WORLD REACTION TO SUMMIT BREAKDOWN (AS OF 1700 19 MAY)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00782R000100110019-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: May 19, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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19 May 1960
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OCI No..2581/60
Copy No. 2
WORLD REACTION TO SUMMIT BREAKDOWN
(As of 1700 19 May)
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION ORREVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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19 May 1960
I. Soviet Propaganda
II. Eastern European Propaganda
III. Communist Far East
IV. Non-Communist Far East
V. South and Southeast Asia
VI. Africa
VII. Middle East
VIII. Western Europe
IX. Western Hemisphere
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WORLD REACTION TO SUMMIT BREAKDOWN
19 May 1960
I. Soviet Propaganda
1. During the first week following Khrushchev's disclosure
on 5 May that a US reconnaissance plane was shot down over USSR
territory, the USSR was cautious and restrained in its exploita-
tion of the incident. Soviet propagandists gave it comparative-
ly moderate publicity and followed the lines of Khrushchev's two
speeches before the Supreme Soviet. However, after the 11 May
opening of the exhibition of the wreckage and "evidence" of US
espionage at which Gromyko and Khrushchev ridiculed the US state-
ments on the affair, the volume of Soviet propaganda denunciations
of the US policy of "provocation" and "treachery" increased. At-
tacks on Secretary Herter and "US ruling circles" and "warmongers"
became sharper, but propagandists still avoided personal attacks
on President Eisenhower. The press treatment of Khrushchev's
statements at his impromptu press conference on 11 May indicate a
Soviet effort to tone down the impact of some of his harsh off-
the-cuff remarks, and seemed to reflect a desire to forestall the
conclusion that there had been any shift in his attitude toward
the Summit. After a delay of almost 24 hours TASS issued a revised
version of Khrushchev's statements which clearly softened his ref-
erences to the President and gave a more optimistic assessment
of future Soviet-US relations,
2. Mass meetings solely to protest the US espionage flight
started on 13 May. (Previously, mass meetings to discuss the
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materials of the Supreme Soviet, including the statements on
the U-2 incident, were held from 6 to 11 May.) By 14 May the
plane incident dominated the Moscow press, and personal criti-
cism of President Eisenhower and attacks on Secretary Herter were
intensified.
3. Nevertheless, on the eve of the Summit talks, Soviet com-
mentators continued to stress Khrushchev's statement that he would
still go to Paris "with a pure heart" but to insist that the out-
come of the conference would depend largely on the attitude of the
West, particularly the United States. Pravda's correspondent in
Paris asserted that "there can be no question of easing interna-
tional tension" as long as Western policy continues to be in-
fluenced by the "aggressive militarist quarters" in the United
States.
4. There is considerable evidence that the USSR's propaganda
apparatus had no forewarning of Khrushchev's intended moves in
Paris and was forced to reverse prepared stories on the Summit.
Three hours after Khrushchev's statement in Paris on 16 May, TASS
instructed the Soviet regional press not to publish any despatches
on the Summit it had transmitted earlier that day and sent re-
visions strongly condemning US actions.
5. Massive Soviet jamming of VOA's transmissions in the
languages of the USSR was resumed on or about 17 May. This fol-
lowed the selective jamming of VOA's output on the plane incident
during the previous week. There was also selective jamming of
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BBC broadcasts to Russia during the past week, followed by
more extensive interferences on 17 May.
6. Throughout this period and up until 17 May, studied
caution had been particularly evident in output for Russian
domestic consumption. Despite cries of indignation against the
US "provocation," Soviet domestic propaganda avoided pointing
to the danger of accidental war as a result of such flights and
did not stress "vigilance.'". It was made clear that the
present situation is not a "crisis" situation and that "calmness"
was the principal requisite. The Russian people were assured that
the USSR would continue its struggle for peace and told that Khru-
shchev is an "incurable optimist" about the further relaxation
of tensions.
7. Since the breaking off of the Summit meeting, Soviet com-
mentary has concentrated on "proving" that the United States tor-
pedoed the summit. As "proof," Pravda offered Secretary Herter's
remarks to the US press in Paris and the US "fear" of another
"preliminary meeting" on 17 May. Izvestia asserted that the US
refusal to condemn espionage flights and promise not to repeat
them, "which wrecked the Summit," was only a link in a chain of
US actions--such as the President's alleged "retraction," under
pressure of the US monopolists, of the view that the Berlin situa-
tion is abnormal and Undersecretary Dillon's speech against a
change in Berlin's status. After initially ignoring Presi-
dent Eisenhower's statement that there would be no further U-2
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w flights, Soviet commentators followed Khrushchev's lead, dis-
missing it as a mere "maneuver to avoid responsibility" and
placing all emphasis on the fact that Khrushchev's full demands
were not met. All attacks are aimed at the United States, with
the exception of passing criticism of Macmillan and De Gaulle
for their alleged failure to persuade Eisenhower to condemn the
flights.
8. 'Subsidiary coverage has been devoted to reports alleg-
ing worldwide support of the Soviet Union and condemnation of the
United States and to protest meetings voicing "enthusiastic ap-
proval" of Khrushchev and indignant denunciation of US leaders.
However, the population generally continues friendly to US Em-
bassy personnel and American tourists in Moscow.
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19 May 1960
II. Eastern European Propaganda
1. Eastern European propagandists apparently were unpre-
pared for the sudden turn of events, with many of them preferring
not to comment but merely to repeat TASS releases. The few early
attempts at independent comment, which reflected an underlying
belief that the conference would somehow go on, were by those
regimes we believe most opposed to the policy of detente with
the West--Albania, Czechoslovakia and East Germany.
2. As the collapse of the conference became more apparent,
all the satellites except Rumania began broadcasting independent
comment which reflected a national, in addition to a bloc, point
of view. The East European bloc countries are unanimous--as
might be expected--in support of Khrushchev. All place the
blame for the collapse of the conference on "Eisenhower's
intransigence." Most commentaries hint that future summit,
disarmament and other, conferences are not only possible but
also desirable, although the way in which such possibilities
are handled varies from vituperation to probing attempts at
reconciliation. Satellite commentaries also link the successful
flight of the new Soviet sputnik to the claims that the USSR is
the most powerful state in the world, and that it is "high time"
that US policy recognizes this fact and abandons its false "posi-
tion-of-strength" in any future negotiations. Reports of
differences among the Western big three continue to be
circulated.
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3. The Albanians, Bulgarians, Czechs and Hungarians have
unleashed the most vicious attacks, reminiscent of the Stalinist
era. The first two regimes have broadcast highly vituperative
condemnations of US "imperialist aggressions" and report numerous
worker demonstrations supporting Khrushchev. In the meantime
Czechoslovakia protested Secretary Herter's references to the
1948 take-over in his 9 May speech, and called this statement
evidence of a "two-faced" policy in Washington, which they in-
ferred was just as unacceptable to Prague as it was to Khrushchev.
Budapest mixed a vitriolic attack on President Eisenhower and on
both John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles with the comment that
summit conferences are still the most "efficient means of settling
international disputes" and are "more fruitful than routine diplo-
matic exchanges." The broadcast concluded, however, with the
statement that so long as the President must "subordinate his own
ideas" to "US reactionary circles" and must adhere "to the absurd...
principle of 'freedom of espionage'," there can be little hope
for progress.
4. East Germany immediately resorted to threats against
continued Western occupation of Berlin, but later statements by
middle-level GDR officials were intended to suggest that there
would be no action on this problem, or that of a separate peace
treaty with East Germany, until after "negotiations" had failed.
The East German party paper editorially stated on 18 May that
the GDR "will not wait indefinitely for a treaty" and that "the
international balance of power is such that the imperialists
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are no longer in a position to delay... indefinitely." Chancellor
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Adenauer and President Eisenhower have been consistently linked
together as the two men most responsible for the failure at the
Summit.
5. Polish press comments have been generally moderate, and have
stressed that even though the US bears responsibility for "torpedo-
ing the Summit," Poland will "not change its basic policy of seeking
international detente," and Polish "faith in the possibility of
peaceful coexistence" cannot be shaken. The Poles have stressed
their "complete and unreserved" support for Khrushchev in all
comments on the events in Paris. Belgrade has continued its
neutral pose, broadcasting full coverage of Eastern and Western
comments, but the programming indicates a leaning toward.Khrushchev.
For instance, reports of worker demonstrations in support of
Khrushchev from TANJUG correspondents in the USSR have been followed
by broadcasts from London rounding up condemnations of US "spy
f lights"in British papers. On 14 May a senior Foreign Office
official in Belgrade stated that in the event of a failure in
Paris, Yugoslavia would probably support the USSR and sign a
separate peace treaty with East Germany.
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19 May 1960
III. Communist Far East
1. Peiping's first major comment on the Summit breakdown--
a statement by Premier Chou En-lai on 19 May--places the Chinese
Communists squarely in line with the rest of the bloc in support-
ing Khrushchev and in condemning US "imperialism." Chou stated
that Peiping "firmly supports" the measures taken by the USSR at
the Summit and warned the US government not to mistake Communist
efforts for peace as "signs of weakness." Chou continued: "En-
croachment on any socialist country is an encroachment on China,
on the entire socialist camp, and will assuredly meet with an an-
nihilating rebuff." In closing his remarks, he stressed that
"the 650 million Chinese people will continue to unite closely
with the great Soviet people, the peoples of all the socialist
countries, and all the peace-loving people of the whole world,
and work persistently and untiringly for the relaxation of in-
ternational tension and a lasting world peace."
2. Although Chou did not indulge in the "I told you so"
attitude which was apparent in some earlier lower-level comment,
politburo member Peng Chen used this line at a rally in Peiping
on 19 May. Peng said that the U-2 incident showed that President
Eisenhower was "not a peace envoy but a warmonger" and proved to
the world that "no illusions should be held about the real nature
of US imperialism." A few days before the Summit, Mao Tse-tung
had implicitly criticized Khrushchev for being one of those people
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Ow ? JLV[41L 7
who held such illusions. However, the Chinese Communists
probably feel that Khrushchev's actions in Paris were so in
line with Peiping's own attitude toward the West that they can
now wholeheartedly endorse Soviet policy. Chinese leaders
did not feel they could do so when there was still some chance
that the Summit conference would result in agreements which might
undercut their policy in the Far East and in underdeveloped areas
where Peiping is active.
3. Because of the time lag customary in the response of
Asian satellite capitals, material presently available is limited
to commentary on Khrushchev's remarks at the opening session of
the conference on 16 May. However, North Vietnam, North Korea,
and Mongolia have all resoundingly endorsed Khrushchev's position.
Hanoi's official party organ Nhan Dan on 18 May termed the Soviet
stand "understandable and necessary" and asserted "peaceful ne-
gotiations cannot be conducted with those who continue to prepare
aggressive wars." The press and radio in Pyongyang and Ulan
Bator reiterate this line with little variation.
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19 May 1960
IV. Non-Communist Far East
1. In general, the Japanese, Koreans and Nationalist
Chinese blamed Khrushchev for the breakdown of the Summit
conference, although some Japanese newspapers ascribed a share
of the blame to the US because of the U-2 incident. The
Nationalists were relieved that the conference was ended
and want a more aggressive policy toward the bloc; the
Koreans want strengthened defenses, while the Japanese hope
that efforts to solve the impasse will result in a new summit
meeting in the near future.
2. In Japan, official and editorial comment tended to
lay blame for the breakdown of the Summit talks squarely on
Khrushchev; there was general agreement that his behavior was
entirely unwarranted. Some major newspapers, however, attributed
a share of the blame to the US because of the U-2 incident.
Prime Minister Kishi expressed "deep regret" over rupture of
the talks. Foreign Minister Fujiyama stated that Khrushchev
used the U-2 incident as an excuse to hide his belief that
there is no prospect of agreement on the German problem. The
chairman of the left-wing Socialist party termed Khrushchev's
action "highly regrettable" but said he understood the reason.
The feeling is unanimous that the short-term result will be a
resumption of cold war tensions, but most Japanese comments
expressed hope that efforts would be made to solve present
differences at a new summit meeting in the near future.
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3. Following the plane incident, the Japanese government
had been on the defensive in attempting to secure ratification
of the new US-Japanese security treaty. However, possibly
hoping to capitalize on Japanese criticism of Khrushchev and
the threat of a revived cold war, the government moved suddenly
late on 19 May to-force a vote on the treaty in the lower house
of the Diet over a combination brawl and boycott staged by the
opposition Socialists. Although successful on the vote, the
government possibly has exposed itself to public charges that
its methods are dictatorial.
4. South Korean reaction has unanimously blamed Khrushchev
for the failure of the Summit meeting. The semi-official
Korean Republic, along with other papers, asserted that the
free world must now unite and not be intimidated into conces-
sions, but rather strengthen its defenses. Regarding the U-2
incident, a Foreign Ministry announcement reflected the United
States position that such flights are made necessary by Soviet
secrecy and linked the situation to the Communist sneak attack
on South Korea in 1950.
5. Nationalist Chinese officials, apprehensive that the US
would make an agreement in Paris detrimental to their interests,
are relieved that the Summit conference has collapsed. They
believe that Khrushchev "sabotaged" the conference and that
even without the U-2 incident, he would have found another pre-
text for breaking up the meeting. They are worried, however,
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that the US will weaken in the face of Soviet threats and are
using the incident to call for a more aggressive policy toward
the bloc.
6. The non-communist Hong Kong press has initially attributed
the collapse of the Summit meeting to the Soviet Union. The
British China Mail accused Khrushchev of sabotaging the Summit
and spoke of his "display of petulant self-righteousness...
intransigence and vindictiveness." Earlier some papers labeled
the U-2 incident a propaganda victory for the Soviets and asserted
that the US had walked into a Soviet trap. The pro-Chinese
Nationalist English language Hong Kong Tiger Standard suggested
that Khrushchev's behavior at the Summit was due to domestic
rather than international reasons. However, the British South
China Morning Post called the U-2 flight a "stupid enterprise"
made without top-level knowledge or authority, "an example of
provocative brinkmanship far more dangerous than anything at-
tempted diplomatically by Mr. Foster Dulles." The local
Communist press reflected Peiping's attacks on the US.
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19 May 1960
V. South and Southeast Asia
1. official reaction in Southeast Asia to the breakup of
the Paris Qonference so far has been limited. The earliest
theme in widespread press commentary--distress over the setback
to hopes of world peace--has given way to almost universal con-
demnation of Khrushchev's tactics at Paris.
2. Indonesian, Australian and Philippine government of-
ficials have commented publicly to date. In Djakarta, on 18 May,
Acting Foreign Minister Leimena expressed regret at the breakup
of the Summit, and stated that under the circumstances, "we should
not blame either side." He urged that efforts be made for another
heads of government meeting, possibly under UN auspices. In Can-
berra, in parliament sessions of 18 and 19 May, both government
and opposition parties unanimously supported acting Prime Minister
McEwen's position that Khrushchev, not the West, was responsible
for the collapse. In London, on 18 May, Prime Minister Menzies
said "the wQrld's.ordinary, sensible and honest persons regard
the Russian maneuvers with contempt." Philippine Foreign Minister
Serrano stated in New York on 18 May that he believed Premier
Khrushchev had committed a diplomatic blunder in torpedoing the
conference and called his behavior "inexcusable."
3. Throughout the developing crisis since the U-2 incident,
the Southeast Asian press has shown itself to be both thoughtful
and responsible. With-the exception of the Communist press, al-
most all accounts have been sympathetic to the United States'
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position; although initially there had been considerable criti-
cism of United States handling of the plane incident.. Follow-
ing Khrushchev's extreme accusations and intransigence at Paris,
Southeast Asian criticism of Khrushchev has mounted rapidly.
Editorials published in Bangkok, Rangoon, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore
and Djakarta all place the onus for the meeting's failure direct-
ly at Khrushchev's door.
4. Reaction in South Asia generally has also been a good
deal more hardheaded than on similar occasions in the past. The
Indian press, indignant over the Summit breakdown, has been
virtually unanimous in holding Khrushchev responsible. While
consistently critical of American U-2 operations, Indian papers
agreed that Khrushchev was not justified in using them to "make a
shambles" of the conference. Nehru's first comments were more
cautious. He carefully refrained from pinning the blame for the
"fiasco" on either side, noting only that it was "certainly due
to lack of good will." Nehru similarly refused to condemn the
U-2 incident, pleading lack of information. Although he pointed
out that "one does not push his nose into everything," Nehru's
comment on possible mediation suggested that he would at least
urge moderation on both parties.
5. Pakistan has lodged a mild protest against the flight,
but Ayub has made it clear where his sympathies lie: "Today the
Free World must live under an umbrella of American nuclear deter-
rent." Afghanistan's formal protest was far stronger, but
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Foreign Minister Naim
friendly act" involved no "unfriendly intention" by the US
against his country. The Afghans are probably more concerned
over future Soviet intentions.
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19 May 1960
VI. Africa
1. In the independent nations of Africa, the reaction
to the failure of the Summit conference and the period of tension
preceding the meeting has stressed the danger to world peace,
especially for the smaller uncommitted nations of the world, but
has avoided strong condemnation of either party. Generally the
United States has been criticized for its intelligence activities
on the eve of the Summit; the USSR has been rebuked for its in-
transigent attitude and insistence on an unrealistic apology.
2. The Tunisian attitude was reflected in the government
party's press, which stated that the US could not comply with
the Soviet demand for an apology, even though the plane incident
cast doubt on American intentions and desire to preserve the
peace. According to the independent press, nearly all political
observers attributed the failure of the conference to the stiff
attitude taken by Khrushchev. Earlier, in relation to the plane
incident, President Bourguiba was extremely complimentary to
Secretary Herter for a "courageous and master stroke" in handling
the matter publicly.
3. Morocco has not reacted officially. Prior to the Summit
meeting, news agency dispatches tended to stress Soviet state-
ments, but the press did not take sides. The statements
concluded that US prestige had suffered more than its reputa-
tion for wanting peace.
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4. The Ethiopian press, unofficial but subject to
control, maintained a balanced position prior to the Summit
breakdown and saw in the espionage activities of both nations
proof that immediate disarmament was needed if the world were
to avoid hostilities. The press commented that Khrushchev, in
adopting an innocent attitude, would be saying in effect, "forget
my past because my future is so spotless."
AW 5. The government-controlled Ghana press editorialized
against the danger of recklessness on the part of either govern-
ment which could threaten mankind--both the "folly of US flying
spy planes over Russian territory" and "the trump card hilarity
of the Soviet Union in crude espionage and sabotage charges
against the American government." Prime Minister Nkrumah,
defending the interests of small nations, opposes settlement
of the world's problems by the "big four" alone.
6. Reaction in the remainder of the continent has not
been reported.
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18 May 1960
,AV -
VII. Middle East
1. Reactions vary widely among the Arab states. The com-
mon denominator is bitter disappointment over the Summit break-
down and fear of extreme international tension to come.
2. Cairo press and radio blame both sides for the Summit
failure. They are concerned that Khrushchev might throw another
bombshell by signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany
very soon. Nasir, busy with the final session in his talks with
Nehru, has as yet made no direct comment. The UAR press has
contrasted the Summit fiasco with the Nasir-Nehru "peace-promoting
discussions" and stressed the need for "nations of positive neu-
trality" to play a bigger role in world affairs.
3. Israeli officials and press have strongly backed the
Western stand, seeing no justification for Khrushchev's "tor-
pedoing" of the conference.
4. Jordan's foreign minister, expressing admiration for
Eisenhower's candor on the U-2 incident, said he had been sure--
but wrong--that Khrushchev would have accepted the President's
"transparent honesty" and closed the matter. Jordanian news-
papers, a number of which receive small British subsidies, have
sided emphatically with the West.
5. Press reaction in Lebanon has typically ranged all
over the spectrum: One paper, for example, speaks of "another in
the series of American blunders"; one blames the Soviet military
for forcing Khrushchev's hand.
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6. The pro-Communist press in Iraq holds US "imperialist
provocations" entirely responsible for the frustration of "the
high hopes of humanity." The Iraqi nationalist press pointed out
that the U-2 incident showed the need for reaching a settlement
and warned the leftist papers against "propagating for the Com-
munist camp."
7. Turkish and Iranian comment has been favorable to the
United States, although Turkish reaction has been limited by the
need of political leaders and of the press to concentrate on
domestic problems.
The Turkish press gave the U-2
story rather superficial treatment but reacted with surprise
and irritation to the collapse of the Summit talks. Khrushchev
was denounced for sabotaging the conference and no sympathy for the
USSR!s action in demanding a US apology was shown.
8. Iranian military officials
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incident indicates that the US "has not been sleeping" re-
garding the USSR and that US prestige in the intelligence field
has risen considerably. The newspaper Etelaat, which usually re-
flects the viewpoint of the Iranian government, blames the break-
up of the Summit Conference on the USSR. No reaction has yet
been received from the Shah.
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- JG{?I[G 1
19 May 1960
VIII. Western Europe
1. The feeling is strong among diplomats, newspapermen,
and assembly deputies in France and in the general public that
Khrushchev has overplayed his hand. Khrushchev
has largely destroyed the image he built dur-
ing his March-April state visit and is now widely referred to as
a fool and a buffoon. The belief is strong that the three Western
leaders did everything possible to salvage the Summit, and that
greater allied unity is necessary. While the ultimate blame for
the Summit failure is laid to Khrushchev, the US is not exonerated.
The-chief editor of the influential Le Monde said on 18 May that
Khrushchev cannot be blamed for taking advantage of such a
"beautiful occasion" and of the 'tconfused" US statements follow-
ing, but Khrushchev far overplayed his hand in presenting his
ultimatum to Eisenhower. He added that the failure of the
conference may call the leadership of American diplomacy in the
West into question. The most recurrent press theme on Khrushchev's
motivation is that he decided to break off when he could find no
breach in Western unity. Earlier, Khrushchev's tactics had been
attributed more to domestic (army) pressures and to Soviet bloc
(principally Peiping) pressures. The French press is almost
unanimous that the Summit failure brings a return of the cold
war, but believes that it is unlikely to "go much further."
Fears are, however, evident in the calls for renewed allied
unity.
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-- ,JL:A.-3 L
A few typical quotes:
Paris-Jour (Mass-circulation sensationalist type):
""Twelve days ago, on May 5, addressing the Supreme Soviet,
Khrushchev suddenly and without forewarning stopped talking
like Khrushchev. On that day he became the spokesman of
Mao Tse-tung... ""
Le Figaro: (Moderate): "The torpedoing of the conference
by Mr. Khrushchev is a development over which no one in
France will rejoice. But if it contributes to tightening
Western solidarity it will not be a totally bad thing."
Humanite (Communist): "The policy of peaceful coexistence
is not in any way jeopardized." (Failure of Summit is) "Only
a dramatic vicissitude in the struggle for peace." There
will be other vicissitudes, but "an uncertain peace is
better after all than war."
Le Monde (Independent): "If Khrushchev thinks everything
will be better after the US elections, he has much to
learn on how the US is really governed."
2. Italian Foreign Minister Segai
underlined the need for allied solidarity. Soviet belligerency
might even be advantageous to the anti-Communist cause in Italy.
On the unofficial level the non-Communist Italian press sees
Khrushchev as having greatly inflated the U-2 incident, and as
having overplayed his hand in the process. Socialist Avanti
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,JL.%.,w J i i
ftr also criticizes Khrushchev. Various
papers attribute Khrushchev's
harshness to sheer bluff, or to a need to conciliate his own
military people and the Chinese. "Khrushchev wanted to prove
to the tough Stalinists of Moscow that he was no softy," said
independent Ii Giorno. The free press in general has expressed
concern at the increase of international tension, and stresses
the need for maintaining allied solidarity. Khrushchev is
strongly criticized for his "premeditated" wrecking tactics.
A rightist paper calls him "a working heir of Genghis Khan."
Others compare him to Stalin.
3. The Bonn believes that Khrushchev
went to Paris determined to wreck the conference and attributes
his arrogant behavior either to belief in superior Soviet mili-
tary strength, to some undisclosed weapon, or merely to his intent
to impress and split the West through psychological tactics. West
Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt
is now convinced that the USSR
will sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Bundestag
politicians in Bonn are reported "unruffled" over the Summit
collapse, but note considerable uneasiness in the country at
large, especially in Berlin. They view "salami-tactics" of
slicing away at Berlin as the greatest present danger and do
not expect an East German peace treaty for perhaps several
months. Although critical of earlier stages of American
handling of the U-2 incident, they approve US conduct at Paris.
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A Social Democratic foreign policy expert suggested that
differences between West German parties on foreign policy
would diminish in the face of the tougher Soviet line. Press
reports describe the West German public as worried and puzzled
over Khrushchev's future intentions, Reflecting this nervous-
ness, the West Berlin stock market had another bad day on 18 May,
but Mayor Brandt says no flight of capital has occurred and there
has been no panic selling. The West German press consensus is
that Khrushchev deliberately wrecked the Summit with unreasonable
demands to discredit Eisenhower and US policy. Many papers be-
lieve the Western alliance has been strengthened by Khrushchev's
extremes. The respected Hamburg daily Die Welt terms the Paris
meetings a "bitter lesson" for the West and says the real victor
is Mao Tse-tung. All papers express concern for Berlin and one
drew a parallel between Hitler's tactics in 1938 and Khrushchev's
now.
4. The British press and public statements of political
leaders unanimously blame the Soviet government for the collapse
of the Summit conference. There is also general agreement that,
in overplaying his hand, Khrushchev has demonstrated the continuing
need for Western solidarity--a point supported by critics of the
US in the U-2 incident. The West is nevertheless urged to indi-
cate readiness to negotiate whenever the opportunity is seriously
offered. Some typical statements:
Opposition leader Hugh Gaitskell. "Once President
Eisenhower had announced that no more intelligence flights would
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- O UJ I-Ax Ed !
take place, Mr. Khrushchev should have been satisfied." He
states that a nuclear test ban agreement is now all the more
urgent.
Liberal Party leader Joseph Grimond: Urged the US
not to retreat behind a curtain of "her own fears and suspicions."
Manchester Guardian (Liberal, a habitual conciliator):
"Breakdown of Summit seems certain to mark return to cold war....
If Russians threaten to impose (Berlin) blockade, West must not
flinch."
Herald (Labor, which had called the U-2 flights "lunacy"):
"...In eyes of peace-seeking world what a sorry, despicable
character he (Khrushchev) now appears, spitting in the face of
peace."
Times (Independent): "Immediate dangers--Berlin,
pressure on outlying NATO states--are obvious but the only remedy
is to restate our will to negotiate seriously whenever opportunity
is seriously offered."
Telegraph (Conservative): "Back to Stalinism."
"...likely that the object of recent Kremlin policy has been so
to disarm, confuse, and divide the West that its public opinion,
if not its statesmen, would be in no position to resist the kind
of apocalyptic pressure which the Kremlin can now deploy."
5. In Austria, on the eve of the Summit meeting, informed
public opinion was highly favorable to the United States
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Since the
collapse of the meeting, however, a sharp reversal has apparently
begun.
views
the American position in Austria has
suffered "considerable damage" as a result of the "contradictory"
treatment of the U-2 episode. In their opinion, the tactical error
of admitting the flight was compounded, first by defending the
necessity of such flights, and second, by suspending them. These
are shared by conservative circles and the diplomatic corps.
Despite this criticism, there are few illusions regarding Soviet
exploitation of the affair and general condemnation of Soviet
hypocrisy. Some typical press comments are: "There can be no
doubt the world situation--is considerably more serious than at
any time since before Suez and Korea." "The row in Paris has at
least spared us those false tones which we know from Geneva and
Camp David." The cold war cannot be "much colder than the climate
of coexistence."
6. There is no available Swiss comment since the actual
collapse of the Summit meeting. As of 17 May, however, the
following press comments were typical: "In exploiting the
Sverdlovsk incident, Khrushchev went to the limit. He demanded
from the United States humiliating apologies--he has asked for
the submission and humiliation of the US, affronted Eisenhower,
probably exploded the Paris conference, and considerably
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aggravated the international situation." "His impolite behavior,
is believed a result of increased pressure from a military clique
which for a long time has reproached him for having reduced some
troop contingents, and which for the time being wants a continuation
of the cold war to preserve its strong position in the country."
However: "It is embarrassing if the President during the first
conference hour, so to speak,had to eat as hors d'ouevres the words
which the State Department issued to the world a few days ago."
Swiss opinion of the Summit meeting has been colored to a con-
siderable extent by its own spy episode and the expulsion of two
Soviet diplomats on spy charges.
7. The Belgian and Dutch press generally attribute the
failure of the Summit meeting to Khrushchev's deliberate attempt
to sabotage the conference by exploiting the U-2 incident. One
Catholic Flemish paper says: "If Khrushchev hoped to see De Gaulle
and Macmillan condemn Eisenhower, he was grossly mistaken.
Eisenhower has shown the proper reaction. The West is in a better
position in a continued cold war than the East." However, a
Socialist Flemish paper says: "Once again inept American politi-
cal and strategic policy has permitted Khrushchev to pose as the
victim... arguments advanced by him only plausible, but give basis
for spectacular propaganda...he takes first round on points."
Foreign Minister Luns in a statement to the Dutch parliament on
17 May said: "This is not the first time the Soviet Union has
precipitated an international crisis. Since 1945, switching
from grin to intimidation has been the constant method for what
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steadfastness of West are more important than ever." Prime
Minister De Quay, in a private conversation with Ambassador
Young in The Hague, also strongly emphasized the absolute need
for Western unity.
8. Khrushchev's insulting manner toward the Norwegian
is happening in Paris at the moment. Absolute unity and
in connection with the U-2 affair, and his
threats to obliterate bases used in connection with overflights,
made a bad impression on the Norwegians. Although disturbed at
the Soviet leader's threats, the Norwegians resented his accusa-
tions and allegations regarding their complicity. Norwegian
resentment contributed to making them more critically disposed
toward Khrushchev's actions at the Summit. All non-Communist
newspapers in Oslo on 18 May blamed Khrushchev for the failure
of the Summit meeting. Foreign Minister Lange called a meeting
of the Norwegian cabinet on 18 May to consider the situation
following the breakdown of the Summit. He had planned to go to
Moscow on 23 May to attend the wedding of the Norwegian ambassa-
dor's daughter and then make a 10-14 day private visit, during
which he planned to see Gromyko. He has now cancelled the trip
"because of the increased burden of work in the situation which
has arisen.','
9. Danish press comment on the break-up of the Summit
conference is rather restrained with all papers voicing disappoint-
ment at the turn of events in Paris. Most papers agree that
Khrushchev had gone to Paris with "good cards" and had overplayed
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the leaders to adopt more uncompromising positions.
them. The only official comment has been that of Foreign
Minister Krag who said news of the conference's failure was
received with great regret by the Danish government. In a
possible move to ward off possible Soviet charges that Danish
territory is being used for "aggressive" purposes, the Danish
defense minister told a parliamentary committee on 17 May that
Denmark will not permit American airbases in Greenland to be
used for reconnaissance flights over the USSR.
10. The Swedish press has generally agreed that Khrushchev,
used the U-2 plane incident as a pretext to scuttle the Summit,
knowing from his prior talks with President Eisenhower
and De Gaulle that no concessions would be forthcoming on
Berlin, etc. The leading Conservative paper criticizes Khrushchev
for his "crude behavior" in Paris and states the Russian leader
has the responsibility if the world now enters a period of
greatly increased tension. The semi-official'government paper
is more reserved in its judgment, however, and condemns
"activists" in both the Soviet Union and the US for pressuring
the Swedish Foreign Ministry took a
tensions,
gloomy view of developments in Paris and referred to the dangers
to the world of a return to "primitive diplomacy" in the nuclear
age. Convinced that we are in for a long period of greater
there was no escaping the fact that the US
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had presented Khrushchev with the excuse which he desperately
needed. He believed that Khrushchev was sincere in desiring
a detente. With the world likely to be entering a new period
of tension, the Russians may be tempted to get some difficult
things done--i.e. a German peace treaty--which would have been
difficult to achieve during a period of detente.
11. Finnish officials are keeping close-mouthed. While
the Finns may feel that Khrushchev bears the responsibility for
the Summit fiasco, they will exercise considerable caution in
openly criticizing him in the press.
12. The Madrid press of 17 May expressed no surprise over
the breakdown since it never was optimistic about the outcome.
However, it expressed full sympathy for the US and the President.
The press and also the Madrid radio on 18 May speculated on the
cause of Khrushchev's sudden truculence, ascribing it to
pressure from Red army leaders and Peiping and to a probable
weakening of his control over that sector of the Communist
party's central committee which opposes a relaxation of East-
West tension.
13. The President's exchanges with Khrushchev appeared
to have enhanced his popularity in Portugal, according to press
reporting.
14. General popular and press reaction in Greece to the
U-2 incident and the subsequent collapse of the Summit talks
has been favorable to the United States. Greek Foreign Minister
Averoff believes the Greek people, while excited by the U-2
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incident, are "taking it well" and is of the opinion that no
lasting harm has resulted from the propaganda advantage which
initially accrued to the USSR. The action of nationalist
opposition leaders in joining with the government to reject
the communist-front United Democratic Left's demand for a
parliamentary debate on US bases in Greece is an unusual example
of collaboration by all Greek nationalist elements in the face
of communist propaganda attacks against the West. The non-
communist Greek press, while critical over the timing of the
U-2 flight and the "inadequate control and defective coordination"
of US intelligence services, praised the "typical-American
honesty" in admitting the flight's purpose and noted with
pleasure the indication of Soviet vulnerability to aerial
attack. The collapse of the Summit talks was blamed on
Khrushchev's "cold-blooded torpedoing" of the conference, but
Orlin
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will applaud you (for the U-2 avowal) but in today's world, as
seen from Greece, only a great power could afford the luxury of
honesty in those circumstances." However, he said that
Khrushchev,by the grossness of his behavior in Paris, dissipated
his assets.
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19 May 1960
IX. Western Hemisphere
1. The Canadian press strongly condemns Khrushchev and
blames him for the Summit conference failure. Prime Minister
Diefenbaker has associated Canada with the Western communique
and claimed Khrushchev's actions had strengthened Western resolve
to remain united. He added that the failure "has not and must
not mean return to a cold war status." Liber?s4l opposition leader
Pearson has endorsed this position. The usually anti-American
Toronto Globe and Mail editorially speculated on 18 May that the
people of the uncommitted nations in Asia will take note of
Khrushchev's "appalling discourtesy toward the President" and
commented on the inconsistency of Khrushchev's refusal to
negotiate with the US because of alleged American aggression
with his demands that Communist China be recognized in world
councils.
2. Reaction from Latin American countries is limited so
far. The Dominican Republic, Peru and Venezuela highlight
Khrushchev's responsibility for the conference failure,while
Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador suggest that the smaller powers can
help to calm tensions between the great powers. Reported
Mexican and Panamanian reaction is thus far limited to ex-
pressions of concern,while Cuba tends to follow the Communist
line.
3. Brazilian Foreign Minister Lafer stated on 18 May
that he did not think the Summit failure would lead to war.
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Editorials in two important papers accuse both sides of
"imprudence," and "inflexibility" and express fear for the
"salvation of mankind." One newspaper proposes that smaller
nations be given a voice rather than leaving all crucial
decisions to a handful of "technologically advanced" nations.
4. Chilean Foreign Minister Ortuzar lamented "the failure
of the conference in which all the world had placed its hope for
better days for humanity." A conservative radio commented that
the United Nations might now be allowed to play its proper role
in world affairs: "Withholding from the United Nations any
knowledge of the agenda of the abortive meeting in Paris turned
out to be dangerous. Matters of war and peace should not be
considered exclusive attributes of nations having the largest
stock of weapons,..The American plan in sum is nothing but a
return to the principles of the United Nations."
5. The Castro-controlled press used Khrushchev's diatribes
to emphasize Cuban charges that US policies are basically aggres-
sive. Mambi Radio, known to be government controlled, referred
to Eisenhower on 17 May: "The gentleman who misrules the people
of the US has just been deflated ... has backed down...has asked
pardon...What he did would be called moral cowardice anywhere...
Where is the world going to end with men such as these?"
6. The official Dominican radio commented that President
Eisenhower's attitude was dignified and energetic. It portrayed
Khrushchev as "oozing venom between his wolf's fangs" in revoking
the invitation to Eisenhower to visit the USSR. It admonished
that Communism retreats only in the face of force.
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7. Prior to the end of the Summit, Ecuadorean President
Ponce suggested that the medium and small nations join as a
force to prevent the "catastrophic clash of interests between
the great powers."
8. Mexican radio comment on 18 May expressed concern that
a failure of understanding could lead to war. "It is not right
and not human to permit two groups with differing political ideas
to carry humanity to an armed struggle which could ...lead to its
extermination."
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