ISRAELI CAPABILITIES FOR STRIKING PLO BASES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T01298R000300330001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 20, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

I
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90T01298R000300330001-5
SUBJECT: Israeli Capabilities for Striking PLO Bases
NESA M485-10236
DISTRIBUTION:
EXTERNAL:
Cry Atlfi!!?A~.
1 - The Honorable Richard L. Armitage (Pentagon)
1 - Jock Covey (NSC)
1 - Robert Gallucci (State)
1 - David Mack (State)
1 - Gordon S. Brown (State)
1 - Philip Wilcox (State)
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
l.- DD/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA; AI/I
DDI/NESA/AI/I/
4Ce,
25X1
NGA Review Completed
NOT
(20Dec85)
~,sa?~a~n~eo RR~'9't
Data Entry n y~
. rRRT
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90T01298R000300330001-5
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90T01298R000300330001-5
Len ra In "e igence gency
DIRECTORkTE OF INTELLIGENCE'
20 December 1915
Israeli Capabilities for Striking DLO Bases
Summary
Israel has the capability to strike any major
PLO facility in the Middle East and North Africa
using P-1.5 fighter aircraft. The Israelis could
also use submarines or their- large missile boats
to deliver seaborne commandos for attacks on
facilities on or near the coast anywhere in the
Mediterranean Sea. Naval combatants, however,
would have to move through the Suez Canal into the
Red Sea to overate against. targets on the Arabian
Peninsula. PLO targets in Jordan could be hit by
ground units or by helicopter-borne troops.
The nLO bases in or near Sanaa in North
Yemen--1.1-00 nautical miles from southern
Israel--would be particularly likely targets for a
reprisal air rail because Fatah terrorists have
trained there and because North Yemen has weak air
defenses. The PLO base at Tebessa in
Algeria--1,350 nautical miles from Tel Aviv--would
be an inviting air target for the same reasons.
Recently, about 500 PLO fighters have moved to a
camp in Sudan--ti75 nautical miles from southern
Israel--bringing the number of fighters at the
facility possibly as high as 700. The relatively
short distance 14! this camp from Israel and its
weak air defenses may also make it an inviting
target. The '?eres Government almost certainly
would strike at PLO targets in Jordan if Israel
suffered an unusually destructive terrorist attack
of OIA/TWTFD. Information as of 1.9; December 1.985 was used in its 25X1
preparation. Questions and comments should be directed to Chief,
Arab-Israeli Division, 25X1
office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis; and 125X1
the Near Fast Branch
of the Israel-.Jordan-Palestinian branch, Arab-Israeli Division,
This memorandum was prepared byl 25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90T01298R000300330001-5
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000300330001-5
or a series of smaller operations directed from
Jordanian territory.
The PLO has offices in 85 countries, but since the expulsion
of PLO fighters from Beirut in 1982, the organization's military
forces have been concentrated at bases in Algeria, North and
South Yemen, Tunisia, Iraq, Jordan, and, most recently, Sudan
(see the accompanying map). Fighters associated with
pro-Damascus Palestinian groups remain in Lebanon and Syria, and
Fatah fighters have gradually filtered back to Lebanon's major
cities. (Descriptions of major PLO facilities in the Middle East
and North Africa are at Annex.)
Israeli Strike Capabilities
Israel's military has the capability to strike any PLO
facility in the Middle East (including the Arabian Peninsula) and
North Africa.
Air Force Using F-15Cs or F-15Ds flying 'a high-low-high
mission profile and supported by its two KC-707 aerial refueling
tankers,. the Israeli air force probably could strike even the
most distant of PLO bases--the camps in Alge;ia, North Yemen, and
South Yemen--with as many as 13-20 aircraft. Flying a low-low-
high mission profile to avoid radar detection would consume a
much greater amount of fuel and would require a substantial
reduction in the number of strike aircraft. When attacking
targets in Iraq or Jordan, the Israelis could use aircraft with
shorter range, such as their F-16s, F-4s, or Kfirs, and stage
much larger raids.
Navy Israel's navy has the technical capability to land
naval cormnando teams as far away as Algeria or the Yemens. These
commandos could operate either from Gal class submarines or the
Aliya or Ramat class missile-armed patrol boats, but would be of
use only against facilities located near the coast, such as the
recently destroyed complex in Tunis or the now abandoned PLO
* In reaching this assessment, we assume that the F-15C/Ds
would be supported by two KC-707s that each could provide the
raiders with at least 110,000 pounds of fuel. Some of these
aircraft probably would carry GBU-15s, which are 2,000-pound
glide bombs guided by a television seeker system. Others
probably would carry Mark 82 500-pound "iron bombs." All
probably would be armed with Sparrow and Sidewinder air-to-air
missiles, and all would carry conformal fuel tanks and as many
wing or belly tanks as would be compatible with the specific
ordnance load. We assume further that the strike force would
travel to and from a target at a relatively high altitude (e.g.,
30,000 feet) and at a constant cruising speed (e.g., 500
knots) .
-2-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000300330001-5
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000300330001-5
facility on Kamaran Island, North Yemen. Naval combatants,
however, Aioull have.--o move through the Suez Canal into the. Red
Army Israel's army could strike deep into Jordan using
elite helicopter-borne forces or regular ground troops. The
Israelis have the capability to insert about four battalions of
infantrv in a one-time helicopter lift. 3v using such forces,
however, the Israelis would largely sacrifice the element of
surprise provided by an airstrike. Even if ground troops or
helicopter-borne soldiers achieved tactical surprise, they would
Sea to operate against targets on the krabian aeninsula.
remain vulnerable to retaliatory attack. Consequently, such
units woull require extensive protective aircover.
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000300330001-5
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000300330001-5
. outlook
Peres probably will continue to rule out raids against PLO
targets in ?tordan unless Arafat's forces there are clearly linked
to a highly destructive terrorist raid or a series of smaller
operations in ?srael or the West lank. Xing 9ussein already has
imposed new restrictions on PLO activities in Tordan and has
forced some radical Palestinians to leave the country. Peres
almost certainly calculates that Hussein will crack down further
on the "M if the organization becomes embroiled in another
incident such as the Achille Lauro affair.
Although the Tunis raid has encouraged other Arab states to
increase their alert levels, Israel probably could still mount an
operation against the PLO in North Yemen, Algeria, or Sudan
without unduly endangering its railing force. The only factors
that might cause the Israelis to reject a strike on the base in
Sudan would be a fear.of reprisals against the roughly 2,000
Ethiopian Tewish refugees still quartered in Sudan or fear of 25X1
The PLO base at Tebessa in Algeria
might be another inviting target because of Algeria's relatively
weak air defense cover and the easy approach route over
Tunisia. Given sufficient provocation, Israel might elect to
attack ILA) bases in Iraq,, although the Israelis would have to
accept a greater risk to its forces in such an operation because
of Iraq's relatively dense air defenses.
A
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000300330001-5
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90T01298R000300330001-5
SECRET
North Yemen
Annex
The PLO's air assets--called Force 14--consist of a handful
of helicopters and transport aircraft located at Sanaa
International Airport,
Yemeni civilian and military aircraft, making them a difficult
target for a raiding force. The airport is defended by
obsolescent SA-2 SAMs and AAA, and the SA-2s are not supported by
an effective air defense radar network. The North Yemenis
recently received SA-3s, but these missiles probably will not
become operational for several months.
North Yemen's air force has an extremely limited capability
to defend its airspace with fighter aircraft. The most effective
unit in the air force is an F-5 squadron, but North Yemen's
pilots have not been well trained for air-to-air combat.
Until recently, the PLO had a small naval detachment based
on Kamaran Island near Hudaydah, where Israel feared they could
stage raids against Israeli ships in the Red Sea.
The PLO also maintains a detachment of fighters in Hudaydah,
but they are not located at an easily identifiable facility.
Hudaydah, like the Sanaa area, is protected by SA-2s and AAA.
Algeria
The PLO maintains a regional military command in Algeria,
and its main base is located at Tebessa--approximately 1,350
Newly installed air defense equipment has been observed at
Tebessa. Two six-position antiaircraft artillery (AAA) sites and
two four-position SA-7 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM)
25X1
25X1
-5-
qv ('WrT
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90T01298R000300330001-5
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90T01298R000300330001-5
sites--presumably operated by the Algerians--have `been
constructed there since late October. Additionally, the fighters
may be armed with individual SA-'-s.
Even so, the DLO fighters would undoubtedly depend heavily
on support from the Algerian air force for defense. Algerian air
defense units are equipped.with modern Soviet interceptors,
supported by a fairly extensive radar network that is situated to
protect the western region of the country and coastal areas.
'rehessa, however, is not well covered by this network or by
Algerian ^AM units and could be approached by flying across
DLO fighters have also received armor, artillery, air
defense, and amphibious warfare training from Algerian
instructors at several Algerian bases around the country,
weakly defended Tunisian airspace.
These fighters receive eir
training at a center at Arzew, about 100 nautical miles east of
the Moroccan border. Like other Algerian bases, the Arzew
facility probably has no permanent 'Palestinian presence, making
it a less suitable target for the Israelis than Tebessa. Arzew,
which is an important port, is defended by three SA-6 batteries
and an antiaircraft artillery (ANN) battery.
Fighters stationed at the camp possibly as high as 700. A few
fighters may also be located ata small camp--called
Sinkat--located nearby. The camp at Erkowit is protected only by
six quadruple-mount 14.5-mm antiaircraft machine guns and,
oossiblv, 4A-?s. Sudanese air defenses are virtually
nonexistent. The Sudanese have no operational air defense
missiles, no early-warning radar network, and no skilled pilots
to fly their handful of Mi_O-21_s.
south Yemen
After the ?LO's expulsion from '3eirut, the organization may
have sent about 1,1!10 mostly Fatah fighters to camps near Aden in
south Yemen--'.,200 nautical miles from southern Israel--and
established a regional command there. By the end of last summer,
however, most of these men had departed for Iraq.
Soviet pilot-advisers, but they probably would not be available
South Yemeni Air Force operates two fighter squadrons equipped
with Mi_O-?ls, but its pilots are untested in combat and not
considered particularly proficient. South Yemen has several
for use against the Israelis.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/10/13 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300330001-5
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90T01298R000300330001-5
Iraq
The PLO maintains several offices in Baghdad, including the
headquarters of a regional command, but the main PLO camp in Iraq
is located at Al Musayyib, about 25 nautical miles south of
Baghdad--about 475 nautical miles from Israel. The camp was
built to house between 1,000 and 2,000 persons, but the recent
influx of Fatah fighters from Tunisia and South Yemen may have
pushed the occupancy figure as high as 2,500. Although no air
defenses are visible.at the camp, several light AAA pieces are
located at a nearby Iraqi facility. Fighters at the camp may be
armed with SA-7s or similar short-range air defense weapons, and
five Iraqi SA-6 battalions and an SA-3 battalion are located
about 30 nautical miles of the camp.
Iraq's air defense forces, which include hundreds of SA-2,
SA-3, SA-6, SA-8, SA-13, and Roland SAM launchers and 18
fighter-interceptor squadrons, are improving, although they have
not been able to prevent intruders from overflying their
country. Moreover, even though Iraq is wary of Israeli raids in
the wake of the attack on its Tuwaitha reactors in 1981 and the
recent raid on Tunis, Iraq's principal concern is Iran.
Consequently, most air defense forces are focused toward the
east, not the west. Still, the density of Iraqi a.ir defenses and
cooperative efforts among Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq in
trading air defense information imposes risks for would-be
Israeli raiders.
Tunisia
The devastating Israeli raid last October on the PLO
political headquarters in Tunis--1,200 nautical miles from
Israel--destroyed most of the complex and inflicted more than-200
casualties.
Tunisian air defenses, as the Tunis raid made abundantly
clear, are weak. If the Israelis chose to strike the PLO in
Tunis again in the near future, the Tunisians could not prevent
them from doing so.
Jordan
The PLO maintains several administrative offices in Amman,
including those of the Palestine National Council, the Palestine
National Fund, the Voice of Palestine radio service, the
headquarters of the Palestine National Liberation Army's Badr
Brigade, the commander of Fatah Force 17, and the commmander of
25X1
25X1
25X1
-7-
VrRFm
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90T01298R000300330001-5
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90T01298R000300330001-5
Fatah's Western Sector Command. The main PLO military base in
Jordan is located next to the Jordanian army barracks at Az Zarqa
northeast of Amman.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90T01298R000300330001-5
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000300330001-5
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000300330001-5