THE SOVIET SUCCESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 78
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 29, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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29 March 1985
FB 85-10015
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The Soviet Succession
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This analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in
foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without
coordination with other U.S. Government components.
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The Soviet Succession
Foreword
This is the second of two reports examining aspects of the transfer of the lead-
ership of the Soviet Communist Party to Mikhail Gorbachev following CPSU
General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko's death on 10 March. Analysis
Report FB 85-10009 of 11 March 1985, "Gorbachev: A Political Profile,"
reviewed the new general secretary's public statements and activities over the
past 15 years to sketch a profile of his political views. This report focuses on
the initial days of the new regime.
Major portions of the foreign policy section of this report were compiled from
articles previously published in the FBIS Trends of 13, 20, and 27 March
1985. The section on the new regime's treatment of China and Beijing's
response appeared under separate cover as Analysis Report FB 85-10013 of
26 March 1985, "Sino-Soviet Relations: Ground Prepared for Fundamental
Change."
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Contents
Highlights ........................................................................................................ 1
Emergence of Gorbachev ................................................................................ 2
Transfer of Power ............................................................................................ 4
Timing of Succession: Leadership Moves With Unusual Speed............ 4
CPSU Plenum: Nominating Speech Breaks With Past ........................ 5
Military Eclipse: The Symbols Were Missing ........................................ 8
New Regime .................................................................................................... 9
Leadership Rankings: Continuity on Top, Confusion Below ................ 10
Building a Coalition: Gorbachev's Allies and Opponents ...................... 11
Military Role: Evidence of Decline ........................................................ 15
New Dynamism in Foreign Policy .................................................................. 16
United States: Moderate Stance ............................................................ 18
West Europe: Stress on Improved Relations .......................................... 21
Japan: Evidence of Strains Predominates .............................................. 24
East Europe: Positive Image Projected .................................................. 26
China: Ground Prepared for Fundamental Change .............................. 28
Indochina: Gorbachev Reassures Hanoi ................................................ 43
Korea: Pyongyang Seeks Improved Ties ................................................ 48
Cuba: New Signs of Strain Apparent .................................................... 50
Nicaragua: Cautious Support for Sandinista Regime ............................ 52
Nonruling Parties: Dissident Communists Cultivated .......................... 54
South Asia: Concern Over Afghan Conflict .......................................... 56
Middle East: Low Profile ........................................................................ 57
Africa: Ties With Allies Highlighted .................................................... 59
Media Behavior After Chernenko's Death ....................................................... 61
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1. Leadership Rankings at Lying-in-State ......................................... I... 63
2. Leadership Rankings at Chernenko Funeral in Red Square ............ 64
3. Meetings With Foreign Leaders ........................................................ 65
4. Full Names and Titles of Leaders ...................................................... 68
5. Media Behavior After Deaths of Chernenko, Andropov, and
Brezhnev ..............................................................................................73
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The Soviet Succession
Highlights
By all appearances, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected general secretary of the
CPSU without any serious opposition at a CPSU plenum on 11 March. His el-
evation closed the books on a long period of uncertainty during which the
health of his predecessors and the succession question seemed to dominate
Soviet domestic politics. The succession differed from the previous ones in
significant respects-the speed with which it took place, the unusual nature of
the speech by Foreign Minister Gromyko nominating Gorbachev, and the low
profile of the military in the proceedings.
The elevation of the youngest member of the Politburo to the post of general
secretary is a major watershed in the transfer of power from the generation of
Soviet leaders that rose in the party leadership under Stalin. Over the past
three years most of the inner core of the leadership that ruled the Soviet Union
during the Brezhnev regime has passed from the scene. In overseeing the
completion of this transition, Gorbachev appears to be in a favorable position
to build a solid base of power and move on to address domestic problems that
his predecessors were unable to tackle.
Despite the obligatory reaffirmation of continuity in foreign policy, Gorbachev
gave early hints that he was prepared to try to accelerate changes begun under
Chernenko and to take new initiatives in some areas that have long been
neglected. At the same time, Gorbachev exhibited an energetic leadership
style by meeting with an unprecedented number of foreign dignitaries at the
Chernenko funeral.
Gorbachev's most dramatic move was his meeting with the Chinese represen-
tative-the first such meeting in more than 20 years. The new regime also in-
dicated that it was prepared to look for ways to improve relations with the
West and with former adversaries in the communist movement. Gorbachev's
rhetorical restraint and the Soviet media's nonpolemical coverage of his
meeting with Vice President Bush suggested that Moscow will continue the ef-
fort begun under Chernenko to ease tensions with the United States.
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Emergence of Gorbachev
Mikhail Gorbachev rose to the post of general secretary in part by being at the
right place at the right time, and he does not appear to have an independent
base of political power. After serving as a full Politburo member for only two
years and working only in agriculture, he emerged as a contender for the lead-
ership of the party during the regime of Yuriy Andropov, who apparently
turned to Gorbachev as one of the few young members of the Politburo and
Secretariat who could help him gain control over the party apparatus. The
public record of Gorbachev's advancement during this period suggests that
Andropov relied increasingly upon the younger man as his own health
deteriorated:
? In April 1983 Gorbachev's name began to appear with those of other senior
Politburo members on obituaries for a wide range of officials, and he
delivered the annual Lenin Day speech-an honor given to Andropov in
1982 and Chernenko in 1981.
? By June, when he helped install a new party leader in Leningrad and a new
RSFSR premier, it was evident that he had assumed responsibility for the
key area of personnel matters.
? In August 1983, shortly before Andropov was removed from public life by
his illness, the general secretary symbolically gave Gorbachev special
attention among the leaders of the new generation. Andropov and Gorba-
chev were the only party leaders that addressed a meeting of older cadres at
which Andropov made a special plea for orderly transfer of power and
authority to younger leaders.
When Andropov died in February 1984, the party leadership again put off
handing over power to a member of the younger generation and turned instead
to 72-year-old Konstantin Chernenko, the senior-ranking member of the
Secretariat. The transfer of power nevertheless involved another big boost for
Gorbachev, who assumed most of the responsibilities Chernenko had been
exercising as second secretary under Andropov without giving up any of his
previous duties:
? He took over supervision of ideological matters from Chernenko, for
example, succeeding him as chairman of the Politburo commission on
education reform.
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? He began playing a lead role in economic planning, addressing meetings on
long-term planning in mid-1984.
? He succeeded Chernenko as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of
the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of the Union and made a widely
publicized trip to Britain in December 1984.
By contrast, Grigoriy Romanov, the only
other full Politburo member also in the
Secretariat, and Gorbachev's chief rival in
the succession, apparently assumed no new
responsibilities outside his sphere of secu-
rity matters and heavy industry. More-
over, despite the vacancies in the Secretar-
iat, no new secretaries were named,
leaving Gorbachev a free hand.
Gorbachev speaking
at Chernenko funeral. (Soviet televi-
sion 13 March 1985)
Under Chernenko there were persisting
signs that some members of the leadership
were trying to slow Gorbachev's rise.
There were inconsistencies in his ranking
in the leadership throughout the period,
and although he was ranked third-after
Chernenko and Tikhonov-on many im-
portant occasions, he sometimes appeared
below Kremlin elders Gromyko, Ustinov,
and Grishin. During October and November signs of resistance to Gorbachev
increased, and for a brief period it appeared that Romanov was being
advanced at Gorbachev's expense. At an 18 October award ceremony attended
by the Politburo, Gorbachev appeared in an unusually low ranking position,
while Romanov stood in Gorbachev's usual spot. During the same period
Romanov played a much more active public role, while Gorbachev was
conspicuously absent from several key leadership meetings.
Gorbachev resumed a high profile in early December, and by the time of
Chernenko's death on 10 March he was the best placed to succeed him. He
was the second-ranking party secretary and was already exercising oversight
responsibility for most key areas of party work. Foreign Minister Gromyko re-
vealed in his nominating speech that Gorbachev had "led" the Secretariat and
chaired Politburo sessions in Chernenko's absence.
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The option of again turning to a member of the older generation had largely
disappeared: Defense Minister Ustinov died in December; Premier Tikhonov
is almost 80; 75-year-old Foreign Minister Gromyko has had no experience in
domestic affairs; 70-year-old Moscow party leader Grishin, a more likely
candidate, has never worked in the central party apparatus. Moreover, the
deaths of Ustinov and Chernenko had significantly reduced the voting power
of the older generation in the Politburo.
Transfer of Power
Departures from precedent during the leadership transition reveal something
of the politics and character of the new regime. The transition took place
much faster than after the deaths of Brezhnev and Andropov, projecting an
image of efficiency and suggesting that there was no serious opposition to
Gorbachev's selection. Gromyko's unusual nominating speech was marked by
a personal tone totally unlike the set-piece nominating addresses delivered at
the two earlier plenums. The meager role of the military in the transition was
also a break with the past.
Timing of Succession: Leadership Moves With Unusual Speed
The current transfer of power was faster than previous transitions in .a number
of respects.' The announcement that Gorbachev would head Chernenko's
funeral commission came earlier than the comparable announcements after
the deaths of Brezhnev and Andropov. In all three cases the person who would
be named general secretary headed the commission, suggesting that the
Politburo had discussed the decision about the new general secretary before
the announcement was released. The CPSU plenum that elected Gorbachev
was convened hastily, the day after Chernenko's death, with the result that
many Central Committee members not already in Moscow probably were
unable to attend. Not even all the Politburo members were present-
Ukrainian party chief Vladimir Shcherbitskiy was leading a parliamentary
delegation to the United States and did not return to Moscow until the day af-
ter the plenum. The plenum had been held one day later following the deaths
of Brezhnev in 1982 and Stalin in March 1953, and three days later following
Andropov's death last year. Chernenko's funeral was also held one day earlier
than the ceremonies for Brezhnev and Andropov.
' Table 5 provides details on the timing of the last three Soviet successions.
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CPSU Plenum: Nominating Speech Breaks With Past
Gromyko phrased his nominating address in direct, colorful idiom totally
unlike that normally used on formal party occasions. Unlike the nominating
speeches for Andropov and Chernenko, delivered respectively by Chernenko
and Tikhonov, Gromyko's speech was not publicized in Soviet mass media, al-
though it was published in a pamphlet on the proceedings of the plenum,
released on 14 March.
Its intriguing statements about Gorbachev aside, the unique character of
Gromyko's speech is apparent in the ways it differed from the nominating
speeches in 1982 and 1984:
? Gromyko did not once mention Chernenko. By contrast, Tikhonov devoted
half of his speech to praising Andropov before he nominated Chernenko, and
Chernenko spent more than half of his nominating speech for Andropov
praising former General Secretary Brezhnev.
? Gromyko claimed to be revealing the "content" and "atmosphere" of the Po-
litburo meeting that selected Gorbachev to replace Chernenko. Previous
nominating speeches included stock phrases about the Politburo's belief in
the worthiness of the candidate, but otherwise did not purport to reflect the
discussions among the top party leaders.
Gromyko's accolades for Gorbachev were far different from the dry records of
party service and qualities of character that were marshaled in speeches
nominating Andropov and Chernenko. His emphasis on pragmatic qualities of
intelligence and reason was so atypical of Soviet statements that it may have
reflected his personal enthusiasm for Gorbachev. Other areas discussed in the
speech-Gorbachev's abilities and attitudes in foreign affairs and security
matters-may have been stressed by Gromyko not only because of his own ex-
pertise in these fields but also because Gorbachev's public record and
experience are so thin in these areas.
Outlining what he presented as the view of the Politburo, Gromyko praised
Gorbachev as a "man of principle" who speaks his mind directly, has a "keen
profound intellect," and approaches problems analytically. Noting that poli-
tics will "just stand still" without more than analysis, he also maintained that
Gorbachev had demonstrated "many a time" in the Politburo and Secretariat
that he also had the ability to draw conclusions. Appearing to suggest that
Gorbachev would not be dogmatic, Gromyko maintained that he does not see
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issues in terms of "black and white" but in "intermediate colors." At the same
time, Gromyko described Gorbachev as a man of "strong convictions" who
"states his position frankly," whether or not others agree. He also said the Po-
litburo agreed that Gorbachev was gifted in organizational and communica-
tion skills.
---- In the area of foreign policy, Gromyko
spoke in more personal terms and used
language apparently designed to allay mis-
givings about Gorbachev's experience. He
stated that by virtue of his own service it
might be "clearer" to him than to "certain
other comrades" that Gorbachev "grasps
very well and rapidly the essence of the
processes taking place outside our coun-
try," and he added that Gorbachev had
repeatedly drawn "correct, party conclu-
sions" in foreign affairs. Gromyko also
offered assurances about Gorbachev's
views on defense, asserting that Gorbachev
had argued at Politburo sessions that the
Soviet Union must "keep its powder dry"
Foreign Minister Gromyko at Cher- and that defense must be kept "at the
nenko funeral. (Soviet television, 13
March 1985) necessary level." Going unusually far in
acknowledging Soviet concern about the
impact of the succession on world opinion, Gromyko also warned that the
world was watching, looking for "cracks of some kind in the leadership." He
affirmed that the Politburo was unanimous in the opinion that the leadership
"will not allow our political opponents any satisfaction on this score."
The Election In reporting the election of Gorbachev, the plenum
communique published in Pravda used an unusual
term in characterizing the decision as unanimous. Rather than the term used
to describe the elections of Andropov and Chernenko, yedinoglasno (a
unanimous vote), the communique used the less precise term yedinodushno,
implying full agreement. Yedinodushno had been used to describe Brezhnev's
reelection as general secretary at the plenums in 1971, 1976, and 1981 but has
rarely been used in accounts of plenums in recent years.
The implications of this terminology are not clear. The two terms have
appeared to be used interchangeably on some occasions in the past-for
example, at the conclusion of the 1981 CPSU congress Pravda on 4 March
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used both terms to describe Brezhnev's election. At other times, there appears
to have been a distinction: An account of the June 1983 Central Committee
plenum contained in the plenum's stenographic report suggests that yedino-
dushno means approval by acclamation rather than by vote. Chernenko, who
was chairing the plenum, used both terms in describing approval for a draft
resolution on the nomination of Andropov as Supreme Soviet Presidium
chairman. Chernenko characterized the "stormy applause" that greeted the
resolution as "unanimous (yedinodushnoye) acceptance" of the resolution. But
he added, "In view of the importance of the question, I consider it advisable to
have a vote." The plenum then approved the resolution yedinoglasno.
Gorbachev's Gorbachev's plenum speech was more conventional
Acceptance than Gromyko's nominating speech, assuring his audi-
Speech ence of his commitment to collective decisionmaking
and the maintenance of Soviet defense capabilities, as
Chernenko and Andropov had done in their speeches to the plenums that
elected them:
? On collectivity, Gorbachev pledged to implement policies "elaborated
collectively" and appealed to the rest of the leadership, saying he was
"counting on the support and active help of the Politburo members,
candidate members, and Central Committee secretaries and of the party's
Central Committee as a whole." Chernenko, in his acceptance speech, had
similarly pledged that he would "exert every effort" to work "together" with
other members of the leadership and would further advance "by collective
efforts" the work initiated by Andropov. Andropov's acceptance speech is
not known to have been publicized by Soviet media, but in his opening
speech to the plenum he observed that "the collective wisdom of the party,
its collective leadership" must play an important role in policymaking.
? On defense, Gorbachev pledged to maintain Soviet defenses "at a level such
that any aggressors" will recognize that attempts to encroach on the security
of the USSR or its allies "will be met with a crushing retaliatory strike." To
accomplish this, he said, the armed forces would continue to receive
"everything necessary." Chernenko had similarly pledged to "further see to
it that our country's defense capability is strengthened so that we should
have enough means to cool the hot heads of belligerent adventurists," calling
this "a very substantial prerequisite for preserving peace." Andropov paid
direct tribute to "the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces" as the
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Military leaders stand honor guard at Chernenko lying-in-state ceremony; left to
right: Main Political Directorate Chief Yepishev, Warsaw Pact Commander in
Chief Kulikov, General Staff Chief Akhromeyev, Defense Minister Sokolov. (Soviet
television, 12 March 1985)
only means of defending peace and implicitly promised to continue Brezhnev's
policy of ensuring that defense capability meets "present-day requirements."
Military Eclipse: The Symbols Were Missing
The military played a sharply reduced role compared with the two previous
transitions. Given the highly symbolic implications of the ceremonies sur-
rounding successions, it is unlikely that the changes in the protocol of the fu-
neral can be explained merely by the fact that the defense minister is no longer
a member of the Politburo or by Chernenko's lack of military rank. The
exclusion of the military comes in the wake of earlier indications of reduced
military influence in the political leadership.
The military's role in the public ceremonies has declined successively in each
of the last three transfers of power:
? The military was most prominent at Brezhnev's funeral in November 1982
when Defense Minister Ustinov delivered a eulogy and was the only
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Politburo member other than General Secretary Andropov to speak. The next
four ranking senior officers-First Deputy Defense Ministers Ogarkov,
Kulikov, Sokolov, and Main Political Directorate Chief Yepishev-were also
present on the mausoleum with party leaders and the members of the funeral
commission.
? At Andropov's funeral in February 1984, the military was given less
symbolic importance. Ustinov shared the limelight with Foreign Minister
Gromyko as supporting speakers at the funeral. Ogarkov, Kulikov, and
Yepishev again stood on the mausoleum, but Sokolov was apparently away
from Moscow.
? Military leaders had no role at Chernenko's funeral. Only civilians stood on
the mausoleum and delivered eulogies. Defense Minister Sokolov was not
even named to the funeral commission. (Ustinov was on the commissions for
Brezhnev and Andropov along with all the other Moscow-based Politburo
members.) By contrast, in 1953 Defense Minister Vasilevskiy was named to
Stalin's funeral commission even though he was not a Politburo member.
The military leaders' only public role during the Chernenko funeral was a
brief appearance in the honor guard during a lying-in-state ceremony shown
on television on 12 March.
New Regime
Gorbachev is in a highly favorable position to influence the composition of the
top leadership. Additions to the Politburo and Secretariat over the past three
years have not kept pace with departures, bringing the size of both bodies to
their lowest levels in two decades; other leaders can be expected to depart
soon.' In addition, Ustinov's replacement as defense minister is 73 and clearly
intended to be an interim choice. As the party prepares for the 27th CPSU
Congress in the coming year, Gorbachev will also be able to influence the
composition of the Central Committee and the regional party leadership.
An early indication of Gorbachev's political strength could be the handling of
the chairmanship of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. When
Gorbachev nominated Chernenko for the post in April 1984 he linked the
2 In the past three years nine Politburo and Secretariat members have died or resigned: Suslov,
Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Rashidov, Kiselev, Pelshe, Andropov, Ustinov, and Chernenko. Many of
the remaining members are old: Kuznetsov is 84, Ponomarev is 80, Tikhonov is 79, and
Gromyko is 75; Kunayev, Solomentsev, Grishin, and Kapitonov are all in their early 70's.
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office with that of general secretary, stating that it was in the national interest
for the same person to hold both posts. He maintained that the Central
Committee, proceeding from the interests of Soviet society and government,
"recognized the necessity" for Chernenko to hold both posts and that this
arrangement had "great significance" for the conduct of foreign policy.
Having thus made an institutional case for linking the two positions,
Gorbachev would suffer an important loss of prestige if he were not also
elected head of state, an office held by Brezhnev (since 1977), Andropov, and
Chernenko.
Leadership Rankings: Continuity on Top, Confusion Below
There were no signs of change in the power relationships among top leaders in
the immediate aftermath of Chernenko's death. Aside from Gorbachev's rise
to the top spot, the senior Politburo members remained in their presuccession
order during all the formal lineups connected with Chernenko's funeral, with
Tikhonov coming first, followed by Gromyko, Grishin, and Romanov. Roma-
nov was in a more prominent position during graveside ceremonies where the
ranking was less formal, standing on one side of Gorbachev while Tikhonov
stood on the other.
Leadership lineup at lying-in-state; left to right: Romanov,
Grishin, Gromyko, Tikhonov, Gorbachev. (Soviet television,
12 March 1985)
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Vorotnikov, Gorbachev, Tikhonov (left to right) at lying-in-
state. (Soviet television, 11 March 1985)
In contrast to the clear lineup of the top five, the rankings of other members of
the Politburo and Secretariat were inconsistent. There were nine lineups
during the lying-in-state and funeral ceremonies, and no two were alike.' At
least one anomaly may have some significance: Vorotnikov, who normally
appears in last place among full Politburo members, had a more prominent
spot at the 11 March lying-in-state ceremony following the plenum when he
stood on one side of Gorbachev, while Tikhonov and the other top leaders
stood on the other. Gorbachev's appearance in this same position at a lying-in-
state ceremony following the plenum that elected Chernenko apparently
reflected his increased status, but it is too early to tell if the parallel will hold
true for Vorotnikov.
aniildinng a Coalition: Gorbacbev's Allies and Opponents
Among the elders in the Politburo, Gromyko and Grishin have given
Gorbachev the strongest public show of support-Gromyko with his impas-
sioned nominating speech and Grishin by referring to Gorbachev as the head
' See Tables 1 and 2 of this report.
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of the Politburo in a speech reported in Moskovskaya Pravda on 19 March.
Gorbachev may get his firmest backing from the younger members of the
leadership brought in under Andropov: Vorotnikov, Ligachev, and Ryzhkov.
Several other leaders, including Romanov, Shcherbitskiy, and Dolgikh, may
pose obstacles to his consolidation of power.
Vorotnikov The leader with a public record closest to Gorbachev's
on economic issues is 59-year-old Politburo member
and RSFSR Premier Vitaliy Vorotnikov, who had the most meteoric rise of
any leader under Andropov. For reasons that are unclear, Vorotnikov was
removed as RSFSR first deputy premier and exiled as ambassador to Cuba in
1979. He was brought back into domestic politics in mid-1982 when Andro-
pov's KGB campaign against corruption brought down Krasnodar First
>,,,,._ 7111M,,_11111 Secretary Medunov, an apparent crony of Brezhnev;
Vorotnikov was installed in his place and carried out a
vigorous purge of local officials. In June 1983 he was
elected premier of the RSFSR, after being nominated
by Gorbachev, and candidate member of the Politbu-
ro. He was promoted to full membership in the
Politburo with unusual speed in December 1983.
Like Gorbachev, Vorotnikov has publicly stressed a
need to stimulate initiative through economic incen-
tives and administrative decentralization. As RSFSR
premier, he has vigorously shaken up the republic
ministries and promoted economic management reforms, including a major
economic experiment in the services sector that is designed to reduce planning
controls and stimulate initiative and quality work. In a speech in Turkmeni-
stan, reported in the 23 December 1984 Pravda, Vorotnikov called for a new
approach to solving economic problems at all levels, "from the worker and kol-
khoznik to the minister." According to the 27 November 1984 Zarya
Vostoka, he "highly praised" economic experiments being conducted in
Georgia during a November 1984 visit to the republic and stated that this ex-
perience should be "disseminated in other parts of the country." In recent
years Gorbachev has also shown more interest in Georgia's economic experi-
ments than any other national-level leader.
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Ligachev Yegor Ligachev, 64, is Gorbachev's direct subordinate
in the leadership. He was brought to Moscow to head
the Central Committee's Party Organization Work Department in April 1983,
and by June 1983 there were clear signs that Gorbachev was overseeing this
department. Ligachev was raised to Central Committee secretary at the
Yegor Ligachev
December 1983 plenum and succeeded Gorbachev as
chairman of the Council of the Union's Legislative
Proposals Commission in April 1984, when Gorbachev
moved up to chairman of the council's Foreign Affairs
Commission.
Prior to Chernenko's death Gorbachev seemed to be
relying on Ligachev to fill some gaps in the Secre-
tariat. Ligachev appeared to be taking on duties in the
agricultural sector as Gorbachev assumed more and
more responsibilities. For example, in January this
year in a keynote address to a conference in
Leningrad, Ligachev kicked off a campaign called for by Gorbachev to
introduce the collective contract system of labor organization throughout the
country's farms. On two occasions he also intruded into police activity, a
sphere supervised by Romanov, most recently attending a 4 March conference
of internal affairs ministers as the only representative of the leadership.
Ryzhkov
Nikolay Ryzhkov, a 55-year-old economic specialist,
has probably also been working directly under
Gorbachev. In November 1982 he became a CPSU secretary-and head of the
Central Committee's new Economics Department and became involved in
Nikolay Ryzhkov
efforts to work out changes in the methods of planning
and management. During 1984 Gorbachev apparently
took over supervision of this department. Ryzhkov and
Gorbachev's subordinate Ligachev were the only party
secretaries to attend Gorbachev's February 1985 elec-
tion speech.
Ryzhkov also appears to support changes in economic
management. Like Gorbachev and Vorotnikov, he has
visited Georgia to observe economic experiments. Ac-
cording to the 24 September 1983 Zarya Vostoka
report on his visit, he praised innovations in the
republic as a positive example for other areas. In speeches in February 1984
and February 1985 Ryzhkov praised national economic experiments begun in
1983 that increase the independence of enterprises.
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Romanov As the only other senior CPSU secretary, 62-year-old
Grigoriy Romanov is Gorbachev's most obvious rival
for political power. As overseer of the military-industrial complex and
machine-building sector he is the chief spokesman for defense interests and
will be a key actor in debates over allocation of resources. Even before he as-
sumed this role Romanov was one of the strongest advocates in the leadership
for the defense sector. If he is not constrained by political rivalry, Romanov
may side with Gorbachev in efforts to change economic policy. He has long
pressed for economic incentives and promoted many economic experiments.
Shcherbitskiy Noted for his obvious ambition and his strong opin-
ions, 67-year-old Ukrainian party leader and Politburo
member Vladimir Shcherbitskiy may have sharp conflicts with Gorbachev.
Shcherbitskiy has been outspoken in upholding defense interests and has often
taken a hard line in foreign policy matters. In two September 1984 speeches
he lobbied for beefing up defense, criticized reliance on trade with the West,
and urged a big effort to develop Soviet technology independent of the West's.
Shcherbitskiy's sharpest disagreement with Gorbachev may be in the sphere of
economic policy. In a November 1984 Kommunist (No. 17) article he took po-
sitions which appeared opposed to Gorbachev's calls for transferring more
rights to plants and increasing "self-management." He argued that any
weakening of central planning and turn to market forces would disrupt
economic production, would be conducive to the "restoration of capitalism,"
and could not be called "genuine people's self-management." Shcherbitskiy
has not opposed all changes in economic management, however. In fact, he has
cultivated an image of innovator in experimenting with new methods of
advancing scientific and technological development.
Dolgikh As a Politburo candidate member and the third or
fourth ranking secretary (after Gorbachev, Romanov,
and perhaps Ponomarev), 60-year-old Vladimir Dolgikh also is an important
political figure. He has been most closely associated with Brezhnev, Kirilenko,
and Chernenko. Although Dolgikh was the ranking secretary for economic
questions when Andropov took over, Andropov bypassed him, naming Ryzh-
kov secretary for economic planning and later bringing in Romanov to be
senior secretary for industry, outranking Dolgikh. Dolgikh has not been an
enthusiastic advocate of economic innovation and may not share Gorbachev's
approach to improving economic performance.
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Military Role: Evidence of Decline
Initial indications are that the military's influence in political matters will be
minimal in the Gorbachev regime. This was suggested by the military's
exclusion from a prominent role in the transition, against the background of
apparent efforts by the party leadership to reduce the influence of the military
under Chernenko. Gorbachev's own views on the military are largely un-
known: He has no experience in military affairs, having never even served in
the army, and has not taken clear public positions on defense matters.
The most significant reduction of military influence in the leadership was
produced by the death of Defense Minister and Politburo member Ustinov in
December 1984 and the selection of a replacement who seemed to have been
chosen precisely because he would be relatively weak and ineffectual.
Ustinov's successor, 73-year-old Sergey Sokolov, was the oldest and least
controversial of the three first deputy defense ministers and cannot be
expected to rise to a position of power comparable to Ustinov's. Before too
long, Gorbachev will probably have an opportunity to influence the choice of a
new defense minister.
The change in the Ministry of Defense came against the background of other
indications of reduced military influence during the Chernenko regime. With
the demotion of Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov three months before
Ustinov's death, the party leadership removed a forceful advocate for defense
interests from contention for the post of defense minister. Ogarkov's removal
on 6 September was accompanied by the appearance of a formula in editorials
in Pravda and the military paper Krasnaya Zvezda that asserted that funds
would not be diverted from the consumer to meet defense needs, suggesting
that a key resource decision that went against military interests had just been
made.
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New Dynamism in Foreign Policy
Like Andropov and Chernenko before him, Mikhail Gorbachev began his
tenure as general secretary by vowing to continue the broad outlines of foreign
policy that he had inherited. While his public statements and actions during
his first days in power supported this pledge in many key areas of Soviet inter-
national relations, including U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations, there were
also a number of signs that he will impart a more dynamic style to foreign pol-
icy and that he may be significantly more open to changes in Soviet policy
than his predecessor.
Gorbachev's energetic leadership style was most evident in the unprecedented
number of meetings he held with foreign dignitaries attending Chernenko's
funeral.' Whereas Chernenko had met separately with 13 heads of state
delegations at Andropov's funeral and Andropov with only seven at Brezh-
nev's, Gorbachev met individually with 25 heads of state delegations as well as
with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and the heads of delegations
from the Italian and Japanese Communist Parties. In addition, like Chernenko
in February 1984, he met collectively with the six leaders of the other Warsaw
Pact member-states. In a further indication of personal style and willingness
to bend protocol, Gorbachev spent more time than planned with several
foreign leaders, according to Western press accounts, forcing reshuffling of
the schedule.
Despite repetitions of the usual pledge of continuity in foreign policy, the new
Soviet regime has given hints that it might both accelerate changes begun un-
der Chernenko and take new initiatives in some neglected areas of foreign re-
lations. In its most dramatic move to date, the Gorbachev regime made an im-
portant symbolic gesture toward China when the new general secretary met
with the Chinese representative at the funeral-the first such meeting in 20
years. Soviet actions in other key areas have contrasted less sharply with
previous practice, but nevertheless have created an impression of movement
toward both improved relations with the West and closer ties with several
former adversaries in the communist movement:
? Gorbachev's conciliatory statements and nonpolemical Soviet press reporting
of his meeting with Vice President Bush suggest that Moscow may want to
give new impetus to the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations that began
during the last few months of Chernenko's rule.
' For a list of meetings between the Soviet general secretary and foreign heads of delegations
at the Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko funerals, see Tables 3 and 4.
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? The Soviet media's positive portrayal of Gorbachev's meetings with West
European leaders, including West Germany's Chancellor Kohl, may reflect
Gorbachev's interest in cultivating even stronger ties to the region.
? The breakthrough with China and an apparent effort to court the Yugoslavs
suggest that higher priority will be given to improving Soviet relations with
ruling communist states and parties outside the Soviet bloc.
? Gorbachev's meeting with the heads of delegations from the Italian and
Japanese Communist Parties also raises the possibility that the new general
secretary will push for a more accommodating approach toward dissident
nonruling parties.
Chernenko's passing may have little immediate effect on the conduct of Soviet
foreign policy:
? In the authoritative tributes paid to him during the funeral period,
Chernenko was credited with a comparatively minor role in the formulation
of foreign policy, suggesting that Moscow wants to give the impression that
Gorbachev and others in the present leadership were involved in and
committed to the foreign policies followed over the past year. This character-
ization may be genuine, given the high level of activity the Soviet leadership,
particularly Gromyko, maintained during Chernenko's final period of grave
illness and incapacitation.
? Gorbachev has relatively little experience in foreign affairs and may rely
heavily on more experienced advisers, such as Foreign Minister Gromyko.
Soviet media publicized Gromyko's presence at an overwhelming majority of
Gorbachev's meetings with foreign leaders. Moscow has not yet identified
any Gorbachev personal aide for international affairs although Andrey
Aleksandrov, a foreign policy aide to every general secretary since 1966, and
Viktor Sharapov, a specialist in relations with communist countries original-
ly added to the general secretary's staff by Andropov, were judging by
pictures shown on Soviet television-also involved in most of Gorbachev's
meetings. In the previous two successions, Soviet media at comparable
meetings explicitly identified aides to the general secretary.
Despite the continuity lent by Gromyko's presence in the foreign affairs
leadership, however, there are signs that continuity may be less in vogue than
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it was in the previous two changes of general secretary. Pravda's handling of
the question as well as remarks by a highly placed commentator point to the
new regime's greater receptivity to change:
? An alteration in Pravda's handling of the question of continuity in its two
editions on 13 March suggested a desire to avoid overplaying that theme in
either domestic or foreign policy. In a sentence that in the first edition said
Gorbachev's election had been seen both at home and abroad "as yet more
proof of the CPSU's unshakable loyalty to the Leninist course of creation
and peace and as evidence of complete continuity in the party's policy," the
second edition deleted the word "complete."
? Izvestiya political observer Aleksandr Bovin, a member of the party's
Central Auditing Commission and an influential foreign affairs journalist
who is widely reported to have close contacts with the Soviet leadership, also
appeared to indicate that continuity would not be accentuated as heavily
under Gorbachev. Bovin told listeners to a domestic radio discussion
program on 24 March that the regime's rhetorical devotion to "consistency,
continuity, and stability" should not be interpreted as "immobility." No
foreign policy can be immobile "if it wants to be effective," he said.
Moscow's commitment to "stability of principles" does not rule out but
"presupposes," he argued, "flexibility and the ability to alter one's actions
depending on changing circumstances."
United States: Moderate Stance
Gorbachev adopted a moderate public posture toward the United States
during his first days in power and reaffirmed Moscow's interest in arms
control negotiations, particularly the U.S.-Soviet talks that opened in Geneva
two days after Chernenko's death. Soviet leadership treatment of the United
States traditionally has been circumspect in the early days of a new regime,
but Gorbachev has been more restrained than Andropov was in 1982 and
Chernenko in 1984.
Gorbachev's first statement on foreign policy as general secretary, in his 11
March speech to the CPSU Central Committee, seemed calculated to
reinforce the warming trend in U.S.-Soviet relations in recent months. He
echoed positive statements about detente that had been made in two of the last
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public statements attributed to Chernenko and avoided even the indirect
criticism of the West that had marked early speeches by Andropov and
Chernenko:
? Gorbachev used powerful images of U.S.-Soviet cooperation that had been
invoked in Chernenko's 22 'February RSFSR Supreme Soviet election
address and his 28 February reply to U.S. war veterans. He endorsed the
"success of detente achieved in the 1970's," affirmed that the Soviet Union
was "prepared to participate in a continuation of the process of establishing
peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation between states," and added that
"new steps in this direction" would be a fitting commemoration for the 40th
anniversary of the end of World War II.
? In arguing for arms control, Gorbachev warned that a "frightful threat"
faces mankind but did not go on to blame the West explicitly for the
problem. Both Andropov and Chernenko had been more critical on similar
occasions, although both, like Gorbachev, had avoided any direct reference
to the United States. In his funeral eulogy for Brezhnev, Andropov had
accused the "forces of imperialism" of trying to "push mankind onto the
road of hostility and military confrontation." Chernenko, in his speech to the
extraordinary plenum that elected him, had denounced the "threat created
today to humanity by the reckless, adventurist actions of imperialism's
aggressive forces."
Arms Control Gorbachev signaled that arms control will be given a
high priority by devoting more attention to the subject
in his 11 March plenum speech than to any other foreign policy issue. He said
that "the only sensible way out of the present situation is an accord between
the forces opposed to each other on the immediate cessation of the arms race,"
particularly regarding nuclear and space arms. In describing Moscow's
approach to the U.S.-Soviet talks in Geneva, he adopted the formulation used
in Chernenko's election speech last month, saying that the Soviet Union does
not seek "unilateral advantages," wants a "termination" rather than "contin-
uation" of the arms race, and endorses a mutual "freeze" on future nuclear
missile deployments and a "real and major cutback" in stockpiled armaments
on both sides. In keeping with the traditional constraints of the occasion,
Gorbachev did not raise questions about U.S. earnestness toward the Geneva
negotiations, as he had done in his election speech last month, but simply
called on Washington to reciprocate the Soviet approach to the talks.
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The attention devoted to arms control in Gorbachev's speech stands in marked
contrast to the treatment of the issue in Chernenko's plenum acceptance
speech in February 1984, at a time when Moscow was refusing to return to the
negotiating table in Geneva. Chernenko spoke only in general terms of Soviet
readiness for peaceful settlements of all disputed international problems
through "serious, equal, and constructive talks" and, without naming the
United States, complained that "some leaders" in the West "do not realize or
do not wish to realize" the unprecedented need for cooperation to limit
armaments.
Vice President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz meet in the Kremlin with General
Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Gromyko. (Soviet television, 14 March 1985)
Meeting With Vice Soviet media took a slightly more positive approach to
President the United States in coverage of the general secre-
tary's 13 March meeting with Vice President Bush
than they had taken during the two previous successions. The authoritative
TASS report on the meeting said that Gorbachev had "noted the importance
of Soviet-U.S. relations" and expressed Moscow's "readiness, provided the
U.S. side also was ready, to work in practice to improve them." TASS also re-
ported that the Vice President similarly expressed Washington's desire to
"have better relations with the Soviet Union." In contrast, the TASS reports
on the similar meetings with Chernenko and Andropov had not cited views
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expressed by Vice President Bush, reporting only remarks by the Soviet
leaders. Both Chernenko and Andropov were said to have insisted that
bilateral relations be based on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and
noninterference in internal affairs, and Chernenko had implied that U.S.
failure to adhere to these principles was the key obstacle to an improvement in
relations.
Soviet media took the unusual step of calling attention to optimistic remarks
by the Vice President after his meeting with Gorbachev and gave some
indirect signals that Moscow may be receptive to the idea of a summit meeting
between Gorbachev and President Reagan. A TASS dispatch from New York,
quoted on Soviet television on 14 March, cited UPI in reporting that the Vice
President had brought away from his conversation with Gorbachev "a hope for
an improvement" in relations and had expressed the opinion, which he said
was shared by President Reagan, that a summit would be "useful." Soviet me-
dia discussion of the possibility of a summit meeting has been rare in the re-
cent past and has adhered to the position articulated by Gromyko in
June 1983 that any such meeting must be adequately prepared in advance and
that certain prerequisites must be met, including some degree of mutual
understanding on major questions.
West Europe: Stress on Improved Relations
The Kremlin's treatment of West Europe during and immediately after the
Chernenko funeral suggests that Moscow will continue to encourage improved
ties with most West European countries and to promote opposition to U.S. de-
fense policies. Soviet coverage of West German Chancellor Kohl's meeting
with Gorbachev was markedly less critical than Moscow's accounts of other
recent Soviet-West German meetings..
Following the example set by Chernenko at the time of Andropov's funeral,
Gorbachev met with the delegation heads, of the major West European
countries, including Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and West Germany.
Authoritative TASS reports on these meetings avoided polemics and appeared
to, reinforce' the effort to improve relations that characterized Gorbachev's
December 1984 trip to Great Britain and Gromyko's' recent visits to Italy and
Spain.
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France As at the time of Andropov's funeral, Moscow re-
served its warmest comments for the 13 March meet-
ing between the new general secretary and the head of the French delegation.
Gorbachev was quoted by TASS as referring in the meeting with President
Mitterrand to the "traditional sentiments of friendship and affection" between
the Soviet and French peoples, and both leaders were cited as endorsing the
"extension of political dialogue" between them as an important factor
affecting "the political climate in Europe and elsewhere."
Italy The official Soviet account of the new Soviet leader's
meeting with Italian President Pertini and Foreign
Minister Andreotti was somewhat warmer than the TASS report on their
meeting with Chernenko in February 1984, avoiding criticism of Italy's
support for NATO's INF deployments. As in the report on the Soviet-French
meeting, it affirmed that Italy and the USSR intended to broaden their
political contacts "so as to promote the restoration of detente in Europe."
Spain The reception Moscow gave the Spanish delegation
indicated Soviet interest in strengthening ties with
Madrid. Last year Spain sent a lower ranking delegation, headed by a deputy
prime minister, which was not received by any of the top leadership. This year
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez journeyed to Moscow for the funeral and was
received by the new general secretary. As in Soviet media treatment of
Gromyko's recent visit to Madrid, the TASS report on Gorbachev's meeting
with Gonzalez portrayed Spain as siding with the USSR in opposing the arms
race "in space," even though the Spanish Government has not adopted a
formal public position on this issue.
Great Britain Gorbachev's remarks to British Prime Minister
Thatcher paralleled his statements during his visit to
Great Britain last December and seemed designed to encourage improved
relations. The report on the post-funeral Gorbachev-Thatcher meeting credit-
ed both sides with an interest in "political dialogue" and in stepping up
cooperation in economic, scientific, and other fields. As he had done in Britain,
the new Soviet leader was reported by TASS as expressing opposition to the
"arms race in space ... and on earth," and he called on London to "make a
contribution toward changing the world situation for the better." Like the
TASS description of the Soviet and British leaders' meeting after Andropov's
funeral last year, the TASS report on the Gorbachev-Thatcher conversation
did not mention INF.
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General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Gromyko
pose with West German Chancellor Kohl prior to their
Kremlin meeting. (Soviet television, 14 March 1985)
West Germany Although Moscow aired a sterner depiction of Chan-
cellor Kohl's 14 March meeting with Gorbachev than
of any of the other meetings with West European leaders, the Soviet account
was notably milder than Moscow's characterization of other Soviet-West
German meetings over the past year:
Last year, Moscow signaled its irritation with Bonn in its treatment of the
Chernenko-Kohl meeting that took place after Andropov's funeral. Cher-
nenko, according to TASS, drew attention to West Germany's support for
NATO's missile deployments and restated the USSR's "principled" opposi-
tion to them. By contrast, the report on the 14 March meeting between Gor-
bachev and Kohl failed even to mention the INF issue.
The contrast was even more striking between Moscow's treatment of the
Gorbachev-Kohl meeting and its description of the meeting 10 days earlier
between Foreign Minister Gromyko and West German Foreign Minister
Genscher during his 4 March visit to Moscow. The latter report cited
Gromyko as calling for an end to U.S. missile deployments in West
Germany and warning Bonn that its cooperation with the United States in
strategic defense research would lead the USSR to regard it as an
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"accomplice in the violation of the treaty on antiballistic missile defense."
The TASS account of Gorbachev's remarks to Kohl failed to mention either
the strategic defense issue or U.S. missile deployments in the FRG. TASS
added, however, that the Soviet side emphasized that the "decisive" element
in Moscow's posture toward Bonn was West German policy on matters
concerning the "security interests" of the USSR and its allies.
? Although Soviet leaders have referred sporadically to West German "revan-
chism" in their speeches over the last 10 months, the TASS account of
Gorbachev's talks with Chancellor Kohl made no mention of this subject.
This was in line with the official Soviet pronouncements on other leadership-
level exchanges with the West Germans since last spring, when the
"revanchism" campaign got under way. However, judging by the communi-
que issued after East German Foreign Minister Fischer's 19-20 March visit
to Moscow, the Soviet Union is still determined to impress on its East
European allies-and particularly East Germany-its concern over the
contacts with Bonn. The communique pointedly noted that the Soviet Union,
the GDR, and "all the fraternal socialist states" are determined to deal the
"most resolute rebuff" to "manifestations of revanchism" in West Germany.
Japan: Evidence of Strains Predominates
Moscow's account of Gorbachev's meeting with Japanese Prime Minister
Yasuhiro Nakasone, the first between a Japanese prime minister and a Soviet
general secretary since 1973, provided no evidence that Gorbachev is more
flexible than his predecessors about the longstanding substantive differences
between Moscow and Tokyo.
Gorbachev's reception of Nakasone on 14 March represents an elevation in
Soviet treatment of Japanese delegations compared with the previous two
successions. In 1982 then Prime Minister Suzuki attended Brezhnev's funeral
but was not received by any Soviet leader, although Gromyko received then
Japanese Foreign Minister Sakurauchi. In 1984 Gromyko met with Foreign
Minister Abe, who led the Japanese delegation to the Andropov funeral.
Despite the change in the level of the meeting, it is not clear that the Soviets
were eager to raise bilateral contacts to the top level. According to Japanese
press reports citing Nakasone himself, Moscow agreed to the meeting only
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General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Gromyko
together with Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone at 13
March reception. (Soviet television, 13 March 1985)
after the Japanese prime minister refused to meet with Prime Minister
Tikhonov, as the Soviet Foreign Ministry proposed, and threatened to go home
without meeting any Soviet leader unless Gorbachev received him.
The authoritative TASS report on the Gorbachev-Nakasone meeting suggests
that Moscow is maintaining its critical, inflexible position on Soviet-Japanese
relations. The report, one of the sternest of the many TASS reports on
Gorbachev's,meetings with foreign visitors, indicated that the Soviet side had
dismissed Nakasone's expression of good will toward the Soviet Union and
"stressed" that Japan was "artificially" creating "difficulties and limitations"
in bilateral relations. "Japan's pursuit of a peace-loving policy in practice
would undoubtedly be conducive to improving relations and good-neighborli-
ness," the Soviet side was reported to have added.
This year's TASS report was similar in tone to that of the TASS report at the
time of Gromyko's meeting with Abe at the Andropov funeral. That report
had said the Soviet side had expressed regret that there was "no sign" of Japa-
nese readiness to reciprocate a Soviet desire for relations of "good-neighborli-
ness and cooperation."
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East Europe: Positive Image Projected
Gorbachev moved swiftly to underscore ties with Moscow's East European
allies and to encourage cordial relations with Yugoslavia. His meeting with
Warsaw Pact leaders on 13 March was portrayed as more substantive than a
similar gathering following Andropov's funeral in 1984. The TASS report on
the meeting, which it said took place in an atmosphere of "cordiality and un-
animity," indicated that many domestic and international topics were dis-
cussed and that participants expressed determination to improve cooperation.
They also emphasized a need to "strengthen unity and cohesion" and "step up
coordination of action in the international arena." By contrast, the report on
the 1984 meeting noted only a "cordial, fraternal" atmosphere and said
nothing about the content of the discussion.
Warsaw Pact Most congratulatory messages to Gorbachev from
Countries Warsaw Pact countries did not differ significantly
from comparable messages sent to his predecessors,
but those from the GDR and Poland were notable:
? Possibly in an effort to dispel tensions that arose last year when GDR party
chief Honecker canceled a visit to the FRG under Soviet pressure, Honecker
departed from past protocol to assure Gorbachev that the GDR is Moscow's
"loyal" and "reliable" ally and a "firm member" of the socialist community.
No such assurances were included in Honecker's messages to Chernenko a
year ago and to Andropov in November 1982.
? The message from Polish leaders Jaruzelski and Jablonski assured the new
Soviet leader that the Polish party and government would "do everything
possible to increase Poland's contribution to our joint cause"-a statement
that could be taken as a response to complaints in recent years that Poland
was not fulfilling its CEMA obligations. Perhaps acknowledging Gorba-
chev's relative lack of experience, the message omitted a statement con-
tained in messages to Andropov and Chernenko that those leaders "under-
stood Poland's problems."
East European media comment on the succession revealed differing views on
the new Soviet leader:
? A Prague radio commentary on the 17th seemed to reflect apprehension in
its defensive insistence that Soviet domestic and foreign policy would not
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change under Gorbachev and that Western conjectures on this score were
"only wishful thinking."
? By contrast, effusive Hungarian comment seemed to reflect relish for the
prospect of change. An article in the trade union daily Nepszava on 12
March described at length what it claimed was Gorbachev's "expert"
interest in new Hungarian agricultural and industrial methods during a
1983 visit. The party paper Nepszabadsag on the 16th, in a dispatch from a
Moscow correspondent entitled "Continuity and Dynamism," portrayed
Gorbachev as having energy, aptitude, and "composure and openness" and
described his speeches as presaging a "needed decisive change" in the Soviet
economy.
Yugoslavia Gorbachev's apparent desire to improve relations with
the Yugoslavs was underlined by a 12 March Belgrade
radio report that he had personally telephoned the Yugoslav delegation that
day to express thanks for their attendance at the funeral and for their
condolences.
Soviet and Yugoslav reports on the delegation's meeting with Gorbachev on
the 13th noted a cordial and friendly atmosphere and the readiness of both
countries to promote further all-round cooperation. The Tanjug account of the
talks reported that "both sides stressed that Yugoslav-Soviet relations are
developing successfully based on the principles of the Belgrade Declaration of
1955 and the Moscow Statement of 1956, which were also confirmed in
subsequent joint Yugoslav-Soviet documents at meetings at the highest level."
Moscow, as on past occasions, avoided reference to the specific agreements,
with TASS noting only that cooperation between the two countries and two
parties would be based on "joint documents and accords." TASS also omitted
the information, supplied by Tanjug, that Gorbachev had accepted an
invitation to visit Belgrade and extended a similar invitation to the Yugoslav
leadership to visit the Soviet Union.
No meeting between Chernenko and the Yugoslav delegation was reported a
year ago, although Andropov had met with the Yugoslavs at the time of
Brezhnev's funeral. The descriptions of the atmosphere of the 1982 meeting
were similar to the present one, although the reports on the meeting were
much shorter.
The Yugoslav message to Gorbachev appeared to reflect a warmer climate
than at the time of the previous successions. Yugoslav party leader Sukrija's
message implied that bilateral relations were good by voicing the "conviction"
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that ties would "continue to develop successfully." Yugoslav messages in 1984
and 1982, by contrast, had expressed Belgrade's readiness to improve
relations.
Yugoslav media comment on Gorbachev was less restrained than that
following the accessions of Andropov and Chernenko. Stressing that Gorba-
chev's work style differs from that of his two predecessors, Tanjug's Moscow
correspondent on the 17th said that the new Soviet leader's initial speeches
and meetings with foreign visitors showed him to be a "modern-concept
politician." The daily Politika on the 13th enthused that Gorbachev has a
"statesman's personality" marked by "resoluteness, clarity, and authority."
Albania Following past practice, Albania briefly reported with-
out comment the death of ~ Chernenko and election of
Gorbachev. Presumably to project an image of Soviet collusion with the
United States, however, Tirana radio on the 14th reported that "the Kremlin's
new boss, Mikhail Gorbachev," met with Vice President Bush.
In 1982 Tirana waited almost a month to comment on Andropov's rise to pow-
er. A 7 December article in the Albanian party paper declared that Albania
had no relations with Khrushchev or Brezhnev and would have none with
Andropov "or anyone else who might come to lead the revisionist Soviet
Union."
Gorbachev gave special attention to Albania last year in a speech at an
anniversary celebration in Sofia, published in Pravda on 10 September, in
which he affirmed that the Soviet Union "favors normalization of relations
with the Peoples Socialist Republic of Albania." Although his statement
reflected official Soviet policy, he was breaking with convention by raising the
issue explicitly. No ' other 'Soviet leader has directly discussed the question of
relations with Albania since Brezhnev, in a speech to a 25 October 1976
CPSU plenum, affirmed that the Soviet Union was prepared to restore
relations with Albania. Tirana is not known to have commented on Gorba-
chev's remark at the time.
China: Ground Prepared for Fundamental Change
The Soviet succession, provided the stage for a historic drama in Sino-Soviet
relations, as. Gorbachev broke with two decades of precedent to meet the
Chinese delegation to the funeral and Beijing, laid, aside its doctrine of 18 years
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General Secretary Gorbachev accepts condolences from Vice
Premier Li Peng at Kremlin reception. (Soviet television, 13
March 1985)
Meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev, with Foreign
Minister Gromyko to his right and Vice Premier Li Peng,
second from left. (Soviet television, 14 March 1985)
by referring publicly to the Soviet Union as a socialist country. While both
sides unmistakably signaled their desire to accelerate the.pace of improving
ties, it is not yet clear whether these important symbolic actions presage
fundamental changes in relations. Neither side has acknowledged a departure
from past policy or articulated a rationale to explain a departure. Particularly
on the Chinese side, such a rationale will be necessary to justify further moves
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toward reestablishment of party relations. Any radical change in doctrine or
relations may provoke controversy and opposition in either party.
Moscow Gorbachev set forth policy on China with a simple
declaration in his 11 March CPSU plenum address:
"We would like a serious improvement in relations with the PRC and consider
that, given reciprocity, this is fully possible." He underlined his apparent
seriousness three days later when he met with Chinese delegation head Vice
Premier Li Peng. It was the first such meeting between a Soviet general
secretary and a Chinese official since Brezhnev met with Zhou Enlai in
November 1964, when the Chinese premier came to Moscow following the
ouster of Khrushchev to explore the possibility of overcoming differences with
Moscow.,
Gorbachev's formulation of policy toward China was more positive than any
used by Chernenko during his tenure as general secretary. While Chernenko
had expressed hope for improved relations, his statements tended to be linked
with criticism of the Chinese or qualified with assertions that the interests of
"third countries" could not be prejudiced. Gorbachev avoided such a link, but
did reflect similar concerns in his conversation with the Vietnamese delegation
to the funeral on 14 March. In an implicit reference to China, reported by So-
viet media, he offered support to Vietnam's struggle against "the intrigues of
imperialism and those who abet it." (Emphasis added)
Pravda gave the authoritative TASS report on the 14 March Gorbachev-Li
Peng meeting the prominent treatment that accorded with such a significant
meeting and with an effort to improve relations. It published the report of the
meeting on page one together with reports on meetings with such Soviet
friends and allies as Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Afghanistan, Angola, South
Yemen, and Mozambique. The report on Aliyev's meeting with Wan Li in
February 1984 appeared on page two of Pravda between reports on leadership
meetings with the delegations from Malta and Japan. The report on Gromy-
ko's meeting with Huang Hua in November 1982 was on page four, isolated
from other reports on bilateral meetings.
Beijing sent State Councillor and Foreign Minister Huang Hua to Brezhnev's funeral in
1982, and he was received by his counterpart, Gromyko. To represent China at Andropov's fu-
neral in 1984, Beijing sent Vice Premier and Politburo member Wan Li, a leader of state rank
equivalent to Huang Hua but of considerably greater political stature. Wan received less
favorable treatment, however, meeting with Geydar Aliyev, who held comparable government
and party posts but was lower in stature than Gromyko.
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The TASS report on the Gorbachev-Li Peng talks indicated that the general
secretary had reiterated his plenum formulation on relations. Otherwise, the
report followed the pattern of accounts of Sino-Soviet meetings in 1982 and
1984, conveying little of the substance of the meeting beyond noting that the
Chinese side had also expressed an interest in improving relations.
Four days later, however, Pravda printed excerpts of a much warmer Chinese
report. Not only did Pravda note that Li had "agreed with the statement made
by Comrade Gorbachev" at the CPSU plenum about the desirability of
improving relations, but it recorded the key Chinese statements that reflected
Beijing's willingness to grant the Soviet Union socialist status and to
communicate informally between party leaders. Citing the Chinese party
paper Renmin Ribao, Pravda reported that Li Peng had conveyed congratula-
tions to Gorbachev from Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu
Yaobang, had referred to the Soviet Union as a "socialist" country, and had
"stressed" that China was prepared to assist the further development of
relations in the "political" as well as other spheres.
Moscow may see China's gestures in this regard as responding to Soviet
sensitivities expressed late last year in an article written under pseudonyms as-
sociated with the USSR Foreign Ministry. Appearing in the prominent foreign
policy journal Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn (International fairs) under the
names "I. Alekseyev" and "F. Nikolayev," the article chided Beijing for
refusing to recognize the USSR as "socialist."
By publishing the markedly different accounts of the meeting without further
explanation, Moscow reinforced a public appearance of uncertainty about
China policy: Earlier, Pravda and Izvestiya had omitted Gorbachev's state-
ment on China in their otherwise thorough reviews of his plenum address in
their 13 March editorials. Pravda included a reference to the "authoritative
statement" at the plenum calling for better relations in its followup editorial
three days later, but the formulation was not cited in similar editorial reviews
of the speech in Izvestiya on the same day or in the military daily Krasnaya
Zvezda on the 15th, 16th, and 21st or in the Russian republic paper
Sovetskaya Rossiya on the 15th.
Despite these mixed signals, there are tentative signs of central direction to
Soviet media to soften their treatment of China-a tactic employed on many
occasions by Moscow in the past to encourage an improved atmosphere in re-
lations. There has been little critical comment on China, and the TASS
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report on U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Michael Armacost's 17-19 March
visit to China failed to mention that Sino-Soviet relations were discussed.
Moscow also encouraged the impression that efforts on normalization would
continue to move forward, reporting on such bilateral contacts as Gromyko's
22 March meeting with the Chinese ambassador, First Deputy Premier Ivan
Arkhipov's meeting on 21 March with a Chinese economic official and on the
26th with the Chinese ambassador, and First Vice President Vasiliy Kuznet-
sov's meeting on 12 March with a Chinese parliamentary delegation. Accord-
ing to a Soviet television news report on Gromyko's reception of the PRC am-
bassador, both sides expressed an interest in normalization, and the Soviet side
again "drew attention" to Gorbachev's plenum statement on relations.
In addition, a Soviet expert on China, Lev Delyusin, in an interview with the
Japanese daily Yomiuri Shimbun, published on 23 March, encouraged the
restoration of CPSU-CPC relations. Delyusin said he did not think the issue
could be "solved right away," but he noted that the Gorbachev-Li Peng
meeting showed that party leaders on both sides were "concerned about the
development of friendly, comradely" party relations and that it did not make
sense for relations between "two socialist countries" to improve while their
party relations remained frozen.
Background There is nothing in Gorbachev's record of public
statements on China that anticipated his initiative to
meet with Li Peng or that might have prompted Beijing's effusive response.
He is not known to have ever made a public statement on relations with China.
The few statements in which he mentioned China were delivered at formal
party occasions abroad-such as the Vietnamese Communist Party congress
in March 1982-and offered only conventional Soviet criticism of Chinese
policies. Judging by published reports, he said nothing about China in his
RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech last month.
Despite the meager Gorbachev record on the China question, his apparent ties
with Andropov and Gromyko associate him with a perspective that has given
more priority to improving relations than did Chernenko. Different approach-
es to the China issue may explain some of the twists and turns in Soviet policy
and behavior since Brezhnev's call in March 1982 for improved relations and
his affirmation that China had a "socialist system":
? Polemical attacks on China were dropped from Soviet media in September
1982 shortly before Brezhnev's death that November, and Andropov
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reaffirmed Moscow's interest in better relations with China in a plenum
speech 10 days after becoming general secretary. Andropov referred to
China as "our great neighbor" and said that the USSR pays "great
attention to every positive response" to Soviet efforts to "overcome the
inertia of prejudices." The November 1982 speech did not criticize China,
and all Soviet leaders refrained from direct polemical attacks on Beijing
during Andropov's tenure, although Soviet media did resume lower level
criticism by the end of 1983-at a time when Andropov's terminal illness
may have reduced his influence.
? Chernenko was less positive than Andropov in his first public remarks on
China after becoming general secretary in February 1984. In his 2 March
USSR Supreme Soviet election speech, he affirmed an interest in improving
relations but noted that "differences on a number of questions of principle"
remain and ruled out any agreements that would "prejudice the interests of
third countries." Moreover, while stating that "the Soviet Union stands for
the level of contacts being raised," he added that this should take place "to
the extent acceptable to both sides."
? By April 1984 low-level criticism of China was becoming more serious, and
on 4 May Moscow released an authoritative TASS statement excoriating
Chinese "military provocations" on the Sino-Vietnamese border.
? An effort at higher level contacts was aborted in May, when Moscow
postponed a scheduled visit to Beijing of First Deputy Premier Arkhipov-a
move seemingly designed to demonstrate displeasure with Chinese policies
toward Indochina and the United States.
? In June Chernenko publicly attacked Chinese policy in Southeast Asia
during visits by Vietnamese and Lao party leaders, condemning Beijing in
stronger terms than had been used by any Soviet leader since October 1982.
? By the fall of 1984 Soviet media had toned down their attacks on China, al-
though criticism still appeared in scholarly journals.
? Chernenko was also milder in his rhetoric in remarks during a visit of a
Mongolian delegation in October. In his first comment on China since June,
using the most positive language that he employed during his tenure as
general secretary, he stressed the importance of normalization of relations
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and asserted that "we always keep open the door to constructive talks with
China." His only criticism of China was implied when he stressed that
socialist countries must "hold clear-cut class positions in international
affairs."
? Gromyko, who has a consistent record of temperate formulations on China
in recent years, was even more positive in his 6 November address marking
the anniversary of the October Revolution. He stated that the Soviet Union's
commitment to "normalizing and improving" relations with China "has
repeatedly been confirmed by us, even at the very highest level," and added
that "we consider a continuation of contacts between representatives of the
two countries useful and important."
? In December the Arkhipov visit to Beijing was revived amid signs that
Beijing was attempting to mollify Moscow on issues that had led to
postponement of the visit the previous spring. Both Beijing and Hanoi
renewed publicity for clashes on the Sino-Vietnamese border as Vietnam's
dry season offensive in Cambodia began, but the level of Beijing's protests
was distinctly lower and their tone more restrained than they had been the
previous April. While Arkhipov was in Beijing in late December, Beijing
conspicuously avoided previously routine denunciations of Moscow on the
anniversary of Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan, marking the occasion
only in early January.
? From late January to mid-February 1985, Soviet media increased criticism
of China in the wake of the visit to the PRC of Chairman of the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Vessey. Much of the Soviet criticism was pegged to
a Kabul protest about alleged Chinese involvement in the Afghan conflict. A
14 February article in Izvestiya by "I. Alekseyev" also complained about the
"ambiguous" Chinese leadership approach to the Soviet Union. It noted that
Beijing had "verbally" declared its desire to normalize relations and allowed
limited progress but was raising preconditions, had undertaken action
"harmful to the interests of world socialism," and was even posing a "threat
to the security of socialist states." The article advocated bilateral dialogue
and normalization of relations and observed: "We would like to believe that
common sense and a correct understanding of the Chinese people's interests
will sooner or later gain the upper hand in Beijing."
? The last speech attributed to Chernenko-a 22 February USSR Supreme
Soviet election address that was read for him because he was too ill to ap-
pear-was positive about the need for normalization of relations and noted
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there should be "efforts by both sides," but again pointed to "serious
political differences" dividing Moscow and Beijing.
Beijing In marking Chernenko's death and welcoming Gorba-
chev's succession, Beijing violated strictures against
confusing party and state relations with Moscow that it had scrupulously
observed for nearly two decades. Taken together, these departures from
precedents and practices rigidly observed in the past appear intended to
convey dramatically a new Chinese assessment of the potential for fundamen-
tal change in Sino-Soviet ties:
? Beijing extended congratulations to Gorbachev on his succession as CPSU
general secretary. The congratulations were extended not only by a Foreign
Ministry spokesman on 12 March, according to Xinhua that day, but also
personally by several Chinese leaders. As recorded by Xinhua, these include
National People's Congress (NPC) Chairman Peng Zhen in his condolence
call at the Soviet Embassy in Beijing on the 12th, Vice Premier Li Peng di-
rectly to Gorbachev in Moscow, and CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang,
as conveyed to Gorbachev by Li Peng. At the time of Andropov's and
Chernenko's successions, Beijing observed constraints in place since the
break in CPC-CPSU ties in 1967 and did not extend congratulations of any
sort-either from party or state spokesmen.
? On meeting Gorbachev at the reception for foreign delegations attending
Chernenko's funeral on the 13th, according to Xinhua the same day, Li
Peng wished the USSR well in "socialist construction." In his meeting with
Gorbachev the next day, by Xinhua's account, Li described China and the
USSR as "great neighbors and socialist countries." These references to the
"socialist" character of the Soviet Union are the first in authoritative
Chinese public statements in at least 18 years. The closest Beijing had come
to such an acknowledgment appeared in Xinhua's account of CPC Politburo
Standing Committee member Chen Yun's meeting with Soviet Deputy
Premier Arkhipov last December, in which Chen observed that China and
the USSR "practice economic planning and are neighbors."
? In his meeting with Gorbachev on the 14th, Li expressed Beijing's readiness
to improve relations in the "political" sphere as well as in the economic,
technical, and cultural fields. Although Beijing has routinely in the past
three years indicated a readiness to improve cooperation in these latter
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Li Peng meeting Gorbachev and Gromyko in the Kremlin on 13 March. (Renmin
Ribao, 15 March 1985).
fields, it has not previously done so in the "political" arena. The closest it
has come to doing so also emerged from Arkhipov's visit to China last
December, when, according to Xinhua, Premier Zhao Ziyang suggested
that "problems in the political relations" between the PRC and USSR
should "not be difficult to solve" if both sides took the same "positive" ap-
proach that they have adopted in cooperation in other areas.
In reporting Peng Zhen's call at the Soviet Embassy on the 12th, Xinhua's
English-language report cited the Soviet ambassador's expression of grati-
tude for Chinese congratulations to "Comrade" Gorbachev. Reports on the
same event by Beijing radio and by Xinhua's Chinese service, as published in
Renmin Ribao, went even further, citing Peng Zhen himself as extending
congratulations to "Comrade" Gorbachev. Since the break in party ties,
PRC media ordinarily have shunned reference to Soviet leaders as "comra-
des," regardless of the speaker. The only known exception again emerged
from Arkhipov's visit to Beijing last December, when Chinese media
repeatedly cited Chinese leaders calling Arkhipov "comrade." Judging by
the context in which they were made, these references appear intended to
convey Beijing's gratitude for Arkhipov's contributions to the PRC's
development as supervisor of Soviet aid to China during the heyday of Sino-
Soviet cooperation in the 1950's.
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? The condolence message sent by President Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen on
behalf of the NPC on the 11th, Peng Zhen's remarks in his call at the Soviet
Embassy and comments by the Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 11th and
12th, as reported by Xinhua, all praised Chernenko for his work as an
"outstanding" and "supreme leader" of both the Soviet party and state. By
contrast, comparable authoritative statements had called Brezhnev "an
outstanding statesman of the Soviet Union" and Andropov "supreme leader
of the Soviet Union."
? The party newspaper Renmin Ribao on the 12th carried on its front page
pictures of both Chernenko and Gorbachev together with Xinhua's reports
on the condolence message sent by Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen and on the
CPSU plenum that elected Gorbachev. NPC condolences on Brezhnev's and
Andropov's deaths and Xinhua reports on Andropov's and Chernenko's
successions were also carried on Renmin Ribao's front page, but there were
no pictures. Chernenko's picture was also framed in black-treatment that
the Chinese press normally reserves only for the CPC's own leaders and for
leaders of ruling foreign communist parties.
Other Gestures These departures from longstanding practice indicate
that China has begun to apply to the Soviet Union
some of the protocol trappings it ordinarily confers on socialist countries, but
other signs suggest that it has not yet resumed party links with the CPSU. Li
Xiannian and Peng Zhen's condolence message, for example, was sent only in
the name of the NPC to the USSR Supreme Soviet and not also in the name
of the CPC Central Committee, as was the practice before 1967. Chinese
media also were scrupulous about referring to Li Peng as head of a Chinese
government delegation. The PRC-owned Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao
on 16 March cited a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman's comment, not
reported in PRC media, that Hu's greetings to Gorbachev as conveyed by Li
do not mean that CPC-CPSU relations have been formally resumed.
The highly suggestive changes in Chinese practice do, however, appear
designed to convey to Moscow the potential for fundamental change in Sino-
Soviet ties. The gestures were complemented by other Chinese signals in the
same direction. At no time in statements and comment on the Soviet
leadership succession did Beijing raise the three "obstacles" that it long has
insisted block fundamental change in bilateral relations-Moscow's military
buildup along the Soviet and Mongolian border with China, the Soviet
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Renmin Ribao's front-page treatment of Tito's death, including his
black-framed portrait and the Chinese condolence message. (Renmin
Ribao, 6 May 1980)
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intervention in Afghanistan, and Soviet support for Vietnamese actions in
Cambodia. By contrast, Xinhua cited Vice Premier Wan Li raising them in
his meeting with Soviet Deputy Premier Aliyev after attending Andropov's
funeral last year.
Beijing's choice of leaders to attend the funeral in Moscow and to convey con-
dolences at the Soviet Embassy in Beijing seems calculated to convey a
cautiously positive message. In terms of state rank-which in view of the gap
in party relations is the only protocol strictly appropriate-both choices were
marginally lower in level than the leaders chosen when Andropov died.'
However, in both cases Beijing may have had reason to believe that the Soviets
would be pleased with the selection:
? Although Li is marginally outranked by Wan Li in state protocol and vastly
in terms of party level (Wan is a full Politburo member, Li is not), his selec-
tion is important symbolically in terms of his youth and education. Li was
promoted to vice premier as part of Deng Xiaoping's reform effort to
invigorate the Chinese party and state apparatus with a successor generation
of leaders competent technically and administratively to guide PRC modern-
ization. In his early 50's, Li is of the same generation as Gorbachev. Li, ac-
cording to the biography Xinhua publicized when he was promoted in 1982,
was also educated in the Soviet Union and presumably speaks Russian.
? Although marginally outranked by Ulanhu in state protocol, Peng Zhen far
outranks Ulanhu in party stature. Peng is normally listed among the four
veteran Politburo members named after the Politburo Standing Committee
members and ahead of the rest of the Politburo members. Ulanhu falls
among the latter. Judging by his public statements-during Arkhipov's
China visit, for example-Peng may also be more flexible in his views on
Sino-Soviet relations than others in the Chinese leadership.
Implications Beijing's readiness to treat the USSR as a socialist
country effectively overthrows two decades of pessi-
mistic media assessments about the potential for positive change in Soviet
state and society. The traditional Maoist critique of Soviet "revisionism"
(Beijing's term for Moscow's abandonment of class struggle in both the foreign
6 Li Peng and Wan Li are both vice premiers of the State Council, but Wan Li as a veteran is
always named ahead of Li in lists of public appearances by state leaders. Similarly, Peng Zhen
as NPC chairman ordinarily follows PRC Vice President Ulanhu-who led the leaders paying
respects at the Soviet Embassy on Andropov's death last year-in name lists following strict
state protocol.
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and domestic spheres under Khrushchev) and its pursuit of "social-imperia-
lism" (the harnessing of the resources of a society organized formally along so-
cialist lines to pursue imperialist aggression externally) saw little possibility of
fundamental change because Soviet leadership policies drew on attitudes
embedded in Soviet society itself and on predilections deeply rooted in
Russia's tsarist past. Soviet leaderships could come and go, according to this
critique, but there was little prospect of fundamental changes in policy. Public
acknowledgment of the "socialist" character of the USSR implies, conversely,
that Soviet policies can change for the better, particularly when the Soviet
leadership chooses to do so.
By the same token, the revised placement of the USSR in Beijing's political
taxonomy introduces a deep cleavage in the foundations of China's foreign
policy, which long has included the principle that a socialist country cannot
also be "hegemonist."
As Deng Xiaoping moved in recent years to dismantle Mao's ideological
legacy on China's domestic scene, he attempted to remove the same ideologi-
cal constraints from PRC foreign policy, and particularly as applied to the
USSR, while still upholding Mao's anti-Sovietism. From this process of
demaoification emerged a new body of ideological principles that Beijing has
used to distinguish real socialist parties and states from false ones.
In recent years Beijing's rare public analyses of the origins of Soviet foreign
policy have reaffirmed the pessimism of the Maoist critique on prospects for
change. The traditional Maoist critique of Soviet "revisionism" was aban-
doned not because of a changed attitude toward the USSR, but clearly
because of Beijing's reassessment of the role of class struggle under socialism
in its own domestic context. In its place there emerged a Dengist critique of
Soviet social imperialism based on an analysis of Soviet "hegemonism."
These changes are recorded in the CPC's most authoritative documents. The
landmark resolution on party history adopted by the Central Committee in
1981, for example, reaffirmed China's "just struggle" against Soviet "big-
nation chauvinism" in the 1950's and 1960's, the formulation of the "correct
strategy" of the "three worlds theory," and the PRC's pursuit of "genuine in-
ternationalism," and not hegemonism, as "indelible contributions" of Mao
Zedong and the party leadership. The prevailing CPC constitution, adopted at
the party congress in 1982, formally enjoins the party to unite with all
progressive parties and groups in the world on the basis of proletarian
internationalism in the "common struggle" against hegemonism.
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Although Beijing since Mao's death has moved gradually to reestablish ties
with foreign communist parties, it has done so on the basis of a series of four
principles that together, according to Beijing comment, advance its struggle
against Soviet hegemonism. These four principles are mutual respect, equality,
independence, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other parties. As
Beijing has articulated and applied them in resuming ties with parties it once
dismissed as revisionist-as in Yugoslavia and West Europe-or in exploring
the possibility of ties with those it formerly regarded as Soviet pawns-as in
East Europe-the emphasis has been to encourage independence from Mos-
cow and its "hegemonic" ambitions within the international communist
movement.
As applied to the CPSU itself, the new critique of Soviet hegemonism-and
the four principles Beijing has enunciated on that basis for interparty ties-
has provided the foundation for continued explicit criticism. On the basis of
the four principles, Beijing says it is no longer appropriate for China to
criticize Soviet domestic policies, but asserts that it remains obliged to
criticize Soviet hegemonism in the international communist movement and in
international affairs generally. Hu Yaobang was cited by Xinhua in 1983, for
example, dismissing the CPSU's claim to being a socialist party in view of
Moscow's pursuit of hegemonism in Afghanistan, citing Lenin's observation
that a proletariat that inflicts the slightest degree of coercion on another
nation cannot be a "socialist proletariat."
With respect to state relations, Soviet hegemonism as a "difference in
principle" between the two countries is embodied in the "three obstacles" that
Beijing asserts impede full Sino-Soviet normalization. Beijing's recent public
treatment of the USSR as a socialist country, therefore, appears to be
fundamentally inconsistent with the ideological framework of its approach to
communist relations and to state foreign policy.
Prospects Beijing has thus far not offered a rationale that
attempts to reconcile the discontinuity between its
longstanding policies and the principles that justify them on one hand and its
public acknowledgment of the USSR's socialist credentials on the other.
Media coverage of an NPC delegation that arrived in the Soviet Union before
Chernenko's death and left after his funeral, however, suggests that Beijing's
treatment of the Soviet Union as socialist is not a one-time gesture extended to
Moscow on the occasion of a major leadership transition. A mid-tour
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commentary on the delegation's progress carried in Beijing's Russian-lan-
guage broadcasts on 10 March conventionally recounted the delegation's
favorable impressions of achievements in "economic construction." Reports on
the delegation after Chernenko's funeral in Renmin Ribao and Beijing
Russian broadcasts on the 16th, however, said that the group had familiarized
itself with Soviet successes in "socialist construction."
Although Beijing apparently has not changed its views on Soviet "hegemon-
ism" or on the substance of the three "obstacles" to Sino-Soviet normaliza-
tion, it has not explicitly reiterated that the obstacles continue to confound bi-
lateral ties. Low-level commentary continues to criticize the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan and to denounce Hanoi's actions in Cambodia. Post-funeral
commentary is not known to have criticized Soviet complicity in Cambodia,
but such omissions have been the rule, not the exception.
Li Peng himself appeared to assert the constancy of PRC foreign policy goals
in his conversation with Gorbachev on the 14th, as reported by Xinhua. In re-
marks implying that Beijing is retaining its views on "hegemonism" in world
affairs, he reaffirmed that China "pursues an independent foreign policy"
aimed at establishing a lasting world peace. Implicitly reiterating Beijing's
oft-stated corollary position that it will participate neither in an American axis
against the USSR nor join the Soviet bloc against the United States, Li stated
that China "is not aligned with and does not establish strategic relations" with
other countries.
With respect to potential CPC-CPSU ties, the pattern of China's interaction
with the East European bloc parties, Romania aside, is suggestive. In the East
European case, Beijing's public acknowledgment of those countries' socialist
credentials-made by Zhao Ziyang at the NPC session in June 1983-has
been accompanied by numerous gestures and signals in the same direction,
only some of which have been reproduced in the Soviet context. For example,
SED chief Erich Honecker and Hu Yaobang were reported by GDR and PRC
media to have exchanged greetings last year, paralleling the Gorbachev-Hu
exchange via Li Peng.
At the same time Beijing has undertaken some steps in dealing with the East
European bloc that it has not yet extended to the Soviets:
? PRC media accounts of bilateral dealings with East Europe now ordinarily
include the party titles of both Chinese and East European officials. PRC
media accounts of Sino-Soviet dealings, including those. connected with the
Chernenko funeral observances and bilateral dealings since then, still do not.
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? Zhao's public recognition of the bloc countries' socialist nature was accom-
panied by concrete contacts between the parties. A delegation of CPC
propaganda officials toured the GDR in 1983, for example. No such
exchange has been reported with the Soviet Union, though the way may now
be open for contacts of this nature.
? Li Peng's comments to Gorbachev on the potential for Sino-Soviet ties also
were cast in a framework that appears to be more limited than that applied
to some East European bloc countries and to preclude CPC-CPSU ties, at
least for the time being. According to Xinhua, Li expressed China's hope to
"coexist peacefully" with all countries, including the Soviet Union, and to
establish friendly relations with them, effectively reaffirming the "five
principles of peaceful coexistence" as the basis for Sino-Soviet ties. Beijing
has publicly gone further with at least one East European bloc country.
During the China visit of Hungarian Deputy Premier Marjai last August-
the highest ranking East European bloc leader to visit China since the mid-
1960's-his host, Li Peng, cited Beijing's four principles of interparty ties,
modified slightly to accommodate Hungarian sensitivities, as the basis for
improved ties with Budapest.
At a time of potentially fundamental change in Sino-Soviet ties, Moscow's
leaders have firmly underscored the continuity of Soviet support for Hanoi
and its Indochinese allies in meetings with their representatives after Chernen-
ko's funeral. Indochinese treatment of Chernenko's demise was virtually
identical to the attention the three countries gave to Andropov's passing, and
none of the three countries has publicly signaled concern over new departures
in Sino-Soviet relations.
In his 14 March meeting with the Vietnamese delegation, headed by CPV Po-
litburo member and SRV President Truong Chinh, Gorbachev reaffirmed
Moscow's relationship with Hanoi and its approach to Southeast Asian
regional questions. According to Moscow radio the same day, the two sides
noted their satisfaction with the "unshakable cohesion" of Soviet-Vietnamese
relations, an assertion that was not recorded in Soviet media accounts of
Truong Chinh's meeting with Chernenko after Andropov's funeral last year.
They also underlined their "determination" to continue "actively cooperating"
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Vietnamese State Council Chairman Truong Chinh with
General Secretary Gorbachev and Central Committee Secre-
tary Rusakov (front left) prior to their 14 March meeting.
(Soviet television, 14 March 1985)
in the international arena. Gorbachev reassured Hanoi of his continued
support for Vietnam on Southeast Asian issues, expressing Moscow's "solidar-
ity" with Vietnam in its struggle against the "intrigues of imperialism and
those who abet them."
As Soviet media did last year in reporting Truong Chinh's meeting with
Chernenko, Moscow radio's account of the meeting with Gorbachev again
underscored the special relationship between Moscow and Hanoi, noting that
the two leaders reached a "complete identity of views." In only one other
case-Gorbachev's meeting with representatives of the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries-did Moscow report that the new Soviet party leader reached "unanim-
ity of views" with the foreign leaders that he received.
Moscow radio's report on the Gorbachev meeting with Truong Chinh in its
Vietnamese broadcasts on 15 March went even further. After noting that both
leaders expressed satisfaction at the "close and unshakable solidarity" be-
tween the two sides, Moscow radio's commentator observed that the Soviet
Union has always given Vietnam reliable support in its "fierce struggles
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against foreign invaders and in its peaceful construction." The radio commen-
tator went on to recall that Gorbachev, at the Vietnamese party congress in
1982, had pledged that the two countries would remain united due to common
goals and mutual regard for each other's achievements.
Neither Soviet nor Vietnamese media accounts of the Gorbachev meeting with
Truong Chinh cited either leader referring directly to China or to recent
developments in Sino-Soviet relations. Moscow radio's broadcasts in Vietnam-
ese, Lao, and Cambodian all included Gorbachev's brief statement on the
potential for improvement in Sino-Soviet ties in reporting his CPSU speech on
11 March and have reported Gorbachev's landmark meeting with Chinese
Vice Premier Li Peng. Vietnamese media have not commented directly on any
of these developments.
Reception for Lao, Moscow upgraded its welcome for both the Lao and
Cambodian Leaders Cambodian delegations attending Chernenko's funer-
al. Gorbachev received the Lao delegation headed by
Politburo member and President Souphanouvong on 14 March, an honor not
bestowed on Souphanouvong by Chernenko at Andropov's funeral. Gorbachev
used his meeting with Souphanouvong to offer reassurances on regional issues,
routinely reiterating Moscow's "firm support" for Indochina's "constructive
stand" for solving Southeast Asian problems. In addition, Moscow radio on
the 15th noted that Soviet Defense Minister Sokolov on the same day had a
"warm and friendly" conversation on questions of "mutual interest" with Lao
Politburo member and Defense Minister Khamtai Siphandon, -a member of
the Lao delegation to the funeral.
Soviet Premier Tikhonov met with Cambodian party and state chief Heng
Samrin on 14 March, a gesture that may signal a greater willingness on the
part of Moscow's new leadership to lend diplomatic support to Phnom Penh
and to Hanoi's policy on Cambodia. Heng Samrin was not received by any So-
viet leader following Andropov's funeral last year. According to TASS on the
14th, Tikhonov pledged Moscow's continued "all-round support" for the
Phnom Penh regime's efforts to build the country and "defend the gains of the
revolution."
The new regime's support for Cambodia was also reflected in routine media
commentary. An atypical Moscow radio commentary in Cambodian on the
13th, for example, welcomed the fall of the last Cambodian resistance camp at
Ta Turn to the combined forces of the Phnom Penh regime and Hanoi. And on
the 15th, Moscow radio's International Situation: Questions and Answers
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program praised the "vigorous attacks" that wiped out the resistance bases.
Under Chernenko, Moscow was generally more restrained in voicing its own
support for Phnom Penh, tending to offer only indirect support for the fighting
against the resistance by publicizing Phnom Penh reports.
Hanoi Hanoi's observances of Chernenko's death closely
followed the pattern of its treatment of Andropov's.
Truong Chinh had attended Andropov's funeral in Moscow as he did
Chernenko's. The party Central Committee, National Assembly, Council of
State, and Council of Ministers issued a joint communique announcing
Chernenko's death, and the party paper Nhan Dan carried two editorials
mourning Chernenko's passing and highlighting his contributions to Soviet-
Vietnamese relations. A joint party-state delegation led by CPV Politburo
member and SRV Premier Pham Van Dong paid the traditional condolence
call at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, and on 13 March Dong delivered a eulo-
gy at the customary memorial service that underlined the "unshakable
friendship" between Hanoi and Moscow.
The Vietnamese leadership's condolence message on Chernenko's death,
publicized by VNA on the 11th, was virtually identical to the message they
sent on Andropov's death, although the present message seemed to imply that
Chernenko was a better benefactor than Andropov. It recalled that Chernenko
had "always rendered profound sentiments, precious support, and assistance"
to Vietnam's cause; the condolence message on Andropov's death recalled only
that he had rendered Vietnam "great service." Similarly CPV chief Le Duan's
message congratulating Gorbachev on his election as CPSU general secretary
seemed to suggest that the new Soviet leader was expected to be an even closer
supporter of Hanoi. It praised the new Soviet leader as a "close friend of the
Vietnamese people," a characterization that had been lacking in Le Duan's
congratulatory messages to both Chernenko and Andropov on their succession.
Le Duan failed to appear to sign the condolence book for Chernenko at the So-
viet Embassy. In 1982 at the time of Brezhnev's demise, he led the Vietnamese
delegation to pay its respects to Brezhnev at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi; in
1984 he made a separate appearance at the Soviet Consulate in Ho Chi Minh
City to sign the condolence book for Andropov. There is no media evidence,
however, to suggest that Le Duan's absence on this occasion was intended as a
snub. In addition to his message to Gorbachev, Vietnamese media reported
that Le Duan sent a wreath to the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi.
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The reasons for Le Duan's failure to extend condolences in person either in
Hanoi or in Ho Chi Minh City are not clear. Le Duan also failed conspicuous-
ly to receive a delegation of the Portuguese Communist Party, led by Political
Commission member and Central Committee Secretary Octavio Pato, which
arrived in Hanoi on 11 March. Le Duan customarily receives all major visiting
communist party delegations. In mid-February, for example, he received an
Italian Communist Party delegation. The Portuguese delegation, however, left
Vietnam on the 13th without seeing Le Duan, paid a three-day visit to
Cambodia, and returned to Hanoi to meet on the 18th with CPV Politburo
member Truong Chinh, Le Duan's routine stand-in at meetings with visiting
communist party delegations on several other occasions in the past two years
when the Vietnamese party chief has been absent for prolonged periods.
All of Le Duan's recent appearances, both before and after the funeral, have
put him in the south. He appeared most recently, according to Vietnamese me-
dia accounts, at a liberation anniversary celebration in the southern province
of Binh Tri Thien on 25 and 26 March. VNA on 6 and 20 March reported
that he "recently" visited dockworkers in Ho Chi Minh City and a construc-
tion site in the southern province of Dong Nai respectively. Before that, Le
Duan's most recent appearance was in late February, when he was reported
attending the 21-23 February plenum of the Central Committee of the
Vietnamese Fatherland Front in Ho Chi Minh City.
Vientiane, Like Hanoi, both Vientiane and Phnom Penh followed
Phnom Penh established precedents in marking the passing of Cher-
nenko. The attendance of Souphanouvong and Polit-
buro member and Defense Minister Khamtai Siphandon at funeral ceremo-
nies in Moscow repeats their appearances in Moscow for Andropov's funeral.
In Vientiane, Lao party chief Kaysone Phomvihan led the turnout at the
Soviet Embassy, as he' had on the occasion of Andropov's demise, and
delivered a eulogy at a 13 March memorial service that closely paralleled one
that he gave for Andropov. Both the leadership condolence message and
Kaysone's congratulatory telegram to Gorbachev were virtually identical to
the messages sent by the Lao following Andropov's passing.
As before, party and state chief Heng Samrin headed Phnom Penh's
delegation to the funeral in Moscow. At home, Phnom Penh followed past pre-
cedent by sending a high-ranking delegation to the Soviet Embassy to pay con-
dolences and sending condolence and congratulatory messages that were
virtually identical to those sent on the occasion of Andropov's demise. At a
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14 March memorial service, Politburo member and PRK National Assembly
Chairman Chea Sim delivered a eulogy that mourned Chernenko's passing in
terms similar to those used in the eulogy for Andropov at the memorial service
last year.
Korea: Pyongyang Seeks Improved Ties
Moscow upgraded its reception for Pyongyang's representatives at Chernen-
ko's funeral but was characteristically cautious in its expressions of Soviet-
DPRK solidarity. Pyongyang's observances of Chernenko's death reflect the
improvements in Soviet-Korean relations that have emerged over the past
year, a trend Pyongyang appears eager to further.
While North Korea's delegations for the funerals of Brezhnev and Andropov
were not received by high-level Soviet leaders, DPRK Premier Kang Song-san
met with his counterpart Tikhonov on 13 March. DPRK media accounts,
describing the atmosphere as "friendly," reported that Tikhonov praised the
results of Kim 11-song's May 1984 visit to Moscow and that he claimed
relations were "developing onto a high stage." A TASS account of the
meeting, transmitted on the 13th, characterized the talks as "warm and
friendly," paralleling Soviet media formulations depicting the atmosphere in
Gorbachev's meeting with the Mongolian and Yugoslav party heads on the
same day.
TASS's account of the substance of Kang's meeting with Tikhonov also was
virtually identical to that used for Tikhonov's talks with the head of the
Mongolian Council of Ministers, Dumaagiyn Sodnom, also on the 13th. TASS
thus cited both Tikhonov and Kang expressing "satisfaction" with the
development of relations and pledging to work to the "utmost" to strengthen
ties.
Pyongyang Pyongyang's upbeat observances reflected trends in
Soviet-North Korean relations over the past year. Kim
11-song's 12 March condolence message credited Chernenko with having
"greatly" contributed to raising relations between the two parties and
countries to a "new, higher stage." The North has used this evaluation
repeatedly over the past year to describe the results of Kim's meetings with
Chernenko last May.
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Similarly upbeat, Kim I1-song's congratulatory message to Gorbachev, carried
by KCNA on the 12th, was warmer than his greetings to Chernenko last year
on his succession. Kim described Gorbachev as an "outstanding activist,"
praise that Pyongyang extended to Chernenko and Andropov only after their
deaths. Kim also went on to call attention to the "correct" leadership of the
CPSU and to note the "long historical tradition based on a solid class alliance
and comradeship" of Korean-Soviet friendship, characterizations that were
not included in Kim's congratulatory messages to either Andropov or
Chernenko.
Also reflecting the improvement in party ties, a Nodong Sinmun editorial on
the 13th pegged to Chernenko's passing was markedly warmer in describing
USSR-DPRK relations than one in February 1984 on the death of Andropov.
This year's editorial described the two sides as "close revolutionary comrades"
and praised their "militant fraternity and revolutionary unity." Last year's
editorial referred merely to the "firm solidarity" between the two sides as
"class brothers."
The delegation Pyongyang sent to funerary observances in Moscow appeared
to reflect the closer party ties suggested in these formulations. The delegation
was led by Premier Kang Song-san, who is equivalent in party ranking to the
head of the DPRK representation for the Andropov and Brezhnev funerals.
The delegation to Chernenko's funeral, however, also included the Workers
Party of Korea (WPK) secretary in charge of international affairs, Hwang
Chang-yop.
North Korean comment pegged to Chernenko's death praised the former
Soviet leader for his efforts to promote "the unity of socialist countries," a
theme that Pyongyang has emphasized during the past year to signal its
interest in closer solidarity with Moscow and East Europe. The call for
unity-which was not included in the North's eulogies for Andropov or
Brezhnev-was stressed by Kim II-song during his visit to the USSR and East
Europe in 1984. It received prominent attention at the ninth WPK plenum in
July 1984, and Kim emphasized it again in his New Year address in January.
In an apparent effort to reaffirm the North's commitment to closer coopera-
tion with the Soviet Union at a time of transition in Moscow, Nodong Sinmun
on 12 March carried an article, reported by KCNA the same day, that
recalled Kim's New Year remarks on this score and renewed Pyongyang's
views on the importance of improving "socialist unity."
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Cuba: New Signs of Strain Apparent
Fidel Castro's failure to attend Chernenko's funeral and other anomalies in
Cuban observances of the occasion sharpened earlier signals of tension
between the two allies. Second-ranked party and state leader Raul Castro,
who headed Cuba's delegation to the funeral, was accorded a chilly reception
in Moscow.
Possibly reflecting Moscow's pique at Fidel Castro's absence at the funeral,
Gorbachev's meeting with Raul Castro on 20 March was blatantly belated,
coming several days after the new leader's meetings with the heads of other
delegations. TASS characterized Gorbachev's meeting with Raul Castro in
routine fashion, noting that the talks took place in an atmosphere of "fraternal
friendship, cordiality, and full mutual understanding." TASS used the same
formulation to describe Fidel Castro's talks with Chernenko following Andro-
pov's funeral last year.
The day before meeting with Gorbachev, Raul Castro, who is also Cuba's
minister of defense, met with Soviet Defense Minister Sokolov. TASS
reported, without elaboration, that the two had held a "cordial and friendly
conversation" on "questions of mutual interest."
Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro (foreground) offers
condolences to Soviet leadership at reception following Cher-
nenko's funeral. (Soviet television, 13 March 1985)
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Soviet media attention to Raul Castro's presence in Moscow was otherwise
routine. Pravda listed him among Soviet bloc delegations arriving and paying
last respects to Chernenko in the Hall of Columns on the 12th and reported
him attending funeral ceremonies and the Soviet leadership reception on the
13th. Soviet media also publicized Fidel Castro's condolence message and
briefly acknowledged his message of congratulations to Gorbachev.
Havana Havana has offered no explanation for Fidel Castro's
decision not to attend Chernenko's funeral, a trip he
had made to mark the passing of Brezhnev and Andropov. Cuban media also
are not known to have publicized Castro signing the condolence book for
Chernenko at the Soviet Embassy, though Pravda in its 15 March issue stated
that he had. Cuban media had reported him doing so in marking the deaths of
Brezhnev and Andropov. Havana radio on 12 and 13 March did report several
Cuban leaders signing the book but Castro's name was not included.
Havana media also ignored Western press speculation about Castro's absence
from Chernenko's funeral. Castro's 14 March interview with CBS, in which
he briefly explained that his absence was because of a heavy workload,
received virtually no attention in Cuban media. This treatment contrasts with
the extensive coverage Havana accorded other interviews Castro gave with
Western reporters last month. The only Cuban media coverage of Castro's
CBS interview was a brief Prensa Latina report on 18 March that failed to
mention Castro's disclaimer that his absence from Moscow should not be read
as a sign of strain in Cuban-Soviet relations.
Castro did send a condolence message on Chernenko's death, but its tone and
substance contrast sharply with the one he sent after Andropov's death,
differences that seem to point up Havana's dissatisfaction with Soviet
attitudes toward Cuba under Chernenko. Castro's message last year effusively
praised Andropov as "a true friend" who had demonstrated his "affection,
understanding, and support" for Cuba and who had "confirmed" his under-
standing of Cuba's need for Soviet economic and military cooperation. In
contrast, Castro's message marking Chernenko's death, reported by Havana
radio on 12 March, was cooler in tone, eulogizing Chernenko only as a
"constant friend" who had expressed the solidarity of the Soviet party,
government, and people with Cuba.
By the same token, Castro's message to Gorbachev on the death of Chernenko
appeared to seek reassurance from the new party chief on the issue of Soviet
cooperation with Cuba. In the message, Castro pointedly expressed confidence
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that "Soviet cooperation with the cause of defending national sovereignty and
with the building of socialism in Cuba are irreversible," a conviction he did
not find reason to include in his message last year.
Background These signs of strain in Cuban-Soviet ties comport
with earlier indications of Cuban dissatisfaction with
the terms of Soviet economic aid and of Soviet pressure on Havana to improve
economic efficiency and fulfill its economic commitments to the communist
bloc. Castro's absence from Chernenko's funeral is the second time in recent
months that the Cuban leader has passed up an occasion to visit Moscow. Cas-
tro was the only top leader of a country having full membership in CEMA to
miss the organization's summit meeting in Moscow last June, a snub that may
have reflected Cuban disappointment over the level of economic aid it was re-
ceiving from the Soviet-dominated organization.' In October, during the
meeting of CEMA premiers in Havana, Castro acknowledged that Cuba had
been criticized by its partners for delaying economic deliveries to the socialist
bloc. These criticisms in turn may have played a role in Cuba's ongoing
campaign, launched by Castro in several speeches last December, for greater
economic austerity at home in order to meet international economic
obligations!
Nicaragua: Cautious Support for Sandinista Regime
Although Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega may have sought out promises
of stronger Soviet support for Managua while he was in Moscow, Gorbachev's
expressions of solidarity cautiously hewed to traditional Soviet lines.
Moscow's reception for Ortega, who headed Managua's delegation to Cher-
nenko's funeral, mirrored its welcome for him last year when he attended
Andropov's funeral and reflected the care it usually takes in public statements
about the extent of Soviet support for Nicaragua. As Chernenko had done last
year, General Secretary Gorbachev received Ortega on 13 March. According
' For a discussion of Castro's absence at the CEMA summit last June and Cuban unhappiness
with CEMA aid, see the Trends of 20 June 1984, pages 7-8.
e Castro's speeches on the revision of Cuba's economic plans and the need to improve
productivity are discussed in the Trends of 16 January 1985, pages 14-17, and 30 January
1985, pages 12-13.
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to TASS's account that day, Gorbachev went no further than to express the
"Soviet people's solidarity" with Nicaragua, repeating the stock formulation
Chernenko used in his talks with Ortega last year.
Both sides routinely denounced U.S. policy on Central America and reiterated
longstanding positions on the need for efforts, like those of the Contadora
Group, to find a political settlement for the conflicts in the region. In this re-
gard, Gorbachev, according to TASS, gave a "high" assessment of the
"constructive" initiatives put forward recently by Managua on ways to resolve
Central American conflicts.' Unlike last year, when Ortega's meeting with
Chernenko was described as "friendly," neither Soviet nor Nicaraguan media
characterized the atmospherics of the recent talks.
Managua's observances of Chernenko's death closely paralleled the pattern it
used to mark Andropov's passing last year. As he did last year, Ortega
declared a national mourning period of three days and sent a condolence
message to the Soviet leadership in the name of the Nicaraguan Government
and the Sandinista leadership, in addition to leading the Nicaraguan delega-
tion to funerary ceremonies in Moscow.
In both his condolence message and his statement on arrival in Moscow, as re-
ported by Managua radio on 13 March, Ortega went out of his way to recall
Chernenko's "special love and understanding" for Nicaragua's "struggle for
development and independence." In his arrival statement, he recalled that
Chernenko first met Ortega and other Sandinista leaders at the Cuban party
congress in 1980, where he began a pattern of regular "brotherly communica-
tion" that reflected Chernenko's "great understanding" of Central American
and Nicaraguan problems. Ortega had not made parallel comments about
either Brezhnev or Andropov in observing their deaths.
Although both Managua and Moscow were reserved about publicizing the
substance of Ortega's conversation with Gorbachev while he was in Moscow,
Ortega confidently asserted after leaving Moscow that Soviet economic and
diplomatic support for Nicaragua would continue. In remarks during a brief
stopover in Havana on the 19th, reported the same day by the Nicaraguan
news agency (ANN), Ortega claimed that Gorbachev pledged to continue
Soviet economic cooperation with Nicaragua. Ortega added that he also
"perceived clear support" for his government's peace initiatives during his
talks in Moscow.
9 Nicaragua's recent initiatives and Moscow's reaction to them are discussed in the Trends of
6 March 1985, pages 1-4.
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Nonruling Parties: Dissident Communists Cultivated
General Secretary Gorbachev's meeting after Chernenko's funeral with
leaders of the Italian and Japanese Communist Parties, two of the nonruling
communist parties with which the CPSU has had its most troubled relations in
the past, suggests a more flexible Soviet approach toward dissident parties.
Moscow's primary aim with both parties appears to be to obtain their
endorsement of Soviet positions on space and nuclear weapons.
Gorbachev's meetings with the representatives of the Italian Communist Party
(PCI) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) represented a departure from
Soviet practice after other recent Soviet leaders' funerals. It was the first
meeting of Soviet and Italian party heads since 1979. Former PCI leader
Enrico Berlinguer attended both the Brezhnev and Andropov funerals but did
not meet separately with the new CPSU general secretary on either occasion.
Similarly, the JCP representative at the two previous funerals did not meet
with Soviet leaders.
The significance of Gorbachev's meetings with the PCI and JCP representa-
tives was underscored by his failure to meet with representatives from other
nonruling parties, even from the more orthodox parties, including such
longtime pro-Soviet figures as Alvaro Cunhal of the Portuguese Communist
Party and the leader of the pro-Soviet Spanish communist faction, Ignacio
Gallego. The only other earlier meeting with a nonruling party was Andro-
pov's talk with French Communist Party (PCF) leader Georges Marchais after
the Brezhnev funeral in November 1983. Marchais did not attend the
Chernenko funeral although he had been present for Andropov's final rites
and was not received at that time.
The language of the authoritative TASS reports on Gorbachev's meetings
with the Italian and Japanese communist representatives-both of which
appeared on page one of Pravda-projected a picture of improved CPSU
cooperation with both the PCI and the JCP and a common outlook on
disarmament issues:
? PCI. The TASS report on Gorbachev's 14 March talks with PCI General
Secretary Alessandro Natta described the atmosphere of their discussion as
"friendly" and conveyed the impression that the two parties had agreed to
strive jointly to end the arms race "both on earth and in outer space." The
report said nothing about any past or current differences between the two
sides. Strengthening the impression of a common CPSU-PCI view on the
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international situation, Soviet television on 22 March publicized Natta's
praise for the USSR's stand against the "aggressive plans of imperialism"
and its "struggle" to end the arms race on earth and "to prevent it in outer
space."
The Gorbachev-Natta meeting came in the wake of a gradual improvement
in CPSU-PCI relations over the past 30 months. During that period,
Moscow has generally avoided direct -attacks on the PCI despite periodic
criticism of Soviet policies by the PCI and its leaders. This period of relative
quiescence followed sustained attacks on PCI leaders in Soviet journals
during 1981 and 1982 for their criticism of martial law in Poland and their
reservations about the applicability of the Soviet "model" of socialism."
Gorbachev's attendance at former PCI leader Berlinguer's funeral in Rome
last June strengthened the impression of a more favorable Soviet attitude
toward the PCI.
? JCP. Gorbachev's meeting with the Japanese party's de facto leader
Tetsuzo Fuwa apparently was aimed at sustaining the momentum toward
improved CPSU-JCP ties that developed in late 1984. The official TASS re-
port on the Gorbachev-Fuwa talks was even more upbeat than the report on
JCP party chairman Kenzi Miyamoto's meeting with Chernenko last
December. It approvingly noted CPSU and JCP agreement in December on
"cooperation in the struggle for preventing nuclear war" and for the
"complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons." It also cited
Gorbachev as personally calling for increased cooperation between the two
parties in the struggle for better Soviet-Japanese relations and recorded the
Japanese delegation as expressing "the same opinion." The report made no
reference to any disagreements between the sides.
By contrast, although the joint statement issued after Miyamoto's December
visit to Moscow described his talks with Chernenko as having taken place in
an atmosphere of "friendship and comradely solidarity," it also acknowl-
edged the two parties' "divergences of opinion" on a variety of issues
including their evaluations of responsibility for the nuclear arms race.
Unlike the report on the 15 March Gorbachev-Fuwa talks, the December
joint statement made no mention of both sides' interest in joint efforts to im-
prove Soviet-Japanese relations."
10 For a discussion of Moscow's attacks on the PCI in 1981 and 1982 see the Trends of 14
April 1982, pages 6-7.
11 For more detailed treatment of Miyamoto's December 1984 visit to the USSR and
continuing signs of contention between the two parties, see the Trends of 9 January 1985,
pages 14-16.
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South Asia: Concern Over Afghan Conflict
Soviet accounts of Gorbachev's meetings on 14 March with the leaders of
Afghanistan and Pakistan illustrated Moscow's concern and frustration over
developments in the Afghan conflict, and there was evidence of tension in
Soviet-Afghan relations. Upbeat reports on Gorbachev's meeting the previous
day with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi underlined Moscow's desire to
maintain close ties with India in the wake of the assassination of its longtime
friend, Indira Gandhi.
Afghanistan Despite expressions of "satisfaction" with "friendly
relations" between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union
and reaffirmations of a desire to strengthen them, the official TASS report on
Gorbachev's 14 March meeting with Karmal was notable for its lack of
warmth. By contrast with previous accounts of Afghan leader Karmal's post-
funeral meetings with Chernenko and Andropov, which were described as
taking place in a "warm and friendly atmosphere," TASS merely character-
ized Karmal's session with Gorbachev as a "comradely conversation."
Soviet reporting on the Gorbachev-Karmal talks gave unusual prominence to
the Afghan conflict. Unlike reports of Karmal's comparable meetings with
Andropov and Chernenko, which dealt only with bilateral questions, the report
on the meeting with Gorbachev contained an explicit denunciation of the
"continuing aggressive actions by outside forces" and reiterated Moscow's
longstanding position that foreign intervention in Afghanistan must cease
before any settlement is possible.
Pakistan Consistent with the pattern in recent months of Soviet
pressure on Pakistan for its policy toward Afghani-
stan, Gorbachev's meeting with Pakistani President Zia appeared designed to
reinforce Soviet complaints about Islamabad's support for the Afghan rebels.
According to the TASS account, Gorbachev forcefully reiterated Moscow's
displeasure with Islamabad's policy, directly accusing Pakistan of allowing its
territory to be used for mounting "aggressive actions" against Afghanistan
and warning that this policy "cannot but have a most unfavorable effect on the
state of Soviet-Pakistani relations."" The TASS account of Andropov's
November 1982 meeting with Zia merely noted that the two sides held a
12 According to the TASS report issued at the time, Gromyko delivered a similarly pointed re-
buke to Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan during their meeting in New York last
September. For a further discussion, see the Trends of 12 December 1984, pages 4-5, and 3
October 1984, pages 1-2.
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"short conversation" concerning the "situation around Afghanistan," al-
though disagreement between the sides was reflected in TASS's failure to
provide a characterization of the atmosphere of the session. Chernenko did not
receive Zia in 1984.
India A strong bid for maintaining close relations with India
seemed to be reflected in the report of Gorbachev's
meeting with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Using markedly warmer
terms than had been applied to comparable meetings with Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi in 1982 or 1984, TASS said that the Gorbachev-Gandhi
meeting took place in an "atmosphere of friendship and complete mutual
understanding," with the two sides noting the "high level, dynamism, and
diversified character" of their "fruitfully developing" relations. By contrast,
Soviet accounts of the 1984 Chernenko-Indira Gandhi meeting cited a "warm,
friendly atmosphere," while the parties merely noted the "steady development
of Soviet-Indian relations." The more terse account of Indira's 1982 meeting
with Andropov referred to an "atmosphere of mutual understanding" and
reported only that the two sides agreed on the importance of "deepening and
strengthening Soviet-Indian cooperation."
Middle East: Low Profile
For the most part, Moscow observed past practice in its relatively low-key
treatment of Middle East leaders at the funeral. The highest level reception
was given PDRY President `Ali Nasir Muhammad, who met with Gorbachev.
Soviet accounts of the funeral underscored the deterioration in Moscow's
relations with PLO leader Yasir `Arafat.
South and Delegations from both South Yemen (PDRY) and
North Yemen North Yemen (YAR) were granted higher level audi-
ences than at the time of previous Soviet successions,
with Gorbachev meeting PDRY President `Ali Nasir Muhammad and Soviet
Premier Tikhonov receiving YAR Prime Minister `Abd al-'Aziz `Abd al-
Ghani. At the 1982 and 1984 funerals, the Soviet leadership received neither
the PDRY nor the YAR delegation.
Syria Consistent with his status as deputy general secretary
of the ruling Bath Party, Syrian delegation leader
`Abdallah al-Ahmar was received by candidate Politburo member Boris
Ponomarev. In 1984 al-Ahmar also headed the Syrian delegation but was not
reported to have met with the Soviet leadership.
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Iraq
The Iraqi delegation, which included party Vice
Chairman `Izzat Ibrahim and Deputy Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister Tariq `Aziz, was not reported to have been granted a
meeting. There were similarly no reported meetings with high-level Iraqi
delegations following the Andropov and Brezhnev funerals.
Lebanon Soviet Premier Tikhonov's reception of Lebanese Pre-
mier Karami was unprecedented for the occasion.
Lebanon had not sent comparable delegations in the past-none was listed by
Moscow in 1982, and in 1984 Lebanon was represented only by a former
president.
Egypt and Jordan Moscow kept unchanged its treatment of Egypt and
Jordan at the Chernenko funeral compared with the
Andropov funeral. The low-ranking Egyptian representative, Consultative
Council Speaker al-Hakim, met with candidate Politburo member Kuznetsov,
as had the Egyptian delegate at Andropov's funeral. In 1982 the Egyptian del-
egation had no reported meeting. There were no reported meetings with
Jordanian representatives at any of the funerals.
PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat
pays final tribute to
Chernenko at formal ly-
ing-in-state ceremonies.
(Soviet television, 13
March 1985)
Consistent with its arms-length treatment of `Arafat
over the past year, Soviet press reports on the funeral
proceedings noted his presence but did not acknowl-
edge his title as chairman of the PLO Executive
Committee, simply referring to him and his lieutenant,
Faruq Qaddumi, as representatives of the PLO. As
was the case at past funerals, there was no Soviet
report that `Arafat had had a private meeting with any
Soviet official. Soviet television, however, gave `Arafat
considerable attention, showing him bidding farewell
at the lying-in-state ceremonies, focusing on him
during the funeral proceedings at the Lenin Mausole-
um, and showing him warmly greeting Gorbachev at
the reception following the funeral.
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Algeria Candidate Politburo member Boris Ponomarev's meet-
ing with the Algerian representative, FLN Politburo
member Messaadia, is consistent with earlier signs of improved Soviet-
Algerian ties, highlighted by Ponomarev's visit to Algiers in August 1984.
Messaadia had attended both Brezhnev's and Andropov's funerals, but in
neither instance was he reported to have met with a Soviet leader.
Africa: Ties With Allies Highlighted
Gorbachev met with three African leaders, Angolan President Eduardo dos
Santos, Mozambique President Samora Machel, and Ethiopian leader Men-
gistu Haile Mariam. None of them had previously been received by a new gen-
eral secretary following a funeral.
Angola Gorbachev's 14 March talk with dos Santos, the first
between the Angolan president and the Soviet leader-
ship since dos Santos visited Moscow in May 1983, raises the possibility of a
higher Soviet profile on Angolan issues. According to the authoritative TASS
account of the meeting, both sides expressed "satisfaction" over the state of
Soviet-Angolan relations while Moscow reaffirmed its "solidarity and sup-
port" for Angola's "rightful cause." The image of increased Soviet attention to
Angola is reinforced by the 6 March high-level Soviet-Angolan-Cuban
meeting in Moscow. As reported in Pravda, the participants at the 6 March
meeting upheld Angola's public proposals as a "just foundation" for ensuring
peace and security in the region and pledged "to further coordinate" their ac-
tions in "strengthening the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity
of Angola."
The TASS report on the Gorbachev-dos Santos meeting, however, also
reflected the strains that have been evident in Soviet-Angolan relations since
Luanda began negotiating its disengagement agreement with Pretoria. TASS
failed to provide any characterization of the atmosphere of the 14 March
meeting, an indication that the discussion may not have gone smoothly. By
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contrast, the communique issued on dos Santos's May 1983 visit depicted the
talks on that occasion as "warm and friendly." Dos Santos inexplicably failed
to attend Andropov's funeral in February 1984, and during a tour of East Eu-
rope that April he again failed to visit the Soviet Union. Moscow has not di-
rectly criticized Luanda for its policy of negotiations with South Africa, but
has shown a distinct coolness for Luanda's willingness to deal directly with
South Africa and the United States.13
Ethiopia Gorbachev's reception for Ethiopian leader Mengistu
Haile Mariam befitted Mengistu's position as Mos-
cow's closest African ally and head of a newly formed workers party. TASS
noted that the meeting took place in a "warm and comradely atmosphere" and
that the two leaders expressed satisfaction with relations between their
countries and parties. In addition, according to TASS, Moscow reaffirmed its
"invariable solidarity" with Ethiopian efforts to "defend the gains of the
revolution."
Mozambique Moscow's willingness to grant Mozambique President
Machel a meeting with Gorbachev, despite apparent
reservations about recent Mozambican policy toward South Africa and the
West, underscored Soviet interest in southern Africa. The TASS account of
their meeting gave no hint of serious disagreements, noting that it took place
in a "friendly atmosphere and in a spirit of mutual understanding." Machel
had been received by Premier Tikhonov at the 1984 funeral and by Defense
Minister Ustinov at the 1982 funeral.
" For further details, see the Trends of 4 April 1984, pages 7-9, and 18 April 1984, page 15.
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Media Behavior After Chernenko's Death
As was the case following the deaths of Andropov and Brezhnev, anomalies in
Soviet media behavior signaled Chernenko's death before it was officially
announced. Program changes were noted in the media less than six hours after
Chernenko's death, which occurred at 1620 GMT (1920 Moscow time) on
10 March. At 2155 GMT national television omitted a regular program
preview and a concert of gypsy music. From this point on, departures from
scheduled radio and television programming were noted with increasing
frequency. By 0200 GMT on 11 March, most regular programs on all audible
channels of Soviet domestic radio had been replaced by classical music. After
the normally scheduled Vremya television newscast at 0500 GMT, which
begins the broadcast day in the Moscow area, there were major departures
from scheduled programming.
In all three cases Soviet radios linked up before broadcasting announcements
of the death of the general secretary, providing a clear indication that a major
announcement was imminent. In the case of Andropov this linkup occurred 15
minutes before the announcement and in the case of Brezhnev approximately
an hour before the announcement. There was less advance warning this time,
since the linkup of the radios was delayed until immediately before the
announcement of Chernenko's death.
A detailed chronology of significant Soviet media behavior following the
deaths of Chernenko, Andropov, and Brezhnev is presented in Table 5.
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Table 1
Leadership Rankings at Lying-in-State
(Soviet Television)
Lineup Before
Approaching Family
Gorbachev
Gorbachev
Gorbachev
Gorbachev
Gorbachev
Tikhonov
Tikhonov
Tikhonov
Tikhonov
Tikhonov
Gromyko
Gromyko
Gromyko
Gromyko
Gromyko
Grishin
Grishin
Grishin
Grishin
Grishin
Romanov
Romanov
Romanov
Romanov
Romanov
Solomentsev
Aliyev
Solomentsev
Aliyev
Solomentsev
Kunayev
Shcherbitskiy
Shcherbitskiy
Solomentsev
Kunayev
Aliyev
Kunayev
Kunayev
Kunayev
Shcherbitskiy
Vorotnikov
Vorotnikov
Shcherbitskiy
Aliyev
Solomentsev
Aliyev
Vorotnikov
Vorotnikov
Ponomarev
Dolgikh
Kuznetsov
Kuznetsov
Demichev
Chebrikov
Demichev
Chebrikov
Demichev
Demichev
Ponomarev
Kuznetsov
Rusakov
Zimyanin
Dolgikh
Dolgikh
Dolgikh
Dolgikh
Shevardnadze
Ryzhkov
Chebrikov
Chebrikov
Kuznetsov
Ponomarev
Kapitonov
Ligachev
Ponomarev
Ponomarev
Chebrikov
Demichev
Kuznetsov
Ligachev
Zimyanin
Ligachev
Zimyanin
Shevardnadze
Ryzhkov
Ryzhkov
Shevardnadze
Kapitonov
Rusakov
Kapitonov
Rusakov
Rusakov
Shevardnadze
Rusakov
Kapitonov
Ryzhkov
Kapitonov
Shevardnadze
Ryzhkov
Zimyanin
Ligachev
Zimyanin
Ligachev
' Shcherbitskiy was absent; Vorotnikov stood apart from other Politburo members on Gorbachev's right, followed by Ponomarev, etc. When the Politburo members
lined up to approach the family, Vorotnikov fell in after Aliyev (last). Leaders did not line up in groups as an honor guard as they did on 12 and 13 March. This line-
up was shown in the 12 March Pravda.
' The television announcer also listed them in this order. The 13 March Pravda carried a photo of the ten Politburo members in this order.
The television announcer also listed them in this order. There was no photo of this event in the press.
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Table 2
Leadership Rankings at Chernenko Funeral in Red Square
(Soviet Television)
Walking Behind
Coffin to Grave
Gorbachev Gorbachev Gorbachev
Grishin Tikhonov Tikhonov Romanov Tikhonov
Romanov Gromyko Gromyko Solomentsev Gromyko
Shcherbitskiy Grishin Aliyev Grishin
Kunayev Romanov
Solomentsev Shcherbitskiy
Aliyev Kunayev
Vorotnikov Solomentsev
Aliyev
Vorotnikov
Ponomarev
Demichev
Kuznetsov
Dolgikh
Shevardnadze
Kapitonov
Ligachev
Zimyanin
Rusakov
Ryzhkov
' This lineup was also the order shown in Pravda's 14 March photo.
z Vorotnikov, Shcherbitskiy, and Kunayev stood in a second row.
Tikhonov
Gromyko
Grishin
Romanov
Solomentsev
Vorotnikov
Kunayev
Aliyev
Shcherbitskiy
Dolgikh Ponomarev
Chebrikov Kuznetsov
Demichev Shevardnadze
Kapitonov
Ligachev
Zimyanin
Rusakov
Ryzhkov
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Table 3
Meetings With Foreign Leaders'
Bulgaria
Zhivkov
Zhivkov
Zhivkov
Czechoslovakia
Gorbachev
Husak Chernenko
Husak
Husak
East Germany
Tikhonov
Honecker Tikhonov
Honecker
Honecker
Hungary
Gromyko
Kadar Gromyko
Kadar
Kadar
Ustinov
Poland
Rusakov
Jaruzelski
Jaruzelski
Jaruzelski
Romania
Ceausescu Rusakov
Ceausescu
Ceausescu
Other Countries-Individual Meetings
Afghanistan
Gorbachev Chernenko Karmal Andropov
Karmal
Gromyko Gromyko Gromyko
Ponomarev
Angola
Gorbachev dos Santos Shalayev' Luvualu -
dos Santos
Gromyko
Austria
Gorbachev Kirchschlaeger - Sinowatz -
Kirchschlaeger
Gromyko
Cambodia
Tikhonov Heng Samrin - Heng Samrin -'
Heng Samrin
Maltsev
Canada
Gorbachev Mulroney Chernenko Trudeau Tikhonov
Trudeau
Gromyko Gromyko Suslov
China
Gorbachev Li Peng Aliyev Wan Li Gromyko
Huang Hua
Gromyko Ilichev Ilichev
Cuba
Gorbachev Raul Castro Chernenko Fidel Castro Andropov
Fidel Castro
Rusakov Gromyko Rusakov
Sokolov 6 Rusakov Ustinov'
Ogarkov
Cyprus
- Ladhas Tikhonov Kiprianou -
Kiprianou
Ethiopia
Gorbachev Mengistu - Mengistu -
Mengistu
Gromyko
Finland
Gorbachev Koivisto - Koivisto -
Koivisto
Gromyko
France
Gorbachev Mitterrand Chernenko Mauroy Tikhonov
Mauroy
Gromyko Gromyko
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Table 3 (Continued)
Meetings With Foreign Leaders
Country or Party Soviet Leader(s) Visiting Leader Soviet Leader(s) Visiting Leader Soviet Leader(s) Visiting Leader
French CP - Plissonnier - Marchais Andropov Marchais
Gremetz Ponomarev
West Germany Gorbachev Kohl Chernenko Kohl Andropov Carstens
Gromyko Gromyko Gromyko
Great Britain Gorbachev Thatcher Chernenko Thatcher Gromyko Pym
Gromyko Gromyko
Greece - Kharalambopoulos Tikhonov Papandreou Tikhonov Papandreou
-n
India
a
0
Z! Indonesia
n
D ON Italy
C
N
m
0
Z
r
Japanese CP
North Korea
Laos
Lebanon
Madagascar
Malta
Mexico
Mongolia
Gorbachev Rajiv Gandhi Chernenko Indira Gandhi Andropov Indira Gandhi
Gromyko Gromyko Gromyko
Gorbachev Pertini Chernenko Pertini - Fanfani
Gromyko Gromyko
Gorbachev Natta - Berlinguer - Berlinguer
Ponomarev
Gorbachev Nakasone Gromyko Abe - Suzuki'
Gromyko
Gorbachev Fuwa - Kaneko - Kaneko
Ponomarev
Tikhonov Kang - Pak
Maltsev
Gorbachev Souphanouvong - Souphanouvong
Gromyko
Rusakov
Tikhonov
Maltsev
Karami - Helou
Andrianarahinjaka Chernenko Ratsiraka
Gromyko
Tikhonov Barbara
Maltsev
Tikhonov Bartlett
Maltsev
Lugo
Gorbachev Batmonh Chernenko Tsedenbal -
Gromyko Gromyko
R isakov
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Souphanouvong
Babeony
Barbara
Gonzalez Avelar
Tsedenbal
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Mozambique Gorbachev Machel Tikhonov Machel Ustinov Machel
Gromyko Ilichev Ogarkov
Nicaragua Gorbachev Ortega Chernenko Ortega - Ortega
Gromyko Gromyko
Norway Tikhonov Willoch - Harald - Harald
Maltsev Willoch
Pakistan Gorbachev Ziaul Haq - Ziaul Haq Andropov Ziaul Haq
Gromyko Gromyko
Philippines Gorbachev Imelda Marcos - - e Gromyko Imelda Marcos
Gromyko
Portugal - do Amaral Tikhonov Soares - Pereira
Spain Gorbachev Gonzalez - Guerra - Perez-Llorca
Gromyko
Turkey Tikhonov Ozal Tikhonov Ozal Tikhonov Ulusu
Maltsev
United States Gorbachev Bush Chernenko Bush Andropov Bush
Gromyko Gromyko Gromyko
Vietnam Gorbachev Truong Chinh Chernenko Truong Chinh -10 Truong Chinh
Rusakov Gromyko
Rusakov
North Yemen (YAR) Tikhonov 'Abd al-Ghani - al-'Arashi - Salih
Maltsev
South Yemen Gorbachev 'Ali Nasir 'Ali Nasir - 'Ali Nasir
(PDRY) Gromyko Muhammad Muhammad Muhammad
Yugoslavia Gorbachev Djuranovic Arkhipov Spiljak Andropov Stambolic
Gromyko Sukrija Markovic Rusakov Ribicic
Rusakov
' Table includes representatives from countries or parties that were received by either the new general secretary or the Soviet premier while attending the funerals in
1982, 1984, or 1985. Meetings were reported by Soviet media unless otherwise noted. See Table 4 for full names and official positions of leaders listed in this table.
'The Soviet leaders met collectively with the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in 1984 and 1985. No meetings were reported in 1982.
'A dash indicates that no meeting between any Soviet leader and the head of the delegation listed for the country is known to have been reported in Soviet media.
Reported by Angolan domestic radio.
Cambodian media reported that Cambodian Foreign Minister Hun Sen met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev.
6 Castro was received in a second meeting by Sokolov.
Castro was received in a second meeting by Ustinov and Ogarkov.
Delegate, if any, not known to have been named by Soviet media.
Suzuki was not reported to have met with any Soviet leaders; Foreign Minister Sakurauchi was received by Gromyko.
10 SRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach met with Ilichev.
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Full Names and Titles of Leaders
`Abd al-Ghani, `Abd al-'Aziz
Abe, Shintaro
Aliyev, Geydar A.
do Amaral, Fernando Monteiro
Andrianarahinjaka, Arema L.
Andropov, Yuriy V.
al-'Arashi, `Abd al-Karim
Arkhipov, Ivan V.
Babeony, E.
Barbara, Agatha
Bartlett Diaz, Manuel
Batmonh, Jambyn
Berlinguer, Enrico
Bush, George
Carstens, Karl
Castro Ruz, Fidel
Chernenko, Konstantin U.
Djuranovic, Veselin
Fanfani, Amintore
Foreign Minister
First Deputy Premier, CPSU Central Committee
Politburo Member
Speaker of the Assembly of the Republic
President of the National Assembly
General Secretary of the CPSU
Vice President
First Deputy Premier
Chairman of the Military Committee of the
Development of Madagascar
President
Secretary of Government
General Secretary of the Mongolian People's
Revolutionary Party Central Committee, Chairman of
the Presidium of the People's Great Hural
General Secretary of the Communist Party of Italy
Vice President
President
First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party,
President of the Council of State and Council of
Ministers
Second Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, First
Vice President of the Council of State and Council of
Ministers, Defense Minister
President, President of the State Council, General
Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party
General Secretary of the CPSU
President of the Presidency of the Republic
Speaker of the Senate
68
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Gandhi, Indira
Gandhi, Rajiv
Gonzalez Avelar, Jose Miguel
Gonzalez Marquez, Felipe
Gorbachev, Mikhail S.
Gremetz, Maxime
Gromyko, Andrey A.
Guerra Gonzalez, Alfonso
Harald
Helou, Charles
Heng Samrin
Honecker, Erich
Hun Sen
Husak, Gustav
Huang Hua
Ilichev, Leonid F.
Jaruzelski, Wojciech
Kadar, Janos
Kaneko, Mitsuhiro
Kang Song-san
Table 4 (Continued)
President of the Japanese Communist Party Central
Committee Presidium
Prime Minister
Prime Minister
Chairman of the Grand Commission of the Senate of the
National Congress
Prime Minister
General Secretary of the CPSU
French Communist Party Central Committee Secretary,
Politburo Member
First Deputy Premier, Foreign Minister, CPSU Central
Committee Politburo Member
Deputy Prime Minister
Crown Prince
Former President
Chairman of the Council of State, General Secretary of
the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
Chairman of the Council of State, General Secretary of
the Socialist Unity Party
Foreign Minister, Kampuchean People's Revolutionary
Party Central Committee Politburo Member
President, General Secretary of the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia
Foreign Minister
Deputy Foreign Minister
Prime Minister, First Secretary of the Polish United
Workers Party
First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers
Party
Japanese Communist Party Central Committee
Secretariat Chief
Premier, Worker's Party of Korea Central Committee
Politburo Member
69
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Karami, Rashid
Karmal, Babrak
Kharalambopoulos, loannis
Kiprianou, Spyros
Kirchschlaeger, Rudolf
Kohl, Helmut
Koivisto, Mauno
Ladhas, Yeoryios
Li Peng
Lugo Gil, Humberto
Machel, Samora
Malik, Adam
Maltsev, Viktor F.
Marchais, Georges
Marcos, Imelda
Markovic, Dragoslav
Mauroy, Pierre
Mengistu Haile Mariam
Mitterrand, Francois
Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja
Muhammad, `Ali Nasir
Mulroney, Brian
Nakasone, Yasuhiro
Table 4 (Continued)
General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council
Foreign Minister
President
President
Federal Chancellor
President
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Vice Premier
Chairman of the Grand Commission of the Senate of the
National Congress
MPLA-Labor Party Central Committee Politburo
Member
President, Frelimo Party Chairman
Vice President
First Deputy Foreign Minister
General Secretary of the French Communist Party
Human Settlements Minister, Wife of the President
President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
Central Committee Presidium
Prime Minister
Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative
Council, General Secretary of the Workers Party of
Ethiopia
Foreign Minister
Prime Minister, President of the Supreme People's
Council, General Secretary of the Yemeni Socialist
Party
70
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Table 4 (Continued)
Natta, Alessandro
Nguyen Co Thach
Ogarkov, Nikolay V.
Ortega Saavenda, Daniel
Ozal, Turgut
Pak Song-chol
Papandreou, Andreas
Pereira, Vasco
Perez-Llorca, Jose Pedro
Pertini, Alessandro
Plissonnier, Gaston
Pym, Francis
Ratsiraka, Didier
Ribicic, Mitja
Rusakov, Konstantin V.
Sakurauchi, Yoshio
Salih, `Ali `Abdallah
dos Santos, Eduardo
Shalayev, Stepan A.
Sinowatz, Fred
Soares, Mario
Sokolov, Sergey L.
Souphanouvong
Spiljak, Mika
General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party
Foreign Minister, Candidate Member of the Vietnamese
Communist Party Central Committee Politburo
First Deputy Defense Minister, Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces
Coordinator of the Junta of the Government, Member of
the Leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation
Front (1982, 1984), President (1985)
Vice President, Member of the Workers Party of Korea
Central Committee Politburo
Prime Minister, Defense Minister
Foreign Minister
Foreign Minister
President
French Communist Party Central Committee Secretary,
Politburo Member
Foreign Secretary
President
President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
Central Committee Presidium
CPSU Central Committee Secretary
Foreign Minister
President
President, Chairman of the MPLA-Labor Party
Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade
Unions
Federal Chancellor
Prime Minister
Defense Minister
President, President of the Supreme People's Council
President of the Presidency of the Republic
71
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Stambolic, Petar
Sukrija, Ali
Suslov, Mikhail A.
Suzuki, Zenko
Thatcher, Margaret
Tikhonov, Nikolay A.
Trudeau, Pierre
Truong Chinh
Tsedenbal, Yumjaagin
Ulusu, Bulent
Ustinov, Dmitriy F.
Willoch, Kare
Zhivkov, Todor
Ziaul Haq
Table 4 (Continued)
President of the Presidency of the Republic
President. of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
Central Committee Presidium
CPSU Central Committee Secretary, Politburo Member
Prime Minister
Prime Minister
Prime Minister, CPSU Central Committee Politburo
Member
Prime Minister
Chairman of the State Council, Vietnamese Communist
Party Central Committee Politburo Member
General Secretary of the Mongolian People's
Revolutionary Party, Chairman of the Presidium of
the People's Great Hural
Prime Minister
Defense Minister, CPSU Central Committee Politburo
Member
Deputy Premier, Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee Politburo Member
Prime Minister
President of the State Council, General Secretary of the
Bulgarian Communist Party
President
72
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Stambolic, Petar
Sukrija, Ali
Suslov, Mikhail A.
Suzuki, Zenko
Thatcher, Margaret
Tikhonov, Nikolay A.
Trudeau, Pierre
Truong Chinh
Tsedenbal, Yumjaagin
Ulusu, Bulent
Ustinov, Dmitriy F.
Willoch, Kare
Zhivkov, Todor
Ziaul Haq
Table 4 (Continued)
President of the Presidency of the Republic
President. of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
Central Committee Presidium
CPSU Central Committee Secretary, Politburo Member
Prime Minister
Prime Minister
Prime Minister, CPSU Central Committee Politburo
Member
Prime Minister
Chairman of the State Council, Vietnamese Communist
Party Central Committee Politburo Member
General Secretary of the Mongolian People's
Revolutionary Party, Chairman of the Presidium of
the People's Great Hural
Prime Minister
Defense Minister, CPSU Central Committee Politburo
Member
Deputy Premier, Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee Politburo Member
Prime Minister
President of the State Council, General Secretary of the
Bulgarian Communist Party
President
72
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