SOVIET PLANS AND PROSPECTS FOR REDUCING OIL USE IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T01298R000400010001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Soviet Plans and Prospects
for Reducing Oil Use in
the Electric Power Industry
NOT MICR F14MEO
For Data t rtey
NGA Review
Completed
Secret
SOV 85-10037
April 1985
Copy 4 4 6
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Muz
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of Imagery Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Economic Performance Division, SOYA, on
25X1
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Secret
SOV 85-10037
April 1985
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Soviet Plans and Prospects
for Reducing Oil Use in
the Electric Power Industry
This paper was prepared by the
Office of Soviet Analysis, with contributions by
the Office
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Summary
Information available
as of 1 January 1985
was used in this report.
Soviet Plans and Prospects
for Reducing Oil Use in
the Electric Power Industry
Moscow's hopes of sharply reducing oil consumption in the power industry
will be frustrated at least through 1985 and possibly until the early 1990s.
Programs to build gas-fired power plants, expand gas distribution systems,
and convert power plants to gas have been largely successful. Oil use,
however, probably will not decrease until 1990 or later. Before then, most
of the increase in supply of gas to the power industry will be needed to off-
set shortfalls in the coal supply and to support above-plan electricity
generation at many thermal power plants.
Oil use by the power industry became an important issue in the 1970s when
it more than doubled, making oil the leading fuel. Moscow first called for
the replacement of oil by coal at new power plants, but by the late 1970s
this policy was overtaken by shortfalls in coal production and by the
promise of gas-for-oil substitution. The Soviets now view natural gas as the
fuel that will displace oil, at least through the mid-1990s.
Outlook for 1985
The 1981-85 plan set a goal for reducing use of oil products (residual and
diesel fuel oils) at power plants by about one-half million barrels per day in
terms of crude oil equivalent (b/doe) in 1985. We estimate, however, that
in 1985 power industry oil use will remain at about 2.5 million b/doe,
unchanged from the 1980 level. Our projections suggest that, under
conditions less favorable than those underlying this estimate, oil use could
increase by up to 150,000 b/doe in 1985. A reduction in oil use of up to
250,000 b/doe is possible but not probable. For the maximum reduction to
occur, the power industry's total fuel demand would have to be curtailed
sharply, coal supplies boosted, and efforts to maximize gas use almost
totally successful-all before yearend 1985.
In 1985, gas use at power plants will probably be about 50 percent higher
than in 1980, reaching roughly 177 billion cubic meters-about 28 percent
of our projection for total Soviet natural gas production. We estimate that
power plant conversion to gas from coal or oil will absorb about 40 percent
of the total increase in power industry consumption of natural gas, that
new demand from gas-fired power station startups will take 35 percent,
and that the remaining 25 percent will go to power plants that increase
their use of gas as a backup fuel.
iii Secret
SOV 85-10037
April 1985
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Prospects for 1990
In their 20-year energy program published in March 1984, the Soviets
announced goals for cutting power plant oil use by about 1 million b/doe
by 1990. We judge that this goal is out of reach, even under the most favor-
able circumstances. Our projections indicate that oil use in the electric
power industry could be lowered by as much as 720,000 b/doe by 1990.
Savings of this magnitude would require during 1981-90 an increase in
coal supplies to the industry of 40-45 million tons and a boost in gas
supplies of about 123 billion cubic meters. At the same time the growth of
organic-fuel consumption to provide electricity and cogenerated heat would
have to be held at or below an average annual rate of 2.1 percent. To
achieve the 720,000-b/doe oil reduction, the Soviets must rapidly boost
output of the now-stagnant coal industry, eliminate virtually all constraints
to gas usage in the power industry, speed up construction of nuclear power
plants, and accelerate improvements to fuel-use efficiency. We do not
expect the Soviets to succeed in changing the structure of power industry
fuel use so rapidly.
Rather, we project a decline in power industry oil use of only about
275,000 b/doe between 1980 and 1990-with the power industry's coal
supply growing by some 25 million tons, gas use increasing by about 110
billion cubic meters, and growth of power plant demand for organic fuels
slowing to about 2.2 percent annually as the share of nuclear power
becomes larger. Even this modest progress in changing the power industry's
fuel mix could be placed in jeopardy by unfavorable developments. For
example, a demand for up to 170,000 b/doe more oil in 1990 than in 1980
could result if, simultaneously, the coal industry failed to increase supplies,
the rate of conversion of plants to gas use does not rise above the current
level, and nuclear power plant construction fails to accelerate.
Critical Constraints
We consider coal supply to be the most important variable in the power sta-
tion fuel-use equation. Coal availability is an important though indirect
determinant of power industry use of oil because many coal-fired plants
burn backup stocks of oil when coal supply is inadequate. The coal supply
issue has particular relevance, not only because of the large amount of
coal-based capacity on line and under construction but also because of the
clouded outlook for both the quantity and the quality of coal available. We
expect that the Soviets will fail to overcome the problems plaguing coal
production during the remainder of the 1980s. The Ministry of Power and
Electrification will therefore need to curtail sharply plans to build new
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coal-fired power plants and to redesign existing plants to burn gas, or else
face increased oil consumption or more disruptions in the supply of
electricity. The outcome will probably be a combination of these alterna-
tives, given the large amount of coal-based capacity under construction and
the time-consuming nature of fuel redesign.
The large number of power stations capable of burning oil and the need to
keep them operating to meet electricity demand are other obstacles to
saving oil in the power sector. Almost 85 percent of the thermal power
plant capacity in the USSR can use oil, even though only 10 percent relies
solely on oil. Oil-capable generating capacity is pressed into service to
offset shortfalls in other fuel stocks, particularly coal. Moreover, when
power systems must compensate for below-plan output at hydro and
nuclear stations, oil is frequently the only fuel available.
The track that the Soviets have followed in converting power plants to gas
from other fuels has also limited oil savings. The current plan for
conversion puts top priority on using gas to eliminate the use of oil as a
backup fuel at coal-fired power plants; direct substitution of gas for oil at
oil-fired plants has been given a lower priority. Although this kind of
conversion can offset coal shortfalls and cut consumption of backup oil, the
reduction in oil use will be less than could be achieved if all the gas were
substituted in power plants that burn only oil. Moreover, reluctance to take
the largest power plant boilers off line for conversion and delays in
constructing gas distribution lines have been and probably will continue to
be a drag on the expansion of the use of gas in the electric power sector.
Taking these factors into account, we expect the Soviets to be able to shift
about 10 percent of the power industry fuel. consumption to gas by 1990.
Implications for the Soviet Economy
In our view, the most likely trends in power industry fuel use imply:
? Delayed expansion of secondary oil refining. Power plant demand for
residual fuel oil will continue to exceed Soviet plans-thereby reducing
the availability of residual oil for cracking to increase supplies of gasoline
and diesel fuel.
? Reduced exports of fuel oil or more valuable refined products "saved" at
power plants. The slow progress in reducing oil use will limit such sales to
less than 30 percent of the prospective $10 billion that could be earned
annually by 1990 if goals for oil savings were achieved.
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? Some brake on the growth of Soviet production and consumption of gas.
Because the power industry is by far the leading gas consumer, maintain-
ing the growth of gas production after the mid-1980s will require the
dedication of more resources to increasing power plant gas use or to
adding major new gas consumers in other economic sectors.
The changes under way and planned in the power industry's fuel supplies
may well aggravate disruptions in electricity supply. A greater incidence of
power shortages, brownouts, and substandard electricity supply is likely
because there is little reserve capacity to bring on line when plants are out
of service during fuel conversion. Although electricity supply is likely to be
taut for the foreseeable future, increased use of gas should eventually
reduce those power interruptions stemming from inadequate supply of fuel.
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Summary
The Power Industry's Claim on Soviet Fuel Output
1
Fuel-Use Capabilities of Soviet Power Plants
4
Multifuel Capability of Soviet Power Plants
4
Coal-Fired Plants
5
Oil-Fired Plants
8
Gas-Fired Plants
9
New Capacity at Thermal Power Plants
11
Power Plant Fuel Conversion
14
Conversion to Natural Gas
15
Conversion to Coal
17
Conversion to Oil
18
Conversion Costs
19
Projections of Power Industry Fuel Use
19
Supply of Coal
20
Supply of Gas
21
Supply of Minor Fuels
22
Supply of Oil
22
Implications
24
The Oil Industry
25
The Gas Industry
25
Supply, Reliability, and Costs
26
Methodology for Projecting Soviet Power Industry Fuel Demand and Fuel Use
27
1. USSR: Electric Power Industry-Claims on Soviet Fuel Output,
1960-80
2
2. Regional Distribution of Electric Generating Capacity, 1980
4
3. Coal Basins Supplying Power Plants
4. USSR: Coal Shortfall at the Zaporozh'ye Gres
5. Regions Served by Thermal Power Systems
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1.
USSR: Measures of Fuel Consumption by All Electric Power Plants
3
2.
USSR: Fuel-Use Capability of Thermal Power Plants in 1980
5
3.
USSR: Sources of Coal Supply for the Power Ministry
4.
USSR: Fuel Oil Storage at Selected Power Plants
5.
USSR: Major Additions to Gas-Fired Power Plants and Resulting
Fuel Demand
12
6.
USSR: Major Additions to Coal-Fired Power Plants and Resulting
Fuel Demand
13
8.
USSR: Projected Power Industry Fuel Use
9.
USSR: Thermal Power Plant Capacity and Fuel-Use Capability by
Region, 1980
38
10.
USSR: Estimated New Fuel-Use Capability of Thermal Power
Plants, 1981-85
40
11.
USSR: Estimated New Thermal Power Plant Capacity and
Fuel-Use Capability by Region, 1981-85
41
12.
USSR: Estimated New Fuel-Use Capability of Thermal Power
Plants, 1986-90
43
13.
USSR: Estimated New Thermal Power Plant Capacity and
Fuel-Use Capability, 1986-90
44
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single-largest fuel consumer in the USSR.'
Long before the possibility of a leveling off or decline in the USSR's oil
production was discussed openly in the Soviet press and technical journals,
the power industry adopted programs to radically restructure its fuel
consumption. Oil consumption was to be sharply reduced, coal use was to
increase, and-under the most recent programs-natural gas usage was to
grow rapidly. As the possibility of a decline in oil output became an issue,
Soviet energy experts came to view a shift in the power industry's fuel mix
as a priority program. Attainment of this goal is a matter of great
importance to the economy as a whole because the power industry is the
This paper reviews power industry fuel use since 1960. It points out trends
and pertinent Soviet policies; examines the most important advantages and
constraints in Soviet power plant design, operation, and new construction in
relation to the fuel used; and assesses the fuel conversion program, which
the Soviets hope will have the greatest effect on fuel use. In addition, we es-
timate likely ranges of fuel consumption in the electric power sector by
type and quantity for 1985 and 1990. Finally, we provide some analysis of
how the restructuring of the power industry's fuel supplies could affect the
Soviet oil and gas industries, as well as the reliability and costs of
electricity production.'
' Throughout this paper, the term "fuel" refers to organic fuels, including not only the fossil
fuels (oil, natural gas, associated gas, coal, and shale) but also refinery byproduct gas, peat,
and fuel wood; nuclear fuels are excluded. Similarly, the term "thermal power plant" refers
' The Soviets publish comprehensive data on the power industry at five-year intervals
corresponding to their planning cycles; therefore, the most complete and current data are
for 1980. These data have been revised and updated through December 1984 0
only to conventional (nonnuclear) power plants.
They are summarized in appendix tables covering thermal power plant
individual fuels (oil, gas, and coal).
capacity and fuel-use capability in 1980, projected new thermal power plant capacity and
fuel-use capability during 1981-85 and 1986-90, and in a list of power plants in the 1981-85
fuel conversion program. The appendix also explains the methodology used to project total
power industry fuel demand in 1985 and 1990 and the industry's demand for major
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Soviet Plans and Prospects
for Reducing Oil Use in
the Electric Power Industry
The Power Industry's Claim on Soviet Fuel Output
The power industry is the largest single consumer of
fuels in the Soviet Union. From 75 to 80 percent of all
electricity and 50 percent of centralized heat are
supplied by power stations that burn organic fuels.
Over the last two decades the power industry has
tended to consume a growing share of total fuel
output, particularly oil (figure 1).
Unlike electric power generation in most other coun-
tries, the Soviet power industry provides a substantial
portion of the space- and process-heating needs of its
customers. This heat is "cogenerated" at power
plants, and nearly 40 percent of the fuel consumed by
the power industry is used for this purpose. Soviet
energy experts anticipate that fuel requirements for
cogenerated heat at power plants will continue to
grow until the late 1990s, when they expect that
nuclear energy will be used extensively in this role.
In the 1960s, the amount of fuel used by power plants
nearly doubled. The growth of fuel demand in the
power industry far outpaced the growth of fuel pro-
duction. At that time, however, the potential for
imbalance between power industry fuel requirements
and fuel production did not alarm Soviet energy
planners. The oil, gas, and coal industries were grow-
ing steadily, and power industry experts were promis-
ing that nuclear energy would soon replace many
power plants that use organic fuels.
In the 1970s, power industry consumption increased
to about 27 percent of the country's fuel production.
Although the rate of growth in power industry fuel
demand slowed, Soviet energy analysts became in-
creasingly concerned about the quantities and types of
fuel supplied to the industry. In their view, the share
of organic fuel output going to the power industry had
to be reduced, but nuclear energy was not developing
rapidly enough to make this possible. High-level fears
about energy arose, reflecting uncertainty concerning
the reliability of supplies (particularly of oil) and the
outlook for growing energy demand and slow progress
toward conservation. Moreover, a number of Mos-
cow's energy experts noted that the share of oil output
going to power plants was soaring
Oil use at power plants more than doubled in the
1970s, to become the power industry's largest fuel
source by 1980 (see table 1). A number of factors
favored oil consumption: it burns more cleanly and
efficiently than coal; it is easier to transport and store
than either coal or gas; and, during the 1970s, power
industry designers introduced a new generation of
large-scale plants that took advantage of the combus-
tion properties of fuel oil to produce electricity more
efficiently and cheaply.
Coal consumption at power stations-in terms of
standard fuel equivalent (SFE)-increased about 20
percent in the first half of the 1970s but declined
somewhat by the end of the decade. The dropoff
reflected the declining output of coal and its poorer
quality in terms of lower heat content and higher
noncombustible content. As a result of these changes,
coal declined in relative importance as a power indus-
try fuel source, dropping behind oil. Nevertheless, the
power industry is still the largest customer for coal,
consuming nearly 40 percent of total output, although
it competes for supplies with other important consum-
ers such as ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy.
In the 1960s, when power plants used about 40
percent of total gas output, gas use in the power
industry increased more than threefold. As gas distri-
bution networks added a more diverse range of cus-
tomers in the 1970s, growth in power plant gas use
slowed to about 60 percent. During this period many
power stations became seasonal gas customers, run-
ning on gas in the spring and summer and switching
to oil when the fall and winter heating demand for gas
peaked.
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 1970
1975
1980
Figure 1
USSR: Electric Power Industry-Claims on Soviet
Fuel Output, 1960-80
Output of all fuels/output of individual
fuels-crude oil including gas condensate, natural
gas, coal, peat, oil shale, and fuelwood.
Percent share Million tons standard fuel equivalent
Total fuel
1960
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
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1980 pmomspomisil~
1970
1975
1965
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980 V:j
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
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Table 1
USSR: Measures of Fuel Consumption
by All Electric Power Plants a
Oil (million metric tons)
53.0
90.8
131.2
Gas (billion cubic meters)
71.3
94.3
116.6
Coal (million metric tons)
246.0
308.3
313.9
Other (million metric tons)
59.0
61.0
48.0
As Soviet energy policy began to receive greater high-
level attention in the early 1970s, the power industry
became the focal point for several programs intended
to correct what were seen as growing imbalances in
energy supply and demand relationships. Notably, the
Ministry of Power and Electrification (hereinafter
Power Ministry) was directed to increase the use of
coal and reduce the use of oil. This goal posed difficult
fuel supply adjustments for the power industry be-
cause coal use was in decline and oil was becoming
the most important fuel source at power plants. F
Million metric tons standard At least since 1974, when the Soviets were setting fuel
fuel equivalent b targets for the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976-80), in-
Million b/d oil equivalent
Total
4.56
6.10
7.11
Oil
1.03
1.76
2.54
Gas
1.18
1.57
1.93
Coal
2.10
2.52
2.44
Other
0.25
0.25
0.20
Percent shares of SFE
Total
100.0 100.0
100.0
Gas
26.0 25.7
27.2
Coal
46.1 41.3
34.3
Other
5.4 4.2
2.8
a Consumption of fuel to produce electricity and cogenerated heat
by all power plants, both Ministry of Power and Electrification
stations and those plants dedicated to other industries. "Oil"
comprises residual fuel oil and diesel oil; "Gas" comprises natural,
refinery byproduct, and associated gases; "Coal" comprises hard
coal, lignite, and cleaning plant secondary products. "Other"
includes shale, shale oil, peat, and possibly some fuelwood or
cellulose.
b The standard fuel equivalent (SFE) is equal to 7,000 kilocalories
per kilogram. The amount of oil, gas, coal, or other fuel products
needed to provide this quantity of heat varies among products and
may vary over time. According to Power Ministry data:
1 million tons of fuel oil products equal 1.385 million tons SFE;
1 billion cubic meters of gas products equal 1.19 million tons SFE;
1 million tons (averaged) of shale, peat, or fuelwood products equal
0.30 million tons SFE; 1 million tons of coal products equaled 0.61
million tons SFE in 1970, 0.585 million tons SFE in 1975, and
0.557 million tons SFE in 1980.
creased coal usage has been considered a key route to
reductions in power station oil consumption. In fact,
during the mid-1970s planners looked to rapid con-
struction of coal-fired generating capacity as the
centerpiece of the effort to reduce oil use.
The 1976-80 plan called for the replacement of oil by
coal at new facilities. The plan envisioned the rapid
expansion of open pit coal mines and timely construc-
tion of mine-mouth power plants as the best means to
boost coal consumption and permit reduced oil use.
However, the share of coal in fuel consumption at
power plants under direct control of the Power Minis-
try (about 90 percent of Soviet capacity at thermal
power stations) declined, while the share of oil rose
substantially, as shown in the tabulation (in percent
shares of SFE):
1975 1980 1980
Actual Actual Plan
Thus, by the late 1970s, hopes for coal had faded,
overtaken by production problems and the promise of
gas-for-oil substitution.
The coal-centered strategy failed because of con-
straints in the coal and electric-power industries.
Total coal output declined in both the quantity mined
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Figure 2
Regional Distribution of Electric Generating Capacity, 1980
55,4%
9.0% 1
--------- aku
`% pr100%
Other
" European
35.3% Tashkent
Central0647,
> Asia J'
53.3, 46.7'
and the heat content of coal delivered to customers,
forcing the Power Ministry to offset the resulting
shortfalls with increased oil use. Moreover, the indus-
try was unable to complete planned new capacity at
power plants located near mines where coal produc-
tion increased. As a result, greater reliance on coal
usage has been postponed as a viable policy until the
late 1980s and 1990s, when the Soviets anticipate that
mine-mouth power plants east of the Urals will make
a major contribution to electricity supply.
Electricity production in the USSR is still very depen-
dent on adequate and timely fuel supply for thermal
power plants, despite the substantial use of hydroelec-
tric plants in some regions and a growing contribution
94%
Center
Moscow
th
coarsus
PPx1?',,te ertenr
n
Kazakhstan
Total installed
capacity
266,700 megawatts
u-1s Power system name
- Region boundary
ear
Nucl.77
4
Thermal
75.7%
from nuclear stations. Figure 2 illustrates the relative
shares of thermal, hydro, and nuclear power generat-
ing capacity in major regions of the Soviet Union in
1980. The current picture is not much changed. By
December 1984, the Soviet electric power system had
a total capacity of roughly 305,000 megawatts (MW),
with some 223,000 MW (73 percent) at thermal
plants, nearly 59,000 MW (19 percent) at hydroelec-
tric stations, and about 23,000 MW (8 percent) at
nuclear plants.
Multifuel Capability of Soviet Power Plants
The Soviets design their thermal power plants to use
more than one fuel to ensure against supply interrup-
tions, to circumvent limitations in the fuel distribution
32.5%
(D-67.5%
Far East
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network, and to minimize fuel costs.' In 1980, only
about 20 percent of Soviet thermal power stations
were limited to the combustion of a single fuel.
Multifuel capability has important implications for oil
consumption and for programs to reduce oil use (see
table 2). Almost 85 percent of the thermal power plant
capacity in the USSR can use oil, even though only
about 10 percent now burns oil as the sole fuel.F
Coal-Fired Plants
Although more than one-half of Soviet thermal power
plants were equipped to burn coal in 1980, coal
accounted for only about one-third of the total fuel
used by the power industry that year-despite a
policy favoring increased use. The main reasons for
the coal shortfall were: lagging production, declining
quality, bottlenecks and disruptions in transportation,
and increased plant downtime because of aging equip-
ment. These factors continue to hinder the expansion
of coal's role in power generation, and deliveries to
power plants have remained nearly constant since
1980. As a result, the power plants scheduled to use
coal must increase their reliance on backup fuels, oil
and gas.
Soviet plans for construction of coal-fired power
stations were ambitious. In 1976-80, about one-third
of new organic-fueled capacity-15,000 MW of the
planned 43,800 MW-was to burn coal as the prima-
ry fuel. By 1980, solid-fueled power plants using coal,
peat, and shale were to provide 44 percent of total
electricity and 55 percent of electricity from organic
fuels. Actually, the solid-fuel share of electricity
generation declined. Because of shortfalls in coal
production, solid fuels provided only one-third of total
power output and two-fifths of the electricity generat-
ed from organic fuel.
Although industry data for 1981-85 are not yet
available, it is clear that the Power Ministry's efforts
to increase the use of coal continue to falter-again
' The term "fuel-use capability" is used here to describe the original
power plant design and later modifications which allow the plant to
burn various fuels; these adaptations include boiler configuration,
fuel handling and storage facilities, and training of personnel for
operation and routine maintenance of the fuel systems
Table 2
USSR: Fuel-Use Capability of
Thermal Power Plants in 1980 a
Fuel Megawatts Percent
Share
Maximum capacity (capable of burning
indicated fuel as primary or secondary
energy source) b
Total
176,087
100.0
Oil
148,752
84.5
Coal
90,826
51.6
Gas
66,950
38.0
Minor fuels
6,879
3.9
Actual distribution c
Total
176,087
100.0
Oil
20,256
11.5
Oil/gas d
44,643
25.4
Coal/oil
79,407
45.0
Peat/oil
1,189
0.7
Coal/oil/gas
1,542
0.9
Gas/oil/coal
525
0.3
Peat/coal/oil
740
0.4
Peat/gas/oil
450
0.3
Coal/gas
8,419
4.8
Natural gas
8,347
4.7
Byproduct or associated gas
3,024
1.7
Peat
2,769
1.6
Shale
3,045
1.7
Secondary heat
1,731
1.0
a This table summarizes the results of our study of fuel consumption
at nearly 300 thermal power plants that were operating in the
Soviet power system by yearend 1980. The 300 plants represent
176,087 MW of the total thermal capacity of 201,900 MW on line
at that time. For a regional summary of the plants studied, see table
9 in the appendix.
b All plants that were studied have been aggregated by their
capability to burn a specific fuel irrespective of whether this fuel
actually was used. The percentage shares thus reflect individual
fuels' maximum potential share of the total capacity. Because this
share calculation ignores the effect of all other fuel usage, multiple
counting results.
c This distribution summarizes the actual fuel-use capability of the
300 power plants studied.
d Primary, secondary, and tertiary capabilities are indicated in
sequence, separated by slash marks.
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mainly because of stagnating coal production.' Ex-
haustion of the more accessible reserves has left the
older coal basins with much poorer mining condi-
tions-just keeping output from declining is difficult
and costly. At the same time, rapid expansion of
surface mining has not gone according to plan be-
cause investments have been delayed and improve-
ment in the productivity of equipment and labor has
been slow.'
Maintaining adequate coal supplies to the power
industry has been and will, we estimate, continue to
be a major problem, as shown in table 3. In 1980, for
example, the reduction in coal shipments from suppli-
ers in the Donets/L'vov-Volynsk (Ukraine), Moscow,
and Chelyabinsk/Kizelovsk (Urals) regions offsets
nearly 50 percent of the increased availability of coal
for power plants from the Kuznetsk, Ekibastuz, and
Kansk-Achinsk areas. By 1990, falling output from
the Ukraine, Moscow, and Urals regions will probably
offset more than one-fourth of the increment in other
coal supplies to power stations. Moreover, power
plants designed to use the higher quality coals from
the older regions generally will not be able to use the
lower quality coals from the more recently developed
regions without major boiler modifications, downrat-
ing of generating capacity, and increased transporta-
tion costs (given the longer shipping distances).F--]
When coal-quality problems interfere with power
station operation, a common solution is to switch to a
backup fuel (frequently oil). The backup oil can be
used to supplement lower quality coal when the coal
quality has declined but is still close to the parameters
specified in the boiler design. However, when coal
quality is much lower than called for in the original
plant design, major boiler changes must be imple-
mented before the new, inferior coal can be used.F_
Coal Transportation. Delays in the delivery of rail-
hauled coal frequently disrupt operations and push
down utilization rates at power plants. When coal
' The Soviets have not augmented power plant coal supplies by
shifting coal from other uses. In the metallurgical industry-the
second-largest consumer of coal-the opportunities for reducing
coal use are circumscribed by technical considerations, as well as by
the potential costs of plant modification and loss of production
during the changeover period.
Table 3
USSR: Sources of Coal Supply
for the Power Ministry a
Million metric tons
of raw coal
1975
1980
1985
Plan b
Projected
1985
1990
Total
284.7
299.3
335.2
313.5
350.0
Kuznetsk
59.4
74.7
79.7
78.7
83.7
Ekibastuz
44.1
62.4
82.4
80.0
105.0
Donets
64.8
59.7
59.7
54.6
48.6
Karaganda
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
Kansk-Achinsk
19.3
23.3
33.3
33.3
50.0
Moscow
29.0
21.8
21.8
14.0
10.0
Chelyabinsk
12.3
10.1
10.1
7.9
5.9
Pechora
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
L'vov-Volyn'
9.8
7.3
7.3
4.8
2.8
Kizelovsk
2.8
2.1
2.1
1.4
1.0
Other basins
8.2
2.9
3.8
3.8
8.0
a Coal supplies for power plants of the Ministry of Power and
Electrification. The Power Ministry uses about 90 percent of all
coal burned in power plants.
b Plan total and most regional detail are from Power Ministry data.
Data for Karaganda, Pechora, and Kuznetsk underground mines
are CIA interpolations.
c Projections are midpoints of CIA estimates based on analysis of
the coal mining industry. This analysis assumes that all increases in
coal output from the Kuznetsk, Ekibastuz, and Kansk-Achinsk
basins go to power plants as planned. We also assumed that coal
supply shortfalls resulting from declining output at the Donets,
Moscow, Chelyabinsk, L'vov-Volyn', and Kizelovsk basins are
apportioned to the power industry in line with past shares of output
from each producer.
supplies are delayed by rail bottlenecks-especially
after power plant stocks have been exhausted in late
winter-the plants often must operate on backup fuel
or shut down. Coal haulage will probably become
even more troublesome to the power industry later in
the 1980s.
Part of the strain on the rail network results from the
need to move increasing amounts of coal from eastern
basins to the European USSR to offset coal produc-
tion shortfalls at western basins. By 1985, for exam-
ple, the Power Ministry plans to ship 20 million
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metric tons of Kuznetsk coal some 3,500 kilometers
(km) to power plants in the central industrial region.
Not surprisingly, the average length of rail-haul for
coal has increased, from 692 km in 1970 to about 830
km in 1983. Coal losses have increased with the
length of rail shipments. The longer shipping dis-
tances increase the amount of pulverized coal blown
out of open cars and the chance that coal of all sizes
will be shaken loose from poorly loaded and inade-
quately maintained railcars.
The erosion in coal quality aggravates the coal trans-
portation problem. Ekibastuz coal, which makes up
about one-fifth of the raw coal used by power plants,
is 40-percent ash (noncombustible matter). Because
this coal is not cleaned to reduce the ash content, each
year thousands of railcars that would otherwise be
unnecessary are required for shipment from Ekibas-
tuz. Another low-quality coal, lignite from Kansk-
Achinsk, is subject to spontaneous combustion in
transit and often freezes solid in rail cars. These
difficulties presently limit its shipment to distances of
600 km or less (see map, figure 3).
The low-quality Ekibastuz and Kansk-Achinsk coals
are likely to make up a growing share of rail-shipped
coal in the 1980s unless programs for "coal-by-wire"
transfer of energy are greatly accelerated.' Continued
design and construction delays at the Kansk-Achinsk
mine-mouth power plants will probably force the
Soviets to increase rail shipment of this coal-boost-
ing the Kansk-Achinsk share in the tonnage of coal
transported by rail from mines from 8 percent in 1980
to about 14 percent by 1990.
Backup Fuels. Coal-fired power stations, with few
exceptions, use fuel oil; natural gas; or, sometimes,
both of these fuels as backup. In 1980, about 88
percent of coal-fueled capacity used fuel oil as a
secondary energy source. Nine percent was backed up
by natural gas, nearly 2 percent could use either oil or
gas, while only 1 percent relied solely on coal.
' Coal-by-wire energy transfer is a technology for bridging long
distances between coal producers and users. In the USSR, power
industry coal-by-wire plans for the 1980s call for construction of
coal-fired power plants near the Ekibastuz and Kansk-Achinsk
mines and transmission of the plants' electricity output to the Urals
and the central industrial region over ultra-high-voltage powerlines.
To some extent a backup fuel must be used in the
operation of a coal-fired power plant. During boiler
starts, a higher quality fuel, such as fuel oil or natural
gas, is fired initially; then, after the boiler and other
systems have reached equilibrium, the plant is shifted
gradually to coal. The starting of boilers occurs
frequently because of major maintenance, after emer-
gency shutdown, or as part of a routine response to
increased electricity demand. About 1 or 2 percent of 25X1
a coal plant's annual fuel consumption consists of
backup fuel used for boiler restart purnoses.
The preponderant share of backup fuel, however, is 25X1
used mainly when electricity (or both electricity and
cogenerated heat) is required from a plant that has
exhausted its coal stocks. Delivery interruptions range
in severity from temporary transportation difficulties
to major coal-mining problems. The power industry
has built large fuel-oil storage tanks at many coal-
fired power plants (and at plants designed for gas or
minor fuels) to assure steady fuel supply in these
situations (see table 4). The stored oil permits contin-
ued operation of the plants at full capacity for periods
ranging from a day to about four weeks before oil
resupply would be necessary. This capability to switch 25X1
to standby fuel oil is particularly important in the
Ukraine, where,
more than 5 million tons of fuel oil-96,800 25X1
barrels per day oil equivalent (b/doe}-were needed to
offset extended coal supply shortfalls in 1980 alone 25X1
(figure 4).
The backup fuel is also used along with the main fuel
when the quality of coal deliveries declines somewhat.
Fuel oil or natural gas is then burned simultaneously
with the coal to boost the amount of heat released and
ensure that steam pressure remains high enough to
run the electricity-producing turbine-generators at
full capacity. Former first deputy minister of the
Power Ministry, E. I. Borisov, acknowledged that
nearly 3 million tons of fuel oil (58,000 b/doe) was
burned by Ministry power plants in 1982 just to
supplement the heat content of low-quality coal_F_
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Figure 3
Coal Basins Supplying Power Plants
Ekibastui j
basin , l
Karaganda
basin
Oil-Fired Plants
In the 1970s, the use of oil in power plants grew
rapidly. By 1980, oil had overtaken coal as the power
industry's leading fuel. The expansion of oil use was
facilitated by the ability of nearly 85 percent of
thermal power plant capacity to burn oil as primary or
backup fuel. The swift increase in oil use was aided by
Soviet decisions on oil refining and by policies for
improvements to power plant fuel combustion effi-
ciency.
Soviet refineries do not refine crude oil very "deeply."
They therefore produce large amounts of residual fuel
oil, which is suitable only for burning in big industrial
boilers. Power plants are ideal customers for this
residual fuel oil-they use large quantities and stor-
age can be accommodated. In 1980, for example, the
Hard coal (anthracite/bituminous)
Brown coal (lignite)
power industry accounted for about 2.5 million b/doe,
or more than 55 percent, of the 4.4 million b/doe of
residual fuel oil burned in boilers or furnaces.
The power industry welcomed the surge in fuel-oil
availability that accompanied the expansion of Soviet
oil production in the 1970s. Power plants designed for
oil use could be built more cheaply and operated with
better fuel-use efficiency than plants designed for
coal, the chief competing fuel. A shared interest
between power industry planners and oil refiners, who
were interested primarily in meeting throughput
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Table 4
USSR: Fuel Oil Storage at Selected Power Plants a
Oil Storage
(thousand barrels)
Primary
Fuel c
1983 Capacity
(megawatts)
Equivalent Days of
Full Power Output
on Fuel Oil d
Syrdar'ya Gres
950
Gas/oil
3,000
8.5
Yermakovskiy Gres
400
Coal
2,400
4.5
Stavropol' Gres
400
Oil/gas
2,100
5.1
Kurakhovka Gres
400
Coal
1,460
7.3
Nazarovo Gres
59
Coal
1,300
1.2
Navoi Gres
122
Gas
1,250
2.6
Gusinoozersk Gres
300
Coal
840
9.6
Cherepovets Gres 2
129
Peat
630
5.5
Arkangel'sk Tets
400
Oil/gas
420
25.5
Takhia-Tash Gres
190
Oil/gas
368
13.8
Tambov Tets
236
Coal/oil/gas
310
20.3
b Plants labeled "Gres" (after the Soviet designation for state
regional electric power station) generate electricity primarily, if not
exclusively. Plants labeled "Tets" (after the Soviet designation for
heat-electricity central) provide both electricity and cogenerated
heat. Fuel used at Gres and Tets plants is for generation of both
electricity and heat.
goals, thus helped to promote rapid expansion of oil-
fired capacity and related power plant design innova-
tions. These innovations resulted in successive new
generations of power-generating units, each larger
than its predecessor. By the early 1980s, a sizable
number of large, oil-fired units (500 MW, 800 MW,
and 1,200 MW) were on line.
Soviet energy planners had hoped to make changes in
the electric power and refining industries during the
early 1980s so that heavy fuel oil displaced by
increased use of gas or coal in power plant boilers
could be further refined to yield lighter products
(diesel fuel, gasoline, and jet fuel). Neither the power
industry nor the refining industry has been able to
c Fuels at multifuel-capable plants are listed in order of their share
during normal operations.
d Calculated as the number of 24-hour days-of-operation possible at
full plant capacity before fuel-oil tanks are exhausted. It is assumed
that tanks are at full capacity to start and that there will be no
resupply during period.
c Capacity of 2,400 megawatts (MW) designed to burn oil and
1,200 MW to burn coal as primary fuel.
implement the plans that would have led to expanded
secondary processing of fuel oil. As a result, refineries
continue to produce relatively large quantities of
heavy fuel oil-a product that meets power industry
fuel needs at plants experiencing coal supply problems
or delays in conversion to gas.
Gas-Fired Plants
For nearly a decade, the power industry has been
tasked with bringing its gas consumption more fully
into line with the ability of power plants to use gas. In
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1980, for example, 38 percent of thermal power plant
capacity could use gas, but gas accounted for only 27
percent of power industry fuel consumption. Limita-
tions on gas use at gas-capable power stations result
from an energy policy that gives priority to other
customers during seasonal energy demand surges,
when the gas pipelines serving an area are unable to
meet total demand.
Gas now accounts for about 30 percent of power
industry fuel use, indicating that bottlenecks in gas
distribution have eased. However, many gas-capable
power plants still burn other fuels-primarily oil
products-during seasonal upswings in the energy
demand of industrial and municipal/ residential sec-
tors. The causes of these spurts in gas consumption
outside the electric power sector include increased use
for residential space heating; industrial process-
heating at the end of a quarter when plants are
pushed to peak operating rates to meet production
quotas; and backup fuel when other gas customers
(with backup fuel capability but without adequate
backup storage capacity) run low on other fuels.' F_
The surge in fuel and electricity demand by industrial plants at
the end of a quarter particularly strains the gas distribution system.
As plants try to win bonuses by meeting or exceeding quarterly
output goals, fuel consumption soars; because gas distribution
pipelines are not designed to accommodate the peak usage, some
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The amount of gas diverted from power plant use is
large. For example, in 1980 the Power Ministry
posted an average daily gas consumption of about 284
million cubic meters in December but had used 25
percent less gas in January. On an annual basis, the
effect of these limits on gas use is substantial. If gas
supplies to the Power Ministry had been maintained
all during 1980 at the December rate, total annual gas
use by the Ministry could have been increased by
about 13 billion cubic meters. The effect of fully
utilizing gas at all the power plants connected to the
existing gas distribution system is more pronounced
when non-Ministry gas-capable power plants are in-
cluded in the network: we estimate that annual gas
use could be boosted by about 17 billion cubic meters.'
To bring the power plant gas network close to maxi-
mum utilization, the Soviets need to push more gas
into the large urban pipeline systems. This task is
easiest for plants readily accessible to the major gas
trunk pipeline system, which is being greatly expand-
ed during this decade. The relative ease with which
the Soviets boosted gas consumption during 1981-83
can be largely explained by this process of bringing
some of the existing gas networks to full throughput
capacity.
Expanding the capacity of urban gas networks and
constructing lateral gas pipelines from the main
branch lines to service distant power plants may not
be completed until the 1990s. New demands for gas
resulting from major new plants or from additions to
gas-fired power plants are shown in table 5. In large
urban areas, extending the gas network is a slow and
complicated task, often requiring tunneling. In a press
interview, the deputy chief of a Moscow-area pipeline
construction trust stressed that the gaslines must be
built without interrupting traffic flow on roads. In the
Moscow area, for example, one 38-km pipeline section
currently under construction has 70 intersections with
roads or with other underground lines.
New Capacity at Thermal Power Plants
Planned construction of power plants using organic
fuels is substantial even though the Soviets are count-
ing on rapid growth in nuclear power plant capacity.
' Increasing annual gas consumption by 17 billion cubic meters at
power plants capable of using both oil and gas would save about
The original 1981-85 plan called for 35,200 MW of
new thermal capacity, constituting 51 percent of total
planned power plant additions. About 16,600 MW of
thermal capacity went on line during 1981-83, and we
estimate a total of 27,500 MW will be completed by
yearend 1985 (see tables 10 and 11 in appendix). F_
The fuel requirements for the new power plants are
substantially different from those originally planned
by the Power Ministry. About 70 percent of the
35,200 MW of planned new capacity was to have
been fueled by coal, peat, or shale (mainly by coal),
but only 45 percent of our yearend 1985 estimate of
27,500 MW has been designed to burn such fuels.'?
The Power Ministry may have made an unpublicized
decision to slow down construction of coal-fired power
plants, or equipment and construction bottlenecks
may have hit coal plants harder than other plants. In
any event, the power industry will be hard pressed to
obtain sufficient coal for even the reduced number of
new coal-fired plants, as well as for additions to plants
already operating (see table 6). Without adequate coal
supplies for these power stations, the power industry
will have to burn more oil or gas than planned at
nominally coal-based plants.
Despite Soviet claims that very little thermal capacity
is being built in the European USSR, we estimate
that more than one-third of the total thermal capacity
to come on line during 1981-85 is located there. This
additional capacity may be advantageous in light of
nuclear power plant construction delays. However, the
reason the Soviets wanted to curb new thermal power
plant construction in this region was the increasing
costs of bringing fuels westward from Siberia and
Kazakhstan-costs that are probably rising faster
than the Power Ministry had anticipated.
We project that during 1986-90, about 24,000 MW of
new thermal power generating capacity will be
brought on line (see tables 12 and 13 in the appendix).
This estimate is based on published Soviet targets,
10 During 1981-85, about 18 percent of the estimated new capacity
was designed chiefly for gas firing, and another roughly 36 percent
of the new plants can use either gas or oil. Somewhat less than 1
percent of the new capacity will need to use oil as the primary fuel,
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Table 5
USSR: Major Additions to Gas-Fired Power
Plants and Resulting Fuel Demand a
Surgut Gres 1
Surgut Gres 2
Pechora Gres
Moscow Tets 25
Mary Gres
Mangyshlak Gres 3
Navoi Gres
Nizhnevartovsk Gres
Talimardzhan Gres
Zuyevka Gres 2 e
Urengoy Gres
Krasnovodsk Gres
Krasnovodsk Tets 2
Leningrad Tets 26
Takhia-Tash Gres
Syrdar'ya Gres
Tobol'sk Tets
Moscow Tets 23
Tallin Tets 2
Plan c
1981-85
Projected d
800
1,600
795
795
800
1,600
420
210
420
250
250
250
420
210
210
210
210
210
210
210
800
800
600
500
400
321
500
500
500
500
250
250
420
210
210
500
500
420
420
300
300
310
310
250
250
220
220
200
200
a This table includes additions of 200 megawatts (MW) or larger at
new or existing plants.
b Plants labeled "Gres" (after the Soviet designation for state
regional electric power station) generate electricity primarily, if not
exclusively. Plants labeled "Tets" (after the Soviet designation for
heat-electricity central) provide both electricity and cogenerated
heat. Fuel used at Gres and Tets plants is for generation of both
electricity and heat. Plants with oil backup can burn either oil or
gas and have sizable oil storage on site; gas demand is calculated
for operation only on gas.
c
The 10,125 MW is nearly all the gas-fired capacity in the
published original plan. Plan (1985) fuel demand is about maximum
annual demand by total new planned additions during 1981-85.
Plan c Projected d
1985
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
2.6
0.7
0.3
0.7
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
1.3
1.3
1.0
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.5
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
0.6
0.6
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.2
1.2
0.7
0.7
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.7
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.3
0.3
d CIA projection of 1981-85 and 1986-90 additions to capacity
based on analysis of construction progress and extrapolation of
trends to 1990. The 7,945 MW projected for 1981-85 is about half
of the estimated new gas-fired capacity to be completed by yearend
1985. The 10,071 MW projected for 1986-90 is 80 percent of the
new gas-fired capacity likely to be built in that period. Projected
fuel demand in 1985 and 1990 is based on estimates for operation
at effective maximum annual capacity utilization rate (63 percent).
Actual utilization in 1985 and 1990 could range from 47 to 63
percent, according to past performance.
e The Zuyevka Gres 2 was designed as a coal-fired plant but was
converted to gas before any boilers began operating.
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Table 6
USSR: Major Additions to Coal-Fired Power
Plants and Resulting Fuel Demand a
Plant b
Capacity (megawatts)
Plan c
Plan C
Projected d
1981-85
1985
Total
10,370
5,430
8,470
20.3
10.4
15.8
Ekibastuz Gres 1
2,500
2,500
4.1
4.1
Ekibastuz Gres 2
1,500
500
3,500
2.5
0.8
5.8
Ekibastuz Gres 3
500
0.8
Berezovka Gres 1
1,600
3.1
3.1
Angren Gres 2
600
300
300
1.2
0.6
0.6
Neryungri Gres
600
210
390
1.6
0.4
1.2
Primorsk Gres
600
600
1.2
1.2
Omsk Tets 5
240
240
0.7
0.7
Novo-Zima Tets
220
220
0.6
0.6
Izhevsk Tets 2
220
220
0.6
0.6
Kurgan Tets
220
220
0.6
0.6
a This table includes additions of 200 megawatts (MW) or larger at
new or existing plants.
b Plants labeled "Gres" (after the Soviet designation for state
regional electric power station) generate electricity primarily, if not
exclusively. Plants labeled "Tets" (after the Soviet designation for
heat-electricity central) provide both electricity and cogenerated
heat. Some Gres plants are hybrids; the Neryungri Gres, for
example, is designed to have two 180-MW Tets additions. Fuel
used at Gres, Tets, or Gres hybrids is for generation of both
electricity and heat.
The 10,370-MW total is about 40 percent of the published
original plan for new coal-fired capacity. Planned fuel demand for
1985 is nearly equal to the maximum annual demand by total new
planned additions during 1981-85.
Power Ministry plans to reduce thermal plant con-
struction and boost nuclear plant construction, and
observed progress on construction of power plants
accounting for nearly 21,000 MW of that total. Our
projections of the fuel-use capability of this new
d CIA projections of 1981-85 and 1986-90 additions to capacity at
new and existing plants are based on analysis of construction
progress and extrapolation of trends to 1990. The 5,430 MW
projected for 1981-85 is about 48 percent of the estimated new
coal-fired capacity to be completed during these years. The 8,470
MW projected for 1986-90 is nearly 90 percent of the likely coal-
fueled new capacity built in that period. Projected fuel demand in
1985 and 1990 is based on capacity estimates operated at effective
maximum annual utilization (63 percent). Actual utilization in 1985
and 1990 could range from 47 to 63 percent.
e The Zuyevka Gres 2 was designed as a coal-fired plant but
converted to gas before any boilers began operating. The Smolensk
Gres was designed as a peat-fired plant, but the Soviets plan to
convert it during construction to coal use.
capacity are preliminary-the Soviets have already
announced the redesign of two major power plants
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(about 9 percent of the estimated 1986-90 thermal
power plant increment) from coal to gas."
Since the mid-1970s, the Soviets have considered
power plant fuel conversion as one of their most
important tools in reducing oil use (see inset)." As
indicated above, natural gas is now the critical fuel in
the USSR's boiler conversion program. Conversion to
coal use has been studied but implemented only on a
very small scale. There have even been some cases
where coal- or peat-fired power plants were converted
to oil use when the superior quality and assured
supply of fuel oil was judged to result in substantial
improvement to plant performance and reliability. LI
Moscow's 1985 goal is to change the fuel input to
about 32,000 MW of power plant capacity-nearly 14
percent of total projected thermal power station ca-
pacity. We believe that this goal is overly ambitious
and that the Soviets will convert roughly 15,000 MW
by yearend 1984. At this pace, they should be able to
shift nearly 5 percent of the power industry's 1985
fuel consumption almost entirely to natural gas. Re-
ductions in oil use will be limited to about 240,000
b/doe, because more than three-fifths of the targeted
plants burned solid fuels or some gas before the
proposed modifications. The current (1981-85) power
plant conversion program has become a series of ad
hoc adjustments to unexpected changes in fuel sup-
ply-mainly coal shortfalls-rather than an integrat-
ed plan. Despite these circumstances, substantial
progress has been achieved in conversions: nearly
11,000 MW of capacity had been completed by
February 1984-35 percent of the apparent 1985 goal
(see table 7).
" Currently, about 44 percent of the power plant capacity that we
expect to be completed during 1986-90 is designed to use solid fuel
(41 percent will use coal), less than 1 percent is scheduled to burn
another 20 percent will be equipped to use either gas or oil.
12 The Soviets use the term "power plant fuel conversion" to
describe a range of activities. In the broadest Soviet usage,
"conversion" entails any change at the power plant or in the fuel
distribution system (chiefly gas networks) that results in increased
consumption of the target fuel. In a narrow sense, "conversion" is
often used to describe only those modifications at a power plant
necessary to equip the plant to burn a fuel other than the one it has
been using. Other modifications to the fuel distribution network
are, however, usually necessary before the plant can use the "new"
fuel. Distinguishing the type of conversion being referred to in
Soviet source material is important because of the likelihood of
large differences in types and amounts of fuel consumption associ-
Power plant fuel conversion is not new to the Soviets.
Before the mid-1970s, however, fuel "conversion"
was simpler to execute: it involved power plant
modifications to improve fuel-consumption efficiency
at plants using multiple fuels, not, for the most part,
substitution offuels-a process that requires the
coordination of several bureaucracies. For example, a
former Power Ministry boiler inspector reported on
an effort begun in 1970 to improve the efficiency of oil
and coal use in coal-fired power plants in the
Ukraine. By the time this effort was completed in
1979, about 17,800 MW of capacity had been
upgraded-nearly half the thermal power station
capacity in the Ukraine. The Power Ministry made
these changes with little involvement of other minis-
tries.
Major efforts to reduce oil consumption were at-
tempted as early as 1978, when Gosplan announced a
decision to convert combustion equipment at 265
installations from fuel oil to natural gas. A large
share of these proposed conversions were at power
stations in the Urals and Volga regions, along the
route of the main gas pipelines planned from
Medvezh'ye and Urengoy. The Soviets assessed the
results of this early conversion program in 1980 and
were largely disappointed. In the Urals region several
major power stations cut back or ceased oil use, but
conversion lagged at many others. In the Volga region
the conversion program had not shown results-the
Power Ministry did not have ready the detailed plans
necessary for timely conversion, and the gas pipeline
sections and compressor stations were not brought on
line according to schedule.
There have been at least three versions of power
industry planning for conversions since January 1980.
The 1981-85 power plant conversion program pre-
viewed in January 1980 by the director of Gosplan's
Institute for the Study of Fuel/Energy Problems
called for conversion of large oil-fired power plants in
the Urals and Volga regions to natural gas. The
projected reductions in oil use were about 250,000
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Table 7
USSR: Power Plant Fuel Conversion, 1981-85 a
Planned
1981-85
Completed by
31 January 1984
Total (megawatts)
31,718
10,996
Distribution by primary fuel
before conversion b
Oil
10,162
4,287
Oil/gas
8,260
3,910
Coal
11,964
2,287
Peat
1,332
512
Distribution by primary fuel
after conversion b
Projected annual reduction
in oil use c (thousand b/doe)
420-575
175-245
a Planned conversions summarize all plants identified by the Soviets
as scheduled for conversion to full operation on a new fuel source
during 1981-85. Completed conversions are shown as of 31 January
1984. See table 14 in the appendix for list of individual power
plants.
b Capacity labeled "oil/gas" burned some gas fuel even before
conversion.
c To calculate the reduction in oil use achieved by plant conversion,
the type(s) and quantity of fuel being displaced must be known.
Unfortunately, the Soviet practice of multifuel usage gives this
calculation a range of likely values. Upper estimates of both ranges
show oil savings, if before conversion 25 percent of coal capacity
used oil as fuel (in addition to all oil capacity and all oil-gas
capacity). Lower estimates of ranges show oil savings, if before
conversion all oil and 50 percent of oil-gas capacity used oil.
b/doe. This version of the 11th Five-Year Plan con-
version agenda was little more than an effort to finish
the work begun in the late 1970s.
When the Power Ministry published the details of its
1981-85 plans in 1981, the conversion program had
been doubled in comparison with the 1980 preview.
The new goal was to cut oil use by nearly 500,000
b/doe in 1985, with the effort focused on oil-to-gas
conversion not only in the Urals and Volga regions but
also in the central Moscow region and the Ukraine.
Thus, it was expected in the second version of the
anticipated.
conversion program that large, new gas supplies
would be available to substitute for oil along the route
of the Urengoy-Center gas transmission pipelines.
The coal supply shortfalls that developed were not
The current version of the conversion plan, announced
in December 1983, retains an oil-use reduction goal of
about 500,000 b/doe in 1985 but puts top priority on
using gas to eliminate backup oil use at coal-fired
power stations. The direct substitution of gas for oil at
oil-fired plants has been given a reduced priority. The
Power Ministry, however, has not publicly acknowl-
edged that the net effect of shifting emphasis from
replacement of oil with gas to the current priority of
gas-for-coal makes attainment of even the original
250,000-b/doe oil reduction target unlikely. Power
industry plans include the construction of 27 major
natural gas branch pipelines being built to connect
large power stations with the main gaslines from
Urengoy.
Conversion to Natural Gas
The process of switching a power plant from coal or
oil to gas use is not technically demanding and need
not take the plant out of service for more than several
weeks if gas supply is already in place (see inset for
possible exceptions). Most Soviet power plants that
have used oil as the primary fuel have boilers original-
ly designed to burn gas. Consequently, these plants
can be operated at their full rated capacity after
conversion to gas and may actually increase their fuel
consumption efficiency and reliability.
Although simple in theory, the gas conversion process
in the USSR enounters complications related to the
multiple bureaucracies that must jointly design, pro-
duce components for, construct, and operate the gas
pipeline system connected to a power plant. In some
cases, coordination among the organizations in-
volved-the Gas Ministry, Petroleum and Gas Con-
struction Ministry, Power Ministry, regional con-
struction trusts of the Power Ministry, and individual
power plant management-works fairly smoothly. For
example, the Syrdar'ya Gres plant (3,000 MW) was
fully converted from oil to gas use in somewhat more
than one year.
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Problems in Using Natural Gas
in Large Boilers?
The power industry has been very slow in converting
the largest oil-fired units to gas use and in bringing
on line the largest new units fueled solely by natural
gas. These delays are surprising in view of the broad
objectives of cutting back oil use and boosting gas
consumption.
We can only speculate on possible reasons for the
problems the Soviets are currently encountering in
using their largest boilers. Conversion delays would
result if the Power Ministry were reluctant to take an
800-megawatt (MW) unit (a sizable amount of gener-
ating capacity) out of service even for the several
weeks needed to modify boilers and connect gaslines.
Such reluctance is warranted because there is little or
no reserve capacity for the generation of electricity in
most of the USSR. Another possible explanation of
both delayed conversions and delayed startups of
large, natural-gas-fired units could be the overspe-
cialization of Soviet boiler designs. It is possible that
the largest boilers were designed to maximize oil
consumption efficiency and cannot be easily adapted
to use alternative fuels.
By January 1984, the largest organic-fuel-fired
power-generating units in the USSR were one 1,200-
MW and 10 800-MW power units that were in
Conversions at many other plants, however, experi-
ence long delays, because one or more of the organiza-
tions involved in linking the plants with the gas
distribution network fails to do a job. At the Karman-
ovo Gres (1,800 MW), for example, oil-to-gas conver-
sion was scheduled for October 1983, following about
a year of preparations. Problems with the supply of
material and equipment for construction of gaslines
continued to plague the station into early 1984. About
one-fifth of the power stations slated for conversion to
gas during 1981-85 have had similar serious delays.
These delays have increased the time needed to
change fuels by one to three years. Another one-fifth
of the power plants to be converted by 1985 are
experiencing less serious delays ranging up to one
year.
operation at four power plants. At most, three of the
800-MW units (located at one plant) had been con-
verted from oil to gas use. The Soviet press an-
nounced this conversion was completed in November
1983,
Assuming that the three 800-MW units
have been converted to gas, the remaining 6,800 MW
of large units will use about 150,000 b/doe of oil
products each year. Availability of gas should not be
an issue in at least some and possibly all of these
conversion delays because new gas trunklines have
been completed within a few miles of the power
plants.
The power industry is also behind schedule in bring-
ing on line two new natural-gas-fired 800-MW units.
Delays at one of these units (Perm' Gres) can be
largely explained by the preconstruction work made
necessary when the plant was redesigned from coal to
gas. However, the other 800-MW unit (Surgut Gres
2)-scheduled for completion this year and critically
needed by the oil and gas producers in Tyumen'
Oblast-is unlikely to supply electricity until 1986.
Compared with previous plans, the current program
for conversion to gas is a much more complex effort,
and the amount of oil reduction is constrained. As
noted earlier, initial Soviet planning (1976-80) for
power plant boiler conversions to gas use depended on
minor adjustments at power plants in the Urals and
Volga regions and the tapping of expected increases in
gas supplies. If these conversion plans had succeeded,
the Soviets would have been able to increase gas use,
and at the same time back out sizable quantities of oil
at these power plants. Because of coal supply prob-
lems, however, the power industry is now stressing
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coal-to-gas conversion while still hoping to back out as
much oil as originally planned. Although switching
from oil to gas as the backup fuel at coal-fired plants
can reduce the effects of coal shortfalls on oil con-
sumption, the reduction in oil use will be less than
could be achieved if all the gas were substituted in
power plants that burn only oil.
According to the latest conversion plans, the Power
Ministry will attempt to convert 31,718 MW of
capacity before yearend 1985. The conversions are
intended to increase gas use by about 50 billion cubic
meters annually, reduce oil use by 420,000 to 575,000
b/doe, and cut back raw coal use by about 40 million
tons. However, at the current pace of conversion, only
15,000 MW of plant capacity will be modified in time
to affect fuel consumption in 1985. This amount of
conversion would probably boost gas use by 23 billion
cubic meters, reduce oil consumption by 220,000 to
250,000 b/doe (with oil savings most likely to fall
about 240,000 b/doe), and decrease coal use by 20-24
million tons (raw coal). (The latest schedule of power
plant fuel conversions is shown in table 14 in the
appendix.)
During 1986-90 the power industry probably will try
to accelerate the gas conversion program, but the
outlook for attaining more ambitious targets is un-
clear. On the positive side, the experience gained in
the current conversion effort should lead to a reduc-
tion in the bureaucratic bottlenecks that have delayed
the approval process for conversion of plants; the
production and timely shipment of the necessary
pipeline segments, compressors, valves, and other
equipment; and the assignment of work crews. On the
negative side, however, plants targeted for conversion
to gas in 1986-90 will be farther from the main gas
pipelines and probably technically more difficult to
convert than currently selected plants. Consequently,
we expect that much, if not all, of the gains from
increased efficiency in the planning and execution of
conversion will be offset by increased requirements for
pipeline construction and complications in modifying
boilers at large oil-fired power plants slated for
conversion (see inset).
During 1986-90, we estimate that the Power Ministry
will convert some 15,000 to 20,000 MW of capacity to
gas use. Consumption would be boosted by 23-34
billion cubic meters, approximately the annual
throughput of one main gas trunkline. The lower end
of this range represents the completion of the sched-
uled conversions that we estimate will remain from
the current five-year plan. The upper end contem-
plates the completion of the current conversion pro-
gram plus 4,000 MW from plants newly targeted for 25X1
conversion. If all the additional gas were to displace
oil, power plant consumption of oil could be reduced
by up to 565,000 b/doe. By 1990, however, the power
industry will probably continue to have problems with
coal quality and intermittent shortfalls in supply. Gas
will be used to work around these difficulties. Perhaps
as much as 40 percent of the gas going to converted
power plants could be needed to offset the shortfalls,
if the experience of 1981-85 is repeated.
Conversion to Coal
Modifying a power plant to use coal rather than oil or
gas is the most difficult of conversions,
Unless
the power station boilers were originally designed to
use coal, major alterations are necessary. These re-
quire sizable investment, extended plant downtime
(perhaps as long as two years), and often result in
reduced electrical generating capacity. For these rea-
sons-and because of the specialized staffing needs at
coal-fired plants and the requirements for heavy-
engineering construction necessary to convert a plant
to coal fuel-the Soviets have indicated that few
power plants will be converted to coal use in the near
term.
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the relevant skilled labor is very important in the
decision to convert to coal, in the speed with which
conversion takes place, and in the effective operation
of the converted plants. The engineering skills needed
to modify boilers, install coal-handling equipment,
and rework control instrumentation in conversion to
coal are in strong demand elsewhere-in shipbuilding,
nuclear power plant construction, and construction of
major facilities such as refineries. In the Soviet
Union, defense industry and high-priority projects
such as nuclear power plant construction probably 25X1
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An important factor in the decision to convert to coal
fuel and in the reliability of a recently converted plant
is the availability of personnel experienced in coal-
based power station operations. Unless a power pro-
ducer already employs or has recruited people who
know coal systems, the utility is likely to have serious
problems with plant malfunctions and downtime.
During 1981-85 we believe that at least one 60-MW
power plant, the Blagoveshchensk Tets in the Bashkir
ASSR, is a candidate for conversion from oil to coal.
Although articles in Soviet power industry journals
reflect a willingness to push conversion to coal despite
the technical obstacles, present coal-supply problems
make a major attempt before the late 1980s unlikely.
Power industry officials have also discussed plans to
convert power plants from one type of coal to anoth-
er-usually to one of lower quality. This coal-to-coal
conversion aims at reducing the use of backup fuels
and finding users for new supplies of poorer quality
coal. It is a policy option at power plants where the
original coal supply has not been maintained and new
coal supplies of lower heat content are being supple-
mented, in part or wholly, by fuel-oil injection into the
boilers. Nevertheless, this sort of conversion requires
major new equipment or extensive upgrading of exist-
ing coal-handling machinery and boilers. Because of
the consequent disruption of power plant operations,
only a few plants have been selected for coal-to-coal
conversion by 1985.
Power plant conversion to coal could become more
important in the late 1980s and the 1990s if the coal-
supply problems ease and if the Soviets can exploit
new fuel technologies. Fuel innovations such as coal-
oil mixtures, coal-water mixtures, and fluidized-bed
combustion make it easier to use coal in large boil-
ers." The coal-water fuel technology has the added
" Fluidized-bed coal combustion is a technology under development
that promises increased fuel consumption efficiency, flexibility to
burn coals of varying quality, reduced emissions of sulfur and
nitrogen oxides, a solid waste that is easier to dispose, and
potentially lower plant investment. The principle of this technology
involves the feeding of crushed coal for combustion into a bed of
inert ash mixed with limestone. The mixture is fluidized (held in
suspension) by injection of air through the bottom of the bed at a
controlled rate great enough to cause the bed to be agitated much
like a boiling fluid. The noncombustible materials in the bed
advantage of being adaptable to slurry pipeline trans-
port-a technology that the Soviets hope to exploit on
a large scale.
Rapid implementation of coal-slurry transportation
will, however, require Western technology and equip-
ment. Moscow's own development of coal-slurry tech-
nology has been stalled in the design and preliminary
testing phases for about six years. The Soviets are
currently involved with Western firms in engineering-
feasibility studies on a proposed 256-km slurry pipe-
line for central Siberia. These technical discussions
with companies from West Germany, Italy, Japan-
and indirectly the United States-will probably soon
evolve into contract negotiations because the Soviets
have declared that they want to operate the 256-km
slurry line during 1986-90. At stake immediately are
equipment sales of several million dollars. More im-
portant, however, the slurry contract winners would
have the inside track on even more lucrative contracts
for Soviet transcontinental slurry lines of the future.
Conversion to Oil
Despite the emphasis in the power plant conversion
program on reducing oil use, some power plants are
being converted from peat to oil during 1981-85. The
amount of capacity currently scheduled for this kind
of conversion is small (162 MW), but these plants may
be just the entering wedge of a program to reduce
sharply or end the use of peat in power plant boilers.
By 1990, there would be about 5,000 MW of peat-
fired capacity available for conversion. Converting all
or most of the peat-fueled capacity to oil use (an
unlikely outcome) would increase oil consumption by
about 135,000 b/doe.
Peat-fired power plants are concentrated in two areas
near the peat bogs of Leningrad and Moscow. Power
Ministry discussions of these plants have noted the
fluctuation in peat fuel supplies to power stations in
recent years. This situation probably was a factor in
Power Ministry endorsement of Gosplan's longer
range goals to curtail reliance on peat as a fuel and
increase peat shipments to agricultural consumers.
The initial conversions took advantage of available oil
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backup combustion and storage facilities to improve
power plant performance and reliability in the short-
est possible time. In the medium-to-long term, howev-
er, the power industry is more likely to substitute gas
for peat, even though this conversion effort would
somewhat diminish resources dedicated to reduction
of oil consumption by other power plants.
Conversion Costs
The investment needed to convert power plants to gas
use is the only major direct cost to the economy of
restructuring the fuel balance in the power industry.
Conversions to oil or coal are only a small fraction of
the total conversion program. We estimate that the
projected 1981-85 conversion-related investment for
15,000 MW of power plant capacity fuel changes will
be roughly 500 million rubles. Branch pipeline con-
struction accounts for the bulk of this spending. Total
annual investment in the power industry is currently
at 4.5 billion rubles, so conversion costs do not seem
prohibitive.
Conversion from oil to gas, moreover, has been cited
in the Soviet power industry literature as a way of
reducing power plant operating costs. At one 3,000-
MW plant converted to gas use, the deputy minister
of power in the Uzbek republic expected that the
annual fuel bill would be reduced by roughly 40
million rubles because gas is cheaper for the Soviets to
produce and ship than an equivalent amount of fuel
oil. If this experience were repeated at all the power
plants that we estimate will be able to switch from oil
to gas use, the annual cost of fuel purchases could be
cut by 220-230 million rubles by the end of 1985.
Savings of this magnitude imply that oil-to-gas con-
version might. pay for itself in less than three years. F_
Projections of Power Industry Fuel Use
Total fuel demand in the power industry depends on
cogenerated heat and electricity needs in the USSR
and the power industry's ability to meet these de-
mands. Several indicators of the likely range of these
requirements for 1985 and 1990 are available from
corresponding five-year plan targets." For example,
cogenerated heat production in 1970 and 1975 di-
verged from the respective plans by 10 percent and for
1965 and 1980, by less than 2 percent. Drawing on
plans for 1985 and extrapolating annual growth rates
to 1990, we project that power plants will cogenerate
1,335 million gigacalories of heat in 1985 and 1,510
million gigacalories in 1990. Fuel requirements to
meet these projected heat outputs will be about 230
million tons standard fuel equivalent in 1985 and 259
million tons SFE in 1990.
Soviet projections of electricity supply and demand
are, unfortunately, not as reliable as the estimates of
cogenerated heat. Since the early 1970s, however, the
supply side of Soviet power generation has been the
main factor in total electricity output. Reporting from
Soviet news articles and technical journals,
all confirm that the electricity
output is constrained by such supply factors as plant
capacity and availability of fuels. Power shortages,
restrictions on electricity consumption, and disrup-
tions related to power shortages at many industrial
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facilities indicate that the quantity of electricity re- 25X1
quired to satisfy all uses exceeds the present ability of
the Soviet power industry to supply it. We expect that
constraints on electricity supply will continue at least
through 1990, even with additions to capacity at new
or existing power plants.
Thus, by focusing on the key variables of power plant
capacity and capacity utilization rates in electricity
production, we can predict electric plant output with a
reasonable degree of assurance and thereby estimate
electricity consumption in the Soviet economy. We
have not ignored, however, the possibility that a level
of electricity demand much different from the present
one could shift power plant fuel usage in coming
years. In projecting the kinds and amounts of fuels the 25X1
power industry could use in 1985 and 1990, we
estimated fuel consumption over a range of likely
power plant capacity utilization rates that would
correspond to varying levels of electricity demand.F___1
We estimate that the Soviet power industry will
produce 1,167-1,190 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) at
thermal power plants in 1985 and 1,254-1,294 billion
kWh in 1990. Most of the variation in these ranges
can be attributed to uncertainty about the amount of
electricity that new capacity will be able to produce.
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The quantity of fuel needed to yield the estimated
electricity output will depend largely on the fuel
efficiency of power plants. International comparisons
show that Soviet power plants, on average, use fuel
somewhat more economically than those in other
countries. The economy in fuel use results from
factors such as the more extensive use of waste boiler
heat for urban centralized heat supply in the USSR
and less rigorous pollution control at Soviet plants.
Even so, the power industry can be expected to have
some success in making more efficient use of fuels.
The gains in efficiency, however, will not be as large
or as easily achieved as in the 1970s. Poorer quality
coal, the growing number of inefficient aging plants,
and reduced construction of thermal power stations
all will slow progress toward further improvement in
fuel efficiency.
In 1980 Soviet thermal power plants required, on
average, 328,000 tons SFE per billion kWh of output.
We estimate that in 1985 the fossil-fueled power
plants will need 326,000 tons SFE to produce 1 billion
kWh, and, in 1990, 323,000 tons SFE. Thus, to
produce the projected 1,167-1,190 billion kWh in
1985, 346-353 million tons SFE will be needed.
Estimated 1990 output of 1,254-1,294 billion kWh
will require the use of 369-380 million tons SFE.
Under this set of assumptions, the combined fossil-
fuel requirement for electric power and cogenerated
heat will probably amount to 576-583 million tons
SFE (8.05-8.15 million b/doe) in 1985 and 628-639
million tons SFE (8.78-8.93 million b/doe) in 1990.
The distribution of these requirements among the
several organic fuels is derived from our analysis of
two principal constraints: the fuel-use capability of
power stations and the fuel supply to those stations."
Our analysis shows that the projected fuel-use capa-
bility of Soviet power plants in 1985 and 1990 would
not be a constraint to greatly expanded use of oil or
IS To analyze the fuel-use capability of power plants, we studied
about 300 power plants that were operating at yearend 1980. These
plants represented about 92 percent of steam-driven thermal capac-
ity and 87 percent of all organic-fuel power plants (the latter figure
includes small, non-steam-turbine portable power plants). This
survey, updated by including projected additions for 1981-85 and
1986-90, shows that plant design for fuel use had-and will
continue to have-much built-in flexibility. Through this decade,
more than half of Soviet power plant capacity will have the
technical capability to burn coal; nearly 40 percent, gas; and about
coal and only a limited constraint to increased use of
gas. On the other hand, there are major constraints
affecting the supply of oil, gas, and coal.
Supply of Coal
The outlook for coal supply is probably the most
important variable in the fuel-use equation. The coal
supply issue has direct relevance because of the large
amount of coal-fired capacity already on line and
under construction and because-despite the coun-
try's vast reserves of coal-future coal deliveries are
very uncertain in terms of both quantity and quality.
Indirectly, as noted above, coal availability is an
important determinant of power industry use of oil. F_
The power industry began the 1981-85 plan period
with power plants capable of burning more coal than
was available. More than 52 percent of yearend 1980
power plant capacity was equipped for coal combus-
tion, but only 34 percent actually operated on coal. In
1985, despite slowdowns in the construction of coal-
fired power plants, the conversion of about 3,000 MW
of coal-based capacity to gas, and some increase in the
coal supply, coal availability probably will still be
inadequate to fuel all the coal-capable power plants.
We estimate that about 325 million tons of coal will
be shipped to power plants in 1985. The operation of
all coal-based power plant capacity in 1985 at about
62-percent utilization (which would represent good,
somewhat-above-average Soviet performance) would
require approximately 350 million tons of coal. This
fuel shortfall of 25 million tons would represent an
annual loss of up to 40 billion kWh of electricity-a
situation that the already taut Soviet power system
could not tolerate. If all the projected coal shortfall
were offset by oil use, oil consumption would be
increased by about 185,000 b/doe in 1985. Instead,
the Power Ministry probably would selectively permit
power outages and substitute fuel oil for coal when
power cutoffs entailed too high an economic cost. F_
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By 1990, total coal-fired power plant capacity will
increase further unless the Power Ministry steps up
coal-to-gas conversion. Coal-based plants now under
construction will add 10,300 MW of generating ca-
pacity during 1986-90,, calling for new coal supplies of
about 33 million tons per year. Since we project that
coal supplies to the power industry could be increased
28-67 million tons by 1990 (output at the upper end of
the range is less likely), we believe that the coal deficit
could be reduced somewhat by 1990.
Progress in raising supplies of raw coal to the level
needed to fuel all the Power Ministry's coal-based
plants will not, however, eliminate the growth in oil
use required to offset deterioration in coal quality. We
anticipate that the average energy value of coal
supplies to power plants will continue to fall-a
1-percent annual decline has been the long-term
trend. Power plant operators will continue to inject oil
into the combustion chambers of coal-fired boilers to
maintain steam pressure when coal feedstocks are
below the heat value specified in power plant design.
Supply of Gas
The power industry will receive a large increase in gas
supply during the 1980s. We project that the growth
of gas use, however, will be less rapid during 1986-90
(averaging 5 percent annually) than during 1981-85
(averaging nearly 9 percent). By 1985, under our
assumptions, power industry gas consumption will
reach 173-186 billion cubic meters annually, about 28
percent of the projected total Soviet natural gas
output. Power industry gas use will probably deceler-
ate in the latter 1980s, because:
? The industry will have fully employed all the reserve
capacity of existing gas networks.
? Construction of new lateral distribution pipelines
will be more costly and difficult.
? Building new gas-fired power plants will have
slowed. We estimate that gas use in power plants in
1990 will be 214-240 billion cubic meters.
The utilization of gas in the power industry can be
considered in four categories: (1) gas production and
transmission at past rates of use, (2) increased delivery
to power plants through the existing gas network, (3)
gas sent to newly commissioned power plants, and (4)
gas delivered to plants converted from other fuel
usage. We estimate that by 1985 new gas supplies of
about 60 billion cubic meters will be shared among
three groups of power plants-40 percent of the
increment will flow to plants converted to gas use; 35
percent to new plants recently started up; and 25
percent to plants that, although previously linked to
the gas distribution network, will operate more often
on gas.
The rise in the volume of gas supplied to the power
industry that we project during 1981-85 exceeds the
original goal set by Gosplan. Our projections for 1985
show gas supplies growing by 56-70 billion cubic
meters over 1980, compared with the increase of 47
billion cubic meters originally planned. The power
industry is overtaking the original goal because of its
success in (a) raising the utilization rate of existing gas
distribution networks and (b) implementing a crash
program to convert more power stations to gas. These
successes should more than offset the failure to
achieve goals for new construction of gas-fired plants.
The success with gas supply increases during the
current five-year plan could lead to policy mistakes in
the future, however. Moscow's energy experts may
overlook the special circumstances that made the
rapid shift to gas possible in the power industry during
1981-85 and expect equally rapid growth in 1986-90.
As noted above, one-quarter of the increment to gas
supplies in the current five-year plan will be provided
by bringing the existing gas networks to full through-
put capacity. By the late 1980s, all or most of the
previously constructed power industry gas distribution
system will be operating at full throughput. Pipeline
builders will certainly be working hard during 1986-
90 to extend the gas networks. However rapidly this
construction proceeds, it still will take longer to
accomplish than pushing more gas into existing pipe-
lines. Moreover, during this period, longer branch
lines from the main trunk pipelines to power plants
will have to be laid because the plants closest to the
-main gaslines will already have been connected.
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We estimate that in 1990 about 50 billion cubic
meters more gas will flow to the power industry than
in 1985. The increase during 1986-90 could range
from 36 to 62 billion cubic meters. This additional gas
will be distributed to power plants converted to gas
use (61 percent), new power stations (35 percent), and
power plants that-although previously connected to
the gas distribution system-will operate more fre-
quently on gas (4 percent).
In estimating the gas increase for 1986-90, we have
assumed that the industry could at most convert
20,000 MW of power plant capacity to gas use.
However, the power industry may only be able to
match the amount of conversion (15,000 MW) likely
in 1981-85 because of limitations on investment and
labor and the greater technical difficulty of projects.
Our estimate also forecasts a slight decline in the
amount of new gas-capable power plants brought on
line during 1986-90 as the Soviets implement plans to
rely more on nuclear-generated power. New gas-fired
additions will total about 13,200 MW, compared with
14,700 MW scheduled to come on stream before
1986.
Supply of Minor Fuels
Although shale, peat, and fuelwood/cellulose play
only a minor role in fueling power plants (about 3
percent), they still cannot be overlooked. According to
Power Ministry statements, supplies of these fuels in
1985 and 1990 should be only slightly greater than in
1980, at best. We estimate that minor fuels could
contribute up to the planned 15.8 million tons SFE in
1985 but are unlikely to exceed that amount by 1990,
because few power plants are being built to burn these
fuels.
Supply of Oil
Moscow's hopes for a sharp reduction in oil consump-
tion in the electric power industry will be frustrated at
least through 1985 and possibly until the early 1990s.
In 1980 the power industry used 2.54 million b/doe of
oil products. By 1985, power industry oil consumption
(depending on the assumptions made) will probably be
2.29 to 2.69 million b/doe. In 1990 oil use by the
power industry of 1.8 to 2.7 million b/doe is likely.
Our best estimate is shown in table 8.
A reduction in oil use by 1985 is unlikely, in our view,
because of the essential preconditions: total fuel de-
mand in the power industry would have to be cur-
tailed sharply, coal supplies would have to be in-
creased, and efforts to maximize gas use would have
to be almost totally successful (see inset on page 24).
During 1981-83, power industry demand for fuel grew
at an average annual rate of 2.5 percent. A cut in oil
use would be feasible (assuming success on other
fronts) if the rise in total fuel use in 1981-85 could be
held at or below 2.4 percent per year. However, the
Power Ministry has not demonstrated the ability to
increase output of nuclear and hydro power sources
rapidly enough to make this likely.
The outlook for increased coal supplies, as discussed
earlier, is poor. To reduce 1985 demand for backup oil
at coal-fired plants, raw coal deliveries would have to
be at least 330 million tons (174.8 million tons SFE).
During 1981-83, however, coal supply to power plants
remained at the 1980 level of about 314 million tons.
Finally, to maximize reductions in the use of oil, gas
supplies to the power industry in 1985 would have to
be about 186 billion cubic meters, compared with 117
billion cubic meters in 1980. To implement this 60-
percent increase, the Power Ministry would have to
convert 18,000 MW of capacity to gas use (11,000
MW was converted in 1981-83), all new dual-fueled
plants capable of operation on either oil or gas would
have to operate entirely on gas, and the gas network
connected to power plants would have to operate at
maximum throughput. If the power industry could
accomplish all of this, oil consumption in 1985 could
be cut back to 2.29 million b/doe, a reduction of
about 250,000 b/doe.
However, an increase in oil consumption of 150,000
b/doe by 1985 is also possible. The power industry
would probably continue to increase its consumption
of oil if total fuel demand grew to 583 million tons
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Table 8
USSR: Projected Power
Industry Fuel Use a
Million metric tons
standard fuel equivalent
The increased demand for fuel, coupled with the
problems in coal and gas supply, could drive 1985
power industry oil demand to 2.69 million b/doe,
about 150,000 b/doe more than 1980 consumption.
Total
580
634
Gas b
211
270
Existing consumers
138
213
Conversions to gas
30
35
25
20
Gas network gains
18
2
173
187
Minor fuels
15
15
Oil (million b/doe) 2.53 2.26
Change in oil use, compared No significant Reduced by
with 1980 consumption of change 275,000 b/doe
182 million tons SFE (2.54
million b/doe)
a Estimates for the use of total fuels, gas, coal, and minor fuels are
midpoints of ranges cited in text with the exception of the 1985 gas
conversion projection, which was calculated from data on observed
conversions.
b Total gas use was derived from data on four key components:
existing consumers, that is, total gas use in the power industry at
the end of the previous five-year plan period; new gas used at plants
converted to gas from other fuels; new gas burned by plants that
came on line or were expanded during the preceding five years; and
additional gas use made possible by changes to the existing gas
pipeline system allowing greater gas throughput.
SFE (the amount implied by the generation of 1,190
billion kWh)-somewhat faster growth (2.8 percent
per year) than in 1981-83 (2.5 percent per year)-and
if:
? The supply of raw coal to power plants remains at
the 1980 level, and the energy value of coal contin-
ues to decline at past rates.
? Substitution in favor of gas is limited by slower-
than-expected conversions (14,000 MW instead of
15,000 MW).
? Constraints in gas-network expansion allow only 85
percent of the new gas-capable power plants to
consume gas and also limit gas throughput to 75
percent of the capacity of service pipelines (13
billion cubic meters instead of 17 billion cubic
meters).
Goals for cutting power plant oil use by about 1
million b/doe by 1990 were announced in the 20-year
energy program. We do not expect that the Soviets
will be able to restructure the fuel balance in the
power industry so rapidly. Oil consumption in the
power industry in 1990 will probably range from 1.8
to 2.7 million b/doe. The lower end of this range
translates into a reduction in oil use of up to 720,000
b/doe; the upper end, an increase of 170,000 b/doe.16
In our best estimate of fuel consumption in 1990, oil
use would fall by about 275,000 b/doe, bringing total
consumption in the power industry down to 2.3 mil-
lion b/doe. This reduction, although not easy, would
be feasible if: (a) gas supplies to power plants increase
by about 110 billion cubic meters, (b) coal supplies
rise by 25 million tons, and (c) nuclear and hydro
power programs permit organic-fuel demand in the
power industry to slow from the current rate of 2.5
percent per year to 2.2 percent.
Under circumstances only slightly different from
those assumed above, however, power plant consump-
tion of oil could increase by 170,000 b/doe in 1990
compared with 1980 consumption. This consumption
rate would occur if (a) coal deliveries to the power
industry failed to increase in 1981-90, (b) gas supplies
were stepped up by only 97 billion cubic meters, (c)
and total fuel demand grew at an average annual rate
of 2.3 percent. Oil consumption in the power industry
in 1990 could then be as high as 2.7 million b/doe.
This situation might develop if, for example, energy
investment during 1986-90 were directed to maintain-
ing oil production while funding for coal, gas, and
nuclear programs was constrained.
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Factors Working Against Reduced Use
of Oil in Power Plants in 1985
During 1981-85, three major developments (one
planned and two unplanned) are impeding the power
industry's effort to reduce oil consumption. These
developments-increased demand for fuel at newly
commissioned coal-fired power plants, below plan
deliveries of coal, and larger-than-planned fuel de-
mand for the power industry as a whole-will proba-
bly combine to increase demand for fuel oil. If
unconstrained, these changes would increase oil use
by up to 800,000 b/doe. We do not believe that the
Soviets would allow this to happen; instead, we
expect the Power Ministry to offset much, but not all,
of the unplanned increase in oil demand by emphasiz-
ing gas use.
The Power Ministry will add about 12,000 MW of
new coal-fired capacity during 1981-85. There will be
a net increase of about 7,000 MW to the inventory of
coal-fired plants, because 3,000 MW of coal-fired
capacity will probably be converted to gas use and
2,000 MW of older coal-based plants are likely to be
retired. Still, total coal-based capacity will increase
faster than the projected increase in coal supplies,
necessitating greater use of backup oil.
Below plan deliveries of coal will add to the fuel-mix
problems that the power industry will experience in
1985. The Power Ministry planned for 1985 coal
At most, according to our projections, the power
industry could manage to reduce oil consumption by
720,000 b/doe during 1981-90. To accomplish savings
of this magnitude, the Power Ministry would need 40-
45 million tons more raw coal and about 123 billion
cubic meters of new gas. In addition, the growth of
fuel demand would have to fall to an average annual
rate of 2.1 percent, mainly through the generation of
a much larger share of electricity at nuclear and
hydro plants. We doubt that the Soviets will be able to
find the resources to satisfy all of these requirements.
deliveries of 335 million tons (raw coal) but is likely
to receive only 314 million tons because of production
problems. We estimate that all coal-fired plants (the
Power Ministry's stations and those belonging to
specific industries) planned on about 350 million tons
of coal but will receive only 325 million tons. Most, if
not all, of the shortfalls will be offset by using backup
oil.
More fuel, probably both gas and oil, will be needed
to generate above plan electricity at thermal power
plants because of below plan output at hydroelectric
and nuclear power stations. In 1985, the power
industry was scheduled to provide 1,105 billion kWh
from thermal power plants. We project 1985 output
from these plants at 1,167-1,190 billion kWh, com-
pared with 1,127 billion kWh in 1983. To provide
about 7 percent more thermal power than originally
planned, the power industry will need an additional
22 million tons standard fuel equivalent. This trans-
lates into a demand for an additional 300,000 b/doe
in oil products or 18 billion cubic meters more gas-
or some combination of these fuels.
Because the power industry is the largest consumer of
fuel in the USSR, changes in its fuel mix have major
implications for the oil, gas, and coal industries and
for power industry customers who face disruptions in
power supplies during fuel changeovers. The oil indus-
try will probably have to supply fuel oil to the power
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industry at close to the current level until the late
1980s. The continuing demand for residual fuel oil by
power plants may be one reason why the expansion of
secondary oil processing facilities (needed to "crack"
residual fuel oil to produce larger quantities of gaso-
line and diesel oil from a barrel of crude oil) is not
being pressed more vigorously. Although prospects
are good for major substitution of gas for other fuels,
the rate of substitution will probably slow by the end
of the decade. This may well curb the growth of total
gas output. Fuel supply problems at power stations
will probably further strain power networks, leading
to a greater incidence of power outages, brownouts,
and the like.
The Oil Industry
Above-plan consumption of residual oil will tend to
postpone the need for a large and rapid expansion of
secondary oil refining capacity." The perception of
the power industry's progress in cutting oil use is
likely to be a key determinant of the direction and
pace of oil refining development. The oil industry
must satisfy growing demand for diesel oils and
gasolines. Central planners hoped that these necessary
light products could be obtained by cutting back
power plant fuel oil use and putting the "saved" fuel
oil through newly built secondary processing units.
However, judging by the small number of these units
under construction, planners may be holding back on
the large investments needed to rapidly expand sec-
ondary processing until progress in reducing power
industry oil demand is evident.
The Soviets had been counting on cuts in power plant
consumption of oil to free 500,000 b/doe of residual
fuel oil for further refining into gasoline and diesel
fuels in 1985. At most, only about 50 percent of the
anticipated amount will be available for secondary
refining. In 1990, the best-estimate reduction in pow-
er plant oil use of 275,000 b/doe would increase the
feedstock available for secondary refining, but by a
level far short of what the Soviets hope to achieve-
1 million b/doe. Our lower estimate is, however, far
more consistent with the observed pace of construc-
tion on Soviet cracking capacity to further process the
fuel oil.
If the Soviets had hoped to export the oil "saved" at
power plants either directly as fuel oil or as more
refined products, then they will be forgoing sizable
earnings over the rest of the decade. In current prices,
exports of 1 million b/doe would be worth roughly
$10 billion annually. We believe, however, that slow
progress in reducing oil use will, by 1990, limit
potential hard currency earnings from sales of the
"saved" oil to less than 30 percent of the prospective
1 million b/doe.
The Gas Industry
The outcome of efforts to maintain or to accelerate
the growth of gas consumption in the power industry
will be a major determinant of Soviet gas production
during this decade. To the extent that the share of gas
in power plant fuel use rises, electricity supplies will
be more reliable and less costly. Nonetheless, conflicts
are likely to deepen between those energy experts
promoting a strategy of greater reliance on coal at
power plants and the Power Ministry experts who
focus on the advantages of using gas.
We expect that constraints on gas consumption will be
the leading factor affecting Soviet gas output through
1990. Gasfield operations and long-distance transpor-
tation will be less important because major gasfields
are ready to be tapped and the USSR can build the
main trunk pipelines necessary to carry this gas. New
gas demand by the power industry in 1990 could be
97-123 billion cubic meters, compared with the 117
billion cubic meters consumed in 1980. Consumption
would fall to the lower end of this range if construc-
tion slowed at gas-capable power plants and comple-
tion of gas feeder lines to power plants continued to
drag.
Soviet energy experts now view gas as a transition fuel
between oil and coal. We believe, however, that after
power plant managers and regional network adminis-
trators experience the advantages of gas-fewer deliv-
ery interruptions, higher quality fuel, and lower oper-
ating costs-they will resist a switch to coal. Middle
managers in the USSR are masters in the art of foot-
dragging. Indeed, the Soviet press has already report-
ed the machinations of a power station manager in
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Novosibirsk who wanted his plant to use gas instead
of slurried coal. If key personnel in the Power Minis-
try want to delay the planned resurgence of coal as a
power plant fuel in the 1990s by obstructing conver-
sion from gas and delaying construction of new coal-
fired plants, the return to coal could be delayed
substantially, or even derailed.
Supply, Reliability, and Costs
Although changes in the composition of power indus-
try fuel supplies now under way and planned could
eventually improve the reliability of the power supply,
the changeover process will temporarily increase the
incidence of disruptions in electricity supply. If the
Soviets want to accelerate the rate of substitution in
the industry's fuel supply, they will very likely have to
convert a number of plants simultaneously, at the risk
of increasing the frequency of interruptions in elec-
tricity service. The electric power system has very
little reserve capacity to bring on line when power
plants are out of service during conversion.
Eventually, the increased use of gas should make
electricity supplies more reliable. As long as the gas
pipeline system functions well, gas-fired power plants
will not experience interruptions in fuel supplies, and
utility customers will be spared the resulting disrup-
tions in electric service. Disturbances are now com-
mon at oil- and coal-fired plants because of transpor-
tation stoppages and fuel rationing.
Moreover, at plants switched to gas from coal or oil,
the cost of electricity production should decline. Pro-
duction costs will be lower because capacity utiliza-
tion will be higher and gas is less costly than oil on an
energy-equivalent basis. At current Soviet prices, fuel
costs total nearly 6 million rubles to generate a billion
kilowatt-hours at oil-fueled plants but only about half
that at gas-fired power stations.
There also is a high opportunity cost entailed in using
oil instead of gas in power plant boilers. Oil freed
from power industry consumption and exported for
hard currency has the potential of earning about 15
percent more than gas would on an energy-equivalent
basis.
In addition, investment requirements for oil produc-
tion are greater than for gas. For example, a 1979
Soviet text on energy economics indicated that invest-
ment requirements for West Siberian oil were 170
percent more than those for West Siberian gas on an
energy-equivalent basis. Indications since then show
the gap widening. Oil investment needs are soaring
because of the increasing difficulty of maintaining
production at older fields and the deteriorating re-
serve quality and remote location of new fields. In
1981 and 1982, the oil industry took nearly 60 percent
of all incremental industrial investment in the USSR.
Gas industry investment is also rising, but three-
fourths of this investment is for pipelines. These
pipelines, once built, will continue to operate well into
the next century.
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Appendix
Methodology for Projecting
Soviet Power Industry
Fuel Demand and Fuel Use
In estimating power industry fuel use, our methodology aims at capturing
both the flexibility in Soviet power plant fuel-use capability and the
constraints in fuel supply to power plants. Our approach parallels actual
Soviet behavior in several important respects. We posit minimum use of
organic fuels (particularly oil) by (1) simulating generation of as much
primary electricity as possible at hydro and nuclear plants, (2) covering the
difference between projected demand and primary electricity supply by
using the output from organic-fueled plants, and (3) minimizing oil use
through direct and indirect substitution of gas and coal, subject to the
supply constraints imposed on these fuels by factors such as gas transmis-
sion capabilities and coal production problems.
Electricity and The projection of electricity and cogenerated heat output from all power
Cogenerated Heat plants that will use organic fuel is the basis of our estimate of the total fuel
Production requirements of the power industry in 1985 and 1990. The electricity
output estimate is a function of effective generating capacity and the
capacity utilization rate. The cogenerated heat projections are based on
Soviet plans for 1985 and extrapolation of a declining trend to 1990.
Projected Electricity Output
We estimated gross electricity production in 1985 and 1990 by (1)
computing the generating capacity at the end of the previous five-year plan
plus additions to capacity (for 1981-85 or 1986-90) minus retirements and
(2) multiplying the result by average annual hours of utilization of capacity.
We calculated upper and lower bounds for probable electricity output from
thermal power plants in 1985 and 1990 on the basis of alternative
assumptions about retirements and capacity utilization.
The Power Ministry had planned to increase retirements of thermal power
plants from 5,200 MW during 1976-80 to 8,000 MW during 1981-85.
Below-plan growth of hydro- and nuclear-derived electricity has forced the
Soviets to keep many of the obsolete plants running. Less than 2,000 MW
of capacity was retired during 1981-82, and we expect that retirements for
1981-85 will total about 2,800 MW. During 1986-90, power plant
retirements will need to be accelerated; we estimate plant closures of 4,000
to 7,000 MW.
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The total thermal power plant capacity utilization rate depends not only on
plant readiness but also on Power Ministry decisions on reserve margins
and Soviet ability to produce electricity at hydro and nuclear plants. The
average thermal power plant utilization rate posted during 1975-83 was
5,188 hours out of a theoretical total of 8,765 hours. We calculate
electricity output at two rates of utilization. The high rate, 5,250 hours per
year, is consistent with improvements to average performance through
more gas use and a decision to boost thermal power plant output and hold
back on retirements because of shortfalls at hydro and nuclear facilities.
The low utilization rate, 5,150 hours per year, reflects factors such as the
need to keep older plants operating, diminished plant performance caused
by use of low-quality coal, reduced thermal power plant use, and increased
retirements because of increased output at nuclear plants.
Taking these factors into account, we project electricity output in 1985
using the formula (base capacity + additions - retirements) X
utilization rate:
(201,900 MW + 27,500 MW - 2,800 MW) X 5,150 hours =
1,167 billion kWh
(201,900 MW + 27,500 MW - 2,800 MW) X 5,250 hours =
1,190 billion kWh
Similarly, for 1990, we project electricity output:
(226,600 MW + 23,900 MW - 7,000 MW) X 5,150 hours
1,254 billion kWh
(226,600 MW + 23,900 MW - 4,000 MW) X 5,250 hours
1,294 billion kWh
We paired the factors of high retirements and low-capacity utilization and
low retirements and high-capacity utilization because circumstances such
as increased electricity output at nuclear plants would permit both factors
in the pairs to be changed.
Projected Cogenerated Heat Output
Our estimate of the amount of heat to be cogenerated at Soviet power
plants in 1985-1,335 million gigacalories (Gcal)-is taken directly from
the plan for that year. We project 1990 cogenerated heat output of 1,510
million Gcal on the basis of an estimated annual growth of 2.5 percent dur-
ing 1986-90. This estimated growth rate reflects the slowdown in additions
of new cogeneration power plants and the resulting smaller increment to
heat output.
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Total Fuel Use The Soviets publish statistics annually on the amount of fuel needed to
produce an average kilowatt-hour of electricity or an average gigacalorie of
cogenerated heat by power plant boilers. The Ministry of Power and
Electrification also sets targets for increased fuel efficiencies in both
generation of electricity and production of cogenerated heat. The fuel
consumption efficiency goals set for 1985 are 319 grams of standard fuel
equivalent (SFE) per kWh of electricity and 172.2 kilograms SFE per Gcal
of heat. We consider the target for efficiency gains in power generation to
be unattainable before the 1990s, but the power industry may come close
to achieving the less ambitious goal for cogenerated heat production.
Since 1981 the fuel efficiency of thermal power plants has been 327 grams
SFE per kWh (327,000 metric tons SFE per billion kWh). We expect that,
at best, the average fuel efficiency in the generation of electricity will
improve to 326,000 tons SFE per billion kWh in 1985. Continuing
problems with lower quality coal, numerous inefficient older power plants,
and a slowdown in additions of more efficient new plants will limit the im-
provements in fuel efficiency. By 1990 we estimate that efficiency will
improve to 323,000 tons SFE per billion kWh, largely because of the
changing shares of gas (increased) and coal (decreased) in power industry
fuel consumption.
The Soviets expect the efficiency of heat cogeneration to improve from 173
kilograms SFE per Gcal of heat to 172.2 by 1985. We estimate that this
goal is reasonable and project an improvement of similar magnitude by
1990. Therefore, we project the fuel efficiency of cogeneration plants at
172.2 thousand tons SFE per million Gcal in 1985, and 171.4 thousand
tons SFE per million Gcal in 1990.
Projected Fuel Use in the Generation of Electricity
Total projected fuel use for electricity generation is calculated as the
product of (1) estimated total electricity output from thermal power plants
and (2) estimated fuel-use efficiency at those plants. However, if we are to
compare projected fuel use with past fuel consumption, we need to convert
estimated gross electricity production to electricity output net of power
station use. This conversion is necessary because the Soviets calculate
power industry fuel use in this manner.
In 1980, Soviet thermal power plants used 9 percent of gross electricity
output to run equipment at the stations. The Power Ministry estimates that
by 1985 power plant use of electricity will increase to 9.1 percent. This pro-
jected increase is consistent with data from 1981-83 showing small
increases in on-site power plant fuel consumption, primarily at coal-fired
plants handling low-quality fuel. By 1990, we expect that the on-site power
plant needs for electricity will drop back to 9 percent of gross output as the
share of gas-fueled generating capacity increases and the share of coal-
fueled capacity decreases.
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Using the estimates of gross electricity output and projections of changes in
efficiency of fuel use and on-site power use, we calculate the fuel
requirements to generate electricity in 1985:
1,167 billion kWh X .909 X 326,000 tons SFE = 346 million tons SFE
billion kWh
1,190 billion kWh X .909 X 326,000 tons SFE = 353 million tons SFE
billion kWh
In 1990, fuel needed to generate electricity is calculated:
1,254 billion kWh X .91 X 323,000 tons SFE = 369 million tons SFE
billion kWh
1,294 billion kWh X .91 X 323,000 tons SFE = 380 million tons SFE
billion kWh F_
Projected Fuel Use in the Cogeneration of Heat
Total projected fuel use in cogenerated heat production is calculated as the
product of estimated heat output and estimated fuel-use efficiency in the
cogeneration of heat. Although the Soviets measure the efficiency of heat
cogeneration net of station use, heat consumption at power plants has a
negligible effect on the calculation of fuel needed for heat production.
Therefore, we estimate fuel requirements to cogenerate heat in 1985 as:
1,335 million Gcal X 172,200 tons SFE = 230 million tons SFE
million Gcal
For 1990, we project fuel needs:
1,510 million Gcal X 171,400 tons SFE = 259 million tons SFE
million Gcal
Individual Fuel The previous calculations provide likely ranges for total power industry fuel
Supplies consumption. The amounts of individual fuels (oil, coal, gas, and minor
fuels) likely to be consumed will depend on (1) power plant fuel-use
capability and (2) the fuels available to the power industry. We ruled out
fuel-use capability as a major factor in determining power industry
consumption of individual fuels through 1990. Our study of a representa-
tive sample of power plants shows that the capability of power stations to
use gas or coal would probably exceed the supply of those fuels during
1981-90. Fuel-use capability will be a determinant of fuel types to be
consumed only in terms of demand from new capacity.
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The starting point for our estimates of individual fuel supply to the power
industry is the consumption of each fuel in 1980. We calculated fuel
supply, by type, for all Soviet thermal plants on the basis of total power and
cogenerated heat output at all power plants, as well as published Power
Ministry statistics on individual fuels used in 1980 at Ministry plants.
Although the Ministry plants made up about 90 percent of total capacity
and used nearly 88 percent of the fuel consumed in thermal power plants in
1980, the shares of coal and gas burned differed from the shares of these
fuels used by all power plants. We adjusted the data to reflect the fact that
plants operated solely by the Ministry used about 3 percent more coal and
3 percent less gas than all power plants taken together
Supply of Coal to Power Plants
We estimated power industry coal supplies for 1985 and 1990 as (1)
supplies received in 1980 plus (2) projected new supplies minus (3)
projected cutbacks in supplies (from coal basins in production decline).
Since the quality of coal supplied to power plants has declined, we
correspondingly adjusted the energy value of projected coal supply down-
ward.
For the estimate of power industry coal supply in 1985, the calculations are
(in million tons raw coal): 314 (1980 supply) plus 33 (increased coal from
Ekibastuz, Kuznetsk, and Kansk-Achinsk) minus 16 to 23 (decreased
supply from Donets, Moscow, and smaller basins in Urals) equals 324 to
331. In 1980 the average energy value of coal used in the power industry
was 0.5562 tons SFE per ton raw coal. In 1985 we anticipate that the aver-
age energy value will decline to 0.5283 tons SFE per ton raw coal. This de-
cline of about 1 percent annually represents an improvement over 1976-80,
when coal heat value decreased at an average annual rate of 1.5 percent.
Therefore, we calculate the energy value of power industry coal supply in
1985 at 171-175 million tons SFE.
Projection of power industry coal supply in 1990 is calculated as follows (in
million tons raw coal): 314 (1980 supply) plus 80 to 110 (increased coal sup-
ply during 1981-90 from Ekibastuz, Kuznetsk, Kansk-Achinsk, and several
small basins in East Siberia) minus 31 to 42 (decreased supply from
Donets, Moscow, and smaller basins in Urals) equals 352 to 393. In 1990
we expect that the average energy value of power industry coal supply will
be about 0.5018 tons SFE per ton raw coal. Thus, power plants will
consume an amount of coal equal to 177-197 million tons SFE.
Supply of Gas to Power Plants
We project power industry gas supply (which consists of natural gas,
associated gas, and refinery byproduct gas) in 1985 and 1990 as the sum of
four components: (1) preexisting supplies (measured as power industry
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consumption at the end of the previous five-year plan), (2) new gas supplies
through existing pipelines, (3) gas supplies for new power plants, and (4)
new gas supplies for plants converted to gas.
We considered preexisting gas supplies at power plants in 1985 to be the
amount consumed in 1980. We assumed that the preexisting gas supply to
power plants for 1986-90 would fall in the range of our projection for total
power industry gas use in 1985. In the calculation of "most likely" total
1990 power plant gas supply, we used the midpoint of projected total 1985
gas supply as the estimate of existing gas supply in 1990.
Since 1980 the elimination of bottlenecks in the gas transmission system
has enabled power plants that previously could use gas only part-time to in-
crease this use of gas. From power industry data on monthly gas use
published in 1981, we calculated that, if various constraints in gas
transmission were eliminated, the power industry could receive up to 17.1
billion cubic meters more gas through existing pipelines. However, some of
the bottlenecks will be eliminated only slowly, according to authorities in
both the Power Ministry and in gas pipeline construction trusts. We
reflected the possibility that most, but not all, gas transmission bottlenecks
could be eased by 1985, creating a range for increased consumption of 13.4
to 17.1 billion cubic meters (15.9 to 20.3 million tons SFE). The lower end
of the range represents increases to throughput on gaslines connected to
only Power Ministry plants, with the postponement to 1990 of improve-
ments to the whole transmission system that would allow the total increase
of 17.1 billion cubic meters.
Gas will be supplied to new power plants of two types-those designed
solely for gas use and those that can use either oil or gas. Additionally,
many of the plants using gas will be power stations that cogenerate heat.
We calculated the gas supply that these new gas-fired plants will need in
1985 and 1990 at two levels. The upper level of gas consumption reflects
the assumption that major improvements to the gas distribution system
could enable all new gas-capable power plants to operate totally on gas.
The lower level of gas consumption reflects the gas distribution bottlenecks
that constrain gas use at power plants that can also use oil as fuel. Prior to
1980, the gas distribution constraints were extensive, and many gas-
capable plants ran on gas only 25 percent of the year. However, the gas dis-
tribution network has been much improved since 1980, and accordingly we
estimate that at least 85 percent of the new dual-fueled gas-capable plants
will operate on gas.
25X1
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Thus, we project gas supplies to new power plants in 1985 in the range of
23.6-26.4 million tons SFE:
4,825 MW (plants using only gas) + 9,916 MW (plants using either gas
or oil) X 4,200 hours = 61.9 billion kWh gross output
61.9 billion kWh X .909 X 325,000 tons SFE = 18.3 million tons SFE
billion kWh
Plus fuel for cogenerating heat at Tets:
2,778 MW (plants using only gas) + 6,996 MW (plants using either gas
or oil) X 4,200 hours X 1.15 million Gcal = 47.2 million Gcal
billion kWh
47.2 million Gcal X 172,000 tons SFE = 8.1 million tons SFE
million Gcal
Therefore, total gas use in 1985 by new gas-capable plants, if 100 percent
gas supplied, = 26.4 million tons SFE.
However, if some constraints to gas distribution remain:
4,825 MW + (.85 X 9,916 MW) X 4,200 hours = 55.7 billion kWh
gross output
55.7 billion kWh X .909 X 325,000 tons SFE = 16.5 million tons SFE
billion kWh
Plus fuel for cogenerating heat at Tets:
2,778 MW + (.85 X 6,996 MW) X 4,200 hours X
1.15 million Gcal = 42.1 million Gcal
billion kWh
42.1 million Gcal X 172,000 tons SFE = 7.2 million tons SFE
million Gcal
Then, total gas use in 1985 by new gas-capable plants, if dual-fueled plants
are 85 percent gas supplied, = 23.6 million tons SFE.
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Similarly, we estimate that gas supplies to new power plants started up
during 1986-90 will, in 1990, range between 18.9 and 20.1 million tons
SFE:
8,513 MW (plants using gas only) + 4,689 MW (plants using either gas
or oil) X 4,200 hours = 55.4 billion kWh gross output
55.4 billion kWh X .91 X 322,000 tons SFE = 16.2 million tons SFE
billion kWh
Plus fuel for cogenerating heat at Tets:
945 MW (plants using only gas) + 3,625 MW (plants using either gas or
oil) X 4,200 hours X 1.20 million Gcal = 23 million Gcal
billion kWh
23 million Gcal X 171,000 tons SFE = 3.9 million tons SFE
million Gcal
Therefore, total gas use in 1990 by new gas-capable plants, if 100 percent
gas supplied, = 20.1 million tons SFE.
However, if some constraints to gas distribution remain:
8,513 MW + (.85 X 4,689 MW) X 4,200 hours = 52.5 billion kWh
gross output
52.5 billion kWh X .91 X 322,000 tons SFE = 15.4 million tons SFE
billion kWh
Plus fuel for cogenerated heat at Tets:
945 MW + (.85 X 3,625 MW) X 4,200 hours X
1.2 million Gcal = 20.3 million Gcal
billion kWh
20.3 million Gcal X 171,000 tons SFE = 3.5 million tons SFE
million Gcal
Then, total gas use in 1990 by new gas-capable plants, if dual-fueled plants
are 85 percent gas supplied, = 18.9 million tons SFE.
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The remaining component of power industry gas supply is the fuel to be
used at plants converted to gas. During 1981-83, nearly 11,000 MW of ca-
pacity was switched to gas use. By 1985 we estimate total conversions of
14,000 to 18,000 MW. During 1986-90, we project that 15,000 to 20,000
MW of capacity could be modified to use gas. By 1985 the estimated gas
supply to converted plants will range from 27.8 to 36.0 million tons SFE,
calculated as follows:
14,000 MW X 5,500 hours X .909 = 70 billion kWh (output net of
plant use)
70 billion kWh X 325,000 tons SFE = 22.8 million tons SFE
billion kWh
Plus fuel for cogenerated heat at Tets:
4,620 MW X 5,500 hours X 1.15 million Gcal = 29.2 million Gcal
billion kWh
29.2 million Gcal X 172,000 tons SFE = 5.0 million tons SFE
million Gcal
Thus, total gas use, if 14,000 MW converted, = 27.8 million tons SFE.
An acceleration of the conversion program could yield:
18,000 MW X 5,500 hours X .909 = 90 billion kWh
90 billion kWh X 325,000 tons SFE = 29.3 million tons SFE
billion kWh
Plus fuel for cogenerated heat for Tets:
6,200 MW X 5,500 hours X 1.15 million Gcal = 39.2 million Gcal
billion kWh
39.2 million Gcal X 172,000 tons SFE = 6.7 million tons SFE
million Gcal
And total gas use, if 18,000 MW converted, = 36.0 million tons SFE.
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By 1990, power plant conversion to gas will callfor new gas supply of 29.8-
39.7 million tons SFE, calculated as follows:
15,000 MW X 5,500 hours X .91 = 75.1 billion kWh
75.1 billion kWh X 322,000 tons SFE = 24.2 million tons SFE
billion kWh
Plus fuel for cogenerating heat at Tets:
4,950 MW X 5,500 hours X 1.2 million Gcal = 32.7 million Gcal
billion kWh
32.7 million Gcal X 171,000 tons SFE = 5.6 million tons SFE
million Gcal
Thus, total gas use, if 15,000 MW converted, = 29.8 million tons SFE.
An acceleration of the conversion program could yield:
20,000 MW X 5,500 hours X .91 = 100.1 billion kWh
100.1 billion kWh X 322,000 tons SFE = 32.2 million tons SFE
billion kWh
Plus fuel for cogenerated heat:
6,600 MW X 5,500 hours X 1.2 million Gcal = 43.6 million Gcal
billion kWh
43.6 million Gcal X 171,000 tons SFE = 7.5 million tons SFE
million Gcal
And total gas use, if 20,000 MW converted, = 39.7 million tons SFE.
Supply of Minor Fuels
The minor fuels (shale, peat, and fuelwood/cellulose) contributed 14.3
million tons SFE, or about 3 percent of power industry fuel supply in 1980.
The Soviets plan for a small increase to 15.8 million tons SFE by 1985. It is
likely that even this modest growth in minor fuels supply could be stretched
out until 1990. We, therefore, project that minor fuel supplies to the power
industry will range from 14 to 15.8 million tons SFE in 1985 and 1990.
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Calculation of Oil Consumption as a Residual
We projected ranges of oil consumption in 1985 and 1990 by subtracting
estimated supplies of coal, gas, and minor fuels from total fuel demand.
These calculations are summarized (in million tons SFE) as follows:
1985 Oil
Consumption
1990 Oil
Consumption
Upper
Lower
Upper
Lower
Total fuel demand
583.0
576.0
639.0
628.0
From which, subtract:
Existing
supply
138.4
138.4
205.7
221.1
Network gains
15.9
20.3
0
4.4
New plants
23.6
26.4
18.9
20.1
Converted
plants
27.8
36.0
29.8
39.7
Minor fuel supply
-14.0
-15.8
-14.0
-15.8
Residual oil demand
192.3
164.1
193.6
129.9
(C)
Expressing these projected oil consumption quantities in terms of oil
equivalents yields the ranges:
? For 1985-2.29-2.69 million b/doe.
? For 1990-1.82-2.71 million b/doe.
Since oil use in 1980 was 2.54 million b/doe, by 1985 oil demand could fall
by 250,000 b/doe or could rise by 150,000 b/doe. For 1990, the projected
change in oil consumption ranges from a reduction of 720,000 b/doe to an
increase of 170,000 b/doe.
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Table 9
USSR: Thermal Power Plant Capacity and Fuel-Use
Capability by Region, 1980 a
Capacity Fuel-Use Capability b
(megawatts) (maximum theoretical percent share)
Reported Identified Oil Coal Gas Minor Fuels
Total 192,300
176,087
84.5
51.6
38
3.9
Gres (state regional electric power stations) 117,300
117,243
84.2
55.2
32.7
4.8
Tets (heat-electricity centrals) 75,000
58,844
85.1
45.0
48.6
3.5
Regional distribution c
Region II: West
11,489
72
3
14
35
Gres
8,485
64
4
NEGL
40
Tets
3,004
95
NEGL
56
23
Region III: South
37,563
98
76
7
NEGL
Gres
33,861
100
79
2
NEGL
Tets
3,702
81
62
44
NEGL
Region IV: North Caucasus
8,080
86
33
67
NEGL
Gres
5,792
100
45
55
NEGL
Tets
8,939
93
15
72
NEGL
Region VII: Central
27,213
87
35
55
11
Gres
15,239
90
43
41
13
Tets
11,974
81
24
72
7
Region VIII: Urals
19,165
63
77
52
2
Gres
14,335
58
83
59
NEGL
Tets
4,830
78
68
31
7
Region IX: West Siberia
12,244
70
69
30
8
Gres
7,055
60
60
40
NEGL
Tets
5,189
84
83
16
18
Region X: Central Asia
19,929
80
50
51
NEGL
Gres
14,041
76
40
60
NEGL
Tets
5,888
91
75
30
NEGL
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Table 9 (Continued)
a This table is based on the study of 294 thermal power plants that
were in operation by yearend 1980. Plants were selected with
several objectives in mind: (1) to describe the thermal power plant
inventory as accurately and fully as data allowed and (2) to
minimize the amount of data collection and analysis by focusing on
the largest plants with the most capacity. The column labeled
"Identified" shows the total amount of power plant capacity that
we studied. The column labeled "Reported" shows the total Soviet
steam-driven power plant capacity as reported in various authorita-
tive sources such as the Soviet statistical yearbook, Narodnoye
khozyaystvo SSSR, or the Power Ministry's principal published
work on the current five-year plan, Energetika SSSR v 1981-1985
godakh.
Capacity
(megawatts)
Fuel-Use Capability b
(maximum theoretical percent share)
Reported Identified Oil Coal Gas Minor Fuels
9,382 100 96 10 NEGL
b All plants that were studied have been aggregated by their
capability to burn a specific fuel irrespective of whether this fuel
actually was used. The percentage shares thus reflect individual
fuels' maximum theoretical share of total capacity, Gres capacity,
or Tets capacity. Because this share calculation ignores the effect of
all other fuel usage, multiple counting results.
c The regional distribution of all the "Identified" capacity is shown
in this table. The regional divisions reflect Soviet administrative/
economic boundaries. A map identifying the regional divisions
follows table 13.
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Table 10
USSR: Estimated New Fuel-Use
Capability of Thermal Power Plants,
1981-85 a
Fuel Megawatts Percent
Share
Maximum capacity (capable of burning
indicated fuel as primary or secondary
energy source) b
Total
27,496
Oil
22,146
Coal
11,980
Gas
14,741
Minor fuels
525
100.0
80.5
43.6
53.6
1.9
Estimated fuel use in projected capacity c
Total 27,496 100.0
Oil 250 0.9
Oil/gas 9,916 36.1
Coal/oil 11,980 43.6
Natural gas 3,808 13.8
Byproduct or associated gas 1,017 3.7
Peat 254 0.9
Secondary heat 271 1.0
e These data are based on the study of 121 power plants. The
Soviets want to add 28,600 megawatts (MW) of capacity at these
plants out of a total of 35,200 MW planned new capacity during
1981-85. We project that 27,496 MW will be installed by yearend
1985. We were able to directly identify new-capacity additions at
85 plants representing 20,496 MW. The remaining 7,000 MW of
new capacity that we project will be on line by 1985 was extrapolat-
ed from new-capacity startups reported during 1981-83 and from
the study of power plant construction trends during previous five-
year plan periods.
b All plants that we project to be in operation by yearend 1985 have
been aggregated by their capability to burn a specific fuel regard-
less of whether this fuel will actually be used. The percentage
shares thus reflect individual fuels' maximum theoretical share of
the total capacity, Gres capacity, or Tets capacity. Because this
share calculation ignores the effect of all other fuel usage, multiple
counting results.
c This distribution summarizes the actual fuel-use capability of the
new capacity projected to be in operation by yearend 1985.
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Table 11
USSR: Estimated New Thermal Power Plant Capacity
and Fuel-Use Capability by Region, 1981-85 a
Capacity Fuel-Use Capability
(megawatts) (maximum theoretical percent share) b
Projected Identified Oil Coal Gas Minor Fuels
27,496
20,496
80.5
45.6
51.7
1.3
Tets
1,330
100
19
100
NEGL
Region IV: North Caucasus
800
100
NEGL
100
NEGL
Gres
800
100
NEGL
100
NEGL
Tets
0
0
0
0
0
Gres
900
89
NEGL
100
NEGL
Tets
1,500
74
26
72
9
Region VIII: Urals
680
65
65
18
18
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Table 11 (Continued)
USSR: Estimated New Thermal Power Plant Capacity
and Fuel-Use Capability by Region, 1981-85 a
Capacity
(megawatts)
Fuel-Use Capability
(maximum theoretical percent share) b
Projected
Identified
Oil
Coal
Gas
Minor Fuels
5,862
79
67
33
NEGL
4,662
80
71
29
NEGL
Tets
1,200
78
52
48
NEGL
Region XI: East Siberia
1,175
100
100
NEGL
NEGL
Gres
520
100
100
NEGL
NEGL
Tets
655
100
100
NEGL
NEGL
Region XII: Far East
1,250
100
100
NEGL
NEGL
Gres
810
100
100
NEGL
NEGL
Tets
440
100
100
NEGL
NEGL
s These data are based on the study of 121 power plants. The
Soviets want to add 28,600 megawatts (MW) of capacity at these
plants out of a total of 35,200 MW planned new capacity during
1981-85. We project that 27,496 MW will be installed by yearend
1985. We were able to directly identify new-capacity additions at
85 plants representing 20,496 MW. The remaining 7,000 MW of
new capacity that we project will be on line by 1985 was extrapolat-
ed from new-capacity startups reported during 1981-83 and from
the study of power plant construction trends during previous five-
year plan periods.
b All plants that we project to be in operation by yearend 1985 have
been aggregated by their capability to burn a specific fuel regard-
less of whether this fuel will actually be used. The percentage
shares thus reflect individual fuels' maximum theoretical share of
the total capacity, Gres capacity, or Tets capacity. Because this
share calculation ignores the effect of all other fuel usage, multiple
counting results.
c The regional distribution of the 20,496 MW of "Identified"
capacity is shown in this table. The regional divisions reflect Soviet
administrative/economic boundaries. A map identifying the region-
al divisions follows table 13.
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Table 12
USSR: Estimated New Fuel-Use
Capability of Thermal Power Plants,
1986-90 a
Maximum capacity (capable of burning
indicated fuel as primary or
secondary energy source) b
Total
Coal
Gas
Total
Oil
Oil/gas
Coal/oil
Natural gas
Byproduct or associated gas
Peat
Shale
Megawatts Percent
Share
23,925
100.0
14,591
61.0
9,686
40.5
13,202
55.2
23,925
100.0
216
0.9?
4,689
19.6
9,686
40.5
7,197
30.1
1,316
5.5
213
0.9
608
2.5
a These data are based on the study of 54 power plants representing
20,925 MW. The remaining 3,000 MW of new capacity that we
project will be on line by 1990 was extrapolated from new-capacity
startups and analogous construction during previous five-year plan
periods.
b All plants that we project to be in operation by yearend 1990 have
been aggregrated by their capability to burn a specific fuel
regardless of whether this fuel actually will be used. The percentage
shares thus reflect individual fuels' maximum theoretical share of
the total capacity, Gres capacity, or Tets capacity. Because this
share calculation ignores the effect of all other fuel usage, multiple
counting results.
c This distribution summarizes the actual fuel-use capability of the
new capacity that we project will be in operation by yearend 1990.
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Table 13
USSR: Estimated New Thermal Power Plant Capacity
and Fuel-Use Capability, 1986-90 a
Capacity
(megawatts)
Fuel-Use Capability
(maximum theoretical percent share) b
Projected
Identified
Oil
Coal
Gas
Minor Fuels
Total
23,925
20,925
61.0
40.5
55.2
3.4
Gres (state regional electric power stations)
17,751
17,751
53.4
47.8
49.3
4.6
Tets (heat-electricity centrals)
6,174
3,174
86.3
20.2
76.7
NEGL
Regional distribution c
Tets
360
100
NEGL
100
NEGL
Region III: South
1,570
62
NEGL
100
NEGL
Gres
850
16
NEGL
100
NEGL
Tets
720
100
NEGL
100
NEGL
Tets
310
68
NEGL
100
NEGL
Region VII: Central
991
42
31
69
NEGL
Gres
531
39
39
60
NEGL
Tets
460
46
10
78
NEGL
2,350
32
NEGL
100
NEGL
2,350
32
NEGL
100
NEGL
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 13 (Continued)
Capacity Fuel-Use Capability
(megawatts) (maximum theoretical percent share) b
Projected Identified Oil Coal Gas Minor Fuels
a These data are based on the study of 54 power plants representing c The regional distribution of the 20,925 MW of "Identified"
20,925 MW. The remaining 3,000 MW of new capacity that we capacity is shown in this table. The regional divisions reflect Soviet
project will be on line by 1990 was extrapolated from new-capacity administrative/economic boundaries. A map identifying the region-
startups and analogous construction during previous five-year plan al divisions follows this table.
periods.
b All plants that we project to be in operation by yearend 1990 have
been aggregated by their capability to burn a specific fuel regard-
less of whether this fuel actually will be used. The percentage
shares thus reflect individual fuels' maximum theoretical share of
the total capacity, Gres capacity, or Tets capacity. Because this
share calculation ignores the effect of all other fuel usage, multiple
counting results.
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Figure 5
Regions Served by Thermal Power Systems
West ll 'u... Arkhangel'sk -"' l
Minsk
Kiev,'Z;;z5 --V- `~-- &S
Central
ti --- ` Sverdlovsk
11,j_ Volga ~/ \ C ~~
Soviet Union
West
Siberia
,vur1n
Novosibirsk
East
Siberia
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Table 14
USSR: Scheduled Power Plant Fuel Conversions,
1981-85 a
Capacity
(megawatts)
Conversion
Date
Old Fuel
New Fuel
Syrdar'ya Gres
3,000
1980-81
Oil/gas
Gas
Uglegorsk Gres
2,400
1983
Oil
Gas
Uglegorsk Gres
1,200
1983
Coal
Gas
Vitebsk Tets
62
1980-81
Peat/coal
Oil
Blagoveshchensk Tets
60
1981-85
Oil
Coal
320
255
b Plant capacity may differ from data cited elsewhere because this
listing shows only power plant capacity affected by fuel conversion.
The Uglegorsk Gres is listed twice because of separate oil and coal
fuel arrangements at the plant.
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 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000400010001-9
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000400010001-9
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000400010001-9
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000400010001-9