WORLD REACTION TO SUMMIT BREAKDOWN (AS OF 1700 24 MAY)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00782R000100120008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 24, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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NOT RELEASABLE TO
24 May 1960
FOREIGN NATIONALS
OCI No. 2633/60
CONTINUED CONTROL
Copy No. 2
WORLD REACTION TO SUMMIT BREAKDOWN
(As of 1700 24 May)
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
T
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24 May 1960
I. Soviet Propaganda
II. Eastern European Propaganda
III. Communist Far East
IV. Non-Communist Far East
V. South and Southeast Asia
VI. Africa
VII. Middle East
VIII. Western Europe
IX. Western Hemisphere
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WORLD REACTION TO SUMMIT BREAKDOWN
24 May 1960
I. Soviet Propaganda
1. During the first week following Khrushchev's disclosure
on 5 May that a US reconnaissance plane was shot down over USSR
territory, the USSR was cautious and restrained in its exploita-
tion of the incident. Soviet propagandists gave it comparatively
moderate publicity and followed the lines of Khrushchev's two
speeches before the Supreme Soviet. However, after the 11 May
opening of the exhibition of the wreckage and "evidence" of US
espionage at which Gromyko and Khrushchev ridiculed the US state-
ments on the affair, the volume of Soviet propaganda denunciations
of the US policy of "provocation" and "treachery" increased. At-
tacks on Secretary Herter and "US ruling circles" and "warmongers"
became sharper, but propagandists still avoided personal attacks
on President Eisenhower. The press treatment of Khrushchev?s
statements at his impromptu press conference on 11 May indicate a
Soviet effort to tone down the impact of some of his harsh off-
the-cuff remarks, and seemed to reflect a desire to forestall the
conclusion that there had been any shift in his attitude toward
the Summit. After a delay of almost 24 hours TASS issued a revised
version of Khrushchev's statements which clearly softened his ref-
erences to the President and gave a more optimistic assessment
of future Soviet-US relations.
2. Mass meetings solely to protest the US espionage flight
started on 13 May. (Previously, mass meetings to discuss the
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materials of the Supreme Soviet, including the statements on
the U-2 incident, were held from 6 to 11 May..) By 14 May the
plane incident dominated the Moscow press, and personal criti-
cism of President Eisenhower and attacks on Secretary Herter
were intensified.
3. Nevertheless, on the eve of the Summit talks, Soviet com-
mentators continued to stress Khrushchev's statement that he would
still go to Paris "with a pure heart" but to insist that the out-
come of the conference would depend largely on the attitude of the
West, particularly the United States.
4. There is considerable evidence that the USSR's propaganda
apparatus had no forewarning of Khrushchev's intended moves in
Paris and was forced to reverse prepared stories on the Summit.
Three hours after Khrushchev's statement in Paris on 16 May, TASS
instructed the Soviet regional press not to publish any despatches
on the Summit it had transmitted earlier that day and sent re-
visions strongly condemning US actions.
5. Massive Soviet jamming of VOA's transmissions in the
languages of the USSR was resumed on or about 17 May, following
selective jamming of VOA's output during the previous week on the
plane incident.: However, on 22 May jamming was again reduced and
only about 46 percent of VOA's are being selectively jammed. VOA
'broadcasts in the Armenian and Georgian languages are completely
.unjammed. Soviet jamming of BBC/s broadcasts to the USSR apparently
has followed. the same pattern.
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6. Throughout this period, studied caution has been
particularly evident in output for Russian domestic consumption.
Despite cries of indignation against the US "provocation," Soviet
domestic propaganda has avoided pointing to the danger of accidental
war as a result of such flights and did not stress "vigilance."
It is made clear that the present situation is not a "crisis"
situation and that "calmness" is the principal requisite.
7. Since the breaking off of the Summit meeting, Soviet
commentary has concentrated on "proving" that the United States
torpedoed the Summit. As "proof," Pravda offered Secretary
Herter's remarks to the US press in Paris and the US "fear" of
a second "preliminary meeting" on 17 May. The deliberate scuttl-
ing" of the Summit was said to be a logical link in the chain of
US policy planned in advance to prevent the relaxation of tension
and to step up the war psychosis in order to enrich arms producers.
TASS cited as another link in this chain President Eisenhower's
signing of the mutual security program bill. Red Star asserted
that Vice President Nixon's "boasting" about the US reconnaissance
flights in his 15 May TV speech shows that US wrecking of the Sum-
mit meeting "was an operation planned and prepared in advance."
Pravda and New Times have charged that American concentration on
the development of "spy satellites" proves that the US space pro-
gram is geared primarily to espionage and subversion.
8. All attacks are aimed at the United States with the ex-
ception of passing criticism of Macmillan and De Gaulle for their
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failure to persuade the President to condemn the flights. But
the distinction drawn by Khrushchev between these leaders'
loyalty to an ally and their own previous efforts to contribute
to the success of the Summit is maintained. Strong personal
attacks on the President by several commentators show the Soviet
Government's desire to destroy Eisenhower's image as a man
of peace in the eyes of the Russian people and to show that he
has succumbed to the influence of.i.various "US circles." One
of the most vitriolic, a Pravda article, said that "General
Eisenhower" is a devoted servant of "his capitalist class" and
"gangster system of imperialism," and added that Khrushchev was
suspicious of his behavior during the Camp David talks. Izvestia
said the reason Eisenhower twice rejected opportunities to save
face over the plane incident was because he had become the
"stooge of the American monopolies" and concluded that he could
not "'rise above the moral and intellectual level of a common,
garden-variety general of a capitalist country."
9. However, many of the commentaries stress Khrushchev's
subsequent line that the USSR "would like to believe" that
prudence will finally triumph in the West and that a Summit meet-
ing can be held in six to eight months in "new and more propitious
circumstances." Commentaries on the German issue generally restate
Khrushchev's opinion that the USSR and other countries have the
full right to sign a peace treaty with the GDR now, thus solv-
ing the Berlin question, but that the USSR is willing to wait a
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while in the hopes of a joint solution by the four powers.
10. Subsidiary coverage has been devoted to reports alleg-
ing worldwide support of the Soviet Union and condemnation of the
United States and to protest meetings voicing "enthusiastic ap-
proval" of Khrushchev and indignant denunciation of US leaders.
However, the population generally continues friendly to US Em-
bassy personnel and American tourists in Moscow.
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24 May 1960
II. Eastern European Propaganda
1. As in the USSR, Eastern European propagandists apparently
were unprepared for the sudden turn of events, with many of them
preferring not to comment but merely to repeat TASS releases.
2. As the collapse of the conference became more apparent,
all the satellites except Rumania began broadcasting independent
comment which reflected a national, in addition to a bloc, point
of view. The East European bloc countries are unanimous--as
might be expected--in support of Khrushchev. All place the blame
for the collapse of the conference on "Eisenhower's intransigence."
Most commentaries hint that future summit, disarmament and other
conferences are not only possible but also desirable, although
the way in which such possibilities are handled varies from
vituperation to probing attempts at reconciliation.
3. Although European satellite commentaries have moderated
in tone and noticeably decreased in number in the past two days,
personal attacks on President Eisenhower and Chancellor Adenauer
have become stronger. East German and Czechoslovak commentators
attempt to show a split in the Western alliance and to point out
that the US is trying to revive the cold war, while West Germany
is "fanning the war psychosis again."
4. Official statements published by the Albanian, Bulgarian
and Czechoslovak governments, and speeches by Hungarian and East
German party first secretaries have become relatively moderate
in tone, in line with Khrushchev's 20 May Berlin speech. The
II 1
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statements and speeches, doubtless coordinated in detail, are
remarkably similar. They all contain the outlines of bloc foreign
policy as set forth by Khrushchev for the future: 1) convocation
of another summit conference in six to eight months; 2) resumption
of negotiations for general and complete disarmament; 3) resumption
of negotiations for banning nuclear tests; 4) the eventual signing
of a peace treaty with East Germany; and, 5) creation of an inter-
nationally governed free city of Berlin.
5. Yugoslavia no longer maintains its neutral pose between
East and West. After suffering severe public attacks from Albania,
China, and the USSR for "assisting imperialism" by its stand on
the Summit talks, Belgrade has reversed its position, and condemned
the US for espionage flights, stating that under the circumstances
the USSR could not be expected to negotiate. The reversal accords
with the 14 May remarks by a senior Yugoslav foreign office offi-
cial who said that in the event of a failure at the Summit,
Belgrade would support Khrushchev and probably would sign a separate
peace treaty with East Germany when the time comes.
6. While satellite propaganda attacks continue, contacts
between US diplomatic personnel and satellite officials have
remained unexpectedly cordial. Usually difficult Bulgarian offi-
cials have been uniformly friendly on three occasions since 16
May, and the Poles
would like to play down tensions as long as possible. Highly
placed Yugoslav Army officers have expressed understanding for
the US position, and stated that they found themselves 25X1
11-2
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in close agreement. The Rumanian cultural negotiating team in
Washington suddenly cancelled all future meetings on 17 May, but
suddenly amazed State Department officials two days later with its
effusiveness and eagerness to resume negotiations immediately.
7. Reports of popular reactions in Eastern Europe have been
spotty. in Bulgaria reported great publ 25X1
interest in the events at the Summit, but stated that the average
citizen appeared to be "going about his business." Hungarian
press articles of 18 May indicate that some tension existed in
Hungary, as well as criticism of Khrushchev's actions in Paris,
but that after the situation was "explained correctly,"...people
were again working normally as before...." Although the general
atmosphere in Warsaw is calm after some panic buying and bank
withdrawals of gold and dollar currency, considerable popular
uneasiness remains, with the man in the street apprehensive about
a future tightening of regime policies. Many Poles feel that
Gomulka will be forced into closer uniformity with the Soviet
bloc on domestic issues. According to a recent repatriate from
Bucharest, initial Rumanian public reaction to the U-2 incident
was one of disbelief. Confirmation of the incident reportedly
contributed to a general feeling of regret, and a fatalistic
judgment that the US is incapable of liberating the satellites
from Soviet control.
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24 May 1960
III. Communist Far East
1. Peiping's first major comment on the Summit breakdown--
a statement by Premier Chou En-lai on 19 May--placed the Chinese
Communists squarely in line with the rest of the bloc in support-
ing Khrushchev and in condemning US "imperialism."' Chou stated
that Peiping "firmly supports" the measures taken by the USSR at
the Summit and warned the US government not to mistake Communist
efforts for peace as "signs of weakness." Chou continued: "En-
croachment on any socialist country is an encroachment on China,
on the entire socialist camp, and will assuredly meet with an an-
nihilating rebuff." In closing his remarks, he stressed that "the
650 million Chinese people will continue to unite closely with
the great Soviet people, the peoples of all the socialist countries,
and all the peace-loving people of the whole world, and work
persistently and untiringly for the relaxation of international
tension and a lasting world peace."
2. Peiping's largest and most acrimonious demonstrations
against the United States since the Lebanon crisis in 1958 con-
tinued unabated on 23 May. In the past four days more than 45
million people have participated in nationwide protest marches,
meetings, and rallies against American "aggression" and "sabotage"
of the Summit conference. Peiping declares nothing like this
has happened before in China. American officials in Hong Kong
note, however, that Peiping claimed in 1958 that 147 million
people denounced US "intervention" in Lebanon. In language as
III-1
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intemperate as Khrushchev's in Paris, Peiping is denouncing the
United States and personally castigating President Eisenhower.
The Chinese are militantly proclaiming that should the "US
imperialists" dare to unleash a new world war, the "powerful
socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and the peace-loving
people of the whole world will resolutely liquidate imperialism
forever from the earth."
3. Behind these public demonstrations of support for Soviet
conduct at the Summit conference, Peiping is taking advantage of
the conference breakdown to vindicate its views of opposition
to any accommodation with the US. A People's Daily editorial
of 20 May states that the outcome of the conference was no sur-
prise to those (e.g., the Chinese) who view the international
situation correctly and are not misled (as was Khrushchev) by
"certain superficial phenomena."
4. The editorial contains some indications that the Chi-
nese may fear that Khrushchev will not maintain, in the long run,
the uncompromising attitude he adopted toward the West at the
Summit conference. In this connection, the editorial assesses
the Summit breakdown as "helpful" because it "laid bare" the
"ferocious" features of "US imperialism" and calls, as did the
Chinese in the pre-Summit period, for further exposure of the
United States. There has thus far been no Chinese Communist com-
ment on Khrushchev's moderate Berlin speech which Peiping may well
interpret as confirming its fears about Soviet tactics vis-a-vis
the West.
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5. By implying that the Chinese were right and Khru-
shchev wrong, the 20 May editorial suggests the Chinese prob-
ably hope to use present developments to increase their in-
fluence throughout the Communist world as the most accurate
interpreters of Western intentions and of Marxist-Leninist
theory.
6. There was the customary time lag in the response of
Asian satellite capitals. It was not until 19 May that comment
was forthcoming from North Vietnam, North Korea, and Mongolia.
All three have resoundingly endorsed Khrushchev's position and
followed the bloc line in criticizing the US.
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24 May 1960
IV. Non-Communist Far East
1. In general, the Japanese, Koreans and Nationalist
.Chinese blamed Khrushchev for the breakdown of the Summit
conference, although some Japanese newspapers ascribed a share
of the blame to the US because of the U-2 incident. After the
conference failed, the Japanese press in general blamed both
sides. The Nationalists were relieved that the conference was
ended and want a more aggressive policy toward the bloc; the
Koreans want strengthened defenses, while the Japanese hope that
efforts to solve the impasse will result in a new summit meeting
in the near future. The domestic political crisis over the US-
Japanese security treaty has reduced Japanese interest in the
Summit breakdown and comment has declined.
2. In Japan, Prime Minister Kishi has expressed "deep
regret" over rupture of the talks. Foreign Minister Fujiyama
stated that Khrushchev used the U-2 incident as an excuse to hide
his belief that there is no prospect of agreement on the German
problem. The chairman of the left-wing Socialist party termed
Khrushchev's action "highly regrettable" but said he understood
the reason. The feeling is unanimous that the short-term result
will be a resumption of cold war tensions, but most Japanese com-
ments expressed hope that efforts would be made to solve present
differences at a new summit meeting in the near future.
IV-1
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3. Following the plane incident, the Japanese government
was on the defensive in attempting to secure ratification of
the new US-Japanese security treaty. The success of the govern-
ment's sudden move late on 19 May to force a vote on the treaty in
the lower house of the Diet has not relieved the government from
attacks on the treaty relationship and has exposed it to charges
that its methods are dictatorial. As a result of public agitation
over the treaty, Prime Minister Kishi is in a difficult position
that will become worse if he is unable to convince his country
that no US planes have in the past or will in the future make
illegal overflights from bases in Japan.
4. South Korean reaction has unanimously blamed Khrushchev
for the failure of the Summit meeting. Acting Chief of State
Huh Chung said the Paris events were "fortunate
as they would
solidify Free World vigilance against aggressive Communist designs.
The semi-official Korean Republic, along with other papers,
asserted that the free world must now unite and not be intimidated
into concessions, but rather strengthen its defenses. Regarding
the U-2 incident, a Foreign Ministry announcement reflected the
United States position that such flights are made necessary by
Soviet secrecy and linked the situation to the Communist sneak
attack on South Korea in 1950.
5. Nationalist Chinese officials, apprehensive that the US
would make an agreement in Paris detrimental to their interests,
are relieved that the Summit conference has collapsed. Vice
IV -2
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President Chen Cheng said long experience of negotiating with
Communists had taught him they will "bow low when weak, shake
their heads at everything when they are as strong as you, and jump
on you when they think-they are stronger." The Nationalists believe
that Khrushchev "sabotaged" the conference and that even without
the U-2 incident, he would have found another pretext for breaking
up the meeting. They are worried, however, that the US will
weaken in the face of Soviet threats and are using the incident
to call for a more aggressive policy toward the bloc.
6. The non-communist Hong Kong press has initially attributed
the collapse of the Summit meeting to the Soviet Union. The
British China Mail accused Khrushchev of sabotaging the Summit
and spoke of his "display of petulant self-righteousness...
intransigence and vindictiveness." Earlier some papers labeled
the U-2 incident a propaganda victory for the Soviets and asserted
that the US had walked into a Soviet trap. The pro-Chinese
Nationalist English language Hong Kong Tiger Standard suggested
that Khrushchev's behavior at the Summit was due to domestic
rather than international reasons. However, the British South
China Morning Post called the U-2 flight a "stupid enterprise"
made without top-level knowledge or authority, "an example of
provocative brinkmanship far more dangerous than anything at-
tempted diplomatically by Mr. Foster Dulles." The local
Communist press reflected Peiping's attacks on the US.
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7. British Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, in Hong Kong
en route to Communist China, said the U-2 incident was a "tragedy"
and then "to bring your allies into a thing like this without
telling them is awful. If you use any of these measures over
other countries you must not be found out...and if you are you
must fasten the blame on someone else." He ruled out the possi-
bility of a hot war because it would mean suicide on both sides.
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24 May 1960
V. South and Southeast Asia
1. Official reaction in Southeast Asia to the breakup of
the Paris Conference has been limited. The earliest theme in
widespread commentary--distress over the setback to hopes of
world peace--has given way to almost universal condemnation of
Khrushchev's tactics at Paris. Former Prime Minister Hokyoake,
leader of the New Zealand opposition party, also characterized
Khrushchev as a "lout and a thug." He strongly supported US
policy toward the Soviet Union, including the U-2 overflight,
as necessary for the free world's survival. Philippine Foreign
Minister Serrano stated in New York on 18 May that he believed
Premier Khrushchev had committed a diplomatic blunder in torpedo-
ing the conference and called his behavior "inexcusable."
2. On the Southeast Asia mainland, except for the Communist
output, almost all accounts have been sympathetic to the US posi-
tion, although there has been considerable criticism of American
handling of the plane incident. In South Vietnam, however,
confidential governmental guidance to the local press resulted
in the deletion of all wire accounts of the U-2 incident which
could be unfavorable to the United States. Editorials in Bangkok,
Rangoon, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Djakarta all place the onus
for the Paris meeting's failure directly on Khrushchev.
3. Indonesian, Australian, New Zealand and Philippine
government officials have commented publicly. In Djakarta on
18 May, Acting Foreign Minister Leimena expressed regret at the
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breakup of the Summit, and stated that "we should not blame
either side." He urged that efforts be made for another heads
of government meeting, possibly under UN auspices. Privately,
both he and the Secretary General of the Foreign Department
have expressed the view that Khrushchev sabotaged the Summit
under pressure from Communist China. In Canberra, both govern-
ment and opposition parties unanimously supported acting Prime
Minister McEwen's position that Khrushchev, not the West, was
responsible for the collapse. In London, on 18 May, Australian
Prime Minister Menzies said "the world's ordinary, sensible and
honest persons regard the Russian maneuvers with contempt." In
New Zealand, on 19 May, Acting Prime Minister Skinner issued a
public statement regretting the breakup of the Summit as a set-
back to world hopes. He commended Western leaders for their
restrained joint statement.
4. Reaction in South Asia generally has been more realistic
than on similar occasions in the past. Nehru's comment has been
cautious. He has carefully refrained from pinning the blame for
the Summit "fiasco" on either side, and similarly refused to
condemn the U-2 incident until the facts are known. In communiques
issued after visiting Nasir and Menderes, Nehru "deplored" the
failure at Paris, and hoped the big powers would try again. The
communiques also suggested some move to "help" was under considera-
tion, although in Ankara on 21 May Nehru specifically ruled out
personal mediation. Other top Indian officials estimate that
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Khrushchev came to Paris with the intent to scuttle the conference.
Some see the Chinese Communists as partially responsible; Deputy
Prime Minister Pant noted there is "only one country" (Communist
China) which does not feel unhappy over the outcome. The Indian
press continues to castigate both sides, but the initially strong
criticism of Khrushchev recently has taken second place in some
papers to complaints of US "bungling."
5. In Pakistan, Ayub has made it clear where his sympathies
lie: "Today the Free World must live under an umbrella of American
nuclear deterrent." The government-monitored press, however, is
beginning to put more blame for the world crisis on the US.
Afghanistan's government-controlled press meanwhile has flailed
the "aggressive" attitudes and actions of the US and Pakistan.
Late Additions
6. In Rangoon Premier Nu, without assigning blame for the
Summit breakup, asserted that the failure of the Paris Conference
would not lead to war since "both sides have developed weapons of
mutual destruction and they will try their hardest-to avoid war."
7. New Zealand's Prime Minister Nash, in the wake. of the
Summit breakup, continued optimistic. He declared in Bonn,
that he is convinced the Soviet leaders still desire peaceful
coexistence and disarmament. He blames the breakup of the
conference upon public statements of US government officials
but he did not disapprove the American U-2 flight, although
he felt the flight was made at the "wrong time."
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24 May 1960
VI. Africa
1. In their reaction to the Summit collapse, African
leaders and press have stressed the danger to world peace; and
they have shown some irritation that the "big four" should claim
to speak for the world. They have generally criticized the US
for its intelligence activities but have also rebuked the USSR
for its intransigent attitude. The government party press in
Tunisia has taken the position that the US could not comply with
the Soviet demand for an apology, but that the plane incident
cast doubt on American desires to preserve the peace. The
independent press has reported that nearly all political observers
attribute the Summit's failure to the stiff attitude taken by
Khrushchev. President Bourguiba earlier had complimented Secretary
Herter for a "courageous and master stroke" in handling the U-2
matter publicly.
2. Ghana's Prime Minister Nkrumah, claiming to be speaking
on behalf of the small nations of the world, questioned the right
of the "big four" to settle the world's problems. His controlled
press editorialized against the danger of recklessness by either
the US or the USSR, "the folly of US flying spy planes over
Russian territory," and the "trump card hilarity of the Soviet
Union in crude espionage charges against the American government."
3. Ethiopia's controlled press blamed the USSR for giving
undue importance to the plane incident and acting irresponsibly
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in breaking up the Summit. Emperor Haile Selassie said privately
that "Khrushchev acted like a child."
4. Liberian President Tubman blamed the US for a violation
of international law, but his tone indicated he believed the US
was justified.
5. The Nigerians--leaders and press--generally blame Khrushchev
for the Summit breakup, but they deplore the timing of the US plane
flight.
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24 May 1960
VII. Middle East
1. Reactions among the Arab states vary widely in the pro-
portion of blame attributed to the US or USSR, but all show deep
disappointment over the Summit breakdown and fear of extreme
international tension to come.
2. Cairo press and radio blame both sides for the Summit
failure. They contrast it with last week's "peace-promoting"
discussions between Nehru and Nasir, and they stress the need
for "nations of positive neutrality" to play a bigger role in world
affairs. Nasir himself is reported to believe that, while the
US blundered seriously in its handling of the U-2 incident, Khru-
shchev badly overplayed his hand in Paris and Eisenhower's re-
straint helped salvage American prestige. Nasir has said private-
ly that Khrushchev's behavior had puzzled most Arabs as much as
it had his own young son who asked, "Has Khrushchev gone crazy?
Does he want war?"
3. Israeli officials and the Israeli press have strongly
backed the Western stand, seeing no justification for Khrushchev's
"torpedoing" of the conference.
4. Jordan's foreign minister, expressing admiration for
Eisenhower's candor on the U-2 incident, said he had been sure--
but wrong--that Khrushchev would have accepted the President's
"transparent honesty" and closed the matter. He observed in a
press interview that Khrushchev's actual performance at Paris
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was like that of Shakespeare's Shyiock in seeking "a pound
9 Y1
have sided emphatically with the West. --" '
5. The prime minister of Lebanon declared that, in view
of the atmosphere then prevailing, the Summit conference should
have been postponed before it convened. Lebanese press reaction
has been typically mixed but, on balance, has been sympathetic
to the West.
6. Following several days of quarreling between the
pro-Communist and nationalist press in Iraq as to who was re-
sponsible for the Summit failure, the emphasis has shifted to
the need for "redoubled efforts by the peace-loving nations" to
check the dangers of increasing world tensions.
7. Several middle-ranking Saudi Arabian officials have
expressed the view that the American handling of the U-2 inci-
dent embarrassed all friends and allies of the US, including
Saudi Arabia in particular, since Khrushc?hev's-=thr6ats against
free world bases include Dhahran airfield.
8. Turkish comment has been favorable to the United States,
although Turkish reaction has been limited by the fact that politi-
cal l:eader.s.tand, the press are preoccupied with domestic prob-
lems. The Turkish press gave the U-2 story rather superficial
treatment but reacted with surprise and irritation to the col-
lapse of the summit talks. On 19 May, Foreign Minister Zorlu
publicly stated: "The incident which prevented the Summit con-
ference is, in fact, an incident which could be a subject for the
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conference." He also said that Turkey's views are identical
"with the decision taken and hopes expressed by the NATO Council."
Zorlu has said privately that, in view of recent events, Premier
Menderes' anticipated visit to Moscow in July is now up in the
air.
9. Iranian military officials, according to Brig. Gen.
Arbabi of the Iranian Supreme Staff, believe that the U-2 air
craft incident indicates the US "has not been sleeping," and
that US prestige in the intelligence field has risen considerably.
The newspaper Etelaat, which usually reflects the viewpoint of
the Iranian government, blames the breakup of the Summit on the
USSR. The Shah's reaction has not yet been received.
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24 May 1960
VIII. Western Europe
1. Although there is no disposition to minimize the
seriousness of the Summit collapse, official and public appraisal
has become somewhat clamer in the last few days. Khrushchev's
speech in Berlin has led many to believe that a crisis is not
imminent in that area; many observers have stressed that the
West has been drawn closer together; there is some belief that
the Summit failure cleared the atmosphere of false illusions
and made the West more realistically aware of the true nature
of the adversary.
2. Most observers continue to blame the USSR for the
Summit breakdown, and there is still considerable speculation
on the reasons for Khrushchev's changing attitude. Aside from
the belief that he was under pressure from within the Kremlin and
from Peiping, another theory has received some emphasis; that
Khrushchev wanted at any cost to avoid the President's visit
which would have followed a successful summit meeting. Several
observers have opined that the visit would have increased American
prestige and influence--which Moscow could not tolerate.
3. There is a persistent undercurrent of criticism of
American handling of the U-2 episode in relation to the subsequent
events at the Summit. Both press and responsible government
officials have called the flight ill-timed and ill-prepared, have
frequently deplored American admission that espionage was in-
volved, and have charged that Washington was "trapped" into a
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series of contradictory statements. As a result, it is alleged,
the USSR was so directly challenged that it had no choice but to
react violently and was given the opportunity it was looking for
to break up the Summit meeting. There is some feeling that the US
"abused" its smaller allies and exposed them to increased dangers.
Several of these have shown signs of taking precautions to minimize
the possibility of a recurrence of such episodes.
France
4. While there is still considerable thinking in France
that Khrushchev's tactics stemmed from internal Soviet and external
Soviet bloc pressures, seasoned observers now see Khrushchev's
handling of the air incident and the Summit as "an episode and
maneuver" to improve the Soviet position in the world vis-a-vis
the US and not as an indication of a fundamental reorientation of
Soviet foreign policy. Khrushchev's outrage over the 1 May flight
is believed to be simulated and no reason is seen for the belief
that the Soviet military were more concerned with the 1 May U-2
flight than with earlier ones, or that Soviet military influence
had suddenly increased. The new element was that this time the
Russians were able to get hold of the U-2 plane and pilot, a
situation which presented them an opportunity for exploitation.
5. While De Gaulle is reported to have told the French
cabinet on 20 May that "there must be no dependence on others to
assure our own destiny" Couve de Murville, in answer to a
parliamentary query on the meaning of the President's statement,
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said that the solidarity of the Western Allies was complete and
there was no question of France's playing a separate role.
6. The French press has moved away from the question of
blame for the Summit breakdown and looks to a period of increased
tensions, beginning with the "prestige battle" in the United
Nations. Several have noted that the East-West problems remain,
and Le Monde asserts that the East and West would have to start
talking again when the storm abated.
Italy
Soviet belligerency
might even be advantageous to the anti-Communist cause in Italy.
On the unofficial level the non-Communist Italian press sees
Khrushchev as having greatly inflated the U-2 incident, and as
having overplayed his hand in the process. Socialist Avanti
also criticizes Khrushchev. Various papers attribute Khrushchev's
harshness to sheer bluff, or to a need to conciliate his own
military people and the Chinese. "Khrushchev wanted to prove to
the tough Stalinists of Moscow that he was no softy," said
independent Il Giorno. The free press in general has expressed
concern at the increase of international tension, and stresses
the need for maintaining allied solidarity. Khrushchev is
strongly criticized for his "premeditated" wrecking tactics.
A rightist paper calls him "a working heir of Genghis Khan."
Others compare him to Stalin.
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United Kingdom
8. The British press and public statements of political
leaders unanimously blame the Soviet government for the collapse
of the Summit conference. There is also general agreement that,
in overplaying his hand, Khrushchev has demonstrated the continuing
need for Western solidarity--a point supported by critics of the
US in the U-2 incident. The West is nevertheless urged to indi-
cate readiness to negotiate whenever the opportunity is seriously
offered. Some typical statements:
Opposition leader Hugh Gaitskell: "Once President
Eisenhower had announced that no more intelligence flights would
take place, Mr. Khrushchev should have been satisfied," He
states that a nuclear test ban agreement is now all the more
urgent, but adds that the recent events point the need for NATO
members to coordinate their activities more closely.
Liberal Party leader Joseph Grimond: Urged the US
not to retreat behind a curtain of "her own fears and suspicions."
Manchester Guardian (Liberal, a habitual conciliator):
"Breakdown of Summit seems certain to mark return to cold war....
If Russians threaten to impose (Berlin) blockade, West must not
flinch."
Herald (Labor, which had called the U-2 flights "lunacy"):
"...In eyes of peace-seeking world what a sorry, despicable
character he (Khrushchev) now appears, spitting in the face of
peace."
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Times (Independent): "Immediate dangers--Berlin,
pressure on outlying NATO states--are obvious but the only remedy
is to restate our will to negotiate seriously whenever opportunity
is seriously offered."
Telegraph (Conservative): "Back to Stalinism."
"...likely that the object of recent Kremlin policy has been so
to disarm, confuse, and divide the West that its public opinion,
if not its statesmen, would be in no position to resist the kind
of apocalyptic pressure which the Kremlin can now deploy."
9. According to a Gallup poll taken 21-22 May, some 44
percent of Britishers blamed the Russians mostly or entirely for
the breakdown, but 17 percent blamed the United States, with the
rest dividing the blame equally or expressing no opinion.
West Germany
10. Addressing the West German Bundestag on 24 May,
Chancellor Adenauer said that the USSR alone was responsible
for the collapse of the Summit conference and that the Soviet
Union had displayed irresponsibility to a "frightening" extent.
Adenauer expressed doubt that Khrushchev's statement concerning
a resumption of negotiations at a later date can be taken
seriously and warned that a threat to Berlin was incompatible
with future negotiations. The Chancellor stated that the
failure of the Summit demonstrated the correctness of the Federal
Republic's position that the German and Berlin problems were not
the cause but rather the expression of international tensions.
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He once again insisted that successful disarmament negotiations
are the prerequisite for the solution of the Berlin and German
reunification questions.
11. The West German press is giving heavy play to the
.proposition that Khrushchev used the U-2 incident as an excuse
to delay the Summit, believing that it would be unproductive at
this time from the Soviet viewpoint.
12. Khrushchev's more conciliatory speech in Berlin on 20
May was greeted both by the public and in official circles with
a "sigh of relief," according to press reports. However, the
initial nervousness engendered by Khrushchev's outbursts in
Paris had already begun to subside by then. West Berliners
reportedly feel the West is more united than ever in its deter-
mination to protect the city's freedom. Mayor Brandt has voiced
Berliners' determination to remain an example of "patience, cool-
ness and firmness."
13. On 19 May the West German member on the NATO Working
Group on Germany and Berlin stated that some members of the Bonn
Foreign Ministry favor a new treaty between the Federal Republic
and the Western Big Three or perhaps all NATO powers in the event
of the conclusion of a USSR-GDR peace treaty. The new treaty
would not be a peace treaty, but rather one in which the signatories
would undertake to do everything possible to achieve a just peace
treaty for all Germany on a basis of self-determination, to con-
clude no peace treaty with the Ulbricht regime, and to withhold
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recognition of any peace treaty concluded with a part of
Germany. The treaty would serve to exert counterpressure on
neutrals to deter them from acceding to the USSR-GDR treaty.
14, Adenauer's Christiar25X1
Democratic Union takes a certain amount of quiet satisfaction at
the course of events, believing that they justify Adenauer's esti-
mate of Soviet behavior. Members also believe the Western powers
should draw closer together and that counteraction should be
taken, perhaps in the form of dispatch of an additional US divi-
sion to Europe and increased support for military-scientific
research. They are gratified that the crisis was brought on by
a direct US-Soviet issue rather than one involving Germany.
15. The attitude of the opposition Social Democrats (SPD)
and Free Democrats (FDP) is more complex. Their hopes for the
Summit meeting were greater and their disappointment is more
intense. A lead article in the Socialist Vorwaerts attempts to
Justify a statement of the party presidium alleging that a relaxa-
tion of tensions still is achievable through efforts to placate
the Russians. Nevertheless, the SPD sees Khrushchev as chiefly
responsible for the Summit collapse. A prominent FDP deputy,
Thomas Dehler, takes a sharply partisan note, echoing Soviet
propaganda charges that Adenauer's influence with Eisenhower is
somehow partially responsible for the Summit collapse.
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Norway
16. Khrushchev's insulting manner toward the Norwegian
ambassador in Moscow in connection with the U-2 affair, and his
threats to obliterate bases used in connection with overflights,
made a bad impression on the Norwegians. Although disturbed at
the Soviet leader's threats, the Norwegians resented his accusa-
tions and allegations regarding their complicity. Norwegian
resentment contributed to making them more critically disposed
toward Khrushchev's actions at the Summit. All non-Communist
newspapers in Oslo on 18 May blamed Khrushchev for the failure
of the Summit meeting. Foreign Minister Lange called a meeting
of the Norwegian cabinet on 18 May to consider the situation
following the breakdown of the Summit. He had planned to go to
Moscow on 23 May to attend the wedding of the Norwegian ambassa-
dor's daughter and then make a 10-14 day private visit, during
which he planned to see Gromyko. He cancelled the trip "because
of the increased burden of work in the situation which has arisen."
17. The Labor party leadership and government is clearly
determined to tighten procedures for the granting of permission
for foreign aircraft to use Norwegian airfields, and a member of
the Prime Minister's staff clearly indicated to the US Embassy
that the Norwegian government would not like to see air missions
resumed. All responsible non-Communist newspapers regard the
breakup of Summit as a deliberate act on the part of Khrushchev,
but government circles feel Khrushchev had a handful of high cards
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which he threw away in a single gesture. Although there is no
outward evidence of deep concern, there is widespread disappoint-
ment, particularly in Labor circles that the hopes for lessening
tensions have been frustrated.
Sweden
18. The Swedish press has generally agreed that
Khrushchev used the U-2 plane incident as a pretext to scuttle
the Summit, knowing from his prior talks with President Eisenhower
and De Gaulle that no concessions would be forthcoming on Berlin,
etc. The leading Conservative paper criticizes Khrushchev for
his "crude behavior" in Paris and states the Russian leader
has the responsibility if the world now enters a period of
greatly increased tension. The semi-official government paper
is more reserved in its judgment, however, and condemns
""activists" in both the Soviet Union and the US for pressuring
the leaders to adopt more uncompromising positions. In a con-
the Directorate
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25X1
of Political Affairs in the Swedish Foreign Ministry took a
gloomy view of developments in Paris and referred to the dangers
to the world of a return to "primitive diplomacy" in the nuclear
age. Convinced that we are in for a long period of greater
tensions, the Swede stated that, while he thought Khrushchev
had overplayed his hand, there was no escaping the fact that
the US had presented Khrushchev with the excuse which he
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desperately needed. He believed that Khrushchev was sincere in
desiring a detente. With the world likely to be entering a new
period of tension, the Russians may be tempted to get some diffi-
cult things done--i.e. a German peace treaty--which would have
been difficult to achieve during a period of detente.
19.
25X1
the collapse of the Summit was a "great 25X1
tragedy." He expressed puzzlement as to why Khrushchev did not
let the conference proceed after President Eisenhower stated such
flights would not be resumed.
was an immediate danger of war, he feared that the world faced
a long period of growing tension. The Swedish foreign office
does not believe the USSR has the legal right, according to inter-
national law, to try the US pilot since the US government
recognizes him as an American agent and the matter is consequently
one for diplomatic discussion between the two governments.
Finland
20. President Kekkonen
read Secretary Herterts admission re-
garding the overflight, since it left the Russians no other
choice but to present demands. When President Eisenhower did
not disassociate himself from overflights, Khrushchev had no
alternative, said Kekkonen. As a result, he thought Khrushchev
had achieved a solid victory until he behaved so coarsely in
Paris. Kekkonen expects Khrushchev to start pressing within a
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couple of months for a new summit, and if President Eisenhower
does not agree, "people of the world will say that the President
is in the hands of the Pentagon."
Iceland
21. All newspapers except the Communist press hold Khrushchev
responsible for a deliberate rupture of the Summit, although the
plane incident and subsequent handling are deplored. A Conserva-
tive party newspaper accused Khrushchev of attempting a "diplomatic
Pearl Harbor," and together with a Social Democratic newspaper
predicted intensification of the cold war for which Khrushchev
must bear responsibility. A newspaper of the opposition Progressive
Party said the conflict between Soviet and Chinese interpretations
of Marxism-Leninism was an added cause for Khrushchev's conduct.
Denmark
22. Danish press comment on the breakup of the Summit
conference is rather restrained with all papers voicing disappoint-
ment at the turn of events in Paris. Most papers agree that
Khrushchev had gone to Paris with "good cards" and had overplayed
them. The only official comment has been that of Foreign Minister
Krag who said news of the conference's failure was received with
great regret by the Danish government. In a possible move to ward
off any Soviet charges that Danish territory is being used
for "aggressive" purposes, the Danish defense minister told a
parliamentary committee on 17 May that Denmark will not permit
American airbases in Greenland to be used for reconnaissance
flights over the USSR.
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23. In commenting on a more recent incident, i.e. the
forcing down in East Germany of an unarmed US transport plane
en route from Copenhagen to West Germany, the Director General
of the Danish Foreign Ministry in a conversation with the US
ambassador on 21 May repeatedly deplored the timing of the
flight and the carelessness of the pilot in continuing the
journey so close to the East German frontier when the plane
appeared mechanically deficient soon after leaving Copenhagen.
Later the foreign minister telephoned the embassy and said that
Prime Minister Kampmann had instructed the foreign office to
reaffirm privately the Danish government's concern over the
the Danish government
is apparently eager to head off possible criticism from the
Austria
24. In Austria, on the eve of the Summit meeting, informed
public opinion was highly favorable to the United States and
officials privately expressed considerable gratification from
the success of the U-2 reconnaissance operation. Since the
collapse of the meeting, however, a sharp reversal has apparently
begun. According to a well-informed source, who reputedly re-
flects the views of Socialist Foreign Minister Kreisky and Vice-
Chancellor Pittermann, the American position in Austria has
suffered "considerable damage" as a result of the "contradictory"
treatment of the U-2 episode. In their opinion, the tactical error
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of admitting the flight was compounded, first by defending the
necessity of such flights, and second, by suspending them. These 2
views, in the opinion of observers in Vienna,
are shared by conservative circles and the diplomatic corps.
Despite this criticism, there are few illusions regarding Soviet
exploitation of the affair and general condemnation of Soviet
hypocrisy. Some typical press comments are: "There can be no
doubt the world situation is considerably more serious than at
any time since before Suez and Korea." "The row in Paris has at
least spared us those false tones which we know from Geneva and
Camp David." The cold war cannot be "much colder than the climate
of coexistence."
25. The Austrian Socialist press shows signs of increased
optimism following the conclusion of Khrushchev's Berlin visit,
but still thinks it doubtful any new summit meeting can be
arranged in six or eight months. Several conservative papers
draw conclusions that new East-West tensions make it imperative
that Austria establish its neutral status with "complete clarity";
that there be no "escapades" in foreign policy, and that Austrian
defenses be improved.
Switzerland
that every true friend of
the US can only be "extremely unhappy" that an overflight of the
USSR could have been permitted on the eve of the Summit meeting,
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that the pilot was apparently insufficiently trained and did not
destroy his plane, and that the US allowed itself to be trapped
into a series of contradictory statements. He felt, however, that
Khrushchev in any event would have seized upon some other incident
to create tension since Moscow "greatly feared" the prospect of
the President's visit. In this respect, the reception accorded
Eisenhower in India had been an "eye-opener" for Moscow. The
Swiss official added that he had a strong personal impression that
Khrushchev personally had desired a detente
but may have had to take an intransi-
gent stand in Paris in order to maintain his own position in the
USSR.
27. Swiss press comment stresses the unlikelihood of another
summit meeting even in six or eight months, and is dubious that
Moscow can make much more capital out of the U-2 episode with its
approach to the UN Security Council. The tone of press comment
has become optimistic, due to a belief that a~crisis in Berlin
is not imminent and that the Paris debacle has increased Western
unity.
Benelux
28. Writing before the actual collapse of the Summit
meetings, the president of the Belgian Senate--a Catholic--
editorially declared that the handling of the U-2 episode had
"prejudiced the American position of moral leadership within
the Western Alliance." He felt that the gravest aspect of the
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incident was American "abuse" of the smaller powers whom it thus
involved in a "distasteful adventure, which brings the menace of
excessive and unjust retaliation on the part of the USSR." He
asks: "How can the US profess to be surprised if the small
countries do not show themselves eager to put missile launching
bases at its disposal?"
29. Netherlands Foreign Minister Luns issued a statement late
19 May calling the Summit failure "most disappointing, because all
of us in the Western world had entertained hopes that now at last
a beginning of the easing of tension could be attained." He
added, however, that he was not surprised at this outcome inasmuch
as it had become more and more obvious that there was no genuine
desire in Moscow for real top level talks. Noting that the West
has become accustomed to the present state of uneasy peace, he
thought that "we can stand it a little longer." Prime Minister
De Quay, in a private conversation with Ambassador Young in The
.Hague, strongly emphasized the absolute need for Western unity.
30. A ranking official of the Luxembourg foreign ministry
has expressed the view that Khrushchev seized upon the U-2 episode
as a pretext for "avoiding" both the Summit meeting and the
President's subsequent visit to the USSR--events which Moscow
anticipated would considerably enhance the US position in the
eyes of the world. The official was, however, "frankly unhappy"
at US admission of espionage because it gave Moscow an excellent
propaganda weapon and forced Khrushchev into the position of
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having to threaten retaliation. On balance, he thought,,-the
USSR would suffer more than the West from the Summit failure,
noting that Luxembourg has long been convinced of the dangers
of too great a public reliance on an East-West detente and that
the West will again be more alert to the true nature of their
adversary.
Greece
31. General popular and press reaction in Greece to the
U-2 incident and the subsequent collapse of the Summit talks has
been favorable to the United States. Greek Foreign Minister
Averoff believes the Greek people, while excited by the U-2
incident, are "taking it well" and is of the opinion that no
lasting harm has resulted from the propaganda davantage which
initially accrued to the USSR. The action of nationalist
opposition leaders in joining with the government to reject
the communist-front United Democratic Left's demand for a
parliamentary debate on US bases in Greece is an unusual example
of collaboration by all Greek nationalist elements in the face
of communist propaganda attacks against the West. The non-
communist Greek press, while critical over the timing of the
U-2 flight and the "inadequate control and defective coordination"
of US intelligence services, praised the "typical American honesty"
in admitting the flight's purpose and noted with pleasure the
indication of Soviet vulnerability to aerial attack. The
collapse of the Summit talks was blamed on Khrushchev's "cold-
blooded torpedoing" of the conference, but the US was criticized
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for handing him the opportunity. Prime Minister Karamanlis told
that "maybe history will applaud you (for the 25X1
U-2 avowal) but in today's world, as seen from Greece, only a
great power could afford the luxury of honesty in those circum-
stances." However, he said that Khrushchev, by the grossness
of his behavior in Paris, dissipated his assets. He added that
a period of inaction must be avoided and emphasized that the
West should come up with a variety of proposals to capture the
initiative from the USSR and attract the attention and imagination
of the Free World, especially the neutrals.
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24 May 1960
IX. Western Hemisphere
1. The Canadian press strongly condemns Khrushchev and
blames him for the Summit conference failure. Prime Minister
Diefenbaker has associated Canada with the Western communique
and claimed Khrushchev's actions had strengthened Western resolve
to remain united. He added that the failure "has not and must
not mean return to a cold war status." Liberal opposition leader
Pearson has endorsed this position. The usually anti-American
Toronto Globe and Mail editorially speculated on 18 May that the
people of the uncommitted nations in Asia will take note of
Khrushchev's "appalling discourtesy toward the President" and
commented on the inconsistency of Khrushchev's refusal to
negotiate with the US because of alleged American aggression
with his demands that Communist China be recognized in world
councils.
2. Reaction from Latin American countries is limited so
far. The Dominican Republic, Peru and Venezuela highlight Khru-
shc.hev's responsibility for the conference failure, while Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico are critical
of the US in varying degrees. Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador sug-
gest that the smaller powers can help to calm tensions between
the great powers. Cuba tends to follow the Communist line.
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3. In Brazil, Foreign Minister Lafer said on 18 May that
he did not think the Summit failure would lead to war. Editorial
reaction condemns both sides but places greater blame on Khru-
shchev and his "violent tactics." Most newspapers also demand
that smaller nations be given a voice in working out problems
affecting the whole world. One conservative paper refers to
the US and the USSR as "dinosaurs" and says they are "unfit
to make decisions vital to mankind because they are guided by
19th century philosophies in a 20.th century world." Most editor-
ials see a renewal of the cold war but feel a hot war is unlikely.
A Foreign Ministry official, however, privately expressed con-
cern lest the US lose its moral authority, in the eyes of the
general public, as the leader the Western alliance. The line
put forth by the Communist press--that Khrushchev was forced to
abandon the conference because of US intransigence, but is clear-
ly willing to return when the US mends its ways--has had very
limited currency in the non-Communist press.
4. In Chile, criticisms of US leadership are the sharpest
in recent years. Even President Alessandri reportedly expressed
disappointment at Western strategy. Chilean Foreign Minister
Ortuzar lamented "the failure of the conference in which all the
world had placed its hope for better days for humanity." A con-
servative radio commented that the United Nations might now be
allowed to play its proper role in world affairs: "Withholding
from the United Nations any knowledge of the agenda of the
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abortive meeting in Paris turned out to be dangerous. Matters
of war and peace should not be considered exclusive atributes
of nations having the largest stock of weapons."
5. In Cuba, the Castro-controlled press used Khrushchev's
diatribes to emphasize Cuban charges that US policies are basic-
ally aggressive. Mambi Radio, known to be government-controlled,
declared on 17 May: "The gentleman who misrules the people of
the US has just been deflated ...has backed down ...has asked
pardon. . .What he did would be called moral cowardice anywhere...
Where is the world going to end with men such as these?" The
daily El Mundo on 19 May editorialized, "We no longer know on
whom the safety of the world depends nor when the slim thread
of peace will break...This permanent fear is supremely harmful
to small, underdeveloped nations..."
6. The official radio in the Dominican Republic com-
mented that President Eisenhower's attitude was dignified and
energetic. It portrayed Khrushchev as "oozing venom between his
wolf's fangs" in revoking the invitation to Eisenhower to visit
the USSR. It warned that Communism retreats only in the face of
force.
7. Prior to the end of the Summit, Ecuadorian President
Ponce suggested that the medium and small nations join as a force
to prevent the "catastrophic clash of interests between the great
powers."
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8. In Mexico, as the Summit began to disintegrate there
was a change from a cool attitude toward the US following the
U-2 incident to one urging Mexican neutralism in the whole af-
fair. Toward the end of last week Mexican commentary became
increasingly critical of the Soviet stand.
9. Costa Rican radio commentary has featured criticism of
"childish behavior and smallness in world politics" which was
observed at Paris. The commentary asserts that the international
policy of the US has been wrong, but policy errors of the US in the U-2
incident are "not of such magnitude as Russians have tried to
make out."
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III. THE WEST
Reaction to.U-2 Incident and Summit Developments
The limited Asian. reaction received thus far has been sur-
prisingly sophisticated over the U-2 incident and dismayed and
critical of Khrushchev for his summit actions. Nevertheless,
the United States has not escaped blame for provoking Khru-
shchev.
In Japan, initial official reaction blamed Khrushchev for. the
threatened breakdown of the summit meeting. Foreign Minister
Fujiyama stated that Khrushchev is using the "spy plane" incident
as an excuse for breaking off the talks because he feels there is
no prospect of agreement on the German problem. The chairman
of the left-wing Socialist party termed Khrushchev's action "re-
grettable" but said he understood the reason.
In Southeast Asia,there has been no high-level official comment
yet on the U-2 incident and succeeding developments. Distress over
the serious setback to hopes of a world detente was a major theme
in widespread press commentary on the situation. While the com-
ment was generally sympathetic to the American position in this
matter, there was recurring. criticism of the United States for hand-
ing the USSR a major propaganda issue.
India, while critical of the overflights in general, has played
down the U-2 incident. New Delhi had placed much hope in the summit
as. a means of relieving world tension and is greatly concerned by
the breakup of the meeting. Early Indian comments blame Khru-
shchev for making a propaganda play. Pakistani President Ayub
has lodged.a mild protest with the United States over,the U-2 inci-
dent, but publicly has charged the USSR with overflying Pakistan.
Reaction of the nationalist press in Iraq has been relatively sub-
dued, but pro-Communist newspapers have made intensive attacks on
the U-2 incident. Radio Cairo, which had earlier treated the incident
as constituting a major barrier to any progress at the summit, has
alleged "the present tension has intentionally or unintentionally been
created by certain groups in the United States:' The Israeli press
and radio regard the U-2 incident as a Soviet propaganda victory
which Khrushchev is exploiting.to the hilt. Turkish Foreign Minister
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Zorlu in conversation. with Ambassador Warren was genial and
showed every desire to maintain a united front before the USSR,
The Turkish Government intends to reply to the Soviet protest
note of 13 May along lines acceptable to the United States.
There has been little editorial comment in the African press
except in Ethiopia and Tunisia, where the need for world peace
and disarmament was stressed. Neither. the United States nor the
USSR"was specifically blamed. President Bourguiba of Tunisia
complimented Secretary Herter for a "courageous and master
stroke" in handling the matter publicly.
Khrushchev's actions in Paris have brought universal condem-
nation.from the non-Communist press in Western Europe. Influ-
ential papers that had been most critical of American handling of
the U-2 incident have applauded Western firmness. West German
papers have likened Khrushchev's tactics to those of Hitler or
"Stalin in his best days." French papers blame Khrushchev for
the conference. break, and speculate that some internal crisis which
caused his brusqueness may point to his own weakness and possible
loss of power in Moscow.
British papers all hold Khrushchev responsible for the turn of
events, with the prom Liberal Manchester Guardian noting that "while
the British Government over the past 19- months has gained a reputa-
tion for supple diplomacy, it may now have to earn a reputation for
firmness:' The Laborite Daily Herald, which alone had unreservedly
condemned the American role ink -2 incident, on 17 April de-
cided that President Eisenhower's statement had made it "impossi-
ble for Khrushchev to say he is being threatened by aggressive
Americans, and it will be monstrous if he can still think of throw-
ing the world's hopes in an ash can."
Limited non-Communist Latin American press opinion on the
U-2 incident thus far has been moderately critical, but has ex-
pressed some sympathy for the US position and explanation. It has
also reflected concern over the incident's effect on the summit meet-
ing. The controlled Cuban press and radio for the most part have used
the U-2 affair to bolster their charges of "US aggression" against
the. Castro regime.
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presidential term with a great failure.'
summit developments. A Chilean radio has commented that
Khrushchev "wants the talks to fail" so that "Ike will finish his
There has been virtually no official or unofficial opinion on
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