NEW ZEALAND: A PROFILE OF LABOR AT THE HELM

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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence 25X1
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New Zealand: A Profile of
Labor at the Helm
An Intelligence Assessment
NOT MICROFILMED
iii.G&Idr0/44(oeir
For D3ta Entry Only,
EA 85-10145
85-10145
CR 85-12964
August 1985
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ecret
e4t? Directorate oi
Intelligence
4- A
New Zealand: A Profile of
Labor at the Helm
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
of East Asian Analysis, an
Office of Central Reference. Lomments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
or to the Chief, Asia/Near East
Division, OCR, on
Office
Secret
EA 85-10145
CR 85-12964
August 1985
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 15 July 1985
was used in this report.
New Zealand: A Profile of
Labor at the Helm
A young, well-educated, and supremely confident generation of Labor
politicians has revived the Labor Party's electoral support, reoriented its
economic policy toward free market operation, and reinforced its antinucle-
ar policy. Leading the resurgence have been Prime Minister David Lange
and leftwing leader Jim Anderton, rivals for party leadership and archi-
tects of the renaissance.
Lange's charismatic oratory, especially in debating former Prime Minister
Muldoon, has propelled him to the forefront of parliamentary politics. His
rapid rise has been aided by two developments in domestic politics:_
mounting dissatisfaction among the electorate with the stagnant economy
under Muldoon's National Party government, and increasing dissatisfac-
tion within Lange's own Labor Party over the ineffectiveness of the old
guard?headed by thrice-defeated former Prime Minister Bill Rowling.
Lange's sudden rise, however, has meant that he has had to try to
consolidate his power base at the same time he has been mastering the art
of governing.
To maintain control of the party, Lange must limit the influence of
Anderton, whose talent for organization during the 1970s saved Labor
from financial disaster, rallied voters, and won him the loyalty of the
grassroots party workers. Anderton has strengthened his influence by
making the party's annual conferences?which are usually dominated by
his supporters?policymaking events. Anderton now challenges Lange in
the party parliamentary caucus?especially on economic policy?although
we judge that he is not strong enough to challenge Lange for the party
leadership.
On the issue that most concerns the United States?the ban of nuclear ship
visits?the party is unified. Opposition to things nuclear traverses the
political spectrum, and we cannot identify one Labor Party member of
Parliament who is not opposed to the entry of nuclear weapons into New
Zealand. Some Labor Party members of Parliament would agree that the
government's policy is costly because of US sanctions, but, in light of
widespread popular support for the nuclear ban, we expect Lange and his
party to hold firm.
Moreover, the nuclear issue is no longer of front page interest to the New
Zealand public?which is preoccupied with economic woes. We believe
economic policy will be the major issue in domestic politics during the rest
of Lange's term and in his reelection campaign in 1987.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments iii
Postwar Decline of the Labor Party . . . 1
. . . And a Resurgence 1
The Architect and the Spirit 1
Anderton Builds. . . 2
. . . and Lange Infuses 4
The Rivals: Divided at Work. . . 5
. . . But Unified on the Nuclear Issue 6
Looking Ahead: Give and Take Until 1987? 7
Figures
1.
Labor Party Victory in July 1984 3
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New Zealand: A Profile of
Labor at the Helm
Postwar Decline of the Labor Party . . .
Traditional caricatures of the Labor and National
Parties portray National attracting the farmers and
the monied classes?businessmen, financiers, and pro-
fessionals?and Labor appealing to the blue-collar
workers, especially trade union members, and the
leftist ideologues. After World War II, however, the
Labor Party's trade union base began to erode. First,
union membership itself declined because a smaller
portion of the work force was engaged in industry.
Second, fiery devotion to the union movement's cause
waned as memories of the Depression faded, working-
class neighborhoods were supplanted by urban renew-
al, and more New Zealanders considered themselves
middle class. Registered Labor Party membership,
accordingly, fell from 14.5 percent of the population
in 1940 to 6.4 percent in 1976, while revenues from
party dues declined proportionately.
Trade unionists have also been at odds with other
Labor constituencies?weakening what remained of
Labor's dwindling political base. Unionists struggled
bitterly with the university intellectuals who joined
the Labor Party in the 1960s, attracted by its anti-
Vietnam-war platform. They also accused party lead-
ers of forsaking the working class because both the
1957-60 and the 1972-75 Labor governments took a
hard line in industrial disputes. By the same token,
party politicians have accused trade union leaders of
disregarding the party's interests, because unions have
more than once called strikes that seriously inconven-
ienced the public shortly before an election. More-
over, acknowledged Communists with well-known
links to Moscow hold prominent positions in some
unions, and many Labor leaders believe being associ-
ated with the trade union movement alienates voters
who might otherwise support the party.'
' US Embassy contacts say that at least 28 Federation of Labor
(FOL) members visited the Soviet Union in 1983 and that the
number of free airline tickets to the USSR available through FOL
leaders continues to rise. About 30 percent of the current Labor
Party parliamentary caucus has traveled to the USSR or Eastern
Europe under Soviet auspices, according to Embassy estimates.
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. .. And a Resurgence
Since the early 1980s, Labor has reversed its fortunes,
benefiting mainly from the National Party's inability
to handle New Zealand's economic problems. Trade
unions began to look back toward Labor after the
National Party government placed labor disputes
under criminal law in 1980. Meanwhile, Prime Minis-
ter Muldoon's welfare-state policies placed a drag on
the economy that virtually halted growth and raised
unemployment, further discouraging working-class
voters.
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Muldoon's policies also alienated traditional upper-
class National Party supporters?business leaders
called them "erratic, arbitrary, and capricious." Mil-
lionaire Bob Jones harnessed the discontent among
businessmen, professionals, and some farmers and
formed a new party in 1983?the New Zealand Party. 25X1
Labor Party leaders, however, were also promising to
turn around the sputtering economy with a more
"realistic" economic program, and thus won some
business support. Profiting from the New Zealand
Party's vigorous campaign, which split the National
vote, Labor won by a landslide in the July 1984
national election?capturing 43 percent of the popu-
lar vote to National's 36 percent and the New Zea-
land Party's 13 percent.' 25X1
The Architect and the Spirit
The shape of the Labor Party today primarily reflects
the simultaneous rise to positions of power of Auck-
landers David Lange and Jim Anderton. Leftwing
In early July 1985 Jones withdrew his personal and financial
support from the New Zealand Party and suspended its political
activity for 18 months?despite the party's good showing in the
June byelection for the seat of Timaru. According to the US
Embassy, Jones is unhappy that the party has been used as a 25X1
"protest vehicle" for voters dissatisfied with the free market
economic reforms of the Labor government?which embody many
of his economic policy objectives. Moreover, after donating an
estimated $750,000, Jones is reluctant to pour more funds into a
party that is continually in debt. Because the National Party's new
leaders are leaning toward more conservative economic policies,
most New Zealand Party voters will most likely return to the
National Party
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Trade Union Leadership and the Labor Party
New Zealand trade unions have for years been in low-
intensity conflict with the Labor Party. Unions expect
the party to serve obediently as their 'Political arm,"
while the party believes unions should give electoral
support but leave the governing to politicians. With
the Labor Party now in power, trade union leaders
face a dilemma: if they continue to challenge the
market-oriented economic policies of the Labor gov-
ernment and thus split the party, they risk returning
the National Party to power at the next election. But
if they allow a short-term reduction in real income
for their members as the government prescribes?to
improve international competitiveness?they encour-
age the already significant loss of faith among the
rank and file in the efficacy of unions, forfeiting their
power to call debilitating strikes and thus undermin-
ing their own political influence.
New Zealand's primary union organization, the Fed-
eration of Labor (FOL), faces internal problems of its
own. Several moderates and pro-US trade unionists
have resigned from FOL Executive Council positions,
frustrated by its radicalism. At present, the council
is staffed by two admitted Communists, Ken Douglas
and Bill Andersen, who are members of the Moscow-
aligned Socialist Unity Party (SUP); two alleged
Communists, Rob Campbell and Len Smith; four
leftwing socialists, Jim Knox (FOL President), Sonja
Davies, Rex Jones, and John Slater, who usually side
with Campbell and Smith; and only three moderates,
Sam Jennings, Ashley Russ, and Wes Cameron. Of
the moderates, Cameron and Russ often do not
support positions favorable to the United States, and
Cameron is to take another position soon.
To complicate matters, in July 1984 the Electrical
Workers Union (EWU) split from the FOL. The
Engineers Union and the Printers Union have threat-
ened to pull out as well. Since then, Tony Neary?
leader of the EWU and opponent of the leftward drift
in FOL politics?has been trying to unite groups
unaffiliated with the FOL. US Embassy officials have
little hope that Neary's efforts will bear fruit, howev-
er. Important trade union leaders are profiled in
figure 2.
leader Anderton is, in our judgment, the "architect"
of the new Labor Party, having rebuilt it as party
president from 1979 to 1984. Lange, we believe, is the
"spirit" of the new Labor Party, having made Labor's
traditional, social reformist goals popular again by
infusing them with a message of renewal and hope.
Behind Lange and Anderton stands a young, well-
educated, and supremely confident generation of La-
bor Party leaders.' They have put a new face on Labor
policy by reorienting economic policy toward free
market goals and reinforcing an antinuclear foreign
policy?all in the name of recognizable, mainstream
Labor, social democratic goals.4
Anderton Builds .. . As early as 1974, international
journalists pegged Anderton as a future leader, and
New Zealand watchers interpreted his active party
Secret
presidency as a bid to become the party's parliamen-
tary leader when Rowling stepped down. Not satisfied
to be an administrator, the hard-driving Anderton has
consistently feuded with the party's parliamentary
leaders over control of policymaking, and his circum-
vention of parliamentary processes has often provoked
their anger, according to US Embassy reports.
Anderton's Labor roots go back to the late 1960s
when "a little clique of young leftists" formed on the
Auckland University campus. The group included
ministers of the current Cabinet Jonathan Hunt,
Michael Bassett, and Mike Moore (all of whom
subsequently switched their loyalties to Lange). Ac-
cording to their own accounts, they joined Labor
primarily because of its anti-Vietnam-war rhetoric.
Anderton became disgruntled with the party's method
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How the New Zealand Electorate Voted
Labor's base of support continues to be largely drawn
from the nation's five largest cities. Of these cities' 39
parliamentary seats, Labor won 32, National five,
and Social Credit two in 1984. Labor also won the
four seats allotted to the indigenous Maori popula-
tion and a few rural districts on each island. National
solidly held the sheep-farming country on the north-
western half of the North Island, as well as the large
rural districts on the southernmost tip and the east
coast of the South Island. National also won four
small cities: New Plymouth (where one of Muldoon's
"Think Big" petroleum projects is located), Invercar-
gill, Whangerei, and Rotorua (all surrounded by
solidly National districts).
of operation because "the party membership was
totally against the war, but somewhere at theparlia-
mentary level we seemed to fudge it a bit."
Anderton's primary aims as party president were to
modernize and streamline the party. In practice, this
has meant reworking party machinery to give dele-
gates to the annual party conference?which has
become the party's primary policymaking exercise?
the power to overrule the parliamentary wing.' Ander-
ton believes the party is more credible now that the
party-at-large makes policy and binds its members of
Parliament (MPs) to follow conference decrees. We
believe Anderton is correct in applying this to left-of-
center voters; third parties on the left of the political
spectrum are waning, and Labor seems to be captur-
ing their base of support
Anderton also rescued the party from critical debt
during his five years as president. To offset the decline
in party dues paid by members of affiliated unions,
Anderton introduced fundraisers (such as raffles) and
effectively organized young people to knock on doors,
3"The supreme governing body of the party" is formed by 400 to
500 delegates elected by party branches to attend the annual
conference. There, resolutions passed at six regional conferences
become topics for debate and are put to a vote. If passed, the
resolutions are submitted to the policy committee to be drawn up
into the party platform. The platform becomes binding on all
candidates once it is ratified by the conference.
3
Figure 1
New Zealand: Labor Party Victory,
July 1984
Percent
Number of Seats (95-seat Parliament)a
New Zealand Party (0 seats)
Social Credit Party (2 seats)2
National Party
(37 seats) 39
Labor Party
(56 seats) 59
Popular Vote (close estimates)
New Zealand Party 13.5
Social Credit Party 8
National Party 36
Labor Party 42 5
a seats held after July 1985 by election:
55 Labor, 38 National, 2 Social Credit.
306285 7-85
tack up posters, and dial telephones to increase mem-
bership and donations. Anderton?correctly, in our
view?credits his reinvigorated party organization
with returning the majority of the New Zealand
popular vote to the Labor Party in 1981 and making
victory possible in 1984.
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Labor's Economic Reform Policies
Upon assuming office in July 1984, Prime Minister
Lange's conservative team of economic policy mak-
ers?Roger Douglas, Richard Prebble, and David
Caygill?initiated sweeping reforms designed to im-
prove New Zealand's international competitiveness
and regain its declining share of world trade. They
began by:
? Devaluing and later floating the New Zealand
dollar.
? Removing price and interest rate controls.
? Liberalizing restrictions on international flows of
capital.
Although the Labor government's first measures met
with public approval, criticism has mounted since
November 1984?when Labor announced an austere
budget and a plan to dismantle New Zealand's
system of protection for domestic industry. These
moves included:
? Lowering import barriers.
? Reducing farm, fuel, and export subsidies.
? Raising taxes and charges for government services.
Undaunted by Labor's slipping popularity in public
opinion polls, Lange's economic policy team has
continued its calculated gamble by restructuring the
tax system and revising New Zealand's centralized
wage negotiating process to encourage enterprise-level
bargaining. Labor Party leaders,
believed they could not achieve eco-
nomic reform piecemeal because of New Zealand's
three-year election cycle. They hoped to weather the
grumbling of the electorate early in their term and be
reelected amidst an economic rebound in 1987. Our
analysis indicates, however, that growth will be slow-
er in 1985 and 1986 than in 1984?primarily because
markets for New Zealand's traditional exports are
being squeezed and redirecting industry investment
will take more time.
... And Lange Infuses. The disparate faction behind
Lange was originally united by the belief that the
Labor Party could not win with three-time election
loser Rowling at the helm and by a strong antipathy
Secret
Leftwing leader Jim Anderton Prime Minister David Lange
to Party president Anderton. On the opposition bench-
es, Lange was the only Labor Party member in
Parliament charismatic enough to match Muldoon in
debate, and on the campaign trail he convincingly
articulated Labor positions and won votes. His maid-
en address to Parliament on 27 May 1977?proclaim-
ing the virtues of a New Zealand upbringing in a
witty, reminiscent manner, while demanding that the
New Zealanders' lot be improved?was widely publi-
cized and propelled him to national prominence.
Lange's name immediately appeared in public opinion
polls among those preferred by respondents for Prime
Minister. By April 1978 he was rated well ahead of
deputy opposition leader Bob Tizard and not too far
behind opposition leader Rowling.
Some young Labor Party MPs?Aucklanders Mi-
chael Bassett, Richard Prebble, Anderton, and Roger
Douglas?resolved to change Labor's "party of de-
feat" image in 1978 by repackaging policy and pro-
moting younger leadership. They concluded that the
first step should be replacing the uninspiring Tizard
with the more popular Lange on the Labor Party
ticket. Rowling neutralized the plan through a series
of changes in the party hierarchy. But, after Labor
took another thrashing at the polls in 1978, serious
coalition building began among younger MPs, and
Lange won the deputy slot by two votes in November
1979. Lange continued his attacks on National Party
policy, and, when Rowling stepped down in February
1983, Lange stepped in.
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Upon assuming leadership, Lange eliminated front
bench?back bench distinctions and appointed
"spokespersons" for policy areas in order to secure
unity in the Labor Party caucus while promoting
several of his supporters. Since then, a de facto "inner
cabinet" has emerged, with Lange's supporters in
leading positions. Lange also has squared off against
Anderton at the annual Labor Party conferences,
matching Anderton's cries for socialist economic poli-
cies and the welfare state with pleas for pragmatism.
Lange has been universally criticized since assuming
office for his relative inexperience, particularly during
his first weeks of government, when he insufficiently
disciplined his caucus. Ministers appeared to contra-
dict one another in press statements. In early Septem-
ber, Anderton left the country for Australia without
notifying the Prime Minister and presented his own
views to the Australian press as if they were estab-
lished party policy. Lack of experience also plagues
the Cabinet. Only four ministers?Douglas, Tizard,
Moyle, and Colman?previously have held portfolios.
By the end of September 1984, however, New Zea-
land political observers noted a new discipline in
Lange's Cabinet and a silence among Anderton's
supporters, suggesting that Lange is a "quick study"
in the art of governing. According to US Embassy
reports, for example, Acting Prime Minister Palmer
refused in September press conferences to discuss
Defense Minister O'Flynn's comments on ANZUS or
to speculate about Lange's meeting with US Secre-
tary of State Shultz in New York. Meanwhile, Fi-
nance Minister Douglas, having frankly discussed
economic initiatives with US officials, risked awk-
ward silence rather than comment on the issue of port
access by nuclear ships. Moreover, Douglas and Preb-
ble talked with labor leaders in October about pro-
posed budget reforms, but consistently declined to
discuss areas of economic policy for which Caygill
was responsible.
The Rivals: Divided at Work...
Since he won his first seat in Parliament last year,
Anderton has had a second medium through which to
5
influence Lange.' In our judgment, he and other
Labor leftists came to the government benches antici-
pating a hard fight over nuclear issues. Lange's
unshakable stand in support of banning nuclear-
armed and nuclear-powered warships from New Zea-
land ports, we believe, far exceeded their expectations.
Thus, for several months Lange and his conservative
team of economic policy makers were allowed free
rein on Matters of principal interest to them, in
particular in the area of economic policy.
Now confident that the port ban is secure, the Labor
left has renewed its attack on the market-oriented
course charted by Lange's economic policy makers. In
the six regional party conferences held from March
through May 1985, Lange's Cabinet fought hard to
gain support for its proposed goods and services tax,
but no conference gave unqualified approval, and the
most recent Wellington conference flatly rejected it.
Thus, by using its strongest weapon?party confer-
ences?the Anderton faction already has forced Cabi-
net conservatives to postpone introducing the tax. It
probably will achieve modifications of the tax plan at
the nationwide party conference in September and
possibly could stir up enough grassroots opposition to
cause Lange to scrap the plan entirely.
The party constitution continues to work to Ander-
ton's advantage in formulating party policy positions
because annual party conferences are dominated by
?
The US Embassy estimated in August 1984 that only 26 of the 56
Labor MPs supported Lange, and 24 supported leftwing leader Jim
Anderton. Many of the new MPs?about 12 are first-term mem-
bers?were recruited through the Anderton party machinery. Sev-
eral first-term members subsequently abandoned Anderton, prefer-
ring, we believe, to link their political fortunes with Lange, and by
the end of October the US Embassy reported Anderton's faction ?
numbering only 15. Oral reports from political observers during the
last two months indicate that Anderton may now command as few
as five or seven votes on many issues. In our judgment, however, he
can muster at least 18 or 20 caucus votes to challenge the
moderates' free market economic initiatives?and may ultimately
garner a majority as the country's economic fortunes decline.
Attitudes of caucus members toward the United States fall
roughly into four categories, not always corresponding to members'
Anderton-Lange factional affiliations. According to our estimates, 25X1
there are 21 caucus members generally pro-US; 14 apparently open
to the United States; 13 usually anti-US, though not extreme left;
seven anti-US and left wing,
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his supporters. Before Anderton's presidency, annual
conferences were dominated by the party's parliamen-
tary branch and its affiliated trade unions. Union
leaders were granted bloc votes in return for their
financial support of parliamentary candidates, but
MPs were often able to influence their affiliated
unions to support their preferred policy positions.'
Conference delegates are now elected by local party
organizations?the lower levels of Anderton's hierar-
chy?more or less on the basis of interest and avail-
ability. Many attendees are drawn from the ranks of
or are elected by the college-age workers organized by
Anderton's efficient party machinery.
Not surprisingly, activists have a higher proportion of
representatives at party conferences than is justified
by their numbers in the Labor Party constituency.
Moreover, because delegate votes are no longer tied to
the positions of popularly elected members of Parlia-
ment, leftwing initiatives have prevailed in recent
years. In fact, in 1984 Deputy Party Leader Palmer
told the US Embassy that the party had no choice but
to include the antinuclear plank in its campaign
platform, because otherwise it could not attract
enough young people to round up votes.
Within Parliament, however, Lange has successfully
dealt with the Anderton faction. After excluding
Anderton from his Cabinet by using a longstanding
party tradition that first-term MPs are not given
portfolios, he assigned Anderton the time-consuming
job of rounding up votes for the party's positions when
bills come before Parliament and the more irksome
chore of nagging Labor MPs for questions the party
should address in Parliamentary sessions. In another
deft move, Lange gave Anderton-supporter Ann Her-
cus the police and social welfare portfolios. She has
gained prestige by becoming the nation's first woman
Minister of Police, but the portfolios are of little
consequence in politics and will require much time
and effort to solve the constant headaches associated
' The general decline of union involvement in the Labor Party and
Anderton's new party rules have reduced union influence. Although
Lange's policies and cajolery have regained working-class votes, the
trade union movement has not regained its power in the party
organization or increased its representation in Parliament. Eight
Labor members of Parliament have had some experience in union
organizations: Stan Rodger, Fraser Colman, Eddie Isbey, Fred
Gerbic, Phil Goff, Fran Wilde, Mary Bachelor, and David Butcher.
None are among Lange's inner circle of advisers.
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with them. In the Parliamentary chamber, moreover,
Lange's deputies Moore and Prebble have successfully
limited the speaking time of Anderton faction mem-
bers?despite the protests of the somewhat naive
Palmer who would prefer to be "fair" to everyone.
. . : But Unified on the Nuclear Issue
Once an issue that split the caucus along factional
lines, the nuclear question is now one of the few
political issues that traverses the Anderton-Lange
division. Both Lange and Anderton supporters now
recognize that there is general political support for the
belief that New Zealand can make a contribution to
world peace by banning nuclear-powered and nuclear-
armed warships. Opposition to "things nuclear" has
become an article of faith within the Labor Party.
While Labor was in opposition, annual party confer-
ences regularly passed resolutions calling on the next
Labor government to bar nuclear-powered and nucle-
ar-armed ships from New Zealand harbors?encour-
aged by the success of the Norman Kirk Labor
government (1972-74) in forbidding nuclear ships to
enter. In 1983 Lange offered the opinion that nuclear-
powered ships were safe and therefore might be
admitted to New Zealand ports. His position met with
overwhelming defeat in a caucus vote?which Lange
has not forgotten.
In part, Muldoon is responsible for Labor's unani-
mous antinuclear position because he tried to polarize
the electorate over the issue. Muldoon maintained
that to ban port calls by nuclear ships would destroy
ANZUS and insisted that voters must choose between
the ban and ANZUS?a tactic that for a time
prevented antinuclear voters from gaining the upper
hand. The opposition, however, refuted Muldoon's
position by pointing to the Kirk years during which no
nuclear-powered ships were sent to New Zealand by
the United States. Furthermore, Muldoon called La-
bor Party MPs who supported the ban naive, and his
ridicule made them martyrs to their cause.
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Some New Zealand observers delineate between the
Labor Party factions according to the formula ad-
vanced by Lange: "Anderton's faction is anti-Ameri-
can; we are only antinuclear." We believe the distinc-
tion is irrelevant, given US policy of neither
confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weap-
ons aboard its warships. Lange and his ministers,
however, were not quick to perceive?or accept?this.
As late as September 1984, Lange's close adviser,
Mike Moore, told a US Embassy official that his idea
of a compromise solution to the problem was that the
United States should "finesse" the nuclear power
issue by asking to send a conventionally powered ship
and should "tell David privately" that no nuclear
weapons would be on board the ship requesting access.
In our judgment, Lange fully expected the US Gov-
ernment to agree to an eventual "compromise" on his
terms, and his penchant for speaking off the cuff in
press interviews inched him into a trap from which he
could not extricate himself. First, he announced to the
press that, in accord with Labor Party policy and the
mandate he had received in the July 1984 election,8 he
would under no circumstances allow nuclear-powered
or nuclear-armed ships in New Zealand harbors.
Later he claimed that the United States would never
request port access for a nuclear-powered or nuclear-
armed ship because it would not want to be rebuffed.
In December he declared that the New Zealand
Government would independently assess the arma-
ment of whatever ship requested access?
Given these proclamations, Lange can-
not now accept any ship not demonstrably free of
nuclear weapons without substantial embarrassment.
There are other reasons to believe Lange will not
change policy. Everyone in the caucus is philosophi-
cally opposed to nuclear weapons entering the nation's
ports. Therefore, even if Lange were inclined to
remove the ban, there is no nucleus of party leaders
0,:Zro ideologically opposed to the policy who would be
willing to lead a campaign to change prevailing
'Well over 60 percent of the 1984 electidn vote went to parties
whose platforms included antinuclear planks.
7
opinion.8 If Lange wanted to modify the port ban
policy, he would have to argue that the government's
stand is costing more than it is worth?by requiring
New Zealand to spend more on defense and limiting
its access to intelligence information. Lange, however,
will not acknowledge that New Zealand's security is
in any measure reduced and has repeatedly an-
nounced that New Zealand does not wish to be
defended by nuclear arms. Moreover, Lange has
always been uncomfortable with political arm-
twisting, in our judgment. Although Moore and
Prebble have led politicking on Lange's behalf,
neither has shown any interest in overturning the
Labor Party policy on ship visits, and Lange is
unlikely to instruct them to do so. Even if he did, they
probably would not be able to win over a majority of
the caucus.
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Looking Ahead: Give and Take Until 1987?
We do not expect Lange to be deposed from the party
leadership before the next election, which must be
held by the end of 1987. New Zealand watchers
continue to ask when Anderton will challenge Lange,
but we believe a variety of factors militate against
such a leadership challenge. First, as the incumbent
Prime Minister?and only the third Labor Party
official since World War II popular enough to win
that post in a general election?Lange holds consider-
able political clout. Second, New Zealand's postwar
history is devoid of "no-confidence" votes because one
or the other of its two largest parties has always held a 25X1
majority of seats in the unicameral Parliament and 25X1
both have enforced strict party discipline. Third, the
Labor Party could not hope to win a general election 25X1
led by someone viewed as an extremist. Whenever
Lange is replaced, therefore, it is probable that the
caucus will select a member of Lange's own faction
rather than Anderton or one of his associates.
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25X1
'Geoffrey Braybrooke, in our judgment the most conservative
member of the Labor Party parliamentary caucus, has told Embas-
sy officials that he is in principle antinuclear?even though he says
he understands the concept of deterrence and, perhaps, of a global
balance of power. His electorate, moreover, is thoroughly antinucle-
ar, so he says he cannot afford to oppose the government's policy.
With Braybrooke on the right edge of the Labor Party political
spectrum and every other caucus member to his left, it is clear that
the chance for a reversal of the port ban policy by the government is
remote. 25X1
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For now, Anderton seems to be content to challenge
Lange on one issue at a time. He will not let Lange
forget that he is standing ready to pick up the ball
should the Prime Minister fumble, but even he seems
to realize that a leadership dispute with a sitting
prime minister would do his party more harm than
good. Labor Party factionalism is thus unlikely to
degenerate into a battle for leadership as long as
Lange is popular enough to maintain the prime-
ministership.
The present Labor regime, however, faces the prob-
lem that plagued the 1972-75 government: Cabinet
ministers running off in many different directions
without coordination. New Zealanders have told US
Embassy officials that Lange absorbs briefs so quickly
that he cuts off Cabinet discussions before the other
ministers begin to grasp the complexities of the case
at hand. As a result, policymaking is compartmented:
Lange frames foreign policy; Douglas, Prebble,,and
Caygill write economic policy; Moore manages trade
policy; and lower-ranking ministers such as Hercus
take care of complaints against the police and the
social welfare system. Few high-ranking Labor Party
MPs appear to have time for anything besides their
own responsibilities. This approach by Lange could be
deliberate?a response to the original lack of Cabinet
discipline. Nevertheless, if few ministers know what is
going on outside their own portfolios, the Labor
government ultimately will be weakened, its policy-
making hampered, and its reelection chances threat-
ened.
Divisions within the party will hinder and may even
scuttle the dominant faction's economic program. The
left wing can now cite Labor's stunning defeat in the
July 1985 byelection in Timaru-36 percent to Na-
tional's 43 percent?as evidence of popular discontent
with Labor's reform program because the campaign
was waged primarily on economic issues. We believe
only sustained economic growth on the order of 3 to 4
percent annually?an unlikely prospect, according to
our analysis?would deter the party's left wing and
union leaders from demanding that Labor reverse its
free market policies. At the same time, we believe the
electorate ultimately will judge Labor according to its
Secret
progress in dealing with the country's economic prob-
lems. If the economy sputters?for whatever reason?
the Labor Party will be held responsible in the next
election.
In contrast, the Labor Party's antinuclear policy is
secure. In the next few months, we believe, Lange
again will seek talks with the United States, but he
will not allow nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered ships
to enter New Zealand ports. The political dividends of
the party's stand are clear: public opinion polls regis-
tered an immediate upturn in Labor's popularity after
the port ban was announced, and public support for
the ban continues even though the ANZUS issue is no
longer of front page interest. In our judgment, any
change in public opinion to favor a return to the
obligations of the ANZUS alliance at best would be
gradual.' Moreover, we believe any adverse reaction
to the antinuclear policy?a lesser issue in domestic
politics?would be insufficient in itself to oust the
present government.
'? Furthermore, attempting to defend ANZUS in the present
political climate might exacerbate antinuclear sentiments. In public
debate, supporters of ANZUS have been painted as reactionary,
and the concept of deterrence as an obsolete solution to the world's
most serious problem. In order to justify ship visits now, Lange?or
any other New Zealand leader?would have to argue primarily on
the ground that ANZUS gives New Zealand a means of influenc-
ing the course of the arms race.
Complicating matters, Lange is likely to endorse legislation of
the ban by the end of the year. In the face of demands by leftwing
groups that Parliament write the ban into law, Lange's argument
that legislation is unnecessary convinces no one. His claim that
New Zealand should await the outcome of the South Pacific
Forum's nuclear-free-zone treaty is also under fire from those who
think the Forum's proposal has been watered down to the point of
insignificance
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