks 25X1
useless) and then consumed sometimes renderin the
sailor useless .
Parents contribute to the problem by mailin vodka to
their sons in the Navy,
Soviet
press articles have criticize tie practice, ut some
parents apparently consider it their duty to tr to ease
the discomforts of their sons' service time.
Some units have a lax attitude toward
alcohol
abuse-with predictable consequences.
ypica y,
sai ors w o return rom liberty intoxicated are given a
10- to 15-day brig term, and those who commit crimes
while drunk can be sentenced to five additional days.
Despite the remote location and tough discipline of
many units, naval authorities find it difficult to
control alcohol problems. the
primary interests of young conscripts are women and
alcohol, and, since remote locations and restrictive
leave policies make it difficult to meet women, drink-
ing is about the only remaining recreation. In many
units, alcohol is the principal medium of exchange.
The Soviet Navy uses alcohol extensivel for equip-
ment maintenance, but very
little of it finds its way to the equipment. Sailors in
some units regularly draw 15 to 20 times the amounts
In general, officers are less likely than either warrant
officers or conscripts to abuse alcohol on duty. Cita-
tions for drinking offenses can seriously damage an
officer's career
Nevertheless, heavy
drinking was to erated in an elite helicopter unit,
despite crashes by drunk pilots.
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Ton Secret
as a group, warrant officers are
most likely to have severe alcohol problems. This is
probably a result of their having significantly more
spending money and personal freedom than con-
scripts, while lacking the officers' professionalism and
concern over career prospects.
Drug Abuse. Drug abuse does not appear to be a
significant problem in the Soviet Navy because drugs
are not as readily available as alcohol, and because
most sailors come from cultural backgrounds in which
alcohol use is more acceptable than drug use. There is
evidence Dof limited drug use, mostly
among Central Asian conscripts who are sometimes
mailed drugs from home. Most sailors, however, never
come into contact with them.
Theft and Corruption. Startling instances of graft and
personal use of state property go unnoticed in the
Soviet system, according to Soviet press articles
practices are common in Soviet society, so it is
unlikely the Navy will be able to eliminate them.
Frustrated by low pay, sailors sometimes sell state
property, particularly vehicle parts and clothing, on
the black market to raise money to buy vodka,
Fighting. Although fighting is a recurring discipline
problem for the Navy, it probably has no significant
effect on readiness.
mass raw s occur rom time to
time, mostly in naval construction units, where racial
tensions are higher and the personnel generally of a
lower class than elsewhere in the Navy. Not surpris-
ingly, small fights between sailors occur regularly and
often involve alcohol or harassment of new recruits.
Desertion, AWOL, and Suicide. Despite the Spartan
living conditions in much of the Navy, desertion does
not appear to be a serious problem,
reasons, including strict controls on personal travel
and relocation in the USSR, that make it easy for
There are several pro a e
authorities to track down deserters. Punishment for
those caught is severe-usually a sentence to a disci-
plinary battalion. Moreover, at many bases in remote
areas there is simply nowhere for a deserter to go.~
A good example of this problem appeared in
a 1983 Red Star article-the case of a submarine
commander who used his crew to work in civilian
industry. He was caught when a political officer
noticed he hid purchased three new cars in two years,
prompting an investigation. offi-
cers sometimes allow their men to be used by civilian
factories and then order them to steal construction
materials, vehicle parts, and food for the unit. Such
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Tou Secret
Russian-language instruction is available, and those
who cannot speak the language when drafted are
assigned menial jobs where they are forced to learn a
dozen or so basic Russian words so they can follow
problem in home ports,
dom is a strong incentive for going AWOL,
lit is an offense that typical y c rrac ies
a light punishment (such as extra duties). In some
units, officers apparently make little effort to stop
sailors from sneaking off base at night, and, through-
out the Navy, warrant officers can usually be bribed
for a pass. In foreign ports, however, discipline is
strict and sailors are not allowed ashore without an
official escort.
Suicides in the Soviet Navy probably occur most often
in remote areas because of the isolation of sailors and
their families.
orders.
The Soviet press in 1984 made several references to
Central Asians being admitted to higher naval schools
and indicated that entrance requirements may have
been lowered for minority applicants. Although ex-
ceptional candidates will probably be taken into the
naval officer corps-with fanfare over the "socialist
brothers joining in the common defense against capi-
talists"-we think it unlikely that the Navy will
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pursue an active US-style affirmative action program. 25X1
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Most Central Asian ethnic groups are poorly qualified
for naval service, lacking Russian-language skills and 25X1
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them prefer to avoid occupations in high-technology
fields. Moreover, joining the officer corps essentially
means accepting Russification and a career closely
associated with the central government-a prospect
which many non-Slavs find distasteful.
Ethnic conflict among sailors does not appear to be a
serious problem for the Soviet Navy. Occasional
outbreaks of violence between Slavs and Central
Asians occur, but thev are usually confined to con-
The Soviet press states that one of the functions of
military service is to assist in the Sovietization of the
diverse ethnic groups that make up the Soviet empire.
the Navy is only
interested in controlling minority peoples, getting
from them whatever useful labor it can.
Little attempt is made to accommodate minorities in
the Soviet Navy. All orders are given in Russian, and
the use of other languages on duty is forbidden. No
Naval authorities are apparently distrustful of non-
Slavic ethnic groups, and most sensitive or critical
Navy billets are reserved for personnel of Slavic
origin. submariners-even the
conscripts-are almost exclusively Slavic, and sailors
of Jewish or Baltic extraction are sometimes trans-
ferred from vessels visiting foreign ports.
The Soviets apparently believe such discrimination is
justified. It may be influenced by memories of ethnic
groups during World War II collaborating with the
Germans or proving to be unreliable fighters. ~
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We do not believe the Soviet Navy's inability to
integrate or co-opt non-Slavic ethnic groups into
positions of responsibility will have a significant effect
on its combat readiness. We believe, however, that
such policies will make it more difficult for the Navy
to respond to recruiting problems associated with the
changing demographic composition of the USSR.
They will also deny the Navy the services of techno-
logically proficient Western minorities-Germans,
Jews, ,and Baltic veovles-for sophisticated combat
units.
As a result of infrequent and poor-quality peacetime
training, most reserve personnel would probably be of
limited value to the Navy in combat operations-a
factor that degrades the Navy's ability to fight a
protracted war at sea. Reserve forces appear to be
regarded by the naval leadership more as a peacetime
auxiliary work force than as a wartime combat re-
serve. This neglect of the reserves may reflect a Soviet
view that a conventional war with the West will be
brief, so there is little point in diverting resources
from regular Nary programs to prepare for the
replacement of wartime casualties.
The Navy draws its reserve personnel from discharged
conscripts, career sailors, and ROTC graduates. Some
ROTC personnel never serve a regular tour in the
Navy, so their military experience is limited to what
they receive in initial training and occasional reserve
callups. ~~described reserve officer training
on the instructors.
school as a "boring charm school" where students and
faculty were indifferent and discipline was practically
nonexistent. Everyone graduated, regardless of per-
formance, because any failures would reflect poorly
allups for naval reserve train-
ing or temporary duty occur irregularly and infre-
quently. One reservist, for example, served only one
month of active duty in 18 years. Typically, personnel
are recalled once or twice, usually within 10 years of
entering the reserves, and serve from one to three
months. Reservists from large cities near naval facili-
ties appear more likely to be recalled on a regular
basis, generally for about eight to 40 hours of evening
classes per year.
The quality of naval reserve training is poor
Training at sea is rare (one officer
received his first shipboard duty 19 years after receiv-
ing his reserve commission), and reservists tend to be
ignored by regulars, who do not take them seriously
and do not have the time to supervise their activities.
Reservists often receive no military training during
callups, but instead perform manual labor for the
Navy. The Soviet press has made references to the use
of reservists to work on "ur ent construction for the
nation," and construction
tradesmen are the personnel most often recalled.
Morale among reservists is low, as many believe their
services are neither needed nor appreciated by the
regular Navy and that time spent on reserve duty is
wasted. Some reservists, however, view reserve duty as
something of a vacation, since discipline among re-
servists tends to be lax.
Classroom instruction for reservists tends to consist of
lectures on theoretical and political topics. Instructors
apparently care little about these classes, and
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fficers view reserve teaching 25X1
assignments primarily as an excuse for late-night
drinking in the officers' club.
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The poor training received by naval reservists would If the Navy is forced to fight such a war, the strain on
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and rear-area support. The Navy could recall officers potentially negating many of the technological and .
and other men who had been recently discharged in
the hope they would remember enough from their
service experience to make them useful in combat
assignments. Without retraining, most of these indi-
viduals would only be useful in the same billet and
ship class in which they had previously served because
of their narrowly specialized backgrounds.
Merchant marine personnel-many of whom have
served in the regular Navy or received ROTC train-
ing-would probably be of some value in billets
related to their civilian work, such as surface naviga-
tion or nonnuclear engineering. But they would also
require retraining to effectively perform many combat
tasks. As a result, the Soviet Navy could find itself
unable to quickly replace personnel losses in billets
that are essential to submarine, ASW, and surface
attack forces.
Implications
We believe the Navy's personnel system, despite its
many weaknesses, is adequate to support the limited
naval operations required by Soviet war plans. The
Soviets have taken personnel limitations into account
in developing equipment, tactics, and operating proce-
dures. Their war plans do not require most of their
naval units to conduct operations as complex and
demanding as those expected of US and other West-
ern navies. Most of their fleet is intended to conduct
defensive operations lasting only a few weeks, in
waters relatively close to Soviet shore facilities, and
characterized by setpiece combat situations. Under
such conditions, personnel problems that would be
serious in other navies would be viewed as less so for
the Soviets.
If a war with the West became a prolonged conflict,
however, involving repeated combat situations over
large areas and placing a premium on tactical imagi-
nation and flexibility, we believe the personnel short-
comings would make it difficult for the Soviet Navy
quantitative, gains made in recent years.
25X1
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to adjust.
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The Soviet naval personnel system has been resistant
to change-over the years. It is likely to face an
increasing demand for quality personnel, however,
with the cgntinued introduction of more sophisticated
equipment. In addition, recent fleet-level exercises
suggest the Soviets are considering wartime opera-
tions that will place increased demands on person-
nel-for instance, to operate conventional takeoff and
landing aircraft carriers, to manage large surface task
groups, and to extend sea control and sea denial areas
farther from the USSR. Weaknesses in their person-
nel system may become more pronounced under such
circumstances.
Demographics trends-particularly the declining pro-
portion of Slavs in the draft-age population-will also
pressure the Navy's personnel system. We believe the
Soviets will deal with this problem by tightening
restrictions on military service deferments and possi-
bly by.improving preinduction training of Soviet
youths
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