STATEMENT BY MR. ALLEN W. DULLES TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00782R000100020001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 278
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 31, 1960
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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PART I
TAB A - DCI Testimon.ey to Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee.
TAB B
Chronological Account of Handling of U-2
Incident and Supplemental Questions and
Answers as Furnished to the President's
Board of Consultants.
TAB C - Released Testimony by Secretary Herter,
Secretary Gates, and Dr. Dryden.
TAB D - Letter to General Goodpaster re TRUE Magazine article.
Copy of the article.
PART II
TAB A - Questions and Answers, and Moscow Statements by
Mitchell and Martin
TAB B - Correspondence with Congressman Walter.
Background.
TAB C - 12 September Washington Post editorial.
TAB D - Status of CIA Station Chiefs.
Correspondence.
TABt - Correspondence on Tourists
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STATEMENT BY
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
to the
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
ON 31 MAY 1960
The duty of the Central Intelligence Agency under
statute and under National Security Council directives pursuant
to statute, is to provide the President and the National
Security Council with evaluated intelligence relating to our
national security.
The Agency has no pollcy or police functions.
In addition, however, the Agency has the duty, within
policy limitations prescribed by the President and State
Department, to do whatever is within its power to collect and
produce the intelligence required by the policy makers in
government, to deal with the dangers we face in the world
today, a nuclear world.
Increasingly over the past ten years, the main target
for our intelligence collection has been the U.S.S.R., its
military, its economic, and its subversive potential.
The carrying out of this task has been rendered extremely
difficult because the Soviet Union is a closed society.
Great areas of the U.S.S.R. are curtained off to the
outside world. Their military preparations are made in secret.
Their military hardware, ballistic missiles, bombers, nuclear
weapons, and submarine forces, as far as physically possible,
are concealed from us. They have resisted all efforts to
realize mutual inspection or "open skies."
The ordinary tools of information gathering, under thee
circumstances are not wholly adequate. These ordinary tools
include both the normal overt means of obtaining information,
and the classical covert means generally referred to as. espionage.
It is true that from these sources and from the many Soviet
defectors who have come over to the Free World and from
disaffected and disillusioned Soviet nationals, we obtain very
valuable information.
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However, these Sources and other sources developed
through the application of various scientific techniques,
while very helpful, did not give us the full intelligence
protection this country required against the danger of
preparation for surprise attack against us, from bases which
might remain unknown and by weapons, the strength and power
of which we might not be able adequately to evaluate.
Almost equally serious had been our lack of knowledge
of Soviet defense measures against our retaliatory striking
power.
Shackled by traditions, we were seeing the power of
.attack grow while the ability to secure the intelligence
necessary for defense against attack was slipping, bound down
in part by tradition.
For example, while Soviet spy trawlers can lurk a few
miles off our shores and observe us with impunity, the Soviets
cry "aggression" when a plane, invisible to the naked eye,
flies over it some fifteen miles above the ground.
Either, theoretically, could carry a nuclear weapon.
The trawler could deal a much more serious nuclear blow than
a light reconnaissance plane.
But, of course., as we well know, no one would think of
starting a nuclear war with either an isolated plane or ship.
In this age of nuclear peril we, the Central Intelligence
Agency, felt that a new approach was called for in the whole
field of intelligence collection.
This was the situation, when in 1954, almost six years
ago, consultation was initiated on new intelligence collection
techniques. We consulted with a group of highly competent
technicians in and out of government. From our discussions
there emerged the concept of a high-flying, high performance
reconnaissance plane. In the then state of the art of aeronautics,
it was confidently believed that a plane could be designed to
fly unintercepted over the vitally important closed areas of
the Soviet Union, where ballistic, nuclear, and other military
preparations against us were being made.
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We also believed, as a result of these consultations,
that the art of photography could be so advanced as to make
the resolution of the pictures taken, even at extreme altitudes,
Of very great significance. On both counts the accomplishments
exceeded expectations. ?
While the developmental work for this project, pursuant
to high policy directive was in process, there came the Summit
Conference of July 1955.
Here, in order to relax the growing tentions resulting
from the danger of surprise attack, the President advanced the
open skies" proposal. Moscow summarily rejected anything of
this nature, and Soviet security measures continued to be
reinforced.
Accordingly, the U-2 project was pushed forward rapidly,
and about a year after the 1955 summit meeting the first
operational U-2 flight over the Soviet Union took place. For
almost four years the flight program has been carried forward
successfully.
Speed in 'getting the program underway had been a top
priority. We were then faced, that is in 1955-1956, with a
situation wherethe Soviets were continuing to develop their
missiles, their heavy bomber and bomber bases, and their nuclear
weapons production without adequate knowledge on our part.
This was considered to 'be an intolerable situation;
intolerable both from the viewpoint of adequate military
preparation, on our part to meet the menace; intolerable from
the point of view of being able effectively to take counter-
measures in the event of attack.
It was recognized at the outset that this U-2 project
had its risks and had a limited span of life due to improvement
of counter measures; that a relatively fragile single-engine
plane of the nature of the U-2 might one day have a flame-out
or other malfunction in the rarified atmosphere in which it
had to travel. If that resulted in a serious and prolonged
loss of altitude, there was danger of failure and discove-y.
To stop any enterprise of this nature because there are
risks, would be, of course, in this field to accomplish very
little.
While air reconnaissance is an old and tried method of
gaining intelligence, a peacetime operation of this particular
type. and on this scale was unique.
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But I submit that we live in an age when old concep
of the limits of "permitted" techniques for acduiring informa-
tion are totally outdated. They come from the horse and buggy
days.
I see no reason whatever to draw an unfavorable distinction
between the collection of information by reconnaissance at a
high altitude in the air and espionage carried on by individual:3
who illegally operate directly within the territory of another
state.
In fact, the distinction, if one is to be drawn, would
favor the former. The illegal espionage agents generally
-attempt to suborn and subvert the citizens of the countries
in which they operate. High level air reconnaissance in no
way disturbs the life of the people. It does not harm their
property. They do not even notice it.
be
I believe these techniques should/universally sanctioned
on a mutual basis and become an accepted and agreed part of our
international arrangements.
The USSR has known a good deal about these flights for
the last four years. It has studiously refrained from giving
the people of the Soviet Union the knowledge they now admit
they had.
With respect to the U-2 project, I am prepared to support
and document these conclusions:--
First, that this operation was one of the most valuable
intelligence collection operations that any country has ever
mounted at any time, and that it was vital to our national
security.
Second, that the chain of command and authority for the
project was clear.
Third, that every overflight was carefully planned, fully
authorized, and, until May 1, 1960, effectively carried out.
Fourth, that the technical and logistic support was prompt
and efficient.
Fifth, that the security which was maintained for this
project over a period of more than five years has been unique.
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I shall deal with these points in the inverse order in
which I have presented them.
First - security. The project was run by a small,
closely knit organization at headquarters and in the field.
Knowledge of the operation was restricted to a minimum. Over
more than five years, since the inception of the project,
there has never been any damaging disclosure to interfere
with the program.
The existence of the U-2 aircraft was, of course, well
known, though its full .capabilities, particularly the altitude
and range were not disclosed. It had important weather and
Air sampling capabilities which were effectively used and which
afforded natural cover for the project. These weather capabilities
were open and publicized.
For example, as far as I know the U-2 is the first aircraft
that has ever flown over the eye of a typhoon. It was used very
effectively out in the Far East to.learn about typhoons which
cause so much damage, and we have a very extraordinary series
of pictures of the U-2 looking right down at the eye of a typhoon
from several miles above the top of it. Of course, the U-2 also
had very valuable characteristics as a reconnaissance plane for
peripheral flights.
With regard to technical and logistic support:--from the
inception of the project, CIA has called on the United States
Air Force for support in the form of technical advice and
assistance in those fields where the Air Force has the most
expert knowledge. These included advice on aircraft design and
procurement, operational training of air crews, weather,
aero-medicine and communications. I may say the Air Force
liberally gave all this support to us.
The CIA also drew on the technical knowledge and advice
of those members of the United States Intelligence Board with
particular competence in the field of intelligence priorities,
targeting and the like. Each mission was carefullY planned
with respect to the highest priority requirements of the
Intelligence Community.
The project has been directed by a senior civilian in
CIA with high competence in this area of work. He was
responsible directly to me and, of course, to General Cabell.
Since the inception of CIA - going back for ten years -
:personnel from the military services, including the Air Force,
have been detailed to CIA for tours of duty. We have had as
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8 or 9 hundred of them at one time. These personnel take their
orders from CIA, not from their parent service, during their
period of detail. The U-2 project, under its civilian director,
drew upon both the military and civilian personnel of the Agency.
They were assigned to duties in headquarters and in the field
staffs which were responsible for carrying out the technical
functions of the program. They were chosen in view of their
particular qualifications for this particular project.
Third, every overflight, from the inception of the project,
and every phase of it, was carefully planned and staffed.
From time to time intelligence requirements were reviewed,
and programs of one or more missions were authorized by higher
authority.
Within the authority thus granted, specific flights
could then be carried out on the order of the Director of
Central Intelligence, as availability and readiness of aircraft
and of pilot and as weather conditions permitted.
On the afternoon of 30 April last, after carefully
considering the field report on the weather and other determining
factors affecting the flight then contemplated, and aftea-
consultation with General Cabell and other qualified advisors
in the Agency, and acting within existing authority to make a
flight at that time, I personally gave the order to proceed with
the flight of May first.
There was no laxity or uncertainty in the chain of command
in-obtaining the authority to act or in giving the order to
proceed. With respect to the flight authorized on April 30,
the same careful procedures were followed as had been followed
in the many preceding successful flights.
NoiALI wish to discuss the value to the country of these
flights from the intelligence viewpoint and from the viewpoint
of national security considerations. I shall do this within
the limitations of what I. think both you and I feel are the
necessary security restrictions.
Under the law setting up the Central Intelligence Apency,
as Director,. I am enjoined to protect "intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure." Naturally I recognize
this Committee as an authorized body to whom disclosures can
properly be made that should not be made publicly. In so doing
I wish to keep within the bounds of what I believe you would
agree to be in the national interest to disclose, even here.
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I feel that you should share ?the facts which I confidently
believe justified the obvious risks of this project. '1,1ch risks
were recognized and evaluated at all stages of the project.
For many years, the United States Intelligence Community
has been directing its efforts to provide the information which
would help to meet the threat of surprise attack. Every
available means in the classical intelligence field have been
utilized, and over recent years these have been valuably
supplemented by the highly technical electronic and other
scientific means to which I have referred.
Our main emphasis in the U-2 program has been directed
Against five critical problems affecting our national security.
These are: the Soviet bomber force, the Soviet missile program,
the Soviet atomic energy program, the Soviet submarine program.
These are the major elements constituting the Soviet Union's
capability to launch a surprise attack. In addition, a major
target during this program has been the Soviet air defense
system with which our retaliatory force would have to contend,
in case of an attack on us and a counterattack by us.
Today, the Soviet bomber force is still the main offensive
long range striking force of the Soviet Union. However, the
U-2 program has helped to confirm that only a greatly reduced
long-range bomber production program is continuing in the Soviet
Union. It has established, however, that the Soviet Union has
recently developed a new medium bomber with supersonic capabilities
The U-2 program has covered many Soviet long-range bomber
airfields, confirming estimates of the location of bases and the
disposition of Soviet long-range bombers. It has also acquired
data on the nuclear weapons storage facilities associated with
them.
Our overflights have enabled us to look periodically at
the actual ground facilities involved.
With respect to the Soviet missile test program -- this
I shall illustrate graphically by showing you the photograph
of these facilities, including both their ICBM and their IRBM
test launching sites which could, of course, also become and
may well be, operational sites.
Our photography has also provided us valuable insight
into the problem of Soviet doctrine regarding ICBM deployment.
It has taught us much about the use which the Soviets are making
of these sites for the training of troops in the operational
use of the short and intermediate range ballistic missiles.
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The program has provided valuable information on the
Soviet atomic energy program. This information has been Lncludca
in the estimate which we give periodically to the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, but without referring to the actual source of
our data. This has covered the production of fissionable
materials, weapons development and test activities, and the
location, type, and size of many stockpile sites.
The project has shown that, despite Mr. :hrushchev's
boasts that the Soviets will soon be able to curtail the
production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the
Soviets are continuing to expand fissionable material capacity.
The Soviet nuclear testing grounds have been photographed
more than once with extremely interesting results. The
photography has also given us our first firm information on
the magnitude and location of the USSR's domestic uranium
ore and uranium processing activities, vital in estimating
Soviet fissionable material production. We have located
national and regional nuclear storage sites and forward storage
facilities.
In general, the program has continued to give useful data
on the size and rate of growth of Soviet industry.
The material obtained has been used for the correction
of military maps and aeronautical charts.
Among the most important intelligence obtained is that
affecting the tactics of the United States deterrent air strike
force. We now have hard information about the nature, extent,
and in many cases, the location of the Soviet ground-to-air
missile development. We have learned much about the basic
concept, magnitude, operational efficiency, deployment, and
rate of development of the Soviet air defense system, including
their early warning radar development.
We have obtained photographs of many scores of fighter
air fields previously inadequately identified, and have
photographer various fighter-types vainly attempting to
intercept the U-2. All of this has proved invaluable to SAC
in adjusting its plans to known elements of the opposition it
would have to face.
As a result of the concrete evidence acquired by the U-2
program on a large number of targets in the Soviet Union, it
has now been possible for U.S. commanders to make amore
efficient and confident allocation of aircraft, crews and weapons.
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U-2 photography has also made it possible to provide
new and accurate information to strike crews which will make
it easier for them to identify their targets and plan their
navigation more precisely.
We have obtained new and valuable information with regard
to submarine deployment and the precise location of their
submarine pens.
In the opinion of our military, of our scientists, and
of the senior officials responsible for our national security,
the results of the program have been invaluable.
The program has had other elements of value. It has
. .
made the Soviets less cocky about their ability to deal with
what we might bring against them.
They have gone through four years of frustration in
having the knowledge since 1956 that they could be overflown
with impunity, that their vaunted fighters were useless
against such flights, and that their ground-to-air missile
capability was inadequate.
Khrushchev has never dared expose this to his own
people. It is only after he had boasted, and we believe
falsely, that he had been able to bring down the U-2 on May 1
by a ground-to-air missile while flying at altitude, that he
has allowed his own people to have even an inkling of the
capability which we possessed.
His frustrated military, many of whom know the facts,
are far less confident today than they otherwise would have
been.
At the same time, in competent military circles among
our allies, the evidence of American capability demonstrated
by the present disclosure of the U-2 flights has given a new
and better perspective of odr own relative strength as compared
with that of the Soviet'Union.
At this point I propose to show you some photographs
to support my presentation regarding the intelligence value
of the project.
Now I shall present the facts with regard to the dispatch
of the May 1 flight and the ensuing developments insofar as the
intelligence aspects are concerned and insofar as they are known
to us.
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As to the timing of the fllght, there is, of course, no
good time for a failure.
I have already presented thc ei-rcumtancc undcr wh ch I
assumed direct responsibility fo di,3pncUing 11115 flight.
If this flight had been a success, we ,imuld iir covred
certain targets of particular significance and wu would, in the
?normal course, have wished to analyze its results before
scheduling a further mission. When it failed, it was obvious
even before..we received instructions that we would not .try
.
again before studying the cause and effects of failure.- In
either eveht, success or failure, after this flight we were
snot preparing to fly again for several weeks and until further
policy guidance was received.
With respect to the timing of the flights, the President,
in his speech of May 25, had this to say: "As to the timing,
the question was really whether to halt the program and thus
forego the gathering of important information that was essential
and that was likely tq be unavailable at a later date. The
decision was that the program should not be halted.
"The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence
activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed.
Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation
itself can be used to conceal preparations for a surprise attack."
I would point out, also, that if you turn off all flights
for months before international meetings and then for some time
after such meetings and before trips to the Soviet Union of high
American officials or trips here of Soviet officials; if you
also estimate that in times of tension flights should be stopped
because they might increase the tension, and in times of
sweetness and light they should not be run because it would
disturb any "honeymoon' in our relations with the Soviet Union;
if, on top of this, you take into account that in much of the
Soviet Union most days of the year are automatically eliminated
because of weather and cloud cover and low Arctic sun, - then
you can understand the problem of timing of flights.
If you asked me whether or not a flight would have been
made after this particular flight, I cannot give you the answer
because I do not know. At the time, we had no authority for
any mission other than the one that was then undertaken.
With respect to the flight itself, when the aircraft did
not reach its destination within the flight time and fuel
capacity given it, it was presumed to be down. But at first
we did not know where. It could have been within friendly
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territory, in hostile desert, or in uninhabited territory,
or within hostile territory where if alive the pilot would
have been quickly apprehended as was the case.. We did not
know whether the plane was intact or destroyed, the pilot
alive or dead.
I shall deal in a moment with the statements which were
issued during this period of uncertainty.
The question of course arises as to what actually
happened to cause this aircraft to come down deep in the
heart of Russia.
Let me remind you first that the returns are not yet
all in, and so our picture is not complete. However, we do
lhave a considerable body of evidence that permits a reasonable
judgment with a high degree of confidence.
Our best judgment is that it did not happen as claimed
by the Soviets. That is, we believe that it was not shot
down at its operating altitude of around 70,000 feet by the
Russians. We believe that it was initially forced down to a
much lower altitude by some as yet undetermined mechanical
malfunction. At that lower altitude, it was a sitting duck
for Soviet defenses, whether fighter aircraft or ground-to-
air fire or missiles.
As to what happened at the lower altitude, we are not
sure. The pilot may have bailed out at any time or he may
have crash landed. The aircraft was equipped with a destruction
device to be activated by the pilot as he leaves the aircraft.
Again we do not know whether or not he attempted to do so. It
should be noted, however, that no massive destruction device
capable of ensuring complete destruction could be carried in
this aircraft as weight limitations were critical, and every
pound counted.
Thus, whether or not the destruction device was used,
one might expect sizable and identifiable parts of the aircraft
and its equipment to remain.
As to the nature and cause of the suspected malfunction,
we are not prepared to pass judgment. But let me remind you
that this aircraft and this pilot had proven their high degree
of reliability in many technically similar flights, inside and
outside friendly territory. When operating as in this case,
about 1200 miles within unfriendly, heavily-defended territory,
. there can be no cushion against malfunction.
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There has been much comment and qpestioninp; ,A_th l'e7ard
to the pilot and his behavior after apprehension. Of cource,
we only have the Soviets' report on all of this, and we should
accept it with caution.
All of the pilots engaged in th-J. ?;:el most
carefully selected. They were highly trained, highly motivated,
and, as seemed right, well compensated financially. But no one
in his right mind would have accepted thece fo money alone.
Since the operational phase of the program stalA:ed, the
reliability record of the plane; for a craft of this character,
was little short of phenomenal. It was a tribuLc to ,,;he high
skill of the designer, the maintenance crews, and the pilots,
.Until the May first flight, over about a four-year period of
operations, no plane had been lost over unfriendly territory
in the course of many, many missions. Several were lost during
the training period at home and in friendly territory abroad.
Francis Gary Powers, the pilot on the May 1 flight, is
a fourth generation American citizen, born in Jenkins, Kentucky,
about 31 years ago. He received a BA uegree from Milligan
College, Tennessee, in September 1956. Scholastically he was
high average. He joined the Air Force in the fall of 1950, as
a private and served in an enlisted status until November 1951,
when he was discharged as a Corporal in ordo: to enter the
Aviation Cadet School to train as a pilot. He attended the
Air Force Basic and Advance Pilot Training School at Greenville,
Mississippi. Upon completion of this trainl'Ig in December 1952,
he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant.
His first duty assignment was as an F-84 Commando Jet
Pilot with the 468th Strategic Fighter Squadron at Turner Air
Force Base, Georgia. He resigned his Air Force Reserve Commission
under honorable conditions in May 1956. The reason for such
resignation was to join the project we are discussing.
His record with the Air Force had been uniformly good.
He was given a special security screening by the Air Force
and also a supplemental check by the security office of the
CIA.
During his Air Force career, he received training with
respect to his behavior and conduct in event of capture, and
after entering the employ of the Agency, he took the Agency's
escape. and evasion course at our training station here in the
United States in June of 1956. He had subsequent training in
escape and evasion after his assignment to his overseas post
. in August 1956..
An Air Force Major Flight Surgeon assigned to CIA who
worked with the U-2 pilots during their training in the United
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and continuously during their stay overseas, had this to say
in regard to Francis Powers, "....During the period of my
assignment as Flight Surgeon at Adana, I not infrequently
shared a room with Mr. Powers and participated in social,
flying, and mission duties with him. In my opinion 'Mr. Powers
was outstanding among the pilots for his calmness under pressure,
his precision, and his methodical approach to problems. I have
flown considerably in jets with Mr. Powers. I would consider
him temperate, devoted, perhaps more than unusually patriotic,
and a man given to thinking before speaking or acting."
. It should be remembered that Powers was a pilot, navigator,
a well-rounded aviator trained to handle himself under all
conditions, in .the air or if grounded in hostile territory.
He was not trained as an "agent" as there were no foreseeable
circumstances, even the present ones, where he would act as such.
Furthermore, such training would have been incompatible both
temperamentally and with the strenuous technical demands of his
flight missions.
The pilots of these aircrafts on operational missions,
and this was true in the case of Powers, received the following
instructions for use if downed in a hostile area:
First, it was their duty to ensure the destruction of
the aircraft and its equipment to the greatest extent possible.
Second, on reaching the ground it was the pilot's first duty
to attempt escape and evasion so as to avoid capture, or delay
it as long as possible. To aid him in these. purposes and for
survival he was given the various items of equipment which the
Soviets have publicized and which are normal and standard
procedure, selected on the basis of wide experience gained in
World War II and in Korea.
Third, pilots were equipped with a device for self
destruction but were not given positive instructions to make
use of it. In he last analysis, this ultimate decision has
to be 'left to the individual himself.
Fourth, in the contingency of capture, pilots were instructed
to delay as long as possible the revelation of damaging
information.
Fifth, pilots were instructed to tell the truth if faced
with a situation, as apparently faced Powers, with respect.
to those matters which were obviously within the knowledge
of his captors as a result of what fell into their hands.
In addition, if in a position where some attribution had to
be given his mission, he would acknowledge that he was working
for the Central Intelligence Agency. This was to make it clear
that he was not working for any branch of the armed services,
and that his mission was solely an intelligence mission.
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These instructions were based on a careful study of our
experience in the Korean war of the consequences of brain-
washing and of the extent of information which could be
obtained by these and other means available to the Soviets.
Whether or not in this instance the pilot complied with
all of these instructions, it is hard to state today with
the knowledge we have. However, a careful review of what he
has said does not indicate that he has given to the Soviets
any valuable information which they could not have discovered
from the equipment they found upon the pilot's person or
retrieved from the downed aircraft..
I would warn, of course, against putting too much belief
in what Powers may say, particularly if he is later put on
trial. By that time they will have had a more thorough oppor-
tunity for a complete brain-washing-operation which might well
produce a mixture of truth and fiction.
I will .now deal with the "cover story" statements which
were issued following May 1.
When a plane is overdue and the fact of its takeoff and
failure to return is known, some statement must be made, and
quickly. Failure to do so, and, under normal conditions, to
start a search for the lost plane, would in itself be a suspicious
event.
Thus, when the U-2 disappeared on May first and did not
return to its base within the requisite time period after its
takeoff, action was required.
For many years, in fact since the inception of the
operation, consideration has been given to the cover story
'which would be used in the case of the disappearance of a plane
which might possibly be over unfriendly territory.
Because of its special characteristics, the U-2 plane
was of great interest to the U.S. weather services and to the
National Advisory Committee for .Aeronautics, the predecessor
of NASA. NASA was very much concerned with the scientific
advances which operations of these U-2s could make towards
greater knowledge of the upper atmosphere and for other
scientific purposes. As already indicated, U-2s have now
Undertaken many weather andrelated missions and their functions
in this respect have been publicized by NASA, and this publicity
has been distributed freely to the world.
It was therefore natural that NASA's operations be used
to explain the presence of -U72s at various bases throughout
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the world, although NASA did not participate in the development
of intelligence devices, nor did- they participate in the, planning
and conduct of any intelligence missions.
Accordingly, when the May first flight was lost, an initial
statement was issued on May 2nd by the Base Commandant at Adana
that a U-2. aircraft, engaged in upper air studies and operating
from the base was down, and oxygen difficulties had been reported.
This was identified in the press as a NASA plane. A search for
the plane was initiated in the remote areas of eastern Turkey.
On May 5, early in the day by our time, Khrushchev made
his Claim that "an American aircraft crossed our frontier and
continued its flight into the interior of our country... and...
.was shot down." At that time, Khrushchev gave no further details
of significance.
Apparently as an attempt at deception, Khrushchev followed
up his speech the next day by distributing photographs of a
pile of junk -- according, to experts, pieces of an old Soviet
fighter plane -- possibly for the purpose Of making us think
that the U-2 plane had been effectively destroyed. Since the
fake wreckage was quickly identified for what it was, this
particular ruse had no effect.
The NASA statement which followed the Khrushchev speech
of May 5 developed somewhat further the original cover story.
Also on May 5, the Department of State issued a further release
which generally followed the cover story. Mr. Dillon has covered
this in his testimony before this Committee on May 27.
? At this time - on 5-6 May - we still did not know whether
the plane or any recognizable parts of it or the pilot were in
Soviet hands, or whether the pilot was dead or alive.
Furthermore, then we did. not know whether Khrushchev desired
to blow up the incident as he later did, or put it under the
rug and spare his people the knowledge that we had been
overflying them.
Hence, in this situation, there seemed no reason at that
time to depart from the original cover story.
These two press releases attributed to NASA were worked
-out in consultation between CIA and NASA and after conferring
with the Department of State.
- These statements did not come out of any lack Of fore-
thought or attention to their preparation or lack of coordination.
The basic cover stOry had been developed some years ago for the
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exigency of a failure, and this Original cover story was on
May 5 modified to meet our then estimate of what was best to
say in the light of what little we knew about the details of
the May 1 flight failure.
Subsequently, on May 7, Khrushchev adduced evidence that
? he had the pilot alive, and quoted his purported statements.
He also produced certain of the contents of the plane and
later various parts of the plane itself. This clearly disclosed
the true nature of the mission on which the plane was engaged.
- The cover story was outflanked.
The issue then was whether to admit the incident but
deny high level responsibility, or to take the course which
was decided upon and clearly expressed in Secretary Herter's
statement of May 9 and in the President's statement of May 11,
and his address of May 25,
In Mr. Herter's appearance before this Committee, he has
dealt with the statements which were issued during the period
after May 6, except for the two statements involving NASA which
I have covered.
I would only add that in my opinion, in the light of
all the factors involved, the decision taken to assume
responsibility in this particular case was the correct one.
Denial, in my opinion, over the long run would have been
tortuous and self defeating.
Those who took this decision knew that I was ready to
assume the full measure of responsibility and to cover the
project.as a technical intelligence operation carried out
on my own responsibility as Director of CIA. This alternative,
too, was rejected because of the many elements making it hardly
credible over the longer run.
This concludes my statement respecting the intelligence
aspects of the U-2 project
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Copy No.
CAL ACCOUNT OF HANDLD'QU-2 INCIDENT
I May
tini
unday, I May, at approxinately 0 JO hours lashington
personnel in the CIA operations control center where the
All key Project personnel assembled in the Agency control
center the morning of 1 May to analyse the latest infor- ation and
implementto appropriate actions to cover the possible loss of the
aircraft. Also present were Mr. Walter Bonney. Pres Relation*
officer, NASA and Colonel Leo P. Geary, UsAr, Project Officer,
. Richard Helms, Acting Deputy Director, Plans, and Mr. Hugh
Cumming. Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
full scale discussion of proposed texts of a suitable cover story
release was held. Mr. Cumming Mr. Helms. and Colonel Burke
went to Mr. Dulles' home about 1500. He proposed revisions in
the cover story. This group returned to Colonel Markel* office where
they were joined by Mr. Richard M. Bissell Jr., Deputy Director,
Plans.
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25X1
25X11
25X1
at
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The story as rale
d differed
the rldeeion and distributed
ired in
rornanda r
fl.sdquaflers, tp!,Arx Headquarters.tibAr, and
A representatives in friendly countries involved in the
ight plan.
In its final form. the setual release reflected political
estimates and inputs of the Department of state and (JA at the
time, based an the latest information and the assumption that the
aircraft waS down deep within the Soviet Union where m. tory
nnected with navigational e
Pilot irypoxis. err aircraft
ctionwould be difficult to sustain. Howe er. in the absence
verified informatIon on the actual fate of the rni.aio,
condi ton of the sires's& or pilot, and not being certain that the
oviete amid *drat to t deep penetration, it was agreed that such
did our the best prospects of being sustained
vent the aircraft was totally destroyed and the pilot killed
should the Soviets take credit for shooting it down, while at
the same time electing to mo ported scene of the incident
-loser to their borders in order to conceal frau. their own people
d the world in general the depth of the penetration.
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flight plan cons
cover story back4 zp by an act al
night, WWI II
CIA cozrmwdc*t1orza chazutes t tha Co mender of Detachment
tent with the
Tield C
e.
4 it,teay
y, biter* the Soviets
disclosure *hats er there were meetings at
state attended by Co1on..&TU Richard
Berry, and Am
asw?r brief pripare4 by the,Ilgency, principally for alio by NASA
of
Soblesit wkG went over a qeetLon and
vent of Soviet di*
affected pftTtes. incl
but designed to be circulated to all
Headquarters, Headquarters USAFE.
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the Departmeat
It wa
the
? of
approved the Aue
te, as well as Detachment 104 at A
have to be amended4 depending upon
lesure the Soviets might make. The meeting
Its
brief, and it was dispatched to
11 interested parties In Wee and overseas. the latter through
g este y co a.uicatins channels.
M
Mr.
ev made
the Pres
lisciosurs, After the NSC meeting
cretary Gates, iTr. Gordon Gray,
Oldies and General Goodpsstsr met to considerthe
17.2 incident. It was agreed that
toL
d handle all publicity and the ger: al outlinesof what the
De rtmevl should say were discuieed.
In livalladritott. there was a meeting in the Department of SLItti
Raymond Ha office., attended by Zr. Davis and bar. Berry
of %tate, and General Cabefl and sir. Bissell of CIA. This meeting
was subsequently transferred to Mr. Dillon's officefollowing the
return from High Point.
1Z00 hours, kr. Hagerty at the A bit
reAeaae tins that the President had order
the fact* as developed would be forthcoming from NMA and the
Deartaogd of State.
Aid& &
y and that
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The SA Press Officer. Mr. Bonney. received a suggestion
from Mr. Hagerty that he hold a press conference on as
possible as a rtsafls of handling the heavy volutros of press inquiries.
ch a conferenc
The NASA press confer
brief referred to above.
d at 1330 ho
I.
was Wised on the q
NASA Headquarters.
it4 answer
pones to direct questioning tl
?
y 4090011( indicated that the U 2 aircraft had been grounded
for aiprneret checks.
age to the U.2 unit in Turkey and later on 9 2ayto the
advising them to stand down and to indicate if questioned
wn was for the purpose of checking equipment tatement
the original cover story release. The Edwards
Air Force Base NASA Detachment was likewise stood down for a
$psrent. The afternoon of 6 May. messes* was
St
ning of thi from Mr. annsy, CIA
quick che
sent to Hea q a
Headquarters US
Agency channels, coordinated with
dummy air search. At 1430 hours
Id a background meeting with some 35 press correspondents.
*time in 1r. Dillon's office on 5 te.i y, the Department
s prepared. During its pr
one a munber of times wil
co with 4r.. Dulles regar
oral
-5..
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C the release. The Department text, wiule making reference to
the original statement of the missing iane and the oxygen failure.
did not y cornr t the DepartmentThis
release also referred to the fact that the Soviet Goverzursnt had
been queried as to details and any particulars concerninghe fate
of the pilot. In this earns rr?etting, the text of the act*1 note
a.king the Soviets for details was agreed upon. Mr. tmncomn
Depa.rtin ot of State Press (fftcer, gave out this release and made
certain background remarks at a press conference at 1245 hours.
6 May
There were
es* briefings
of te. One, by ir. Tully at 1110 hours. and th. other by )tr. thit
at 5 hours. In reply to a question, Mr. Whitestated that there
wa absolutely 'deliberate attervt to violate Soviet air space, and
there never has been." The stateni.nt accurately reflected Mr.
knowledge incident.
hey made
tailed state
here was a meeting fro 1100 to 1430 hour, in the Di
attended by Mr. Dune*
Clunrning and Mr, 3ohl.en from Sta
ci
Mr. Bissell from
al
-6-
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fro the Whit. House. In this session, a draft statem
prepared for con*i4eraton by the Secretary of State hicb 414
not go as far as the text actually released.
The final text aa drafted by the Secretary
ain n and cleared with the Preelden
approximately 1800 hours, acknowledging
ter ritery
Pr
bablv undertaken". The DCI was
phont of th. final decision to in effect, "com clea
ix days after the incident, was th
casting doubts on the initial and o
and repeated in more detail ii
release ma
1
frau*
for
f 5 Val.
U-Z at
the
ased at
This
first U.
Ly covez
he NASA
story
day, a public display of a NAk
d at the NASA hangar, Edwards Air
the result of arrangements made by
Company, to meet insistent press demands
the plane and to document further the
t uses of the aircraft.
There were no statement
cretary o
? a meet
a addition t
ff clad source.
called in the office
etary and the Under Secretary,
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everal nenbers of his staff were present, includi
Jerry Smith and Ma.coxnber. Defense Secretary
G4es end Deputy ecrstary Douglas also attended, as wall a.
. Dulles and Mr. Bis II of CIA.
It was decided that Mr. Dulles should brief the Conirese
leaders in executive session and tell therm the basic facts,
would
which would clarify the position of the United States uovernment.
Later, aft
Herter would also give his statement to the Congressional
leaders prior to public release.
At about 1130 hours, Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles returned to
their officea and Mr. Del.. spent the intervening tIn.*, prior to the
agressional leaders, in preparing his
eta sit. Mr. 13iaseil shortly returned to the Department of state
and ended the session WhLeK prepared a first draft a/ the Ortatternent
to be ziade by the Secretary of stat.. Mr. Dulles did net participate
bjsct to Presidential approval, a press state
ultation with the White House, it was decided that
1400 hours session wi
drafting session.
rt1y before 1400 hours
retary of State and drove with
driving to the Capitol
Mr. Biseell joined
Congressional hearing
showed Mr. Herter
proposed remarks. General Cabell, Lundahl,
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'pined the group at the Capitol.
covered the following points: the first overflight was in 1956
and that a cansiderabla number had beenmade; we tended to
disbelieve the SovIet version of the shoot down; valuable information
had been obtained. Mr. Bleachl gave more details and Mr. Lendithl
showed several selected photograph..
11 May
The Presidentheld his press conference.
12 May
General Goodpaster telephoned Mr. Dulles to say that further
flights should be suspended.
?ay
The President announced from Paris that high altitude
reconnalsunce flights over the Soviet Union had been suspended
since the LT incident1 in accordance with a decision made on 12 Wa
and that "these flights would not be res ed". The President
Prepared 15 June 1960
Distribution:
Orig - President's Board (Mr. Pat Coyne via IG)
Cy if 2- 0/DCI
/Cy # 3- DDCI
Cy # 4 - DD/P
Cy # 5 - DD/P/DPD(Mr. Cunninghani19.
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elki3p rove d ForElWeAsIA9045/43 ;rgILA-MORTRUASity 00020%01-1
complete because unless there is such candor it is most difficult for the
Senate to discharge its responsibilities in the field of foreign policy.
As you know, the committee has agreed that these sessions are to
be executive. However, in order to make the maximum amount of
information available to the public, which must in the final analysis
understand our policies if they are to be supported by the people, we
have arranged for a high ranking official of the executive branch to de-
lete from the executive transcript any statements or information
which might in any way jeopardize the national security. Should
any question arise as to whether such deletions go beyond those neces-
sary to protect the national security, I will appoint a bipartisan sub-
committee to consider such questions.
I have urged members to limit their questions to those directly
relevant to the recent summit conference and incidents related thereto.
Although the committee has not considered fully all witnesses it may
wish to hear, I have expressed the personal opinion that there is no
occasion for private witnesses to be heard on the matter before the
committee.
Finally, as you know, the committee has decided that members
should for the first time around, at least, limit their period of ques-
tioning to not to exceed 10 minutes each.
FOCUS OF STUDY
It is my hope, Mr. Secretary, that our study can be focused on four
principal areas: first, the events and decisions resulting from the U-2
incident; second, the effect of these events and decisions upon the
summit; third, the policy of our Government regarding the summit
meeting; and fourth, the policy of the United States in the future and
possible improvement in the execution thereof.
INTEREST IN HEARING
Mr. Secretary, we have some guests from the Senate who have
requested to come as observers. I wish to admonish them that this
is an executive session, and that they are not to disclose on their own
responsibility anything that takes place in these hearings. I might
also call to the attention of the committee that it was noted in the
press that Tass, the official governmental news agency of Soviet Rus-
sia, was the first applicant to purchase a copy of the transcript which
will be later released, so we might keep this in mind. The staff of
the committee has compiled a set of background documents on events
incident to the summit conference. Those documents will be printed
as an appendix to the hearings when they are published.
I suggest, Mr. Secretary, that you proceed with your statement for
the information of the committee. The Secretary has a statement
prepared which will be the presentation of his point of view.
szENIENT,_OF HON. CHRISTIAN, A. HERTER SESAUlQP
TATE. ACCOMPANIED BY Rol DOUGLAS DILLON, UNDER SEC-
RETARY, AND HON. CHARLES E. BOHLEN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT
Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
I appreciate very much your willingness to allow me to make this
statement.
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4 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SITMMIT CONFERENCE
This statement is guided very much as indicated by the chairman in
the remarks that he has just made in the next to the last paragraph
with regard to divisions; namely, the genesis of the summit; the TJ-2
incident; the events in Paris and the future.
TIIE THREAT TO BERLIN
I. The genesis of the summit
In order to understand what happened in Paris, we need to look
back over the preceding 18 months.
In November 1958, the U.S.S.R. began a new strategy directed
toward altering the situation in Berlin and East Germany in its favor.
If the Western Powers refused to give up their present position in
Berlin and make West Berlin a so-called free city, the Soviet Union
stated its intention to proceed unilaterally at the end of 6 months,
turning over full sovereignty to the so-called GDR and thereby con-
fronting the Allies with the alternative of capitulation or resort to
force which would be met by Communist force.
Though the strategy as it unfolded proved to be more flexible than
its original statement, it is still the official policy of the U.S.S.R. Its
force hes in the Soviet ability to threaten Berlin, where we are morally
committed, but physically exposed.
The Western Powers, of course, promptly rejected the Soviet pro-
posal and reaffirmed their determination to stand by Berlin.
In the months that followed, while the U.S.S.R. elaborated and
pressed its strategy, the Western Powers concerted their plans to meet
it. They sought to engage the U.S.S.R. in negotiations, thereby
clarifying its intentions and either attaining solutions acceptable to
the West, or as a minimum, convincing it that unilateral action against
Berlin would not be sound.
ENGAGING TIIE SOVIET UNION IN NEGOTIATION
It was by no means a foregone conclusion that the U.S.S.R. would
negotiate on an acceptable basis. In January 1959 the U.S.S.R. pro-
posed a conference to adopt a peace treaty with the two parts of an
indefinitely divided Germany.
The Western Powers continued to maintain that a peace treaty
could be negotiated and signed only with a united Germany, hence
that the reunification of Germany must be settled first.
They also maintained that the only proper solution for Berlin lay
in its becoming the capital of a unified Germany, and therefore, they
were unwilling to discuss Berlin as an isolated issue. But the U.S.S.R.
had held for some time that reunification was solely the business of
the Germans and therefore refused to discuss it.
The West persisted during February and March in its efforts to
get the Russians talking somehow. It proposed a meeting of Foreign
Ministers, with the prospect of a possible summit meeting when due
preparations had been made. The U.S.S.R. had repeatedly indicated
a desire for that summit meeting since 1956. Finally, a compromise
agenda, which did not prejudice the substantive views of either side,
was adopted for a Foreign Ministers' meeting and a date was set in
May shortly before the expiration of the original Soviet deadline for
meeting their arbitrary demands on Berlin.
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EVENTS INCIDENT Tu MBE
FOREIGN MINISTERS' DEADLOCK
During the intensive preparations for the meeting the Western
Powers developed a new version of their basic position regarding
Germany, which was submitted at Geneva as the Western peace plan.
It consisted in approaching the unification of Germany through a
series of stages, thereby offering the U.S.S.R. a chance to adjust
its position gradually to the eventual loss of its hold on East Ger-
many which free elections would presumably bring.
The plan showed flexibility and imagination; it appealed to world
opinion ? but its rejection by the U.S.S.R. was none the less flat.
The -U.S.S.R. stuck adamantly to its previously announced pro-
posals for a peace treaty with a divided Germany. Thus, the basic
positions remained totally unreconciled.
Finding no progress possible on Germany, the Western Powers and
the U.S.S.R. explored the possibility of an interim agreement on
Berlin which, without contemplating a basic solution of Berlin as a
separate issue would do something to mitigate difficulties which the
U.S.S.R. professed to find there. Though some progress was made
in this direction, the U.S.S.R. insisted on language which would have
implied the eventual erosion of the Western position in Berlin.
Accordingly, despite the labor of 3 months with only one short ad-
journment, the Foreign Ministers' meeting ended in deadlock.
HIGH LEVEL TRIPS
The failure of the Foreign Ministers' meeting did not
result in a war crisis, however, because a _parallel train of events had
meanwhile brought hope in a different direction. We took the op-
portunity of Mikoyan's visit to the Soviet Embassy here in January
to arrange informal exchanges of views between the Soviet leader.
and top U.S. officials.
This was followed in Juno and July by further visits and ex-
changes of Kozlov to this country and the Vice President to the
U.S.S.R. The fact that these visits took place without public inci-
dent and made possible somewhat more realistic communication than
usual with the Soviet leadership seemed to offer a possibility?only
a possibility, of course?that means of avoiding war and eventually
getting Soviet-Western relations into somewhat dangerous shape
might found by developing these informal contacts.
Accordingly the President decided to go ahead with a move which
he and his advisers had long had in mind when the time seemed right.
He invited Chairman Khrushchev to visit this country, and the visit
was announced before the Foreign Ministers ended. their Geneva
meeting.
During that visit no progress was made, or indeed expected, on
resolving outstanding problems, but a somewhat greater degree of
mutual understanding was seemingly attained, particularly on the
need to settle international questions by peaceful means rather than
by force. There was also a suspension, later publicly acknowledged,
of whatever was left of the Soviet ultimatum on Berlin.
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PREPARATION FOR THE gummrr
After the Khrushchev visit it was judged feasible and desirable by
the Western Powers to move toward renewed discussion, this time at
the summit. Some flicker of hope for progress on Berlin had ap-
peared at Camp David, whereas Geneva had ended in deadlock. Dur-
ing his American visit Khrushchev had also evinced an interest in the
equally vital field of disarmament, and even though disarmament talks
were to start in the Committee of Ten at Geneva it was felt that
Khrushchev might reserve his constructive moves, if any, for the
summit.
Accordingly, after due consultations among the Western heads of
government, an invitation to a summit was sent to Khrushchev and
accepted by him and after some difficulty over earlier dates the time
was finally set for May 16. This move found broad support in West-
ern public opinion.
There ensued an intensive and protracted series of preparations
on the Western side, involving repeated meetings not only of the
Foreign Ministers and of NATO but even of the heads of govern-
ment. Within our own Government we also studied most carefully
the possibilities of making progress not only on Berlin and Germany
but most particularly in disarmament, as well as other aspects of
general Soviet-Western relations.
At the December meeting of Western heads of government a con-
sensus emerged that the May summit might well be only one of a series
of such meetings, and that it would be largely exploratory. Some
modest progress was hoped for, but no major solutions on any front.
But if a beginning could be made, the series of talks, possible in a
gradually improving atmosphere over the years, might do substan-
tially more.
SUMMIT PROSPECTS DIMMED
In the first weeks after the Khrushchev American visit there was
a general improvement of atmosphere and people began talking, partly
in hope, partly in some confusion, about "detente." There were com-
paratively conciliatory speeches on each side ? there was progress in
the test ban talks at Geneva; a new Soviet-United States cultural
agreement was signed November 21, and on December 1 the United
States, the U.S.S.R., and other powers signed the Antarctic Treaty.
But clouds began to gather even then. One of the earliest signs
was the strong Soviet protest on November 11 against West German
plans to build a broadcasting station in West Berlin. Another was
the Khrushchev speech on November 11 which was harder in tone,
boasted again of Soviet missile prowess and began a concentrated
attack oeAdenauer and the German Federal Republic which later
increased and seemed to be a central feature of Soviet presummit tac-
tics. The reason for this attack is still a matter for speculation.
Perhaps they thought it would undermine the Western position on
Berlin by helping to divide the Western Allies. It had no such effect
of course, but naturally rallied us to speak out in defense of our Ger-
man ally.
Khrushchev as early as December 1 also began repeating his
threats to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He repeat-
ed these threats in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 11
No,
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 7
and in his remarks during his visit to Indonesia and other countries
in January. On February 4, the Warsaw Pact powers issued the first
formal blocwide commitment to sign a separate GDR peace treaty.
Thus Khrushchev's threatening Baku speech of April 25, though it
was the most sweeping since February 1950, was only a harsher
version of what he had been saying for months before. I shall make
full documentation on his speeches available to the committee.
Not until April did we reply at length to this mounting crescendo of
Soviet statements. We did so in order to keep the record straight?
notably in the speeches of April 4 and 20, which Khrushchev attacked
for starting arguments that he in fact had begun.
The unity of the four Western Powers on Berlin meanwhilepre-
sumably signaled to the U.S.S.R. that prospects for eroding the est-
ern position or obtaining Soviet terms on Berlin remained slight.
President de Gaulle and other leaders were quite firm in discouraging
expectations on this front. The NATO Council in Istanbul May 2 1
also reaffirmed the Western position on German reunification and re-
gretted Soviet refusal to discuss specific practical measures of dis-
armament. Thus as the summit drew near the prospects for important
agreement seemed slender, so long as the U.S.S.R. remained com-
mitted to driving the Western Powers out of Berlin and to dis-
cussing disarmament in terms of general principles rather than con-
crete steps.
The Western outlook consistently remained, however, that the sum-
mit would be worthwhile. It would afford an opportunity for an ex-
change of views which would clarify each side's position; it might con-
tribute to some reduction of tensions over Berlin and narrow some of
our differences on disarmament. It could be at least a small first step
in a long process of improving Soviet-Western relations.
IT-2 INCIDENT
H. The U-2 incident
On May 1 occurred the unfortunate failure of an intelligence mis-
sion. The U.S.S.R. at once seized on it to complicate the approach
to the summit. With regard to the role of the U.S. Government in
this matter, I cannot hope to improve on the lucid and straight-
forward account which the President gave to the Nation Wednesday
night. I will, therefore, not attempt to go into detail, although I am
of course ready to answer questions concerning my responsibilities.
CENTRAL POINTS IN PRESIDENT'S ACCOUNT OF 17-2 INCIDENT
Here I would only like to reemphasize four central points which
stood out in the President's account:
1. The U-2 program was an important and efficient intelligence
effort. We knew that failure of any mission under this program would
have serious consequences, ?but we considered that the great benefit
derived justified the risks involved.
2. The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the sum-
mit meeting approached, was a sound decision. Conditions at a later
season would have prevented obtaining very important information.
There is never a "good time" for a failure of an intelligence mis-
sion. We believe it unwise to lower our vigilance because of these
political negotiations.
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8 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
3. Initial statements by the U.S. Government properly sought first
of all to protect the pilot, his intelligence mission, and everything
connected with it that might still be kept secret. But when it be-
came clear that plane and pilot were in Soviet hands we believed
the Congress and. the American people should be given the facts.
Thus up to May 7 U.S. statements followed the general line of the
cover story, and thereafter were adjusted to the situation as it de-
veloped.
4. Since the U-2 system had been compromised, it was discontinued
as any other intelligence mission would be in such a case. An-
nouncement of its discontinuance was withheld until the President
'could convey the fact personally in Paris.
Based on these four points, I believe most Americans will agree
that the main course of our actions, given what we knew at any
particular time, was sound. In _particular, I have doubts that any
alteration in the language of U.S. statements would have made any
difference in the arbitrary Soviet demands which followed.
KHRTTSIICI-IEVIS ARRIVAL IN PARIS
III. The events lin Paris
I should like to give you an account of the major developments at
Paris. I shall be as brief as possible, since the details have been
widely publicized. But I would like to tell you of those events which
in my opinion had a determinant effect there, and particularly those
which influenced the decisions of the President.
On my arrival in Paris on Friday, May 13, there was already con-
siderable speculation at the news that Mr. Khrushchev was arriving
in Paris on Saturday rather than on Sunday, the day on which the
President and Mr. Macmillan were due to arrive.
Mr. Khrushchev's statement on arrival at Orly Airport gave no
indication of his subsequent position. It was mild in character and
conveyed the distinct impression that he would proceed with the
summit conference despite the U-2 incident. Subsequent events
showed that this was deliberately designed to conceal his real purpose.
PREMIER KIIRUSIICHEVIS CALLS ON PRESIDENT DE GAI7LLE AND PRIME
MINISTER MACMILLAN
On Sunday at 11 a.m., at his request, Mr. Khrushchev, accompanied
by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky?which is in
itself an unusual procedure which I shall revert to later?called on
President de Gaulle at the Elysee Palace.
During this meeting he left with President de Gaulle a memoran-
dum setting forth the conditions which would have to be met by the
United States before Khrushchev would be prepared to attend a
summit conference. The French delegation provided a copy of this
memorandum to the American delegation early that afternoon. The
memorandum was subsequently presented by Mr. Khrushchev' with-
out change' as the opening part of his statement to the Four Power
meeting on Monday morning, May 16.
After visiting President de Gaulle Sunday morning, Khrushchev
called on Prime Minister Macmillan at 4:30 p.m. on the same day
and read the same statement of position to him.
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The copy of the statement received from the French delegation was,
of course, the subject of immediate consultation with the President
and with members of the American delegation as to its significance
and meaning.
BINDING NATURE 01' DECISIONS MADE PRIOR TO KIIRUSIICIIEV'S DEPARTURE
FROM MOSCOW
It was our general conclusion, subsequently borne out by the facts,
that the position and totally unacceptable demands set forth in this
document had been drawn up in Moscow prior to Mr. Khrushchev's
departure. In this sense it represented a fixed Soviet governmental
position from which even Mr. Khrushchev would not have the au-
thority to depart while in Paris.
I might digress here to observe that it had been our experience at
previous conferences with the Soviets, at least since the death of
Stalin, that the Soviet representative, no matter how highly placed
he might be, was bound by the collective decisions on basic policy
matters made prior to his departure from Moscow. Any substantive
changes in these positions apparently required reference back to Mos-
cow before they could be undertaken.
PRESIDENT'S POSITION AT FIRST CONFERENCE MEETING
I should like to emphasize the opinion which was thus unanimously
arrived at in the American delegation, since it bore directly upon the
position which the President took at the meeting on Monday morning.
It was out of the question, of course, that there should be any ac-
vase' ceptance by the President of the humiliating and arrogant conditions
of Mr. Khrushchev. We had very much in mind, however, the im-
portance of showing the world that it was Mr. Khrushchev, and no
one else, who was placing this summit conference in peril.
The president, therefore, decided before the Monday meeting that
the proper course of action, consonant with the great responsibility
which he bore and the seriousness of the issues which were to have
been discussed at the conference, was for him not to engage in vituper-
ation with Mr. Khrushchev but to demonstrate the restraint and
dignity which was incumbent upon the office he holds and which be-
fitted the leader of a great country.
FIRST MEETING OF SUMMIT CONFERENCE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF
SUSPENSION OF U-2 FLIGHTS
In connection with this decision, the President resolved to announce
to the conference his previously taken decision to suspend further
flights of U-2 aircraft over the Soviet Union.
Although the original intention had been to restrict the first meeting
of the conference at the summit to the chiefs of state and heads of
government and to their interpreters, the President, on learning
that Mr. Khrushchev wished to bring Foreign Minister Gromyko
and Marshal Malinovsky, asked Secretary Gages and myself to ac-
company him to this meeting.
I do not need to describe this meeting in detail beyond saying that
Mr. Khrushchev read a statement which, with interpretation, took
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10 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
fully an hour. He read this entire statement from a prepared text
before him. The first part of this statement was the memorandum
which he had left with President de Gaulle, plus certain additions
which were in the same vein as regards the United States and which
referred to Soviet willingness to hold a summit conference within
6 to 8 months. The major addition was the cancellation of the in-
vitation to the President to visit the Soviet Union.
Apart from his statement, which was made public, the President
only once joined in the ensuing discussion?in order to make clear to
Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues that the suspension of the U-2.
flights was not merely for the duration of the conference, but for as
long as he was in office.
The balance of the discussion at this meeting, which I should point
out was the only one during the entire period in Paris at which the
Soviets were present, was largely devoted to attempts by President de
Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan to dissuade Mr. Khrushchev
from the irrevocable step of publishing his abusive statement, whose
unacceptable conditions would render impossible any conference at
the summit, and to Khruslichev's adamant insistence that he would
publish this statement and do so at a time of his own choosing. The
meeting broke up on the basis of a suggestion by President de Gaulle
that the conferees should reflect on this matter for 21 hours and then
examine the situation.
BINDING NATTJRE OF DECISIONS MADE PRIOR TO KIIRUSIICIIEV'S DEPARTURE
FROM MOSCOW
This meeting completely confirmed our conclusion of the night
before that Mr. Khrushchev was operating within the fixed limits of
a policy set before his departure from Moscow. It is significant in
this connection that the statement he issued later that day, Monday,
May 16, which was identical with the one he had made at the confer-
ence, took no cognizance whatsoever of the discussion at the conference,
and in particular of the President's statement concerning the suspen-
sion of U-2 overflights.
FINAL PROCEEDINGS IN PARIS
Secretary HERTER. The rest of the proceedings in Paris were anti-
climactic. It was apparent to all the Western representatives that
there was no possibility of a summit conference short of a changed
position on Mr. Khrushchev's part. On Monday, Mr. Macmillan
visited Mr. Khrushchev in a fruitless effort to persuade him to with-
draw his impossible demands.
On that same day, President de Gaulle decided, with the agreement
of the President and Prime Minister Macmillan, to call a session of
the summit conference for 3 p.m. on Tuesday, May 17, which was after
the 24-hour recess which he had proposed on Monday. He sent invi-
tations in writing to the three other participants.
The President'', in accepting, made clear his view that acce-Dtance by
the Soviet representative would mean that the Soviets had abandoned
the demands which the President had previously found completely
unacceptable.
*NOV
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 11
Mr. Khrushchev did not show up at the appointed time for the
Tuesday meeting. After a great deal of telephoning between the
Soviet Embassy and the French Foreign Office it became clear that
he was refusing to attend a summit conference and would only join
in what he termed a preliminary meeting to ascertain if conditions
could be created for a summit conference. By this reference to "con-
ditions" he obviously meant the acceptance by the United States of all
of the conditions he had set forth previously, and indeed he so stated
in a written communication to President de Gaulle later that same
day.
THE TRIPARTITE COMMUNIQUE
In the light of Mr. Khrushchev's refusal to attend the summit
conference, except on terms which all three Western representatives
deemed unacceptable, the three Western heads of government met
briefly at 9:30 p.m., on May 17 to approve the final tripartite com-
munique, a copy of which I should like to insert in the record, at
this point.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it may be done.
(The tripartite communique referred to appears on p. 235 of ap-
pendix 1.)
TrarmarrE MEETINGS TO ASSESS SITUATION
Secretary HERTER. Thus the summit conference was ended by
Soviet intransigence before it began, without addressing the great
international issues with which it was supposed to deal.
The following day, Wednesday, May 18, was marked by tripartite
meetings of the Western heads of government and their foreign min-
isters to consider the situation. In these meetings we soug;ht to
analyze the reasons for the Soviet attitude, prospects for the future,
and the measures that the three Western Powers might adopt.
PREMIER KIIRLISIICIIEV'S PARIS PRESS CONFERENCE
This day was also marked by Mr. Khrushchev's press conference,
which was fully reported by press, television, and radio. It was
apparently an unparalleled performance of vituperation, abuse, and
loss of temper. It should be noted, however, that despite the appar-
ently uncontrolled nature of his remarks and actions at this press
conference, Mr. Khrushchev was very careful not to commit himself to
any specific course of action in the international field.
ANALYSIS OF SOVIET ACTION
We have naturally given a great deal of thought to the reasons for
this extraordinary action by the Soviets in coming all the way from
Moscow to Paris for the sole purpose of sabotaging the conference.
I should like to say right off that there are many obscure aspects
of this Soviet behavior and that we do not know all considerations and
factors which went into its determination. We probably never shall.
I hardly need to emphasize here to the members of this committee
the complete secrecy in which decisions are arrived at in the Soviet
Government and in the hierarchy of the Communist Party, which is
the effective ruler of that country. It is only possible to try to deduce
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12 EVENTS lNCH)ENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
from Soviet actions, after they are taken, the considerations which
brought them about. What I give you now, therefore, is at best a
tentative estimate of why the Soviet Union behaved as it did, an
estimate which may have to be revised i a the light of further informa-
tion and future events.
DECISION TO WRECK CONFERENCE MADE PRIOR TO KHRUSTICHEV'S DEPARTURE
FROM MOSCOW
There is one thing, however, that can be regarded as certain: This
is that the decision to wreck the conference was made prior to Khru-
0-whey's departure from Moscow. At no point during his stay in
Paris?neither when he disclosed his true intentions to General de
Gaulle at 11 a.m. on Sunday the 15th nor subsequently?did Khru-
shchev deviate one inch from his demands that the United States (1)
denounce the overflights, (2) apologize to the Soviet Union, (3)
punish these flights. Neither the statement made by the President at
the one meeting held on Monday nor the serious and responsible efforts
of General de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan in bilateral talks with Mr.
Khrushchev before and after the President's announcement of sus-
pension of flights could persuade him to withdraw these unacceptable
demands. Indeed, it is a logical deduction from his behavior in Paris
that he had no authority to modify his position to any significant
degree.
SIGNIFICANCE OF GROMYE 0 AND MAI:INOVSKY ACCOMPANYING
KIIKUSIICH EV
The fact that he was accompanied everywhere, and literally every-
where, by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky is an
interesting sidelight on this point. There is much speculation as to
this change from his previous attitude during his visits both to the
United States and France, when he insisted upon having meetings
alone with the President and with President de Gaulle, with only
interpreters present. The best guess as to the significance of this new
factor is that (1) in view of the brutal and threatening attitude he
adopted at Paris it was considered desirable to have some tangible evi-
dence of Soviet armed strength in the person of Marshal Malinovsky.
Secondly, Gromyko and Malinovsky would be able to testify upon
return to Moscow that he had stuck strictly to the agreed position.
DECISION TO CANCEL INVITATION TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER; SOVIETS'
EXTREME POSITION
It also seems certain that the decision to cancel the invitation to the
President was made before Khrushchev left Moscow.
As to what led the Soviets to this extreme position, in regard to the
summit meeting which had previously appeared so much desired by
Mr. Khrushchev, we enter into the realm of pure speculation, as I
indicated earlier. The most we can hope to do in the absence of
reliable information is to evaluate the elements and factors which
appear to have entered into this decision. I shall try to list them
briefly.
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SIGNIFICANCE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S DOUBTS OF SUMMIT SUCCESS ON
SOVIET TERMS
1. There was considerable indication, particularly during April
that Mr. Khrushchev had concluded that there was little likelihood
of his having his way, particularly in regard to Berlin, at the summit.
Evidence of 'Western determination and unity on this point in speeches
and statements by Western leaders appears to have brought him to
this conclusion. Thus in his Baku speech on April 25, he not only
reiterated with the utmost finality his position on Berlin, including his
intention to conclude a separate peace treaty with the East German
regime, but he also began for the first time seriously to cast doubts
upon the success of the summit. By this of course he meant success on
Soviet terms.
SOVIET HIERARCHY'S VIEWS OF KIIRUSIICHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY AND 13-2
INCIDENT
2. Although the evidence is highly inconclusive there are a number
of indications that Mr. Khrushchev's conduct of Soviet foreign policy,
particularly his overpersonalization and in Communist eyes over-
commitment through personal visits to the United States and France,
was arousing at least serious questioning if not opposition to the So-
viet hierarchy. It would seem a logical deduction that some of the
opposition to his conduct of foreign relations which was openly
voiced by the Chinese Communists found a sympathetic response
among some of his associates, and very probably among the Soviet
military.
3. It was against this background that the U-2 incident occurred.
WEIGHING THE FACTORS RESULTING IN CONFERENCE DISRUPTION
A combination of these three factors in our judgment is what re-
sulted in the definite and brutal decision to disrupt the Paris con-
ference. To determine how each of these factors should be weighed
is, for the moment, beyond our reach.
The U-2 incident was most certainly seized upon and magnified
beyond its true proportions as a justification for this decision. It is
debatable whether it would have been possible for Mr. Khrushchev
to devise another pretext for so radical and violent a position.
It might well be that a lack of success at the summit would have
confronted Khrushchev with a much more difficult choice, from his
point of view, than no conference at all. Ile and his associates may
have therefore much preferred to avoid facing the consequences of
failure of negotiation by the simple expedient of torpedoing the
conference.
BASIC MISCALCULATION IN SOVIET THINKING
It may seem incredible to you that responsible leaders of a great
power should have come all the way to Paris merely for the purpose
of wrecking the conference, thereby incurring worldwide condem-
nation of the Soviet Union and enhancing the sense of unity and pur-
pose among not only the Western Powers represented there but also
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and free nations everywhere.
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t EVENTS IN C I DENT CO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
I believe the answer lies in a basic miscalculation in Mr. Khru-
slichev's and the Soviet's thinking.
Mr. lihruslichey undoubtedly hoped?and. this explains his early
arrival in Paris?to divide the allies and isolat'e the I nit ad St WI CS.
Ile anticipated that the United States would refuse the demands he
had set forth and that the conference would then collapse, with the
United States -Iva ri rig responsibility for the rupture before world
opinion.
His plans miscarrie,4 I because our two allies stood sol idly and loyally
with the United States a nd refused to be parties to Mr. _Khrushchev's
scheme. The result, as t he whole world knows, was that the position
which Mr. Khrushchey brought to Paris resulted in the complete
isolation of the Soviet 'Union rather than the United States and in
placing the responsibility for the disruption of the conference squarely
where it belongs?on his own shoulders.
This estimate of the reasons for Mr. Khrushchev's behavior is
strongly supported by the attack which he made at his press confer-
ence on General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan for what he
termed their lack of objectivity, lack of will and subservience to the al-
lied relationships-4n other words, in plain English, for their solidarity
with the United Slates, their loyalty to our common purpose, and their
refusal to play the Soviet game.
SIGNS Oi \O RADICAL ALTERATION IN SOVIET POLT(71Y
117. The future
What conclusions should we draw for the future?
1 believe the signs are that there has been as yet no radical altera-
tion in Soviet, policy, though we can expect the continuance of a propa-
ganda effort designed to split off the United States from its allies.
This conclusion is supported by Mr. Khrushchev's Paris statements,
including those at his press conference. It is supported, somewhat
more specifically and definitely, by the statements which he made in
Berlin on his way home.
We must remember, however, that, given the nature of the Soviet.
state, the men who run it can meet in secret at any time and change
existing policy without public debate or even foreshadowing any such
change. It is for this reason that any statement about a phase of So-
viet policy must be regarded as qualified, with no certainty that it will
remain valid in the future.
Thus, though the world's hopes have been keenly disappointed by
the fact; that the summit conference was not held as plan tied, the signs
so far are that the basic realities of the world situation have not been
greatly changed. Whether this continues to be so depends, as I have
indicated, on actions of the leading Communist countries.
1)1 cwrioNs Ft E .5. EOM CV
Provisionally, however, I conclude that the implication for IT.S.
policy is that the main lines of our policy remain sound and should be
continued. The lesson of Paris is that we should prosecute those lines
with renewed effort. Proponents within the Communist bloc of an
aggressive course must not be encouraged by signs of weakness on our
part. Proponents of a peaceful course should be encouraged by our
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readiness to get on with outstanding international business in a sober
and rational manner.
We must remain prepared to withstand aggressive pressures, not
only in Berlin but also elsewhere. I trust that our evident readiness
will deter such pressures.
FRESH REALIZATION OF THE DANGERS WE FACE
Among the lessons of Paris, the most important for the free world,
including ourselves, it seems to me is fresh realization of the dangers
we face and consequent need for Closing of ranks and moving ahead
with our own and our allies' programs for strengthening the free world.
We came back from Paris with a keener sense of what it means to have
allies, and I am sure that our alliances will take new life from this ex-
perience.
At the same time I would stress equally the need to expand imagi-
natively and generously our collaboration with the newly developing
countries.
On both accounts, I hope the Congress will give wholehearted sup-
port to our mutual security programs as authorized by this committee,
which are now more important than ever.
SEEKING TO MAKE PROGRESS ON OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIET
UNION
We must continue, as the President has said, to seek in a businesslike
way to make progress on outstanding problems with the Soviet Union.
We intend to go ahead with existing negotiations, to stand by our com-
ls/ mitments, and to foster open communication and peaceful exchanges.
Above all, we shall not cease from the most determined, patient, re-
sourceful endeavor to find ways to bring the arms race under con-
trol and thus to meet the nuclear menace that hangs over mankind.
MAINTAINING A VIGILANT, CALM, AND RESOLUTE POSTURE
I believe in this period it is incumbent upon us, all of us, to keep
a calm and steady gaze on the world scene and to avoid actions, state-
ments, and attitudes which might tend unnecessarily to increase inter-
national tension. If such an increase is to occur, it should be clearly
the fault of the Soviets and we should not do them the favor of
providing pretext for action by them which would have this effect.
We should not define as "hard" or "soft" our attitude or policy
toward the Soviet Union. To do so is not only to deflect our gaze
from the grim reality that confronts us, but even more to plunge us
inevitably into fruitless and damaging domestic recrimination. We
must now, as in the future, maintain a vigilant, calm, and resolute
posture and, insofar as it lies in our power to do so, be accurate in
our estimates and effective in our actions.
I would close in expressing the hope that we will not become so
fixed in preoccupation with the Soviet challenge as to lose sight of
our own constructive purposes?which are larger and more im-
portant than merely resisting or reacting to external threats. We
have our own vision of the future toward which we want to see the
world evolve. We have our own programs for helping to bring that
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16 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
future about?for bolding high the light of freedom, for sharing its
message and rewards with emerging nations, for trying to create an
international community in which the rule of law will replace the
rule of force. It is to these programs that our talents and energies
should be rededicated in the uncertain times that lie ahead.
Thank you, Mr. C
The Ott AIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Reporter, I have the documentation mentioned by the Secretary
on page 4, which wil I be inserted in the record at this point. They are
the various documents and speeches.
(The documentation referred to is as follows:)
STATEMENTS DY KITRUSHCHEV SINCE VISIT TO UNITED STATES
'orinued by the Department of Statel
The following is a collect ion of public statements made by Khrusbehev from
the time of his departure from the United States until May 5, 1960, which are
offensive or threatening in nature vis-a-vis the West, particularly the United
States. The statements are arranged under the following headings: (1) Berlin.-
ermany ; (2) United States and Western policy; (3) the summit ; (4) com-
ments on West during Asian tour. They have been extracted from the following
statements and speeches:
Speech in Moscow, upon return from United States, September 28, 1959.
Speech in Vladivristoh. October 8, 1959.
Speech to Supreme Soviet, October 31, 1959.
Speech to Soviet journalists., November 14, 1959.
Speech at Hungarian Party Congress, 1)ecember 1, 1959.
Speech to Supreine Soviet, January 14, 1960.
Letter to Chancellor Adenauer, January 28, 1964).
Speech to Indian Parliament, February 11, 1960.
Speech at Delhi (a vi c reception, February 12, 1960.
Speech at Bhilai, February 15, 1960.
Speech at Calcutta dinner, February 15, 1960.
Speech at JogjaLarta, February 21, 1900.
Speech to Indonesian Parliament, February 26, 1960.
Press conference at. Jakarta, February 29, 1960.
Press conference at Jakarta, March 1, 1960.
Speech at press luncheon. March 25, 1960.
Speech in Rheims, March 29, 1960.
Press conference at Rambouillet, April 2, 1960.
Speech in Moseow, upon return from France, April 4, 1960.
Speech in Baku, April 25, 1960.
It should be noted that this collection does not include private statements and
criticisms of West Germany. On occasion, Khrushchev has been especially
offensive and threatening in private talks. The Federal Republic and Chancel-
lor Adenauer personally were the chief targets of offensive public statements on
Khrushchev's part during this period. Beginning with his November 14 speech
to Soviet journalists, Klirvishchev launched a vigorous campaign of slander
against the FRG and Adena her designed to discredit them and isolate the FRG
from the West. At times these public statements were truly scurrilous, liken-
ing the Chancellor to Nazis, to Hitler, calling him senile, etc.
It is also important 10 note that in his December 1 speech in Budapest, after
a lapse of 31/4 months. Kbrushehey renewed his threat of a separate peace
treaty without any provocation on the part of the West. Apparently Khru-
slichev then concluded that the West would go ahead with a summit conference
and that it was therefore timely to begin exerting pressure on the West on the
key issue of Berlin. Moreover, Khrushchev's threat of a separate treaty, in
terms of the consequences for the allied position in Berlin, became more explicit
and menacing with each succeeding major speech after the December 1 speech,
culminating in his April 25 Baku speech threat that the allies would thereby
not only be deprived of a legal basis for maintaining access, but would have
no right to maintain troops in Berlin.
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BERLIN-GERMANY
"The only way [to settle the Berlin problem] is to sign a peace treaty with
Germany, and we have submitted a proposal to that effect. There is no evading
a peace treaty for anyone, if the other countries on whom the signing of a peace
treaty depends stand for peace and coexistence. The vestiges of World War II
must at long last be removed, since they constitute a source that nourishes the
instigators of a third world war. We are not forcing a solution of the West
Berlin problem in point of time; we are setting no deadlines, issuing no ultima-
tums; but at the same time we shall not slacken our efforts to come to terms
with our allies.
"If we? try all means and they do not lead to the desired results, we shall have
no other way out except signing a peace treaty with whichever of the two Ger-
man states wants it. And in such a case we shall bear no responsibility for the
refusal to sign the peace treaty. It will he borne by those who had an unrea-
sonable approach to the solution of this problem, who did not take the road of
easing tension in relations between states but, on the contrary, wanted to
preserve the dangerous source threatening the outbreak of a third world
war * * *
"We are doing our utmost to make the Soviet proposals acceptable. We do
not impose them, but wish to reach agreement through negotiations, though we
have every right to sign a peace treaty with the GDR if the Government of
the Federal Republic of Germany does not wish to sign a peace treaty.
"We have before our eyes the example of the United States of America, which
has signed a peace treaty with Japan without us. However, it cannot be held
that one side can unilaterally sign treaties while the other cannot, though a
peace treaty with Japan was signed earlier to its detriment. * * *
"The liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin will undoubtedly be
conducive to this [improving relations]. We wish to reach agreement with all
our former allies. This is why we do not fix any time limits. We want the
solution of this question to improve, not worsen, our relations. The Soviet
Government is ready to try out any conceivable peaceful means to secure a
reasonable solution of the German problem, to promote the improvement of the
international atmosphere, and to create conditions for disarmament and the
NNW' establishment of eternal peace on earth for the sake of mankind's happiness.
"But if we do not meet with understanding, if the forces backing Chancellor
Adenauer obstinately insist on the 'positions of strength' policy, we shall have
no other choice left but to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. The Soviet Union
does not intend to connive with those who are for the continuation of the
`positions of strength' policy. We and our allies would readily sign a treaty
with West Germany, but if we do not succeed in this, we shall be compelled to
sign a unilateral treaty with the GDR." (Speech at Hungarian Party Con-
gress, December 1, 1959. Khrushchev's first public threat to sign a separate
peace treaty with the GDR after his U.S. visit.)
"The Soviet Government considers that a peaceful settlement with Germany
is an urgent international question, a question of the very foremost importance.
We shall make every effort to have this question solved at last. We sincerely
strive to find a solution for the German question together with our allies in
the struggle against Hitler Germany. We consider that along with this the
question of West Berlin too will be settled on an agreed basis. If, however,
all our efforts to conclude a peace treaty with the two German states fail
to be crowned with success after all, the Soviet Union, and other willing states,
will sign a peace treaty with the GDR with all the consequences proceeding
from this." (Khrushchev Supreme Soviet speech, January 14, 1900.)
"But what if we do not meet understanding? Could it be that we should live
forever without a peace treaty, and forever resign ourselves to an abnormal
situation in West Berlin?
"Of course, we cannot reconcile ourselves to such a situation. If the Soviet
Union does not meet understanding it will have no other recourse but to sign
a peace treaty with the GDR with all the ensuing consequences, including those
for West Berlin. That treaty would settle the frontier questions of Germany
with the Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic. With the
signing of a peace treaty it would be clear to all that to strive to alter the exist-
ing frontiers means nothing else but to bring matters to a war. We shall not
abet aggressive forces which cherish the dream of pushing German frontiers
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to the east. If some states refuse to sign a peace treaty it will also be clear
to all what they stand for peace or war, for relaxation of tension and friendly
relations or for cold IVO r." (Letter to Adeaauer, January 2.i9;0.
"AP (loiatEseoNntaxT. laid you actually say that you will insist on a 'Western
withdrawal from West Berlin regardless of the concessions they may make
to Russia's position on disarmament? Did you make this statement to Presi-
dent Gronehi of Italy?
"K H RES IICHEV. The question is put in a not too correct way. The Western
powers are allegedly to make concessions to the Soviet Union on questions
of safeguarding peace, while we are to make concessions to the West with
regard to Berlin. This is incorrect. These are two independent questions,
each of which requires a separate solution.
"Is it only the Soviet Union and the socialist countries that are interested in
disarmament, in safeguarding peace? All the peoples are interested in safe-
guarding peace. This is why it is necessary to consider the disarmament ques-
1,ion and solve it in a way beneficial for all countries, for alt the peoples, for
the cause of peace.
"The question of West Berlin is entirely different. This is a question whose
solution has been dragged out for 15 years since the end of the war. How
much longer can we wait? A summit conference will meet shortly to strengthen
peace, but: the leftovers of the last war have not been done away with yet.
This situation contradicts commonsense. This is why we shall strive to wipe
out the hangovers of war, shall try to convince our allies of the last war to
sign a peace treaty with the two existing German states. If they fail to under-
stand this need or if they realize it but refuse to agree, then we shall sign a
peace treaty with the GDR.
"When a peace treaty with the GDR is signed, all the consequences of the
war against Germany will 'ease to exist on the territory of the GDR and with
regard to West Berlin as well. West Berlin is on the territory of the GDR."
t Djakarta press conference. February 29, 1960.)
"Question of FRANCE-0nR correspondent MICHEL GORDET. YOU are regarded
as an advocate of peaceful coexistence and territorial status quo between East
end West. If this really is so, why do you question the status quo in Berlin
where the military positions of the Western powers are weak?
`4` * * If all our possibilities are exhausted and our aspirations not under-
stood, we shall unilaterally sign a peace treaty with the GDR. This will settle
i he problems connected with the liquidation of the remnants of the war le the
territory of the GDR which will sign the peace treaty with us: the problem
of liquidating the occupation regime in West Berlin will also be settled.'"
t'Diplomatic Press Association luncheon in Paris, March 25. 1960.)
"We are doing and shall continue to do our utmost to achieve understanding
for our policy and to secure the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.
repeat, we shall do our utmost to this end. If the Western powers do not
understand our peace-loving position, we shall have to conclude a peace treaty
with the GDR." (Rheims luncheon, March 29, 1960.)
"Fontaine of LE MONDE. Mr. Chairman, you more than once intimated that the
:-;oviet Union would sign a separate treaty with the GDR if the summit meeting
did not lead to the conclusion of a German peace treaty. (solid you say more
precisely to what extent such a treaty would affect the communications between
ilie Western garrisons in Berlin a ml West Germany?
"K ii ntruciii,:v. If we do not meet with understanding on the part of the lead-
ers of those countries with which the Soviet Union fought against Hitler Ger-
many, we shall have to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR alone. However,
ihis is very undesirable for us; we should not like to do so. But if there is no
other way out, we---a not only we but a number of other countries that fought
against Nazi Germany- --will be impelled to sign a peace treaty with the GDR
alone, and all rights arising from the surrender of Nazi Germany would then
necome invalid on the entire territory under the sovereignty of the GDR. Hence,
all countries now having garrisons in West Berlin on the basis of the surrender
and defeat of Nazi Germaey, would lose all rights connected with the occupation
if the city. We have declared this more than once and we also reaffirm this
today." (Rambouillet press conference, April 2, 1960.)
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"We shall do everything to solve this question [German peace treaty] on a
basis acceptable to the Western powers. But if our efforts are fruitless, then
the Soviet Union will conclude a peace treaty with the GDR. And we are sure
that all those who understand the necessity of removing the abnormal situation
in the center of Europe will sign it along with the Soviet Union.
"We are also convinced that, despite the efforts of Chancellor Aclenauer, the
Western powers, sooner or later, will arrive at the same conclusion we have.
Life itself will compel them to understand that the conclusion of a peace treaty
with the two German states is the only correct solution insuring normal condi-
tions of peace and tranquility in Europe." (Lenin Stadium speech on return
from France, April 4, 1960.)
"So that nobody should have any illusions, I would like to state sincerely
and directly: those who think this, and those who are going to follow such a
policy, are going to be disappointed. The Soviet Government, for its part, will
do everything to make our position clear, and will spare no effort to convince
our partners of the need to conclude a peace treaty and set up a free city in
West Berlin. But if, in spite of all our efforts, the Western powers show them-
selves unwilling to seek together with the Soviet Union an agreed solution of the
question of a peace treaty, and, contrary to common sense, ignore this question,
then we shall of course go our own way and will conclude a peace treaty with
the German Democratic Republic.
"I think that the Soviet Union will not be alone in concluding this peace treaty.
Along with us, it will be signed by many other states which are also convinced
of the need for a peaceful settlement with Germany.
"The supporters of an aggressive course where the socialist countries are
concerned often reason that allegedly even after the signing of a peace treaty with
the GDR, the three Western powers would retain the right as before to the main-
tenance of their troops in West Berlin. I must say that this is an incorrect
Interpretation, and a policy which is based on such calculations is doomed
to failure.
"It is generally known that the signing of a peace treaty will put an end to
those conditions which were brought about by the capitulation of the country.
Therefore, when a peace treaty is signed with the GDR, on the whole territory
^ Which is controlled by the government of this state, the conditions brought
about by the surrender will no longer obtain. Thus in relation to this territory,
the rights which the Western powers obtained as a result of the surrender of
Hitlerite Germany will also lose effect, including the right to the further main-
tenance of the occupation regime in West Berlin.
"Some politicians say that they, allegedly, do not recognize the GDR, and
therefore they do not want to have anything to do with it. It even gets to the
point where they call for insuring the stay of the troops of the three powers
In West Berlin, and their rights in relation to that city, as based on the sur-
render and with the aid of force.
"I must warn such hotheads, that when appeal is not made to right and
? law, when force is invoked, it is natural that force should be opposed by the
force of the other side, a force which will rest on law, on right, and will conse-
quently win the moral support of all countries. It cannot be otherwise.
"Our policy is based on concrete conditions. The Soviet Government is
guided by the good intentions of liquidating the remnants of World War II,
of removing the occupation regime in West Berlin, and of giving West Berlin
the status of a free city. Contrary to the assertions of unscrupulous propaganda
in the West, nobody intends to encroach upon the freedom, property, and rights
of the inhabitants of West Berlin. They will be given every opportunity and
every condition for a free choice of the political and social system they desire.
"But West Berlin lies within the territory of the GDR, and obviously when
a peace treaty is signed, the GDR will exercise sovereign rights over its entire
state territory. If, therefore, the Western powers should not wish to sign a
peace treaty with the GDR, that would not preserve for them the rights on
whose preservation they insist. They would then obviously lose the right of
access to West Berlin by land, water, or air." (Khrushchev speech at meeting
in Baku, April 25, 1960.)
U.S. AND WESTERN POLICY
"There are forces in the U.S. which are acting against us, against the easing
of tension, and for the continuation of the cold war. To shut one's eyes to this
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would mean showing weakness in the struggle against these evil forces, against
these evil spirits.
"* * I have gained the impression that there are forces in the United States
which act not in the same direction as the President. These forces want a
continuation of the cold war and the armaments race. Whether these forces
are big or small, influential or not influential, whether the forces which support
the President can win?and he is supported by the absolute majority of the
U.S. people?are questions to which I would not hasten to give a final answer."
(Speech in Moscow, upon return from U.S. visit, September 28, 1959.)
"Some militant American generals are trying to frighten us. They are
making many speeches with threats against us * * *. 1 have already said many
times that to make militant speeches in our day, when terrible means of de-
struction have been created, is an extremely dangerous business." (Speech in
Vladivostok, October 8, 1950.)
However, the most bellicose leaders in the West cannot in any way give
up the old methods. Echoes of the past are still heard here and there. Take
for example the lamentable decision of the U.S. Congress to hold a so-called
'captive nations week' and to offer prayers for their liberation!'
"* * * Herter and Assistant Secretary of State Dillon in speeches began
something in the nature of psychological attack against the Soviet Union, trying
deliberately to distort the character of relations between our country and China
* * *. I do not know how it sounds in English, but in Russian attempts of this
kind may be called 'bovine logic.'" (Speech to Supreme Soviet, October 21,
1959.)
Our policy is not a position of strength policy * * *. By the way, I shall
reveal?and let people abroad know it, I am making no secret of it?that in one
year 250 rockets with hydrogen warheads came off the assembly line in a factory
we visited. This represents millions of tons in terms of conventional explosives.
You can weli imagine that if this lethal weapon Is exploded over some country
there will be nothing left there at all." (Speech to Soviet journalists, November
14, 1959.)
"During our talks in Washington I told Mr. Eisenhower that his position
differed from mine, of course. I was authorized by the Soviet tiovernment, in
conformity with the desire of our people, to immediately sign an agreement on
disarmament * * *. I believe that the President also wants this, but apparently
he cannot do it because there are still strong quarters in the U.S. that oppose
disarmament. We must not be deceived in this respect. Yesterday I read Mr.
Nelson Rockefeller's statement * * *. But Messrs. Imperialists, if you try to
return to the positions of the cold war, Rockefeller will not save you, just as
Dulles could not save you." Speech to Soviet journalists, November 14, 1959.)
"Even now the enemies of socialism are not abandoning their plans for
smashing the socialist camp and are, of course, looking for the weak links in it.
They want to rout the socialist countries one by one. We must bear this in mind,
because it is real, and we must do everything to deprive our enemies of these
hopes, thwart these hopes." (Speech to Hungarian Party Congress, December
1,
'Thirst for profit is pushing some imperialistic circles toward continuing the
arms race and maintaining the cold war. These circles are sufficiently influential
to harm the cause of easing international tension in certain conditions. Those
political leaders who have joined their interests with the policy of the arms race
are afraid of the easing of international tension and regard it as unthinkable
that this easing could become a fact * * *. It is clear that the imperialists will
try again to rally the forces of the advocates of cold war." (Speech to Supreme
Soviet, January 14, 1960.1
"Is to the questions to be discussed at the conference of the heads of govern-
meets, I should like to express some reservations. The nearer May 16, the day
of the meeting of the heads of government, approaches; the more one-sided be-
comes the approach of some statesmen of the Western powers to the problems
the participants of the conference will have to face. They talk about and fan
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those aspects of this or that problem which, if attention is focused on them,
cannot further the search for mutually accepted solutions. It goes without
saying that such an attitude does not help the search for ways of solving im-
portant international issues. On the contrary, it leads to a maintenance of
tension and consequently hinders the normalization of relations between states.
"There is no need to look far to find an example. Let us take a speech,
recently made by the U.S. under secretary of state, Dillon, and offered as a
summary of U.S. policy before the summit conference. This speech positively
smelled of the spirit of the cold war. Dillon's speech reminds us, if anything,
of a collection of prefabricated arguments, against the USSR and socialist
countries, rather than of a responsible political statement. He kicked up a
hullabaloo about the constant communist threat to peace, proposed that the
conception of peaceful coexistence be thrown overboard, and crassly distorted
the Soviet proposals on disarmament, the conclusion of a German peace treaty,
and on West Berlin's transformation into a free city.
"Dillon tried to introduce a stream of unfriendliness and mistrust on the
very eve of the summit conference, when it is so important to be consistent,
to create and support an atmosphere of trust between states. Dillon described
the summit conference as a check on the sincerity of the intentions of the
USSR. He tried to make out that the outcome of the conference depends entirely
on the USSR and not on all the participants. But nobody will succeed in
undermining the trust in the good will of the USSR, the policy of which is
clear, is permeated by love of peace and has gained the firm sympathy of the
peoples.
"In the eyes of the peoples, the summit conference is truly a serious testing
of the policies of the states represented at that conference, perhaps, most of
all, of the policy of the United States itself. The peoples will judge sincerity
of intention on what each of the four powers brings with it to the conference,
and what contribution each power is ready to make to the cause of the lessening
of international tension.
"But if one goes by the statement of Mr. Dillon, who understandably is not
an outsider to government circles in the United States, it turns out that the
U.S. Government is ready to come to an agreement on the disarmament ques-
tion and on the improvement of relations between the states of East and West
only if its own viewpoint is accepted on the Berlin question.
"Why did Dillon have to make a statement which is obviously out of harmony
with the atmosphere established between the Soviet Union and the United
States after my talks with President Eisenhower at Camp David? Maybe this
is simply a manifestation of pugnacity by a diplomat who has got it stuck in
his head that if one attacks the other side before talks begin, the other side
will become more yielding? One would like to say to Mr. Dillon, and to those
who may share his opinion, that such methods are most unsuitable in dealing
with the Soviet Union." ( Speech in Baku, April 25, 1900.)
TIIE SUMMIT
"Some in the West claim that the Soviet Union has changed its policy and,
therefore, it has become easier to talk with us. This is wrong, of course. We
were born Communists, we live as Communists, and will not die, but will con-
tinue to march onward as Communists." (Khrushchev speech at Soviet journal-
ists' meeting, November 14, 1959 (referring to a de Gaulle statement made at a
November 10 press conference) .)
"We have recently reached an agreement * * * on convening a conference
of heads of government on May 16 in Paris. It is envisaged that this conference
will be followed by a number of summit meetings. It would be improvident to
try to guess beforehand the possible results of the forthcoming conference * * *
(Khrushchev speech to Supreme Soviet, January 14, 1960.)
"As for the imminent summit meeting * * * naturally we must not think that
all controversial issues can be regulated in one or two meetings between the
leaders of Western and Eastern powers." (Khrushchev speech at Paris press
luncheon, March 25, 1960.)
NoTn.--Por Khrushchev's last public statement on the summit before May 1, see his
comments of April 25 in Baku quoted under "U.S. and Western Policy."
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0010 TS ON WEST DURING ASIAN TOUR
"Everyone sees how the plans of the reactionary circles of certain Western
powers which pursued a foreign policy 'from positions of strength' are coming
to grief. Common sense and the understanding that the policy of 'brinkmanship'
lS a fatal policy under present conditions are beginning to gain ground.
"It is known that there are circles in the West who are unwilling to reconcile
themselves to the beginning of the relaxation of international tension and seek
to reverse the march of time and revert the world to cold war times. Especially
dangerous in this respect are the activities of the military blocs of NATO,
SIIATO, and CENTO, the holding of military maneuvers in various parts of the
World and the establishment of new bases, including those for nuclear-tipped
rockets. In this connection it is impossible to overlook the actions of the
Japanese ruling circles, which are a danger to the cause of peace.
"The question of peace is the main question of our time. Closely connected
with it is the question of the abolition of the colonial system. The sooner the
colonial powers are deprived of their colonies?and the colonialists will then be
unable to plunder and oppress other nations?the quicker peace on earth will be
established * * *.
"In our time, the colonialists cannot act as they did in the past when the
destinies of people throughout the world were decided in European capitals.
They are casting about for new ways and means of enslaving countries which
recently achieved independence * * *
"Especially dangerous to the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America are
various forms of collective colonialism. It is impossible not to mention such
manifestations of colonialism as military-political blocs.
"Provocations against Indonesia, Cambodia and Laos are but a few of
the shameful deeds of the SEATO bloc operating in your area." (Speech to
Indonesian Parliament, 'February 26, 1960.)
"The struggle for strengthening peace is not an easy job, for still active in
softie countries are influential forces interested in the continued arms race,
and in wrecking the prospect now in evidence of a decrease in international
tmision and in rekindling the cold war.
"SOIDO of the Western countries are advanced just because those of Asia,
Africa and Latin America are underdeveloped. It would be only fair for the
Western nations to repay at least a portion of the looted wealth to the peoples
whom they held in bondage:" (Khrushehey speech to Indian Parliament,
February 11, 1900.)
-Whereas all the peace-loving peoples want a further relaxation of inter-
national tension, the cold and hot war advocates continue galvanizing such
aggressive blocs as NATO. SEATO and CENT'170." (Khrushchey speech at Civic
Reception in Delhi, February 12, 1960.)
The Soviet Union and the West have two different approaches to aid. The
Soviet Union strives to achieve economic aid which promotes economic inde-
pendence. But some people in the West utilize assistance as ii weapon of new
colonial policy." (Khrushchey speech at Bhilai, February 1.5, 1960.)
"t do not think all of you understand when we show bitterness toward colonial-
ists. For some ages you have been oppressed by colonialists, but still you do
not feel as strongly as we do, though we have never in the strietest sense been
a colony." (Khrushcbev speech at a dinner in Calcutta, February 15, 1960.)
"Peace is also sought by the greater part of the peoples of the capitalist
states in Europe and North America, even in the United States of America
whose people for long have been influenced by the propaganda of those on the
side of the cold war, where expressions of agreement with peace are considered
almost akin to traitoronq acts towards the interest of the state. * * *" Ichru-
shchev speech at Jogjakarta State University of Gadjah :Itada) February
21, 1960.)
''The European colonialists Implanted their so-called civilization in Asia by
the sword and the gun and for centuries they held up the development of the
countries they enslaved." (Statement at Press Conference, Djakarta, March 1,
1960.)
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"However, to be frank, one must say that the Western countries, having
pumped out incalculable wealth from the colonies as a result of centuries of
plunder and are continuing to pump out wealth in one way or another * * *
might be fair enough to allocate at least a portion of this wealth for aid to
underdeveloped countries." (Khrushchev speech to Indonesian parliament,
February 26, 1960.)
"[Afro-Asian countries] are important suppliers of raw materials for the
Western powers. The supporters of aggression understand that when the
majority of Afro-Asian countries follow a peace-loving policy, they are unable
to count on the use of the rich resources of Afro-Asian countries in their ag-
gressive plans." (Khrushchev speech to Jogjakarta University, February 22,
1960.)
"The capitalist states are guided by the law of their society?no cheating, no
sales?in other words help the weak today so that tomorrow the weak will again
come to you for assistance. " * This is not assistance, but striving to hook
by the ear and drag into slavery, to make one or another country the object
of exploitation by a state or group of persons." (Khrushchev press conference,
Djakarta, February 29, 1960.)
ADDITIONAL KIIEUSIICHEV STATEMENTS
The following Khrushchev statements all made after his return from the US,
do not fit easily into the four categories listed above. They serve, however, to
illustrate his interpretation of "peaceful coexistence," "detente," "capitalism,"
"exchange of ideas," etc.
"There were very good things [in the US], but we must not forget the bad
things. This little worm, or, rather, giant worm is still alive, and can display
Its vitality in the future as well." (Moscow Speech on return from US, September
28, 1959.)
"We must realize clearly that the struggle for the consolidation of peace will
be a long one. Peaceful coexistence must be understood correctly. Coexistence
means the continuation of the struggle between two social systems, but of a
struggle by peaceful means, without war, without the interference of one state
Into the domestic affairs of another state. One should not be afraid. We must
struggle resolutely and consistently for our ideas, for our way of life, for our
socialist system. The partisans of capitalism too will not, of course, abandon
their way of life, their ideology, they will fight. We hold that this struggle must
be economic, political, and ideological, but not military." (Novosibirsk speech,
October 10, 1959.)
"He who does not recognize peaceful coexistence wittingly or unwittingly slips
down into the positions of the cold war and the armaments race, of deciding
international problems by force of arms and not by way of peaceful negotiations.
Hence it is clear that it is essential to tear off the masks from all those who
wish to embellish the policy of the imperialist state who continue the arms race.
Things must be called by their names. The aggressive circles of these countries
are striving to decide disputed international questions by means of war. All the
pacts and alliances set up by the imperialist states are camouflaged by false
statements to the effect that they are allegedly defensive, against the threat of
communism. But such statements are not new and have been repeatedly exposed
by life itself." (Novosibirsk speech, October 10, 1959.)
"The supporters of capitalism are trying to put a new coat on the decrepit
capitalist system, but nothing will come of it; just like a horse, you know, that
is getting old and is unable to keep its tail up like a young spirited horse. So,
the moribund capitalist system will not see a new surge of energy." (Vladivostok
speech, October 8, 1959.)
"In the course of these talks [during the Khrushchev ITS visit] certain Ameri-
can representatives repeatedly spoke about the so-called free dissemination of
Ideas. They tried to convince me of the need for wider dissemination in our
country of books and films especially selected by them, and of the need for free
broadcasting. They want to foist upon us all kinds of trash that would poison
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24 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
the minds of Soviet people. Can we agree to this? Of course not. Our people
do not want to consume bad food poisoned with the venom of bourgeois ideas."
(Kransoyarsk speech, October 9, 1959.)
In his October 31, 1959 speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev assessed
the relative relaxation of international tension and gave his interpretation of
the causes for it. These remarks were not directly linked to his US trip, but
it was clear that this was his intention.
"Only recently, the foreign policy of some Western powers was built on openly
aggressive calculations, on the 'positions of strength' policy. The inspirers of
this policy wanted to impose their will on the peace-loving peoples"--i.e., the
communist bloc countries. "Sometimes this approach to international affairs
was styled a 'policy of pushing back' or 'rolling back,' but the essence remained
the same * * *" The advocates of this policy "meant direct military interven-
tion in the affairs of the socialist and other peaceable states. From this stemmed
the policy of a continuous arms race, illusory hopes of building up 'nuclear
supremacy,' etc * * * Now times have changed. Even some of the active
exponents of the 'position of strength' policy see its futility * * * At the present
time a more sober evaluation of the situation, a more reasonable understanding
of the balance of forces on the international scene is gaining ascendancy in the
West." This "inevitably leads to the conclusion that plans involving the use of
armed forces against the socialist world should be relegated to oblivion. Life
itself demands that the states with different social systems should know how
to * * * coexist peacefully * * * the main reason [for these recent changes]
lies in the growing might and international influence of the Soviet Union, of all
countries of the world system of socialism."
Khrushchev's remarks made clear that Moscow regarded the detente (and
prospective high-level East-West talks) as a consequence, and not a repudiation
of its position of strength policy. Furthermore, by claiming that the improved
international atmosphere was due mainly to the West's accommodation to grow-
ing Soviet power, Khrustichev implied that there would be further improvement
only if the West made further concessions.
WHEN WAS DECISION MADE TO SUSPEND OVERFLIGHTS?
The CHAIRMAN. Proceeding, Mr. Secretary, under our agreed regu-
lations, can you tell the committee when the decision to suspend any
further flights over Russian territory was taken?
Secretary HERTER. My impression is that it was taken on the Thurs-
day before the President went to Paris.
Phe CHAIRMAN. That would be Thursday, is that it, the 12th?
Secretary HERTER. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. What were the considerations which led to the
decision taken on Thursday, the 12th of May, that there should be no
further flights over the--
Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, I think I answered that in my
own statement, in Which I said that since the T7-2 system had been
compromised, it was discontinued as any other intelligence mission
would be in such a case.
The CHAIRMAN. It had been compromised sometime before the 12th,
hadn't it?
Secretary HERTER. No, sir.
(Subsequently the Department of State informed the Committee
that the reporter had misunderstood the Secretary's 'answer to this
question, which had been "Yes, sir.")
QUESTION OF' A MORATORIUM ON FLIGHTS
The CHAIRMAN. Was a moratorium on flights agreed upon prior to
May 1 to be effective at any time after May 1?
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Secretary HERTER. Not that I know of.
The CHAIRMAN. You would know of it if it had been taken, wouldn't
you ?
Secretary HERTER. I am sorry? I couldn't hear the question, Mr.
Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Was any moratorium on the flights agreed upon
prior to May 1, to be effective at any time after May 1 ?
Secretary HERTER. I have heard reports to that effect, but of my
own knowledge I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Was such a moratorium ever discussed or consid-
ered by anyone in the State Department ?
Secretary HERTER. Not by Mr. Dillon nor myself.
The CHAIRMAN. Or anyone?
Secretary HERTER. I don't know of anyone.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the CIA considered such a
moratorium?
Secretary HERTER. I do not, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Did Mr. Dulles or anyone else order a suspension
of flights after the loss of the plane on May 1?
Secretary HERTER. That, sir, he will be able to testify to. I can't
tell you as of what date he did that.
PREVIOUS U-2 FLIGHTS
The CHAIRMAN. Were any other planes lost on these same ventures
prior to May 1?
Secretary HERTER. [Deleted.] Not over Soviet territory.
The CHAIRMAN. None had been shot down or lost over Soviet
territory?
Secretary HERTER. No.
The CIIAIRMAN. The flight referred to, that Chairman Khrushchev
referred to on April 9, you were aware of that, were you?
Secretary HERTER. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. It was a successful overflight?
Secretary HERTER. It was.
DELAY IN ANNOUNCING SUSPENSION OF OVERFLIGHTS
The CHAIRMAN. If the President decided to suspend the flights
prior to Monday, May 16, which you stated he did on the 12th., why
was this announcement delayed until the meeting with Chairman
Khrushchev on the 16th?
Secretary HERTER. Because the President reserved that decision to
make the announcement in Paris.
The CHAIRMAN. What was the reasoning for doing that?
Secretary HERTER. I cannot give you the answer, sir.
EFFECT OF U-2 INCIDENT ON SOVIET WRECKING OF CONFERENCE
The CHAIRMAN. I believe you stated very convincingly that Chair-
man Khrushchev came to the conference determined to wreck it. Do
you believe that the U--2 incident contributed to this determination
on the part of Chairman Khrushchev?
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26 EVENTS INCIDENT 10 THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secretary IIEwrEn. Might I say because I have got a little cold and
can't hear too well, caii that question be repeated ?
The 01AIRMAN. You have said that Chairman Khrushchev came
to the conference determined to wreck it. Do you believe the 11-2
incident contributed to this determination?
Secretary HERTER. Yes; I believe it did. It was one of :the factors
as I tried to explain in my statement.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think
DELAY IN A NNOLNCING SUSPENSION OF OVERFLIGHTS
Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, might I for a Rio-meat go back
to the previous question you had asked as to the President's delay in
announcing the suspension of the flights?
You may recall that he at the summit or at the so-called meeting
in Paris coupled that with the offer of bringing into the United Na-
tions a proposal for general overflight program superintended by the
United Nations and wanted to couple those two things together.
WHY DIDN'T PRESIDENT DISCLAIM RESPONSIBILITY FOR II-2 FLIGHT?
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, why do you think Chairman Khru-
slichev left, a way out for the President by suggesting in one of his
earlier statements that he believed the President did not know about
these flights?
Secretary HERTER. I can there, of course, only speculate that he
had committed himself very strongly in Russia with regard to his
friendship for the President, and wished to in that way continue the ,oek?
possibility of the President disclaiming any responsibility for the
flight.
The CHAIRMAN. What was the reason for not accepting this way
out on our part? Why didn't we accept that suggestion?
Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, that was a question, as you know,
of judgment.
The CHAIRMAN. That was what?
Secretary HERTER. It was a question of judgment. As to when the
essential facts had been revealed by the capture of the pilot and the
plane with all its instrumentation intact, the U.S. Government should
admit the fact that this overflight had taken place, that it was an intel-
ligence overflight, and that decision was made, of course, by the
President himself.
QUESTION OF WISDOM OF THE HEAD OF A STATE ASSUMING RESVONSIBILITY
FOR ESPIONAGE
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you are a longtime devotee of in-
ternational relations and thoroughly familiar with precedents in this
field. Is the public assumption of responsibility for espionage by the
head of a state the usual and customary practice among nations?
Secretary HERTER. No; the general practice has been. I think, for a
long period of time to deny any responsibility whatever.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any precedent in our history or in
the history of any great nation in which the head of state has assumed
personal responsibility for espionage activities?
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Secretary HERTER. No; I do not know of any firsthand. It may be
that there have been some. On the other hand, I would point out,
Mr. Chairman, that this particular incident was of a very unusual
nature.
The CnnirimAN. As a general policy, do you believe it is wise for
the head of state to assume responsibility for espionage activities?
Secretary HERTER. Well, very frankly, I don't think it makes a
great deal of difference from the public point of view.
On the other hand I believe in a case of this kind the telling of the
truth was the better course than getting deeper into fabricating
excuses or disavowing responsibility.
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO PRESIDENT'S ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ESPIONAGE
The CHAIRMAN. What precisely were the reasons that persuaded
you to depart from precedent in this case? What were the unusual
circumstances you referred to?
Secretary HERTER. The unusual circumstances were the facts that
the materiel and the statement of the pilot, not every bit of which was
accurate, but a great part of which was accurate, had been revealed,
and could have been presented to impartial tribunals for examination.
Under those circumstances, which was very different from the
ordinary espionage case I think it would have become extremely
evident and was extremely evident that this incident had taken place.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, in our spy cases, isn't it a fact that the
evidence of the particular person being a spy, of some of those we had,
was not in question. The difference is in whether or not the head of
state takes responsibility for it, not that it was convincingly evident
he was a spy. Isn't that the difference?
Secretary HERTER. That is a difference.
The CHAIRMAN. We often catch a spy. We have ourselves, it has
been related, and there is no doubt he is a spy with all the. parapher-
nalia which usually accompanies a spy, but the point I thought that
would be very interesting to the committee to know is why in this
particular case, in spite of the convincing nature of the evidence: that
he was a spy, that the President. and the head of state should assume
responsibility for it.
Secretary HERTER. The first was that it was obvious from the facts
as to .what had occurred., Second was that the situation which had
led to this entire activity was the one which is probably disturbing
the peace of the world the most, and leads to the greatest tensions
in the world; namely the danger of surprise attack, and ther.:secrecy
behind the Soviet Union.
SOVIET DELETION IN MAGAZINE OF REFERENCES TO PRESIDENT'S EXPECTED
VISIT TO RUSSIA
The CHAIRMAN. Was it not after the President said that he did
know and took full responsibility for these flights that Gil:urinal:1
Khrushchev became completely intransigent and wrecked the confer-
(lice ?
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28 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secretary HERTER. That is very difficult to determine. If I may, I
would like to cite at this point just one piece of evidence that I
mentioned yesterday before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
On May 6 the Soviet Embassy in Washington, before any statement
had been made accepting any degree of responsibility, before the
President had made any statement, this was on May 6, canceled from
the magazine which is published in the United States similar to the
magazine which is published by the United States in Russia., called
the U.S.S.R., stopped it press run of that magazine and took out of
it Al references to the coming visit of the President to Soviet Russia.
The magazine had in it a welcome to the President in his visit to
Russia, pictures of the places that he was going to, and a good many
photographs indicating what a great success his visit was going to
be. That was canceled and taken out of the magazine entirely.
The CHAIRIVIAN. My time is up. Senator Green. I recognize you
for 10 minutes.
EXECUTIVE COORDINATION ON IT--2 INCIDENT
Senator GREEN. May I ask a few more questions about the same
matter because I do not understand, and perhaps it is my fault, how
far the President acted alone, and how far the State :Department
acted alone before they came together and agreed on the situation ?
Secretary HERTER. Well, I would say that there was consultation
right through this period.
Senator GREEN. I didn't understand.
Secretary HERTER. I would say there was consultation right through
in this period. May I make this observation, Mr. Chairman? From
the point of view of :firsthand knowledge on these matters, asked
Mr. Dillon to come up with me because until May 6, I was out of the
United States. He was acting Secretary of State and some of the
questions that may be directed to that period when I was out of the
country he can answer from firsthand information, whereas I would
have to do it only from secondhand information.
The CHAIRMAN. We would be very glad to have Mr. Dillon sup-
plement the statement whenever you would like.
Senator GREEN. Mr. Dillon, then will you take up the answer to
my question ?
Mr. DtmoN. I can say is that in the period that I had responsi-
bility: we were in contact regularly with the President with full
coordination.
Senator GREEN. Well, the division of authority seems to have re-
sulted in a great many understandings which have been spread well
in the press, and the people are anxious to be informed on how it
happened; what was the lack in organization or otherwise that was
responsible. If you an explain it, I would be glad to have you do so.
ISSUANCE OF COVER STORY ON OVERFLIGHT
Mr. PritoN. If it would be helpful, I will be glad to explain
briefly the course of events in the few days after the plane was
missing.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
We first received news that this plane was missing, was overdue
at its home base on Sunday, which was the day that the Soviet Union
later said the plane was shot down.
At that time, it was determined that a cover story would be used
as was stated by the President the other night, which had been pre-
viously preparea for such instance.
There was full coordination on this. I knew that the cover story
was to be issued and it was discussed that it would be issued as usual
when a plane was lost at the base from which the plane was lost.
There would be no statement from Washington, and this information
was given to the people who would be in charge of the flight at the
base where it flew from in Turkey. [Deleted.] In due course, the
statement was put out there that a plane was missing. The general
content of that statement by the base commander at Adana at Tur-
key was that a U-2 aircraft on the weather mission originating at
Adana, Turkey, was missing; that the purpose of the plane's flight
had been a study of clear air turbulence; that during the flight in
southeast Turkey the pilot reported he had oxygen difficulties; that
the last word heard from MDB at 7 o'clock Greenwich time; that
the aircraft did not land at Adana, as planned; and that it could only
be assumed that it was now down.
A search effort, he said, was underway in the Lake Van area and
that the pilot's name was being withheld pending notification of the
next of kin.
After that statement was made no further action was taken here
because we did not know the circumstances of how the plane had been
lost, where it had been lost, whether it had been actually lost over
Soviet territory or not, although the presumption was that it had
been lost over Soviet territory, because that was apparently where it
was going to be the greater part of the time in the flight.
EVENTS LEADING TO STATE DEPARTMENT MAY 5 STATEMENT ON MISSING
PLANE
The next incident occurred on the morning of Thursday, the 5th
of May when we heard of the first speech by Mr. Khruslichey in
which it was stated that they had shot down a plane. They didn't
say where the plane had been shot down, but they said that an Ameri-
can plane was shot down. This required action and statements on
our part. The news of that was received by me during the course of
a meeting, a regular meeting of the National Security Council which
was being held that day as you will remember, somewhere out of
Washington, as a part of a civil defense exorcise.
A series of civil defense exercises were underway at that time which
had been long scheduled. When we heard that news, it was decided
that the State Department would handle all questions regarding it
and taking part in the discussion at that time, present at that time
were myself, Secretary Gates, and Mr. Allen Dulles. So we were all
three aware of this decision.
Meanwhile, back in Washington, members of the State Department
were meeting with members of the Central Intelligence Agency to
try and work out a proper statement.
As soon as we returned to Washington, that statement was finalized
in agreement with the Central Intelligence Agency and the White
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30 EVENTS INCIDI,NT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
'louse was obviously kept informed of the contents of the statement,
and the statement was then put out at 12:45 in the State Department.
The text of that statement was this:
The Department has been informed by NASA that as announced May 3 an
unarmed plane, a U-2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted
by a civilian has been missing since May I. During the flight of this plane, Om
pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Mr. Khru.shebev has an-
nounced that a U.S. plane has been shot dawn over the U.S.S.R. on that date.
It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely possible that having
a failure in the oxygen equipment which could result in the pilot losing con-
sciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and
accidentally violated Soviet airspace. The United States is taking this matter
up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the
pilot.
PREPARATION OF GUIDELINES ON MISSING PIA NE
Meanwhile, prior in that, in the days immediately before hat, there
had also been conversations between t he State Department and the
Central Intelligence Agency regarding information that might be
given to NASA in case tliere were further questions of them in Wash-
ington, for confirmation of statements regarding where the plane
was down, something of fiat, nature.
General guidelines on this were prepared. This was prior to the
5th, in the period of the 2d and 4th, and these, I understand, were
transmitted to NASA by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The State Department, at no time worked directly with NASA on
any of this publicity or anything regarding these flights.
Senator GORE. Did you say did, or did not?
Mr. DILLON. Did not. This is part of the cover operation.
[Deleted.]
N ASA STATEMENT OF MAY 5
So then the next item on this was that shortly after this statement,
NASA was asked a lot of questions about the plane, and they, follow-
ing the cover story that had been prepared earlier, put out the state-
ment which appeared in the press that same day. f think that clone
out about three-quarters of an hour after our statement. They ap-
parently utilized the general guidelines which they liad been given,
to answer questions and put them toget her into a statement, which was
then put out.
Senator Mime] tarv. What was the date of that?
Mr. Dit,no.N. This was done on May 5. This was right after Mr.
Khruslichev.,s first speech_ in which he said a 1)1 am; was down some-
where and this was-----p-al will recall also at that time the Soviets
printed a photograph of a plane that was supposedly a wreck and we
very rapidly learned, I would say within 24 hours, that this photo-
graph was a fraudulent photograph and was not a photograph of the
17-2 wreckage, but was a photograph of some Soviet type plane.
Senator 1-limtruttEv. Mr. Chairman, may I get a correction ?
The CILAIRITAN. ThP I ime of the Senator from Rhode Island has
expired.
Senator iii-MTPTIREY. Just a technical point. I couldn't follow the
seque,nce. I Wit S WW1 den i ng about the background docunients we have
before us and the sequence of relays.
The CIL1IRM A N. YOU will have an opportunity.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 61
Senator GREEN. I would like to have the witness proceed and finish
his statement.
Mr. DILLON. Yes; could I finish this statement?
EVENTS LEADING UP TO STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF MAY 7
Almost immediately, I would say on Friday the 6th, we were aware
that this was a fraudulent picture, and so that gave us some concern
that the Soviets might have a greater knowledge regarding the air-
craft than we had previously suspected, and that maybe they had in
their possession more of the aircraft and possibly had the pilot in
their possession. So this was then followed on Saturday morning, the
7th by Khrushchev's speech in which he stated that they did have
the pilot, and gave for the first time actual information as to where it
was shot down and so forth.
The Secretary returned to Washington on the afternoon of Friday,
May 6, from Istanbul and Greece, and I reported to him on the situa-
tion as of that time, and at that time he naturally took over. There-
fore, on Saturday morning, we met with him to determine what to do
next, and at that moment as we met, we were faced with this new
Soviet statement saying that they had the pilot, and a new situation
had arisen, and his action at that time the Secretary has explained.
But that was when the decision was made to reveal the fact that this
was an American plane.
Senator GREEN. If I understand you correctly
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator has run considerably over his time.
Senator GREEN. May I ask one more question?
The CHAIRMAN. We, are under a time limitation.
Senator GREEN. I thank you for what you have said. As I under-
stand it, your explanation is that too many cooks spoil the broth.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Wisconsin.
TIMING OF SOVIET DECISION TO WRECK CONFERENCE
Senator WILEY. I want to congratulate you, gentlemen.
It seems to me that the facts as developed this morning, plus the
President's address, give us what we have practically all known from
the newspapers as descriptive of this situation. I want to ask just a
few questions, Mr. Secretary.
In your opinion, do you think that when Khrushchev went to Paris
he had already made up his mind to blow up the conference?
Secretary HERTER. I do, sir, and I think that the bulk of the evi-
dence indicates that he was under instructions to do so.
Senator WILEY. In your opinion, is the matter of using what we
have used in the past, the U-2's, for a mere period of years, all in
the interest of preserving the integrity of the United States and the
integrity of the West?
Secretary HERTER. I do indeed.
Senator WILEY. And, in your opinion, if the U-2 incident hadn't
happened?this is sort of a duplication of the question but I want to
get to the main question?would Khrushchev have had an adequate
excuse or would he have drummed up ono?
Secretary HERTER. That can only be a matter of speculation. I
think that Mr. Khrushchev, as indicated by his Baku speech, felt
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32 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
that from his point of view the summit would not, turn out satis-
factorily, and that the incident, was a convenient handle, for him
to use to torpedo the conference.
SOV1 ET KNOWLEDGE OF 13-2 OVERFLIGHTS
Senator WILE-v. Isn't it a fact that from his remarks that he made
in his talk in Berlin he knew that we were using what has been
called spy planes, and had been using the same for some time?
Secretary HERTte. It certainly does, and that was repeated yester-
day by Mr. Gromyko in the statement that he made at the iInited
Nations in which he said they had known of this for some time, that
they had known of it at the time that Mr. Khrushchey was at Camp
David. [Deleted,j1
PRIOR EXPECTATIONS OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS AT SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator Waxy. Then because of previous conferences, as you have
outlined in your remarks, it is very clear that there was no real
reason to think that a conference could have accomplished anything,
because isn't it a fuJ, that both parties were adamant?
Secretary HERrea. That is true, sir, insofar as Berlin and the
German situation was concerned. It might have been possible to
work out some interim agreement for Berlin. I am rather doubtful
whether it would have been. There was some hope that in the field
of disarmament, the East and the West could have agreed on direc-
tives to those who were negotiating in Geneva to get down to specific
disarmament measures to make a start, and to break away front the
deadlock that had occurred over pure generalities. That is a hope
that we had, that something of that kind might come out, of the Paris
conference. But, as you may recall, in our public statements we had
made it very clear that people should not expect, not have too grew:
hopes of what might conic out of it. But as the President has himself
said, ho had hoped perhaps from this and perhaps from succeeding
summit conferences there might be some easing of the overall at-
mosphere, which in time would lead to a solution of some of these
problem s.
KI IRV'S H S'1' A '1'EATE N T ON A FUTURE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator WI:LEI-. What do you think is the reason that if Khrushche,v
was as heated up as he claims he was, that he said in 6 or 8 months
there AVORld be another opportunity for a conference?
Secretary HEirtre. I think with the admonition that we have been
given earlier in the day with regard to not bringing political matters
into this discussion, the inference would have to be drawn by each
individual for himself on that.
PRESID}INT'S SPEECH OF MAT 25
Senator Wit,Ey. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take more time
except I do believe that into the minutes of this meeting should go
the address of the President of May 25, which is already attached to
this summation of these background documents. But in view of the
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 66
fact that we are asking ourselves certain questions about, let us say,
where do we go from here, and that is my last question, I ask that
this be incorporated in the minutes of this meeting.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The speech referred to appears on p. 249 of appendix 1.)
FUTURE U.S. RELATIONS WITII TIIE SOVIET UNION
Senator WILEY. Now where do We go from here?
Secretary HERTER. Sir, I tried to indicate that in the last part of
my statement. As the President has said, we hope to continue to do
business on a businesslike basis with the Soviet Government. We
intend to continue with the negotiations that are now underway. We
intend to continue with our exchange agreements. One thing [might
put in the record at this point. From such information as we have
received from our embassies in Moscow, and from our missions in
other Soviet bloc countries, the attitude toward our people has re-
mained unchanged. There has been no indication of hostility on a
people to people basis that has been evidenced in any way from what
happened in Paris.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Minnesota.
SOVIET FEAR OF SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO WEST GERMANY
Senator Huirtrimyr. Mr. Secretary, on page 4 of your statement,
you indicate under the subtitle "Summit Prospects Dimmed," a series
of developments that you believe indicated a change in the position or
a possibility of a change in the position of the Soviet representatives,
particularly Mr. Khrushchev, about the summit.
In the third paragraph you say "But clouds began to gather even
then," referring to some developments in the Soviet Union.
If you will recall that period, isn't this about the same time that
the United States was considering offering nuclear weapons again to
West Germany?
Secretary HERTER. I can't recall that we have ever done that.
Senator HowtriiRET. Well, there has been considerable talk about
the offering of nuclear weapons to our allies.
Secretary HERTER. We have not been offering them to our allies
Senator HUMPHREY. I know you have not been offering them.
Secretary HERTER. Under the law we cannot do that.
Senator HUMPHREY. I understand that. There has been consider-
able discussion here in the United States of changing the law and
offering weapons to our NATO allies.
Secretary HERTER. There may have been discussions on that subject,
Senator, but we never made any specific proposal on that point.
Senator HUMPHREY. Are you denying there has been any discussion
of it, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary HERTER. Oh, no; I said there was some discussion.
Senator HUMPHREY In official circles.
Secretary HERTER. We have never made any specific proposals of
any kind.
Senator HumritanY. There was enough talk about it so that resolu-
tions have been introduced into the Congress, and the House of Repre-
sentatives, as you know, to make sure that this didn't happen.
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34 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONI ERENCE
My question rehttes to this: Is there not a, great fear in the Soviet:
Union of the possibility of the spread of nuclear weapons to Western
Germany?
Secretary tharEn. I think that is true. I am not sure that it is con-
fined to Western Germany. I think that it applies to I he spread of
nuclear weapons in other nations and it might well include Commnnist.
China.
Senator HUMPHui Ir. Yes; indeed.
PROPA GANDA NATURE OF KHRUSIIC 1-1[EV'S STATEMENTS PRIWEIBNG
SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Is it not possible that during this period of the dimming of the
summit prospects that you referred to that you are saying here was a
little counteroffensive on the propaganda level by the Soviet.?
Secretary II.EarEa. Yes; that is possible. On the Other hand, may
I say this: The summit conference itself was not agreed upon until
December after the President, Nfessrs. Macmillan, de Gaulle, and
Adenauer had met in Paris and a note was sent to the Soviet Govern-
ment suggesting that. a summit conference be held and the date was
not agreed upon until later than that, the date of May 16.
Senator Ifirmvunny. Mr. Secretary, I want it quite, clear 1 happen
to believe, RS you indicated, that the Soviets made up their minds to
scuttle this conference in light of certain developments, such as the
visit of Mr. Khrushchey to President de Gaulle; and when be found
out that the Americans, the French, and the British were not going
to back out on Berlin, and were not going to agree to a separate
settlement in Germany, I think that Mr. Khrushchey did come to
the conclusion, as you have indicated, that the summit conference
could not be a success and therefore, he wanted to get out of it.
But the point that. I am raising in light of your staternent is, would
we not expect Mr. Khrushchey to blast off, so to speak, on such subjects
as Berlin and a separate treaty with Germany? Isn't this and hasn't
this been a part of his general line for a considerable period of time.?
Secretary HERTER. Yes; it. is not confined to Mr. Khrushchey. It
has been almost a standard technique, before any conference, to take
a very adamant position before the conference.
Senator HUMPIIREY. Yes.
Well, I only bring this up because while I recognize, there was evi-
dence of what you say, possibly a shift of opinion in the Kremlin,
there was always a reason for this and there may very well have been
the reason that the Soviet leaders constantly want to wage the
propaganda, war on this nuclear-weapons distribution inoblem.
STATE DEPA:RTM ENT PRESS AND NEWS BRI EYING OF MAY 5
T. want just, to correct, the record here. I am sorry to have inter-
rupted. Senator Green, hut Secretary Dillon, when you were discuss-
ing for us the sequence of events relating to the IT-'2 incident, you
talked about a press release of the Department of State on May 5;
where is it?
Mr. Du:Lox. I noticed T received this document after I made my
statement, and I noticed that, it was not included in this document.
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I have here a fall text of the on-the-record press and. radio news
briefing by the State Department spokesman on May 5 at 12: 45 p.m.
I will be glad. to submit this record which includes not only the state-
ment but also on-the-record questions and answers which he made, and.
that should be inserted before the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration news release which was given out before that.
(The excerpt from the press and radio news briefing appears on
p. 178 of appendix 1.)
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S NEWS RELEASE OF MAY 5
Senator HUMPHREY. Did the Department of Defense give out a
release before you did; that is, the State Department?
Mr. DILLON. The Department of Defense's news release was really
only confirmation and repetition of the release that had been given
out by the airbase commander at Adana, Turkey, and added nothing
to that. It merely repeated that that was accurate and that was the
one that is in this document.
WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR 11-2 FLIGHTS?
Senator HU1VIPHREY. Mr. Secretary, what agency or who is the per-
son in, the official in, this Government, who is in charge of these flights,
such as the IJ-2flights?
Secretary HERTER. The Central Intelligence Agency.
Senator Hummanv. Do you have constant information, do you have
continuing information, in the State Department, as to the number
of these flights, the course of these flights, the purpose of these flights?
Secretary HERTER. The general programs had been gone over with
the Department. Obviously it is impossible to tell when these flights
are going to take place because they are so dependent on the season
of the year and on weather conditions.
The _Agency has to plan numbers of alternatives so we never know
at any particular time or any particular flight. But the general ap-
proval of the program had been received from the State Department,
of course, as one of the advisers to the President in this matter.
Senator Huminumy. Did you know of this specific flight ahead of
time?
Secretary HERTER. I did not; no. I didn't know it was in the air
even when I was overseas nor do I think any of us did until it came
down.
Senator HUMPHREY. Is that your understanding, Mr. Dillon?
Mr. DILLON. I was not aware that it was in the air until I was
informed that it was?it was overdue as I stated previously.
WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR COVER STORY?
Senator IffixtrtniEv. When something goes wrong on one of these
flights, who is responsible for giving the cover story, the coverup
story, so to speak?
Mr. DILLON. Central Intelligence Agency, but we are also responsi-
ble for agreeing with them that this is a reasonable story, and it is
proper in the circumstances, but they have the responsibility for
executing it.
[Deleted].
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36 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
POSSIBILITY OF UNIDENIIFIED AIRCRAFT FLYING OVER THE UNITED STATES
Senator HUMP) IREY. Mr. Secretary, what do you think would hap-
pen in the United States if on our radar screen we should discover
a plane flying at high altitude over our territory in this age of the
fear of surprise attack?
Secretary HERTER. I think we would do everything we could do to
identify it right away.
Senator HUMPHREY. Just identify it?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, identify it. We have the wherewithal, I
think to do that,.
Senator HUMPH CY. In other words, would we dispatch inter-
ceptors?
Secretary HERTER. I think so.
Senator HUMPHREY. What would be our view of such a flight?
Secretary HERTER. Certainly there is very little that such a flight
could 'ascertain that would worry us much. Every bit of information
that, we have got in this country seems to be available through public
means to anyone who wishes to collect documents. In fact in the
whole Russian espionage system they have collected maps, documents,
and photographs of every part of the I Tnited States.
Senator HUMPHREY. I realize this, but in light of the danger of
surprise attack this is what .11 am getting at. This is a, little different,
may I say, from a spy working in the railroad yard or taking photo-
graphs or even a submarine off our coast even though this gets to be
a little serious, too. But in the light of danger of surprise attack
by air power,
there is some difference, is there not?
Secretary HERTER. There is some difference. On the other hand I
think we could identify it very quickly. This is the type of plane
that no one could possibly mistake for a bomber when you get close
enough to look at it. This is entirely an Unarmed glider type of
plane.
? ,
Senator HumeintEv. Have we ever shot down any Soviet planes
over American territory or over any friendly territory' in which we
have bases or alliances?
Secretary HERTER Not that I am aware of.
Senator Humphrey. Have we ever intercepted any Soviet planes,
in Korea, for example?
Secretary HERTER. I think we have been able to identify them from
time to time. Whether we could say that they were deliberate espio-
nage planes or whether they wandered over the line from the border
or not. I can't tell you.
Senator HUMPHREY. Have we ever shot any down?
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.
Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa.
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE 17-2 AFRPLANE
Senator HicKENEoorEn. Mr. Secretary, we hear a great many state-
ments about this plane being shot down. What is the best evidence
on that? Was it shot down from its maximum height or did they
consider that it had a flameout at that height and then came down
to a lower altitude or what?
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Secretary HERTER. Senator, there has been a good deal of specu-
lation on that point. I think that we are very skeptical as to whether
it was shot down from a very high altitude. [Deleted.]
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I think there is considerable differ-
ence in a situation where this plane might have been shot down at
60,000 Or 70,000 feet, or whether it was shot down or shot at at 5,000
or 7,000 feet.
Secretary HERTER. We are very skeptical and there are certain
evidences that it was not shot down from that altitude. [Deleted.]
SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF U-2 OVERFLIGHTS
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, I think it has been quite well-estab-
lished from Mr. Khrushchev's statements, that the Russians were
aware for some time in the past that flights of this kind had gone
over their territory.
I say I think it is quite evident that Mr. Khrushchev was aware or
the Russians were aware that flights of this kind had gone on over
their territory. At least they claim they were. Did they ever file a
protest with the U.S. Government?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, but not with respect to this type of flight.
WILL THE UNITED STATES BE PERMITTED TO INTERVIEW THE PILOT?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that we have requested in
Moscow that representatives of this Government be permitted to inter-
view the pilot. Have we had any replies from those requests?
Secretary HERTER. As yet they have not given us that permission.
They have said that "When we have finished interrogating him we
will give consideration to it."
HEALTH AND PLACE OF IMPRISONMENT OF PILOT
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do we have a reasonable idea as to where
he is being held?
Secretary HERTER. That I can't tell you. We have been assured
that he is in good health, and beyond that I can't tell you whether we
know where he is held or not. Perhaps one of my colleagues knows
that. I don't think we have any information on that.
DEFENSIVE VALUE TO UNITED STATES OF U-2 OVERFLIGHTS
Senator HIGKENLOOPER. Would you care to give an opinion on the
value to this country, in our defensive posture, of these flights, this
series of flights which have gone on over Russian territory for the last
several years ?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir, I will give you this opinion. It is a
layman's opinion rather than an expert's opinion, but I think they
were of very great value to us.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Isn't it a fact that these flights have en-
abled us, through the knowledge that we have acquired, to reorient our
defensive posture and our equipment and attitudes from time to time
because we have been able to find out exactly, in many instances, what
the Russians were apparently doing or proposing to do by way of
armaments and weapons and installations?
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38 EVENTS INC1DEN'I"rO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secretary ITERTER. think that they have been of very great value
to us.
EFFECT OF SO VI ET INABILITY TO STOP U-2 FLIGHTS
Senator HICKENLOO PER. Mr. Secretary, have you had any opportu-
nity to get a reliable cross section reading on what other nations of the
world think about the vulnerability of Russian defenses; in other
words, on the theory that perhaps a part of Mr. Khrushclutv's and the
Krendin's infuriation about this matter is an exposition to the world
that they knew about these flights and that they could not stop them
from going over the Russian territory with any consistency?
Secretary HERTER. _I think that undoubtedly that played a con-
siderable part in his own state of mind with regard to the whole
incident, the feeling of frustration that they had not been able to stop
these during a period of 4 years.
Senator FITuKENL00PER. And that that exposure to the Russian
people and to many other nations of the world that had been
propagandized perhaps into thinking that the Russians were in-
vulnerable may very well have had some effect on the attitudes within
the Kremlin ?
Secretary HERTER. It may well have had very real effects.
Senator lIfoxENnoorEit. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
The ( A I RMA N. The Senator from Oregon.
DOES RI HAVE A LAND-Al It MISSILE?
Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, do our experts believe that Russia
has a land-air missile?
Secretary URETER. 1 think you are having both the Secretary of
.Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency that can testify to that
better than I could.
Senator MORSE. Have they ever informed you as to what their
opinion is as to whether or not Russia has a land-air missile?
Secretary HERTER. We, I think, assume that they do.
Senator MORSE. We assume that they do. Is it on the basis of that
assumption that they have been asking Congress for some time for
a speedup in our land-air missile program, because of the asstunption
that Russia may have one?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir. I am being purposely cautious for
security reasons as you understand.
Senator MoRsE. I understand.
Secretary HERTER. And possibly in executive session when you have
talked to Mr. Dulles you could get further information on that point.
Senator MORSE. And yet, 1 think from the standpoint of our own
security, it is rather important that we have some information as to
the possibility, on the line of Senator Hickenlooper's question, the
possibility of whether or not this was shot down by a land-air missile.
Senator LA USCHE. A little louder, if the Senator please.
Deleted].
SOVIET li N 0 WLEDGE OF U-2 OVERFLIGHTS
Senator MottsE. [Deleted.]
What evidence do we have, Mr. Secretary, that Russia knew of
previous American spy plane flights over Russian territory'?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 39
Secretary HERTER. Only the statements of Mr. Khruslichey and Mr.
Gromyko.
Senator MoRsE. When?
Secretary HERTER. Mr. KhrGSilelleV made it a number of times.
He did so in his statements in Paris. He did so, I think, in his state-
ments that he made to the Central Committee of the Presidium in
Moscow before he left.
Mr. Gromyko made that statement again yesterday.
RIGHTS OVER CAPTURE OF SPIES
Senator MORSE. What international law rights do we have, Mr.
Secretary, over capture of American spies by foreign governments?
Secretary HERTER. Excuse me, sir?
Senator MORSE. I repeat it. What international law rights do we
have over American spies that have been captured by a foreign
government?
Secretary HERTER. We have no rights over them that are in con-
travention of domestic law. We have no international right.
Senator MORSE. Therefore, Russia is under no international law
requirement to make this American spy accessible to American Gov-
ernment officials in Moscow.
Secretary HERTER. I do not think SO.
COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ON THE 11-2 OVERFLIGHTS
Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, do you think the public knowledge
now of these American spy plane flights over Russia has played into
the hands of Communist propaganda with the Russian people them-
selves by increasing the fear, no matter how unfounded we know it
is, the fear of the Russian people that our real objective is to make
war against Russia?
Secretary HERTER. I think that the Russian Government will do
its very best to work along that line in its propaganda.
As I said earlier, the evidence we have so far is that the attitude
of the Russian people toward our officials, whether in Moscow or in
our missions in the Soviet bloc countries, has shown no change.
[Deleted.]
POSSIBLE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION OF 11-2 INCIDENT
Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, what plans, if any, does the adminis-
tration have of carrying on a peace offensive against Khrushchev
now in a meeting of the,General Assembly of the United Nations
Secretary HERTEL What the situation may be at the time of the
General Assembly meeting is a matter of speculation. The fact_ thn'-,
as I indicated in my prepared statement, he had gone through_ th is
extraordinary press conference in Paris using very extreme language,
but that he did not make any threats of any specific action; that he
then went to East Berlin and called off a mass meeting there, and
only invited people to a meeting on the following day and then made
a statement with -regard to the Berlin situation indicating that there
would be no action taken for sonic time, may well indicate that his
position on specific things has not changed. However, only time will
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40 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
tell. What his attitude will be and what the whole altitude will be
at the time of the 'nettling of the Assembly, of course, 'Ae can only
SI eculai e.
It is very possible that he may want at that time to make a more
con ediatory gesture. [ l./eleted.]
RED CHINA'S INFLUENCE ON SOVIET ACTION
Senator MoasE. To what extent, if any, do you think Red China
has put pressure on the Russian leaders to follow this adamant
course of action?
Secretary HERTER. That again, sir, is a matter of speculation.
Senator MORSE. You have no evidence?
7-;etatet.ttry HliarrEa. lint the articles which have appeared in the Red
Star magazine, which is their official publication, have been of such
a highly critical nature of the whole policy of so-called peaceful co-
existence, the whole detente policy that Mr. Khrushchev seemed to
have been following, t hat they may well have had a considerable
influence.
RED CHINA'S MILITARY ACTIVITIES
Senator MoRsE. Do you have any reason to believe that we may be
confronted with a diversionary movement now in Asia by Red China
stepping up military tie iv ities in Asia seeking to embarrass us?
Secretary Hmeriaz. I think we should be very alert to that.
Senator MORSE. DC.) we have any late information as to any progress
Red China is making in the development of nuclear weapons, either
on their own or assisted by Russia?
Secretary HERTER. No. we do not.
The CHA IRMAN. &alai or, your time is tip.
The Senator from Vermont.
EFFORTS TO INTERVIEW PILOT
Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, one of the missing links in that
chain of information seems to be the circumstances surrounding the
capture of the 17---2 or parts of it and the pilot.
Has every effort been_ made on our part to see the pilot of the IT-2
to interview him?
Secretary HErana. Yes.
Senator AIKEN. Has the United Nations taken steps to interview
him in view of the Russian resolution or demand now being made
in the Security Council ?
Secretary HERTER. No, not that I know of.
Senator AIKEN. Have they any right to?
Secretary HERTER. Not that I would know of.
HEAUEII OF THE PILOT
Senator AIKEN. Have you any information at all regarding the
condition of the pilot?
Secretary HERTF.R. Only what we have been told; he is in good
health.
Senator AIKEN. That was Mr. Khrushchey's statement ?
Secretary HERTER. That was--
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SOVIET PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
Senator AIKEN. But Mr. Khrushchev very evidently, very obvi-
ously, undertook to substantiate his first statement with a false photo-
graph, and then, as I understand it, he later showed another fake
photograph to the Russians, claiming that was taken from films de-
veloped from the camera in the 11-2 plane.
Secretary HERTER. I am not quite so sure that second one was a fake.
Senator AIKEN. You are not so sure?well, I am not referring to
the supposed remains of the 11-2, but to the photograph of the planes
lined up on the ground and claimed to be photographs of Russian
planes.
Secretary HERTER. Even so, that could have been a genuine develop-
ment of film from the plane.
Senator Ara-PN All right.
PREVIOUS RUSSIAN ATTEMPTS TO DOWN A U-2 PLANE
Isn't it a fact that the Russians had previously undertaken to se-
cure a 11-2, both by interceptors and rockets?
Secretary HERTER. I can't tell you about that.
Senator AIKEN. Don't you know anything about that, or don't you
want to talk ?
Secretary HERTER. I can't tell you about rockets. I think there
probably have been occasions when they might have tried by inter-
ceptor planes, but they couldn't reach that altitude.
UNLIKELIHOOD THAT U-2 WAS BROUGHT DOWN BY A ROCKET
Senator AIKEN Than you have no comment to make about an un-
dertaking to get one by rockets?
Secretary HERTER. No, I think I can point out one bit of evidence
that perhaps will be supplemented when Mr. Dulles testifies here,
and that is that the picture of what seemed to be the genuine 11-2
plane had bullet holes in the wings and they are not likely to have
bullet holes from any rocket.
Senator AIKEN. No.
Does it seem unlikely to you that the 17-2 was brought down with
a one-shot rocket?
Secretary HERTER. It seems to HS Very unlikely.
Senator .AIKEN. Leaving the pilot and much of the equipment intact
as has been claimed?
Secretary HERTER. It seems to us very unlikely.
Senator AIKEN. Wasn't the list of equipment which was given out
by Mr. Khrushchev such equipment as would have been naturally
carried on any plane that was undertaking to secure information of
this type?
Secretary HERTER. That is right.
Senator AIKEN. Of any country?
Secretary HERTER. That is correct.
KHRUSIICHEVIS POSITION ON BERLIN AND EAST GERMANY
Senator AIKEN. Didn't Mr. Khrushchev get himself into a rather
untenable position relative to Berlin and East Germany, in fact a
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42 EVENTS INCIDI,NT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
spot so untenable, that he found it virtually neces,...sary to senate the
summit conference one way or the other?
Secretary linatrEtz. That, of course, again is a matter of specula-
tion. He had committed himself so strongly on these subjects that
certainly under cireturtstances in most free countries, if the chief
executive had committed himself to that, extent it would have been
very hard for him .to retreat, from that position. Whether or not be,
has a free enough hand in Soviet Russia to be able to say one thing
al id act, differently 'lie next day or not, I. couldn't tell you.
Senator AIKEN In view of his previous speeches, wasn't, he in
position where he w9s in trouble regardless of what happened at. the
summit conference,?
Secretary tinwrEn., I k had committed himself very firmly.
Senator AIKEN. OS.
VILA'S I iv FRANCE AND DREAT BRITAIN
A iv the Unit ed St at es, France, and Great Britain now in accord
with, let's say, tile fut urn policy as set forth by tile President; the. night
before last?
Secretary friAtTEv. have expressed great, satisfaction with
I beg your pardon. I haven't seen any comment. of theirs with
regard to his statement the night before last. I am spe.a,king of his
statement in Paris.
Senator AIKEN. Yes.
Secretary .H ERTE R. Tin' position that he took in Paris, they ex-
pressed complete accord with that.
Senator .AIKEN. IIKXB we received any reprimand or any statement
in the nature of a reprimand from Britain or France?
Secretary fharrna. Nolie whatever.
A ND U.S.S.R. SPY SYSTEMS
Senator AIKEN (coni holing). Since the incidents of recent weeks.
Yesterday, I got, a tette]. from a lady who I thought was somewhat
misinformed, prolably not indoctrinated, just misinfOrmed, stating
that it was the U.S. spy system that forced Russia to maintain a spy
system. Do you go along with that theory? It seems to be. shared
by a good many people, and seems to be a theory which is quite
generally distributed thuo olt not believed in certain quarters.
Secretary HERTEN_ I would think, sir, that going back into history
that Russia has had a much longer history than the United States and
a spy system has been an integral part of Russia's history. [Deleted.]
Senator AIKEN. It is my impression that Russia had an effective
system before. we did.
Secretary HERTER. Long before.
Senator AIKEN. &tid that we were very apologetic about our lack
of a system up until now.
Well, that is about all.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 43
. EFFECT OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT
One other thing that seems to bother some people is this:
Would you agree with anyone who stated that if the United States
would disarm unilaterally Russia would promptly follow suit?
Secreary HERTER. If we disarmed unilaterally ?
Senator AIKEN. If the United States would disarm unilaterally as
an example to the world, Russia would promptly follow suit?
Secretary HERTER. I do not.
Senator AIKEN. That is all.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Long?
PLANS IN EVENT OF SOVIET DOWNING OF U-2
Senator LoNer. Mr. Secretary, I believe that U-2 flights should have
been made. I have said that publicly and I have stayed by that
statement.
I wondered if the Department and those responsible had not
planned well in advance just what we were going to do when the
Soviets ultimately got one of these U-2's. Had there been such plans
made?
Secretary HERTER. I believe they had. [Deleted.]
Senator LONG. Yes. But that also involves your responsibility be-
cause you would be the one who would give the explanation.
Secretary HERTER. That is correct.
ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Senator LONG, While I don't sea how the great powers can avoid
conducting espionage and military intelligence, as a practical matter
as long as it is conducted on the other person's soil, isn't that a viola-
tion of international law?
Secretary HERTER. All espionage is a violation of sovereignty, all
forms of espionage.
? [Deleted.]
However, the Chicago Convention, which is: the principal conven-
tion dealing with this, has never been accepted by the Russians nor
have they accepted any bilateral agreement with regard to airspace
over their country.
[Deleted.]
DEVICES CARRIED BY PILOT
Senator LONG. Are these statements about this poison needle and
the self-destruction devices correct?
Secretary HERTER. I think so, but there, again, I think that the
testimony of Mr. Dulles would be more accurate than anything I
could give.
[Deleted.]
EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING
Senator LONG. Might I ask this question, also: What is your im-
pression of the present condition of our intelligence behind the Iron
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44 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Curtain? Do you believe that we have adequate information, or do
you believe it is far from adequate as to what we feel we need to know
about a potential oppiment?
Secretary HERTER. Well, I think I can answer that in only one way.
I think that we are doing the best we can to secure such information
as we consider vital. No intelligence service is ever considered per-
fect. No intelligence service is ever considered completely adequate.
I think we are doing, as I said in connection with this particular
operation I felt we were doing, a prudent and efficient job.
ADMISSION OF ESPIONAGE FLIGHT
.Senator lioNo. Well, I believe I had some information about these
flights prior to this time, not as a member of this committee,
but this is information I have run across from tune to time as a
Senator of the United States. I did not seek to be informed officially
and did not want to I:now directly any more than the hearsay infor-
mation I had on the subject.
But the thought that occurs to me is this: Would it not be the
original plan that this Nation would not under any circtunstances
admit that it was sending those planes behind the Iron Curtain in the
event that one of those planes was captured?
Secretary HERTER. I think that, as Mr. Dillon has explained, a cover
story was prepared for that contingency. I think the actual circum-
stances turned out to be rather different from anything t hat had been
an( icipated in the preparatory work that had been done.
Senator LONG. Well, the previous planning had been that we would
not admit it; is that correct?
Secretary HERTER. Yes.
Senator LONG. Now, of course, the Russians are in no position to
put us on trial. They won't go before the World Court on anything
with us, will they?
Secretary HERTER. They have not.
Senator LONG. As a matter of fact, have we not previously tried
to get them before the World Court on the shooting down of our
planes?
Secretary HERTER. We have tried to got Bulgaria before the World
Court and have offered to take one of the cases, the border cases, to
court, and they have refused.
Senator LONG. And they have declined?
Secretary HERTER. They have declined.
Senator LONG. In the absence of any admission on the part of this
Government, how could they have possibly placed us in a position to
force us to admit that that plane was deliberately sent there?
Secretary HERTER. Well, the other cases were all borderline eases
of incursions over the edge of the border. This particular ease, the
plane was shot down in the very center of Russia, some '2,000
kilometers inside of Russia.
Senator LONG. But the point I have in mind, Mr. Secretary, is that
I don't see how they can force you to take the fifth amendment be-
cause they wouldn't get you before a tribunal to do it because they
wouldn't go before it themselves. And I don't see how they could
have forced you to concede that that was an authorized mission un-
less somebody, the President or you, elected to make that adinission.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 45
BRINGING INSTANCES OF ESPIONAGE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS
But do you see any way that the Soviets could have compelled you
to admit that that espionage mission was a calculated plan and de-
liberately undertaken?
Secretary HERTER. No, sir, the alternative for us was to continue
denying any responsibility whatsoever for it. They would undoubt-
edly as they said they would do, take it before the United Nations,
submit all the evidence to the United Nations, and we would have dug
ourselves in deeper and deeper in a denial of something which was
perfectly self-evident. That was the choice that we were faced with.
Senator LONG. Well, a denial of espionage; but you also would have
considerable indication that they would be denying espionage on their
part that you are in position to fairly well prove could you not?
Could you not try your espionage cases before the -United Nations as
well as they could?
Secretary }TEETER. We can. But espionage cases we try before our
own courts.
Senator LONG. Yes, but if they wanted to try this ease before the
United Nations, couldn't you just as well have insisted on trying the
cases of their espionage in the United Nations simultaneously?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, we could, but in that particular case the
issue was a rather different one.
EFFECT OF PLEADING GUILTY OF ESPIONAGE
Senator LONG. Here is the thought that occurs to me. Under the
Russian system if the leader admits he made a mistake he has to
resign more or less as Malenkov did or more or less throw himself
on the mercy of the party. But when we plead guilty to espionage
in this case, how can we plead guilty on the one hand and contend
that there is no punishment in order when we plead guilty to violating
international law?
Secretary HERTER. We have said we admitted it entirely on the
ground that for ourselves and for the free world it was essential for
us to get information with regard to dangers of surprise attack or
aggression.
Senator LONG. The thought that occurs to me is that; and I am not
sure that we are in a position to be completely self-righteous about
passing judgment on ourselves in our own case; that is what your
own people have said, that we judge our own case and do not let the
World Court decide these matters. I, for one, have been holding
back because I am not sure we have a fair court. But how do you
throw yourselves on the mercy of the Court and deny the Court the
right more or less to judge what the penalty should be?
Secretary HERTER. Senator, the eases to which you are referring,
of which there have been quite a number, have all been border cases
where there was no espionage involved, where it was a question of a
border patrol or weather patrol or something of that kind where the
issue was as to whether or not there was an intentional overflight or
not which is entirely different from this particular case.
Senator LONG. Yes, but the thought that occurs to me is that we
didn't have to plead guilty to anything. I know lawyers repre-
sent guilty clients. Now, as with the lawyer, when you plead guilty,
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46 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
aren't, you more or less in a position that you do have either to apolo-
,oize or take corrective action, or even under our system of law more
or less offer to take your punishment if you are going to plead guilty?
Secretary IIIERTER. As you may recall, the President had stated that
hehad taken corrective action. Ile has characterized this as a re-
grettable incident. When a demand wa,s made on him, these other
demands on him, I don't think you, sir, or anyone else could have
accepted those dentands.
Setrat or LoNG. I doil't require my part of your examinat imt be made
a part of the public record, Mr. Secretary. I don't insist on it, all,
but I don't, very well see how we can take the attit ide that, we are
going to plead guilty in the matter and then take the attitude that
no apology is forthcoming.
Secretary HERTER. 1 think this, sir, the circumstances which re-
quired our admission are the most important thing of all.
Senator GORE. Would you restate that, please, sir?
Secretary ITERTER. That the circumstances which required our tak-
ing this action of espionage, namely the tremendous importance to
the whole free world and to ourselves of having some knowledge as
to whether a sudden surprise attack is going to hit us or what -form
of aggression was likely to be perpetrated, justified the action.
Senator LONG. [Deleted.] My time is up.
Tire 01-AIRMAN. The Senator from Kansas.
EI,VEN1_111 OF 1( IIRUSFICIIEV ACTIONS ON FUTURE U.S. INTELLIGENCE-
GA THEM NG ACTIVITIES
Senator (lAinkso-N. -Mr. Secretary, I want to ask questions on two
items that if have selected from the mail I have received on the summit
coIn ference.
The first is that people that write me are concerned because of the
fact that Mr. Khrushchev hurled such epithets at us, our President
and the Nation, as they have?a coward, a bandit, and aggressor.
Will that influence our course of action in getting information that
is necessary for our security?
Secretary HERTER. I think we will do whatever we feel is essential
for our security. I am not saying in that respect that we are going
to deliberately utilize the U---2 again. I have never said that.
Senator (lAnt.sow. That, is one of the questions that concerns our
people' at, the present time.
was wondering?can we assure the American people that despite
all this tirade, there will be no slackening in our efforts to secure, by
MIN' measures or means, the information that is necessary for the.
security of this Nation
Secretary HERTER. I think both the President?I think the Presi?
dent in particular, has made that very clear.
QUESTION OD' 'MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO IN BERLIN
Senator CARLSON. L have selected from the mail this question :
Can Mr. Iiihrushchev be counted on to keep his word on maintaining-
the status quo in Berlin until another summit, meeting ?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONIPhRhAut,
Secretary HERTER. That is one, sir, that I cannot answer.
Senator CARLSON. That is one of the questions that we are getting.
Now, we are treaty-bound to protect Berlin. Furthermore, we have
in recent months assured West Berlin that we will never forsake
them. Mr. Khrushchev has said plainly that he would meet force
with force in Berlin.
Can the American people be assured that the United States has
the full cooperation of our allies in maintaining our position on the
Berlin status?
Secretary HERTER. Senator' one of the most impressive things that
I have ever seen was the meeting of NATO that took place after the
aborted, so-called summit conference. I have never seen such una-
nimity, such firmness, such determination as exhibited at that meeting.
Senator CARLSON. That statement should be at least encouraging
to those of us who are concerned about the situation.
CONTINUED EFFORTS TOWARD DISARMAMENT AND SUSPENSION OF
NUCLEAR TESTS
Another thing that I have picked from my mail is this matter that
the people are concerned about.
Will the United States continue to press for controlled disarma-
ment and nuclear test suspension?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir. I have indicated in my prepared
statement that we will continue to do this.
As you know, however, the conditions that we have always adhered
to is that the controls have got to be controls that one can rely upon.
%we In other words, reliable controls on both sides.
I think that with the very real danger that exists in the world
today of accidental events that may lead to a nuclear war, that we
should pursue the course of doing whatever we can to minimize that
danger, within the bounds that we have stated; namely, that of re-
ciprocal and effective control.
Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that we are making
any progress on these nuclear test suspensions at the Geneva Confer-
ence and other places?
Secretary HERTER. During the last few weeks, really the last few
days, they have been meeting in Geneva examining a coordinated
program of research for improving instrumentation so that small
shots can be detected underground.
Those conferences have moved, I think, pretty satisfactorily. They
are halted at this moment, awaiting some instructions from Moscow.
In the next few days we should know better whether or not there
has been any radical change of position on the part of the Russians
or not. There is some chance of reaching agreement. It will be a
limited agreement at best, but that again depends on -full agreement
with regard to the control mechanisms.
As you know, those talks have been going for a long time. Until
they are shown to be hopeless, I think we will continue with them.
Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee.
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48 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
TH REE CRUCIAL QI7ESTIONS
Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that three crucial
questions here are these:
One. Was there a failure in policy?
Two. Who, if anyone, was in charge?
Three. Was there a lack of coordination and a breakdown in ad-
ministrative procedure?
Senator WILEY. A little louder, please.
Senator GORE. Would you like me to repeat all of them?
I said that there were three questions, it seemed to me,, three crucial
questions.
One, was there a failure of policy?
Two, who, if anyone, was in charge?
Three, was there a. lack of coordination and breakdown in adminis-
trative procedure?
I should like to explore these three questions in inverse order.
RECEIPT OE FIRST INFORMATION THAT U-2 PLANE WAS DOWN IN RUSSIA
When did the Department first receive information that the U-2
flight was down in Russia?
Mr. Dimply. Senator, since I was Acting Secretary at that time, I
think it is proper for me to answer that.
That information was received in the Department during the day,
on Sunday, the 1st of May, at about the middle of the day, our time.
Senator Go. What was the nature of that information?
Mr. Dit,LoN. The nature of the information as conveyed to me,
which had been received in the Department through the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, was that this plane was overdue at its destination,
and that the time beyond which its fuel supply would carry it had run
out; and so, therefore, it was presumed down somewhere.
Senator GORE. The question I ask is, When did you first have some
notice, some information, some hint that the plane was actually down
in Russian territory? I was not referring to your presumption that
because of its flight pattern and the amount of fuel that it must
be down.
When did you actually receive some intelligence, some hint, that the
Soviets had the plane?
Mr. DILLON. That, the Soviets had the plane?I think the first in-
formation we received on that was at the time Mr. Khrushchev made
his statement on Thursday morning before the?I think it was the
Supreme Soviet on the, 5th day of May.
Senator GORE. Are you sure you received no hint, no information,
re) report from either your Embassy in Russia or the Central Intelli-
gence Agency that the plane might actually be down in Russia?
Mr. Dpi,oN. Since rirost of the flight pattern of the plane, its mis-
sion, was to spend most of its time over the Soviet Union, it was our
assumption, right from the first word, that when the plane did not
return that it was most likely that it was down in the Soviet Union.
But we did not receive any specific information that, it was down
in the Soviet Union, that the Russians had either the plane, the pilot,
or any parts of it, until Mr. Khrushchev made the statement on
Thursday morning.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 49
RECEIPT OF FIRST INFORMATION THAT PILOT HAD BEEN CAPTURED
Senator GORE. When did you first receive some hint, some informa-
tion, some indication that the Soviets might have the pilot alive?
Mr. DILLON. The first information we received on that was received
in the Department in the afternoon of the 5th day of May, after we
had put out our first statements.
This was in the form of a report from our Embassy in Moscow
saying that various other foreign diplomats had heard at cocktail
parties or receptions from various Soviet officials that this plane was
down and at one time, to one of these foreign diplomats, a Soviet
official said that they had the pilot and that report reached us.
We didn't know whether it was accurate or not, but it gave us
pause. That reached us the afternoon of Thursday, and I think it was
on Friday that we identified the fact that a photograph of the wreck-
age as put out by the Soviets was a fraud and so then at that time
we assumed, we acted on the assumption from then on, that they
probably had the pilot and that they possibly had a good deal of the
plane.
Senator GORE. A member of your Department informed me in the
offices of the committee on Friday morning of the 6th that the De-
partment did, in fact, have information indicating that the Soviets
might have this pilot alive.
Mr. DILLON. That was probably reporting the information which
I said was received the afternoon of the 5th regarding that.
BASIS FOR STATEMENT OF STATE DEPARTMENT'S NEWS DIRECTOR
LINCOLN WHITE
Senator Goun. Yes. Now you say that you knew of the flight, you
knew of the flight pattern, and you assumed that the plane was down
in Russia.
You say now that on the 5th you received this information that
the pilot was probably alive and yet, on the afternoon of the 6th,
this Mr. Lincoln White, official spokesman for the Department, said
this:
There was absolutely no?N-0, no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air-
space. There has never been.
Did you authorize that statement?
Mr. AIIILLoN. No, not specifically. Mr. White was not one of those
in the Department of State that had any knowledge of these
operations.
The statement which we authorized the day before, which is in the
record, was not that categoric. But I don't think that there was
any reason why he shouldn't have made such a statement. He drew
that conclusion from the NASA statement of the day before and
when he was asked questions?he didn't volunteer this statement.
He was being questioned apparently in a press conference and he
made that statement.
We did not authorize a statement, specifically. He did not ask
us for it, but he thought he was carrying out the NASA story.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
I. ESTRIN OF COORD I N Al 10 N 11 EGARDIN G MR. Wi Ill ESS'['AIRMEN
enabir tioun. Is Air. 'White authorized to speak to the U.S. press
on behalf of the Departnient of State?
Drttox. Yes' ; he is.
.Senator GORE. Are you now saying that he was mak ng statements
about this, but that he was not informed on the subjea ?
Mr. Dur.oN. 1 am stating that he was not informed as to the, facts
of this intelligence operation any more than the people who made
the press statements for NASA were informed of the l'acts of t.
Senator Goan. Do ,you call that responsible and coordinated per-
forma,nm ?
DILLoN. We are 4.!etting at this stage, Senator, into another
quostion, the key question of intelligence. When you have something
as important and secret an this, it is important to limit he knowledge
to the 'minimum number of people and this was strictly limited
throughout the Government and we did limit it in the State Depart-
ment.
;Ve did not think it, was proper to inform our press people. There
was a special procedure for people who were informed of this, and
the press peojde were not st) in formed.
Senator (hoah. Mr. Secretary, I am not questioning you about the
initial cover statement issue you had in Turkey. I n in asking you
ab int art official falsehood on May 6, after you say the 1)epartment
know of the flight pal tern, assumed the plane was down, a whole day
afier you received information that the pilot was probably alive and
in the afternoon of the day after oven I had been informed. I ask
you again if you think this is an example of the coordination which
pat earl ler told its the Department had.
Mr. Dri,i,ox. Senator. I will answer that. I t hink it, took a major
effort which was reached the following day that we were going to
abandon our cover st try and tell the truth. That decision could not
be reached rapidly and quickly. It was reached afte,r long sessions
with the Secretary on Saturday and until that was reached, we saw
no reason to inform our press officer of anything but lie cover story
wIlich is what we were standing by up until that time.
IS \Si's. R MR. WI I TE'S STATEM EN T
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, may I interrupt? I didn't understand
why Mr. White wasn't, required to clear his statement, at this time
with you.
Mr. DILLON. I am glad to answer that. Mr. White sees the press
CA cry day, and be does not know in advance necessarily the detailed
yiestions that lie may be asked.
If a question comes that he thinks he does not know the answer to,
lie does clear it with its.
Now, the day before, when we put out our statement, it was given to
him and he followed exactly what he had been told. Ile did not make
any statement that was quite as categoric as this statement be made
t lie following day.
The CHAIRMAN. -Why didn't he stand on the one that had been
cleared?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 51
Mr. DILLON. This was just an answer to a question. Why he did it,
he thought he was telling the truth. I think he acted perfectly all
right. He did not think that this was a new question. He thought
he was following the cover story, which he was. So he made this
statement.. It wasn't a statement; it was in answer to a question. I
want to emphasize that..
The CHAIRMAN. It was a very categorical statement that went far
beyond the other statement. That is what begins to complicate your
situation, doesn't it?
Mr. DILLON. Possibly to some extent, yes.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.
IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING ACTIVITIES
Senator LAUSCHE. First of all, I want to pursue this question.
Shall we abandon or modify our efforts of gathering intelligence,
covering the military activities of potential aggressors?
First, I ask Mr. Herter this question. At any time during the ap-
pearance of Mr. Dulles, the Central Intelligence Agency Director,
before this committee do you know of him at any time being chal-
lenged or asked about how he acquired intelligence?
Secretary HEIRTER. That I cannot answer at firsthand. My impres-
sion is that there was a very small group in the Senate with whom he
conferred. He has got this responsibility under the law, which was
written by the Congress.
Senator LATTSCHE. You have answered my question. Have you ever
heard of any member of this committee or any member of the Con-
gress asking the Central Intelligence Agency to discontinue acquiring
intelligence or to modify its methods?
Secretary HERTER. No, 0, I do not.
May I qualify that to this extent? I think that Senator Mansfield
had introduced a measure which would provide for a different method
of coordinating with the Congress. That is the only thing I do
know of.
Senator LAI-SORE. Would it be right to assume that at this very
moment there is great probability that there are Soviet intelligence
agents operating in our country?
Secretary HERTER. I would assume SO.
Senator LAITSCIIE. Do you know of any member of our Defense De-
partment in a responsible position, or any person in any government
who is responsible for security, taking the position that intelligence
of a potential enemy's conduct is not essential for the proper develop-
ment of a nation's own defense.?
Secretary HERTER. I do not.
Senator T_JAITSCHE. Do I understand that you subscribe to the state-
ment made by the President that for the protection of the security
of our country it is essential that intelligence of potential enemies'
conduct be acquired?
Secretary HERTER. I do.
Senator LAITSCHE. Now then, this question: Do you feel that it
would be wise for our Government in the face of the discussions about
peace and disarmament and banning of nuclear tests to discontinue
our intelligence activities?
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52 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secretary HERTER. T do not.
Senator LAUSCHE. Would it be a danger to our country if at this
moment while we are discussing disarmament and banning of nuclear
tesi s we scuttle the Central Intelligence Agency?
Secretary HERTER. E certainly would not advocate anything of the
Senator LAUSCHE. What is :it historically concerning men in a re-
sponsible position for the protection of a country, beginning from the
earliest days of recorded battles about the use of scouts and intelli-
gence agents, so as to properly guide a country in what it ought to do?
Secretary HERTER. It is a custom, sir, that has grown up, I imagine,
ever since warfare began.
KM it ISO Cli E DECISION NUT TO PARTICIPATE IN SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator LAUSCI1E. Now then, the second question: Is it your con-
sidered opinion that when IC hrushchey came to Paris In had already
deP ided not to participate in the summit conference ?
Secretary HERTER. That is our best judgment.
Senator IJAUSCIIE. And that judgment is formulated not upon
what he lias said but what he has done; is that correct?
Secretary HERTER. It is a combination of both. But. it. is mostly
in what he has said, and the assumption is that he had received his
orders before he went to Paris.
Senator LArrsonE. Is it a fact that beginning in December 1959
and going down into April, he has made statements indicating that
the probability was that there would never be a conference?
Secretary HERTER. Not the probability that there would never be
a conference but that if a conference were held it would not turn out
to his satisfaction.
Kii RI rS ICJ IEV 'S iIEETINGS wrin DE GAULLE AND AIAGMIL LAN
Senator LAUSC in. He was scheduled to arrive in Paris on Sunday,
May 15; is that correct?
Secretary HERTER. is correct.
Senator LAuscitE. But instead of coming there on Sunday, May
15, he came there on Saturday, May 14.
Secretary HERTER. ['hat is right.
Senator LAusoirE. And on Sunday morning be, with Malinovsky,
at the early hour of ii o'clock already had made an appointment to
see de Gaulle.
Secretary HERTER. at is correct.
Senator LA-luso:RE. And at that meeting this vigorous statement
about what they expected of Eisenhower if Khruslichey were to at-
tend the conference was read.
Secretary HERTER. Yes; that was not only read but a copy of it was
given to General de Gaulle.
Senator LAuscnn. Why do you think that he came there before his
scheduled visit of Sunday and made it Saturday?
Secretary HERTER. Wh3., he came to Paris at all is the real question.
That is a question that General de Gaulle asked him at the time of
the one meeting when the four were present and to which the answer
wa, completely unsatisfactory.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 53
Senator LAiiscHE. So that at 11 o'clock in the morning he met with
de Gaulle and laid down these four demands upon Eisenhower.
Secretary HERTER. That is right.
Senator LAUSCHE. Then at the hour of 4:30 in the afternoon he went
to Macmillan and to Macmillan repeated those demands, that unless
they were met he would not attend the conference.
Secretary HERTER. That is right.
Senator LAU SCHE. Did anything happen between his arrival on
Saturday, his action at 11 o'clock in the morning on Sunday, and 4:30
on Sunday, that would have caused him to change his mind from
what he was thinking when he left Moscow?
Secretary HERTER. Not a thing.
PREMIER KHRUSHCHEVIS DEMANDS
Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, Mr. Secretary, getting down to these
demands that he made i
that s, he demanded that Eisenhower de-
nounce the overflights; is that correct; and two, that he apologize to
the Soviet Union.
Secretary HERTER. Yes.
Senator LAU SCHE. And three, that he punish those directly respon-
sible.
? Secretary HERTER. Yes.
Senator LAU SCHE. And four, that Eisenhower promise not to repeat
these flights.
Secretary HERTER. Yes, may I add there, sir, that the demand for
the apology was added; it was not in the original document. It was
one that was added by him while he was in Paris as a fourth condition.
Senator LAUSCHE. Can we assume that Khrushchev honestly ex-
pected that these demands that he made upon Eisenhower would be
complied with?
Secretary HERTER. He could not have possibly.
Senator LAurscHE. That is additional proof confirming the assump-
tion that when he left Moscow he never intended to participate in the
conference.
Secretary HERTER. You are quite right, sir.
WHY DID KIIRUSHCHEV GO TO PARIS?
Senator LAuscin. Why couldn't he have issued this statement while
he was in Moscow, and why did he go to Paris instead of making the
statement in Moscow?
Secretary HERTER. There it is a matter of speculation but I think
that the desire to dramatize himself, the fact that there would be 3,000
correspondents in Paris, that he would have a larger audience in that
place, led him to take this particular route.
SOVIET MISDEEDS
Senator LAITSCHE. Was anything said anywhere about his train of
misdeeds, of the Communist Reds', beginning from the very day that
they were established as a country, in breaking treaties, in mass mur-
dering of people, including our American boys
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54 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Seeretary HERTER. That was not, in the brief meeting of the four.
The only statements that were made by the President were the state-
ments -,(vIlich were publicized, plus another statement with regard to
the 1T--'2 not being again used for this purpose. That commitment
of the President omit! last, of course, only so long as he was President..
Senator LAITSCITE, Y011 have seen eertain questions about which
I said T would like to get in To the extent. that it can be
I. Ione, 1 wi.ntld like wiswers to those questions prepared and put into the
record. One, broke]) treaties. Two, participation?not, of Red Russia.
!Hit Red communism---in the Red ( Idnese-Sov i et provocation of
trouble throughout the world, their activities in the Katyn Forest, in
Quemoy and Matsu, in South Korea where thousands of our Ameri-
can boys were killed, in Red Hungary, East Germany, and in Poland
when the liberty fighters rose to procure liberty for themselves..
Secretary HERTER. Senator, I saw those questions as they are in-
corporated in the Congressional Record and we will be prepared to
answer them.
(The questions and answers referred to above appear in appendix 2.)
Senator LAITSCHE. I want to say. I am not prepared to put a halo
of honesty and holiness on Khrushchey and one of scorn and disgrace
upon my country, not in this hearing or any other place. That is all
I have o say.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the time is a quarter to 1. I think
ii would be a proper time to adjourn until 2:30.
SELF-PRESERVATION
Sella( or WILEY. May 1 ask one. question, Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. A 11 right, the Senator front Wisconsin is reCOLY-
ized for a question.
Senator WthEy. We say that the first law of human nature is the
law of self-preservation. Yon have heard that said, have you not?.
Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.
Senator WILEY. That applies to nations as well as individuals:
does it not.?
Secretary HERTEL. .It, does.
Senator WILEy. And in wartime we speak of what we have called
spying here; it is called spying, but in peacetime it is espionage:
is it not?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.
Senator WILEY.Ihit there are different rules that apply, too, are
tbere not? In wartime then it, generally means the penalty is death.
peaceful times like we have now, the penalty depends entirely
more or less upon the court a,dministering it is that right ?
Secretary IIERTEr. Yes.
Senator WILEY. Is it ,,enerally conceded that the Kremlin has been.
enga((-ing
in espionage not only in our OW11 C011111 rv 11111, in Virtually
all the countries on cart It and is still doing it ? That is correct, is
not ?
Secretary HERTER. 1'11 at is correct.
Senator WILEY. As demonstrated by Ambassador Lodue in the
nited Nations the other day, they even tried to pull a sI unt on our
mbassy in Russia,: did you see that?
Secretary HERTEL'. Yes, sir. {Delete 1].
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EVENTS INMENT TO THE sUiv.i.m.IT coNrERENCh
Senator WILET. Just this one thing. Now, then, if the first law of
human nature is the law of self-preservation then the best means
that we can use to preserve the freedom of self-preservation,
the CIA has
been using when it has been using the overflight, the 7U-2 means; is
that right?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.
Senator WILEy. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We will
return here at 2 :30.
Secretary HERTER. 2:30.
The CHAIRmAN. Yes, Sir. I may say to the committee that the
Secretary has very kindly agreed to go on today and, if the ques-
tioning is not completed, to come back in the morning. We will
determine that at the end of today's session.
I hope we can make progress.
(Whereupon, at 12 :45 p.m. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 2 :30 p.m. of the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Present: Senators Fulbright, Humphrey, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche,
Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson and Williams.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Secretary, there are one or two statements in your own state-
ment I would like to have developed a bit for clarification.
COURSE FOLLOWED BY PREMIER KIIRL-SIICHEY
On page 12, at the bottom of the page of the mimeographed state-
ment you say as follows:
Proponents within the Communist bloc of an aggressive course must not be
encouraged by signs of weakness on our part. Proponents of a peaceful course
should be encouraged by our readiness to get on with outstanding international
business in a sober and rational manner.
In which of these groups do you include Mr. Khrushchev ?
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, SECRETARY OF
STATE?Resumed
Secretary HERTER. That I think would be very difficult to answer
categorically.
There have been a good many estimates made as to whether or not
he really means some of the things that be has said with regard to
peaceful coexistence, with regard to disarmament and other matters.
There is another group that feels that this is a front for the same
power line that Stalin used to take.
I don't think it is possible yet to answer that categorically.
I think that events are likely to show which of those groups he
belongs to.
The CHAIR-mAN. Who did you have in mind when you wrote that?
Maybe you can't categorically for all time designate him, but what
has been your view an the view of the Department as to which group
he belongs in? I think that is rather important as to how we treat
him. Is it in our interest to discourage him? If he were a member
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56 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
of the aggressive course group, I suppose it would be. If he is a
member of flw group who are proponents of the peaceful course, then
it would be to our advantage to encourage or be cooperative within
limits. I wondered why you put that in there if you didn't have
some idea of who does belong to these groups or how they are
constituted.
Secret aiy HEIZTER. What I was trying to describe here we s in effect
a middle course. Insofar as Mr. Khrushchev is concerned, I think
those who have dealt with him directly were, convinced that he was
genuinely in favor of a, disarmament program, that he genuinely
wanted, for the sake or developing the economy of Russia, a reduction
both in expense from a monetary point of view and from a human
point of view, of the groat burden of armaments.
Certainly there I ould put him in the second category. His more
recent behavior, however, has shaken my belief that this is entirely
genuine, and, as I sac. I think that only the events of the next few
months and possibly even of the next few years cart give a final
answer to what you have asked.
IDENTIFICATION WITH TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION
The CHAIRMAN. Can you identify any other members or any people
you had in mind in citing i hese groups?'
Secretary HERTER. No. I would rather have those who are real
Russian experts do that kind of identification, those who are familiar
with the individuals, more familiar than I am.
There, is no question but what there are still
The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to have Mr. Bohlen comment on
this question?
Secretary HERTER. I would be very glad to have him, if you wish
to.
The CHAIRMAN. It would be very good to have him comment. He
is recognized, is he not, as one of our best Russian experts?
Would you care to comment on this, Mr. Bohlen?
Mr. BOHLEN. Mr. Chairman, my experience has been that it is not
always possible to identify a trend in the Soviet Union with individ-
uals. As the Secretary said earlier we literally know nothing of what
goes on in the hierarchy. My impression of the statement the Secre-
tary made is that it is possible to detect trends. You cannot identify
people with them. My experience with the Soviet officials is that they
follow whatever the agreed line is, whether it is hard or whether it is
soft, with great consistency, and they just do not reveal sufficiently to
any foreigner what their inner thoughts are to identify one individual
with one trend or another. But I think the indications are that both
trends exist.
COURSE Et 'ILO WED 11Y PREMIER IIHRITSHCHEV
The CHAIRMAN. Well, don't you think we know more about Mr.
Khrushchev than any other Soviet leader? More of us have seen him.
He has been around more than any other. Don't you have any view
as to which of these groups Mr. Khrushchev would be identified with?
Mr. 13011LEN. Well, my acquaintanceship with Mr. Khrushchev was
when I was in there as Ambassador when he was not quite as promi-
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nent as he is now. I would merely say that he, along with all of them
are excellent actors [deleted] and are able to maintain whatever the
common line is in their dealings with foreigners. I think also there
is a question of time. I think, as the events of Paris showed, that
there have been certain shifts of emphasis inside the Soviet Union
which were manifested in part by what they did in Paris.
Therefore, it is conceivable that Mr. Khrushchev could have been
entirely serious in the lino he was pursuing prior to Paris, and be
equally serious in pursuing one diametrically opposite to it.
The CHAIRMAN. If I may interpolate, do you mean that prior to
the U-2 incident Mr. Khrushchev may have been identified with the
second group; that is, proponents of a peaceful course?
Mr. BoHEEN. I would not segregate out the U-2 incident alone,
Mr. Chairman. I think, as outlined in the Secretary's statement,
there seemed to us to be three elements involved in this matter, and
I think it is difficult to assess the value of each. But, certainly, I
would say his doubt as to the success from his point of view of the
summit conference, that some of the views voiced by the Chinese
Communists had probably supporters within the Soviet hierarchy,
and the 11-2 incident together brought about this change.
I have no difficulty
IDENTIFICATION WITH TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION
The CHAIRMAN. I didn't wish to make you review all that was
said there. I was merely trying to find the inner meaning of this
particular statement. I thought that I could elicit some clarifica-
tion since many of us don't know about these proponents of these
courses or about any of these groups of people.
Mr. BormEN. The answer, Mr. Chairman, is that I think we don't
know. That you cannot tell whether X, Y, or Z in the Soviet hierar-
chy, what particular line he advocates, because he never reveals any
difference, oven a shade of difference publicly, with what is the
agreed line. It is quite impossible, I believe, for anybody to tell who
within the leading group stands for one trend or the other. You
can only detect from external evidence that there appear to be cer-
tain divergent trends and the individuals may not remain the same.
WAS THERE A DECISION NOT TO SUSPEND FLIGHTS AS SUMMIT MEETING
APPROACHED?
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. One other statement, Mr.
Secretary, on page 5, point 2:
The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the summit meeting
approached, was a sound decision.
Can you tell us who made that decision, and when, and of the
circumstances?
Secretary HERTER. That is a decision that I think has been carried
over the whole 4-year period. Here, sir, we get into certain technical
aspects of when these flights would properly be conducted and could
not be conducted, but I think the technical reasons had better be kept
in executive session.
The finding of a good time for a flight of this kind in relation to
current events is almost impossible if you had known in advance that
it is going to fail.
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rOS EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
The real issue AVIIS how urgent was the information and is there
tiny one time that, is note favorable than another ? From a technical
point of view the time AV as more favorable at that tinw than another.
ft-ron i a diplomatic en it of view, it seemed to ine that with the
l'resident, scheduled to go to Russia later, there wouli I have been the
difficulty; when K kruslichev was here there was the same diffi-
(nay, in effect one would run into one time after another where
diplomatically it would have been a bad time.
The, CD A IRMAN. I I ion't think I make myself clear. _I anderstood
f corn your previous statement and others that the program was agreed
upon, anti it was running along without being suspended. But this
statement seems to leave the implication that a specific decision was
ff.kon not to suspend them in view of the conference approaching.
Was such a decision taken ?
Secreta ry IIntraat. That I can't toll you. I was not a party to that.
The CI !AIRMAN. Well, this says:
The decision not to suspeod this program of flights, as the summit meeting
aoproached. was a sound decision.
Was thieve any decision taken not to suspend it?
Secretary Htiirrtin. I know that when the matter came before me,
which was some time previous from the point of view a the continua-
tion of the program, when conditions were appropriate, I did not inter-
ise any objection to it because of any diplomatic event that was com-
ing up.
'rho Ci [AIRMAN. IL-3 it fair to say then that DO specific decision not
stispent I h(911 WaS taken ? It was allowed to go along without any
decision_ being taken to suspend them.
Secretary lInitTnn. I t1 ink that is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, the other way around is that, no positive
decision was taken not to suspend them; is that correct?
Seeretary HiarrEn. That is right.
The Ci 'AIRMAN. That, statement, I think, needs clarification. I
I hink, to me, it, means that at some point prior to May 1 a speeific
decision was taken not to suspend them in view of the summit. Isn't
that a legitimate interpretation of that sentence?
Secretary HERTF7,1Z. I think that is correct,. May I read what the
I 'resident, said on that subject ? He said :
A8 to the liming, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus
forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was
likely to be unavailable at. a later date.
The prograni went forward.
The CHAIRMAN. Then that decision was made by the President.
Secretary HERTER. Oh., he was certainly consulted with regard to
the continuation of the program.
The CI IA 'RATAN. 1 o you know when that decision was made?
Secretary HERTEn. No.
The ChAIRMAN. Was it prior to May 1_ ?
Secretary HEirritai. I couldn't tell you.
QITESTIO N' OF mattirt /It! UM ON FLIGHTS DURING CAMP DAVID TALKS
The CI (AIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, do you know whet her there was a
ilioratoritun on these flights during the meeting at Camp David?
Secretary HERTER. No. As far as I know, that question never arose.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 59
The CHAIRMAN. So that there was not, as far as you know?
Secretary HERTER. As far as I know, there was not.
PRESS SECRETARY HAGERTY'S KNOWLEDGE
The CHAIRMAN. I refer to this matter that Mr. Lincoln White did
not know that Powers might be alive, the last question before we
recessed. Did Mr. Hagerty know whether or not he was at that
point?
Secretary HERTER. That I will have to ask Mr. Dillon to answer.
I have no direct information.
Mr. DILLON. I have way of knowing whether Mr. Hagerty knew
or not. In the ordinary course of business, a telegram such as the one
which informed us of this rumor?it's only a rumor that we had
received through other diplomats in Moscow such a telegram would
have been transmitted for information to the White House staff.
Whether Mr. Hagerty knew about it or not, I don't know.
QUESTION OF SOUNDING OUT PREMIER KHRUSIICIIEV'S FEELINGS
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, was any effort made on the part of
our Ambassadors or anyone from the Department, after the incident,
to pursue Mr. Khrushchev's feelings?
Was anyone instructed to approach him and express any regret or
in any way to reconcile him to forgive or overlook this incident?
Secretary HERTER. No, I don't know of any such thing.
Tho CHAIRMAN. No approach was made?
Secretary HERTER. No.
IMPLICATION THAT FLIGHTS WOULD CONTINUE
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, what were the considerations which
led to the decision, not only to assume responsibility for the flight, but
to imply that the flights would continue in the future?
Secretary HERTER. I have to take responsibility for t.he statement
that was interpreted and if I may, I would like to read you exactly
what was said on that score.
This is a statement that was interpreted that we were going to con-
tinue the flights:
The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility
not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in
the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally
to lessen and to overcome this clanger of surprise attack. In fact the United
States has not and does not shirk this responsibility.
That is the statement that was interpreted that we were going to
continue the flights, and it seems to me it was a pretty far-fetched
interpretation.
The CHAIRMAN. Then do you mean in that statement you did not
intend to convey the view or the possibility that the flights would be
continued; is that correct?
Secretary HERTER.. No; what I was saying there was just what I
have testified to today; that from the point of view of our own in-
terests and that of the. whole free world, it is essential for us to do
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60 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
whatever we properly can in order to acquire information to avoid
surprise attack or to be prepared for it.
The CHAIRMAN. But in view of that statement, do you think that;
Mr. Khrushchev could accept it and continue the conference?
Secretary HERTER. Yes; I certainly do, if he had wanted to.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think our President would accept such a
statement from any oilier power?
Secretary HERTER. If he wanted to go to a conference? Certainly.
The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.
Senator Wiley?
KIIRUSIICHEV'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS
Senator Waxy. Now in relation to that last question, the President
has suggested time and time again an open skies arrangement, hasn't
he?
Secretary HERTER. Yes.
Senator WILEY. That means that planes would be flying over our
country and over every other country where it, is necessary. Again.
I go to the subject that I think is most important, because some quoted
and I quo ed on the floor of the Senate the other day the Biblical verse
that a little child shall lead them. I had a group of children from
Oshkosh, Wis., that I was talking to. After I talked to them, I opened
myself to questions. One of these girls said, "Senator, if we stop
taking these flights, how are we going to get the information that is
going on back of the Iron Curtain ?"
Well, I. think all America is asking that question, and I am satisfied
that if we are realists, as I think we are becoming more and more, that
we are not going to go up a lot of blind alleys about this and that, and
about what was or what wasn't said. We are going to face the situ-
ation head on and simply say we want defensively to be adequately
prepared and alert and we want the Kremlin to know the facts as they
have been now for, I I hunk, about 31/, years, that we have been sending
these planes over. Khrushchey knew it at the time that he was up
at Camp David, and certainly having the knowledge then could have
interfered with his interest in holding the meeting if he had wanted
it to. Do you think my conclusions are correct in that respect?
Secretary HERTER. I do.
SOVIET REFUSAL TO PERMIT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S TRIP
Senator Wri.Ey. I. didn't get the import of the questions when I
came in that apparently referred to some different groups. What is
the name of the young man who defected the other day? I guess
that is what you call it. Ile testified on
Senator LAttscdE. Meet the Press.
Senator WILEY-. Meet the Press. It is a long, Russian name. I put
what* he said into the record today. But one of the important things
be brought out, and I would like to get the former Ambassador's at-
tention on this, was that there is a group of young people growing up
in Russia who have different ideas, and he was about to go into detail
on it when time ran out:. But among other things, he is the one who.
said--and this is important?he said some months ago that Khru-
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shchev and the powers in being would not permit the President to
come to Russia, that they would find some excuse.
Now, that is all in what he said over the radio here a couple of
weeks ago. That confirms, I presume, your own idea that when
Khrushchev came to Paris, he had already decided that he was
going to throw the bombshell, and he would refuse to invite the
President, and so forth; is that right?
Secretary HERTER. That is right.
Senator WILEY. So this is something that didn't result from the
downing of the plane.
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE 13-2 PLANE?
I want to ask you a question. Have you any definite information
as to whether or not this young Powers is alive?
Secretary HERTER.. No, sir. We have no information other than
that which the Russians have furnished to us.
Senator WILEY. If that plane had been shot down, do you think the
instruments that he had with him would have remained intact?
Secretary HERTER. There, sir, I am not skilled enough in the tech-
nique of shooting down planes. But I should think it is very doubtful
if he was hit by a rocket whether either he or the plane would have
come down intact.
Senator WILEY. Is there any thought that perhaps they have the
plane? They claim they have the instruments and they have shown
something which wasn't the plane. Do you think they have that
intact?
Secretary HERTER. They have shown a later photograph of a plane
which those who built the plane feel is the plane itself. They have
also shown pieces of the plane in Gorky Park in Moscow when they
invited all the diplomats to come and look at it, and I think our people
feel that that is a genuine part of the plane.
INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN RUSSIA
Senator WILEY. I want to ask the former Ambassador if it is true
that the youth in Russia, the new class of youth, is growing up like
this fellow said. Someone said if he had been privileged to carry on
his answer he would have said they are not satisfied with their standard
of living, that they are not satisfied with the little opportunity they
have to express themselves in the political life of Russia. Do you.
know whether that would be true or not?
Mr. BOHLEN. I think it is a fair assumption, Senator. Of course,
as you know, the possibilities for contacts in there during the period
I was there were considerably less than they are now. The country
is still totally controlled by the mechanism of the Communist Party,
of the Soviet Union. They control all modes of expression by press,
meetings, or anything else, so it is very difficult to get any overt signs
of the feelings of the youth or any other section of the population.
But there are certain indications that the youth are looking forward.
at some time in the future to considerably different circumstances:
They hope for better material conditions and also undoubtedly hope
for a period when they will have more freedom of expression and
more ability to participate in the political life of their country.
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But this is very hard to document because people do tiot talk openly
arid freely in the Soviet, Union.
SeIlat or WILEY. Well, you know that. ferment gotten-Illy is all over
this world. You know that the. President of Turkey bas been kicked
oat. You saw that today, and you know what is. happening elsewhere.
Is there any reason why that yeast or ferment should not be operating
in Russia among the yintm.,rsters?
Mr. Bon LEN. There is no reason why it should not le, find it is a
logical assumption it is. But I should also say that the controls in a
society like the Soviet Union are, very tight, indeed and 119A.Te seen
-no. sign that those. controls are breaking down or weakening to the
point where the party is not in complete control of the situation.
'They are able to stifle, if you will, or hold in check this ferment due
to the nature of their .4ystein.
Senator WILEY. 011I. of the 200 mill icti Rtissians, how ninny of them
.do von think below to the Cormounist P riN ?
1.10-j:1 LEN. Ii liii k the latest, figure is somewhere in the neighbor-
hood of .S1/:"...
Sena t Or WILEY. Thank you. That is all.
The CHAIRMAN. The, Senator from Montana?
QI.ESTION OF INDIcATI 0 NS THAT NITRUSTTI WENT WOULD SCI-ITTLE SUMMIT
Ci IN EKREN-OE
Senator MA-Ns-FIELD. Mr, Secretary, it has been reported that at the
House hearings, you slid there were. indications that even before
May 0 the Russians planned to scuttle the conference..
Now, it seems to tre if we are going to estimate the. importance of
the iia'ide.nt in flat collapse of the summit, we need to fix the date
when these indications in any significant fashion beo-an to appear. Ii
would appreciate., then, in the interest of saving time, yes or no answers
to certain questions which T tun about to ask unless there is a need of
an elaboration.
The first, question I Are you aware whether any member of the
Cabinet or the President had any reason to believe before. May 15
when Khrushchev made his demands for an apology and so forth,
that he would come to Paris and leave as he did?
Secretttry HERTER. No.
Senator MANSFIELD. Were there .any indications that, Khrusbehev
planned to scuttle the conference before the 11-2 plane was shot down
On May 1?
Secretary HERTER. No..
UNDER SECRETARY DILL( Nis SPEECH
Senator MANSFIELD. Khrlishche,v's Baku speech precede, or fol.-
low Mr. Dillon's speech to the AFL?CIO convention?
Secretary HERTER. it. followed it.
Senator MANSFIELD. Would you classify Mr. Dillon's speech as very
much in the spirit of Camp David or would you say it was an excel-
lent, forthright and anti-( 'ommunist .statement somewhat, oblivious
to the spirit of Camp 1-)avid, the kind of speech which any official of
the State Department might have made before that historic meeting?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secretary HERTER. That I can't qualify with a yes or no answer,
Senator.
Senator MANSFIELD. YOU can go into detail there.
Secretary HERTER. I would say this, that Mr. Dillon's speech was
almost a requirement as an answer to the allegations that had been
made by Mr. Khruslichey against Adenauer and the Germans and
his continued repetition which I have given the chronology of, of the
fact that they were going to take this unilateral position sooner or
later without its being an absolute ultimatum on the subject of Berlin,
Germany.
Senator MANSFIELD. In other words, Mr. Secretary, speeches which
you and Mr. Dillon made were a counteraction to the gradual harden-
ino. of Mr. Khrushchev's speeches in the period preceding that?
ecretary HERTER. Entirely.
? QUESTION OF STATE DEPARTMENT KNOWLEDGE OF U-2 FLIGHT
Senator MANSFIELD. Did Secretary Dillon propose that a U-2
flight be undertaken prior to the summit conference?
Mr. DiLnoN. No.
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Dillon, as acting Secretary, were you
aware beforehand of the scheduling of the U-2 flight over the Soviet
Union on May 1?
Mr. DILLON. No, I was not aware of it.
I was aware that there was a program of flights that might take
place at some time when the weather was right but I think I was
informed of that maybe a month or two before this actual time, and
I had nothino?'' to do with it afterward because I didn't in the ordinary
course of my duties.
Senator MANSFIELD. Your knowledge was, in effect, general
knowledge?
Mr. DILLON. Yes.
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Herter happening to be out of the country
at the time was, I assume, unaware of any specific flight but per-
haps had general knowledge that these flights were being undertaken
and had been over a period of years.
Secretary HERTER. I didn't know there was a flight underway. The
first knowledge I received was when I was in Ankara. All I heard
was this same report that a plane was down.
PRESIDENT'S ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR FLIGHT
Senator MANSFIELD. Now, both of you have had general knowledge
of this: Would it be a fair assumption to say, despite the fact that
the President undertook, in a certain sense, personal responsibility for
this particular flight, that he, too, likewise, had only general knowl-
edge but that because of his position as the Chief of State, he would
be held responsible under any circumstances because of his position
of responsibility?
Secretary HERTER. That is correct.
Might I just qualify one thing? When you say he was familiar
with this particular flight and his timing, so far as I know all of us
were familiar with alternate possibilities of flights but not this par-
ticular flight as such.
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64 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator MANSFIELD. That would apply to the Department of State
and the President.
Secretary HERTER. That is correct.
STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR FLIGHTS
Senator MANSFIELD. From what legislation or Executive orders, or
both, was the authority for these flights of deep penetration derived?
Secretary HERTER. Well, presumably from the fact that I have here
before me?I am told that this applied to two specific acts. The one
that I am particularly familiar with, that I had a moment ago, is the
one creating the Central intelligence Agency. The other is the Na-
tional Security Act.
Senator MANSFIELD. Would it be possible to have copies for the
record at this point?
Secretary HERTER. Yes.
Senator MANSFIELD, Mr. Chairman, I ask that they be included in
the record at this point:.
The CHAIR:NI-AN. Without objection it is so ordered.
(The provisions in the National Security Act relating to the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency follow:)
EXCERPT FROM NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1.947
(Public Law 253, 80th Cong., July 26, 1947 ; 61 Stat. 495)
cETt TRAL INTELLIGEN CE AGENCY 1
SEC. 102. ( a) There -is hereby established under the National Security Council
a Central intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence who shall
be the head thereof, and with a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence who
shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his absence or
disability. The Director and the Deputy Director shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the
commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired
status, or from among individuals in civilian life: Provided, however, That at
no time shall the two positions of the Director and Deputy Director he occupied
simultaneously by commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an
active or retired status.
(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services 14 appointed as Di-
rector, Of Deputy Director, then--
(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, or Deputy Director, he
shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (mili-
tary or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he
were a civilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army, the
Department of the Nal y, the Department of the Air Fm:ee, or the armed
services or any comp, n lent thereof; and
(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or
functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to
exercise, as Director, or Deputy Director) with respect to the armed services
or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of
the Navy, or the Department of the Mr Force, or any branch, bureau, unit,
or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or
civilian) of any of the foregoing.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the office of
Director, or Deputy Director, of a commissioned officer of the armed services,
and his acceptance of and service in such office, shall in no way affect any status,
office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolu-
ment, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such
status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving
Section 102 (a) and (b) amended by Public Law 18, 88d Congress (87 Stat. 19, 20).
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 65
In the office of Director, or Deputy Director, continue to hold rank and grade not
lower than that in which serving at the time of his appointment and to receive
the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case may be, including
personal money allowance) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and
length of service for which the appropriate department shall be reimbursed from
any funds available to defray the expenses of the Central Intelligence Agency.
He also shall be paid by the Central Intelligence Agency from such funds an
annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which the compensation
established for such position exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and
allowances.'
(3) The rank or grade of any such commissioned officer shall, during the
period in which such commissioned officer occupies the office of Director of
Central Intelligence, or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, be in addition
*o the numbers and percentages otherwise authorized and appropriated for the
armed service of which he is a member.'
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1.912
(37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee
of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in
the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the
right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment of any other
department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment
by the United States Civil Service Commission.
(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several
Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it
shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security
Council?
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such
Intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate
to national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the
coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies
of the Government as relate to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security,
and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within
the Government using where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities:
Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpena, law-enforcement
powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further, That the depart-
ments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect,
evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided
further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such
additional services of common concern as the National Security Council
determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from
time to time direct.
(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved
by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Gov-
ernment, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall
be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intel-
ligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments
and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be
made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation,
and dissemination: Provided, however, That upon the written request of the
Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such infor-
mation for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the
national security.
2 Civilian Compensation?Subsections (a) and (b) supplemented by section 4, Public
1,.aw 359, 81st Congress, October 15, 1949 (63 Stat. 880), increased annual compensation
to $16,000 and $14,000, for the Director and Deputy Director, respectively, per annum;
subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f) from section 102, Public Law 253, 80th Congress, July
26, 1947 (61 Rat. 495). Sections 104(a) (2) and 105(26), Public Law 854, 84th Con-
gress, July 31, 1956, increased the annual compensation to $21,000 and $20,500, respec-
tively, for the Director and Deputy Director.
3 As amended by Public Law 15, 83d Congress (67 Stat. 20).
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66 EVENTS INCI DENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
(f ) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken
office?
(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February
5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and
(2) The personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group
are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such group shall
cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or
other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group
shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner
for expenditure by the Agency.
OI:LAL DIRECTIVE SUSPENDING FLIGTITS
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, by what authority have these
flights now been suspended?
Secretary HERTER. Senator, I have now got. before me the National
Security Act of 194-7, anti if you wish we to read the pertinent para-
graph I will be. gl ad to do. so,
Senator MANSFIELD. No; I would just like to have the pertinent
parts incorporated in the executive record.
Secretary. HERTER. Right-.
Senator MANspoun. Now the, question, to repeat, is by what au-
thority have these flights now been suspended?
Secretary HErrrnit. By direction of the. President.
Senator MANsninto. By a Presidential directive. Could we have a
copy of that for the record?
Secretary HERTER. Yes; I assume so. I don't know whether it was
given in writing or whether it, was done by word of mouth.
Senator MANSFIELD. Well, will you look into it end see what you
can do to comply with the request?
Secretary Martin. Yes.
(It was later reported by the Department of State that the directive
was oral.)
tuTa ATI? X OF ORDER SUSPENDING FLIGHTS
Senator MANsFinto. Will this order suspending the flights auto-
matically remain in force after President Eisenhower leaves office
and until it is superseded by another order of some future President?
Secretary HERTER. It could be. The President's responsibility as
Commander in Chief which gives him the right, to give an order of
this kind would, of course, expire with him. It would only be
through some treaty obligation that there would be a binding commit-
ment on the part of the United States to carry beyond his term.
Senator MANsyttAti. Do I understand you correctly, then, to state
that this order would automatically die with the leaving of office by
President Eisenhower, and to become. effective again would have to be
once again initiated by the next President.?
Secretary HERTER, I believe another President would be free to do
as he sees fit.
EFFECT OF 15-2 INCIDENT ON KIIRUSTICHEV'S POSMON TN RUSSIA
Senator MANSFIELD. Have Russian experts in the executive branch
suggested the possibility that Khrushchev's position at home may have
become seriously undermined?
oft
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO TEE SUMMIT UONF tat H.M..a,
Secretary HERTER. Yes.
Senator MANSFIELD. Do you believe that the U-2 may have been a
contributing factor to this undermining2
Secretary HERTER. It may have been. May I elaborate on that?
It may have been in the sense that it must have been a great shock
to both the military and to the civilian leaders in Russia to find that
they had been as open as they were for such a long period of time.
, Senator MANSFIELD. And to him RS well.
Secretary HERTER. To him as well.
POSSIBILITIES OF CHANGE IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP
? Senator MANSFIELD. If Khrushchev should be forced out of power,
is it the thinking of the Russian experts in the Department that his
successor is likely to be a man more amenable to friendly and peaceful
dealings with the West?
Secretary HERTER. That, sir, I cannot answer categorically. I
think that that is a pure matter of guesswork.
Senator MANsriELD. All right.
What, in the view of our Russian experts, is the most probable
coalition of influential forces in the Soviet Union and in world corn-
inunism that could bring about Khrushchev's downfall?
Secretary HERTER. There, sir, I am afraid of my own knowledge I
cpul cl not answer that. If you would like Mr. Bohlen to answer that,
be is as good an authority as we have on the subject.
Senator MANSFIELD. If you will, Mr. Bohlen. But before you do,
T' would like to throw out indications that perhaps the military, the
Chinese Communists and forces of that kind, might be considered.
13oHLEN. Senator, I honestly in all sincerity think it is not
possible to answer that question. I think in dealing with the Soviet
Union in view of the general secrecy prevailing in the Communist
bloc it is only after the event that you can hope to trace them back
and see what particular influences have seemed to have brought about
given decisions. There is literally no way in which a foreigner can
ascertain what the varying degrees of influence of all factors which
go into the making of any particular event. If I might I will give
you one illustration of secrecy. I was not there but in June 1957 for
10 days the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Central
Committee itself met in a violent inner row which resulted in the
expulsion from both of those bodies of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malen-
kov, and several others.
This went on for 10 days in Moscow and no foreigner in the capital
and mighty few Russians knew anything about it.
We had trained observers there. There was an extremely alert
U.S. press corps and not one of them got any inkling of this major
development. This I merely cite to show the degree of secrecy and
if you are trying to get these things you are in truth looking into a
crystal ball and a very cloudy one at that.
Senator MANSFIELD. What you have said, Mr. Bohlen, is a reinforce-
ment of thoughts you have previously stated in response to questions
propounded to, you by the Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. BOHLEN. That's right, sir.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator MANSFIELD. And, once again, that secrecy is so great there
that it is impossible for a westerner to find out What goes on in many
instances until after the fact is accomplished.
POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET RETURN TO DEPTHS OF THE COLD WAR
Senator MA/ism:Li). Is it the view of the experts in the Department,
the Russian experts, that Khrushchev, even if he remains in power,
will now take a harder line, a reversion to cold war type tactics in
dealing with the Western nations?
Mr. BOBLEN. The indications at present are, and I am speaking at
present, that this will not necessarily be so.
I think we can expect a propaganda campaign. The indication
from his own statements and from such information as we have re-
ceived from Moscow, is that there seems to be no determined policy to
return to the depths of the cold war at this time.
Senator MANsrunt?. Would you say that if that reversion does take
place, taking the opposite tack from what you have just said, and is
pushed by the Kremlin or Khrushchev or his successor, that it will
make more difficult the maintenance of peace?
Mr. BoutEx. It would if it returns to a line that we would call
the lowest phase of the cold war, it most certainly would, Senator.
However, there are degrees in this thing of return to the cold war sit-
uation which are impossible to assess and which might not materially
increase the danger of war. But if it went all out, sealed off the
Soviet Union and the Communist bloc from contact with the outside
world, attempted to exert pressures wherever they thought they could
do so, I think undoubtedly a much more dangerous world situation
would be created.
Senator MANstat,ro. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions but I
don't want to take too much time.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper ?
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't have any questions at this time.
he CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey did I overlook you?
Senator HUMPHREY. I came in late, Senator. If any other Senator
wants to go ahead, it is all right.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse, are you ready?
Senator MORSE. I will yield to Senator Humphrey.
SECRETARY HERTER'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLEGITTS
Senator HUMPHREY. If the question I ask, Mr. Secretary, has al-
ready been asked, just brush it aside. I don't want to take any of
your time on that.
Did anyone ask as to whether or not you had any personal knowledge
of the 1.3-2 flight?
Secretary HERTER. Of the program?
Senator ilitarruarly. No, of the particular flight.
Secretary Hillanut. It was included, I said it was included?I am
sure it was included in a group of flights that I had been asked
whether I had any objections to them.
Senator HUMPHREY. If you wanted to, could you have effectively
vetoed such a policy?
Secretary HERTER. No; I could only have given my advice to the
President.
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VICE PRESIDENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS
Senator HUMPHREY. Would the Vice President be aware of these
decisions.?
Secretary HERTER. I think that as a member of the National Secu-
rity Council, he was aware of the program in the larger sense. I doubt
if he was familiar with any of the individual flights as such, but he
may have been.
Senator HUMPHREY. The reason I asked that question was that the
Vice President intimated on a television program, I believe the day
before the President's announcement in Paris, that the flights should
continue. The next day the President announced that he had already
canceled them.
The Vice President said they would continue, and the next day the
President announced that they had been suspended.
What I am asking is, would the Vice President, as a member of the
Security Council, have any opportunity of knowing the decision that
had been made by the President?
Secretary HERTER. There, the days followed so quickly one on an-
other that I just couldn't answer that, whether that opportunity would
have been offered or not.
Senator HUMPHREY. What I am trying to get at is the policy-
making machinery.
We have a subcommittee as you know, that is studying the policy-
making machinery of the Government, the Jackson subcommittee.
I am a member of that subcommittee. We had recently before the
subcommittee Mr. Kennan. We have had many of the prominent
officials of Government and former officials of Government.
The program of the reconnaisance flights was an established pro-
gram, and apparently was agreed upon by the Security Council; is
that correct?
Secretary HERTER. The Security Council was aware of it, yes.
Senator HUMPHREY. The Vice President is a member of the Secur-
ity. Council?
Secretary FIERTER. Yes.
Senator HUMPHREY. If the Vice President states on a television
program that he understood that the flights would continue, yet the
President announced the next day in Paris that as of the previous
Thursday they had already been suspended, do you think there was
any lack of communication between the responsibile officials of this
Government?
Secretary HERTER. There, sir, I am trying to think of the dates.
The Thursday on which the President gave that order was the day
that I went to Paris. I went to Paris that night.
The President followed 2 nights later and whether or not in that
2-day interval anything had been distributed with regard to that
order, I just don't know.
IMPACT ON SUMMIT DIPLOMACY OF RECENT EVENTS
Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have any changed views, Mr. Sec-
retary, as to the value of the so-called summitry diplomacy as a
result of this recent meeting?
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Secretary HERTER. I think as a method of carrying out negotiations
it has taken a hard knock.
Senator IITTAIPITEEY. Have you any idea as to how we are going to
proceed in the months ahead? I heard the President's address. It
was a good address. Ile gave a good accounting. He talked about, the
necessity of maintaining?I believe the word was businesslike relation-
-ships?or at least normal relationships insofar as we can with the
Soviet Union.
Is there any project ed plan as to how we will proceed with our
contacts with the Soviet -Union?
For example, we have the Geneva Conference still in session on
the nuclear testing. I suppose the Disarmament Conference is still
a reality.
Ts there to be any adjustment, in these conferences, any changes?
Are they to proceed according to the past?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, the President, I think, made that very clear
in 11 is statement.
Senator IIITMPTIRET . Are there any plans for any type of a high
level Foreign Ministers' conference or conference of sub-Cabinet
officers?
Secretary HurrEtt. As of now, there is not. I may add this with
regard to the summit ; that the four nations that were involved in the,
summit, were the four nations who, as a result of the decisions and
agreements reached after the war, were the four nations that have
the responsibility for Berlin and for the final settlement of the whole
German question, and that is the reason for those four, essentially,
get i ing together.
It is possible that again they-will have to get together. Whether
normal diplomatic changes would make progress or Foreign Ministers'
meetings in advance would make a program so that it would be worth-
while for them to come together, I just, can't tell you. That is always a,
possibility. But almost an y other subject, there are many other nations
thil are involved beside those four, and it is a great question in my
mind whether or not that method of coming together for the resolution
.of oroblPinq would be fruitful in the future.
Senator Humettativ, in other words, what you are indicating is that
a summit. conference merely ought to be the ratification, essentially the
ratification, of decisions that have been tentatively arrived at, at the
non-nal diplomatic levels.
Secretary HERTER. In my opinion, that is the most desirable thing.
CO rill\ DICTORY SOVIET ACTIONS
Sena tor TITT1IPITEEY. 1 egree, How do you explain, or is there any
explanation for what appears to be a contradictory bit f evidence of
Gromyko's blustering up at the United Nations on the Soviet resolu-
tion and, yet, of the apparent conciliatory behavior of the Soviets
in recent days with resoeet to the quick release of our plane and flyers
who strayed into East Germany and the recent broadening of Soviet-
Ameri can exchange projects?
Secretary ITEnTER. There again, you have got one of those contradic-
tions. As T was saying earlier, the fact that the attitude of the people
in Moscow and even the oflieials with whom our Embassy officials have
to deal, have been entirely normal since this incident.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SIJMMIT CONFERENCE 71
It is very hard to reconcile with the very harsh words that both
Khrushchev and Gromyko have uttered.
SOVIET OBJECTIVES
Senator IliarminEY. Do you lay any credence to the doctrine, or
at least an observation that has been made, that while the Soviet
tactics may change for awhile, that insofar as their general overall
strategy is concerned, it will remain pretty much the same as it has?
Secretary HERTER. Certainly as far as their objectives are con-
cerned. I think it was quite clear from some of this documentation
that will be put into the record, that is the speeches that were made
by Mr. Khrushchev, that he had laid greater and greater emphasis
on. the eventual triumph of communism over the world, and that he
put particular emphasis on that in recent months before the summit..
PREDICTIONS OF SOVIET ACTIONS
Senator HIIMPIMEY. I have a letter from a gentleman who is a pro-
fessor emeritus of a university, up at Bennington College, who has:
had an uncanny record in my years of acquaintanceship with him in-
understanding what goes on in the Soviet Union. His name is Dr,
Bernard Tauer. He is a former Social Democrat of some 35 years
ago from Austria' a professor of political economy, now retired. He
monitors Soviet broadcasts, studies Soviet literature, particularly
photographs and what-have-you. Just to give you a little back-
ground, he predicted to me some 3 weeks, I guess it was, before it
luso happened, the removal of Beria. I have a letter here from him right
before me, and it is a letter telling how Mr. Khrushchev was going
to scuttle the summit conference, written on April 25, this letter is.
And I also have a letter from him here in which he says:
The Soviet leader will now do everything possible to prove that Eisenhower
is a warmonger and an imperalist aggressor and not a man of peace, in action
not merely in words. We must, therefore, prepare ourselves for all kind$ of
provocations all around the world.
His thesis is that Khrushchev had been selling the Soviet people
upon the idea that President Eisenhower was a man of peace and
a man with whom he could deal. I don't mean deal, in the sense of
the crudeness of that word, but one with whom he could conduct
reasonably good negotiations, and that when the President accepted
the responsibility for the flights and didn't accept the opportunity,
at least what some people say was an opportunity of removing himself
from that responsibility, that Mr. Khrushchev took this as a very
personal matter, since he had staked his reputation in the Kremlin
and in the councils of the Communist Party upon the fact that he
could work with Eisenhower. Then Mr. Khrushchev felt that Eisen-
hower had not only upset the diplomatic applecart, but, more impor-
tantly, from a subjective point of view?Khrushchev's?put Khru-
shchev in a very difficult position with the Communist Chinese, with
the rightwing Stalinists in the Soviet Union, so that Khrushchev is
now making a personal crusade out of attacking the President.
1- What is your view of this? I am going to give you this letter. I
have a whole series of these, and this is a very remarkable man, may
I say.
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72 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
For example, I have a letter from him 2 weeks before the recent
shakeup in the Soviet; Union which was not too fundamental, but indi-
cating- some of the changes that were going to be made, by a very care-
ful analysis of broadcasts and meetings and literature. I had this
man down to see the late Senator Walter George, some of you may
recall, and he was very helpful at one time. What is your view of Mr.
IKhrushcbey's reactions lately to the President, the personal venom
that he seems to ex hi bit ?
Secretary HERTER. I am particularly interested in two things, Sen-
ator, in the letter that you have just read; one, the .fact that it was
written before the JI-2 incident.
Senator Ili huriinny. Yes.
Secret ary linnerna. In which this authority cites the fact that Mr.
Khruslichev was going to scuttle the conference.
Senator Hu MP I IR EY. 1. think that substantiates essentially what you
were saying this torn ing, your own observations on this.
Secretary I IERTER. Yes. The second has to do with the fact that
the President didn't, accept the way out which Mr. .K hrushchev ap-
peared to offer him. Nly own feeling with regard to that second mat-
t or is that it was very much of a trap. That what Mr. Khrushchey
thought might happen is that the President would disclaim personal
responsibility and that then Mr. Khrushchey would say, "The situa-
tion is even more dangerous than I thought, because this means that
I hat same, little frantic group in the Pentagon"?and that is the, phrase
that he used in his press conference?"is running the Government. of
the United States without the President knowing about it, and that
makes our situation even worse" and he would have inveighed in
exactly the same terms and asked the President for exactly the same
apologies and punishments which he asked for later.
I think that the element of personal pique certainly played a part in
the whole show.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.
The Senator from Kansas.
Senator CARLSON. Senator Aiken--
OTHER COUNTRIES REACTIONS TO SI TMMIT CONFEREN CE COLLAPSE
The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, the Senator from Vermont..
Senator AIKEN . I won't take long.
Speaking of the reaction of the rest of the world, have you made
any analysis of the reaction of the other countries of the world rela-
tive to the collapse of the summit meeting?
Secretary IInirrnit. Yes, I think we have. It isn't, of course, com-
plete. This will mean a, study from a. great many nations and bring
this altogether in one place.
I think that, perhaps, the best indication has been the attitude
among the representatives at the United Nations where you have got
a cross section from the rest of the world. From the very outset of
the, Russian complaint there it was very obvious they weren't; going
to be able to get any votes from their calling this an aggression,
except Soviet bloc votes.
Some of the smaller countries, two of them, abstained in the final
vote for reasons that were of a rather different nature.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 73
But, by and large, we have heard no sympathy from the point of
view of what you might call the uncommitted nations or the free
nations of the world for the attitude that Mr. Khrushchev took.
Senator AIKEN. Are you satisfied we have not lost prestige
throughout the world as a result, or lost more than Russia has?
Secretary HERTER. May I say, sir, that in my opinion our alli-
ances are firmer than they have ever been.
SOVIET HIERARCHY
Senator AIKEN. What was the significance of the shakeup in the
Russian Government prior to the 111-2 incident, I believe last April,
was it not, when Mr. Kozlov was promoted; and coupled with that
question_, why don't we hear anything about Mr. Mikoyan any more?
Has he been isolated or just gotten out of the news, or what has hap-
pened with him?
Secretary HERTEL Mr. Bohlen, who is our expert, is also the cen-
sor of the document, so I am afraid he has gone out of the room at
the moment.
With regard to the disappearance of Mr. Mikoyan, we have been
told this is just a normal vacation he has taken down to the Black
Sea. It is true in years gone by he had taken rather extended vaca-
tions there, and whether this is true or not we can't say.
With respect to the shakeup, I think the only significance that it
had were that two of the strongest members of the central committee
were sent to other responsibilities and this may have been a personal
strengthening of Mr. Khrushchev's power within the committee
itself. But it was not considered very highly significant.
Senator AIKEN. That is, Mr. Kozlov's promotion is not significant?
Secretary HERTER. I don't think so. I didn't know that he as such
had been promoted.
[Deleted.]
A long time ago I think when. Mr. Averill Harriman was visiting
in Russia he reported that Mr. Kozlov had been pointed out to him by
Mr. Khrushchev as his successor, saying that he and Mikoyan were
too old to carry on and that Kozlov was the No. 2 man. But there
was no telling whether he was saying that seriously or whether he was
being flattering about it because Mr. Kozlov was there at the time.
Senator AIKEN. I thought he made the best impression of any of
our Russian visitors last summer. At least when he came before this
committee, I thought he did.
I have no further questions.
The CHAIRMAN,. The Senator from Oregon.
FUNCTION OF NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary? I think it would be helpful for this
record if you made a statement in regard to the functions of NASA,
and the part that NASA played in connection with the U-2 flight.
I don't think the record is very clear as to what are the functions of
NASA, and what jurisdiction, if any, the State Department has over
NASA and what the relationship between NASA and the National
Security Council is, and the State Department.
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74 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secretary HERTER, NASA, as you know, is an agency devoted en-
tirely to the peaceful development of satellites and outer space ve-
ii
ides of one kind or another.
Its operations have now been separated out from what were called
purely military operations, although it is always inevitable in the
development, of boosters that there should be an interrelationship
between the two, because the military vehicle and the peaceful vehicle
have got the same problems of propulsion to get. up into the air. The
w itnesses of NASA, of course, will be before the con infi ttee.
[Deleted.] Most of the I7-2's are used by NASA in connection
with purely scientifie work, meteorological work. Actually, the
Japanese Government -foufal them tremendously valuable in tracing
the course of tornadoes last year, and 1 think that NASA put out. at
least three publications on their findings from the II-2 weather
ol yservations.
[Deleted.]
NA :4 CTS ROLE IN TlIE U-2 INCIDEN
With respect to the actual development of events in relation to
NASA, I am sorry to say that-, I can't give you firsthand information.
Perhaps Mr. Dillon can supplement. that as ii, occurred while I
WaS overseas and when M r. Dillon was in charge.
Mr. IntEoN. All 1 can say is as far as I know the State Depart-
a ient didn't have any direct, relationships with NASA on this matter,
and the relationships that there were, were handled by the Central
Intelligenee Agency i deleted], so either Mr. Dulles or the NASA
witnesses I hemselves will lw able to inform you on that.
Senator MORSE. Why would NASA make a statement in regard to
this plane if it was under the. jurisdiction of CIA ?
Mr. ilii,EoN. On the cover story it was in the open, the plane was
under the. jurisdiction of NASA. Actually for this operation it was
under the jurisdiction of CIA. [Deleted.]
Senator MORSE. Therefore, NASA, in your opinion, was acting
within the proprieties when it issued the statement that it issued.
Mr. DILLoN. I think so; yes.
Senator MoRsn. You think it had cleared that statement. with CIA
or had authority Irani CI A to issue it.
Secretary HERTER. [think so.
Mr. DitIoN. They should have; as I understood the matter, these
guidelines to answer questions were prepared by CIA.. They were
gone over with State 1,)eparttnent, people a day or two before. We
had thought that NASA was going to handle this in the way of an-
swering questions, whicht we knew they would (yet, because this was a
NASA plane, mid they apparently chose instead to forestall the
questions just by pulling it all out. in the form of a statement.
)eleted.
QUESTION OF EXEC-111'1yr: BRA NCII COORDINATION ON IT-2 STATEM,ENTS
Senator MoRsE. T raise the question because I want to do what I
can in order to clarify die record in regard to the allegation. made
I hat there is not the best of coordination between the State f)epart-
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 75
ment, CIA, Pentagon Building, and now NASA, and that there may
be a need for a centralization in the State Department of the authority
to authorize any statement by any of these agencies in regard to a
situation such as this, because of some possible reason to believe that
if this had been centralized more we would not have been having
different statements coming from different agencies.
Mr. DILLON. We were not aware, actually, of the fact that NASA
was going to make as formal a statement as this, and it was somewhat
of a surprise.
The CHAIRMAN. I could not hear that answer.
Mr. DILLoN. I say we were not aware of the fact that NASA was
going to make such a formal statement as this, and I am not sure
that the Central Intelligence Agency was either.
All the relationships as I said in my original statement, there was
coordination, there was a decision that the statements were going to
be made by the State Department.
That decision was taken and made known to the other agencies
concerned, which were the Department of Defense, and the Central
Intelligence Agency then on the morning of May 5.
The Central Intelligence Agency had the relationships with NASA
and undertook to pass that on. We had no relationships with NASA.
They didn't know we were in this thing, and somehow this statement
was put out by NASA somewhat more complete than we expected
but it was along the lines of the material that they had been furnished.
VICE PRESIDENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS
*1800 Senator Mons& Turning to a question that Senator Humphrey
asked?and may I assure you that I am quite nonpolitical in raising
that?I am only seeking to find out who had knowledge of what in
regard to the matter. Prefer to the May 27 issue of the Washington
Post, in an article by Mr. Chalmers Roberts in the course of which
he said :
Nowhere in the 31/2-hour television program did Nixon refer to any Presidential
direction in the U-2 crisis, other than his approval of the flights some years
earlier. Nor was there any reference to his own part in the affair. Nixon, of
course, sits in the National Security Council. Nixon did say that he was
"privy" to the U-2 reconnaissance policy "and I do endorse it." He also said
that "I knew about this flight."
Now, my interpretation, Mr. Secretary, of your testimony is that
neither you nor the President knew this specific flight was going to be
taken at the time that it was taken, but that you did know that there
Was a general program for such flights and that this flight could be
considered as a part of that program.
, NOW I ask you, do you have any reason to believe that Nixon knew
anything that you and the President did not know and that maybe it
is just an unfortunate use of language when he says "I knew about this
flight," and that he probably means that he knew about the general
program of reconnaissance?
Secretary HERTER. I would assume it was about the general pro-
gram rather than about the particular flight.
56412-60 6
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76 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
NATIONAL SDI: riff EY COUNCIL'S KNOWLEDGE OF [WITS
Senator Moasfi. Ilut, as far as you know, the National Security
Council did not brief its members in regard to any particular flights
without also notifying the President in regard to specific flights.
Secretary HERTER. No, I think the National Security Council was
only aware of the general program.
Senator MousE. Are you a member of the National Security
( ?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, I am.
N tr( I,EAR ARMAMENT RACE
Senator MORSE. One filial question at this round, Mr. Secretary: As
you know I, along with everyone else, I think, who has the interest of
peace at heart, am very much concerned about long continuation of
tit is nuclear armament raee.
Do you think that the 1Tnited States and the Western Powers on the
one hand and Russia on the other can continue this nuclear armament
race with its constant increase and acceleration for another 10 years
and not create the great probability of war?
Secretary HERTER. I don't know about the great probability of war,
Senator, but I would say certainly increase the chances of war.
Senator MORSE. I know we are of one mind but I want the record to
show this particular one mind: Do you agree with me that our genera-
tion simply has the responsibility in history to find some honorable
way to end this nuclear armament race?
Secretary HERTER. I agree with you completely on that.
Senator MORSE. Do you think that we ought to do everything that
we can to try to get the United Nations to exercise greater jurisdic-
tional authority in connection with this whole matter of armament
race than we have been able to get it to do so far?
Secretary HERTER. Senator, some time ago I made a speech in con-
nection with disarmament in which I stated my views as to the great
necessity in the following years to finding some answer to this, and
at, the same time finding an answer within the framework of the
United Nations of an authority which could maintain the peace with
law, and I still feel that just as strongly as I did at the time I made
that speech.
RECORD OF THE WORLD COURT
Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, my time is up and I want to make
a request for data if I may.
The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.
Senator MORSE. 71 I S morning we talked about the cases that we had
offered to take to the World Court.
Senator Wuxi% A little louder, Senator.
Senator MORSE. This morning you talked about the cases that we
were willing to take to the World Court. I wonder if the State De-
partment can compile for the committee the record in regard to the
World Court's operation, both on the cases it has handled and the
cases that we have offered to have it handle that have been rejected
by Russia or any other power.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secretary HERTER. Yes; we will be very glad to do that.
(The following information was subsequently furnished for the
record:)
STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CONTENTIOUSCASES PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST SOVIET-BLOC
COUNTRIES
1. The United States has proposed to the Soviet Union the adjudication of four
separate cases concerning aerial incidents. In each of these cases, the United
States has filed with the Registry of the International Court of Justice an
application instituting proceedings. These were the following cases: (a) Treat-
ment in Hungary of aircraft and crew of United States of America (United
States V. ; (b) aerial incident of October 7, 1952 (United States V.
U.S.S.R.) ; (c) aerial incident of September 4, 1954 (United States v. U.S.S.R.) ?,
and (d) aerial incident of November 7, 1354 (United States v. U.S.S.R.). Each
of these four cases has been dismissed by the Court for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court lacked jurisdiction because the Soviet Union has never accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under article 36(2) of its statute nor
agreed to jurisdiction specially In any case.
2. The United States also instituted proceedings before the International Court
of Justice in cases against Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These were: (e)
Treatment in Hungary of aircraft and crew of United States of America (United
States v. Hungarian People's Republic) ; and (f) aerial incident of March 10,
1953 (United States v. Czechoslovakia). Each of these cases was also dis-
missed by the Court for lack of jurisdiction. Again, the reason was that neither
Hungary nor Czechoslovakia has ever accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in
any way.
3. The United States also instituted proceedings before the International Court
of Justice in a case against Bulgaria, the aerial incident of July 27, 1955 (United
States v. Bulgaria). This case differed from those above in that Bulgaria had
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the former Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice in 1921, and it was the contention of the United States that
Bu'garia was subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the present International
Court of Justice by virtue of article 36(5) of this Court's statute. Bulgaria
challenged the jurisdiction of the Court on several grounds, including a decision
of the Court in another ease arising out of the same aerial incident that Bulgaria
is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, and a reciprocal invocation of the
United States domestic jurisdiction reservation. The United States has moved
to discontinue the case.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Kansas.
DEVALUATION OF SOVIET CURRENCY
Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, recently one of our Nation's finan-
cial writers, writing on the conditions in Russia, wrote that Mr.
Khrushchev was proposing a devaluation of the currency as of Janu-
ary 1, and he stated that no nation tampers with its currency unless
it is in financial difficulty.
What do we know about the financial and economic condition of
Russia that would lead us to believe or know that he is planning on
devaluating the currency?
Secretary HERTER. This I hadn't heard at all. I hadn't seen that
particular statement and I have seen nowhere in any report any indi-
cations that they were planning to devalue their currency.
There is no question but that their foreign exchange rate, their
official rate, doesn't correspond with reality. They have two rates,
one an official rate and one a tourist rate. They are very far apart.
One is 4 rubles to the dollar and one is 10 rubles to the dollar. But
from the point of view of their internal financial situation, I have
heard no reports they were planning to devalue the ruble.
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78 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN SOVIET IJNION
Senator CARLSON. We have had evidence that there is social unrest
among the people, that they are thinking that they are entitled to
better living conditions, better homes and housing.
Do we have any evidence, of that?
Secretary HERTER. Yes; 1 think there is. But this is a matter that
Mr. lett testified to a, few moments ago.
Senator CARLSON. That there is?
Secretary HERTER. There is evidence of that. As Mr. Bohlen said,
it is impossible to get documentary evidence, as such, because of the
secrecy and the discipline in their society, but I think that every
visitor to :Russia who has had a chance to talk with the workmen or
the students at the university and so on, has come back with that.
feeling.
After all, Mr. Khrushchev has made a good many statements about
the necessity of increasing the standard of living of their people.
In their incentives that they offer from the point of view of their
-workers, better living conditions in these housing projects is one of
the principal incentives that they have been offering in the past,.
giving people priority if their particular sections of a plant do par-
ticularly well from the point of view of production, they will be
advanced to better living quarters.
think that the lure for better living quarters and a better stand-
ard of living, more consumer goods, is a very real one.
SOVIET REDUCTION IN ARMED FORCES AND LABOR SIIORTAGE
Senator CAutsox. Does the State Department have any evidence of
a labor shortage in Russia based on a statement that was recently
made that Mr.Khrushchey reduced his military strength because it
was necessary to get some of the people back into the labor market?:
Secretary :HERTER. Yes. Very recently there has been a study that
think will be made available to you, made on the whole question of
the labor problem in Russia.
(The, study referred to appears on p. 283 in appendix )
It' is an extremely interesting one :from the point of view of the
present situation and the relationship of women at work compared
with men and the very large excess number of women over men that
exists in Russia today.
There is certainly every reason to believe that Mr. KThrushchey's
announced reduction of the armed forces was an effort to increase the
male labor force by taking the extra men out of the armed services
when he said he was planning to reduce from sonic 3,600,000 down to
2,400,000; that the principal purpose of that was to get a larger'
working force.
EFEccr ON UM AT IT CONFER E NCR OF KIIRUSTICIIEV'S INTERNAL PROBLEms
Senator CARLSON-. IS it not reasonable to assume, then, that Mr.
Khruslichey does have some problems, internal problems, and that
that may have some effect on his actions and his decision at Paris?
Secretary ITEarna. That undoubtedly is true. He has had some
other internal difficulty that you undoubtedly know about:, Senator, in
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eonnection with the new land that was planted, an area that has not
been too successful and this was something on which he had banked
very heavily to increase the food supply of Russia and I think he had
been rather heavily criticized because it hadn't worked out as planned.
Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?
ISSUANCE OF PRESIDENT'S ORDER SUSPENDING U-2 FLIGHTS
Senator GORE. Returning, Mr. Secretary, to the examination of
?whether there was a breakdown in coordination and administrative
procedure, I would like to inquire when you personally first learned of
the President's order that the U-2 flights would he discontinued ?
Secretary HERTER. At the time that he gave it.
Senator GORE. When did he give it?
Secretary HERTER. My recollection is that it was immediately after
meeting at the White House on Thursday morning at about noon.
Senator GORE. Did he give the order to you?
Secretary HERTER. No, he did not give the order to me. I think it
was through General Goodpaster, but I am not quite certain.
Senator GORE. HOW did you know that it was given?
Secretary HERTER. I heard him.
Senator GoRE. You heard him give the order?
Secretary HERTER. Yes.
Senator GonE. And this was on Thursday?
Secretary HERTER. This was on Thursday.
Senator GORE. Then you do not know whether this information
was communicated to the Vice President?
Nii0E Secretary HERTER. I have no idea.
Senator GORE. He was not present?
Secretary HERTER. He was not present.
Senator GORE. Was this at a meeting of the Security Council?
Secretary HERTER. No, I don't think it was the Security Council.
I think it was at the meeting immediately after the Security Council
at which there were three of us present. Allen Dulles was not present
and I have forgotten?I think Gates was present?after a Cabinet
meeting it was.
Senator GORE. I don't understand.
Secretary HERTER. After the Cabinet meeting.
Senator GORE. After the Cabinet meeting 2
Secretary HERTER. Right.
Senator GORE. That settles that. You heard the order issued, and
I will have no further question as to where it was issued and to whom.
If you heard it issued to Secretary Gates, that settles one question
definitely and finally.
But you do not know whether the Vice President was informed
about it?
Secretary HERTER. Excuse me
Senator GORE. Did you wish to add something?
Secretary HERTER. NO, no.
Senator GORE. You do not know then whether the Vice President
was informed about it?
Secretary HERTER. No, I do not.
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QUESTION OF PRESS SECRETARY FIAGERTY'S KNOWLEDGE OF SUSPENSION OF
FLIGHTS
Senator GORE. On this question of coordination or lack thereof, in
addition to NASA and the State Department, to which Senator Morse
referred, there is the State Department, CIA, NASA, Mr. Hagerty,
and officials within the Department and perhaps others.
Did Mr. Hagerty operate in this field strictly as press secretary or
did he undertake son me Executive function?
Secretary HERTER. I know of no Executive function that he
assumed.
ISSUANCE OF STATE DEPARTMENT AND NASA STATEMENTS OF MAY 5
Senator GORE. Mr. Dillon, on May 5 Mr. Hagerty, I understand,
told a press conference that the State Department and NASA would
issue statements. Were you aware of this?
Mr. IDuktox. I have very recently learned that he indicated that
NASA would issue a statement as such.
It was decided that the State Department would issue a statement.
I hadn't been aware that he had said we were. But it had been de-
cided and he knew it had been decided that we were going to do it.
Senator GORE. You say you very recently learned this. How
recently?
Mr. DILLON. I think a day ago or 2 days ago that someone from the
press said that he had told the press when they were there that
NASA would issue a statement, so that they could get their infor-
mation from NASA.
Senator GORE. Did Mr. Hagerty suggest to you that the State De-
partment issue a statement?
Mr. Dumox. No, it was decided when we first heard of this, this
news, as I said earlier this morning, at this National Security Council
meeting or right after it that was held outside of Washington, that
the State Department would handle the publicity on this, and that
we would make any statement that would be made, and it was known
at that time that we would make a statement.
Now Mr. Hager i y was not at the Security Council meeting, but
he was at that area out there where this exercise was taking place
and so he was aware of the fact that the State Department would
be making a statement at noon that day at our regular press con-
ference time.
Actually, the statement was delayed 45 minutes. It was made at
12 :45 when our regular daily press conference took place.
Senator GORE. Was it decided there that NASA would make a
statement also?
Mr. Dittox. It was not to my knowledge, no. It was not decided
there that NASA would make a statement.
Senator GORE. Who made that decision?
Mr. Dittox. I think that you have to ask NASA. I don't know
who made any such decision.
The fact is, as I have said earlier, I thought that NASA would
answer questions.
I didn't know they were going to make a statement until I saw it.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT cora htsziNt,z,
Senator GORE. You don't know whether NASA or whether Mr.
Hagerty made that decision?
Mr. DILLON. I have no idea no. I would assume NASA made it
because we did know that NA SA would have to answer questions
because this was a NASA plane that was lost and the reporters were
going to find out how high the plane flew, what kind of a plane it
was, anything they knew about it, and we had given them?the Intel-
ligence Agency had given them good answers on how to answer such
questions.
Senator GORE. You say you assume this. You did not know it?
Mr. DILLON. I knew they had given them that material. I knew
that as a fact, but we did not know that they were going to use that
and put in into the form of a statement as it actually came out.
Senator GORE. But Mr. Hagerty did know that a statement by
NASA would be made?
Mr. DILLoN. I don't know that what he said meant that he knew
they were going to make a formal statement or whether he was just
using that as a phrase, indicating that they would answer questions.
He may have thought they were going to make a statement. I just
don't know that. He may have called them up and asked them. I
don't know.
Senator GORE. Did, in fact, both the State Department and NASA
make statements subject to Mr. Hagerty's notice to the press that they
would do so?
Mr. DimoN. The State Department made its statement and NASA
made one about three quarters of an hour later, yes.
[Deleted].
Senator GORE. MAT time is up, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams?
Senator WILLIAMS. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.
PREMIER KHRUSIICHEV'S KNOWLEDGE OF OVERFLIGHTS
Senator LAUSCHE. When did the Camp David meeting take place
with Khrushchev ?
Secretary HERTER. I am terribly sorry?
Senator LAUSCHE. When did the Camp David meeting take place
with Khrushchev ?
Secretary HERTER. That was in September as I recall it.
Senator LAUSCHE. Did Khrushchev, before May 1, make any state-
ments indicating that the Soviet had knowledge of American recon-
naissance planes over their territory?
Secretary HERTER. None.
Senator LAUSCHE. Based upon his statements and upon the knowl-
edge which he claims the Soviet possess, what day was it that he
understood the first American plane flew over the Soviet?
Secretary HERTER. I can't identify that. My recollection is that
when he was in Paris he made the statement that he knew about these
overflights at the time that he was at Camp David and that he thought
there was something fishy about President Eisenhower at that time.
Senator LAUSCHE. Well, then at Camp David he did state that at
that time he knew that our planes were flying over the Soviet.
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82 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secretary linurER. That is what he said later when he got to Paris.
senator LA USCI1E. When he got to Paris?
Secivtary HERTER. When he got to Paris. Ile never mentioned it
at Camp David or at any time between Camp David and Paris.
Senator .1,Atsci IE. Well, if he knew at Camp Dav id that our recon-
naissance planes were flying over the Soviet, and he said nothing about
1.1., can you give any reason for his remaining silent, on the subject?
Seerotary _HERTER. Ile was asked that question in a press confer-
ence in Paris.
1 haven't got 'here, the exact words of response but T think we could
dig them out for you, and tell you just what he said in answer to that
hinisolf, but as I recollect, he said he felt that this was an inat-ipro-
pri ate moment to bring it up but that he did think there was some-
thing fishy about the President at that time.
Seal or LAUS(11 IE. Then at Camp David, when fie, knew that our
planes were flying over his land, he was discussing what was to be
the summit conference; is that correct?
Secretary llturrErt. What he hoped would be the summit conference.
Senator 14.11.7S(11 E. And if we take him at his word, at that time he
hoped to have, a summit conference although he knew then that we
were supposedly committing a :flagrant transgression against his
rights.
Secretary linfrinu. That is correct., from his own later testimony.
Senator LAuscun. Can you reconcile those two positions as both
being true, one that he honestly intended to attend a summit confer-.
ence and, two, that he knew our planes were flying over his land?
Secretary HERTER. No, it would be very difficult to reconcile the two.
It is very difficult particularly to reconcile the tremendous issue that,
he made of it later when he knew about it all the time, according to
his own statement.
Senat or A IKEN. Will the Senator yield? You will find on page 16
of the Background Docume.nts Khrushchev's statement that Twining,
the then Chief of Staff, sent a plane over Russia which went over
Kiev the day after he. left Russia. It is the third paragraph on page
16. (See appendix 1, p. 191.)
Senator LAnsen K. Yes. Your recollection is that the meeting took
place last September.
Secretary Iluartin Yes, sir.
Senator LAusoun. Now then, from September to May 14, was that
the day he came to Paris, he said nothing about this knowledge that
he had, was supposed to have had while he was at Camp David.
Secretary }TEETER. That is my recollection. I would want to check
on that. It is possible that he may have said something at the Presi-
dium meeting before he left Moscow. My expert; here tells me he did
not, and that, was my recollection that he had never nientioned it, until
he got to Paris.
Senator LA TISCH E. Can one, rationalize the furor of his resentment
in May of 1960 compared to his admitted silence at Camp David about
similar flights?
Secretary Man-En. No; one cannot.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
INFORMATION GATHERING OPPORTUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN
TIIE U.S.S.R.
Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, last January 18, Allen Dulles ap-
peared before our committee, and at that time he merely scratched on
the surface what I thought was a very vital question: the compara-
tive ease with which the Soviet gets information in the United States-
and the impregnable wall that bars us from getting news in the Soviet.
I ask you the question, Mr. Herter, to give your understanding of
the facility with which we get information out of the Soviet, and that
which they get out of the United States.
Secretary HERTER. Senator, as you know, we have what we call an
open society. We are very proud of it in which we have complete
freedom of the press, in which, except for matters of highest security,.
very freely talked about, and a great deal is published.
Our technical magazines publish a great deal from the point of view
of vital military information. Our installations in this country, while
no direct overflights are permitted, can be photographed with com-
parative ease from an angle of one side.
Generally speaking we have had no restrictions at all on travel
in the United States except for a few very small circumscribed areas,
like the Atomic Energy Agency plants, and we have had restrictions
on Soviet citizens traveling in this country which have been taken
entirely as a retaliatory measure because of the limitations put on the
travel of Americans in Russia.
Senator LAUSCHE. Right.
Secretary HERTER. The Soviet society, as you know, is a closed
society, where one moves and goes only where they tell you you can
go or when they tell you you can go.
Senator LAUSCHE. This morning in answer to a question, assuming
that a Soviet plane was over the United States and what we -would
do about it, you said that there is no need of them sending planes for
reconnaissance purposes because they can get the information without,
going through that effort.
Secretary HERTEL That is quite so.
Senator LAUSCIIE. That is, they can go to Cape Canaveral and
pretty simply see what is going on there.
Secretary HERTER. Well, sir, there are newspaper men down at Cape
Canaveral all the time and a good many visitors.
Senator LAUSCHE. Now the fact is that:
The Soviets still consider that secrecy and the security of everything relating'
to their military operations is one of their great assets, and they have no
Intention whatever of changing that. Moreover they have no intention of letting
us into areas of miltary importance.
Those are the words of Dulles.
That is, there is a difference between the Soviet getting information
here and our getting it in the Soviet.
Secretary HERTER. Oh, a very gTeat difference. It is the whole
difference between an open and a closed society.
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84 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
PROPOSED PASSPORT LEGISLATION
Senator LAUSCHE. You have been asking for this Congress to pass
a bill that would give the State Department some, limited control
over Communists going to the Soviet Union. Is that correct?
Secretary HERTER. That is correct.
Senator LAUSCHE. And why have you asked that?
Secretary HERTER. Because we felt that we ought to have some
control--these are American citizens traveling abroad?that we ought
to have some control over those who may be going to various parts of
the world in interest inimical to those of the United States.
Senator LAUSCHE. And you asked that because you have in mind
the grave dangers that, lie in the ability of a Communist to distribute
information in the Soviet Union when he makes the visit, if he so
desires.
Secretary IIERTim. Yes, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. That bill has not been acted upon; is that correct.?
Secretary HERTER. That is correct.
POWERS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senator LAUSCHE. Is there any type of legislation that you feel that
we ought to pass with respect to the curtailment of the duties and the
powers of the Central Intelligence Agency or the expansion of them.
If you have given that subject no thought, you can state it.
Secretary HERTER. I have given it no thought. I hope there would
be no change so far as the activities are concerned. [Deleted.]
Senator LAUSCHE. That is all I have.
ALLEGED FRENCH NEWSPAPER ACCOUNT OF OVERFLIGHTS
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, there was one statement that I was
told when I was in Paris that an account of overflights of the Russian
territory had been carried in a French newspaper some 30 to 60 days
prior to that.
Have you ever heard of such account?
Secretary HERTER. I think I heard the same reports in Paris but I
never saw any documentary proof of it.
The CHAIRMAN. Have any of your people tried to confirm it?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, but I have not heard it mentioned by any-
OPO except when I was over in Paris, too. I had not heard a word
before that.
KHRUSHCHEV'S MAY 5 REFERENCE TO OVERFLIGHTS
The CHAIRMAN. [ 1)eleted.]
In his speech of May 5, Mr. Khrushchey referred to the U.S. over-
flights of July 2, 1956, April 9, 1960, and May 1, 1960. He said that
the April 9 flight caused concern within the Soviet G-overnment and
resulted in admonishments to the Soviet military not to let it happen
again.
[Deleted.]
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KHRUSHCHEVIS INTERPRETATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE
OF OVERFLIGHTS
The CHAIRMAN. This, again raises this point that puzzles me very
much. The evidence is quite Clear that Mr. Khrushchev, if he didn't
know positively, certainly suspected that it was our planes that were
going across his territory, didn't he
Secretary HERTER. That is what I assume.
The CHAIRMAN. And it comes back to this point that he hadn't
raised such a terrible fuss about it until this one, that is, the May 1
flight, which was shot down. And, you said you couldn't reconcile
the difference in his attitude toward the prior flights to the attitude
toward the May 1 flight. But doesn't the reconciliation, if it is ex-
plainable at all?I am just asking you if there is one?does it not lie in
the fact that our Government did take the position regarding the May
1 flight and this program, that this is a deliberate program which we,
the President, takes responsibility for, and which we intend to
continue?
Secretary HERTER. Not which we intend to continue. That has
never been said.
The CHAIRMAN. He interpreted it as such. Mr. Khrushchev in his
statement, which I have a copy of here?this is his language. He
says?this is a quote from part of our Background Documents (see
p. 204, appendix 1) which says:
At his press conference, Herter made an outrageous statement. Far from
feeling guilty and ashamed of aggressive actions, he justifies them and says
that this will continue in the future. Only countries which are in a state of
war can act in this way. * * * Herter's statement has made us doubt the cor-
rectness of our earlier conclusions that the President, the American Government,
did not know about the flights. Herter's statement says that this intelligence
plan was endorsed by the Government.
At least that is the way he interpreted it, and, as we said before--
Senator LAusenn. Who is "he"? Who interpreted it?
The CHAIRMAN. This is a quote from Mr. Khrushchev's statement.
Ile is interpreting what Mr. Herter said as speaking for the Govern-
ment. But is this not at least a possible reconciliation of the differ-
ence in attitude between the prior flights and the May 1 flight?
Secretary HERTER. It might be if one wanted to interpret the words
that I spoke that way. There was no need of his interpreting those
words that way. Certainly from what I said, that is a very far-
'fetched interpretation. I think he was interpreting it for his own
purposes that way. I think that the one reconcilable feature between
those two things is that in one case he had specific evidence and in the
other case he did not.
The CHAIRMAN. Then it is your position that neither your state-
ment nor the President's press conference can legitimately be inter-
preted as an endorsement and justification of the flights and a policy
of pursuing them in the future?
Secretary HERTER. Certainly not the policies of pursuing them in
the future. The President's statement that was made in Paris said
it was perfectly clear from what I had said and from what he had said
that there was nothing that allowed that inference.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you in your background news conference in
Paris on Sunday, May 15, repeat the same statement that you had
made prior thereto in Washington?
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86 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secret ary HERTER. I was asked at that background_ press conference.
whether or not I had made a statement that we would continue doing
tins. _I repeated the very words that I had used in my statement. I
said I stood on those. That, did not imply -that we would continue.
The CHAIRMAN. Prior to that second statement, Mr. Khrusbehev
had so interpreted it. Were you aware that, he had so interpreted it
in his statement to the Presidium?
Secretary HERTER. I think I may have been, but, if one took cog-
nizance of every interpretation of his of everything that happens in
this country one would be spending all one's time trying to correct
his statements.
The CHAIRMAN. You believe that it is an unreasonable and far-
fetched interpretai ion of your statement or the President's in his press
conference. that these would be continued; is that correct ?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, I do.
The CHAIRMAN. IS it or is it not a fact that the press in this country
interpreted it, in that same fashion ?
Secret ary HERTER. I am told that some did am I some, did not.
The CHAIRMAN. It might have been wise for us to clarify at. that.
time so that we interpreted it. properly; don't you think?
Secretary HERTER. That, as I think T have indicated earlier, re-
ferred to the cessation of the flights and not resuming the fliohts.
Tho President had reserved to state, in Paris in conlunction with the
fact that he was going to offer at the United Nations his plan for
aerial supervision of all nations that would be willing to submit to it.
The Cr:FA-tint-AN. Do vou believe ti iat any head of sinte,, of any
important, nal ion a ( je. 4, could proceed with negotiations at a eon-
lerence under the situation, at, least as he interpreted it, that, is, that
we intended to continue such flights?
Secretary IERTn
E. t K
fer all, Mr. hrushchev arrived in Pari
I s and
made. an arrival statement, there the Saturday beforc the conference?
saying that he expected to proceed and have fruitful results.
The CHAIRMAN. For the record, in order that, it is clear what is?
lavolved here, I would like to rettd one sentence, the one that is
referred to by Mr. Ichrushchev, which I think you clarified. I quote
from, the statement, that: was made by the Department of State on
May 7 (see p. 187, appendix l) :
The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense'
is enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet nion in contrast
to the free world.
think that is the statement that led to the interpretation, don't
Von?
Secretary HERTER. I am sorry, sir. I have, got before me, now the
statement of May 7. Which were those words?
'The CHAIRMAN. It appears on page 12 of the background docu-
ments prepared by the staff, the first paragraph at: the top of page 12.
Secretary HERTER. That does not in any way intimate that: they
would go on.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not believe that that could reasonably be
interpreted as meaning that they will continue?
Secretary HERTER. No.
The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.
Senator Wiley?
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KHRUSIICHEV'S SPEECII AT BAKU
Senator WILEy. Mr. Secretary, I have listened to this examination,
and as you brought out, Mr. Chairman, I think that what we had
better do is get down to what I think is the basic issue, not what
was said or particularly done, but let's see what Khrushchev did.
On April 28, in what has been called the speech at Baku, an exam-
ination of that speech shows clearly that the Soviet Government had
come to the conclusion that it would get nowhere at the summit
conference. Now, listen to this:
Overnight all the Government-controlled radio stations?
and get the date, May 25?
all the controlled radio stations and newspapers in the Soviet Union began
to prepare the people for a summit failure, and flatly blamed the West. The
same bitter tones which Khrushchev used in Paris is to be noted in what he
said at Baku.
And Baku was days before.
In a violent attack in Baku on Secretary IIerter and Under Secretary Dillon,
.on that same day, the Soviet Premier intimated that he planned to use military
power to enforce the prospective seizure in the West.
I quote Khrushchev:
If, therefore, the Western Powers should not wish to sign a peace treaty
with the German Democratic Republic, that would not preserve for them the
rights on whose preservation they insist. They would then obviously lose the
right of access to West Berlin by land, water, or air.
In another portion of his speech, the Soviet Premier practically
admitted that he had no hope of reaching any agreement at the sum-
VW :mit conference.
He said:.
The nearer May 16, the day of the meeting of the heads of Government, ap-
proaches, the more one-sided becomes the approach of certain statesmen of
the Western Powers to the problems the participants of the conference will
have to face.
Then he goes ahead and gives examples attacking Herter and
KIIRUSIICIIEV'S DECISION TO SCUTTLE CONFERENCE
Now- I want to quote this. This morning I called your attention to
this young Russian that stepped out from the intelligence department
of the Russian Government, who was heard on the radio. He said,
.and I quote:
The Soviet Communist regime is in no way interested in allowing so popular
:a man as the American President to come to the Soviet Union. They are
definitely afraid of the impact such a visit can make on the people.
Now if the issue is what caused Khrushchev to shoot his wad, so
to speak, I think it is very clear that when he found out, one,
that he
couldn't make an impression upon his associates who were to be at
the conference; two, that Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese were un-
happy and Mao Tse-tung laced him up and down about this confer-
ence, as the record shows, when -he found Out that they didn't want it;
three, that he was having trouble with his own gang in Russia; and,
four, that the youth of Russia were simply getting all fed up?he
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88 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
decided before he went to Paris that he was going to let the balloon
go up.
It wasn't the question of 15-2. That may have given him the os-
tensible opportunity to blow his top, but, as a matter of fact, he was:
all ready to go days before.
PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION
Now if that is the fact, and I think it is sustained by the people
who weigh the evidence, then there is no need of our inquiring into,
what some folks feel. They may be a little remiss hither and yon in
our own public service. They were laboring under deep pressure.
When you put yourself in the President's boots and go over there
and see what he took, you have to say, "God bless him. He held his
temper and he handled himself so that he made, all America and all
the world proud," and the result was as suggested, as the record now
shows. Look at the U.N., look at Britain, what they say about it..
And the answer, I think, is that we should just about stop our in-
vestigation and not try to ball up further the issue.
The CHAIRMAN. For the record I will say that the President, yes-
terday morning, heartily endorsed this inquiry.
Sell at( yr Win EY. That what?
The CHAIRMAN. The President himself said in my presence that
he I Wall ily endorsed this inquiry, and if the Senator wishes to take
issue with the President, why I suggest he talk to him about it.
Senator WILEY. Oh, no. I heard him say that. I am not disputing
his saying it. I am just simply saying that where do we go from here
now?
Are we going further, are we going to try to ball up the agency
that gets the information, that has done such a tremendous job, that
for 31?; years has given us information.
[Deleted.]
The CHAIRMAN. I. think the Senator misunderstands the purpose of
this meeting. It is not, to ball up anything. It is to try to clarify a
Situation for the benefit of the committee and the Senate and the.
country. And I know of no one who has the slightest purpose, of ball-
ing up anything.
Has the Senator completed his questions?
Senator WILEY. Yes, I am sorry that I used that expression. What
I meant was "confuse," and if there is going to be further evidence,
would you mind telling me who the next witness is?
The CHAIRMAN. There will be no other witnesses this afternoon.
Senator WILEY. Well, do you expect to call some later on?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Dulles is coming on Tuesday.
Senator Mansfield?is the Senator through?
Senator WILEY. No, that is the point I am making. I want to state
in all sincerity, gentlemen, it is your responsibility if you want to call
this man who has created this agency under the mandate of the Con-
gress, that we have appropriated money for, and have not tied his
hands and he is the one who brought about this; let 'us be frank.
(Discussion off the record.)
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is misinformed if he thinks that type
of testimony is going to go in the public record. There was no inten-
tion at any time of putting this in the public record.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 89
Senator WILLY. Did you hear yesterday when the distinguished
Senator from Ohio very plainly and bluntly talked about the leaks.
I belong to a committee where I have seen them go right from the
committee room right out in front of the fellows who have the mech-
anisms for giving the news. This is the first time I have blown my
top, but I am simply telling you in the interests of my country, I think
you should not call in this other agency. I think that these gentlemen
have told what the public knows now, but to bring in this other
agency, I think would be a mistake.
The CHAntAx. Does the Senator say that he knows Senators who
have gone out of executive sessions before the microphone and re-
peated what has been said here?
Senator WILEY. I am not putting my finger on any Senators. If
you want to know what is going on what have they got the television
out there for and you are quoted every day as appearing before it.
Let's be frank. This is not the only committee where they spill the
beans. But I am talking about the Central Intelligence Agency,
gentlemen. I happen to know something about it, and I know what
it means, and people over in the House know what it means, and I
sincerely hope that you will not bring Dulles before you. That is all
I have to say.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield.
JURISDICTION OVER THE AIRSPACE AND THE HIGH SEAS
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, in an attempt to clarify some
of the confusion which exists in some of our minds I would like to ask
vs) some questions:
What is your present official interpretation of international law as
regards the extension of national sovereignty skyward?
Secretary HERTER. I don't think we have any.
Senator MANSFIELD. We have no international law in that field as
yet?
Secretary HERTER. That I know of. There is no definition as to
what is considered the atmosphere above the air. There is no ac-
cepted interpretation or verbiage when they are talking about the
atmosphere.
Senator MANSFIELD. Would you think it advisable to have an inter-
national conference or conferences to decide the question of sover-
eignty in the air over a country and also the possibility of regulating
the seas in a more orderly fashion?
? Secretary HERTER. Well, as you know, we have tried for over a
year to get the United Nations to get the outer space committee
organized and underway.
Senator MANSFIELD. At our suggestion?
Secretary HERTER. At our urging. We have been urging that this
be done. We have been pressing it. We have not been able to make
any headway because the Russians refused to go along. There have
been further discussions of this proposal but we have been unable to
agree on who should carry it out. I think we are making progress
but it is still one of those things where there is a constant dispute as
to what should be done.
Not only that but we had hoped to get it adjusted in time so that
this year there could be a great international scientific congress be-
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cause you're dealing with, new matters that the scientists are expert
ID that the layman is not and the Soviets were unable even to allow
the, calling of that congress.
Senator MANSFIELD. No. ln other words, as yet there is no clari-
fieation of this particular matter.
Getting back to my statement concerning reguilation of the seas,
of course, operate under the doctrine of freedom of the seas.
But what I have in mind is the fact that it is my understanding that
the Soviet Union ran launch missiles anywhere it wants to up within,,
say, three miles of our coastline if it is in our vicinity, and we have
the same. right under international law to fire missiles up to 3 miles,
say of Vladivostok. Is that correct.?
Secret ary HERTER. Yes, and it depends again on what one takes as
the territorial waters. Three miles have been the generally accepted
territorial limit. The Soviet Government has claimed 12 miles and,
as yon know, the recent Geneva, Conference failed in reaching agree-
ment among the nations as to what should constitute the territorial
water of different, nations.
Sonic nations have gone ranch farther than that, particularly
with regard to fishing rights.
Serertor \I 'i That's right, but what I have in mind is that
tunes have changed eonsiderably, even in our generation.
Mir. Chairman, inay we have order in the committee ?
The (11AutmAN. It is d filen t to have order.
Senator MANSFIELO. The fact is that we, have these satellites going
skyward hundreds of Miles and we have these missiles going thousands
of miles into the ocean. It was because of these new' factors that I
oifered the sugcrestion that it might be well to have, international con-
ferences to take heed of changed conditions in this modern day.
We have also advocated, as you are aware, peaceful uses of outer
space, and we have made no headway.
rDeleted.1
The Cum-RATAN. Senator Gore?
Senator Gonn. Mr. Chairman, the first question I wish to pursue
leads to a question of Mr. Bohlen. Since others have asked him ques-
tions, I wonder if I mi gilt ask that be return.
STATE DEP. \ R'rAl EN T'S KNOWLEDGE OF IT-2 ELIO I ITS
Mr. Secretary, Secret ary Dillon testified this morning that he
did not know of this particular flight, and to time best of my memory
yOH said you were away at the time and did not know of this particular
fiiht.
Secretary HERTER. I knew of the program. I made that clear in
which the flight was included but not that particular flight.
Senator GoRE. I was specifying this particular flight. Did I cor-
rectly understand bot h of you ?
Mr. Dtr,r,oN. Yes, Senator. I had hoard about 6 weeks earlier that
a series of flights would be undertaken and I had not heard anything
since that time but it was not in my regular order of business.
Senator GORE. Would you repeat what you said? I did not under-
stand it,
Mr. Dit,LoN. I said I was informed about 6 weeks before the date
of this flight, I say, that there was a program of particular flights
of which this one could have been a part, and I did--
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 91
Senator GORE. It could have been but you did not know of this
particular one.
Mr. DILLON. No; I did not know any more than that of this par-
ticular flight.
QUESTION OF DECISION NOT TO HALT PROGRAM OF I1-2 FLIGHTS
Senator GORE. The President, in his statement to the American
people, the other night, said this:
As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and
thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and
that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the
program should not be halted.
Now, as I understand your reply to the chairman of the committee,
you did not participate in the making of a decision to halt or not to
alt this particular flight.
Secretary HERTER. I had approved of it.
Senator GORE. On this particular program.
Secretary HERTER. And approved of it as a part of the program.
The question of the halting of it was not in issue at that time although
I knew that the summit conference was coming.
Senator GORE. Well, my specific question is this: Did you partici-
pate in a conference or were you aware of a decision; did you make
a decision? What is the full extent of your knowledge of a decision
that the flight would not be discontinued?
Secretary HERTER. I know of no conference at which that matter
was discussed.
440 Senator GORE. Then would it have properly been
Secretary HERTER. The only matter that came before me was the
approval of this program.
Senator ? GORE. How long ago did you approve the program?
Secretary HERTER. I can't tell you exactly, but it was some time
prior to the time I went abroad.
Senator GORE. IS it a matter of weeks?
Secretary HERTER. A matter of weeks.
Senator GORE. Would such a decision have been properly within the
province of the State Department?
Secretary HERTER. No. The State Department would not have a
final decision in the matter. The State Department would have an
advisory position in the matter, and the CIA did consult with us
about it.
[Deleted.]
PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION
Senator GORE. I understood the purpose of this hearing was to de-
velop the facts insofar as we were capable of doing so, and to the extent
that security would permit, to make available the facts to the Ameri-
can people.
Do I correctly understand the purpose of the hearing?
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee understands it as I
understand it in spite of the opinion of the Senator from Wisconsin.
Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask, is it?
Senator WILEY. You might as well just now.
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92 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator LAUSLIIE. Is it confined to what our Government has done
or are we concerned about what the Soviet has done?
The CHAIRMAN. I certainly am concerned about what the Soviet has
done.
Senator LAusicm:. It hasn't been manifested here today.
(Procedural discussion.)
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee has the floor.
Senator WILEY. May I just say one thing?
The CHAIRMAN. Does: the Senator yield to the Senator from Wis-
consin ?
Senator WILEY. I realize when I bit the ceiling before that I was
probably not as coherent as I should be. I want to say to you with the
conviction of a man who has lived lona, that the business of a com-
mittee like ours is to develop facts for legislation, facts that are
necessary to bring out curative legislation, or if you please, if you
want to investigate all individual, that is another thing. We had the
McCarthy hearings. We know what that did, but here is another
angle.
It is not the business of this committee to expose to the people of
this country a mechanism that is so important to preserve the life and
integrity of this country, and I mean the CIA, I know what it means.
I happen to know something about what it has done I deleted] and to
me, at least, and as I say, as a young man of past 70 summers, please
remember that when you go into this thing, as you are going into it,
you are going to expose a mechanism that is as vital to the life of this
country as anytbino- you can think of.
It is that mechanism that made possible this series of three and a
half years of exploratory missions over the Soviet I-Tnion [deleted].
If that is what von are going into, just count your words.
Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee.
Senator GORE. I )calirg with the CIA is not a new experience for me.
I happen to have handled in the House of Representatives the ap-
propriation bill for the Atomic Energy Commission for 5 years before
I was elected to the U.S. Senate.
was party to the appropriation for the atomic energy program
when the atomic bomb was being built in my State. No one ever heard
those secrets from my lips. Every year for the past 141 have listened
to the testimony of the CIA from one to two or three or more times..
don't think that it is necessary that we violate the security of tins
country in order to hear Mr. Allen I Mlles' testimony.
The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield? Mr. Dulles said to this
committee when he was asked if he would appear, that be would be
very pleased to appear. He thought it would serve a useful purpose.
He had no objection.
Senator GORE. I. am aware that I am pursuing very important
questions that reflect upon the effectiveness of our country and the
prestige of our country. That is all the more reason why they should
be pursued.
I thought this was the purpose of the hearing, to develop the facts,
and insofar as they could be revealed to the public, to do so.
The CHAIRMAN, The Senator is quite right.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 93
QUESTION OF DECISION NOT TO HALT PROGRAM OF U-2 FLIGHTS
Senator GORE. To return to the question, insofar as either of you
know, or any official of the Department, no actual decision to proceed
with the flight or not to proceed with the flight was made.
If such a decision was made, it was beyond your knowledge. Is
that a correct statement ?
Secretary HERTER. Yes ? I think that I ought to say this. When the
matter came before me, I had an opportunity of disapproving it and
did not do so. Not it, but the program.
Senator GORE. But this particular flight did not come before you?
Secretary HERTER. It came as one of a group.
[Deleted.]
NOTICE TO SECRETARY HERTER OF PLANE'S MISFORTUNE
Senator GORE. When did you first learn of the plane's misfortune?
Secretary HERTER. I received word in Ankara, Turkey, that a plane
was down. That is all.
Senator GORE. From whom did you receive it?
Secretary HERTER. It was handed to me from a slip of paper that
Mr. Livingston Merchant had. He was sitting behind me at a NATO
meeting and he handed me a slip of paper, "word has come that
[deleted] a plane is missing."
I don't think he said in Russia. I didn't know which one of the
flights it was.
Senator GORE. It is your presumption that this was a communica-
tion within the Department?
Secretary HERTER.. Oh, yes. I assume it was either in the Depart-
ment or from CIA sources with whom we are constantly in touch
overseas.
Senator GORE. I believe my time is up. I will return to this.
[Deleted.]
PARIS PRESS BRIEFING BY AMBASSADOR BOHLEN
The CHAIRMAN. You had one question of Mr. Bohlen. He was
called back at your request.
Senator GORE.. Yes. If I may digress a moment, I have been told
several times, Mr. Bohlen, that in your press briefing at Paris I
believe on this 16th, you expressed the view that except for the 1J-2
plane, there would have been a summit conference.
Will you relate to us what you said at this briefing in this regard?
Mr. BOHLEN. I don't recall, Senator, honestly that I made that
statement?
Senator WILEY. A little louder' please.
Mr. BOHLEN. I don't recall that I made that statement. The press
briefing that I held on the 16th was an open press conference on the
record, and I do not recall any statement of that kind because my
view then as now is that the U-2 was one of the factors that nr?y have
led to the particular Soviet behavior at Paris.
I really do not recall any such statement of that kind. It's all on
the record. This was an open press conference.
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94 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator Gout:. You did not hold ;tit off-the-record background
briefing?
Mr. lion LEN-. I hob.' a background later in which I outlined at, that
conference the three factors that I believed and still do entered into
the formulation of i he Soviet position.
Senator GORE. Was a transcript made of that background briefing?
Mr. BOHLEN. 11 ?vottld have to check on that, sir. I think there
probably was.
Senator GORE. W011id you supply it to the committee if there was?
Mr. BoffLEN. If there is (De, 1 would have no views on it.
Secretary HERTER. I would have, no objection.
(The transcript, referred to was subsequently furnished for the con-
iden ti al use of the, con 'nil ttee.)
Mr. Bouf,EN. If I here is a transcript of it, but I recall the circum-
stances very well in this, in that three factors that 1 mentioned earlier,
the Soviet pessi mist 11 as regards the outcome of the suntinit front their
point of view; the possible opposition or questioning of its conduct
and the T--2 matters were the three factors that appeared to me to
have entered into Si wiet decision to torpedo the conference.
I might add, Senator, for clarification on this, we have used the
words "scuttle the conference" quite often.
There, are various ways of scuttling a conference. You can scuttle
a conference before it begins or you can sabotage it from within
[deleted].
[ Subsequently, N1 r. .1 oh len made, available to the Committee the
following statement of views he held in Paris at the time the Sum-
mit Conference came to an end :1
would like to just briefly note?this is a personal opinion--that there
were three elements in this situation:
One, I think, was the situation in Moscow, whereby there were some people
who were a little bit concerned about the manner in which Khrushehev was
conducting the foreign relations of the Soviet Union, for reasons already
totalled on.
The second was that I believe that he came to think?or the Soviet Gov-
ernment came to think?that the prospects for any agreement at the sum-
on Berlin particularly, which is one that he had committiml himself so
deeply to, were very dim indeed. Before the plane incident. they were visibly
preparing the usual tactic of placing the onus in advance upon the Western
Powers for any expected failure. But had there been no plane incident, I
believe the conference would have run its full course. There would have
heel' discussions. There would have been the normal, if you want to call it
that, the normal type conference with the Russians, of which we have had
many in the last 15 years, hut without results.
The plane incident the whole development connecting with that, moved
things into a totally new dimension. And I think that the evidence is (.011-
elusive, that he came here to Paris with the idea of either torpedoing the
conference or conceivably?because you cannot read their full minds--the
hope that somehow or other that the pressure from our Allies would force the
United States to capitulate. I think he makes this very plain. And this is
where he made his major miscalculation. Our Allies stood with us solidly--
wonderfully well.
01 course, it is easier to say that now than it was before,
Mr. DRYDEN. I was told that these statements had been cleared by
Mr. DRYDEN. The GIN people with whom we were dealing, sir.
Senator GORE. Ott the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
The CI tAntmAN. Does the Senator from Ohio have any further
finest ions?
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DUTIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Herter, I have in my hand the National
Security Act of 1947, and I have read from page 5 that part of the ?
material which deals with the duties of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Are the duties enumerated in this section complete?
Secretary HERTER. Yes; I think those are enumerated in that
section.
Senator LAUSCHE. This section didn't place any directions on how
intelligence is to be obtained.
Secretary HERTER. No.
[Deleted.]
PRESIDENT'S ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR U-2 FLIGHT
Senator LAUSCIIE. Based upon the questions that have been asked
here today, one set implied that the President should not have told
the truth.- The next set implied that one of the men lied. And the
third set implied that there was an inability to coordinate the views.
Now, my question is off the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Take it off the record.
We will make a special dispensation, whatever the Senator wishes..
Does he wish it on or off?
Senator LAUSCIIE. Let it be on. Has anyone given any thought
about the peculiar position that the President of the United States
is placed in in connection with the paradoxical situation that he is
supposed to be a man of truth, and moral character, and yet requested
to he about these matters, if they are within his knowledge?
Secretary HERTER. I am not sure whether that is a rhetorical ques-
tion or whether you are asking me that question.
Senator LAUSCHE. Well, take it both ways. [Laughter.]
Senator GORE. Rhetorical or oratorical. [Laughter.]
Senator LAUSCHE. Well, let's assume that you were the President,
Mr. Herter, and you were faced with the dilemma of telling a lie
about what happened or telling the truth. In either event you are
hooked. What course would you follow?
Secretary HERTER. I can answer that one so far as I myself am
concerned.
The CHAIRMAN. He followed both.
Senator LAUSCHE. I don't know. I am beginning to wonder if what
the Central Intelligence Agency is doing ought not to be a matter
left with them and without the knowledge of the President.
I have no other questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I just want to make a comment.
The Senator from Ohio has put his finger on the very point that
perhaps I didn't make clear to him earlier in my inquiry. This is, in
my opinion, a central important question about this whole matter,
the wisdom of the policy of involving the President in this kind of
business, that is, espionage, which traditionally involves lying and
cheating and murdering and violating the sovereignty of countries
with which a country is not at war and all of this. And what the Sen-
ator has said is?perhaps I didn't make it clear?is exactly the point
that I was seeking to raise and to elucidate in the first line of questions
that I asked. And I agree with him this presents a very difficult
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96 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE aumanT CONFERENCE
dilemma, and the question is the wisdom of departing from the tra-
ditional historical practice of not involving the head of the state in
any espionage responsibilities that he is above and apart from. We
follow that in the Congress, as you have just stated. [Deleted.] We
treat it differently, and I was suggesting and raising the question of
whether it is wise to depart from the traditional practice that all
important states throughout history, without exception in accordance
with the Secretary's testimony, have followed. That is the very point.
I don't think the Senator understood what my point was.
Senator LAuscri?. I knew if I were President--
Senator WII,Ey. You would tell the truth.
Senator LAUSCIIE. I would tell the truth.
Senator WILEy. So did he.
The CHAIRMAN. He did and this is the answer.
Senator LAUSCHE. And could you expect him to do anything else?
Senator WILEy. That is right.
Senator LAUSCHE. And the only way you could enable him to per-
form his duty to his country was not by having him know what was
done and if he didn't know the question would be pursued why
didn't he know.
Senator WILEY. He taught the world a lesson in 1960, new diplo-
macy, by telling the truth, and I think that it will echo down through
the years.
Senator LAuscir?. So I don't know which group to follow.
The CHAramAN. It is echoing down the years already. This is the
principal echo that has arisen from this whole matter.
Senator LAUSCIIE. The tragedy is that this is made the principal
echo but all of the misdeeds of the Soviet are looked upon as incon-
sequential.
The CHAIRMAN. 'Well, the Senator is entirely incorrect in that
statement. He draws conclusions that are not justified by the record
or any statement that I have heard before the committee.
Senator LAUSCHE. Well, I can
Senator MANsnyro. Can I ask a question?
[Deleted.]
USIA'S DIREI3TOR'S RADIO PROGRAM APPEARANIE
The CiitAnuwAN. Do I. understand Mr. Allen's statement on the tele-
vision program was not approved by you or by the Actinic,: Secretary?
Secretary HERTER, No, As I understand it, this was in answer to
a question on a TV program.
Senator MANSFIELD. Yes. I think we have the program here. But
could somebody On the staff find it right away so that, I could read it
just as it is? (See P. 212, app. 1.)
The CHAIRMAN. AVell, Mr. Secretary, while they are looking for it,
is it or is it not the policy of the Department of State that its
employees clear public statements with regard to delicate interna-
tional relations before they make them?
Secretary .11mtrmt. -Yes, sir.
The 1HATRMAN. II is the poi icy ?
Secretary HERTER. It is. Any statement dealing with foreign af-
fairs should be cleared with the State Department.
The CHAIRMAN. Then when they are made in this fashion without
clearance _it in accord with your policy ? is that correct?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secretary HERTER. Well, as I say, this had not been cleared with us.
The CHAIRMAN. He is an employee
Secretary HERTER. I think it is very possible that a prepared state-
ment had been cleared, but not an answer to a question. There is no
way of clearing that, until one knows what question is asked.
The CHAIRMAN. What I asked this for is because later on it seems
to me one of the important things that might come out of this commit-
tee hearing is a tightening of the policy which gives the Department
of State and the Secretary of State a much closer control over public
statements by other agencies. It strikes me that we would get in
much less trouble if all these people would clear with you or with
whoever is Secretary of State of the Department, we will say. Don't
you think that would minimize the chances of inconsistent state-
ments being made by members of the Government?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, that is so. But I think that anything that
he may have said in a prepared statement on that TV program at that
time had been cleared. Insofar as answers to questions are con-
cerned, there is no way of clearing them without knowing the ques-
tions and in that way he was on his own.
The CHAIRMAN. It is his responsibility, then, when he goes beyond
anything that had been cleared?
Secretary HERTER. Yes.
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, on page 35 of the Background
Documents on the summit conference, about 7 or 8 lines up from the
bottom of the page Mr. Allen, in response to a question from Miss
Dodd, states the following:
There are a lot of different definitions of "spying" and I don't want to try to
quibble, but I do think I ought to point this out and that more people ought to
recall it: When he went down he told exactly what his mission was and exactly
What he was expected to do, and he was under instruction to do that.
Now, the answer to the question, I just thought ought to be in the
record, because there was some confusion about this statement in view
of information which had been given to a group previously in the
Capitol. Again, I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I am through
with my questions of Mr. Herter, but I want to express my thanks
to Secretary Herter, to Secretary Dillon and to Ambassador Bohlen
for their candor and frankness today and to assure them that I, for
One, appreciate what they had to say, and I think they have made a
real contribution to clearing up a confused situation which confronted
the committee as a whole.
Secretary HERTER. We are very grateful for that, Senator.
Senator WILEY. Of course, on this side of the aisle, I have praised
your statement in the beginning and I will praise your conduct in
the conclusion. You all did very well.
Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.
Senator GORE. I do not wish to unduly tire the Secretary, but I am
perfectly willing to come back after dinner or to come back tomorrow.
I do have many more questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is my understanding the Secretary?he
looks very well to me?would prefer to go on tonight. He does not
wish to run over to next week.
Secretary HERTER. I prefer to go on, Mr. Chairman.
Senator GORE. I don't think it will take very long tonight.
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98 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISION TO DISCONTI NUE FLIGHTS
The CHAlIMAN. The Senator may proceed.
Senator GORE. Fine.
1 wish to resume my inquiry with respect to this particular flight.
I am perturbed that you say it would not be. within the province, of
the, Department, of State to make the decision to discontinue these
flights: I hat this would be a decision for Mr. Dulles to make.
Secretary HERTER. No, I never said that at, all.
Senator GORE. I beg your pardon?
Secretary I IERTER. I never said that at all. T said he was the opera-
tonal man who had to plan things, and then submit them for approval.
Senator GORE. Well, what. would be the proper agency to consider
whether these flights should or should not be discontinued ?
Secretary HERTER. If the question of discontinuance had come, up,
if that was a decision to be made, we would have. been asked advice on
it. We were not asked for advice, on it. We. gave approval to carry
on with the routine planning that, had been done from the point of
view of flight,.
Senator GORE. Some weeks prior?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, and had given that approval.
Senator Go RE. Did that approval--
Secretary HERTER. That approval, as I say, is advice.
Senator GORE. Was advice?
Secretary HERTER. Is advice. The President himself took the re-
sponsibility for any final decision.
Senator GORE. Did your approval involve continuation of the flight
through and during the period of the summit conference?
Secretary }TEETER. Not specifically as such. The approval con-
stituted going ahead when conditions were appropriate for carrying
I hem out.
Senator GoRE. Did you give no consideration to diseontinuance at a
I ime prior to the summit, meeting or during the summit conference?
Secretary HERTER. Senator, I answered that question before when I
said that there is no good time, for a failure, that if the summit. con-
ference had debarred carrying out, these flights the President's visit to
Russia may have been the next thing that, might have debarred them.
It may have been debarred when R hrushehey was at Camp David;
it may Lave been (lobo rred when Mr. Khrushchev was visiting in
France.
Tliere may have been any number of diplomatic reasons why they
shouldn't be conducted at a given period of time.
In my opinion, the value of the information and the necessity of
carrying out, these flights under given conditions warranted their
going ahead.
Senator GORE. I ani t rying to be, specific in my quest ions, and I am
trying to elicit, from you whether at the time you gave your approval
for the general program some weeks prior to this partic,ular flight,
von gave specific consideration to the question of continuance or dis-
continuance during or near the time of the summit conference.
Secretary :HERTER. Certainly. The summit, conference was very
much on my mind as it was on everybody's mind, at that time.
Senator GORE. And you gave your approval then ?
Secret :1 Ty TIERTER. I did.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 99
Senator GORE. To their continuation throughout the summit
conference?
Secretary HERTER. That was never specified as such.
Senator GORE. In other words, you are saying, then, that there was
no decision to discontinue?
Secretary HERTER. That is right.
Senator GORE. Then if any decision to discontinue or if any deci-
sion was made not to continue, to use the words, you are not aware
of it?
Secretary HERTER. No. The only decision that I know of at any
stage of the game was to go ahead.
[Deleted.]
COMPARISON OF STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE
Senator GORE. Another statement which the President made, I
would like to read:
Of course we had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies had
turned about. But when there is even the slightest chance of strengthening
peace, there could be no higher obligation than to pursue it.
Now, on page 4 of your statement here today, I would like to read.
This is on page 4, beginning "Summit prospects dimmed."
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the second, third,
fourth, and fifth paragraphs on page 4 be reprinted at this point in
the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.
NW/ (The paragraphs referred to follow:)
In the first weeks after the Khrushchev American visit there was a general
improvement of atmosphere and people began talking, partly in hope, partly in
some confusion, about "detente." There were comparatively conciliatory
speeches on each side; there was progress in the test-ban talks at Geneva; a
new Soviet-United States cultural agreement was signed November 21, and
on December 1 the United States, the U.S.S.R., and other powers signed the
Antarctic treaty.
But clouds began to gather even then. One of the earliest signs was the
strong Soviet protest on November 11 against West German plans to build a
broadcasting station in West Berlin. Another was the Khrushchev speech on
November 14 which was harder in tone, boasted again of Soviet missile prowess,
and began a concentrated attack on Adenauer and the German Federal Republic
which later increased and seemed to be a central feature of Soviet presummit
tactics. The reason for this attack is still a matter for speculation. Perhaps
they thought it would undermine the Western position on Berlin by helping to
divide the Western Allies. It had no such effect of course, but naturally
rallied us to speak out in defense of our German ally.
Khrushchev as early as December 1 also began repeating his threats to sign
a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He repeated these threats in his
speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14 and in his remarks during his visit
to Indonesia and other countries in January. On February 4, the Warsaw
Pact powers issued the first formal blocwide commitment to sign a separate GDR
peace treaty. Thus Khrushchev's threatening Baku speech of April 25, though
it was the most sweeping since February 1950, was only a harsher version of
what he had been saying for months before. I shall make full documentation
on his speeches available to the committee.
Not until April did we reply at length to this mounting crescendo of Soviet
statements. We did so in order to keep the record straight?notably in the
speeches of April 4 and 20, which Khrushchev attacked for starting arguments
that he in fact had begun.
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100 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator GORE. You will see from this statement, Mr. Secretary,.
that you contradict the President's statement, do you not?
The President says:
We had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies had turned about.
From what I have just read, you list one, two, three, four occasions
where the Soviet policy had, in fact, changed.
Do you wish to comment?
Secretary HERTER, Yes, I would be very glad to comment.
I don't think that there is any essential disagreement in the two
Points of view.
I am talking primarily in my statement in regard to Berlin. and
Germany.
The President was talking about a series of things in which he spoke.
of disarmament, mutual inspection, atomic control, and then he added
Germany and Berlin.
As I testified earlier in the day, I think we all had hopes that there.
might be a possibility of making some progress, oven though not in.
the German-Berlin situation but in the disarmament field, and as a.
corollary possibly in the nuclear testing field where it was not a sum-
mit problem, but it would have been a three-power problem that could
have been discussed in Paris.
For instance, so long as there was any hope of making any progress,.
the President was willing to go.
Senator GORE. I didn't question the President being willing to go,
so long as there was any hope of progress.
What I was asking you to comment on was what appears to me to.
be a contrast between the President's statement that there is no indi-
cation that basic Soviet policies had turned about, and where you give
almost a full page indicating that they had turned about. But you
have finished your comment on that.
Secretary HERTER, Yes, there was some talk here about basic policy'
and tactics in connection with the summit. I don't think the President
felt events such as I cited necessarily mean that Soviet basic policy
had changed.
I think as he said after Camp David, he hoped that there was a
mutuality of interest, particularly in the disarmament field, which
-Would allow the great powers getting together in order to make prog-
ress in disarmament.
That had always been the area in which he hoped, because of the
mutuality of interest, hat we might make progress.
I don't think that there is anything fundamentally opposed in these
two statements.
};XTENU OF PREMIER K FIRITSIICHEV'S rowna
Senator GORE. Now, I want to ask a few questions which relate to
the first of the three questions on which I wish to examine your opin-
ion; that is, whether the diplomatic failure in Paris represented a
failure in policy.
You recall that I submitted certain questions to you here on March
22. At that time I asked you:
Do you think it wouid have been more prudent to have had an understanding
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENcE
about the subjects to be considered at a summit conference before agreeing to
have one, or do you think this is the proper way to keep the store?
Secretary HERTER. It is a gamble. I don't know.
Senator GORE. You are gambling with high stakes, and it seems to me In a
reckless manner. I am disturbed to have the Secretary of State make the
statements that you have made today about the summit conference; that there
is no plan, no purpose, no understanding as to what will be discussed and what
we hope to attain there.
Secretary HERTER, Mr. Senator, I view this as essentially a matter of ex-
ploration. We have the situation where an individual, Mr. Krushchev, is the
man who makes the decisions so far as we know, for the Russians.
Later on, I asked you:
Is there any reason why the Russian dictator could not delegate the same
power to his Foreign Minister as President Eisenhower should or does delegate
to you?
Senator HERTER. None.
Senator GORE. Then isn't that a fallacious argument?
Secretary HERTER. Not necessarily, because you are dealing with an indi-
vidual personality who many believe wants to be the negotiator.
Now, I read those things because one of the principal, if not the
principal, justifications for going to the summit and for the exchange
of visits was that Mr. Khrushchev and he alone spoke for the Russian
people, but today you tell us on page 7:
I might digress here to observe that it had been our experience at previous
conferences with the Soviets, at least since the death of Stalin, that the Soviet
representative, no matter how highly placed he might be, was bound by the
collective decisions on basic policy matters made prior to his departure from
Moscow. Any substantive changes in those positions apparently required refer-
ence back to Moscow before they could be undertaken.
And then on page 8, you say:
This meeting completely confirmed our conclusion of the night before that
Mr. Khrushchev was operating within the fixed limits of a policy set before his
departure from Moscow.
Secretary HERTER. There appears to be an inconsistency in those
two statements.
When I was testifying here before, the visits of Mr. Khrushchev in
which sometimes he had an important person with him and sometimes
he did not
Senator GORE. In which what, sir?
Secretary HERTER. Sometimes in which he had an important person
with him and sometimes he did not, indicated that his situation at
home was such that he had a great deal more leeway than had pre-
viously been the case.
When he went to Paris, and I think this has been brought out, he
had with him Gromyko and Malinovsky, General Malinovsky,
Marshal Malinovsky, who never left him for one moment at any time.
This was a departure from previous occasions. This is why we said
they had gone hack to their standard policy of taking directions from
home.
Prior to that time I had believed he had greater leeway than was
clearly indicated here in Paris.
Senator GORE. SO the assumption proved to be erroneous.
Secretary HERTER. It is.
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102 EVENTS I \ CIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFI. flENCE
Usti Al, oirrAy.u.d, [lc PROCEDURES YEW.; t SU-a:VITT CoNFERENCEti
Senator tioRE. I Eielieve you testified before the House, acNirding
To press reports yesterday, that summitry as a diplomatic, method
had had some hard i !locks.
Secretary IlparrEL:, Yes, I did.
In answer to a question from Senator Humphrey, I repeated the
same tiling today.
SellarTOP GORE. A ad in recommending, which I. eertaittly endorse,
continuing businesslike negotiation wit li the Soviets, you have in mind
the more usual processes and procedures of diplomacy.
Secretary HERTEL:. That is correct.
Senator GORE. Negotiations.
Secretary I h.a'rra. The one thing t hat I did point out, however,
is that with regard to the Berlin situation, Great Britain, France,
the United States and the Soviet. I 7/lion have responsibility. This is
the carryover from the war,
Senator GORE. Y
Secretary H ERTEL!, Anil that there, there must be agreement,. This
is a thing we have, been lighting all the time, that unilateral action by
the Russians cannot talie, away those rights and obligations which
I hey as well as ourselves had acquired as a result of the war.
That it must be done, by the consent of the four.
So that whether or not in the future the discussions to reach agree-
ment Lonong the four should take place through diplomatic channels,
through ambassadorial level, through foreign minister or not, I would
not say which would be the level, but 1 think that it, is much better
to see if we cannot, is we did in the, foreign ministers' conference, and
failed, try to reach a large measure of agreement prior to the meeting
of a summit conference, so that there might be one or two small un-
resolved issues that could be resolved there rather than trying to
negotiate when you know that you are very far apart at a summit
fere:nee.
Senator GORE. Well, t hope that you will persist., and that the
President will persist in the businesslike undertakings. I will not
ask you to say that summitry apart from diplomacy failed. I aM
content with your statement. in that regard. I am sorry that I think
it, did fail.
Secretary HERTER. I would differ with you, sir, on the question of
personal dipornacy as against summitry. I think that, visits are., on
the whole, useful things.
I wouldn't, say that that, was something that should be discarded
completely. I think it is particularly true that visits of ministers
of foreign affairs, and visits of heads of state from time to time ean
accomplish a great deal of good. But I believe very strongly that
insofar as heads of state are concerned that is not the place to begin
negotiations. It is the place perhaps where there should be the
culmination of nego ations.
Senator GORE. I `A ill agree with you in that statement. The, ex-
change of visits offers opportunities. But the, formalization of a head
or state conference, where severe international tensions are involved,
without, precise plan ni rn,, without assurance that, at least limited
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
agreements can be reached, is, in my view, a dangerous process, and
a policy upon which we should never have embarked.
Of course, it is easier to say that now than it was before.
Hindsight, of course, we learned a long time ago, is better than
foresight.
The CHAIRMAN. Would the Senator yield for a moment? I have
one or two questions and then he may come back to it.
Senator GORE. Good.
AUTHORIZATION FOR U-2 FLIGHTS
The CHAIRMAN. These I think have been covered but for clarifica-
tion, I might ask them again. Was there ever a time when the Presi-
dent authorized each flight in this program; that's never been the
practice.
Secretary HERTER. It has never come up to the President.
The CHAIRMAN. Nor of the National Security Council.
Secretary HERTER. No.
The CHAIRMAN. It has always been under a blanket authority
understood?
Secretary HERTER. That is my impression.
The CHAIRMAN. Is this blanket authorization under review, either
constant or periodic review?
Secretary HERTER. In my experience the CIA has planned a num-
ber of alternate flights at a time. [Deleted.]
BACKGROUND OF NASA STATEMENT
The CHAIRMAN. When the Department brought Mr. Bohlen back
from Manila, and he was well-known as an expert on Soviet behavior,
and this was, I thought, in anticipation of these summit meetings
which had been discussed a long time, did he or any other of our
Russian experts advise you or the President to wait and see what Mr.
Khrushchev knew about the TJ-2 flight before making the NASA
statement?
Mr. DILLON. The people in the Department who were familiar with
Soviet policy took part in discussions with the CIA which led to the
coordination and the agreement on the guidelines which were given
to NASA, and those included the people who were familiar with all
aspects of our policy.
However, as we said 'before we did not know that there was going
to be a full statement by NASA.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bohlen was not consulted about the NASA
statement.
Mr. DILLON. Nobody in the State Department was consulted about
the statement as a statement.
The CHAIRMAN. Nobody.
What puzzles me about this is why was there such compulsion, if
there was, to make such an immediate reaction? I have wondered
why there was any necessity for immediately reacting to the first
Khrushchey statement.
It would seem to me much more normal to wait a while and see
what developed.
Was there anything that was compelling you to answer almost
immediately?
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104 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Mr. DilLow. Yes, I would say so. It was such an unusual and re-
markable statement when Mr. Khrushchev said that American plane
had been shot down over the Soviet Union, that we were not in the
position to not make any comment whatsoever.
As a result we had to make some comment, and we made the very
bland statement whieh was put out on the 5th.
The CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean that. You misunderstood me. I
accept the necessity for tile cover story, the statement.
Mr. Ihnnow. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. it is the second one that went into such detail. It
would seem to me that it would be commonsense not to follow up too
quickly in the matter of timing. What was the reason for that?
Mr. DumoN. The Stale Department's second statement was innocu-
ous too. It didn't go into any detail, any more detail than the original
cover story did. There was great?if any detail, that was the state-
ment that was put out by NASA.
The CHAIRMAN. is it not true that the NASA statement itself is
what put you in a position of having to make a further statement?
Is that true ?
Mr. DILLON. The further statement, I think, was the next state-
ment in this series, was the one that was put out on Saturday which
was made only at the time when we knew that the Soviets probably
had the pilot, which was new information, and then the Soviets had
already said they had him, and had said where he was shot down,
and the probability was that they had certain parts of the airplane
because the picture which they had first put out turned out to be a
fraudulent picture.
BACKGROUND OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S STATEMENT OF MAY 7
The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps I don't understand the timing of it.
It seems to me, if I do understand it, that you could have stood
noon the cover story for some time before the necessity of any further
atement, awaiting developments.
Mr. DuzoN. -You mean, your question is why we made the state-
ment on Saturday, May 7, which was the first time we departed from
the cover story.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.
Secretary HERTEIZ. That, as I think I have testified before, was a
decision that was made in the light of the very full revelation of
Mr. Khrushchev in giving out, both as to the pilot's testimony, and
as to the parts WIC equipment, that had been recovered. That was
when we had to make the decision were we going to keep on lying
about this or were we going to tell the truth?
The CriAllnitAx. Why there wasn't a third alternative is what I
am_ trying to get at?
Why didn't you just be quiet and say nothing? You don't have
just, the alternatives of either continuing to lie or to tell the trut
Yon could have said nothing. I was just curious. 'Was it ever
considered that you didn't, have to react?
Secretary ilhurrEtz. A good many statements were already being
made in Congress, a good many statements were already being made
r required of us almost.
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The press was hounding everybody, "What do you say now after
-what Mr. Khrushchev had said," it was a very difficult time in our
.society, our form of society to have said nothing.
The CHAIRMAN. I believe that was the statement in which you
said "it has been established that insofar as the authorities are con-
cerned, there was no authorization for any such flights." Is that
correct?
Secretary HERTER. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. Which was not a truthful statement at that point,
-was it ?
Secretary HERTER. No, this was still partly cover.
The CHAIRMAN. Still partly cover?
Secretary HERTER. Still partly cover. It was not until Monday,
after the briefing had taken place before the congressional leadership
here on the hill that the full statement was made.
The CHAIRMAN. It was after that statement that the full statement
was made?
Secretary HERTER. That is correct.
BACKGROUND OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE STATEMENT OF MAY 9
The CIIAIRMAN. That full statement, if I understood it?I think
you have testified?was only after complete and thorough consulta-
tion with everyone concerned, and had the unanimous support of
State and the President; is that correct?
Secretary HERTER. It is, yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore, go ahead.
Senator GORE. Well, when you made the final statement that the
President did approve, he was responsible?I am not undertaking to
quote you exactly?you also made it plain that he did not approve
.specific flights?
Secretary HERTER. Yes.
[Deleted.]
BLOW TO UNITED STATES' MORAL POSITION
Senator GORE. I will wait until Mr. Dulles' testimony.
Now, I wish to make my own feelings explicit. I have not intended
to suggest, nor do I believe the chairman or anyone else has intended
to suggest, that the President or any other official of the U.S. Govern-
ment tells a falsehood. I don't know of any requirement in Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence or any other jurisprudence stemming from
Roman law that a citizen is required to incriminate himself. I know
? of no requirement that a nation is required to incriminate or denigrate
or defame itself. I do not claim any sense of morals or sensitivity to
moral standards greater than the average American, but I want the
record to show that I was humiliated with official falsification, and I
think millions of Americans were humiliated. I can agree with you
that our alliance stood firm. I am happy that it did, but I think we
would be deluding ourselves if we did not realize that this unfortunate
incident has dealt a severe blow to the moral position of the United
States. I think we should begin to mend it. The way to mend it is
to ferret out our errors and our mistakes, correct them, and thereby
demonstrate to the world our will and our capacity to survive this
kind of blow?and I hope be stronger thereafter.
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IVO EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMEF CONFERENCE
WA s PRESET:MAI:IT MEETING SUGGESTED ?
The Cu-Aunt-AN Mr. Secretary, there was one point that I over-
looked. I had heard that Chairman Khrushohey had directly or in-
directly made SOIM' inquiry about the possibility of meeting Mr.
Eisenhower before the summit meeting. Do you know whether or
not, that is so?
Secret ary I FERTER. No. I know of no such effort.
Tim Cu AIRMAN. No effort ?
Secretary Iltarrnit. Actually, Mr. Khrushchev, when he came to
Paris or just, before he came to Paris, sent a note to the British and to
the French, I think. largely on a procedural matter; no such note to
as. When the l'resident, arrived in l 'anis, there was just as nu tch op-
port unity for Mr. k hrnshchey to seek a meeting with him as with the
others; and no such effort was made from any Russian source.
M LI T. I' PR KPA REDNESS 0 1,"r 1TE SOVIET T1 NION
ClIA 1R :ITA N. N In Secretary, have you dra W71 any inferetices
'from this wl tole event rd ii ive to the military prepared neSS of the,
Soviet I inion ?
Secretary I Iii-itann. t If- course, my judgment would not be as good
as that of experts. nil here, again, I wouldn't want to give my
judgment as a considered judgment, from the point of view of the
record. There is no question but what the Russians are very active in
cert a in directions, it lid that the intelligence that has been gained with
regard to that activity has been of very great value to us. A.nd I
think that, is as far as I should go.
The CI [AMMAN. ny furl her questions?
Senator WI LEY. Is tlm, cold war still on or is it over ?
Secret ary II ER'110. It remains to be seen.
Senator WILEY. '111N1, we had better give primary attention to the
main issue, instead of quarreling about who is who and what is what
in relation to handling situations. It was your judgment.; it isn't my
judgment. It, isn't he business of every little one in the Senate to tell
you what you should do. It is your business, sir.
The Ciff A TRmAN. owl tor Mansfield, do you have any questions?
Senator MANS FIE in. No.
Senator GoliE. Ott the record, Mr. Chairman.
(Discussion off the record.)
[Deleted.]
1 ESSi IN OE THE 17-2 INCIDENT
The CuATRATAN. Nlr. Secretary, one last thing. Do you think we
have learned---not juist we, but, all of us, including you and. the admin-
istration?anything From the 1T-2 incident?
Secret:try if I inruint. N( a. to have accidents.
The CI nA TRATAN. Is that all we have learned?
Senator GORE. Not. what ?
Mr. AfACOMBER. 'it to have accidents.
The CHAIRMAN. I )0 you think that is the only lesson we can draw
from these events?
Secretary Burma Mr. Chairman, I: think that anyone would be
foolish to say that n th hindsight one couldn't have done better elan
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when one is faced with certain, events at a _given time. I think obvi-
ously we should be giving serious consideration to the very best
method of the handling of anything of this kind that might happen in
the future; and I think from that point of view, as the President said,
we welcome this inquiry. We welcome a full disclosure as far as we
could from the point of view of responsibilities and coordination. I
thank you for your patience here today.
The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you for your patience and your
frankness and candor. I think you and your associates?Secretary
Dillon and Mr. Bohlen?have been most cooperative in this whole
hearing. I like to think that out of this one?as you know, rather pet
project of mine?is that the State Department itself be given greater
prestige and authority in controlling and coordinating all matters
relating to our foreign relations?as I have tried in the case, for ex-
ample, with the recent instance of control of the black nutrket in
Turkey. I think your Department, the Department of State, ought
to have more authority than we have in the past accorded it. I am
sure that some of our troubles do not relate to any fault on your part,
but to the sort of institutional practices that have grown up--and
people assuming authority to make statements without consulting you
and the Department. I feel at this stage of the proceedings that this
may be one of the good things that will come out of these hearings;
that the prestige and authority of the State Department will be
enhanced.
Secretary HERTER. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator GORE. Could I join you in commending the Secretary and
his assistants for their candor and their patience and their diligence
here today.
Secretary I-Inurrnu. Thank you.
Senator WILEY. May I also join you the third time by saying, in
my humble opinion the evidence and the statement you made and
the statement that Dillon made and the President's speech show con-
clusively that the breakup of the summit conference was due to Khru-
shchev and no other cause.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
The committee is adjourned until next Tuesday.
(Whereupon, at 5 :55 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene
at 10 a.m., Tuesday, May 31, 1960.)
[As noted in the foreword, Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, appeared before the committee on Tuesday, May
31, at 10 a.m., and testified in executive session. For security reasons,
his testimony was not released to the public. The committee recessed
on May 31 at 5 :10 p.m., to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, June 1,
1960.]
56412-60 8
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 1, 1960
IT.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to recess, Senator J. W.
Fulbright (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright (presiding), Mansfield, Gore,
Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and. Capehart.
Also present: Hon. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State; Hon. William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Congressional Relations; Richard Helms, Central
Intelligence Agency; and Capt. L. P. Gray III, USN, Military Assist-
ant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Our witness this morning is Dr. Hugh Dryden, the Deputy Admin-
istrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
I remind members of our committee that today our transcript will
be censored and released to the press. Tomorrow morning at 10 a.m.
we will meet again in this room in executive session with Secretary
Gates.
Dr. Dryden, do you have a prepared statement?
Mr. DRYDEN. I have no prepared statement but if the committee
will, I would like to proceed for 10 minutes or so to give you the
background of NASA's research with the U-2 aircraft.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. HUGH L. DRYDEN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRA-
TOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
(NASA); ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES P. GLEASON, ASSISTANT AD-
MINISTRATOR FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, NASA
STUDY OF AIR TURBULENCE BY U-21S
Mr. DRYDEN. There is an extensive program on air turbulence
which was begun by the National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics (NACA). It is a part of?as far as NASA is concerned, it
it a part of the aeronautical activities transferred to NASA in ac-
cordance with the National Aeronautics and Space Act.
In this program, which began in 1956, there have been 200 weather
flights of TJ-2 aircraft with NASA and air weather service instru-
mentation covering flights extended over about 264,000 miles. Ninety
percent of this flight time was above an altitude of 40,000 feet, and 40
percent of it, or about 100,000 miles, was above 50,000 feet; and these
109
?????10101"1"."1".'
DRYDEN
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110 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCF
flights have been conducted in the Western United States, Western
Europe, Turkey, and Japan.
I may recall to your PI inds that the function of NACA. was that,
of an iierointutical researth agency to support the Government's pro-
m.) in the development, of civil aircraft and military aircraft.
RESEARO I t INFORMATION PM OUCED
Iiroduced only research information used in the design of air-
planes.
One important, part of this research information which certainly
is brought to your mind by some of the twent accidents to aircraft
is that of loads on the aircraft due to atmospheric disturbances or
gusts. l'Itere are two types of problems: one, illustrated .by the ex-
perience of the airplane which recently got caught in thunderstorm
activity is that of the maximum load Which the airplane may reach
wi lel? mmy lea r the wings from t be body.
The other and more insidious type of niading is the repeated load
(Inc to gustiness or rough air that many of you have often encoun-
tered in flying. These repeated loads produce a type of brittle failure
which . we call fatigue failure. This has, as you may recall, been
encountered in one or two types of t..irplanes and remedied at con-
siderable cost.
Now. it has been the function of NACA to carry on a program to
furnish t ho designer information on the magnitude of atmospheric
gusts encountered by airplanes, the frequency of occurrence of loads
of different magnitudes. We have been engaged the general type
of activi( v since 1933 and have data OP all of the, civil transports from
that, date,.
A RR A NGEMEN TS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON AIR TURBULENCE
That, of course, gives you a record of experience with the perform-
ance capabilities of present airplanes, but it was our responsibility
to I ry to get this information for airplanes yet to be built. This meant
that in practice we were always seeking the highest and fastest air-
planes to get; information of this kind from, so as to be in advanee
of i he development of the commercial 'aircraft.
To do this we made arrangements to get information from military
airplanes.
For example, at the close of World War IT we installed our instru-
ments in the B-36 airplane used then by SAC?' arid during their
training operations these. instruments continued to record gusts aid
the data were sent to us for analysis.
Now tile prittern of operation with the commercial airlines and with.
the military has been the same throughout. We meet with the owners
and operators of the airplanes?whether an airline, or the military
service-- come, to an agreement with them that, our instruments can
be installed on their airplanes.
1-11 the early stages we send our instrument technicians to visit and
supervise the installation of the instruments. We train employees of
the airlines or the GI's in military
The en AnimAx. Dr. Dryden, does any of this have any relevance
to the inquiry which this committee is concerned with?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 111
Mr. DRYDEN. It does. We will come to this immediately. We train
our technicians to change the film and send the information to NASA
for analysis. We have no detailed knowledge of the flight plans until
after the fact; and as a matter of record, we obtain information
needed to analyze the data. Observations extend throughout the
world. At the present time we have instruments on Pan American
and TWA jets which, of course, go around the world. We have co-
operated with foreign governments and airlines by lending instru-
mentation.
U-2 OPERATION
Now the U-2 operation is in the same general pattern of operation.
This project was organized in 1956 when [deleted] the capabilities of
this new airplane were brought to our attention. It was able to fly at
altitudes very considerably higher than any existing airplane.
The program has been carried on entirely openly. There have been
three reports issued, unclassified; there have been press releases on
these operations from time to time.
The program was unclassified except that the data which revealed
the airplane could go higher than 55,000 feet were classified. They
will now be declassified since the potentialities of the airplane have
become known.
[Deleted.]
NEED FOR DATA AT RIMIER ALTITUDES
I must take you back to the atmosphere at the time. These were
the clays when the airlines had had DC-6's and DC-7's, and Constel-
lations. At that time we knew the 707, the DC-8, and the Electra
were under design. We were told that the first of these airplanes
would be developed early in 1959. All of our previous data with air-
planes had been at altitudes generally not too much above 20,000 feet
where these airplanes operated. The new airplanes would operate at
35,000 to 40,000 feet, and the military services were interested in
supersonic airplanes which traveled at much higher altitudes, so that
there was at this time a great pressure on us to find methods of obtain-
ing data, and the presence of the capabilities of the U-2 airplane
seemed to us to give the answer. Some of our advisory committees
at the time were bringing to our attention the great need for this
information. I will simply read one extract, if I can find it quickly
for you, and this committee called our attention to the fact that we
did not have suitable airplanes available.
There are three basic regions within which data are available, below 25,000
feet, up to 30,000 feet with military vehicles, up to 55,000 where meager data
are available from balloons and rockets and inference from meteor trails. Exist-
ing research vehicles are reaching to higher altitudes?
and so on.
It is recommended that emphasis be placed on obtaining quantitative infor-
mation on air turbulence at the highest altitudes reasonably obtainable with
existing research vehicles.
[Deleted.]
Now this program was carried on from 1956 through the present
time. NASA was established in October October 1, 1958, and this was
one of the programs carried over into NASA.
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I might recall to you that NACA was not extensively involved in
aeronautical activities, that NASA, at present, is engaged in inter-
national space activities. So far we have not had any adverse reac-
tions on the part of people with whom we are cooperating abroad in
space programs.
I think this gives the general background and I would be glad to
respond to questions or to continue with the NASA chronology of the
week of May 1, as you desire, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps we ought to proceed with questions..
[I.)eleted.]
LINE OF RESPONSIBILITY FROM NASA TO THE PRESIDENT
Do you report directly to the President? What is your relation-
ship to the rest of the Government?
Mr. DRYDEN. At that time the NACA was managed by a committee
of 17 persons appointed by the President who did report directly to.
him.
I was the chief executive officer reporting to the committee at the.
time this project was started.
The CHAIRMAN. In 195??
Mr. DRYDEN. 1956.
The CHAIRMAN. Al that time the agency was known as the NACA1
Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. When did it change its name to NASA?
Mr. DRYDEN. On October 1, 1958, it not only changed its name but
was collected with other parts of the Government into a completely Olt
new agency, the NASA.
The CHAIRMAN Does it report to the President?
Mr. DRYDEN. It reports directly to the President, sir.
The CHAIRMAN There is a committee of 17 you say?
Mr. DRYDEN. There is not a committee in NASA. There is an Ad-
ministrator and Deputy Administrator appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there anyone on the staff of the White House
who is given the duty of receiving your reports?
Mr. DRYDEN, Doctor Merman reports and talks very frequently
with the President himself. He does keep the Science Adviser fully
informed of our activities in space.
The CHAIRMAN. Who is the Science Adviser?
Mr. DRYDEN. Dr. Kistiakowsky.
The CHAIRMAN. So if anyone has the direct responsibility within
the White House, the office of the Presidency, it is Dr.-----
Mr. DRYDEN. Kistiakowsky. He is the President's adviser on
science and technology. He has no line responsibility. He is an ad-
viser to the President.
REPORT OF IJ-2'S LOSS
The CHAIRMAN. The first that you knew of this was the loss of the
11-2 plane on May I?
Mr. DRYDEN. May 1 it was reported to the Administrator and my-
self that aU-2 had been lost, without further detail.
[Deleted.]
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ANTICIPATION OF INQUIRIE? S ABOUT LOSS
The CHAIRMAN. Did CIA consult with you as to the precise lan-
guage of the release of May 5?
MT. DRYDEN. What was?
The CHArRmAN. Who drew up that language?
Mr. DRYDEN. It was discussed in consultation. The questions the
press asked were: who is the pilot, where was the airplane going, what
information do you have about it?
So that between CIA and ourselves, a list of these questions which
we had received was recorded, and the general nature of the answers
to these questions decided upon. Now, let me tell you about the so-
called release of the statement. On the morning of Thursday, May
5, was Khrushchev's announcement that the plane was shot down.
Somewhere between 11 and 12 o'clock, I believe, the President directed
an inquiry and public report on the missing plane, and as reported
in the Herald Tribune?I do not have any other stenographic record?
in quotes, it says:
At the White House, Mr. Hagerty announced at the direction of the President
a complete inquiry is being made. The results of these inquiries, the facts as
developed will be made public by the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration and the Department of State.
BACKGROUND OF THE MAY 5 NASA RELEASE
The reporters who had listened to Mr. Hagerty, many of them,
came immediately to our public information office to obtain further
information. We ourselves thought it was better to take the agreed-
upon answers to the questions, to write them into a statement, and
give it to them all at once, rather than engage in a general free-for-all
on this subject. I would like to emphasize that the text of that state-
ment as issued was not cleared with CIA or anyone else, although
the information in it, the answers to the questions that are contained
within it, were cleared with CIA, and I am told by them with State.
The CHAIRMAN. You discussed all of the substantive facts and state-
ments in that with representatives of the CIA?
Mr. DRYDEN. This is correct. It was not intended to give out a
statement. We were confronted with a large group of reporters who
wanted the facts. We could either engage in a general free-for-all
discussion?we thought it preferable to take these facts, put them in
a piece of paper and give it to all of them at once.
CLEARANCE OF MAY 5 STATEMENT
The CHAIRMAN. After consulting with CIA, you prepared this state-
ment, and they knew what the statement was?
Mr. DRYDEN. I tried to say before that the statement itself or the
facts that were collected in a statement was not cleared with anyone.
The CHAIRMAN. With anyone ?
Mr. DRYDEN. With anyone but ourselves. The substance of it had
been cleared. The fact that it was written down in a statement on a
piece of paper was not cleared with anyone.
The CHAIRMAN. Before you issued this to the press, did you have
anyone from the Department of State look at it and approve it?
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Mr. DRYDEN. We had no contact with the Department of State.
tut- direct contacts were solely with the CIA.
The CHAIRMAN. Has no one ever advised you that the Department
of Stale should be consulted when statements affecting our foreign
pol icy are made ?
Mr. DRYDEN. I was told that these statements had been cleared by
CIA with State. I did not independently check that, fact.
The Cl [AIRMAN. Who told you that?
Mr. DRYDEN. The CIA people with whom we were dealing, sir.
REASON FOR MENTTO NINO OTHER 13-2 BASES IN MAY 5 RELEASE
The CHAIRMAN. What was the reason for saying in your statement
I hat these planes were being used in Japan and Turkey and California.
Why were you so specific about Japan and California ?
Mr. IDuynEN. We were asked by the press, "How many 11-2 planes
does NA SA have in its weather program? Where are they operat-
ing?" Now, much of this had been published in these documents to
which I referred which had been publicly released. To take a specific
one, one released just a few months ago in June 1959, this has
been released generally, you will find in this that these operations--
The ComamAN. I don't wish you to read that memorandum. I
only want to know your thinking. You issued this without checking
it with i the State Department. Why did you state that they were
operating out of Turkey?
Mr. Daynnx. This published report ?
The CHAIRMAN. YOU had already published it?
Mr. DityDEN ( continuing). Had said, "These flights were made from
base,s at Watertown Strip, Nevada."
The CI [AIRMAN. I know, but those were weather flight s.
[Deleted.]
Mr. DayDEN. We had mentioned Adana, Turkey, and Atsugi, .Japan,
in this free and open publication.
The. CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield
OROIrNDING OF LT-2'S
Senator MANSFIELD. Dr. Dryden, have all our 13-2's been recalled
since the President's order of Thursday, a week ago, that there would
be no further overflights of the Soviet Union?
Mr. DRYDEN. Not to my knowledge, sir. I believe at the present
time the airplanes are grounded. But T think this is a question again
that the operating people will, have to answer.
INCIDENT IN JAPAN
Senator MANSFIELD. Do you recall the incident which occurred in
Japan some months ago when a U-2, I assume, landed at Atsugi and
GI's landed from a helicopter and ordered the Japanese civilians in
the area to leave?
Mr. DRYDEN. I remember the newspaper accounts of it. I have no
personal knowledge of the incident.
[Deleted.]
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We made arrang-ements to put instruments in U-2 airplanes. There.
comes back to us flight plans of weather flights, and our instrumenta-
tion and the data from those instruments, and I do not have in ad-
vance knowledge even of the weather flight operations
Senator MANSFIELD. I am referring to a story which appeared in
Time magazine 2 or 3 weeks ago. I was seeking collaboration of that
story. But you have no personal knowledge whether it was true or
false?
Mr. DRYDEN. I have no personal knowledge of it, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. Your responsibility in these 11-2 flights is
primarily observation and calculation concerning weather conditions?
Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct, and in those flights made with 11-2's
with our instruments, for our purposes.
CHAIN OF COMMAND TO THE WHITE HOUSE
Senator MANSFIELD. What is Dr. Glennan's position? You are
the Administrator of NASA.
Mr. DRYDEN. I am the Deputy Administrator. I appear because
I was hero in 1956 through this program, from the beginning.
Senator MANSFIELD. Dr. Glennan is the Administrator?
Mr. DRYDEN. He is the Administrator.
Senator MANSFIELD. Arid Dr. Glenn an supposedly reports directly
to the President?
MT. DRYDEN. To the President, yes, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. Does he or does he not report directly IO DT.
Kistiakowsky ?
Mr. DRYDEN. The President on the average sees him two or three
times a month.
Senator MANSFIELD. Where does Dr Kistiakowsky
Mr. DRYDEN. He is a member of the White House staff.
Senator MANSFIELD. I know that he is the President's scientific
adviser.
Mr. DRYDEN. He is not in the line of command.
Senator MANSFIELD. The chain of command is directly from Dr.
Glennan to the President?
Mr. DRYDEN. Yes, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. That is all.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley?
DATE OF COVER STORY
Senator WILEY. What was the date of that cover statement?
Mr. DRYDEN. The Turkish story was put out by the local commander
in Istanbul on Tuesday, May 3. The statement which we issued re-
cording the agreed-upon answers to questions was on Thursday, May
5. If I might just continue this on Friday, May 6, a NASA 11-2 air-
plane was flown at Edwards Air Force Base, exhibited to the press,
they saw the instruments that were used. They took movies of the
airplane. On Saturday, May 7, Mr. Khrushchev reported that he,
had the pilot. At 6 p.m. State issued a statement admitting the recon-
naissance flight.
At 6:30 NASA directed all further inquiries to the State Depart-
ment.
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Senator WILEY. Let's get back to my question. What was the date
of the cover statement that the chairman has been talking about?
Mr. DRYDEN. The 5th, as I understand it, sir.
[Deleted.]
Senator WILEY. NASA. is primarily engaged in seeking weather
information.
Mr. DRYDEN. WE'. have no intelligence activities either in the de-
velopment of devices, methods, instruments or operations.
;LEARANCE OF MAY 5 STATEMENT
Senator WILEY. My understanding is that this cover statement was
I he result of previous interrogation by the press.
Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct.
Senator WILEY. When you issued it, you did not consult with Cen-
tral Intelligence?
Mr. DRYDEN. Not on the statement itself but all of the questions
had been taken up with them. We had no source of information. We
asked how shall we reply to the name of the pilot, to the flight plan
of the airplane, and the answers as given us are incorporated in the
statement, although (he exact text was llot read back to CIA.
PUBLIC RELEASES ON 11-2 WEATHER FLIGHTS
Senator WILEY. You referred to some publicity that was issued, I
think you said, in 1959.
Mr. DRYDEN. Well, the first press release on our "II-2 project was
released on May 7, 1)56.
Senator WILEY. You held up a blue docket referring to 1959.
MT. DRYDEN. Yes, this is some of the results.
Senator WILEY. If as that been made public?
Mr. DRYDEN. Yes.
Senator Winny. On what pages is the part you referred to, because
I want it in the record. I want to try to get this story simple and
clear.
Mr. DRYDEN. On page 3 of this NASA memorandum which car-
ries a number, 4-17 591,, the flights were made from bases at Water-
town Trip, Nov., Lakenheath, England, Wiesbaden, Germany, Adana,
Turkey and at Atsugi, japan. Two additional flights were made
from a base in Alaska and these data have been combined with those
from Japan in the statistical treatment.
Senator Winny. Yes. You agree that that has teen public in-
formation now for some time?
MT. DRYDEN. Yes.
Senator WILEY. Since 1959?
Mr. DRYDEN. And even earlier, I think in 1957,-57, one of them
deals with the western part of the United States only, and I believe
that 1959 is the one which gives the list, yes, sir.
June, of 1959.
[Deleted.]
Senator WILEY. That is all.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?
[Deleted.]
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REASON FOR NASA STATEMENT
Senator GORE. In response to a question by me, Secretary Dillon
testified as follows:
No, it was decided when we first heard of this, this news, as I said earlier this
morning, at this National Security Council meeting or right after it that was
held outside of Washington, that the State Department would handle the pub-
licity on this, and that we would make any statement that would be made, and
it was known at that time that we would make a statement.
That leads me to wonder why NASA was making a statement at
all.
Mr. DRYDEN. This information, this decision of which you speak
was not transmitted to us. I would like to remind you that this is
all within a few hours. The information we had was a statement
made at the White House which I read to you that the reporters were
referred to NASA and the State Department for the facts and this was
the extent of my knowledge when the statement was issued.
NASA UNAWARE OF DECISION TO LET STATE DEPARTMENT
HANDLE PUBLICITY
Senator GORE. Then you did not know that a high level decision
had been made that the State Department would make whatever
statement was made with respect to this.
Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct. Within the 3 hours or so of this inter-
val, this was not passed to us, and I would again say that so far as
we were concerned the cover story was in effect as the result of the
collaboration with CIA for the period from May 1 to May 7, and we
did nothing, we said nothing contrary to the agreed on facts relating
to the cover story.
Senator GORE. When did you first learn of this high level decision
that the State Department would make whatever statement was made
and would handle the publicity on this matter?
Mr. DRYDEN. I think that after the statement was issued, there were
some calls as to?I do not know how to place the time. The only
thing I have been able to find in our records is an instruction to our
people as of Saturday to refer all inquiries to the State Department.
I believe that before that time, there had been some discussions of
why the statement had been issued by us, and I have explained the
reasons for that.
Senator GORE. I will get to that in a moment. When did you first
know that the decision had been made to which Mr. Dillon referred,
that the State Department would make statements and would handle
the publicity on this matter? You say you were not informed that
the decision had been made at the time you made your statement.
Mr. DRYDEN. It was subsequent to the day of May 5, May 6, or
May 7. I have a record of May 7. After the State Department's
statement at 6 p.m., that NASA would refer all inquiries to the State
Department, I believe we were informed, probably on Friday the 6th,
but I have no specific record.
Senator GORE. Who informed you?
Mr. DRYDEN. I think it was a telephone call. I just do not have
a specific recollection whether it came as a telephone call or a contact
with Dr. Glennan at lunch at the White House. I just do not recall,
sir.
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118 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
We can perhaps clear that up for the record after consultation, sir.
Senator cl-oun. think it would be. well if you can do so.
The following information was subsequently furnished :)
STATEMENT BY DR, D RYDEN ON WHEN NASA WAR NOTIFIED as DECISION TO HAVE
DEPART M EN T OF STATE HANDLE PUBLICITY ON tr--2
The telephone logs: of Dr. Glennan and myself show no calls to or from the
State Department on May 6 or 7, but it is my best recollection that we did learn
of the decision on May B.
QI 'ESTI )NS A NO ANSWERS PREPARED T() HANDLE INQUIRTES
You have referred several times to questions and answers, or the
answers to questions as the case may be, supplied to you by CIA. Do
you have a copy of that question and answer series?
Mr. DRYDEN. We may have some rough notation. What we did
was record the types of questions that the press was asking us. We
then took these types of questions to the CIA and discussed them with
them as to the answers.
[Deleted.]
Senator (low:. -Was there not a typewritten copy ?
Mr. DuynEN. To tlw best of my knowledge, no.
Senator Gorm. But you do have some notes.
Mr. DRYDEN. The statement itself enables you to reconstruct the
questions. They are generally who was the pilot, what was the flight
plan, where was the airplane supposed to go, what was the route, how
many airplanes does NASA operate on weather missions, from what
bases have these airplanes been operating? I think you can reconstruct
the questions from the statement itself. I am not sure whether we
can find the notes that someone may have written down to refresh his
memory in discussing it.
IN SIlO 'CT I o NS TO NASA / MAKE STATEN ENT
Senator Gout:. Who instructed your Agency to make a statement.?
Mr. DRYDEN. We were instructed to answer questions.
Senator Gonn. By whom ?
Mr. DuynEN. By the CIA, who said that this had been coordinated
with the State Department.
Senator Goan. And the CIA gave you instructions to respond to
iluestions?
Mr. DtivoEx. 'We asked for information. The operation was not
ours. We had no knowledge of the operation itself. We said, "How
shall we reply to I hese questions? You realize the, fact that we did
not know very much about, where this airplane was, whether the
Russians have the airplane, whether they have, the pilot. What do
you want, us to say in this interim period ? Can we find out more
about it ?"
Senator GORE. You felt the burden of saying something, did you?
Mr. I)WYDEN. We felt the burden of answering questions because
for 4 years the existence of this NASA weather flight program had
been known.
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WHEN WERE COUNTERMANDING INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED?
Senator GORE. And, meanwhile, no one informed you that the
decision had been made at the highest levels of Government that the
State Department would handle this? -
Mr. DRYDEN. The discussions I referred to, the visits of the press,
were made within an hour or two of the making of that decision at a
place outside of Washington, and it was not communicated to us
within that 2-hour period.
Senator GORE. You have told us it wasn't communicated to you at
all.
Mr. DRYDEN. Until the following day.
Senator GORE. Until after you had made a statement?
Mr. DRYDEN. A statement. To get the chronology again, this meet-
ing to which you refer, at which the decision was made, was on the
morning of May 5, somewhere between 11 and 12 o'clock. A decision
was made and Mr. Hagerty informed the press at the direction of
the President that the facts would be obtained through NASA and
State. The reporters came immediately over to our public informa-
tion section wanting to know some of these facts.
Senator GORE. Do you know whether either Mr. Hagerty or Presi-
dent Eisenhower had been informed of this decision reached outside
Washington? -
Mr. DRYDEN. I think the President was outside Washington at the
time.
Senator GORE. It seems to me that I recall the President participated
in this conference.
Mr. DRYDEN. I just do not know the details of that. I think it was
given in the testimony of the Secretary of State.
Senator GORE. Wasn't that a meeting of the National Security
Council?
Mr. DRYDEN. I do not know that, to my knowledge. The statement
was made that Mr. Eisenhower was at secret Civil Defense Head-
quarters.
Senator GORE. Will you repeat that?
Mr. DRYDEN. I say the statement says that President Eisenhower
was at his secret Civil Defense Headquarters.
REFERENCE TO MR. DILLON'S TESTIMONY REGARDING NASA'S ROLE
Senator GORE. I will read from Mr. Dillon's statement:
Now, Mr. IIagerty was not at the Security Council meeting, but he was at
that area out there where this exercise was taking place and so he was aware
of the fact that the State Department would be making a statement at noon
that day at our regular press conference time. Actually, the statement was
delayed 45 minutes. It was made at 12:45 when our regular daily press con-
ference took place.
Senator GORE. Was it decided there that NASA would make a statement also?
Mr. DILLON. It was not, to my knowledge, no. It was not decided there
that NASA would make a statement.
Senator GORE. Who made that decision?
Mr. Dir,Lox. I think that you have to ask NASA. I don't know who made any
such decision.
So you say you decided upon instructions of CIA?
Mr. DRYDEN. NO.
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Senator GoittE. Just, how do you state it?
Mr. DRYDEN. I stated that we had received word of the White
House announcement, that the facts will be made public by NASA
and the Department of State. Now, his means 1 suppose that within
this 2- or 3-hour period this information was not transmitted to us.
I do not know the reasons.
Senator Gorm. Do you know if Mr. Hagerty called you or Mr.
Bonney or anyone in the Department suggesting that a statement be.
made?
Mr. DRYDEN. Not, to my knowledge, sir.
Senator GORE. My time is up.
The CETAIRMAN. Yes. Senator Hickenlooper ?
NASA ACTION BASED ON PREVIOUS UNDERSTAN DING WITH CIA
Senator IlicKriNfoormi. Dr. Dryden, when the newsmen came to
the information Department of NASA, did the Information Depart-
ment act on its Own ?
ME. DRYDEN. No, I hey did not. They acted in consultation.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. With you?
Mr. DRYDEN. With me; yes, sir.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was it in connection with that cork.ulta-
lion, based upon the information which you then had about Mr. Hag-
erty's statement, that you authorized the issuance of the statement by.
the Information Service of NASA?
Mr. DiryDEN. It was called a memorandum to the press. I did not
attribute sufficient importance to the distinction between answering OW
questions of reporters and giving them the same information on
piece of paper.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. After you had made the statement, or your-
Information Department issued this statement, was this statement
sent to the CIA or the State Department?
Mr. DityDEN. It was sent--I do not know exactly what time.
Senator IlicKENLoornit. And was the statement which was issued'
by your Information Department?perhaps you have answered this,
question?cleared with CIA in its context or with the- State Depart-
ment prior to the issuance by your Information Service?"
Mr. DitynEN. I have answered that. The statement, as written,.
was not cleared.
The information in the statement had been previously cleared by
CIA, with State.
Senator II ICKTIN LOOPER. So that the statement was based, then,,
upon the understandings which had previously been had?
Mr. DRYDEN. This is correct.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. With CIA?
Mr. DitynEN. This is correct.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. And with the State Department?
Mr. Dliviwic. Nothing?no substantive information was added to it..
Senator HICK E N LOOPER. just to get this cleared up a little bit, after.
you learned of the statement of Mr. Hagerty?which I believe was
the source of your determination to make the May 5 statement?after-
von had learned of that, statement of Mr. Hagerty that NASA and
the State Department, could give information on this matter, did you
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get in touch with the White House, Mr. Hagerty, or any authorita-
tive person there, or with the State Department?
Mr. DRYDEN. I did not. I say I perhaps erroneously did not see
the difference between answering questions of a large number of
reporters and putting the same thing down on a piece of paper. It
is the same information.
Senator HicKENLoorEa. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche ?
Senator IIICTCFNLOOPER. I wanted to ask you for a copy of that
statement.
Mr. DRYDEN. The committee has it already.
Senator HICKENLOOFER. I understand it is in the background docu-
ments. That is all right.
The CHAIRMAN. It is in the background documents.
(See appendix 1, p. 180.)
NO WRITTEN MEMORANDUM OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Senator GORE. Also, I believe you were going to supply to the chair-
man the question and answer series.
Mr. DRYDEN. I was going to see if there is around, a penciled
memorandum of the c uestions. I am not sure that there is.
Senator GORE. If t lere is?
Mr. DRYDEN. If there is, I will supply it to the chairman.
(The following information was subsequently furnished:)
No memorandum Of questions and answers was made; the discussion was
entirely oral.
NASA'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF U-2 FLIGHT
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche, the NASA statement is found on
page 4 of the background .documents.
[Deleted.]
Senator LAusonE. At the time you issued your statement you did
not have knowledge of what the Soviet knew about it and what actu-
ally happened?
MT. DRYDEN. We did not.
Senator LAUSCHE. Did you have knowledge of the instructions that
were given to the pilot?
Mr. DRYDEN. No, sir. No knowledge about the operations.
Senator LAUSCHE. And that is?
Mr. DRYDEN. We heard Khrushchev's press announcement, of
course, that morning.
Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all that I have with this witness.
The CHAIRMAN. You think that your position as an international
weather gatherer has been compromised by this U.-2 incident?
Mr. DRYDEN. Not so far. [Deleted.]
(From this point on all further testimony on this date was classified
by order of the committee.)
(At 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10: o'clock
a.m., June 2, 1960.)
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
THURSDAY, JUNE 2, 1960
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D .0 .
The committee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to recess, Senator J. W.
Fulbright (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright,Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long,
Gore, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capeha,rt, and Carlson.
Also present: Brig. Gen. George S. Brown, U.S. Air Force, and.
Capt. Means Johnston, Jr., U.S. Navy, military assistants to the
Secretary of Defense; Capt. L. P. Gray III, U.S. Navy, military
assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Hon. Charles E.
Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Hon. William B.
Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Rela-
tions; Richard Helms, Central Intelligence Agency.
CHAIRMAN'S OPENING STATEMENT
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
We have this morning the Honorable Thomas S. Gates, Jr., the
Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Secretary, I think you know about the regulations. Your
testimony will be taken down but nothing will be released except
that which has been passed by the censors representing the State
Department and the CIA, and I assume perhaps you may want to
consult with them.
I think you understand that.
Secretary GATES. Yes, Sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand you have a statement.
Secretary GATES. A very brief statement.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS S. G-ATES, JR.,
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to
appear before you.
I have a short, statement, if I racy read it. It relates to two sub-
jects. First, I am certain that you wish me to cover the role played
by the Department of Defense in the U-2 overflight program.
123
56412-90- 9
GATES
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124 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
ROLE ;110 Iris DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN THE OVERFL1 GITT PROGRAM
Elements of the Department of Defense gave technical advice, to
the project. No military aircraft were used for these flights
nor were the pilots military personnel.
From time to time, the Director of the CIA, after obtaining the
---eurrence of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State,
mine tided a series of programs to the President.
lore p?riflcally, I reviewed program proposals embracing sev-
I priority missions, one or more of which it was proposed to
execute in I he near future. Responsibility for the operational con-
duct of r ire program rested with the CIA.
We obviously were interested in the results of these flights as we
are in all of our Nation's intelligence collection results.
]LIG I ITS GAVE VITAL INToalVIA7LION
For example, from these flights we got information OD airfields,
aircraft, missiles, missile testing and training, special weapons stor-
age, submarine production, atomic production and aircraft deploy-
ments, and things like these.
These were all types of vital information. These results were con-
sidered in formulating our military programs. We obviously were
the. prime customer, and ours is the major interest.
TEST OF MILiTARY CO Al NIT I NICA TIONS
Second ly, on a separate subject :
One incident, and one over which: I assume full responsibility, is
the calling of a test of the readiness of our military communications
from Paris. In view of the fact that my action in this matter has
been subject to some speculation, I would like to give you the facts.
First; of all, our military forces are always on some degree of alert.
So it is merely a matter of moving this degree or condition of alert
up or down the scale. On Sunday night, Mny 15, we were already
aware ofthe sense of the statement which Mr. Khrushehe,v was going
to make the following morning. The conditions which he had set
for his partioipation in the conference made it apparent even at the
time that, he deliberately intended to wreck the conference.
This communications alert was not an act that was either offensive
or defensive in character. It was a sound precautionary measure,.
It did not. meal] Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine personnel from
leave. There was no Moveinent of forces involved. However, I want
to emphasize that it did make certain that, if subsequent developments
made neeessary a. higher state of readiness, such action could be taken
promptly and convincingly.
Under i he circumstances it seemed most prudent to me to increase
the awareness of our unified commanders. Moreover, since the com-
mand and individuals concerned in the decision process, including
the President, the Secretary of State, and myself, were overseas, it
was important to check out our military communications. At about
midnight.. Paris time, Sunday night, I requested that a quiet increase
in command readiness, particularly with respect to communications
be instituted without public notice, if possible.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 125
One phase of our testing is to call no-notice exercises of our com-
mand communications. While some commands went further in exe-
cuting the instructions issued by the JCS as a result of my message
than I had anticipated, I consider the order proper and absolutely
essential. In similar circumstances I would take exactly the same
action.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
PRESUMMIT DISCUSSION REGARDING SHSPENSION OF FLIGHTS
Mr. Secretary, did you or any of your aides participate in any con-
ference prior to May 1 regarding the U-2 flights?
Secretary GATES. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I was some weeks before
May 1 briefed on the preliminary results of the April 9 flight. At
that time, I was informed of a program of possible flights, one of
which would be selected to be flown, and I gave my approval of that
program.
The CHAIRMAN. Was anything said at that time about a moratorium
in view of the summit conference?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Who participated in that conference?
Secretary GATES. That conference was in my office in the Pentagon,
and was between myself and a man from CIA.
The CHAIRMAN. Was anyone in the State Department present?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the State Department was
Nape advised specifically of the plans for the May 1 flight?
Secretary GATES. I don't know from my own knowledge, but I am
perfectly certain that the Secretary of State was advised of the pro-
gram as I was.
The CHAIRMAN. You didn't advise him nor was he represented at
that meeting?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And no one raised the question of whether or not
there should be a suspension?
Secretary GATES. No, sir. In this conversation, it was a private
conversation between the CIA representative and myself, and I was
asked for my advice or approval of the program and I gave it.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, but I merely meant that the
question of whether or not there should be a suspension in view of the
upcoming summit was not raised; is that correct?
Secretary GATES. Not raised between the two of us, no, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Was it raised at any time?
Secretary GATES. I didn't have any other discussions about the
flight with anyone, Senator Fulbright.
The CHAIRMAN. Then so far as you know, it was not raised?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
QUESTION OF ANY PRIOR SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS
The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge, were any flights prior thereto
ever suspended because of political meetings, that is, other than
weather or military considerations?
Secretary GATES. I have no knowledge of any suspension of any
flights for those purposes.
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126 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
The CHAIRMAN . There was no suspension to your knowledge when
the ( Tanip David ;fleeting took place?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN Nor was there any suspension, so far as you know,
during the period in which Khrushcliev visited the United States?
Secretary GATES. I don't know of any suspension. I don't .know
precisely whether during that period we flew any flights, Mr. Chair-
man
lie CHAIRMAN . No, but I mean you didn't discuss the question?
Secretary GATES. I didn't discuss the question of suspension of
flights, no, sir.
The CHAIRMAN Since you never considered it, then you had no
position relative to the continuation, did you?
Secretary Givnis. I approved this program, so I took a position
aiiirma t
SIGN! vIcANcE DEF EN SE DEPARTMENT OF SU S PEN SION Or FLIGHTS
The (-11-1-A1RM . Were the results of these flights important to the
Defense Department?
Secretary (3r.vms. The results were very important to the Defense
Department.
The ( )HAIRMA N. Very useful to you?
Secretary GATES. Yes, air.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you regard it as an important loss that the
flights have now been suspended?
Secretary GATEs. I think that, through becoming compromised, we
have lost an important source of intelligence. It has been a very
suecessful program over the past.
The CHA LIMAN. Then it is a great loss from your point of view not
to have available ;my further Bights; is that. correct ?
Secretary GATES. I think if we had been able to continue them with-
out. having been caught and therefore compromised the source, it
would have been most useful.
R t SSA-, NT NOWLEDGE OF TEE FL 1G
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. (hates, did Khrushchey, or the Russians, know
of overflights prior to May 1 ?
Secretary GATES. I Ir says he did.
The CHAIR-MAN. Well, what do you think?
Secretary GATEs. I believe that be did, Mr. Chairman, but I don't
believe anyone. could specifically prove it. But I believe that he did.
I believe he told tile truth.
The enAiramAisi. If he knew about it, why did the incidents of May
I compromise the flights; why should they be discontinued ?
Secretary GATES. Well, I don't believe he knew the exact type and
character of the flights. lie probably?all he knew was that they
were [deleted] aircraft high in his sky.
N OWL EDGE OF PR ES I DE NT AND SE('RETAR Y OF STATE RE 0111)511 FOR ALERT
The. CHAIRM AN. OT1 your order on May 15, your alert, did you con-
sult the Departmetit of State before ordering it
Secretary GATEs. No. I advised the Secretary of State, who was
with the President when it was issued.
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The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise him before you issued it?
Secretary GATES. He was advised before it was released yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Was his opinion asked or was he merely advised
of it?
Secretary GATES. Well, I told him that I was about to issue a com-
munications alert, and the communication readiness exercise.
The CHAIRMAN. He approved of it.
Secretary GATES. He did not register any disapproval.
The CHAIRMAN. Well then he approved it.
Secretary GATES. I think SO, yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Was that Mr. Herter?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. In Paris.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise the President?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Before it was made?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Was the NSC consulted about the alert?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
MEETING OF MAY 9
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Oates, did you participate in any meeting on
May 7 to consider the statement which was later issued by the Secre-
tary of State?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Or on May 9?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
On May 9, that is Monday, I believe, I participated in a meeting in
the office of the Secretary of State.
On the morning of the 9th.
The CnAnnuAN. Did you approve of the statement made M which
the full revelation was made?
Secretary GATES. I approved of the statement that was made on
May 9, yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Who was present at that meeting?
Secretary GATES. Well, I know that Mr. Douglas and myself were
present from the Department of Defense. Mr. Herter and Mr. Doug-
las Dillon, and Mr. Kohler were present, I think Mr. Bohlen was pres-
ent from the State Department, there may have been one or two others.
The CHAIRMAN. Did that meeting go on for some time?
Secretary GATES. I WOU1.d say about an hour.
The CHAIRMAN. About an hour.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCUSSED
The CHAIRMAN. Was the question of whether or not it was wise for
the President to take responsibility discussed at that meeting?
Secretary GATES. ' Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. What was your position?
Secretary GATES. My position was that he should take responsi-
bility.
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128 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
The C ['AIRMAN. Was the meeting unanimous?
Secretary GATES. I believe it was.
The CHAIRMAN. They all agreed?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. It went on about an hour.
Secretary GATins. Well, I would say at least an hour, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, did it go on more than an hour?
Secretary GATES. Well, I am talking about my recollection. I would
think it was at least 1 hour. Perhaps it was longer.
STATEMENT BY NASA
The CHAIRMAN. Was the statement issued by NASA on May 5
cleared with your office?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. you didn't know anything about it..
Secretary GATES. No, sir..
The CHAIRMAN. Have you had any relations with NASA?
Secretary GATES. No, sir, not in this connection.
The CHAIRMAN. I mean in connection with the IT-2 flight,
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Were these I1-2 flights under your direct con-
trol in the field, that is, under the Air Force direct control in the field?
Secretary GATES. No, sir, they were under the control of the GIA.
{Deleted.]
INITEA I. STATEMENT BY MR FORCE IN TURKEY
The CHAIRMAN. how did it happen the Air Force. made the initial .1.1k
statement of the missing plane?
Secretary GATES. That. was a part of the cover story that was de-
cided upon and they issued this statement from the base in Turkey
about a plane being missing.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, does that indicate that you had arrived ahead
of time in concert with the CIA upon proper procedure to be followed
in case of a mishap?
Secretary GATES. I was not familiar with the details of how a cover
story would be executed. I was aware of the fact that a cover story
e.xisted, and I imagine that when the details of it were put into
operation, the Central Intelligence Agency went to work.
The CnAnntAisr. It was not your responsibility to supervise the cover
story?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. Senator Gore?
MEETING OF TILE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, MAY 5
Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, you are a member of the National
Security Council.
Secretary GATES. That is right, Senator.
Senator GORE. Did you attend the meeting of the Council held on
May 5?
Secretary GA`17ES. Yes, sir.
Senator GORE. Did the President participate in that conference?
Secretary GATES, At the meeting of the NSC?
Senator GORE. Yes.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFEichiNuft
Senator GORE. Was the cover story discussed there?
Secretary GATES. No [deleted], Senator.
There was a meeting of the small group after the NSC meeting?
Senator GORE. Did you participate?
Secretary GATES. Where we discussed the Khrushchev statement. I
participated with the President. It was not at the NSC meeting.
Senator GORE. At this conference in which Mr. Khrushchev's speech
was discussed, was the cover story discussed?
STATE DEPARTMENT TO HANDLE RELEASES ON SUBJECT
Secretary GATES. Well, I think it was discussed in a general manner
but not in detail. It was decided at that meeting that the responsi-
bility for all releases pertaining to this matter would be handled by
the Department of State.
Senator GORE. Was there any discussion at this meeting of the
advisability of telling the truth?
Secretary GATES. I think I made a statement in that meeting, some-
thing to the effect that the prestige of the Presidency should not be
involved in an international lie particularly when it would not stand
up with respect to the facts. But that was the extent of the discussion.
There was no decision.
STATE DEPARTMENT'S COVER STORY
Senator GORE. After this observation on your part, the State
Department did issue a statement that was not true; is that the case?
Secretary GATES. I think
Senator GORE. Well, the record shows
Secretary GATES. I think they issued a statement, that is right. I
think they issued a part of the cover story statement after that meet-
ing; yes, sir.
senator GonE. So there was no decision?although the question of
involvement of the Presidency in what you call an international lie
was discussed, and you expressed your view that it would be an unwise
thing to involve the President in the cover story or in an interna-
tional, an official falsehood?
Secretary GATES. If it turned out that Mr. Khrushchev had all the
facts, which we subsequently found out that he had; yes.
QUESTION OF THE PRESIDENT ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY
Senator GORE. How did you think his involvement or his association
with this incident in its ramifications could be avoided by an assump-
tion of responsibility by the President for the program?
Secretary GATES. I believe the President did assume responsibility,
and I believe he should have assumed responsibility.
Senator GORE. Let me see if I understand you correctly. I cer-
tainly do not wish to make any implication at all. I do not wish to
impute to you any meaning which you did not intend. Did I correctly
understand you to say that this question was discussed at a small
meeting following the NSC meeting on the 5th at which you partici-
pated as did the President?
Secretary GATES. That is correct, Sin
Senator GORE. Who else participated?
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130 EVENTS IN(IPENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFLRENUE
Secret ary 6 Arns. Mr. Douglas Mr. Allen I)ulles, Mr. Gordon
4-ray, and General t. ood poster.
Serial or GORE. At this meeting, you expressed the view ihat it, would
be unwise for the President to be involved in an international lie,
believe you deseri bed it.
Secret ary GATES. 'lint is right. This depended on what, Mr. Khru-
shchev knew, when he knew it and. if he knew everything that he
claimed to know. It turned out later he did. I believe, that the
President should take t he responsibility for the truth, for telling the
I ruth. That is my opinion. I did not know specifically at that, time
the extent of Mr. Kinruslichev's knowledge.
Senator Got:E. Yon have a mended your
Secretary Al is. I didn't mean to he evasive, Senator.
Senatt GonE. I muterstand, but, von have mmv amended, and I
would like to clar'.'ify, if I may. I know you are not trying- to be
evasive and I assure you that I am only seeking to develop the facts
its they existed. The Government, has full leeway, so far as II am
concerned, to exercise censorship for se,curity.
Now, when you 'xpressed the view that the Presidency should not
he involved in an unemotional lie, did you at that I line, outhe 5th,
suggest the, President should assume responsibility, or was this on the
7th or the 9th that von expressed that additional view ?
Secret itry ATE.S. It was on had no more meetings on the
'4ubject, until the 9th, Senator. That meeting was with the Secretary
of St ate.
17,1E OF DISCUSSIONS ON MAY 5
Senator GORE. Did you express 1he view on the 5th that the Presi-
dent should assume responsibility or did you express that -view on
t he 9th ?
Secretary GATES. .1 expressed the view on the 51,11 flint if Mr. Khru-
shchev had the complete information and the pilot, that the President
should assert the true story.
I expressed it again on the 9th when we knew that ha had the plane
and the pilot,. [Delet ed.
Senator GoRE. You were informed that Mr. Khruslichey had made
the public, speech with respect to the plane, that it was shot down or
that it came down iii the vicinity of Sverdlovsk ?
Secretary GATEs. Yes. I am not sure of my timine, Senator. We
tale:W some informal ion on the 5th, but we knew a great deal more a
day later. He didn't report the full story until the 7th.
Senator Goan. I iiiileustauid. I am only trying to develop the back-
ground of information? ?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator GonF. Arid the decision that was made. Although you
expressed these views, and although this information A,va.s in the hands
of or wits discussed ilL the, conference
Secret 'tryGATES. SOD le information was in 01 U' hands.
Senator GORE. 'liii information which you have described?
Secret try GATES. Y es.
Senator Gotm. 1 mliiperfectly willing for you to describe it.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator GORE. I have no description of it except as you give it to
me. The decision was not reached at this meeting?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Senator GORE. A decision to tell the truth was not reached at this
meeting on the 5th?
STATE DEPARTMENT TO HANDLE ALL GOVERNMENT RELEASES ON
SUBJECT
Secretary GATES. That is right, Senator. The only decision that
was reached at that meeting was that all the statements pertaining to
the incident would be handled by the Department of State.
Senator GORE. What information was the State Department to give?
Was it specifically understood at the meeting that the cover story
would be continued?
Secretary GATES. Yes; I think it was assumed that the cover story
'would be continued at that time.
Senator GORE. And the cover story was untrue?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. It turned out to be untrue. I mean,
yes, because it was untrue. We didn't have the full facts that we
had 2 days later.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time has expired.
The Senator from Wisconsin.
Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, I have listened to this interroga-
tion. Now see if you can't tell us the story without questioning,
starting in when you first became acquainted with the facts, who was
there, what was said, and then go on.
For instance, we have heard so many statements about something
not being true. Now this release on May 5 was the cover story,
wasn't it
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator WILEY. When did you first get acquainted with the situa-
tion? Start in the beginning and give it consecutively so that it
will be clear.
CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
Secretary GATES. I first got involved in the situation when the
airplane did not return to base. I knew an airplane was down, pre-
sumably because it hadn't come back and it had taken off. That
was on May 1.
I had no other relationship with it until the morning of Thursday,
which was May 5 when we had a [deleted] meeting of the NSC at
a remote location under a. civil defense exercise.
On that morning, there was the preliminary statements of Mr.
Khrushchev that we had been flying over his territory, and so forth.
After the NSC meeting' there was a small meeting at which I have
listed the members present, in which we discussed this matter.
Senator WILEY. Who was there?
Secretary GATES. Mr. Dillon of the State Department, Mr. Allen
-Dulles, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster, and myself and the
President. We discussed this whole matter. We made the decision
there that the matter would be handled by the Department of State,
and we adjourned.
I had no further participation or discussion concerning the incident
until the following Monday morning.
Senator WILEY. What date?
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132 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secretary GATES. Which was the 9th. I at that time participated
in. a meeting in the office of the Secretary of State, and he issued his
complete statement.
Senator WILEy. llave you got one of these pamphlets in front of
you?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator WILEY. See if we can't get into the record that which is on
page 4 for the press. That is the cover story up at the top?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator WILEY. A nd. that is the one that had been said was a lie?
Secretary GATES. This was a cover story; yes, sir.
Senator WILEY. This was issued when you had only part of the
facts; isn't that ?
Secretary GATES. Thai, is right.
Senator WILEY. On May 9, if you will turn to page 5, you have.
the Department of State's release.
Senator WILEY. Was there one issued on May 9?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT ['RESENT ONLY AT MAY 5TH MEETING
Senator WILEY. At any of these meetings, was the President there?
Secretary GATES. The only meeting the President attended was the
meeting of May 5th, after the NSC meeting.
Senator WILEY. I didn't understand. Was he there on the 5th ?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; after the NSC meeting. That is the only
meeting at which he was present.
DECISION ON ALERT
Senator WILEY. When it was decided to have the alert, was that the
judgment of all that, it was in the interest of the national defense?
Secretary GATES. It was my judgment and. I was responsible.
Senator WILEY. You had in mind, did you, what the condition of
this country was at, the time of Pearl Harbor, how we were asleep?
Secretary G's. I certainly did.
Senator WILEY. During negotiations.
Secretary GATES. I did, indeed.
Senator WILEY. is it your judgment from the. facts that when
Ichrushchey went to Paris that he had already made up his mind to
call off the summit meeting?
Secretary GATES. Yes; it is my judgment, Senator.
MEETING ON MAY 5
Senator WILEY. Something was said by yourself in the cross-exami-
nation to the effect that you claimed they should tell the truth. When
was that, on the 5th ?
Secretary GATES. I said on the 511i, if it proved that Mr. Khrushchey
had the pilot, had the equipment, had the full and complete story, it
later turned out that he had, that I believed we should tell the truth
at that time.
Senator WILEY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT UOINFEBEN
REFORMS IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, since you have become Secre-
tary of Defense, you have made it a point to sit in on the meetings
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and if an agreement could not be reached
you make the final decision.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. In that period you have also brought about re-
forms and increased the efficiency of the centralized purchasing
system.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. In that period you have also brought about a
centralization of the communications system.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. For all those you are to be most highly com-
mended because I think they were reforms long overdue and it was
about time they were put into effect.
REASONS FOR ALERT
Now, at the time you issued your alert of the communications system
in Paris did you have any information that Soviet forces were massing
or mobilizing?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. Did any one person or any group ask you to
order the alert?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. YOU did that entirely on your own respon-
Now sibility ?
Secretary GATES. That is correct, Senator.
Senator MANSFIELD. Did the alert order which you issued put the
forces of this country at a war readiness level?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. There was no call back of Reserves or cancel-
lation of leave to any extent.
Secretary GATES. No, sir. There were in one or two instances some
people who interpreted the JCS order as meaning that they would
have a couple of more aircraft on alert, and in that case, they, on their
own, recalled, I believe some pilots who were home or off duty to have
approximately two more airplanes on an alert status. But this was
done on their own, testing their own alert procedures under the broad
order that was issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
It was not the intention of this order to move forces in any way.
Senator MANSFIELD. Now, that JCS order was in response to your
order?
Secretary GATES. That is right, Senator.
Senator MANSFIELD. Is there any connection between this communi-
cations alert and the recent centralization of the communications
system?
Secretary GATES. No, sir, because that will not be in effect in its
entirety for approximately 9 months.
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
Senator MANSFIELD. Now, during the course of your responses to
Senator Gore, you mentioned the following words, "The prestige of
the Presidency should not be involved."
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134 EVENTS IN CI DEN T TO THE SUMMIT CONyu1ENCE
Isn't it true that in almost any undertaking, in a general .way the
prestige of the Prosidency is always involved under our constitutional
system of government ?
Secret ary rta i
Senator MANSf !ELI). What I am getting at there is this: That
whether or not he had any specific knowledge of this particular flight
or of this particular order, which you issued, that nevertheless under
our system he is generally responsible for actions undertaken by the
head of the CIA and for actions and orders issued by the Secretary
of l)efeitse; is that correct ?
Secretary GATEs. lie is the head of the executive branch and he, is
Commander in Chief, Senator, so of course lie ,s responsible in that
sense.
Serial or MANsrifio. Yes. he is generally responsible.
Secret cry (1,vrEs. ( lertainly.
Senator MANsvirko. He is Commander in Chief and Chief of State.
Secret cry ( \Tics. That is right.
ATI RP'; OF A COVER STORY
Senator AI A NSF] ELI). There has been something said about a cover
story and the fact that it is not truthful. Well, isn't a cover story
by its very nature, almost a I ways a, lie ?
Secretary (3,1TES, Ye:--;, Sc t cit or.
Senator M. xsnuat ). That is the purpose; to se,k protection in some,
kind of a story under a given circumstance so that for the time being
at least t he situation ('lilt Id I w, taken care of.
Secretary G ATES. That is correct, Senator.
Senator MA Ni 'trio. That, is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator llickeolooper?
YVIE'l"I'III:EA TS
Sen at or Ii Hai EN LI WER. Mr. Secretary, I believe t hat we have had
repeated shit omen, s from the Kremlin in the last weeks, months, or
iwen years that contained threats of what the Kremlin is ready to do
to the West generally or to the United States under a variety of
i'onditiolis; isn't that correct ?
Secretary GATEs. Yes, it is.
Senator IlicKENtoorra. I believe Ali% Khrusluhev has been quoted
as saying that lie .,.vould bury us--whether he meant economically or
militarily might be argued --and I believe, he slated that they have
ri isKi les on the launch in g pads directed at various, countries of Europe
as well as the United States?
Secretary G.vms. That is right.
Senator ('KEN I ( wytt. Those statements IRLAT been reported, have
hey not ?
Secretary G.vrrs. That is right.
SON' I I, ? r \ IR M.\ -IN KUVE1 IS OVER EAST GERMA NV
Senator I-InacEN-Looetat. A re the Russians still engaging in scramble
operations and massive airtlight operations over East Germany ; do
you know?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 135
Secretary GATES. I don't know of any flights over East Germany
recently, but, of course, they have some 20 divisions in East Germany.
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. I don't know whether this Comes within
your time or not, but I have heard in one way or another in times
past that they have repeatedly had large air forces in the air over
East Germany.
Secretary GATES. They have large air forces stationed in East Ger-
many.
Senator ITICKENLOOPER. I mean in the air.
Secretary GATES. They have had maneuvers, yes, sir.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have had maneuvers toward the West
German border which come very close to the West German border
on occasion?
Secretary GATES. They have had them regularly; yes, sir.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Sometimes these are rather massive maneu-
vers in the air?
Secretary GATES. I believe that is correct; yes, sir.
JUSTIFICATION FOR ALERT
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, now, recently we have heard a great
deal of discussion and argument about keeping all of our strategic
Air Force planes or a great many of them in the air all the time.
There have been some that have advocated that and criticized us for
not keeping our airplanes in the air more than we have.
Secretary GATES. I am very familiar with this argument, with the
Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee.
Senator IlickENLoorEn. I presume you do not see anything un-
warranted about this air alert which you ordered, but I will ask you
the question anyway. Do you see any reason for criticism because of
a demonstration by your Department of a worldwide air alert of our
forces?
Secretary GATES. I stated when I got off the airplane and was
asked the question by the press on my return, I said it was incredible
to me that anybody would question it.
Senator I ICKENLOOPEll. Well, I agree with that statement, but
there seems to be SOITle criticism nevertheless.
ADVIS ABILITY OF OVERFLIGHT BEFORE SUMMIT CONFERENCE A POLITICAL
QUESTION
Now, on the question of whether or not, that is from your view-
point, in your Department, the particular IT-2 flight should have been
cancelled on the 30th of April, or the 1st of May, or whenever it
'occurred, isn't that a political question and not a military question?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is in view of the so-called summit
'conference?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. That becomes exclusively a political ques-
tion as to whether or not it was advisable at that time from the stand-
point of the summit conference?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
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136 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator Iftexmv toOPER., And I take it that from the standpoint
of primary responsibility you have nothing to say about whether it
would be cancelled or not as a political gesture in view of a political
conference ? _
Secretary GATES. Well, 1, of course, knew of the date of the sum-
mit meeting, and if I_ had had a strong conviction about it I would
have said it even though I didn't have the responsibility for the
decision. I was in an advisory capacity, but I believed that there
was really no good time to stop the collection of important informa-
tion. There is always some international conference or something.
Senator HICKEN LoopER. What I am trying to get itt :is whether you
have any primary responsibility for making political decisions, or is
your responsibility military decisions?
Secretary GATES. No, my responsibility is with the Departmens of
Defense.
VALUE OF U-2 FLIGHTS
Senator fficanNtooetat. Now, these 15-2 flights have been extreme-
ly valuable in the securing of intelligence, have they not?
Secretary GATES. They have indeed, Senator.
Senator HicianNtoorm. They have also been very valuable in secur-
ing weather information, have they not?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. [Deleted.]
A 1 WI SABILITY OF ALERT
Senator fficknictoornit. Do you believe that, in view of the general
tensions that exist and the rather jingoist statements, let's say, that
have been emanating from the Kremlin from time to time, it was a
beneficial thing to have this air alert as not only a show of strength
but as an assurance to our friends and allies over the world that we
had a readiness capability?
Secret cry GATEs. I do. It was not an air alert, Senator.
Senator IThroanNnoorna. Sir?
Secretary GATES. It was not an air alert. I think you miss--tech-
nically, you said air alert. It was a command readiness and com-
munications alert. I agree, however, with what you said that it was
a good thMg to do.
Senator flickENtoortat. I shall adopt your description for my
question, then, on that point.
But anyway, it was a show of ability on our part in connection
sith our alertness, general alertness, and our ability to put a defensive
'force, into the air in a short time?
Secretary GATES. Yes, mid we could go from there to further meas-
ures if we needed to, but this was primarily a measure of checking
command and checking communications, particularly, as I said in
my statement, in view of the fact that the persons involved in im-
portant policy decisions were out of the country.
Senator llacKENamorna, Would you agree that it either does have,
or should have, a certain degree of comforting effect upon not only
our own country but upon our allies that we do have these capabilities?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 137
Secretary GATES. I Would hope it would, Senator. It seems to
me this is our responsibility, to be ready and alert under these
circumstances at all times, and we always are.
This was merely a matter of degree. It was a little increase in the
degree of alertness. We are in an alert condition at all times.
ANOTIIER COMMUNICATIONS ALERT ORDERED
As of midnight last night we are having another communications
exercise, starting at 11 o'clock last night, and it is going for several
days.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. This fact that we may be always alert some-
times is not fully appreciated except on occasional demonstrations of
that.
Secretary GATES. That is right, and the Joint Chiefs, as a result of
this experience and critique of it have recommended to me that we
have these alerts on a no-notice basis more frequently.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. My time is up.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.
[Deleted.]
QUESTION OF ADVANCE PLANNING FOR ACTION IN EVENT U-2 PLANE
DOWNED
Senator LONG. Did you advise or consult as to whether we were to
admit that we authorized these flights if and when the Soviets did
succeed in bringing one of our planes down?
irsof Secretary GATES. If we should continue them or not?
Senator LONG. No, no. What I meant is this: As a matter of fore-
handedness?I see a naval officer sitting behind you?they taught
me the definition of that word as a midshipman?I am sure that you
anticipated that sooner or later they were going to bring one of our
planes down.
Secretary GATES. We knew it was a dangerous occupation; yes,
Senator.
Senator LONG. You could anticipate that sooner or later one of
these planes was going to fall into enemy hands?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator LONG. There was a distinct possibility at any moment,
and had you advised and consulted as to how this matter should be
handled if and when such an event materialized?
Secretary GATES. No; I had not, Senator. I was only aware of
the fact that a cover story existed, but I had no part in it.
Senator LONG. And you had not been advised as to what the position
of this country was going to be in the event that that happened?
Secretary GATES. No, sir; this was not my responsibility.
Senator LONG. Senator Young passed up two questions he would
like for me to ask. I will just ask them on my time since I have no
further questions.
He says if it were essential
The CHAIRMAN. I think the Senator ought to ask in his own name.
Senator LONG. May I yield the remainder of my time to Senator
Young then?
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138 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONEY RENCE
The OitAuntAN. No, you may not. You may ask any question you,
yourself, but on your own responsibility.
EFFEcr OF DISCONTINUANCE OF 2 rtacurrs
Senator LoNG. If it were essential or important that the 1,1-2 flights
be made for years, right up to and including May 1, is the defense of
he I "n ited States adversely effected by an absolute discontinuance on.
May 13 ?
Secretary GATES. We have lost, through compromise, an important
source of information. I: 1)eleted.]
Senator LONG. In other words, we do badly need the same informa-
t ;on that we were gathering with the I flights?
Secretary GATES. We need a continuity of this information, I think,
Senator.
Senator LONG. Then if that be the case, in your judgment was it
essential or advisable that the flight of May 1 should not have been
ca nee led ?
Secretary GATES. In my judgment, it was proper to -fly the flight
o May I.
Senator LONG. Thank you. T. have no further questions.
The (111 AIRMAN. Is that all?
The Senator from Vermont ?
WAS ALERT RELATED TO SOVIET PLANS?
Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, at the time you ordered the com-
munications alert on May I 5, did you have any apprehension at that
time the Communists might be considering or planning surprise action
ii any part of the world?
Secretary GATEs. No, sir, I felt that the situation was one that was
at best, not very constructive. We knew the sense of Mr. Khrushches,7's
remarks, but I did not anticipate a surprise attack.
1 didn't order that kiml of an alert.
Senator AtkEN. In other words, it seemed like a good thing: to do
at the tire?
Secretary GATEs. I think it was, yes, sir.
Senator AIKEN. Was the response to the order fully satisfactory?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Senator ATK EN. H ave you had any similar alerts since ?
Secretary CrivrEs. I testified a minute ago, I believe, that we started
one at 11 o'clock last night which will run for several days.
[Deleted.1
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.
Senator Mousm. Mr. Secretary, if this has been covered, please tall
me.
Secretary GATES. Yes, Senator.
I M eLleATIONS OE SOVIET THREAT AGAINST OVERSEAS BASES
Senator MORSE. I am somewhat concerned about the implications,
propagandawise and otherwise, of the alleged threat of the marshal
of the air forces of the Soviet Union that if they know that another
spy plane is leaving a foreign base the instructions are, to shoot a
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missile to that base. What is your judgment as to the seriousness of
that threat?
Do you think it is a bluff or do you think that he means it?
Secretary GATES. Well, Senator' this is awfully hard to know. lle
must know that if he did such a thing that we have allied commit-,
ments. If it was an allied country, for example, he would be starting,
a very major problem for himself.
Senator MORSE. That is the point I want to raise.
Secretary GATES. And this would only be done with the assumption,
that he would take the consequences of an act that would probably
start a general war. [Deleted.]
Senator Mousu. Doesn't it seem to imply, Mr. Secretary, that if he?
is not bluffing, that they thereby mean to start a general war over ?
espionage activity on the part of the United States or any other for--
eiom power that sends a spy plane- over their territory?
Doesn't that seem to be
Secretary GATEs. If I understand your question, Senator, I think'
he must take the responsibility for starting a general war or very -
likely starting a general war if he hits one of our Allied bases for any ?
reason.
Senator MORSE. Could it possibly imply that the Russians are of the:
opinion that our power of both defense and aggression is such that
they are willing to take it on? To put my question a different
way
Secretary GATES. I doubt very much that they are willing to take.
it now. I think they absolutely know they will commit suicide the
Nue moment they try it because I think they are fully informed in every.
way possible about, practically, the exact defense posture of the
United States.
Senator MORSE. If that is true, and I think it is true, that they ought
to know that if they get involved in a nuclear war there can't be any
victory for them, and I doubt if there could for us, but apparently
this type of military mind in Russia possessed by their air marshal is
ready to start a nuclear war. Wouldn't that be a fair deduction -from,
this threat unless it is a bluff?
Secretary GATES. Senator Morse, I think it is a part of a stepped-
up, cold war aggressive, propaganda campaign. That is what I think.
it really is, because I don't believe that Mr. Khrushchev wants to,
start a war which he knows will be the end of his country.
Senator MoRsE. I am inclined to think that is probably true of.
Khrushchev. But the reason I am asking this line of questions is.
to find out from you if the leaders in our country have reason to
believe that Khrushchev is being pushed in Russia by a preventive
war group that entertains the point of view that sooner or later they.
are going to have to fight the United States, and that they think.
probably now is a better time to do it than later.
Do we have any intelligence information that would justify our.
belie-vino- that a military group in Russia is now taking over and,
pushing Khrushchev to the side?
Secretary GATES. We do not have. We can at this time only
speculate. It might be possible that the military- group has come,
into more power in Russia or that Mr. Khrushchev may have hadl
some of his power diluted. This is, however), ilD5t speculatiOn? anct
56412-6o-
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140 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
it, is, I suppose, rather dangerous to speculate, but we do not have any
hard facts on the subject.
LN ELDEN CE OF, A ND DANGER IN, SOVIET MILITARY IIIERARCITY
Senator MORSE. I understand they have. some 2:")0,000 military
officers, army and naval and air. Could it be possible that within
Ole military in Russia they see the possibility of reaching an agree-
ment on total disarmament which means that they would be moved
out of the very favored position in Russian society they now occupy,
and that we need, to be on the alert to the possibility that a great
military change is taking place in Russia in the form of a military
hierarchy taking over control from the Communist leadership ?
Secretary GATES. Well, I_ couldn't agree with you more, sir, that
we should certainly be Oil the alert to t his possibility and continuously
so. I agree that we must consider this as one of the possibilities.
Senator MORSE. AVbat concerns me is that as far as their leadership
is concerned and as far as I have any reason to believe, based upon
be briefings we have had from our own American leaders, we are
dealing with a group of very amoral leaders in Russia. And when
you get amoral leaders among the military establishments, such as they
have, I think we ha Ve cause for concern as to whether or not even in
desperation they might not be willing to start a war. And if this is
more than propaganda, if this is more than bluff, if this is more than
what you suggest might be the case of a new step-up in the cold war
to try to frighten our allies, then we have to take a long look, it seems
to me, as to our responsibility to history in respect to following an
espiona,ge course that might cause these amoral men in desperation
to start a war because i here is always the hope on our part that we
may be able to contain them until we can negotiate through the
United Nations a workable and enforceable total disarmament
program.
NEED FOR INFORMATION BALANCED AGAINST POTENTIAL DANGER
I have raised this question because I don't think that in terms of
history we can completely ignore our responsibility in dealing with a
group of desperadoes such. as I think the Russian military people are,
and so it raises the quest ion how far we can justify going morally, in
connection with MI espionage system such as the E.-2 system, when we
know we are dealing with a group of amoral military leaders in Russia
who might start a nuclear war because of their completelagtk of appre-
ciation for the value of human life.
It puts us :in a difficult position, it seems to me. I'Ve have our own
security to protect, we luwe our duty to gather information, but the
nature of the "beast" with whom we are dealing--in quotation marks
.1 put the word, of course?nevertheless puts upon us some responsi.-
1,ility, it seems to me, to not go too far in our own espionage program
r by going a certain distance might indirectly put us in a position
where history might record that we knew we were dealing, with -Hutt
kiml of a gang and knowing it we nevertheless followed an espionage
course of action that they considered so violated their sovemign rights
hat they were willing then to take that last step into a nuclear war.
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Secretary GATES. Well, the Senator can speculate more intelligently,
I am sure, than I can on military people.
Senator MORSE. Not at all.
Secretary GATES. But basically military people are conservative,
worldwide and basically they are well informed on military matters,
and therefore, the military in the Soviet Union should know better
than the political leaders that they will be lost, and slaughtered and
devastated in a nuclear war.
On the other question, it seems to me again as a lay person that our
survival is at stake. If he threatens us, I have repeatedly testified in
Congress, that I didn't think he intended to make any significant
concessions at any meeting, that we have not prepared our defense pro-
gram on that basis, that we had to keep it under continuous review, at
all times, and with a completely closed country, and our survival
threatened, if he builds up a capability for a surprise attack, it seems
to me absolutely vital that we obtain all the information we can from
every source.
Senator MORSE. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Indiana.
Senator CAPEIIART. I have DO questions except I will say I think
you did the right thing by ordering the alert.
I hope that you will continue to be on alert. I hope you will con-
tinue to get intelligence on Russia in every conceivable way we can.
The CHAIRMAN. IS that all?
The Senator from Ohio.
SECRETARY GATES' SERVICE IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Gates, how long have you been the Secretary
of Defense?
Secretary GATES. Only since last December, sir.
Senator Lauscuu. Were you in the Department prior to that time?
Secretary GAITS. Yes, sir; I have been there since 1953, in the De-
partment.
Senator LAuscllE. In what capacity?
Secretary GATES. I was Under Secretary of the Navy, then Secre-
tary of the Navy, then Deputy Secretary of Defense.
SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF OVERFLIGHTS
Senator LAUSCHE. Based upon your knowledge, when did the Soviet
hierarchy first know of the fact that there were foreign planes flying
over the Soviet?
Secretary GATES. I don't think we can confirm, Senator. We just
have to take Mr. Khrushchev's statements at face value.
I think that it is debatable how much he knew. I assume he knew
that there were planes flying. He said he knew. He says he had
known since he was here in the United States. But I don't think we
,can definitely confirm this.
Senator LAuscuE. Testimony has been given by some witness
that, I think on July 2, 1956, he made a protest that there was a plane
overhead in the Soviet.
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Secretary G,vrEs. Yes. T have the record of this. I believe this;
was the time General Twining visited the Soviet Union. They made.
a public protest of overflights in July of 1956.
Senator LAtiSCIIE. And Since that. time IT-2's have been making In s-
Si Oil S over the Soviet ?
Secretary GATEs. Thal is correct, Senator.
Sem-dor 1i sc lIE. A nil Khrushchey, a fter May 1, made a state-
ment that he knew al., the time that he was at Camp David that planes
Were flying overhead ?
Secretary GATEs. sir; he did.
Senator LAtiscitn. Then the proof indicates that at the time he was
invited to the 11114(41 States, at the time he went to Camp David, and
at. the time, that, he arranged for the summit eonfereiwe, he knew of-
tl ,ese planes being overhead ?
Sec retitry GATES. 'Yes.
Senator LAtisciun. And he did nothing about it? Can a staff mem-
ber tell?
Secretary GATES. .1 can't say that we can confirm this, Senator.
Senator LAuscur. I understand.
Secretary GATES. This is his statement.
sovirr mom VATION FOR ATTENDING SUATATIT
Senator LAUSCH E. 'Filet is correct. When was Tifirnshchev in the,
nit ed States?
Mr. AlAncv. Sept ember 1951).
Secret a ry GATES. September 15 through the 271-h.
Senator T,Arscli E. He made no statement to the President at that
ti me a Is att planes bei ng overhead ?
Secret a ry GATEs. lie did not.
Seiiiitcir 1,Auscur. And he agreed to meet at the SIIII1111 ?
Secret ary GATES. That is right.
Senator I,Auscun. Then on May 1 this TT-2 was brimeht down in
the Soviet and he then made these declarations that have been re,-
ported. That is correct, isn't, it ?
Secret arv GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator LA-usco E, Now, then, what, in your opinion, motivated him
in agreeing to ha ve a summit conference, accepting our invitation to
come to the I Tinted States, meeting with the President., while he knew
that this supposed grave transgression of his rights was taking place?
Secretary GrATES. 1 can only hazard again a, personal opinion, Sen-
ator. My opinion is that he believed that fie could not make any
pi ogTess at the summit meeting., and he made it pre-posit ioned, he took
a pre-posit ion?made a, brief on it and came to Paris to wreck the
summit quite apart from the I .1-2 incident.
AN D SI CVIFT INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING OPPORTCNITIES
Senator LArsc E. Based upon your opinion or active knowledge,
during this period was there espionage practiced by the Soviets in
Oil!' country ?
Secretary GATEs. 'Yes: there was.
Senator r.,Auscur.. Is that. answer based upon your knowledge?
Secretary GATEs. Based upon reports that I have read.
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Senator LAUSCHE. From the Central Intelligence Agency?
Secretary GATES. Or from the FBI.
Senator LAUSCHE. In the Soviet, all things are hemmed in against
an individual getting into proximity of their bases. Am I correct in
that?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
.Senator LAUSCHE. Does that situation prevail in our country?
:Secretary GATES. It certainly does not, Senator.
'Senator LAUSCHE. Then there is a tremendous difficulty in the ability
,of obtaining intelligence by our agents in the Soviet as compared to
:their ability, through their agents in our country?
Secretary GATES. That is correct; and there is obviously no reason
for him to overfly the United States.
IMPORTANCE OF U-2 FLIGHTS
Senator LAUSCIIE. Based upon the knowledge that you acquired
through the U--22's, what would be your opinion about our intellectual
:ability to pursue properly the development of our national defense?
Secretary GATES. I think we had a responsibility to take every
means we could.
Senator LAUSGIIE. That is not my question. My question is, If you
did not ha.ve the knowledge acquired through the U-2's, could you
have intelligently developed your national defense to cope with the
actual, potential military power of the Soviet?
Secretary GATES. Not as well, Senator; by no means.
Senator LAUSCHE. By no means whatsoever?
Secretary GATES. We have other means.
Senator LAUSCIIE. Yes?
Secretary GATES. That gives us other information, but this was a
very importance piece of information.
Senator LAUSCHE. If you didn't have that information, do you feel
that the security of our country in all probability would have been
affected because of our inability to develop properly our military
!strength?
Secretary GATES. I think this was?I want to be careful in my an-
swer because this is one source of several sources of intelligence. It
is a very important one. I think it would have been affecting our
ability to properly defend the United States if we didn't have this
information.
DEMANDS PRESENTED BY IiIIRUSIICEIEV
Senator LAUSCHE. Now, getting down to the matter of the May 16
meeting, have you formulated any opinion as to whether Khrushchev,
when he left Moscow, already had prepared these four unacceptable
demands that he made upon the President with respect to the U-2
incident?
Secretary GATES. Everyone is entitled to a personal Opinion, Sena-
tor. I have an opinion, yes, sir, that he had very definitely, because
the moment he arrived in Paris he presented these conditions to Mr.
,de Gaulle along with a copy already in French.
Senator LAUSCUE. That is?the fact is that he was supposed to go
to Paris on May 15; Sunday?
Secretary GATES. Yes; he came on Saturday night, I believe.
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144 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator LATTSCHE. And for some reason that has not been explained,
be decided to come there in advance?
Secretary GATES. That is right.
Senator LAusc HE, On Saturday?
Secretary GATES. Flint is right.
Senator LATTSCII E. And early in the morning at 11 o'clock on Sun-
day, he asked for a conference?
Secretary GAIT,S. Attended by de Gaulle.
Senator LAITSCH E. AO ended by Mal ihovsky, himself, and de Gaulle?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Senator LAITSCUE. At that meeting, he set forth these unacceptable
demands?
Secretary GATES. That is right, sir.
Senator LAITSCHE. Then in the afternoon at 4:30 he asked for a
conference with Macmillan ?
Secretary GATES. rhat is correct.
Senator LAUSCHE. And he again set forth those four demands?
Secretary GATES. 'Chat is correct.
Senator LATTSCHE. This is merely asking for your opi nion.
Do you believe that in self-respect and maintenance of the Presi-
dent's position he could conform to the demands made in that ultima-
tum?
Secretary GAtEs. I certainly do not. I certainly believe he could
Dot, I guess, would be a better answer.
Senator LATTSCHE. I am of the opinion that when Khrushehev left
Moscow he knew there was not to be a summit conference. He pre-
pared his paper. He had his mode of operation completely outlined.
Secretary GATES. I. share that point of view, Senator.
SifOITLD TT-2 FLIGHTS ItAVE BEEN SUSPENDED BEFORE SUMMIT CONFERENCE?
Senator LATISOHE, Now, you have stated that you did not feel that
we could, in the face of these discussions about a summit conference.
suspend our activities with respect to the security of the country;
is that right?
Secretary GATES. [hat is right, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. H there was to be a temporary suspension of
these IJ-2: flights, when should they have begun? This is speculation.
am just trying to search it out. The discussions for a summit confer-
ence preceded by far the September visit in the United States, and
then from Sept ember to May 16 practically 9 months elapsed. Should
we, last September, have discontinued our U-2 flights?
Secretary GATES. Not in my judgment, Senator. 1 think it would
have been most incorrect to have suspended them.
Senator LATTSCHR. DO you believe the Soviet, because of the ar-
entged summit conference, discontinued its activities?
Secretary GAtts. I: am sure they didn't, although I don't know, but
am perfectly sure Cat:I didn't.
Senator LATTSCHE. 'Mat is all.
Oil.ET NOTE OF MAY ii)
The CHAIRMAN. NIT. Reporter, the staff overlooked a document
hich should have been included in the background information. It
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
is the Soviet note of May 10, which was sent to our Government, as
reprinted in the New York Times of May 11, and I ask that it be
inserted in the record so that this step in the development from a
documentary point of view may be complete.
(The note referred to appears on p. 195 of appendix 1.)
QUESTION OF ALTERNATIVES TO MAY 9 STATEMENT OF STATE DEPARTMENT
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, referring just a moment to a pre-
vious question, on the May the 9th meeting in which the issuance of
the statement by the Department was considered, were there any alter-
native statements proposed and considered to the one which was
issued?
Secretary GATES. Not in principle, Senator Fulbright.
The CHAIRMAN. Not in principle?
Secretary GATES. But there were, of course, various language ver-
sions considered.
The CHAIRMAN. Did anyone at that meeting raise the point that
for the President, the Chief of State, to assume personal responsi-
bility would be a departure from the historical practice of this
country?
Secretary GATES. I think this was understood, Senator, and I be-
lieve that we felt the circumstances were different from anything
that had prevailed heretofore.
The CHAIRMAN. But the point was raised and discussed?
Secretary GATES. I can't accurately say that it was raised and dis-
cussed but it was certainly in my mind and I believe it was obvious
to all of us that it was a departure from precedent.
The CHAIRMAN. It was a departure from precedent in this coun-
try. Do you know of any other country that has followed this
policy?
Secretary GATES. No; I do not.
The CHAIRMAN. Was anyone concerned that this might have far-
reaching implications for the future of our intelligence operations?
Secretary GATES. Well, we knew that it already had marked the
end of this particular method of collection of intelligence because of
its being compromised [deleted].
The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say that to your knowledge
there was no time in the last few years, in which you are familiar
with our activity, that IT-2 flights were suspended for political reasons.
Secretary GATES. Not to my knowledge, Senator; that is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, were you over consulted with regard
to the wisdom of holding a summit conference?
Secretary GATES. No; I was not, Senator.
POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA ON DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR
TESTING
The CHAIRMAN. Do you personally believe there is any reasonable
hope for any agreement with the Russians with regard to disarma-
ment?
Secretary GATES. I think it is extremely doubtful, Mr. Chairman. I
think that the Soviets are playing off-and-on-again tactics; some-
times cool, sometimes cold, sometimes hot.
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146 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFEBENCE
I La 'Ii eve I hat, their proposal for disarmament or total disarma-
uient ,s completely unrealistic. 11 find it, rather difficult to believe they
will ever agree, to tIC c(mtrols and inspections that we NN'il I of necessity
!nsist upon to make progress on disarniament.
The EIAIRMAN. Do you believe the same with regard to nuclear
test bans?
Secretary GATEs. I am not, so definite on that, Mr. Chairman, from
a, personal point of view. We seem to have made more progress in the
negotiat ions on tests titan we have in the other field. 13ut 1. again
worry about, the possibility of having valid control and inspection
yst en is for eit-her of t hese, efforts.
The CHAIR 'IAN. I undersi ood you to say, I believe, in answer to a
question by Senator Morse that, you did not believe any significant
concessions could be expected from the Soviets at the summit meeting.
Secetary GATrs. That, is right. This has beer consistent with my
testimony before, tire committees of ( ongress all of I his year.
Qt' ESTI( OF RELOCATION OF SOVIET BASES
Tire ( IA I a AtA N. Is it now probable, that, as a result, of the revelation
if tile efficiency of i he photography, the Russians Will now change
I lie local ion of ninny of I heir strategic bases?
Secret :Iry (i,vrns. This is quite an undertaking. -Von don't do the
, oust ruct ion that is involved in strategic bases easily or quickly, and
they don't, know precisely how much information we 'lave about II iem,
and 1 w at Id think titer they would perhaps take, di tforent means of
tuilai rig new bases or of dispersing bases or son ret of that
character. lint I chm't, believe. that it is very pract 'ten I to assume that
i hey would shift maim' installatimis because of tl,e, character required
to handlo, I he strategic w.eapons.
The CHAIR ALAN. I Meant is, do you feel that, the information
:?;011 now Ini ve. may become rapidly obsolete because of their know ing
you know about them I rev will change. them, so that you will have a
great deal of difficulty in keeping up with their location ?
Secretary 6.1TES. We will have. to augment, other methods I( aid
obtaining this information.
1Deleted.I
RELEASE SEi R ETA Ry GATES PREPARED Sr.FAI'E.AIENT
The (ir A MALAN. Mr. Secret ar was your prepared statement re-
leased to tire press?
Secret ary (4A1 ts. A-Vas what, sir?
The ( [AIR NI A N. I'Vw; he st atement which you read initially released
o the press ?
Secretary GAITS. I didn't release it. unless the, con/ in ee
The CI "AIRMAN. No, t Ire commit.' ee idn't, as far as I know.
Ca h ain .101 IN Sin' N. it. has been released by Mr. St. ('I aire 1 believe
hal he had released it. We didn't release it.
The ( A1101 AN. W aS it your purp)se, to release it ?
:Secret ary (;:\TES. II' was up to you, AI r. MCI
l'he Cumin.' A N. Wel 1, normally. the initial statement, made by wit-
esStis is tire same as t heir own testimony. 'They either censor it or re-
lease it. I was just inquiring.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CuNEnEIN,
Secretary GATES. It is all right with me if it is all right with you
that it be released, Mr. Chairman. I understand it has been released.
The CHAIRMAN. It has been released?
Secretary GATES. That is what I understand.
Captain JOHNSTON. Yes, sir, I was informed by someone from the
committee, I believe Mr. St. Claire, that it had been released.
The CHAIRMAN. By whom?
Captain JOHNSTON. By the committee, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. May I ask the stair, did you release it?
Mr. MA_Roy. No, Mr. Chairman, this will just be released in the
normal way. It is put on the tape here. It went through the censors
and, unless they took any portion of it out, it went to the public.
The CHAIRMAN. I just was wondering.
Secretary GATES. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I considered it your
prerogative. I have no objection one way or the other.
The CHAIRMAN. It usually follows the same procedure. You make
the statement and then it goes through the record if the censors wish it.
Was this statement cleared with the State Department before you
made it?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we find out
whether a copy got in the hands of the newspapermen other than
through normal sources here.
Mr. MARcy. No, sir, that did not happen, not through the commit-
tee. Everything goes through the regular process, through the cen-
sors, and so on.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I asked the clerk a moment ago if you had
released it. Tie understood you had?I mean that you had given it
to the press before.
Secretary GATES. I didn't give it to the press, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. You or one of your aides, I don't know.
Secretary GATES. No, we did not release it.
TIMING OF KIIRUSIICHEV'S DECISION TO WRECK SUMMIT
The CHAIRMAN. You stated very positively that you believed the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchey, before he
came to Paris, had already made up his mind to wreck the summit.
Can you tell us how and why you arrived at that opinion?
Secretary GATES. Well, I felt, and again speaking personally, I
felt that the fact that he arrived on Saturday night and asked for
these appointments with President de Gaulle, and Prime Minister
Macmillan, and he arrived with a position paper translated in French
in the case of de Gaulle and given orally by translation in English
to Macmillan, a position paper that he used almost verbatim as the
first part of his text the following morning, was pretty good indica-
tion that he had a preconceived plan at the summit meeting and was
planning to, in my judgment again, and used the fact that there were
3,000 newspapermen in Paris and he had a platform to issue all of
these statements from. Then I believe there were indications in other
speeches that he made prior to the summit that he was going to adopt
later on.
The CHAIRMAN. What in your opinion caused him to arrive at this
conclusion to wreck the conference?
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Secretary GATES. Why, I believe that he found that he had been
unsuccessful in creating any disunity among the allies. That he was
not going to get any substantive concessions himself, according to his
(JaIns, on Berlin and other critical issues that he might consider im-
portant, and that he wasn't going to get a blanket disarmament cheek
ithout controls, and so .forth. And I believe he felt that he was not
goin g to make any pro ;;Tess at the summit.
EFFECT OF T "II- 2 INCIDENT ON KHRUSIICHEV'S SUMMIT ACTIONS
The CHAIRMAN. 100 you believe the U-2 incident contributed to
that belief?
, Secretary GATES. .1_, frankly in my judgment it did not, Senator
Fulbright. I believe it gave him, it contributed to his public case, but
don't think it contribined to his position.
The CHAIRMAN. on don't think that was a significant element in
,,uusing him to arrive at this conclusion?
Secretary GATES. .f .(vally do not; no, sir. I believe it was a factor
in his, an important fact or in helping him make his case, but I don't
think- it lad anything to do with his policy decision.
The CIE AIRMAN. Why do you think he would be better off and what
reasoning leads you to this conclusion? Why is he better off having
f.(Alowed the course he (lid, than having gone to the conference and
raving it result in no concessions?
Secretary GATES. 014 he can answer that, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think he left in his initial statement
what is called an "out" for the President, by saying he thought the
President didn't know about this?
Secretary GATES. I don't know what his intentions were, whether
tit at was an out or hither that was just a statement that he believed.
really don't know.
The ell .AMMAN. If it was an out, it would be inconsistent with his
(leterin ;nation to AV 1.1e.l< the conference, would it not?
Secretary GA'PES. Sir?
The, CHAIRMAN. If it was an out as it has been alleged, it would
be inconsistent with Ins determination to wreck the conference. He
:.wouldn't want to give t he President an out, would he?
Secretary GATES. I never personally considered it was an out. I
just thought he was using this as part of his speech-1 don't consider
ii. was an out.
The GitAlRITAN. WC11, he did say that he thought the President
*.1 idn't know about it, didii't he, in his initial statement?
Secretary GATEs. 1 s; he did.
The ()I.\ IRMAN. hy time is up.
Sennt or Morse, do pal have any further questions?
Sei la tor MousE. Son II iF Wi ley is next.
The Cii TRIVIA N. SOD iii or Wiley?
Soi tor Mous E. l I ii ?i'e some more questions.
Sot FEY. Ai r i-tie a ry, we km ow very wel that Khruslichev
id canvassed i he -ii wi th Macmillan, de Gaulle., with Adenauer
Id with our President, and they were all agreed and firm on the prop-
it ion that I( hiuslieliev wanted, to wit, to divide Germany, and so
i%irth and so on. No .,v, he was acquainted with that fact from his
i-a-iversations? was he lot?
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Secretary GATES. I believe he Was, sir.
Senator WILEY. And, in other words, he knew that if he went to the
.conference and couldn't get his way, which would be very apparent,
that wouldn't sit so well with the people of Russia?
Secretary GATES. I think that is a good speculation.
Senator WILEy. So, it seems to be the consensus of those people who
claim to know, including yourself, that the U-2 incident would give
him something to hang on his previous determination and that he
utilized. Do you agree to that?
Secretary GATES. Yes, I think he used the 13-2 as a tool rather than
as a matter of principle. I think he decided that there was no
progress for him at the summit.
SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF OVERFLIGHTS
Senator WILEy. Well, there is just this one other question. I think
you have answered it, but see if I can't get it out into the open and get
it so there won't be any question: Is it your opinion that he had known
of the U-2 incidents for a long time?I mean the U-2 flights?
Secretary GATES. I think I believed him when he said that he knew
we were overflying the Soviet Union. I don't believe he knew their
capabilities. But I think he knew that unidentified aircraft were over
his territory.
Senator Waxy. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?
RELATIONSHIP OF 11-2 FLIGHTS TO SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I want to pursue a bit further the
line of questioning that I was conducting when my time was up
because I think you have got to deal also with the problem of where we
go from here, in view of Russian attitudes at the present time.
We have the air marshal's statement now which has not been coun-
termanded as far as we know by Khrushchev, that if an American U-2
plane flies from any base, goes over Russia, they will fire a missile
:against that base.
Your testimony, I think, justifies my concluding that if they fire at
that base, that under our commitments under NATO, our obligations
to defend our allies, we will meet that force, and that that may very
well start general war.
As I understand also your testimony, you share my doubt as to
whether or not the air marshal is bluffing, whether or not this is
propaganda in the cold war or whether or not this is an announcement
of a definite decision as to what they are (ming to do.
So we have to discuss this hypothetically from this point on. Let's
assume that he means exactly what he said, and because of my fear of
the type of military mind they have in Russia as contrasted with our
own, namely, the difference between amoral military leaders and moral
military leaders, I am very fearful that the group in control of the
Russian military at the present time means exactly what it says.
They will fire a missile at any base from which an American U-2
plane flies. Doesn't that put squarely up to us then the question as
to whether or not we can justify being a party indirectly to the start-
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150 I:VENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFER', NCE
ing of ,general war by flying ally TT-2 planes from any foreign base,
view of that a nnothicement by the Russian air marshal ,1
Sec fast a ry (ATES. \Vt., have a 7111011 ce d that the T71- flightsnot
resumed. The. President has announced this. This is of course,
hi own t 0 and that was announced prior to this De:ferise M in-
ateme?t t hat you refer to.
Senator Mousn. rad, -a; what I want to clarify for this record be-
cause most respect fully, I don't, think it is clear in the record that
this comm id PP, has made iodine.
The I 'resident, announced at Paris that they were suspending them.
Secret arv (TarEs. Ile n aide the statement, Senator, that he eouldn't
commit the next, President, but as far as he was concerned, during his
a( huh'isi ration, t he flights were stopped.
Seat or iNionsE. Then do 4,o you wish to, express the viewpoint that at
tien present time the Vaned States does not intend to continue any
I '2 flights over Russia '!
Secret arv GrArns. I ink we made a commitment notio.
Senator Ikloasn. There has been a considerable amount, of discus-
sion in apse hearings and outside of these hearinirs that in V IP,AV Of
sit nut ion that, confronts us, it is intended to cont mite 17-2 flights;
that the President's statement was a statement made in eonnection
w ill' the summit conference, sit nation.
In other- words, the sunimit conference situation having blown up,
it does not follow that that statement of the President now continues
ill effect.
It is your testimony that it is your -understanding it does continua
in effect ?
( pit Es! \ m iTmE NT NOT TO CONTIN I E FLIGHTS
Seeartary (4-ArEs. I am not, a lawyer, Senator, butl think you could
take the legal point of view that the, President had no commitment
because of the blowup of the summit conference, but from it national
point of view, prestige and the, standpoint, of the honorable point of
view, I think the United States has made a commitment, regardless
of the technicality of the timing of the decision, so in my judgment
we have made a, comni it went not, to fly 1F-2 during the administration
of this President..
Senator Ifousn. I don't care to get into any argument, over seman-
tics, hut only judging from what, I read about the interpretation of
the President's speech to the Nation, there. are many news comments
interpreting the President's speech to the Nation as a st weal that, does
(lanniit this Nati( in to a discontinuance of 1T-2 flights, now that
tile siii,iiiiit conference Las blown up.
I think it, is very Mi portant that we make clear our position. i am
not passimrjudgment 'tow on what our position should be.
Secret ary GATEs. Yes, s r.
writrizEtAtiors- r_nEsIDENt's 04 OIMENTS ABOUT NOT RESTIMINC
OV ERFLIO I iTS
Senator Moasn. we have problems, may I say most respectfully,
w th people in other I ra ri s of the world, even including the segments
of the population of our allies, raising the question as to whether or
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 151
not the President's speech to the Nation the other night means that
we may continue U-2 flights.
In view of the statement of the air marshal of Russia as to what
they are going to do if they do continue, my question is this: Should
not our Government restate its position in regard to the continuation
of U-2 flights and give the world assurance at the present time that
we do not intend to continue U-2 flights and thus risk the possibility
that the Russians may send a missile to the air base from which any
U-2 flight might leave ?
Secretary GATES. Senator, I have in my hand the President's state-
ment in Paris in which he said:
In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident, and are
not to be resumed. Accordingly, this cannot be the issue.
That is a, categorical statement that they are not to be resumed,
This is what I understand our position is.
Senator MORSE. The President didn't say that in his speech to the
.Nation the other night. There isn't anything in the President's
,speech to the Nation the other night that categorically and unequivo-
cally assures to the world that we are discontinuing, as a matter of
espionage policy, the flying of any U-2 planes over any foreign
territory.
All I seek to do at this point in the record, and please let me assure
you of this, is to raise this point so that our Government can remove
any suspicion or fear in other parts of the world in view of the
Russian air marshal's statement, that the world doesn't have to be
,concerned -about a nuclear war being started by us by sending a U-2
plane from any foreign base over Russia.
I think the world is entitled to that assurance at this moment in
order to produce the relaxation that I think is necessary for the con-
tinuation, through the United Nations I hope, of a good faith, this
attempt to reach some understanding with Russia.
Secretary GATES. It may well need clarification, Senator. I didn't
think it did. I thought it was perfectly clear to me that we had made
:a commitment so long as the President is in office, not to fly the U-2
airplane, and everyone understood it. If they don't, perhaps it should
be reexamined. However, you are now faced with making another
.statement in face of a threat, and I don't know whether this is a wise
move or not.
Senator MORSE. I think it is a wise move if we honestly believe
that this is more than a threat, that this is an announcement of mili-
tary policy that they intend to deliver on.
WORLD OPINION ON U-2 CrVERELIGIITS
I don't intend to argue the point. I think the judgment of the
world will be against us if, in view of what you call this threat, we
'should continue U-2 flights, because I think we have to share joint
responsibility with Russia then for starting a nuclear war, because
I seriously question whether world opinion will ever be with us on
-this kind of espionage conduct.
I think that world opinion is against our sending a IT-2 flight over
:any foreign territory, because I think most people in other parts of
the world consider it a form of constructive aggression.
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152 EVENTS INCI DENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
That is all, Mr. Cho irman.
The t.,11/1TRINIAN. Senator Hic,kenlooper, do you have any further.
questions? I think you are next.
Senator IlicKricnoorall. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the dis-
cussion which you have just had with Senator Morse -----I think per-
haps I only have a continent because my comment will go to a mat-
ter of personal opinion.- -as I understand the line of questioning that
has been going on here, and as I think it probably will be interpreted,
the United States is required to take the burden for all the ills of the
world and take the responsibilities for all the mistakes in the world;
that we must do everything, including complete submission to the
demands and the threats od the Kremlin; and that the opinion of the
world is apt to be slanted against us unless we do this at this time.
have heard from so many sources over the country that we have.
to do this or that or t he other thing as a gesture that; We are not
war-minded or that we are not warmongers, or that we really have;
some interest in our fellow man.
RECORD OF THS I TEL) STATES AS A PEA CEF1 J14 N TTI
Now, if the record of the United States over the last good many
years of humanitarian activities, of fantastic expenditures of billions.
of dollars for peace, of fostering all kinds of conferences, of making
all kinds of offers to meet all kinds of reasonable propositions for
aeace, based only upon reasonable agreements for their assurance of
Jet tig carried out--if that isn't an assurance to the world. LE personally
think that to humble ourselves further by yielding to this threat of
this military man in Russia would certainly not add to our prestige,
in the least, and it prebably would be of little use in the eyes of the
world, at least to thi.}se that we would expect to stand by us in an
emergency.
I can't. follow that line of reasoning, especially in view of the past
record of the United States.
We started out at the end of World War II with the sole and
exclusive possession of the atomic bomb, the ability to blow any na-
tion off the map and a nyhody else if We wanted to if we were war--
minded. Nobody else had it. We offered to give it up to an inter-
national agency to get out of the atomic business, to turn over all
fissionable materials to an international agency; all we asked was that
reit sonal de inspect i o ; , reasonable assurance, w out be given that;
the international agency would have control and that no nation would
cheat on this obligation.
Never in the history of the world, as far as I know, has a nation,
possessing the exclusive ;ibility and the exclusive power to destroy
any other nation in the. world, have they ever given that up or offered
to give it; up voluntarily.
We go from that step by step with vast amounts of money, with all
kinds of humanitarian oilers, with all kinds of peaceful offers, with.
all kinds of peaceful efforts in the world and I just want to make
my position clear; we have stated we are not going to ov;erfly Russia,
at least, so far as President Eisenhower's administration is concerned,
wit h. 13-2's?that has beeil stopped. If we did continue it sometante.
in the future in the. interests of the security of this country; I think
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 153
the security of this country comes first in our responsibility, and we
must take whatever reasonable means we have and whatever calcu-
lated risks that may be involved in order to secure essential informa-
tion and in order to secure and maintain our proper defensive posture.
I feel that very deeply and I am not questioning you about it.
You don't have to agree or disagree. I merely wanted to make
that statement in view of the fact that I don't agree that we have
continually to humble ourselves in the eyes of the world, because I
think it can do nothing but destroy the confidence, in many cases, that.
other Nations have in us if we continue to bow to the threats that
emanate periodically from the Kremlin, and we have had just as bad
threats in the past as this one. As I pointed out in my previous ques-
tions, where they said they have rockets pointed at our bases, they
have rockets on the pads pointed at other countries in Europe;
they know how many rockets they are going to put on Paris and
that they are going to bury us one way or another, and so on, and I
think there comes a time when even the world has to turn and stand
fast. That is all I have to say.
The CHAIRMAN. IS that all?
Senator ITICKENLOOPER. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?
[Deleted.]
The Senator's time is up.
The Senator from Ohio, any questions?
Senator LATJSCHE. No further questions.
KHRUSHCHEV'S CHANGING VIEWS ON A SUMMIT CONFERENCE
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I don't want to labor this too long,
but I am interested in your reasoning. I didn't get to finish that ques-
tion. Let me go back. Do you think when Chairman Khrushchev
was in the United States last September that at that time he had an
intention to have a summit conference?
Secretary GATES. I would only be speculating, Mr. Chairman. I
think he did.
The CHAIRMAN. I want to know what happened between then and
May 15, in your opinion, that caused him to take the firm decision
which you stated a moment ago you believe he had.
Secretary GATES. I really don't know the value of my opinion, Mr.
Chairman, but my opinion is that he has tried for many years to
divide our allies from us. He has tried to divide the NATO member-
ship in particular. He has resented the bases that surround his coun-
try, and he has had, I think, as a No. 1 objective the division of our
security and collective alliances. I think he found during this inter-
vening period that he couldn't make a dent in the solidarity and
unity of these relationships, that he couldn't get anybody to change
their -position on Berlin. He found the British and the French and
the United States stalwartly together on that subject, and that he
found the NATO alliance in good shape and strong, and that he was
going to run into a position where he would make no progress, and
as someone else has remarked, I believe, during this testimony, he
would probably lose some face at home if he couldn't make any
progress.
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154 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
1 I N CI DI: NT'S EFFECT ON 511 NTATIT CONFERENCE
(1!TAIRAIA N. 1)0 you think he would have refused to participate
if there had been no I j 2 incident?
Sk,crel :try li'A'rEs. IChink he Inould have -again, we must only
Hpeculat e, Senator--I h ink he would have probably employed ta,ctics
t hat would have ruined the summit from within.
The ClIAIRMTAN. hut you think he would have participated ?
Secretary CrATEs. I think he would have participated and found
ot ler mecha n ism Of dest Toying it,.
II >eleted.]
'The el [AIRMAN. ).1 r. 'Mlles testified that the Air Force gave CIA
weal her forecasts that More helpful to the 13-2, operat ion; is that cor-
rect ?
Secret a ry 'nal is correct.
l >Meted.]
Ov" WU Mt 'ATARI' PREPAREDNESS
`Hie (..1 FAIRAI A N. \Vltai in ference from Soviet, military preparedness
can properly be din wit from the incident?
Secretary GATES. This, pieced together and repeated and associated
with other sources of intelligence builds up, un folds a story that defi-
nitely disclosed a military posture.
It, builds up a story t hat gives you a judgment on a capability for
a surprise attack. It gives you a judgment on important installations.
It g,ves you some judgment on production. It gives you some judg-
mem on logistic backup and actual military sites, so that, I would say
it gave you a very definite look-see at their military posture.
The CI !AIRMAN. 1_,.! it possible for you to give us a judgment? Was
his preparation and strength very impressive ? Was it, greater than
you had expected ?
Secretary 0kTES. :owing into two recent jobs I have had, which is
the first lute I was over involved in this, T would say that it impressed
the., Senator.
The CitAIRMAN. In other words, the result of your overflights and
lie information you got, has given you a better appreciation of their
niilit ary strength and that appreciation is that they are very well
armed?is that correct?lietter than you expected ?
Secretary GATES. In some ease, yes. In some case, perhaps less well
than they advertised.
EFFEA OF Ml M M IT FAILURE ON U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS
The CH A IRIM AN. Does this failure of the summit and all that has re-
sulted from it give you any new ideas as to the level of expenditures
or programs re 66 icr to defense?
Secretary GATns. Not immediately, no, sir. But 1 believe I have
when I started to testify in January, I repeatedly stated we didn't
expect to have any sign i fieant or substantive concessions. We believed
there was a tactic on the part of the Soviet Union. We didn't know
so long long it, would last and we are not basing our military programs on
tI 5premise and I also said that we should keep them under continuous
review and as late as April we went back with it major revision in our
III ilitary progranis to the Appropriations Committees.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 155
I believe now we should continue this careful and continuous process,
and I have no desire right now to make any further recommendations
to the Congress. The Senate Appropriations Committee are about
to mark up the defense bill I believe next week or this week.
[Deleted.]
POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ALERT
The CHAIRMAN. One inference I wish you would comment on that
might have been drawn from the ordering of the test on May 15 is, I
believe: Would it be fair to draw the inference that you had any
doubt about the readiness of our Armed Forces.
Secretary GATES. No, sir, but it is a very good move and we should
do it more frequently to have a no-notice alert communications and
command readiness test, and we hope to do this, I say we started one
again last night which has been long planned, it is going to be about a
7- or 8-day exercise.
The CHAIRMAN. It has been long planned.
DECISION TO ORDER ALERT
Was the one on the 15th long planned ?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. When did you first think of doing that?
Secretary GATES. There was another one planned for about that
period of time, as a matter of fact, I made the decision to do this
myself.
The CHAIRMAN. After you arrived in Paris?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that that might have been construed
as a provocative act under the circumstances that then existed in
Paris?
Secretary GATES. No, sir, it was made after midnight on Sunday
night. It was not intended nor was it worded as a provocative mes-
sage. The first word in it was "Quiet," and the last words in it were
"minimum need to know."
It was not meant as provocative. It was not meant as either an
offensive or defensive alert.
In fact it was not issued as such. If we were going to go on that
kind of an alert we would have had a higher degree of readiness than
the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued.
The CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean you intended it as such. Don't you
think reasonable people might have regarded it as a provocative act?
Secretary GATES. I think reasonable people would have regarded
it as a prudent act.
The CHAIRMAN. But not as a provocative act?
Secretary GATES. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. We have a member here who has
just come in. Would you care to ask any questions, Senator
Humphrey?
Senator HUMPHREY. Can I follow up on two or three of yours?
The CHAIRMAN. You have 10 minutes to do as you please.
[Deleted.]
64i2-6O---i1
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156 EVENTS INCH) EN`1"1:0 THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
OVERFLIGHTS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL
Senator Hum-1-'11nm% Do you think it was essential to have over-
flights in order to gain the kind of information that is supposed to
have been gained in meet it months ?
Secretary GATES. Yes ; this was by :a1 means our best information.
Secretary Humnittatv. Well, it might be your best information.
Secretary GATEs. Yes : I think it was essential ; yes; i do.
[Deleted.]
S( 'MT AIRCRAFT ACTIVITIES
Senator Itummin-ry. Have we ever shot down an-,} Soviet aircraft
t hat ilaye ever been over American territory ?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
Senator Humrintny. Have we shot down any Sot: jet aircraft that
have been over areas where we have some military responsibility ?
Secretary GATES. Not, to my knowledge.
Senator Humm int.y. Not over Korea; Japan ?
Seerettuy GATES. YOU mean in peacetime?
Senator Hu MPIIIZE Y. 'Well, in the armistice period.
Seeretary GATES. No, sir; not to my knowledge.
Senator 1 IiJMLIiREY. We have not?
Secret ary GATES. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Senator HILVIPHREY. I had been informed once that we had, and
that is why I had asked the question.
Secretary GATES. Maybe we ought to qualify this. There has been
speculation that "volunteers" have flown aircraft that have been shot
down. These volunteers may have been Soviet, but, as far as I know,
any identified as a Soviet aircraft has not been shot down.
Senator HUMPHREY. Has the Soviet Union protest ed to the United
States because of ail attack on our part on Soviet aircraft ?
Secret ary GATES. I can't answer that question, Senator, because
:nay knowledge is that t hey have not. I don't think they have. No;
I don't think so, sir.
Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have reason to believe that the so-called
volunteers might very well have been a little less than -volunteers, pos-
sibly engaged actively iii Soviet espionage ?
Secretary GATES. Well, there has been sort of a technique evolving
over a period of time, in various places of the world where volunteers
have peared and we have always been a little apprehensive about'
them.
Senator HUMPHREY. Just a little?
Secretary GATEs. No, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator HUMPHREY. That is all.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley?
Senator WILEY. None.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?
Senator MORSE. I have a few more, Mr. Secretary, pursuing the
same line, of questioning I was pursuing before.
The President the other night in his speech to the Nation indicated
very clearly that a nuclear war would prodnee devastation upon all
part i ci pants.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO `ME SUMMIT CONFERENCE 157
POSSIBILITY OF A GENERAL WAR
Going back to my hypothetkal, assuming that we should fly a spy
plane out of some foreign base and assuming that the Russian air mar-
shal makes good on his threat and strikes that airbase with Russian
missiles and starts a general war, do you think we could win it
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator MORSE. You think we could destroy Russia and have enough
of the United States left so that we could remain a power?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; because in this case he would, by initiat-
ing this attack, give considerable warning to our retaliatory forces
and with that warning, we would move in.
Senator MORSE. Your view then is that the United States could win
a nuclear war?
Secretary GATES. If it is started under those circumstances.
[Deleted.]
Senator MORSE. Do you think that the Russian military are aware
of the fact that we could win a nuclear war if they started that war
by simply sending a missile to one air base from which a spy plane
might fly?
Secretary- GATES. I think theyare well aware of it.
Senator MORSE. Do you think then that if he kept his threat of
sending a missile to a foreign air base from which a spy plane might
be flown, he probably would go much further than that and send mis-
siles elsewhere and if he knows it is going to lead to a general war,
start a complete general war?
Secretary GATES. I think he would have to.
Senator MORSE. In your opinion, could we win that war?
Secretary GATES. Well, we could do what we call in the military,
prevail in general war, but there would be great damage to the United
States.
Senator MORSE. There would be terrific mutual destruction in a
general war?
Secretary GATES. Yes; terrific damage.
Senator MORSE. Therefore--
Secretary GATES. But everything depends, Senator, on a lot of fac-
tors. If you vary any part of the equation you vary the answer. In
other words, time of warning, reliability of missiles, ability to fire .ft
salvo of missiles worldwide against deployed and -U.S. forces at home
and abroad. These factors and the accuracies of these weapons?any
one piece of this equation varies the answer.
INTERPRETATION OF PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS ON SUSPENSION OF U-2
FLIGHTS
Senator MORSE. Therefore, referring most respectfully to Senator
llickenlooper's observation, do you think that we would be showing a
sign of weakness, that we would be guilty of appeasement, that we
would be surrendering to threats if we removed any doubt in the
world at the present moment by notifying the world that we have no
intention of using military aircraft espionage tactics henceforth either
by CIA, by NASA, by the Defense Establishment or by any other
agency of the American Government?
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158 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secretary GATEs. Well, I wouldn't know quite how to answer your
question, Senator, because maybe some of us that live o close to these
things have a different, understanding than the public, has. It is so
clear in my mind t hat the President has made a commitment not to
thy these airplanes during his administration that I believe that the
question becomes hypothetical, and I believe if it is clear to other
people as it is to me that this is so, then it would be, I believe, stepping
ii p to a threat. But if it, is not clear, and I an incorrect. in this, then.
think we ought to take a look at it.
Senator MoRsE. l am so anxious to see to it that we make it crystal
clear because I am very much concerned about world reaction to our
present posit ion. I hink we are living in the moment now where we
can stop an adverse world reaction, and I think we are living in a
moment where thieve is great, danger that a substantial segmeni of
world opinion is going io go against us, unless we are willing to make
cryst al clear that, we are not going to, through any agency If our
'Government, resort to aircraft espionage, because we :ire dealing here
when we are dealing with espionage, as you so very well, 1 think,
described it yourself, with a form of activity that is a pretty ugly
business.
Socretftry GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator MoasE. .1.nd we all know that it, isn't based on principles
41f I ci it It. In espionage, yciu do what is nec.essary to protect y(Air
country, iticluding. deception and engaging in immoral acts. [De-
leted.]
Now, I don't think -we, humble ourselves. Jo the contrary, I. think
we, put, them on flak defensive in world opinion if we say to the world :
Listen, we want the Ittissians to understand that they are going to have to
;,1..;sunie full responsibility for any starting of a war. We have said and e re-
peat to the world that we have no intention of using aircraft in espionage work
over foreign territory.
Volt think it is perfectly clear. I have just come from across tIme
country and I can give you assurance that it isn't in my j udg,anent
clear in American public opinion today, and you have really got a
seautent of public opinion in this country that wants that assurance
from the, Presid.ent, because they take note of the fact that, in his
speech the other night he wasn't even as definite as he was at Paris
in regard to this matter.
NEED FOR AS .41RA NCE OF CESSATION OF AIR4 R.F 1ESPItuNAGE
Secretary GATES. Senator, under the American tradition: :I would
say hat the President says he isn't going to overfly Russia during
his administration, any circumvention of that statenient would not be
in cliaracter with either the President or our country. To me, it is
completely clear, but I respect your judgment.
Senator MORSE. I may be completely wrong. My only point is that
we can afford, it seems to me, as a Nation that does seek peace, to re-
assure the world as many times as that When assurance might help the
muse, of peace, and in doing so I don't think we humble ourselves.
To the contrary, [ think we put Russia on the defensive. Ti will help
us in my judgment to win the so-called battle of propaganda for
peace and strengthen its in getting these issues into the United Nations.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 159
Of course I would say this. I think the President is to be commended
for making clear in Paris that he is suspending 17-2 flights?that is
What he said; U-2 flights.
I think he is to be commended for that, and I hope that those who
seek to replace him will give the world assurance immediately that
when any one of them is elected President that will be their policy,
too, because if all this is a. moratorium for a few months, it is not
going to strengthen America's position in world opinion. They want
to know whether or not this is (ming to be the policy of the United
States, because, in my judgment, if you continue espionage work by
way of aircraft, you are going to lose the world opinion in southeast
Asia, Latin America, and Africa, the opinion of which America has
got to win in the decades ahead to survive, because if that part of
the world goes against us, it is only a matter of a few decades before
we will cease, in my judgment, being a Nation.
You have got to win to the cause of .freedom those hundreds of
millions of people, and you are not going to do it in my judgment if
you let Khrushchev get by with a propaganda drive now that we are
the ones that are committing a form of aggression by carrying out an
espionage program. We don't like to face up to it but in my judgment
that is croin.gto be the verdict of those people.
The CAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.
Senator Gore?
SECRETARY GATES' PARTICIPATION IN ISSUANCE OF STATEMENTS
Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I understood you to say that the
decision on the 9th that the President should assume full responsibility
was a unanimous decision. Did I correctly understand you?
Secretary GATES. The statement that was issued was a unanimous
paper. I think I am answering you yes.
Senator GORE. I wanted to give you an opportunity to affirm that,
and you so do now.
You. did not participate, I believe you told me, or you told the com-
mittee, in any conference between the 5th and the 9th.
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Senator GORE. So you did not participate in a conference or in a
communication between the Department of State, the President at
Gettysburg, or otherwise, with anyone regarding the issuance of the
statement which was issued on the 7th by Mr. Herter?
Secretary GATES. No, I did not.
Senator GORE. Which partially acknowledged the mission of the
plane.
Secretary GATES. That is correct. I had no participation in that
in any way.
Senator GORE. I believe that concludes my questions, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?
NIIRUSTICIIEVIS ATTITUDE FOLLOWING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES
Senator LAUSCHE. I want to explore a bit the course of conduct
taken by Khrushchev after his visit to the United States, concerning
his attitude especially on West Berlin and West Germany. Isn't it
a fact that following his visit to the United States, there was shown
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160 .NVENTS IN Cl DE NT TO THE SUMMIT CONFER E NCE
by him a conciliatory att dude for a period of about a month or two?
Are you able to answer that?
Secretary GATES. My impression is about the same its \lours. Sen-
ator, that there was sort, 4d a tone of cot 'ciliation in the air.
Senator LAITSCHE. We have had before this committee. the Ant-
arctic Treaty that has been recommended.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senatorl,miscrw. lint was signed hv the Soviet and I w the I.Tnited
States.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator LA USCI I E. And that, I think, was last December 1. And
there was progress nui(le. or a period on the matter of ha 'ming nuclear
tests.
Secretary GATES. Y es: there was progress made.
Senator LAuscnn. In fact, there was more progress made, during
that period than there 'find been at any other time, on that, subject.
Secretary GATEs. I think that, would be fair to say, that it looked
more hopeful.
Senator LAESCHE. On November 14 in a speech Rh rush c hev brutally
attacked Adenauer and the German Republic.
Secretary GATES. r Fen iember the speech.
Senator LAusonE. You remember that speech?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator LAuscriE. And there was some, speculation iii the minds of
the people in our Government as to what, his purpose was in making
that attack when ostensibly there was to be a conference to reach some
agreement on West Germany and Berlin.
Now than, on December 1, he began repeating his threats that he
would sign a, separate peace treaty wit h East ( ermany. Is it not, a
fact that his attack inapt Adenauer and upon the German Republic
and his purpose to sign a separate peace treaty, was confirmation of
the immovable posit ion lie took before he niet at Camp David about
lArest Berlin and East Germany?
Secretary GATE,s. Yes; I think it was. 1 think his position was well
advertised, and. we felt in the I)epartment of Defense that we were
living under a threat of a separate peace treaty at drat lime.
Senator LAITscit E. Then he has the Baku speech of April 25 in which
he gave a, harsher version of what he had been saying for months
about East Berlin, West Berlin, and the German -Republic. That is
in April, pretty close to May 16, and then we have those. circumstances
it which you point oni that, he, had a translated paper originally
written in Russian into Elwell translation so that he gave it to-- --
Secretary GATEs. Ih?
Senator .LAUSCITE. De Gaulle. How did he present his paper to
Macmillan?
Secretary GivrEs. Aly understanding, Senator, was that he didn't
leave a paper with -Macmillan. He talked from the same paper and
it, was translated through all interpreter to Macmillan verbally. This
is my understanding.
Senator LAuscun Isn't it also a. fact that during all of this time and
especially in the several months preceding the conference, the sup-
posed Con ferenc.e. the four powers stated that there wonld be no yield-
on West. Berlin. md our rights in West, Berlin?
Secretary GATES. Thal IS right.
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KHRUSIICHEV'S SUMMIT CONFERENCE AIMS
Senator LAUSCHE. In your opinion, what was the primary thing that
he was aiming for in the conference? I am speaking of Khrushchev.
Secretary GATES. You mean when he- agreed to go to a, summit
conference?
Senator LAUSCHE. And down to the end.
Secretary GATES. I testified that I think he thought he would have
his way and make some peace treaty in Berlin with some kind of give
on the part of our allies and our allies refused to give.
REASONS FOR REVOKING INVITATION TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
Senator LAUSCHE. All right. Now then, have you given any
thought to why he revoked the invitation to the President to come to
the Soviet laud?
Secretary GATES. Well, again we speculate but in my opinion the
last thing he wanted was for the President to travel around his coun-
try and be acclaimed and received by the population of Russia.
Senator LAusonE. Do you think that he had flashes in his mind
about the acclaim that Nixon got in Poland, and in other places?
Secretary GATES. He probably did.
Senator LAUSCHE. And do you think that he kind of thought that
there would be demonstrations for the President of the United States
by the Russian people unparalleled anywhere?
Secretary GATES. I believe there would have been.
Senator LAusonE. That is my honest conviction, that he did not dare
have the President meet the Ukrainian people and the normal Russian
people, excluding the Communists, in that trip to the Soviet and that
is why the invitation was revoked.
Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield?
Senator LAUSCHE. I yield.
POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ON KIIRUSIICHEV'S
THINKING
Senator WILEy. I think there are some other facts there that fit
into the picture that you have very dramatically given us.
Do you remember after he came to America he went back and he
canvassed individually the various heads of the various states, and
then he made a trip out east and he met Mao Tse-tung?
It was after that that he made that Baku speech. He made several
other speeches, and if you remember, the papers were pretty well filled
with the thoughts that the Chinese Communists were telling him, and
that at the time that he did go to Paris, that conditions were such that
the evidence indicated the Chinese were in Russia. Now all this
bolsters the conclusion that the Secretary has made, that it wasn't the
I1-2 incident. That was just something that he got hold of as an
ostensible reason.
The other was that he couldn't get his way and that, I understand, is
your position.
Senator LAUSCHE. I have nothing more to ask you. Thank you
very much, Mr. Gates.
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162 EVENTS IN CI DEN T TO THE SUMMIT CONFT FIEN CE
[TEE( 'IF Or DENIAL t )vr( atTIT NI TY FOR PRESIDENT TO VI S IT SOVIET ONION
Senator Goux. If the Senator would yield, I would like to observe
that. I was in the Far East at the time President Eisenhower made his
visit to India and other countries, and there was i tremendous favor-
able reception. It served, the cause of our country magnificently well.
I lii ink it is a great loss 10 us that the President has been denied
the opportunity to visit hi the Soviet Union. It would have, in my
view, lieen a great, eentribution. He is unquestionably a great, exem.-
plary influence for America, and I agree with you, Senator liausche
and Senator Wiley. that, the denial of the opportunity of this visit is
great loss to us.
I do not know whether Mr. Khrushchev wanted it or did not want
. :Everyone can draW his own conclusions there.
T wish now that, the exchange visit. had been arrang;ed before the
Hammitt conference. Perhaps we would have had a different result.
Senator LA ETSCITE. Mr. Chairman, I would like -to ask a question.
The Ci [AIRMAN. The witness would. like to make a comment.
P RES I DEN T EI SE, N DON\ R'S DIG NITY AND CHARACTER AT PARIS MEET] NG
Secretary tir'Arrrs. I want to make a comment I sort of feel like utak-
ng, Mr. (Thai rman. I think you know about this because you were
here. I think everyone should be terribly proud of the dignity and
eharact-,er of the President in this Paris meeting.
I happened to he sitting next to hint and it was a most remarkable
twrfori [lance of strength of character and dignity of any man I have
ever seen.
Senator GORE. Y,)1i might be interested to 1010M, that if immediately
1,)ok I lie floor and expressed such views, and I do not believe you will
find any member of I his committee has criticized the President's con-
duct while in Paris.
Secretary GATES. I am sure of that. The puroose of my remarks
i.vas not intended to do anything but just make a statement. I know
lie has had remarkable support of not only the Congress and this coun-
it-y, but of all of our allies too, the NATO meeting that followed the
'itris meeting was it remarkable meeting.
X)NCILITDING REMARKS
The CIIA1IflfAN. .1s that all, gentlemen?
Senator WILEY. 3 want, to express what, you usually do, the appre-
ciation of the committee for the fine work of the Secretary here this
morning.
Senator LAusenn. I did want to go into this speech of Senator Dodd
ere he points out how Communists took charge in the organizing
of the meeting in New York of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear
But I am not, going to go into it.
The CHAIRMAN. r. Secretary, 1 want to thank you for your -very
i`rank and candid responses and for the patience that von have shown
itt beariter with the committee in asking these questions. I think you
have made a very useful record for the benefit of the committee, and
.1 think we understand what, has gone on much better than we did be-
fore you mine up here, and I hope that the record, as censored by the
1)tiolitir authorities, will not, in any way embarrass you.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 163
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary GATES. I hope not, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, before concluding the hearing I
would wish to express to you my personal appreciation for the dig-
nity, intelligence, and discretion and the courage you have displayed
and statesmanship during the course of this hearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
cHALmEns ROBERTS' CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Senator GORE. Now I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the
record a chronology of events which I found exceedingly well done by
Mr. Chalmers Roberts.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is SO ordered.
(The chronology referred to follows:)
[From the Washington Post, May 27, 1960]
CHRONOLOGY OF U-2 INCIDENT TRACED IN TANGLED WEB or SUMMIT DISPUTE
WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE?
(By Chalmers M. Roberts)
Who was responsible for the incredible assortment of conflicting statements
and contradictory assertions when the Eisenhower administration was con-
fronted with the 17-2 spy plane crisis?
This is the most immediate question in the tangled web of the U-2 affair
and the subsequent collapse of the Summit Conference in Paris. What follows
is a detailed examination of the facts about the Administration's handling of
the 15-2 case.
It should be noted beforehand, however, that there are other important parts
?41?10' to the whole story: The apparent public hardening of American policy toward
the Soviet Union prior to the 13-2 affair ; Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's
reaction to that hardening; Khrushchey's reactions to the American accounts of
the U-2 case; and the internal Soviet pressures on Khrushchev, before and
after the spy plane was downed, because of his year-old policy of trying to do
business with President Eisenhower.
Whether or not Khrushchev would have scuttled the Summit, had there been
no U-2 incident, is not now clear; there are divided opinions in the Adminis,
tration on that. A good many diplomats do tend to agree with what President
Eisenhower said to the congressional leaders yesterday?that Khrushchev
may have scuttled the conference because he was under "pressure by the
Stalinists," those in Moscow suspicious of any dealing with the West, "and the
Chinese" Communists who have openly disagreed with Khruslichey's
But that question is only indirectly related to the handling of the U-2 affair
by the Eisenhower Administration.
The chief figures in the U-2 drama in Washington were President Eisenhower,
Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary C. Douglas Dillon, Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Chief Allen W. Dulles and White House Press. Secretary
James C. Hagerty.
It is evident from the record that much of the confusion sprang from the
fact that no one acted in supreme authority in directing the Administration's
actions.
Here is the chronological record as far as it is known today:
May 1.?The 15-2 flight of pilot Francis G. Powers took place on this date
because of a clear weather forecast. That forecast also indicated that such
good weather probably would not be repeated for some weeks; that is, until
after the Summit Conference, then 2 weeks off. CIA officials say the equip-
ment carried by Powers, including the tiny poison needle, is standard equipment
carried by all Strategic Air Command crews. It is designed to help a crewman
escape if downed in enemy territory. Powers never was ordered to use the
needle to avoid capture; it was for use to avoid torture, if captured, according
to CIA officials. The pistol was not for murdering Russians but for shooting
small game, it is contended.
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164 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Second flight
The day of Powers' flight, there was a Second U-2 flight from Turkey. This
was a meteorological flight outside the Soviet Union, the kind of flight the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration unwittingly thought all U-2's were
making. NASA was, of course, the "cover' for the clandestine flights over the
Soviet Union.
These penetrations of Soviet air space had been going on for four years with
results highly gratifying to Ameriean intelligence officials. There had been a
great many of these flights and the Powers mission was not the :first designed to
cross the Soviet Union. Others had succeeded when he failed.
So detailed were the protographs brought back by the IT-2s that at one time
the State Department's Policy Planning Staff considered a proposal to show them
to Khrushchev. The idea was to use them in an effort to break down his resist-
ance to inspection and control for various disarmament schemes.
The proposal was re;iected, however, partially on the grounds that Khrushchev
already knew of the flights and that such a move might lead him to make such a
public row that they would have to be discontinued.
Cutoff planned
CIA officials contend that there was to be a cutoff of 11-2 flights before the
Summit, that the question was how much time constituted a margin of safety.
Nevertheless, the Powers mission was permitted to take place two weeks before
the Summit. In his speech on Wednesday the President implied he fully ap-
proved of that.
Mr. Eisenhower said that, as to complaints over the timing of the flights so
close to the Summit, "there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed." By im-
plication, he meant there was no reason to cancel the flight because of the im-
pending conference with the Russians.
However, this has not always been the President's policy. In September, 195(,
in the midst of the Sues crisis negotiations with the Russians as well as the
Egyptians?the President did order a halt to the U-2 flights. Then he apparently
wanted to avoid an iniddent which would make negotiation more difficult.
There is no evidence, however, that the President was aware beforehand of
this particular flight or that either the State Department or the CIA thought his
specific approval necessary. He had delegated authority for the flights, once hav-
ing approved the entire U-2 scheme following Soviet rejection of his "open skies"
plan at the 1955 Geneva Summit conference.
May 1-4.?During this period the CIA and the State Department knew that
Powers was missing; ihey hoped he had crashed and that pilot and plane had
left no tell-tale evidence. The initial confusion over the missing plane, as to
whether it was Power: or tin' legitimate met eorologica I flight in Turkey the same
day, was soon clearer mi. There is no evidence that the Administration laid
oat any plan of how to it:11)01e the possible disclosures later fatale by Khrushchev.
.:11-ny horn been misled.
The Administration may have been misled into thinking Khrushchev would
remain silent because id' Sm jet action over the expected visit ti the United States
of tin' hogs of the Soviet Air Force, Air Marshal K. A. Vershinin.
On May 2 the Soviets: asked for a 45-hour postponement of he announcement
the visit. BM on May 4 hey agreed to a joint United States-Soviet announce-
ment and it was made that day. The visit was canceled on May 13 after Kbru-
shchev's Us2 disclosure.
On May 3 it, was aanommed from Istanbul, Turke: that a single-engine Air
Force plane was missing near Lake Van, not far from the Sm let border. It was
described as a high all limb, research plane belonging to NASA.
The report said the Mane was one of two which had taken gift from the United
States base at incrilik near Adana. Turkey, on a weatlier reconnaissance mission.
The other plane returned safely but the pilot of the missing craft was said to
have reported his oxygen equipment was out of order.
Stantla ra .story
This was the standard sett of "cover" story for the missing U-2. issued in the
Ropes that it would suffice. It was not known here whether Powers' U-2 went
down or why. To this date, in fact, there is only Khrushehev's word that it was
downed near Sverdlovsk, deep inside the Soviet Union.
May 5.- -Khrushchev timmuneed to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow the bare de-
tails -of the U-2 flight, deliberately (he said later) withholding information
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 165
which would have let Washington know that Powers was alive and that much
of his equipment had been captured intact. He set a trap into which the Eisen-
hower Administration fell.
In his Wednesday speech, Mr. Eisenhower contended that the "covering state-
ment," as he called it, was imperative "to protect the pilot, his mission, and our
intelligence processes at a time when the true facts were still undetermined."
On May 5 Secretary Herter was in Athens, en route home from a NATO for-
eign ministers conference in Turkey. In charge of the State Department was
Under Secretary Dillon.
Dillon's responsibility
Under the President's delegation of authority, it was Dillon's responsibility
for what next occurred until Herter's return late on May 6. It was on May 5
and 6 that the administration allowed itself to be entangled in a series of lies
about the U-2.
When newsmen went to Press Secretary Hagerty for comment on Khrushchev's
speech, Hagerty was careful to say only that the President did not know of the
news story about the speech.
News of the speech arrived here just after the President had left by helicopter
for a National Security Council meeting at a secret hideout, part of a civil de-
fense exercise. There is no evidence on whether the President at that meeting
discussed what to do about the Khrushchev disclosure. The subsequent record
Indicates that he left it to Dillon and the State Department.
State Department spokesman Lincoln White, who received his instructions
personally from Dillon, said that "it may be" that the plane Khrushchev referred
to was the missing so-called NASA aircraft. It was also announced that the
President had ordered an immediate inquiry into Khrushchev's accusation.
Trouble convpounded
This semi-lie was aggravated by NASA's press chief, Walter T. Bonney. Un-
aware that NASA was being used as a "cover" for the spy flights, Bonney said
at a press conference that the plane was on a wholly peaceful mission. He gave
details of the plane's Adana take-off, its route within Turkey and the pilot's
alleged report of his oxygen trouble. The Administration's story thus was that
a peaceful flight outside Soviet borders might have by accident transgressed the
Soviet-Turkish border.
There is no evidence that the President or Dillon, or anyone else in authority
in the Administration, took charge of the whole affair and told NASA to say
nothing. There have been subsequent hints from the White House, however,
that some such order went out to NASA but was overlooked or disregarded. The
record here is not clear.
May 6.?In Moscow it was claimed the U-2 was shot down by a rocket on
Khrushchev's personal order, but other details still were withheld. However,
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko termed the American explanation
"nonsense."
"Full facts" asked
The State Department said it was asking the "full facts" in Moscow. White,
still acting under Dillon's orders, declared that "there was absolutely no?n-o?
deliberate attempt to violate the Soviet airspace." The lie thus was compounded.
Around dinner time Herter arrived home from Greece to take charge of the
State Department.
The strongest evidence that the handling of the U-2 affair was left by the
President to the State Department?first to Dillon, then to Herter?comes from
Vice President Richard M. Nixon. On a May 15 television show Nixon gave this
explanation, putting part of the blame for the fumbling on the insistent demand
of newsmen for the facts:
"Now, let's look at the problem with which our people in the State Department
were confronted when this information developed. They did not know at the
outset what the Soviet Union knew. They did not know that the pilot had been
recovered and that they had obtained information from him or otherwise which
made it imperative we acknowledge that these flights had taken place.
Alternative question
"Now, some would say then, 'well, why then didn't we keep our mouths shut
and say nothing and wait until we found out what they knew?'
"And here again we have the problem of the open society. We have newsmen
in Washington. The newsmen descended upon the State Department and other
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166 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
officials in great numbers, They had a right to. And they asked for the in-
formation. What about this? And, so under the circumstanees, it was felt that
he host thing to do was to engage in effect, in what -usually is engaged in where
so-en lied espionage mai\ ities are undertaken, evasive actions?evasive actions,
mo as to protect the pilot in the event that he had been captured and also evasive
tuitions so as to give the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrusheliev, for example, an oppor-
(Amity to accept the consequences of this flight without nffinit ling as he has had
to admit that it had been conducted for espionage purposes."
Itir in the sancl Program Nixon added that "they had to make a snap de-
cision at the moment and it proved that?it turned out that that decision was
wrong and in these kinds of activities, we, of course, want to try to avoid mis-
takes if we elm."
Mier(' tee,
Nowhere in i lip three-and-a-half-hour television progratit did Nixon refer to any
rest Ii (Ii reel in the U-2 crisis, other than his at of the flights
moult, years earlier. \ W as their any reference to his iiiwn part in the affair.
Nixon, of eourse, sits in the National Security Council.
Nixon itul say that he wits "privy" to the U-2 reconnaissance policy "and 1 do
endorse it." fle.a18o suiti, that ''l knew about this flight
On Friday afternoon. May the President went, to his Gettysburg, PH., farm
r a weeii.ond :if rest at golf. He did 1101 return to WIlgilington in til SundaY,
MayS tint ilf` was ill I 4-'14'0011e COMM1111hiill ion with I Ler or daring the weekend.
lIagerty, who acoomponied the President to Gettysburg, also talked by phone to
Herter.
Ihty '7. -Kbrustiche in a second :Moscow speech on the disclosed the
ti liii 015 aliro And to t king atilt that much of his equipment had been captured
iii iii, Khrushchevi showed the Supreme Soviet photos taken froln the U-2 of
Sovii t. military inst a llo t ions and he detailed the plane's equipment.
riencicai aIrs-ni a than
Amori it Iii?oiceived the speech in the morning. Washington time,
knew Eli' ishcliev that was genuine /1[14 that some of it
qadd irtv, ? 'mat- only 1' t'on Powers himself.
Kininshetiev quoted Hagerty as saying that "the President in his opinion,
knew nothing about He incident. involving the Amerietiii plane. I fully admit
Khriuslailitiv Mot the President did not know that a plane was sent be-
yond Hie Soviet frontier and did not return."
The Khi ushelier spt resulted in a series of all-day co/de-rot WE'S in which the
elder figures Wi'l'e pl11011, A110'l Dulles and a number or lesser State
officials. imilialing Herter's adviser on Soviet affairs, Clio-tries
llohlen.
(nit of f us ratite a l0ilill11011 110(4i:4041 to tell the truth--but not all the truth.
'Ph' tlinner-hour Slit t. I Hqiiirt moat statement said that the Right referred to by
lichruslichey "wits probatily Hudertaken by an unarmed civilian 1---2 lama, "' *."
/flight jui4i/lco"
lit was just Hied iii fill' grounds 01 the need -to obtain information now
iionceiiiial behind the roil Curtain" to ieS'SOT1 the dangers I-of a surprise attack-
'ii the free world :ER and the United States in particular.
Cm the vritical 40' IOW v' is responsible for the flight., however, the state-
ment lied, it said thit "as a result of the inquiry ordered ity hue President, it
has tirein established that in as the authorities in Washington are con-
t Imro iv is no flp11 horization for any such flight as described by Mr.
K hrushehev."
Ii 1111hl rig this sit & OlitOla, chiefly the decision of Secretary Herter. tflose in-
volved were guided by a -number of considerations. They felt that Kbitiashchev
had the tividenee and therefore an admission was essential despite the earlier
as, Bat they were i raimed in a dilemma on the issue fir resoi7O1Sibility. "l'hey
ilecided it was best I. avoid admitting any responsibility by President Eisen-
hower even at the cosi of accepting the resultant inipression that Washington's
iondrol wit. s40 lax that American pilots around the world could go off on their
'\v'/14411 a mission that might provoke a war.
Dulles 761:lbw
)nri tigi the State Department deliberations Allen Dull 'smole it clear that he,
as head or CIA, was prepared to take full responsibility for the flight, that if the
4111F
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CON FERENCE 167
Administration wanted to pin the blame on him to avoid blaming the President,
he would .agree. But this idea was not accepted as being practical in view of
Khrushchey's disclosures.
Herter read the draft statement on the phone to the President in Gettysburg.
He approved it without changing a word.
In part, at least, Herter's decision to tell the lie that no one in Washington
authorized the flight also was based in the slim hope that somehow Khrushchev
would accept it. The Secretary and his aides had noted Khrushchev's acceptance
of what he had taken as Hagerty's disclaimer of any Eisenhower responsibility.
May 8?While the world assessed the seemingly incredible American admission
that the U-2 had indeed been on an espionage flight, President Eisenhower re-
turned to Washington and met with Herter at the White House.
Notes to Britain, France
The same day Khrushchev sent notes to Britain and France about the forth-
coming summit conference. In them he complained about the 11-2 but gave no
indication it would be used to wreck the conference as was to be the ease.
By- now Hagerty was alarmed at the implications of the admission statement,
implications that the President did not know what was going on. He was
insistent to Herter that this should somehow be eliminated. It is not clear
whether the President said the same thing to Herter directly but if he did there
would seem to have been no reason for IIagerty to do so.
May 9?After another State Department conference, Herter put out a state-
ment in his name saying that "penetration" by the U-2s of the Soviet Union had
been going on for four years, that this had been done by presidential orders
"since the beginning of his Administration" in order to gather intelligence. But
Herter added that "specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not
been subject to presidential authorization." This, at last, appeared to be the
truth.
Unaware of implication
This was the statement which left the implication that such 11-2 flights would
be continued over the Soviet Union. But there is reason to believe that none of
those involved at State Department was conscious of any such implication when
they drafted the statement. They took the view, shared by the CIA, that the
11-2 setup now was "a blown agent" to be discarded, that other intelligence
gathering methods would continue, however.
Nonetheless the implication was there and neither State nor the White House
did anything to correct it until the President himself told Khrushchev in Paris
a full week later that "these flights were suspended after the recent incident
and are not to be resumed."
The President said Wednesday he wanted no public announcement until he
met Khrushchev in Paris. American officials also claimed the flight suspension
was ordered the previous Thursday, May 12, which is at cross-purposes with the
claim that no implication of further flights was contained in Herter's May 9
statement.
Nixon unaware
Indeed, Nixon in his May 15 television appearance seemed unaware that the
flights had been cancelled. Ile then said:
"The first responsibility of the President of the United States * * * is to
protect the security of this country and of free peoples everywhere from the
devastation that would result from a surprise attack. Now, that is why these
flights were made in the first place. That is why an indication has been made
that such activities may have to continue in the future * * *"
Herter and Dulles appeared on May 9 before a specially arranged closed-door
Congressional leadership meeting. To at least some of those present Herter
left the clear implication that the flights would continue.
May 10.?The Soviet news agency, Tass, described Herter's statement as "a
frank attempt to legalize and justify violation of the state frontiers of other
nations for espionage purposes." A Soviet note to the United States avoided
blaming President Eisenhower personally but, in referring to the May 7 state-
ment by State, said it did "not correspond to reality." It charged that the 11-2
flights "are carried on with the sanction of the Government of the United States
of America."
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168 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
'Welcome doubted
May 11.?At an exhibition in Moscow of the U-2 wreckage and equipment,
Khrushchev said Herter's May 9 statement made him doubt "Our earlier conclu-
sion" that the President himself did not know of the flights. Be said he doubted
the President would be welcome in Russia during his scheduled June visit there.
When asked whether the U-2 incident would conic up at the Sunindt Confer-
ence, Khrushchev replied; "it is already the subject of worldwide discussion.
Therefore 1 believe there is no need to put it on the discussion schedule at the
Summit Conference."
The same day at his press conference here President Eisenhower took full
responsibility for the 1:-2 tights, said nothing to counter the implication that
they. would continue, remarked that "no one wants another Pearl Harbor."
May 12-44.?During this period Khrushchev went to Paris a day early, arriv-
ing on Saturday, May 14, Herter arrived on May 13 but there was no United
Slates-Soviet contact. On the 13th the Soviet Union sent protest notes to Nor-
way, Pakistan and Turkey warning against further use of their territory for
such missions as those of the U-2 which Khrushchev had claimed look off from
Pakistan with the expectation of landing in Norway.
On the 12th the United States sent a note to Moscow which said the United
States had "fully stated its position" about the U-2 incident in the May 9 Herter
statement.
By now President Eisenhower's responsibility for the U-2 flights, if not for the
specific Powers mi&sion, had been firmly established on the public! record.
.Way 15.- --The President arrived in Paris just before Khrrisheliev's call on
Prench President de Gaulle. The President considered Iwo possible moves in
this final day before the Summit Conference was to open : To ask for a bilateral
Meeting with Khrushchev and to announce publicly that no more flights would
Is! made.
But the President deeided against either step. He did so chiefly on the basis
of de Gaulle's report of the hard stand taken by Khrushchev in their talk that
morning. His aides told him they deduced from Khrusliebev's words with de
Gaulle that the Soviet leader had come to Paris bound by a prior Moscow deci-
sion by the ruling Presidimit, that he therefore could not be swayed by either
suggested Eisenhower move.
Allen statement
On this same day in Washington George V. Allen, chief of the U. S. Informa-
tion Agency, said on a television show that Herter "has not said that we are
going to continue to fly" U-2 missions, that "he hasn't said one way or another."
This statement surprised State Department officials who now say Allen was talk-
ing entirely on his own, that he had consulted nobody in advance.
May 16.---At the only Paris confrontation between President Eisenhower and
Khrushchev, the Soviet, leader said the United States had "torpedoed" the con-
ference. He demanded that the I'resident apologize for the flights, call off
ft rther flights and punish those responsible for Powers' mission, These were
the same demands of which he had informed de Gaulle the day before. He
charged the President with making "treachery" the basis of his policy toward
the Soviet 17nion.
To this the President responded by terming Khrushchev's demands an "ulti-
matum" which "would never be acceptable to the United States." He also told
Khrushchev that U-2 flights had been suspended and would not be resumed.
The two men parted in anger. The Summit had collapsed before it had begun.
srf':ECT't OF SENATOR DODD
Senator LAUSCHE. 1 would like to put into the record a copy of
Senator Dodd's speech describing how this meeting in New York, on
the phase sponsored by the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy but
.organized by Communists, was conducted.
The CH AIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.
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(The speech referred to follows:)
[From the Congressional Record, May 25, 1960, pp. 10234-102371
THE COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN MOVEMENT
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in his statement of January 22, J. Edgar Hoover
warned that Nikita Khrushchev's visit to this country had resulted in the
reinvigoration of the American Communist movement and that the FBI was
receiving increasing evidence of stepped-up Communist activities at many points.
Among other things, Mr. Hoover warned that non-Communist organizations
dedicated to causes that command popular support could expect Communist
efforts to infiltrate their ranks.
Evidence that has come into the hands of the Subcommittee on Internal
Security indicates that the Communist Party has made the nuclear test ban
movement the chief target of its infiltration operations. I think it important
that this evidence be placed before Congress and before the public so that we
may have a better understanding of the methods by which the Communists
operate and of the goals they seek to achieve. I should like to detail to you
some of the evidence of this infiltration, and to suggest the outline of a self-
defense program for all organizations whose purposes make them particularly
vulnerable to Communist infiltration.
I do not accept the thesis that if one happens to hold a position that enjoys
the support of the Communist Party on any issue, one is, ipso facto, either a
pro-Communist or a fellow traveler. The Communists are opposed to the poll
tax: does that make all people who oppose the poll tax Communists? The
Communists support the Forand bill. Does that make the many millions of
Americans who have endorsed the bill Communist sympathizers? Obviously not.
But on a foreign policy issue of overriding importance like the test ban, if a
legitimate organization adheres to a policy which coincides with Communist
policy, then it must be prepared to expect a concerted effort at infiltration by the
Communist termites. The more urgent the issue, the more respectable the
organization, the more illustrious the names on its letterhead, the greater the
temptation from the Communist standpoint.
The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy is headed by a group of nationally
prominent citizens about whose integrity and good faith there is no question.
Among them are people like Norman Cousins, of the Saturday Review, Mr.
Clarence Pickett of the American Friends Service Committee, Mr. Norman
Thomas, and so forth. They advocate a point of view which some of us consider
unrealistic or utopian, but it is, nevertheless, a significant point of view on an
issue of life and death importance. For the personal motivations of most of
those associated with the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy I have the most
sincere respect. The point of view they represent deserves a hearing?indeed,
it must be heard.
Last Thursday evening, May 19, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy held
a rally at Madison Square Garden in New York City. Many eminent persons
attended this rally. The speakers included Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Mr. Alfred
Landon, Mr. Walter Reuther, Gov. G. Mennen Williams, of Michigan, and Dr.
Harold Taylor, former President of Sarah Lawrence College. At this meeting,
the speakers urged that another summit meeting be convened for the purpose
of attempting to arrive at an agreement banning nuclear tests.
Because I esteem the sincerity of the original founders of the Committee for
a Sane Nuclear Policy and the sincerity of the speakers I have named, it was
for me an unpleasant duty to have to notify them that the unpublicized chief
organizer of the Madison Square Garden rally, Henry Alroms, was a veteran
member of the Communist Party; that there was also evidence of serious
Communist infiltration at chapter level throughout the Committee for a Sane
Nuclear Policy; that the Communist Party and its front organizations had done
their utmost to promote the meeting; that the Communists provided much of
the organizing machinery for the meeting because they planned to use it as
a pressure instrument in support of Soviet nuclear diplomacy.
This information was confirmed by the Subcommittee on Internal Security
only several days before the Madison Square Garden meeting was scheduled to
take place. Because I wished to be fair to all the decent and prominent people
who were associated with the meeting as sponsors or as speakers, I had some
doubt about the advisability of rushing into print with my information only
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170 EVENTS IN CI DE NT 'PO THE SUMMIT CONFE It ENC E
4S hours in advance of the rally. Instead, I decided to comunicate the informa-
tion, or at least certain essential portions of it, to Mr. Norman Cousins, the
chairman of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. Mr. 0011S:1'1S came to
Washington to see me and we had a long and frank discussion about the problem.
The directors of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, it turned out, had
some inkling of the existence of a Communist infiltration and were extremely
unhappy about it. When the Communist affiliations of the chief organizer of
the Madison Square Garden meeting were brought to Mr. Cousins' attention,
he immediately suspended the organizer in question. This was 2 days -before
Ii meeting. It is my understanding that the national committee of the organ-
tion intends to take some further measures against Communist infiltrators.
If I have any criticism to make, it is that the directors of the organization
have moved so slowly to confront the problem arid that the measures they
have taken have been inadequate. I was, for example, surprised to discover
that 0110 of the officers of. the committee, Mr. Norman Thomas, had, as early as
lost January, expressed seritais suspicion about the individual who later became
organizer of the Madison Square Garden meeting?but that no action had been
taken on Mr. Thomas' warning.
To me it is appalling that the Communists should be able to infiltrate and
manipulate a movement founded on sincere humanitarian and pacifist motiva-
tions, and headed by so many reputable citizens. Perhaps this is a situation in
which. remedial legisliC ion is indicated, a situation in which private citizens
mist have the assistance of Government to cope effectively with a movement that
operates by stealth and 'iry secrecy.
;n accorilance with the subcominittee'S mandate from the Senate, it was
clear that our duty required that we do everything in our power to get at the
facts. In presenting the information we have gleaned to the Senate, it is my
hoie that I will be able to do so in a manner that will avoid injury to the
ITO locellt and will point the way to a constructive course of action by Govern-
ni.ent and private organizations.
The test ban has for several years now been the chief objective of the Com-
monist propaganda apparatus. Of this there is ample documentary evidence.
in his speech before the congress of the Soviet Communist Party on January
27. Nikita Khrushebev, in his most militant rhetoric, called for it permanent
bait on nuclear tests.
The main political resolution adopted by the 17th congress of the Communist
Ps rty of the U.S.A., in February 19W) said :
"The demand that the administration end nuclear testing and ban the H-bomb
hos fmind a widening response in cont ill unity meetings, peace talks, petitions,
and. sermons from the pulpit,"
111 14'eli1tia1?y iii, Mitt en Communists foreign language newspapers took
inil-page advertisement in the New York Times and called on the President--
To proclaim the achievement of total, universal, and controlled disarma-
ment as the goal of National I T.S.
-2. To restore lthe moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons and to do
evirything in your power ti insure early agreement on the banning of all nuclear
tes s.
-3. To oppose the sharing of nuclear warheads with NATO allies."
'The rontrnittee for a Sane Nuclear Policy has not solicited the praise of the
0,oununist movement, and most of its leaders, I am certain, would be much
happier if they received no plaudits from Communist sources. The fact, never-
theless, remains that the committee in recent years has been the recipient of
consistent and generous praise from the Communist press. The Communist
ors:ari, New World Review, for April of this year, for example, carried these
paragraphs under the caption "Peace Groups in the United States":
"No amount of conspiratorial silence can wipe out the forces for disarma-
ment and peace; hut it can leave them isolated from each other and ignorant
of he efforts their fellows are making.
It is our purpose to bring to our readers' attention the main groups in our
country working toward these ends, beginning in this issue * * * with a descrip-
tion of the main nonsectarian national organization.
"N ATIONA L cOM AlITTEE FOR A SANE NUCLEAR POLICY
"SANE) offers a wide choice of channels for expression of the American peo-
ple's desire for a world without war. Under the co-chairmanship of Norman
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Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review, and Clarence Pickett, executive secre-
tary emeritus of the American Friends Service Committee, and with the sponsor-
ship and support of many noted Americans, SANE provides an elastic organiza-
tion and comprehensive program through which ordinary people can be effective.
"Local committees of SANE exist in many cities, towns, counties and small
communities throughout the United States. Their membership policy is flexible
and they generally welcome additions to their forces, whether for one particular
campaign or on a long-term basis."
Mr. President, to anyone who is familiar with the language of communism,
the paragraphs I have just quoted constitute a clear directive to members of the
Communist Party to enter into the ranks of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear
Policy. These paragraphs, I might point out, were not the haphazard product of
a novice or intellectual dilettante. They were written by the editor of the.
magazine, Jessica Smith, a hardened oldtime Communist.
As for the Madison Square Garden meeting, the Communist organ, the
Worker, in a series of its own advertisements, called upon all the Communists
faithful to turn out in strength. The masthead of the Worker for May 15
carried a banner headline "For Sanity in Foreign Policy?All Out to Madison
Square Garden, Thursday, 7 :45 pan."
Given this background, it was only natural to anticipate that the Communists
would attempt to find their way into the organizing mechanism of the meeting.
The name of the Communist Party member who served as chief organizer
of the Madison Square Garden meeting is Henry II. Abrams. As I have pointed
out, Mr. Norman Cousins suspended Mr. Abrams several days before the meeting,
when I brought the matter to his attention. Until the date of his suspension,
however, Mr. Abrams devoted virtually full time to the organization of the
meeting for many weeks. He did so, moreover, without remuneration.
On March 16, 1960, Mr. Abrams attended a meeting of the executive committee
of the Greater New York committee of the National Committee for a Sane
Nuclear Policy. Let me read just two sentences from the minutes of that meet-
ing, which clearly illustrates the central role this Communist agent has played:
"Dr. Lear reported that Gov. G. Mennen Williams has accepted our invitation
to speak at Madison Square Garden. Henry Abrams then gave the rest of the
Madison Square Garden report."
Henry Abrams' residence at 11 Riverside Drive, New York City, and his tele-
phone number of Trafalgar 4-7769, is the address and telephone number used
by the headquarters of the Upper Manhattan Sane Nuclear Policy Committee.
Abrams has served as an accountant for both the Upper Manhattan Committee
and the Greater New York Committee of the National Committee for a Sane
Nuclear Policy. From these facts it emerges that his association with the
Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy was a long and fairly prominent one.
Now let us look at Henry Abrams' Communist record.
In 1939, he resided at 972 East 14th Street, Brooklyn, N.Y. In that year he
signed a Communist Party nominating petition from that address which ap-
peared on page 4091 of the election records.
He was a member of the 11th Assembly District Club of the Communist Party
which met at 2744 Broadway, New York City. On Tuesday, February 15, 1944,
it was announced at a meeting of this Communist club that Henry Abrams
would give a class for Communists on the preparation of income tax forms.
Henry Abrams was a member of the Young Communist League and later of
the upper West Side section of the Communist Party of New York City. He has
been a consistent financial contributor to the Communist Party, U.S.A.
As recently as September 28, 1958, the official Communist Party newspaper, the
Worker, printed a letter from Henry Abrams endorsing the candidacy of Ben-
jamin Davis for State senator in the 21st senatorial district of New York City.
Benjamin Davis is national secretary of the Communist Party, and is, in fact, one
of the most notorious of native Communists, a fact which is well known to most
Americans. He was one of the leading members of the party convicted in the
famous Foley Square Smith Act trials of a dozen years ago. He spent several
years in jail for advocating the overthrow of the U.S. Government by force
and violence.
Mr. Abrams has served as an accountant for the American Communist Party,
for the Emergency Civil Liberties 'Committee, amid for the late Congressman
Vito Marcantonio.
Abrams has carried out Communist policies in many ostensibly non-Commu-
nist organizations which have, in fact, served as fronts for the Communist
56412 60 12
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172 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CO NTT HENCE
Party. Among the organizations promoted by the Communists in which he
has played an active role are the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, the
American Committee ft tr the Protection of the Foreign Born, the Hiroshima Com-
memorative Committee, the National Committee of the American Forum for
Socialist Education, the American Labor Party, the United Independent Socialist
Conference Committee.
I state all these things as facts, Mr. President. On Friday, May 13, Henry
Abrams was given the opportunity to deny them in a hearing of the Senate
Subcommittee on Internal Security. He invoked the fifth amenthnent in reply to
all questions regarding his years' long record of service to the Communist con-
spiracy.
The obvious and declared purpose of the Madison Square Garden meeting
was to influence American policy on the nuclear test; ban. It is one thing when
American citizens comae together, in accordance with their rights, for the pur-
pose of urging a specific policy on their Government. It is an altogether differ-
mit thing when such a meeting is infiltrated by the Communists and when the
chief organizing role falls into the hands of a member of the j'ommunist Party,
which, as we all know. is a quisling instrument of Soviet policy. Such a sit-
nitim an important bearing on American security, because it is axio-
matic that all actions if the Communist Party are planned to subserve the ends
tif Soviet diplomacy.
Let me say here, patent hetieally, that this is by no means the only occasion of
Communist machinations in the field of nuclear policy. At a previous hearing,
Nve established that A vrahm G. Mezerik, a man with a long Communist ree-
ord, act unity managed :t so-called Amerivan Nobel Anniversary Forum arid Din-
ner. held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City on January 11, Pt58,
which concentrated on t he theme of an American ban on nuclear testing. it. was
brought out in this hearing that, this gathering while managed by a Commu-
nist. W:1S financed by a prominent American capitalist, who was unaware of
Mezerik's Communist record.
With all tins interest in the subject, the Internal Security Subcommittee
summoned Mr. Abrams to appear and testify. Through his attorney, Leonard
Bowfin. of New York, Mr. Abrams pleaded illness, and asked to be excused from
coming to Washington to testify. We then arranged to hear him in New York
City. He showed up with tt doctor's certificate that he was suffering from heart
disease, and moved a further continuance on the ground 1hat his condition
was so serious that being questioned might cause him serious harm. Since the
committee was aware that Mr. Abrams had continued right up to that day to
carry a heavy load as the man in active charge of arrangements for the May 19
meeting at Madison Square Garden, we were not impressed by these claims.
We had a New York City Public health Service doctor present, and asked
Mr. Abrams if he would consent to be examined then and Howe. Ile refused,
so we denied the request for a continuance and went ahead with the hearing,
which was in executive session.
As I have indicated the hearing had been called in the hope that we could
learn front Mr. Abrams the full story of Communist infiltration of and partici-
pation in this movement for a nuclear test ban, as a basis for determining what,
if any, legislation may he indicated in this area.
The subcommittee has received evidence, much of it still of a classified na-
ture, that Henry Abrams is not a lone infiltrator, that there exists in fact a
serious Communist infiltration in the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy.
What, specifically, are the Communists attempting to achieve by their in-
filtration of the test ban movement, including their recent all-out support of
the Madison Square Garden meeting? The answer to this is, I believe, obvious.
The Communist purpose in supporting the test ban agitation and in going all
out to make the Madison Square Garden meeting a success is to exert pressure on
the administration to make still further concessions to the Soviet, viewpoint in
order to arrive at a test ban agreement ; to create a climate of public opinion
which will make it impossible for the administration to resume small under-
ground tests, even though there may be every reason to believe that the Kremlin
is conducting such tests; to enervate the free world so that it becomes incapable
of responding with appropriate measures to challenges at Berlin and at other
points.
In the test ban negotiations that are now going on there are major differ-
ences between the Soviet position and our own. These differences hinge around
he question of inspection. In my own opinion, we have already conceded too
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 173
much, especially by agreeing in principle to a further voluntary moratorium on
undetectable underground tests. But for those tests that are subject to detec-
tion, we still take the stand that here should be an inspection system based on
an adequate number of fixed stations, with at least 20 or 30 onsite inspections
per annum. The Kremlin wants a minimum of inspection. It wants as few
stations as possible, and its spokesmen have indicated that they would not be
willing to accept more than a few onsite inspections per annum.
The Kremlin apparently attached major importance to the Madison Square
Garden meeting as a pressure operation in support of its nuclear objectives.
This, I believe, is conclusively demonstrated by the generous and sympathetic
coverage of the meeting in the Soviet press. I think this is interesting. Ac-
cording to an AP dispatch of May 21st, Pravda headlined its account of the
meeting with the words "We Want To Live in Friendship With the Soviet
Union," while the Izvestia headline read "Rebuff to Advocates of War."
I believe that the heads of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy have a
serious contribution to make to the great debate on national policy. But they
can only make this contribution effectively if they purge their ranks ruthlessly
of Communist infiltration and if they clearly demarcate their own position from
that of the Communists, first, by stressing the need for adequate inspection, sec-
ond, by reiterating at every opportunity their opposition to the tyranny of
communism
On the basis of the evidence that has come to me, I do not believe that the
Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy has taken the necessary measures to cre-
ate a climate that is inhospitable to Communist infiltration. At the Madison
Square Garden rally, for example, there was much direct and inferential criti-
cism of American policy, but, according to the press accounts and reports from
private sources?persons who were present at the meeting?there was almost no
criticism of Khrushchev or of his arrogant, insulting, gutter-level behavior in
Paris. On the contrary, the speakers called for an immediate effort to renew
the summit conference.
Let me digress briefly for a comment on this last proposal, which has, un-
fortunately, not been confined to the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy.
Perhaps I am old-fashioned, but to me it seems that after the President of the
United States has had to endure a barrage of the crudest insults ever leveled
at a head of state, a petition to Khrushchev for another summit meeting would
constitute a total abandonment of national dignity. The only conceivable politi-
cal consequences of so craven an action would be to encourage Khrushchev to
further arrogance and further demands.
As I have said, I have found no serious evidence that the Madison Square
Garden meeting was organized and conducted in a manner which would have
discouraged Communist participation. It was not surprising, therefore, that
the Communists and their sympathizers turned out in force. Although no
Gallup poll or breakdown was possible, I am convinced from reports that the
Communists were responsible for a very substantial percentage of the overflow
turnout. A number of well-known Communists, including Alexander Trachten-
berg, a top party member, were observed in the audience. Outside the meeting,
the Communists brazenly distributed literature in their own name.
If decent organizations like the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy wish to
protect themselves against the danger of Communist infiltration, I cannot em-
phasize too strongly the need for an organizational climate that is openly
inhospitable to Communists. This is a situation where a tepid declaration of
devotion to democracy simply will not suffice, while a neutral silence is an open
invitation to disaster.
I can think of other things that can and should be done by the directors of
the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy and of other non-Communist organi-
zations which must contend with the problem of Communist infiltration. At
top level, control is relatively easy. One can more or less assume that the
people who are elected to a board of directors or to a national committee have
enjoyed public visibility over a period of years so that their records are known.
At the local level, not even the FBI with all of its resources could offer a 100
percent guarantee against infiltration. However, I think it is possible for
organizations to exercise a good deal of control by carefully examining the
personal records and bona fides, first, of all those who volunteer to help estab-
lish local organizations; second, of those who are elected to office in local
organizations; thi rd of all those assigned to organizing activities.
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174 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
If any effort had been made to do these things, the Madison Square Garden
shut:then might have been avoided. But for 25 years, Henry Abrams has been
a tlommunist. Without looking up his record, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear
Polley allowed him to become the chief organizer of the rally in New York City.
That was not taking the necessary precautionary measures.
I think it is not too much to ask that all such committees, which are headed
by good people and made up of thousands of good people, might to give considera-
tbm to the question whether Communists like Abrams are taking a part in the
running of their meetings. Many of these committees have been doing good
work. But it is little womier that they become infiltrated by Communists if
tiny do not take the pains and the time to ascertain who sonic of their people
are, before they allow them to become officers or chief organizers of mass rallies.
I believe it is not too much to ask our fellow citizens who are organizing
committees for the purpose of exerting influence on Congress?as they have
every right to do---to make a preliminary, cursory check of the persims who tire
working in their organizations, especially before they hold snob meetings.
This would not be an easy task. But there is much that can lie done. It will
not always be possible to obtain accurate personal information. because many
Communists operate underground as secret party members. But la the case of
a !min like Abrams, who has a public record of membership, the facts should
I. e available without too much effort.
Derhaps this is a situation in which private organizations can in some way he
assisted by Government. This is a problem that the Subcommittee on Internal
Sol:Lilly is at present exploring.
Mr. President, in closing my remarks, I wish to pay my personal tribute to
Mr. Norman Cousins, Gm chairman of the Committee for a 'Sane Nuclear Policy,
for the manner in whieb he has reacted to the revelations of the subcommittee.
Mr. Cousins has been a neighbor :mil a friend of mine for many years. I have
the highest regard for i imit. That is why I alled him ute and told him what. I
it it 'wabout Abrams. Ile ?Vflti good enough to come to Washington to see me-
I said. "T don't want to release this material 24 hours before your meeting.
Ti ii lin re your plans all mad". But many innocent people will be present, and
a number of them will be prominent people. Why haven't you checked on peo-
ple like Abrams? Norman Thomas said in January that he Wa S doubtful about
the man's background. Ben, it is the middle of May, on the eve, of your meet-
ing. and you have not yei done anything."
Mr. Cousins WAS lipSCt. about the matter. Tie immediately suspended Abrams.
Net only did he do this, but he told me he wits glad we had informed him about
Abrams. Ile offered to open the books of his organization to the subcommittee
ant to ce/merate in OVOTY Way to rid his organization of Communists.
assure Mr. Cousins and other persons connected with his committee that the
Subcommittee on internal Security is ready to cooperate with them to help to
prevent a repetition of the Madison Square Garden situation.
think it is not too much to say that the subcommittee is desirous and willing
to help any other organization to avoid infiltration by subterranean elements
who are not there for tiny good purpose, and who are certainly not interested,
as are the good people who make up the bulk of their membership, in the welfare
of the United States.
yield the floor.
(Whereupon, at, 1 :10 p.m., the commit tee adjourned.)
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX I
BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS ON EVENTS
INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
I. PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S REMARKS ON U.S. PLANE
[From the New York Times, May 6, 1960]
LONDON, May 5 (Reuters)?Following, in translation, are excerpts
from the section of Premier KItrushekev's address today referring to
the shooting down of a United States plane Sunday, as broadcast from
Moscow:
On instructions of the Soviet Government, I am duty bound to
report to you on aggressive acts directed in the last few weeks by the
United States of America against the Soviet Union.
What form did these aggressive acts take? The United States
sent its planes, which violated our state frontier and intruded into
the airspace of the Soviet Union.
Its last but one aggressive act was perpetrated by the United States
of America on April 9,1960.
A United States plane intruded into the airspace of our country
from the Afghanistan side. Of course, no man in his right senses
can think and assume that this violation was done by Afghanistan,
a country which is friendly with us.
We are convinced that this plane belonged to the United States of
America and obviously was based somewhere on the territory of
Turkey, Iran or Pakistan, which are linked with the U.S.A. by obli-
gations under the aggressive CENTO bloc.
[Mr. Khrushchev said the Soviet Government decided against mak-
ing a protest but ordered military commanders to act if another plane
intruded.]
American military men apparently liked this impunity as it hap-
pened on April 9, and they decided to repeat the aggressive act.
INCIDENT ON MAY DAY
Selected for this was the most festive day for our people and the
workers of the world?the day of May the First?the international
holiday of fraternal solidarity of the working class.
That day, early in the morning, at 0536 hours, Moscow time, an
American plane flew over our frontier and continued its flight into the
interior of the Soviet land. A report on this aggressive act was im-
mediately given to the Government by the Minister of Defense.
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176 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
The Government had stated this: Since he realizes what he comes
up against when intruding into a foreign territory, if he gets away
ith it he will attempt fresh provocations. Therefore, the plane must
be shot down.
This task was fulfilled and the plane was shot down.
According to first information, it has transpired that the plane
belongs to the United States of America although it bears no identifi-
cation signs.
Now an expert commission is studying data that fell in our hands.
It has been established that this plane that crossed the state frontier
of the Soviet Union was coming either from Turkey, Iran or Pakistan.
After the study of all materials that are now at our disposal, the
Soviet Government will lodge with the United States of America a
strong protest and will warn it that if similar aggressive acts against
our country continue, we reserve the right to respond to them with
measures we shall find necessary in order to insure the safety of our
country.
We shall also give the most serious warning to those countries that
put their territories at the disposal of the United States of America
for aggressive acts directed against our country.
The following conclusion comes to mind: Aggressive imperialist
forces in the United States in recent times have been taking the most
active measures to undermine the summit or at least to hinder any
agreement that might be reached.
"WHO SENT THIS AIRCRAFT?"
The question then arises: Who sent this aircraft across the Soviet
frontier? Was it the man who is Commander in Chief of the American
armed forces who, as everyone knows, is the President ? Or was this
aggressive act carried out by Pentagon militarists? 11 f such actions
are taken by American military men on their own account, it must
be of especial concern to world opinion.
Perhaps it was a result of the friendship that is now forming be-
tween the United States and Franco that the American militarists
decided to act independently, as did the Spanish military junta, which
rose up against the legal Spanish Government.
Thus, in the so-called free world, military dictators not seldom set
up their regimes using the methods of Franco. But the peoples are
beginning to understand where true freedom is and where there is
tyranny.
Take, for instance, the events in South Korea. The head of the
puppet Syngnian Mee regime, the best friend of the United States
and the father of his country as someone or other called hita in Amer-
ica, has IIONV been overthrown by the people and is now a political
corpse. And it was not the Communists who were behind these events;
even American politicial leaders have had to admit.
The sufferings of the Korean people led them to rise up against the
bestial yoke, and the peoples understand that it was not only a question
of Syngman Rhee himself who was to blame but all those who sup-
ported him and hung him round the necks of the South Koreans.
It is no coincidence that the free world sees so many popular demon-
strations demanding freedom.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 177
Comrade Deputies, the impression is being formed that the aggres-
sive actions newly undertaken by the United States against the Soviet
Union are a foretaste of the summit meeting.
Are they taken in order to exert pressure on us and to attempt to
frighten us with their military superiority in order to undermine our
determination to work for easing tension, to eliminate the cold war
and to put an end to the arms race?
All these missions are sent in order to prevent any agreement on
vexing questions, for we cannot say that this aircraft was a harbinger
of peace, that it was on a goodwill mission. No, it was a real bandit
flight with aggressive intentions.
We can say to those gentlemen who sent the aircraft that if they
think they can bend our knees and our backs by means of such pres-
sure, this will have no effect on us. The Soviet Union has every means
to give a rebuff to those who want to exert pressure in order to achieve
a solution convenient to aggressors.
In the name of the Soviet Government let me express thanks to the
men of the military units who carried out with honor the task laid on
them in defending the frontiers of our motherland.
Comrades, the Soviet people and Government have always expressed
their peaceful intentions and friendly feelings toward the United
States, but in answer to this we have black ingratitude.
"FEELINGS OF INDIGNATION"
It is understood that this has aroused feelings of indignation against
the activities of the American military men. But we must control this
feeling and must be ruled not by our emotions, but by reason.
Government leaders interested in preserving peace must soberly con-
sider the consequences of such actions and think what they might
lead to.
Hitler's aircraft before the war used to intrude into our airspace.
The Soviet Government would protest, but Hitler refused to pay at-
tention and then attacked us. And where did that all end?
How do we assess the incursion of American aircraft?as a precursor
of war or a foreshadow of attack, of the repetition of what Hitler
did? The Soviet Government thinks that all the same there is no
reason to draw such conclusions.
There is another relationship of power in the world, and in this the
people's will to peace plays a great part and this is why we do not con-
clude that this is a prewar trial of strength or a reconnaissance made
to try our nerves, preserve the atmosphere of the cold war so that the
imperialists can continue to bind their people with taxation, to carry
on the arms race, and to keep their people in a state of fear of war and
to continue to impose their will.
The Soviet Union has no aggressive intentions, we do not want the
cold war, we want disarmament and our proposals made to the United
Nations on this subject remain in force still. Once again, we, repeat
that disarmament is the right way to preserve peace and in such condi-
tions no country would be able unilaterally to arm and attack another.
The Soviet Government once again calls on the Government of the
United States to end the cold war. All states must act peaceably so
that calm, peace and happiness can prevail.
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178 EVENTS IN CMENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
2. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT NEWS RELEASE, MAY 5, 1960
[No. 509-60]
For the Press:
The U.S. Air Force confirmed on May 3, 1960, that a NASA 13-2
aircraft is missing in Turkey. It was on a weather mission originating
at Adana, Turkey. Purpose was a study of clear air turbulence. Dur-
ing the flight in SE Turkey the pilot reported oxygen difficulty. Last
word heard at 9 a.m. 1st of May, Turkish time (3 a.m.. 1 May (WA.)
over emergency frequency. 11-2 aircraft did not land at Adana as
planned and could only be assumed down. A search effort is underway
in Lake Van area.
The missing TT-2 is a National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion aircraft. The pilot is an employee of Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,
under contract to NASA.
The U-2 program was initiated in 1955 to perform high altitude
weather research.
The flight was a joint NASA/AF Air Weather Service Mission.
3. EXCERPTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF DEPARTMENT OF
STATE PRESS AND RADIO NEWS BRIEFINC, MAY 5.
1960
Mr. WirtTE. Now, he Department has been informed by NASA
that 1,s announced May 3 an unarmed plane, ft 17-2 weather research
Pilule based at. Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian has been missing
since May I. During the flight of this plane, the pilot reported
difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Mr. Khrusitchev has an-
nounced that. a I T.S. plane has been shot. down over the 1. T.S.S.R. on
hat date. It may be that, this was the missing plane. It is entirely
possible that haying a failure in the oxygen equipment, w Lich Mild
result, in the pilot 1, tsi og consciousness, the plane com limed on auto-
ntatic pilot for a, eonsiderable distance and ttocident a lly violated Soviet;
airspace. The United States is taking this matter up with the Soviet
4lovernment, with partitular reference to the fate of the pilot.
That, is the, end of the statement.
Q. What was the plane doing, weather nwormaissa nee?
A. NASA is briefing reporters on the full details of that.
Q. When you say yon are taking this matter up with the Soviet
Government, do you mean you are asking for information on the
pilot, or making a protest about the plane?
A. This matter is being taken up with the Soviet!, Government,
John (Ilightower), t brought our ,Ambassador in Moscow.
Q. Yes, but it. is a, prof est or an inquiry?
A. I can't. say just what form it, will take at this stage, I would
think, initially, an inquiry.
Q. Is this the ide. which the, White 1-louse announced would be
made?
A. 'That is correct.
Q. You say it may be. that; this was the missing plane ?
A. Yes.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 179
Q. There are other planes missing or
A. Not that I am aware of.
Q. Unaccounted for?
A. No, not that I am aware of.
Q. You say this plane was from Adana, Turkey. Is that the U.S.
Air Force Base down there?
A. As I say, you better get this information from NASA. (See
NASA Press Release No. 60-193.)
Q. Khrushchev also said an American plane violated the Soviet
frontier by flying over the Afghan border on April 9. Do you have
anything on that?
A. We have absolutely no?N-0---information on that at all.
Q. Wasn't this plane accompanied by another plane of the same
type when it started out on the reconnaissance flight?
A. I am not aware of that, if that is a fact, but I assume NASA
can give you that information, Paul ('Ward). I have nothing on it.
Q. Link, the area where this plane disappeared is the same as the
other plane
A. This is the Lake. Van area.
Q. Is that the same area where the earlier plane disappeared in
1958?
A. In the neighborhood of it..
Q. Link, how do you know the plane was having difficulty?
A. He reported it.
Q. He reported it by radio?
A. That is right.
Q. At the time did he give his position?
A. In the Lake Van area.
Q. Was his course such at that time that if continued it might have.
taken him over the Soviet Union?
A.. John (Hightower) , I don't have those details.
Q. Was that the last communication from him, Link?
A. So far as I know.
Q. What was the question?
A. The question was, was that the last communication from the.
pilot, and to my knowledge. it was.
Q. Is the the name of this pilot being released by somebody?
A. Here I would like to go off the record. *
Q. Link, has any protest been received from the Soviet Govern-
ment?
A. No, sir, it has not.
Q. Link, do you have any comment on the rest of Khrushchev's
speech, his statement that the Summit looks gloomy now because of
hisa .essive American action?
A.ST(rgoi.
Q. Is this the first indication we had in Khrushchev's speech that.
the plane had been shot down? There was no previous communica-
tion from the Soviets?
A. Nothing prior to this.
Q. Thank you, very much.
A. Yes, sir.
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150 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFEliENCE
4. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE A DMINIST RA-
TION NEWS RELEASE, MAY 5, 1960
[NASA Release No. 60-193]
Memo in the Press:
One of NASA's U-2 research airplanes, in use since 1956 in a
continuing program to study gust-meteorological conditions found
at high altitude, has been. missing since about 9 o'clock Sunday morn-
ing (local time), when its pilot reported he was having oxygen diffi-
culties over the Lake Van, Turkey, area.
The airplane had taken off from Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. The
flight plan called for the first check point to be at 37 degrees, 25
minutes, North: 41 degrees, 23 minutes, East, and for a left turn to be
made to the Lake Van beacon, thence to the Trabazon beacon, thence
to Antalya, and return to Adana. The flight scheduled was estimated
at 3 hours, 45 minutes, for a total of 1,400 nautical miles. Takeoff
was at 8 a.m. local time.
(The above-given tin res are the equivalent of 3 a.m. Sunday, and
2 a.m., eastern daylight time.)
About 1 hour after takeoff, the pilot reported difficulties with his
oxygen equipment. Using emergency radio frequency, he reported he
was heading for the Lake Van beacon to get his bearings, and that
he would return to Adana.
As indicated above, his flight plan called for him to make a left turn
at the Lake Van beacon. His last report indicated he was attempting
to receive that beacon. It is believed he probably was on a north-
easterly course, but there was no further word.
An aerial search was begun soon after receipt of the last communi-
cation. The Lake Van area is mountainous and very rugged. No
evidence has been sighted of the aircraft having crashed.
If the pilot continued to suffer lack of oxygen, the path of the air-
plane from the last reported position would be impossible to de-
termine. If the airplane was on automatic pilot, it is likely it would
liave continued along its northeasterly course.
The pilot, as are all pilots used on NASA's program of upper at-
mosphere research with the U-2 airplane, is a civilian employed by
the Lockheed Aircraft Corp., builders of the airplane.
When the research program was begun in 1956 by the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (predecessor to NASA), the
Federal agency did not have a sufficient number of pilots to operate
the program, and so a contract was made with Lockheed to provide
t he pilots.
Overseas logistic support for NASA's continuing use of the U-2 is
provided by Air Weather Service units of the USAF.
NASA has procured a total of 10 U-2 airplanes. The airplane
was originally built as a private venture by Lockheed to :serve .as a
"flying test bed." It is powered by a single Pratt & Whitney .1-57
urhojet engine, and can maintain flight for as long as 4 hours at
altitudes of up to 55,000 feet.
Since inception of the research program in 1956, the 11-2 flying
weather laboratories have operated from bases in California, New
York, Alaska, England, Germany, Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, Okinawa,
and the Philippines.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 181
The U-2 airplanes are presently being used in California (Ed-
wards AFB, one) , Japan ( tsugi, three) and Turkey (Adana, four).
The instrumentation carried by the U-2 permits obtaining more
precise information about clear air turbulence, convective clouds,
wind shear, the jet stream, and such widespread weather patterns as
typhoons. The airplane also has been used by NASA to obtain
information about cosmic rays and the concentration of certain ele-
ments in the atmosphere, including ozone and water vapor.
Instrumentation carried includes: Angular velocity recorder, to
measure the airplane's rate of pitch; modified VGH recorder, to
measure and record head-on gust components in flight; flight recorder
Model BB, continuous recorder of indicated airspeed., pressure alti-
tude and normal acceleration; airspeed and altitude transducer to
measure pressure altitude and indicated airspeed; temperature and
humidity measuring set AN/AMQ 7, to measure indicated free air
temperature and indicated relative humidity; and vortex thermometer
system, to measure true free-air temperature within one-half degree
centigrade at high speeds.
5. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS RELEASE, MAY 6, 1960
[No. 249]
The following is the text of a note delivered today by the American
Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
The Embassy of the United States of America by instruction of its
Government has the honor to state the following:
iftsoi The United States Government has noted the statement of the Chair-
man of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, N. S. Khrushchev, in his speech before the Supreme Soviet
on May 5 that a foreign aircraft crossed the border of the Soviet Union
on May 1 and that on orders of the Soviet Government, this aircraft
was shot down. In this same statement it was said that investigation
showed that it was a United States plane.
As already announced on May 3, a United States National Aeronau-
tical Space Agency unarmed weather research plane based at Adana,
Turkey, and piloted by a civilian American has been missing since May
1. The name of the American civilian pilot is Francis Gary Powers,
born on August 17,1929, at Jenkins, Kentucky.
In the light of the above the United States Government requests the
Soviet Government to provide it with full facts of the Soviet investi-
gation of this incident and to inform it of the fate of the pilot.
6. EXCERPTS FROM PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S REMARKS
ON U.S. PLANE INCIDENT, MAY 7, 1960
[From the New York Times, May 8, 1960]
Following are excerpts from the concluding speech to the meeting
of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow yesterday by Premier Khrushchev,
as provided in English in New York by Tass, the official Soviet press
agency:
The aggressive act committed by the American Air Force against
the Soviet Union has justifiably incensed the Deputies and all the
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182 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Soviet people. Numerous inquiries and appeals are being received
by the session and the Soviet Government. In view of this permit me
to dwell on this question once again and to furnish certain new data.
After my report to the Supreme Soviet, in which I dwelt on this
fact, the United States Department of State claimed in an official
press statement that t he point in question was a violation of the Soviet
State Frontier by an American aircraft of the "Lockheed U-2" type,
which allegedly was studying weather conditions in the upper layers
of the atmosphere in the area of the Turkish-Soviet frontier.
This plane had allegedly strayed off its course because the pilot had
oxygen trouble. The State Department asserts that the pilot lost
consciousness and, steered by its automatic pilot, the plane flew into
Soviet territory. According to the Department of State, the pilot
only had time to report back about the failure of his oxygen equip-
ment to the Turkish airdrome in Adana, whence it flew, an airdrome
which allegedly does not belong to the military but to the National
Aeronautics and Space Research Administration.
Soon after that, the National Aeronautics and Space Research
Administration issued a statement with a view to confirming the State
lfepartment's version.
"141ANY SILLY THINGS"
Comrades, I must tell you a secret. When I was making my report
deliberately did not say that the pilot was alive and in good health
and that we have got, parts of the plane. We did so deliberately be-
cause had we told everything at once, the Americans would have
invented another version.
And now, just look how many silly things they have said--Van
'Lake, scientific research and so on and so forth. Now that they know
that the pilot is alive they will have to invent something else and they
will do it.
[Mr. Khrushchev read from the United States statement issued
alter his first, announcement: it was printed in the New York Times
last Friday.]
These are the official versions put into circulation by American
officials to mislead the public opinion of their country and the world.
I must declare, comrade Deputies, that these versions are completely
untrue and calculated for gullible people.
The authors of these versions supposed that if the plane was shot
down, the pilot most probably perished too. So there will be nobody
to ask how everything actually happened, there will be no way to
check what sort of plane it was and what instruments it carried.
"ALIVE AND IN GOOD HEALTH"
First of all, I wish to announce that the pilot of the shot-down
American plane is alive and in good health. He, is HOW in Moscow.
13rought here also are t he remains of this plane and its special instru-
mentation, discovered daring the investigation.
The name of this pilot is Francis Gary Powers. He is 30 years old.
Ile says he is a first lieutenant of the United States A ir Force, where
he served till 1956, that is, to the day when he went over tot he Central
Intelligence Agency.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 183
Francis Powers reported, incidentally, that while serving with the
American Air Force he used to get $700 a month, but when he went
over to the intelligence service and started carrying out spying as-
signments to glean secret information, he began getting $2,500 a
month. That is how capital buys lives, buys people. The flier testi-
fied that he had no dizziness, nor had his oxygen apparatus failed.
He was flying along the assigned course, accurately executing his
chief's orders, switching on and off the equipment over the pre-
selected targets for gleaning intelligence on the Soviet Union's mili-
tary and industrial establishments, and flew on until the very mo-
ment his piratical flight into this country's interior was cut short.
I want to tell something about the results of the examination
of the plane that has been shot down and its equipment, as well as of
the questioning of the pilot. The inquiry still continues, but the pic-
ture is fairly clear already.
PLANE TYPE CONFIRMED
To start with, this was, indeed, a high-altitude, low-speed "Lock-
heed IT-2." They banked on its high altitude and believed that this
plane cannot be brought down by any fighter or antiaircraft artil-
lery. That is why they thought it could fly over Soviet territory with
immunity. In fact, the plane flew at a great altitude and it was hit
by the rocket at an altitude of 20,000 meters [65,000 feet]. And if
they fly higher, we will also hit them! The plane was in no way
equipped for "upper atmosphere research" or for taking "air sam-
ples," as official American spokesmen assert.
Not at all. This was a real military reconnaissance aircraft fitted
with various instruments for collecting intelligence and, among other
things, for aerial photography.
The competent commission of experts, which examined the wrecked
plane, has established from the documentary evidence that this Amer-
ican plane is a specially prepared reconnaissance aircraft. The task
of the plane was to cross the entire territory of the Soviet Union from
the Pamirs to the Kola Peninsula to get information on our coun-
try's military and industrial establishments by means of aerial photog-
raphy. Besides aerial cameras the plane carried other reconnaissance
equipment for spotting radar networks, identifying the location and
frequencies of operating radio stations and other special radio en-
gineering equipment.
Not only do we have the equipment of that plane, but we also have
the developed film showing a number of areas of our territory. Here
are some of these photos. Here are photos of these airfields. Here
are two white lines. They are lines of our fighters. Here is another
airfield and also planes on it. All these films we developed ourselves.
CAMERA IS PRAISED
Here are photos of petrol stores. It must be said that the camera
is not a bad one and the photo is very accurate.
But I must say that our cameras take better pictures, are more
accurate, so that we gained little in this respect.
These photos here show industrial enterprises.
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There is also a tape recording of the signals of a number of our
ground radar stations. These are incontestible evidence of the spying
done by the American plane shot down in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk.
That is what. "air samples" American reconnaissance took, and it took
them not, over Van Lake in Turkey but quite elsewhere.
The only thing that. is true is that this plane was stationed at the
A merican-Turkish air base at Incirlik east of Adana. As Powers, the
tiler, testified, he was serving with the 10-10 unit, which, for the, sake
of disguise, is under control of the National Aeronautics and Space
A dministration, but in reality, conducts high-altitude military recon-
ha issance.
In his depositions. Powers mentioned the names of several officers
he had served with at the American military base in Turkey. Ac-
cording to Powers' testimony, the commander of the American i10-10
unit is Col. William Shelton and his deputy is Lieut. Col. Carol Funk.
Before his flight, Powers had long trained himself for flying into
the, depth of this country and, as he said himself, he had flown along-
the Soviet frontier many times in order to study the radar system
of the Soviet Union.
"POWERS, THE SCOUT"
On April 27, Powers, the scout, flew over from the Turkish city
o 1 Adana to the Peshawar airfield in Pakistan on orders from his
superiors. And it was, I herefore, front Pakistan's territory, that is.
from the Peshawar a irlield?and not from the Turkish airfield outside
Adana, as stated in the I Tnited States State Department's version?
that Powers took oft on May 1 with instruction to fly along the course
indicated on his map over the Aral Sea, Sverdlovsk and other points
and reach Archangel and Murmansk, before landing at the Thule air-
field in Norway.
Now we can say where he was flying to. I must, admit. that we knew
it already when I was reporting this fact. We did not. say anything.
at that time in order to see what the Americans would invent. Now
that they have made their invention, we report how everything actually
Ii appened.
This is what Powers said when questioned about the task of his flight
over Soviet territory.
"I was to take off from the Peshawar airfield in Pakistan, cross the
national frontier of the U.S.S.R. and fly across Soviet territory to
Norway. I was to fly over certain points of the U.S.S.R., of which I
remember Murmansk and Archangel. During my flight over Soviet
territory I was to switch on and off the equipment over certain points.
indicated on the map. I believe my flight over Soviet, territory was
meant for collecting information on Soviet guided missiles and radar-
stations."
I want to ask the gentlemen from the, State Department: :Is it. such
"air samples over Lake Van" that the spy flier Powers was to take?'
IRAQI REVOLT RECALLED
I say nothing of the fact that by flying along this course, the Ameri-
can scout plane grossly violated the national sovereignty .of Afghan-
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 185
istan by having flown across that country's territory without permis-
sion. But there is, perhaps, nothing extraordinary in this for the
morals of American militarists. Such actions of theirs have long been
known.
Suffice it to recall the flight of American military aircraft over the
territory of Austria, when the aggression was being prepared against
Iraq, where a revolution had just taken place. The Austrian Govern-
ment protested against the treacherous violation of Austria's sover-
eignty by American military aircraft and against that blatant act of
disrespect for her neutrality sealed by the signatures of the United
States, among others.
If one believes the version that the pilot lost consciousness owing to
oxygen trouble and that the aircraft was subsequently controlled by
the automatic pilot, one must also believe that the aircraft controlled
by an automatic pilot flew from Turkey to Pakistan, touched down at
Peshewar Airport, stayed there three days took off early in the
morning of May 1, flew over the territory of Afghanistan, crossed the
Soviet frontier, flew more than 2,000 kilometers over our territory for
a total of some four hours.
All the time of the flight over our territory the aircraft was under
observation and was brought down as soon as the order was received.
When our anti-aircraft rocket battery intercepted and brought down
the plane, the pilot, it must be believed, soon regained his conscious-
ness because he bailed out by parachute; you just note he was not
ejected by the automatic device but left through the upper canopy
designed for emplaning. The question arises why did he do this if
there are devices for rapid ejection?
'lame He did this possibly because there was an explosive charge in the
aircraft which was to have blown up the plane as soon as the pilot was
ejected. The pilot knew this and possibly was afraid that he would be
killed in the explosion. Clever enough!
"NOT THE ONLY PRECAUTION"
But the installation of the infernal machine was not the only pre-
caution taken. To cover up the tracks of the crime the pilot was told
that he must not fall alive in the hands of the Soviet authorities. For
this reason he was supplied with a special pin. He was to have pricked
himself with this poisoned pin, resulting in instantaneous death.
What a barbarism! Here is this instrument?the latest achievement
of American technology for the killing of their own people ( a photo-
graph is produced).
But everything alive wants to live and when the plane was brought
down the pilot bailed out by parachute. And when he landed he did
not follow the advice of those who sent him on his anti-Soviet preda-
tory assignment but remained alive.
It is alleged that the flight was made for scientific purposes to in-
vestigate the upper layers of the atmosphere. The question arises why
the pilot then had to be armed with a noiseless pistol. He was given
it for some emergency, not to take air samples but to blow people's
brains out. All this we shall present to the public as material evidence.
This is what, so to say, such Christians are like.
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186 EVENTS IN CI DE NT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
He was given this pistol after making low bows as they do in
churches. And yet they call us godless atheists. Yet we have never
committed such crimes against humanity and never will. If the pilot
was given a pistol to de-fend himself against wild beasts in case of a
forced landing, the question arises, why a pistol with a silencer? This
also shows what so-called scientific purposes were pursued by the
plane.
The pilot who was supposed to explore the atmosphere was given
.7,500 rubles in Soviet currency. The question arises, when and
where was he to have spent them and for what purposes, for he did
not fly to exchange old rubles for new?
4;1)1.1) FRANCS, GUI I) RINGS
The pilot was also given French gold francs. I have seen these gold
francs with my own eyes. And you can see them here in. the photo-
graph. They are covered with cellophane on both sides of the coins.
I tone in a cultured, American way. But what did the pilot need these
francs for? also had West G'ennan, Italian, and other currency.
Besides his own watch he was also given for his trip another two gold
watches and seven gold rings for ladies. Why was all this necessary
in the upper layers of the atmosphere? Or, maybe, the pilot was to
have flown still higl ter to Mars and was going to lead astray Martian
ladies?
You see how thoroughly American pilots are equipped before setting
oil on a flight to take samples of air in the upper layers of the atmos-
phere. Thus, no concocted version can save the reputation of those
Nvho bear the responsibility for this perfidious act.
Thus, no concocted version can save the reputation of those who bear
the responsibility for this perfidious action. They were caught red-
handed as organizers of the incursion in the airspace of the Soviet
Union not long before the meeting of the heads of government in
Paris, not long before the visit, to the Soviet Union of the President of
the United States. I believe that this is a bad preparation for serious
talks on easing :in tort rational tension.
I am now reading in the Western press comments on these events
and 1 here are some people who accuse us, Khrushchev, of wanting to
undermine the stunnit meeting because otherwise he would not have
presented this fact ;it the session of the Supreme Soviet but raised it
through some other channels but what did you expect, gentlemen?
You are accustomed to make mischief and some people regard this as
all but a good thing and keep silent. No, we are not such kind of
people: if you made mischief bear the responsibility for this openly.
WILY SITC11. A "RECKLESS STEP"
They live according to the law; if one is rich, one will not be impris-
oned. This is true for the capitalist because he always can buy him-
self off. But there is another country, the country of socialism, where
law protects the state, protects society, protects everyone living in this
state.
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2004/67ECRIFIZEW9OTOOWIffil
1 CONFIDENTIAL
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Comments on True Magazine Version of U-2 Incident
1. Statement: "Other spy planes had penetrated deep into
Ruseia, one sneaking within a few miles of Moscow. But Powers
was to be the first to cross the vast Soviet land mass from the Aral
to the Barents Seas. His main checkpoints:
"I? Tyura Tam, the great Soviet missile center in the
desert east of the Aral Sea.
. The Sverdlovsk rocket sites.
"3. The Soviet air and submarinebases at Archangel
and Murmansk.
"His touch-down on friendly soil would be at Bodo, Norway."
Comment: The Russians released to the world very shortly
after the May lit incident photographs a the mission route map carried
in the cockpit of the aircraft which contained the check points noted in
the above quotation. In addition, an enlarged photograph of this map
was on display throughout the public exhibition of the aircraft in Moscow
at Gorki Park. This was the first planned South-north flight_
2. Statement: "It was known that a monster missile, twice the
sise of .America's 107-foot Atlas, was poised on a launching pad at Tyura
Tam. The Central Intelligence Agency desperately wanted photographs
of this new missile. They suspected it might be used for a long-hinted
May Day apace spectacular."
Comment: Tyura Tam was not the primary objective of the
1 May mission. However, it was considered to be a valuable en route
bonus target. There was no knowledge of any "monster missile" being
in place on the launching pad, although there was some conjecture that
the Soviets might attempt a space launching on I May for propaganda
purposes.
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. Statement: The weather on May Day was perfect.
Comment: The weather on May Day was not perfect. The
first portion of the route, to a point approximately 150 nautical miles
south of Sverdlovsk, and including Tyura Tarn, was predicted to be
cloud covered. The pilot was instructed to turn his camera on over
Tyura Tam just as a precautionary measure in the event that holes
In the undercast might permit some coverage of value. The area of
primary interest, northwest of Sverdlovsk to the Kola Peninsula, was
predicted to be clear and it was on this basis that the decision to go
was made. Subsequent analysis of actual weather conditions substantiated
the pre-mission forecast.
4. Statement: "Nor would any other flights across Russia have
been attempted until President Eisenhower had completed his visit to
Russia in mid-June. May 2 had been set as the beginning of a mora-
torium on such aerial espionage, and for at least *ix weeks there would
be no more.
Comment It is true that authorisation for this particular
overflight would have expired after 1 May: however, the six-week
moratorium has no bests in fact. While there has been considerable
conjecture about "deadlines", the above information was never disclosed,
even in Congressional hearings.
5. Statement: "Powers was not piloting the only U-2 in the air
that day. Simultaneously, another U-2 had taken off from Incirlik to fly
conspicuously along the Soviet border as a decoy. The pilot deltSerately
sent meaningless messages over his radio to attract attention and to lure
Soviet radar and monitoring stations into following him while Powers
slipped into Russia unnoticed. The decoy would continue over Pakistan,
then return to Incirlik. The Pakistan authorities who knew nothing of
Powers secret mission, would be notified that a U-2 had arrived and
they would aslUirle it Was Poly/Ors."
Comment: The diversionary aircraft maintained radio
silence throughout its mission. It was not intended as a decoy but was
designed to substantiate the cover story and protect the pre-strike base
in the event the mission aircraft was lost, particularly if it were
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lost in proximity to the border. The diversionary mission did not go
beyond Iran before turning and proceeding back to Turkey.
The only other public reference we find to a second U-2
flight was in an article by Chalmers Roberts in the Washington Post
of 27 May 1960, which included the following statement: "The day of
Powers' flight, there was a second U-2 flight from Turkey. This was
a meteorological flight outside the Soviet Union, the kind of flight the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration unwittingly thought all
U-2's were making. NASA was, of course, the 'cover' for the
clandestine flights over the Soviet Union."
6. Statement: It soon became clear, however, that the Ruse us
had not been fooled by the decoy. American listening and watching stations
picked up the frustrated comments of the Soviet defenders who had dis-
covered Powers but were unable to do anything about him.
"Soviet jets leaped and snarled at the spy plane which
hovered high out of their reach. For a tantalising moment one inter-
ceptor managed to reach the intruder's level. Our monitors could hear
the Russian screaming like a banshee with the fury of his effort."
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7. Statement: "To those daring young men who flew the U-2s,
over Sverdlovsk was pretty much a triiik.run. They called the
rk of domed rocket launchers below the "House of David."
Comment: No overflight of the USSR was ever considered
a "milk run" either by the pilots or anyone else associated with the
project. The reference to the "House of David" is apparently* cor-
ruption of the term "Little David*" applied to the SAM sites by photo
interpreters at PIC because of their geometric resemblance to a Star
of David. This descriptive term WAS adopted by the Intelligence Com-
munity but was not supposedly known to the public.
8. Statement: ". . his inertial guidanc. gear which permitted
navigate without external radio aids, . . . "
Co t: The U-2 had no i
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nce gear whatsoever.
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9. Statement: o switched off the fuel to keep the
engine from hooding, then snapped on his command radio, turned
to the emergency ''G'' channel and barked tersely: ''Flameout
Flameout!" These words were heard across the Turkish border
I, 400 miles away where a handful of Americans were watching the
drama helplessly on radar screens and listening by high-powered
radio monitors."
at tnstaea in tne u -4, una
optimum conditions, 300 nautical miles and
even if a transmission had been attempted, which is highly unlikely,
could not have been received 1, 200 miles away.
10. Stetement: "At 37, 000 feet the Soviet fighters caught
up with him, formed a canopy over his head and began forcing him
to the ground. "
source to
Co
onfiarm this.
a no 'd
ce a
ble from any
U. Statement: l'For the first penetration of Soviet
trusted foreign pilots were used
case the flights should fa
erritory
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14. Statemen
for high altitude cruis
case of flameout."
The U-4
is panic
special kerosene fuel, refined
any ifficult to re-ignite in
Comment: The Jet fuel used in the U-4 to no
difficult to: re-ignite than azy of the other jet fuels in normal
13. Statement: One of the first U.,- flights over Russia
ated as far as Kiev, 400 miles inside the Soviet Union, during
at week of July, 1956. Russian defenders spotted the plane
but could not knock it down. Their anti-aircraft rockets fell short
at 60, 000 feet -- which in itself was valuable information.
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Comment: This statement is true, with the exception
of that portion referring to anti-aircraft rockets falling short at
60,000 feet. There is no evidence that rockets were fired at the
U-2 on any of its overflight. prior to I May.
A statement by Khrushchev at the Czechoslovak Stubassy
reception (reported in the New York Times, 10 May 1960) included the
following:
1 say further. when Twining, the then Chief of
3taff of the u. S. Air Force, arrived here we welcomed
him as a guest and entertained him. He left our country
by air and next day sent a giant flying at great altitude to
our country. This plane flew as far as Kiev."
The fact that one of the first Russian overflights
penetrated deeply into the Soviet Union was widely publicized as a
result of the official Soviet protest of 1 uly 1956. This note protested
overflights on July 4, 5 and 9, 1956 by a "twin engined medium bomber'
and cited that in one case a penetration of 320 kilometers had been
achieved. The note did not mention Kiev, which was in fact covered
on a mission on 9 July.
14. Statement: "Before Powe fateful flight, there had
been at least two missions aimed at Sverdlovsk. The first went only
half way, then turned back bemuse, the clouds made photography
difficult."
Comment. There had been only one mission to Sverdlovsk
prior to the 1 May i . However, there was a mission targeted to
own by Frank Powers, which did turn back prior to
reaching the target because of cloud cover.
the Irkutsk area,
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Brigadier General Audre
Staff Secretary
The White House
Dear Andy:
CIA-RDP9C
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10 September 1960
In response to your request I enclose a memorandum
containing comments on the significant statements in the article in
True Magasine for September 1960, entitled
"Exclusive! Inside Story of Pilot Powers and his
Secret U-2 Spy Flight. Official Air Force documents
and secret reports reveal for the first time the true
facts behind the spy-in.-the-sky misiiions. By Drew
Pearson and Jack Anderson,"
As you will note, the title of the article refers to official
Air force documents and secret reports as a source for the story.
In the text of the article itself there ie reference to the story being
"based on official Air Force reports."
I also enclose a report of the radio interview of Drew
Pearson by Patty Cavin on August 23, 1960, bearing on the
Pearson-Anderson article in which Pearson claims "that we had
access to the Air Force records in this flight". In another portion
of the irtterviow Pearson refers to information that the Air force
has.
I am sending a copy of the enclosed report to General Walsh,
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Air Force to ascertain
whether he can throw any light on these references to the Air Force
which of course may be a blind to divert attention from the real source
of the information.
Cy #1 & #2 - Addee w/orig of report
and orig of report of IntertOew
Peason-Cavin.
Sincerely,
Cy #3 - DDCI w/attch
Cy #4 - DCI w/attch Allen W. Dulles
Director
Cy #3 - D I&A.0 P,W
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Enclosures
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Major General James H. Walsh
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
United States Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Jim:
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U September 1960
At the reiiest of Gen.r&l Goodpaster I have prepared and
sent forward to him an analysis of the Drew Pearson-Anderson
article in True Magazine for September. A copy of that report.
with a copy of the transmitting letter, is enclosed.
You will note Pearsonts repeated allegations that hi had
access to Air Force file. in connection with the preparation of
the port. Similar allegations appear in a radio interview which
Pearson gave to Patty Cavin on 23 August 1960, a transcript of
which is attached.
As I noted in my letter to General Goodpaster, these
references may of course be a blind to divert attention from the
real source of the information.
While there are a very large number of inaccuracies and
false allegations in the Pearson-Anderson article and the Pearson
broadcast, they do contain some fairly accurate material that I
have not seen before in public print.
I would appreciate it however if you would look into the
matter and let me know whether you can find any clue which
would help u* to ascertain the source for the Pearson statements.
1Copy #1 &2 to Addee w/copy of w/attch
and with thermo of Pearson-Cavin
interview
- DDCI - no attch.
# 4 - DCI -no attch.
# 5 - DPD via DDP =no attch
Enclosures
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Sincerely,
Allen
Director
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WRC - Radio (Washington) August 23 19?N,
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INTERVIEW WITH DREW PEARSON
Patty Cavin at 12:15 P.M. over WRC (Washington):
Miss Cavin interviewed columnist Drew Pearson, and the following was heard:
CAVIN: "Columnist Pearson and his partner. Jack Anderson have the exclusive
inside story of what really happened on May D y, 1960, when Lockheed pilot Francis
Gary Powers took off in his sleek U-2 on,what'Iseemed to be an innocent weather
flight. The account is published for the first time n the September issue or True,
and seems to be backed up- today by statements made last night by. CIA Chief Allen
Dulles. We'll have word with Drew Pearson first up on our
"Page 34 of the September issue of the man's magazine True has a rather
startling headline. It says, *Exclusive Inside Story of Pilot Powers and his Secret
U-2 Spy Flight." The byline belongs to Drew Pearson and his partner Jack Anderson.
We have Mr. Drew Pearson at our NBC microphone nob, and, Drew, I was fascinated and
somewhat appalled to read this account of what really happened for the first time)
because it differs rather considerably from the reports that we have had sine May
Day on the Powers flight and what really did happen from the newspapers' standpoint.
How come?"
PEARSON: 'Well, I don't know, Patty, except that we had access to the Air Force
records in this flight, and they very carefully monitored everything that Powers did,
both at the time and then they had to reconstruct what happened afterwards, and, for
Instance, when his plane was displayed at Gorki Park in Moscow, the propeller blade*
were bent back, which wouldn't mean very much to you and me but to the Air Force it
meant a great deal. It meant his plane had stalled in the air at a flight--at an
altitude actually of 70,000 feet, and the plane never crashed. It came down to a
landing whieh didn't break up the plane too much."
CAVIN: "As you and Jack Anderson say in True magazine, to a belly-scraping
landing."
PEARSON: "Your words are better than mine. I see that you've really read that
article."
GAVIN: "Well, I couldn't put the article down, I must admit. Actually, Draw
Pearson, let's go back and start at the findings that you and Jack Anderson began
with. You traced the beginning of IJ-2'e."
PEARSON: "Yes, we went back to approximately five years ago, perhaps a little
bit before that. These flights have been taking place for a long time, not merely
by the U-2 planes, but at first the United States various intelligence forces had
attempted to get inforisation by balloon, and had sent balloons at a very high alti-
tude across Russia with photographic equipment.
"Well, this ran into trouble. Later we sent planes across with pilots who were
Americans of other origins who could speak Russian very well, and then i.e Switched
finally to the U-2 plane after it was developed by Lockheed. We gave orders--there's
no secret about any of this now--it's pretty well come out?we'd given orders that
we had to have a U-2 plane ?it wasn't called U-2 originally?which could fly at a
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terrific altitude so that no Russian plane could knock it down.
"Nov there's one thing I might point out, that nur story differs. from the
testimony of Francis Gary Powers in one respect, and it's a rather important respect.
We say in this article that he--hie engine stalled at 700)0 feet. He says he was
shot at and hit at 68,000 feet. I'm not quibbling about the 2,000 feet, that doesn t
make much difference."
GAVIN: "It's the shot-at area that you are qeibbling on.
PEARSON: "That's right. In other words, he testified that the Russians shot
him at 68,000 feet. The information that the Air Fore* has, and it is definitely
official information--no, I don't think--and we repeat it there-- ie that he was not
shot at, that the Russians have no missile or plane that could hit or fly that high.
Ind, when, as we recount in this article) at approximately 70,000 feet-eit could
have been 68,000--he turned on the emergency radAo in hie cockpit and shouted
'Flame-out', which means stalled--his engine had stalled. And this was picked up in
Turkey by one of our monitoring stations. And at that point he coasted down, Net
as you would your car down a hill to start your engine again."
COIN: "You say in your article he spiraled down to 1,0,000 feet."
PEARSON: *That's right, in order to get his engine started. The atmosphere
at 70,000 feet is so rarefied that you can't do anything with it, and dawn lower you
can get started, but at that point he WO shot. Now the question is, why is the
testimony different from what we believe to be the facts?"
CAVIN: "Well, couldn't that possibly be the effect of the RussianS' questioning
and whatever they have done to Francis Gary Powers eince he's been in their hands?'
PEARSON: *Yes, that is definitely my opinion. I think they treated him with
great skill, I don't believe that he was brainwashed, as you and I usually think
of the -word brain-washed, but his defense attorney, who was an able defense attorney'
undoubtedly got in there with him, and quite rightly told him that if he testified
along certain lines, he would be dealt with more leniently.
"And the very important thing is that the Russians didn't want anyone to know
that they had a plane--that an enemy or a potential enemy rather, or any foreign
country is a better way to put it, could fly over their country and not be shot at,
and I think that's the reason for his testimony."
GAVIN: "Well, new, Drew, you brought out a very interesting point also, which
we have beard some facts on, and I'm interested in your interpretation. You said
that May Day dawned perfectly, the weather on May Day was perfect, either for
picnicking or for U-2 spying, and that the sky over Russia had to be cloudless to
give the cameras a clear view, the upper atmosphere had to be dry so that the plane
would not form giveaway (ton trails) (?). If the weather had not been ideal, Powers
yould not have made that May Day flight, now weld any other flights across Russia
have been attempted until President Eisenhower would have completed his visit to
Russia in mid-June?Nay 2--had already been set as the day for him--the last day--
moratorium-Jo,
PEARSON: "That's right."
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CAVINt *Now, you state that the weather was perfect, Mr. Powers took off, and
It the SaMe time in another part of the country another plane, as a decoy, was taking
Off, auppoiledly to lure the Russian radar and all the Russian trackers into thinking
that this was Powers. Would you give us a few facts on that?"
PARSON: "Well, the other plane took off from--1 think it was Adana--at least
it WAS along the Turkish border--and flew toward Pakistan from Irene along the Iranian-
Pakistan border. The reason for that, as you've indicated, was that the emerican
bases in Turkey could communicate with Powers and the Russians would think-ewe hoped
they would think we were communicating with the weather plane. The weather plane was
not violating Russian territory; we fly- those all the time.
"However, in this particular case, we did not know that the Russian were wise
to what had happened, and they had sighted a previoun plane about April 1--"
GAVIN: "A 1)471
PEARSON: "A U-2,"
GAVIN.: "Which had also gone deep into the interior of Russia?"
PEARSON: "Which had gone deep into the interior of Russia, and they were com-
pletely aware that this plane on May 1 was coming, and they were waiting for it. They
were waiting for it for a couple of reasons. One was the reason I just mentioned,
that this other plane had come along on the first of April. The other was that they
knew that we were worried about these very important bases of theirs in Central
Russia, around the Caucasus, where they have their bie missile bases, they are Benue
facturing some of their biggest rocket projects, and obviously that's what we need
to see."
GAVIN: 'Una this all goes right into the story which Allen Dulles, the Director
of CIA, made last night when he spoke before members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
Mr. Dulles said that the Kremlin is jealously guarding the physical areas of the
Soviet Union where it is building up in secrecy its formidable military weapons.
Dulles declared that the Russians have repeatedly refused to accept a meaningful form
of inspection, the best guarantee that disarmament can be honest, and Dulles then
charged that Russia believes it is free to prepare in relative security for its
spying on, their bases inside, and that this is our only method of getting pictures
--aerial pictures--right?"
PEARSON: "That was the only method we had, and unfortunately the most tragic
aftermath of all this is that we now don't know what is going on inside Russia., and
we do know--we have pretty good reason to believe that they are transferring these
bases to other parts of Russia, and even have some of their missiles on railroad care
so they can be transferred in a hurry."
CAV1Nt *Drew, you made another point, when Mr. Powers was actually captured,
some of the material that be had with him, including a hypodermic syringe with poison
which killed a Russian dog in 30 seconds, was found, and there is a question in ley
Mind after reading your article, written with Jack Anderson, as to why Francis Geer
Powers didn't uSe the hypodemic needle, because, as you point out, &moms who works
for Lockheed but reports to CIA, and one is in a position sore of a pilot than a
app.-didn't necessarily balm to pledge that he would dispose of himself if be were
caught, but he can't expect government backup if he is caught."
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PEARSONt "Quite right. Well, the reason apparently that he didn't ow that
needle was that, in the first place, he had instructions that if he was caught, he
should tell the truth. The reason for those instructions is very simple, that if a
man is captured, well, with modern methods of brainwashing and so on, there isn't
anything that you can do to prevent some kind of a story coming out, and usually
it's a cook and bull story if you're under torture. Now, he probably didn't have
time to use that needle and perhaps he never would have used it--I don't know.
*There have been some theories that somebody got to Powers--that the Russians
got to him before he left Turkey--I don't believe that. The lir Force doesn't
believe it. I think he's--was a guy who was doing his best, he was just an ordinary
guy--"
CAV1/1: "And he decided he wanted to live."
PEARSON: "And decided he wanted to live, right."
CIVINt "Well, the final paragraph of the Pearson-Anderson article on what
really happened to Francis Gary Powers on this fateful U-2 flight, concludest
'Whatever the solution, the age of satellite spying will come, but will it come
soon enough? The hope is that it will arrive before the U-2 pictures, which we al-
ready have in our po3session? of Russia, are too far out of date. Otherwise, an even
worse tragedy may result from our May Day disaster.'
"Drew, that's food for thought, and we hope that everybody gets TRUE magazine
this September and checks through the details which we haven't had time to cover.
Congratulations on an awfully good story, and one final question, Mr. Pearson. Any
truth to the rumor that you are currently working with NBC on a special film project?"
PARSON: "Tea, I've been working very, very hard out of the city for that
purpose, and doing a one-hour documentary as part of the public service program of
NBC on the history and current work of the Quakers, and I hope and believe that it
will be a wonderful film."
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NSA EMPLOYEES MOSCOW PRESS
- BB 48 - USSR I Or 111=NAL AFFAIRS
Sept. 6, 1960
Reportage on Conference
Moscow, Soviet Home Service, Sept. 6, 1960, 1300 GMT--L (UNCLASSIFIED)
(Report on the press conference given by two former employees of the
National Security Agency)
(Text) Long before the beginning of the press conference in the marble
hall of the Central House of Journalists numerous representatives of the
Soviet and foreign press assembled and also radio and televiaion
representatives. What was the topic of the press conferenceV This
question interested everyone without exception.
An answer to the question was given by the head of the press department
of the USSR Foreign Ministry, Kbarlamov, who opened the press conference.,
(Kharlamov recorded statement): Gentlemen, comrades. As you know, in
the press of the United States, Britain, and other countries at the
beginning of August a report was published by the U.S. Defense Department
concerning the disappearance of two workers of the U.S. National Security
Agency. Ths, report mentioned in particular that the FBI and civil
police organizations had begun searching for two employees of the
supersecret National Security Agency who disappeared at the end of June.
It was also reported that these workers were Bernon Mitchell and William
Martin, who for a considerable time worked in the National Security Agency
of the United States.
The workers of the National Security Agency who disappeared are now
in Moscow and have requested that they be allowed to appear at a
press conference for Soviet and foreign jourraliets. Mitchell and
Martin have decided to break with the United States and for political
reasons to ask for political asylum from the Soviet Government.
The Soviet Government has granted Mitchell and Martin the right
of political asylum. The Soviet Government has complied with the
request of Mitchell and Martin concerning the adoption of Soviet
citizenship, and they are now Soviet citizens with full rights. Allow
me to present to-you William Martin and Bernon Mitchell.
Interpreter: Bernon Mitchell wishes to rend to those present a joint
statement left by them in a bank in the town of Laurel in the United States.
Mitchell: We ought to explain to relatives, friends, and mothers who may
be interested why we sought citizenship in the Soviet Union. Since
going to work for the National Security agency in thesummer of 1957
we have learned that the U.S. Government knowingly makes false and
deceptive statements both in defending its own actions and in
condemning the actions of other nations
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USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRNew,
Sept. 6, 1960
The witCh is really indignant: "I pm not a witch. I um Allen Dul s.
I am one of you. There is no question of un-merican activities Are
you mad then? Why me alone? What about Hoover from the Fedora Bureau
of Investigation and Herter?
But nobody listens to the witch. This witch has served be He could
not cope with his duties and failed at every stop. There re, Dulles
and his intelligence agency are being held to account bH he American
authorities.
According to the Weshington POST' AND TIMES HERALD lter told
correspondents that in the beginning he intends t investigate the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Scour y Agency, and
intelligence branches of the Defense Departmen . At the some time,
Walter emphasized that the Central Intellige e Agency, headed by the
not unknown Allen Dulles, would be the main target of the investigation.
At long last, the above committee has sttod business. Dulles should
have been put in the dock a long time o for hardly anyone., has under-
mined U.S. prestige abroad to the ext t that the head of the Central
Intelligence Agency of the United St es has.
Interrogate, .interrogate Dulles, Welter. You have something to ask
him. Ask him several leading al stions: Is it not you Mr. Dulles,
who helps hunt and prosecute h et and talented Americans--scientists
and artists, writers and pa' ers? Is it not you, Mt. Dulles, who,
through your dirty and cru work ? in Guatemala, Iran, Syria, and
Indonesia brought about t wrath and contempt of millions of people
toward your policy? In .; not, finally, with your knowledge, Mt.
Dulles, that spy planes pneer in the Soviet skies only to crash
along with the presti of your country?
Dullest good luck the hard luck of the Americans lie in the fact
that these questi s will not be put to him. Walter will not peck out
the eyes of anot er Walter. In fear two wolves swallowed each other,
a fairy tale s -Fear and confusion now guide the activities of the
American obfu eters. Some are compelled by these feelings to plunge
straitjacke d from sykscrapers. Others search for their own- shadows
in order t question them according to the rules.cf modern criminology
lest the adows lead to subversive activities against those who have
given b th to them.
We d not know what Walter and his committee will do with this new
bi itch. In any case let us give some advice: "Hold him, Mr.
I estigators. Hold him tight. If you let him go, then tomorrow
he will catch you himself.
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(Passage omitted containing Russian suthmary of the statement and including
a short recording of the beginning of Martini's stateMebt--td.)
Announcer: Then the head of the press department of the USSR Foreign
Ministry invited Soviet and foreign journalists to put questions to
Mitchell and Martin.
Question from IZVESTIYA correspondent: You mentioned that (remainder
of sentence indistinct).
Reply: Yes, Italy, Turkey, France, Yggoslavia, the UAR, Indonesia,
and. Uruguay. That's enough to give a general picture I think.
Question from a correspondent of FREIE WELT of the GDR: In your
statement, you mentioned that the U.S. intelligence service has a
post in the embassy of an ally of the United States. Can you
name the embassy in which this American spy works?
Reply: This is Turkey. This was told me by an (analyst?) who worked
on the (several words indistinct).
Question by Moscow radio correspondent Sergoyev: Are the radio
interception stations situated in countries neighboring the USSR
used only against the Soviet Union or also against the countries
in which they are situated?
Reply: Well, it is the general policy to intercept the communications
of all nations that can be successfully intercepted without discriminating
against any nation. (Laughter)
Question by a correspondent of the SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG; What was your
job and task in the agency?
Reply: We were mathematicians in the field of crypotanalysis using
electronic digital computers as aids.
Question by Mr. Frank of the CANADIAN TRIBUNE: I should like to know
some details of your past training and your age. Also, insofar as you
mention Canada in your statement, have you any supplementary data
concerning the state of U.S.-Canadian relations in this field?
Reply (evidently by Mitchell?Ed.) My age is 31. I have a bachelor's
degree in statistics from Stanford University, and then I went to
graduate school at George Washington University. Concerning the
relationship between the United States and Canada on cooperation
in crypotanalysis, well, they cooperate on the communist codebook
(work?)--the communist codebook system--they cooperate on this.
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Reply (Evidently by Martin?Ed.): I'll answer the ffrst question on
biographical data. I am 29 years old, and I received a bachelor's dcee
from the University of Washington in statistics. I stayed with
Mr. Mitchell at the graduate school of George Washington University, and
last year I was given leave to attend the University of Illinois, and
I received my nester's degree in mathematics this June.
Question by a correspondent of the New York NATIOTiAL GLARDIAN:
(Question indistinct)
Reply: The answer to this question is no. However, I consulted with the
people who tid work on these problems. I read their technical reports,
I saw the map of the Soviet Union upon which they plotted the positions
of American pinnes flying around the Soviet Union, and discussed with them
freely all the aspects of their work.
Question: What are you doing at the present time?
Reply: Oh, studying the Russian language, preparing to enter a university
as soon as possible.
Announcer: The Soyiet and foreign correspondents asked some more
questions of Yitchell and Martin and received exhaustive answers.
Text of Statements
Moscow, TASSI Radioteletype in English to Europe, Sept. 6, 1960,
1334 GMT--L (UNCLASSIFIED)
(Text) A press conference for Soviet and foreign newsmen was given in
Moscow Sept. 6. Press statements were made there by the former employees
of the National Security Agency of the United States, Bernon Mitchell
and William Martin, who also read a copy of the statement they left behind
in Laurel before their departure from the United States. The following are
the full texts of these statements.
The parting statement of Martin and Mitchell: June 22, 1960, a parting
statement. We hope to explain to our relatives, friends, and others who
may be interested, why we have sought citizenship in the Soviet Union. '
Since going to work for the National Security Agency in the summer of
1957, we have learned that the U.S. Government knowingly makes false
and deceptive statements both in defending its own actions and in condemninc
the actions of other nations. We also learned that the U.S. Government
sometimes secretly manipulates money and military supplies in an effort
to bring about. the overthrow of governments which are felt to be unfriendl
to the United States.
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sent. 6, 1960
Finally, an instance came to our attention where the U.S. Government
gave money to a code clerk working in the Washington embassy of a
U.S. ally for supplying information which assisted in the decryption
of that ally's coded messages. These activities indicate to us that the
U.S. Government is as unscrupulous as it has accused the Soviet Government
of being.
Many people working in the Department of Defense and in the intelligence
agencies of the U.S. GovernMent know the truth of What We have asserted.
However, if anyone were to Verify any portion of it without official
permission he would be subje'ct to heavy penalties.
The recent U-2 incident had nothing to do with our decision to defect,
for this decision was made more than a year ago. The U-2 incident was
merely an instance where the truth was too obvious to be permanently
suppressed or altered.
In making these revelations we are not seeking excuses for our action.
Neither do we wish to discourage the American people. There are
individuals of great integrity and resourcefulness in America who, if
given a chance, can rectify some of the tragic acts of the U.S. Government
in recent years.
Besides the disillusionment and concern which we have voiced over
certain U.S. policies, other factors have strongly motivated us to go to
the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, our main values and interests
appear to be shared by a greater number of people. Consequently, we
feel that there we will be better accepted socially, and will be better
able to carry out our professional activities. Another motivating
factor is that the talents of women are encouraged and utilized to a much
greater extent in the Soviet Union than in the United States. We feel
that this enriches Soviet society and makes;Soviet women more desirable
as mates.
What are the important issues which divide the people of the United States
and the Soviet Union? One cannot argue convincingly that the Soviets
are evil because they have corrupted Christian virtue. If most Soviet
citizens do not accept Jesus Christ as their personal savior, that is
their business.
The important issues, we believe, concern which economic and political
practices best serve the interests of mankind. A disadvantage of
capitalist society is that its science and technology cause needless
human suffering by contributing to technological unemployment. It is
no wonder that so many people in America feel resentful toward
intellectual and creative activities.
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We hope to beeome scientific workers in the Soviet Union, and we
believe that we will be able to engage in scientific investigations
there without roar of contributing to the economic hardships of others.
Some people in the United States who are er)osed to communism have
advocated a preventive war with the Soviet Union. They seek a kind of
security which involves the annihilation of people with views opposed
to thelr awn, Such a war would at best leave them emperors over the
graveyard of civilization.
Rather than devoting their energies to the development of newer and more
powerful means of destruction, we hope that both the United States and
the Soviet Union will divert their efforts toward competition in the
ideological arena.
One means of achieving this would be to widely publish in both countries,
in mutually agreed-upon volume, unedited debates about economic and
political theory and practice. It is difficult to appreciate one's own
propaganda without having listened to the propaganda of others. As a
means of increasing mutual understanding, we feel that the exchanges
already under way between the two countries of cultural,scientific,and New
industrial delegations should be continued and expanded.
This statement has been made without consulting with the government of
the Soviet Union. The reasons for this are that we feel that we owe
the Amorican people an explanation in such a way that it cannot be
construed later as a propaganda statement inspired by the government
of the nation in which we have asked to be allowed to make our homes.
William H. Martin.
Bernon F. Mitchell.
The following is the full text of the statement for the press by _
William H. Martin and Bernon F. MItchell.
Beforelleaving the United States of America at the end of June of
this year, we left the prevleusly-l-ead statement in safety deposit
box number 174 in the State Bank of Laurel in Maryland, rented in the
name of Bernon F. Mitchell. We brought with us a photographic copy
of this statement.
On the evelope containing this statement, we wrote and signed a request
that the contents be made public, because we wished to explain to the
American people why we decided to ask the Soviet Union to grant us
political asylum.
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Sept. 6, 1960
Reports in the American press indicate that U.S. authorities gained
access to the safety deposit box and found our statement. But they did
no.k., fulfill our request to publish it. We can explain this only by
assuming that the Eisenhower-Nixon administration does not wish certain
aspect of its policies to become known to the American people.
At this press conference, which has been arranged at our request, we would
like to explain, especially to the American public* our reasons for leaving
the United States. de were emj?loyeen of the highly secret National
Security Agency, which gathers dotmuactitions intelligence from almost
all nations of the world for udd by the U.S. Government. However, the
simple fact that the "united States is engaged in delving into the secrets
of other nations had little or nothing to do with our decision to defect.
Our main dissatisfaction concerned some of the practices the United States
uses in gathering intelligence information. We were worried about the U.S.
policy of deliberately violating the airspace of other nations, and,thet
U.S. governmentts practice of lying about such violations in a manner
intended to mislead public opinion. Furthermore, we were disenchanted
by the U.S. Governmentts practice of intercepting and deciphering the
secret communications of its own allies. Finally, we objected to the
fact that the U.S. Government was willing to go so far as to recruit
agents from among the personnel of its allies. An instance of this
'practice, involving payment to a code clerk of a U.S. ally, was mentioned
- in our first statement.
At
At this time we would like to Make some general comments relative to
our reasons for leaving the United States. Before joining the National
Security Agency, we had a high degree of confidence in the honesty of the
U.S. Government, and we considered ourselves to be loyal supporters of
the American way of life. But-the policies mentioned above, which have
been. carried out by the U.S. Government.in recent years, raised serious
doubts in our minds as to whether the causes these policies are intended
Lo support are actually worthwhile. It was a difficult and painful
e2,Terience. to laue our native country, families, and friends. Yet,
we felt that the U.S. Government, in carrying out policies dangerous to
'world peace, should not be allowed to rely upon these emotional attachments
to guarantee the loyalty of its citizens.
In the statement which we left in the United States, we expressed the
opinion that a preventive war would be futile. It should be evident
that those who contemplate unleashing wars constitute a grave threat to
humanity. Should another world war occur, there would probably be no
further opportunity to build communism, capitalism, or any other form of
society.
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Sept. 6, 1960
However, some people in the United States disagree on this matter. For
instance, Gen. Thomas Power, commander in chief of the U.S. Strategic
Air Command, made the following statement, which was published in the
United States in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on appropriations during debate on the 1959-1960 military
budget. He said: I would like to leave the deterrent role for a moment
and talk about the philosophy of initiation of a war and the tremendous
advantages that accrue to the man who starts a war... (PASS ellipsis).
You always have a capability to strike fist, because obviously if these
people thought we never could start a war, why, then they could just take
this world, away from us by piece, because they would know that as long
as they do not strike as, we could never do anything about it.
General Power's statemett involves the dangerous presnuption that the
United States owns the worldl.and implies that emulation of the Soviet
Union represents taking something away from the United States. His
proposal to strike first in an attempt to prevent the trend toward
socialism sounds to us like a more suicidal thaneeffective policy.
Senator Barry Goldwater, chairman of the Republican Senatorial Campaign
Committee, made a speech in Chicago on the eve of the Republican
National Convention, in which he said, we must not agree to a further
ban on nuclear testing, nor disarmament in the near future. In this
same speech he also said: To our undying national shame, there are among
us those who would prefer to crawl on their bellies to Moscow, rather than
to face the possibility of an atomic war.
We do not hesitate to include ourselves in the company mentioned by Senator
Goldwater. In fact, we would attempt to crawl to the moon if we thought
it would lessen the threat of an atomic war. General Power and Senator
Goldwater occupy important posts in American society, but we do not
believe that they reflect the attitude of the majority of the American
people
After the U-2 incident, the U.S. Government admitted .its? policy Of
deliberately violating the airspace of the Soviet Union. U.S.
officials, particularly Vice President Nixon, tried to justify this
policy by claiming that it was the only way to forestall a surprise
attack by the USSR. Vice President Nixon did not mention that much
of the information gathered on these flights could be useful only in an
attempt to penetrate the ?Olefenses of the Soviet Union. In connection
with this, the statements of General Power take on ominous meaning.
They could forestall a surprise attack by the Soviet Union by striking
first. It is very difficult for the Soviet Union and other nations to
assume that General Power was only expressing his private opinion: in
his official teatimony before congress.
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Sept. 6, 1960
Besides its attempts to contain communism in the eastern hemisphere,
the United States recently declared that it would not tolerate communist
influence in the western hemisphere. Perhaps U.S. hostility toward
communism arises out of a feeling of insecurity engendered by communist
achievements in science, culture, and industry. If this is so, such
feelings of insecurity are a poor excuse for endangering world peace.
The ring of U.S. military bases surrounding the Soviet Union seems
to indicate that the U.S. Government thinks it can effectively combat
the ideas of communism by military means. If the United States and
the Soviet Union were to improve communications between their peoples,
perhaps there would not be so,.much antagonism, and conditions might be
created which would make possible a large-scale diversion of military
funds to peaceful purposes.
Let us now consider the aerial intelligence policies of the U.S.
Government. Our first acquaintance with these policies was during
the time that we served with the U.S. Navy, from 1951 to 1954. We
both served as communications technicians at several U.S. Naval
radio intercept stations during this period. The U.S. Government has
recently admitted carrying out intelligence flights around and over
the borders of communist nations, but only during the last four years.
However, we would like to state that these flights were also being
conducted in the period 1952-1954 when we were serving at a U.S. Naval
radio intercept station at Kami-seya, Japan, near Yokohama. In
advance of a reconnaissance flight of a U.S. military plane along the
Chinese or Soviet far eastern borders, a top secret message would be
sent to Kami-seya and other communications intelligence stations,
informing them as to the flight time and the course of the plane.
At the designated flight time, monitors at these stations would tune in
on the frequencies used by radar reporting stations of the target
country, that is the Soviet Union or Communist China. At the same
time, radio direction-finders would tune in on these frequencies to seek
out the locations of the radar reporting stations. Information
gathered in this manner would then be forwarded to the National Security
Agency. There, analysts study the communications and code systems used
by the radar stations. The National Security Agency is then able to
estimate the degree of alertness, accuracy, and efficiency of the radar
defenses of the target nation, and it is also able to collect information
about the organization of command within the target nation's internal
defense system.
After going to work for the National Security Agency, we learned about
another type of aerial intelligence mission which involves incursion
into the airspace of the target nation. These missions, known as
elint missions (electronics intelligence--TASS) consist of flights in the
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Sept. 6, 1960
immediate proximity of radar Installations of the Soviet Union and
other countries to obtain data about the physical nature of radiations
from radar transmitters. This information is used in an attempt to
find ways to render the radar defense system ineffective, for instance
through the use of radar-jamming devices operating from bases close to
the Soviet borders. Flights of U.S. planes along and over the borders
of the Soviet Union are routine operations and the number of such
flights is far greater than is generally supposed by the U.S. public.
In order to clarify the nature of such flights, we would like to discuss
one of them in detail.
In September, 1958, a U.S. C-130 plane flew over the Turkish border
into Soviet Armenia. This plane never returned. The U.S. Government,
as it invariably does in such cases, issued a cover story claiming that
the plane was engaged only in gathering scientific information and
that the crossing of the Soviet border was accidental. The United States
claimed that the 0-130 had been shot down over Soviet territory without
provocation. The Soviets confined itself to a statement that the
plane had crashed.
In February, 1959 the State Department relased a recording in Russian
which it claimed substantiated its contention that the 0-130 had been
shot down inside the Soviet Union. However, the State Department said
nothing about the actual reason that this plane was flying over the
Soviet Union.
In connection with this incident, we would like to make the following
comments.
Late in the afternoon of the same day that the State Department released
the above recording, Lt. Gen, John Samford, director of the National
Security Agency, speaking on the NSA internal broadmasting system,
suggested that NSA personnel refrain from discussion of any questions
pertaining to the 0-130 flight. It is clear that if the 0-130 had
really flown with the sole intent of gathering scientific information
NSA -would have had nothing to conceal.
Despite General Samford's suggestion, NSA employees did discuss among
themselves the possible far-re.ac.hing c(mnequences of the 0-130 incident
for the United States. A high official of NSA told William Martin that
this particular C-130 plane was carrying electronics specialists and
special equipment for receiving at close range the signals of Soviet
radar transmitters. This official added that the Turkish-Armenian
border had been dniberately crossed in order to get into the immediate
proximity of Soviet radar installations.
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Sept. 6, 1960
It should be clear even to a layman that information about radar defenses
has no bearing whatsoever on the problem of ascertaining whether or not
the Soviet Union is preparing for a surprise attack. This information
can be utilized only for the purpose of determining the defense potential
of the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, various U.S. officials condemned the Soviet Union for allegedly
shooting down the 0-130 without sufficient leason. Hubert Humphrey
said in effect that the Soviet Union should not have shot down the
0-130 and should refrain from molesting U.S. planes in the futute. His
arguments assumed that the State Department's statements regarding the
incident were truthful and that the United States was the injured and
innocent party.
Thinking that Senator Humphrey and perhaps most members of Congress were
ignorant of the facts, we decided to speak privately with a congressman
and see if this was the case. In February, 1959, we obtained an
appointment with a congressman who had publicly expressed concern over
the State Department's concealing from congress pertinent facts about
the 0-130 incident. During this appointment, we discussed the statements
of Hubert Humphrey and commented on the failure of the executive branch
to keep Congress correctly informed. We explained to him the nature of
the C-130 intelligence mission) and indicated that we felt such
violations of the airspace of other nations were dangerous to world
peace.
Our conversation was interrupted when the congressman received a
telephone call from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional
Relations, Mr. William Macomber, who requested him to refrain from
further public discussion of the 0-130 incident. Again, it is clear
that if this plane had been engaged solely in gathering scientific
information) the State Department would have had no reason to be concerned.
Further corroboration that the United States has a policy of conducting
overflights was obtained when a high official of NSA told Bernon
Mitchell that the United States had intentionally violated the Chinese
communist borders on aerial intelligence missions.
We hope that the American public will bring pressure to bear against
the U.S. Government's policy of violating the airspace of other nations.
A single incident or misinterpretation concerning the purpose of planes
involved in these flights could be the cause of war.
It is difficult to understand how U.S. officials can maintain an attitude
of indignation when the Soviet Union takes defensive action against
U.S. planes flying over its terlitory.
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The Soviet Government has shown great forbearance with respect to these
flights, and has repeatedly called upon the U.S. Government to ce4se them.
Mbreover, so far as we know, the Soviet Government has refrained from
making any retaliatory flights around and over the United States.
We have purposefully stressed in detail the intelligence flights of
American planes over the territory of the Soviet Union and other countries
because this practice might be the cause of a great catastrophe.
The connection of the National Security Agency with aerial intelligence
missions has already been described Now, -in order to give a bet or
perspective of NSA, we would like to add the following details.
Some information concerning NSA's activities is given in the book
"Central Intelligence and National Security" (Harvard University Press,
1958--TASS). The author correctly states: The NSA specializes in
communications intelligence. It operates as a semiautonomous agency
of the Department of Defense, under the supervision of the Secretary of
Defense's Office of Special Operations. In addition to maintaining its
own professional staff for technical operations, NSA exercises broad
supervision overioand coordination of, the Army Security Agency and
similar communications intelligence groups within the Navy and Air Force.
Further, Ransom states: ...(TASS ellipsis) NSA plays a major, if
unobtrusive, role in the national intelligence community...(TASS ellipsis)
at any rate, through the National Security Agency and related units, the
American Government is again engaged in communications intelligence on a
world-wide scale.
NSA headquarters is located at Fort George G. Meade in Maryland, about
25 miles north of Washington, D.C. The NSA building at Fort Meade is
second in size only to the Pentagon among U.S. Government buildings.
Approximately 10,000 people work there, under the direction of Air Force
Lt. Gen. John A. Samford. About 100 million dollars a year are spent
to maintain the NSA headqnarters at Fort Meade, the basement of which
contains a large number of electronic computers. The network of radio
intercept stations which supply information to NSA extends throughout
the world and keeps in continuolls operation more than 2,000 manual iLtercept
positions, which are staffed by more than 8,000 arMe3 :forces intercept
operators. A smaller number of additional peroonnel operate eqgdrment
for the interception of radioteletype transmissions.
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Sept. 6, 1960
Some intercept units are located on ships and planes, but most of the
intercept activity is carried out at U.S. military radio stations located
in foreign countri08. Both enciphered and plain-text communications are
monitored from almost every nation in the world, including the nations
on whose soil these intercept bases are located.
To maintain this extensive network of intercept stations and to forward
intercept material to NSA headquarters costs about 380 million dollars a
year. Thus, including the cost of operating NSA headquarters, the
United States spends almost half a billion dollars a year for
communications intelligence.
NSA headquarters is subdivided into four main offices: 1) the office of
production (PROD), 2) the office of research and development (R/D), 3) the
office of communications security (COMSEC), and 4) the office of security
(SEC). The major functions of PROD are to receive intercept material
from the stations, to perform cryptoanalysis and traffic analysis, and to
analyze the resulting information. R/D carries out research in the fields
of cryptoanalysis, digital computing and radio propagation, and carries
out the development of new communications equipment. COMSEC is responsible
for the production and security of U.S. cipher systems,, SEC conducts
low investigations of NSA personnel, gives lie detector tests, and passes on
the loyalty and integrity of NSA personnel.
Major subdivisions within PROD and R/D are as follows:
PROD
1--ADVA: Studies high level Soviet cipher systems and diplomatic codes.
2---GENS: Studies Soviet military code systems and medium level cipher
system.
3--ACOM: Studies the code and cipher systems of Asian communist nations.
4--ALLO: Studies the code and cipher systems of U.S. allies, neutral
nations, and some communist nations.
5--MPRO: Provides electronic digital computing and data processing services
to other divisions of NSA.
R/D
1--REMP: Conducts crylAoanalytical research and works on applied
cryptoanalytic problems without restriction as to country, provides
consulting services to other divisions of USA, and carries out research
Awe in computer componentry.
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Sept. 6, 1960
2--RADE: Designs radio receiving and transmitting devices, radio
direction finders, radio fingerprint apparatus, and studies unknown
communications systems.
3--8TED: Studies possible weakness of cipher machines in general,
assists CONSEC in the design of cipher machines for U.S. use, and studies
the process of enciphering speech.
Successes obtained by the National Security Agency in reading the code
and cipher systems of ether nations are due primarily to the skillfulness
of cryptoanalysts, frequently aided by electronic digital computers.
However, success in at least one case has also been faciliteted by the
fact that the U.S. supplied to other nations cipher machines for
which it knew the construction and wiring of the motors. As we have
said before, the success, concqrning one of the U.S. allies, was aided
by the fact that the United States paid money to a code clerk of that
country for his information,
The National Security Agency includes a special group, the United Kingdom
Liason Office (MO), which is staffed by British citizens.
Likewise, in the British communications intelligence organization
called GCHQ, there is a corresponding NSA liason group. Britain and
the United States exchange information as to cryptoanalytic methods
and resalts in reading the code systems of other nations, and their
respective networks of radio intercept stattons supplement Qte another.
Besides the United Kingdom: the United States mdlintains close cooperation
with Ccnada in the field of communications intelligence. As we know
from our previous experience in working at NSA, the United States
successfully reads the secret communications of core than forty nations,
including its own a114es. Besides what we have said above, other factors
in our decision to defect were the suppression of informatinn,
restraints on the freedom of expression and political activity, and
the discrimination against people who are not theists.which exithts in the
United States.
For instance: accordIng to U.S, press reports, the federal government
each year confiscates 50 million pieces of mail entering the United
States, frequently without notifying the addressees that nay seizure
has taken place. In the State of Marylnnd, where we lived, in order
to hold any post whatsoever with the state government it is necessary to
take an oath to the effect that one is a theist. People whose political
convictions are unpopular with those who determine U.S. policy are frequently
called before investigating committees, harassed, fined, imprisoned,
and denied jobs.
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a
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY
1313 61 - USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Sept. 6, 1960
By means of withholding passports, the U.S. State Department attempts to
keep within U.S. borders citizens whose political views are not in favor.
Victims of this practice have won some court battles, but the State
Department is constantly pressing congress for new legislation to tighten
up the issuance of passports.
Are theseepractices in keeping with the free and open society which U.S.
officials so often proclaim exists in the United States? We do not think
so.
Finally, we would like to say a few words about our personal situations.
We have, of course, renounced our American citizenship. We have asked
the Soviet Government to grant us Soviet citizenship and assistance in
learning the Eussian language. Both of these requests have been met,
and in addition the Soviet Government has offered us the choice of
living wherever we choose. Moreover, we have been offered the opportunity
of continuing our education and assistance in finding jobs in our
capacities as mathematicians, providing approximately the same salaries
as we received in the United States. Recently we made a tour of the
Soviet Union, visiting a number of cities, plants, collective farms,
universities, exhibitions, cultural centers, and sanatoriums. We have
familiarized ourselves with the way the Soviet people live, the progress
they have made, and the problems they now face.
We will be glad to hear from relatives or friends who wish to correspond
with 116 or visit us and we will give them a good reception.
- 0 -
ZHUKOV TRUES ETNIOPIA--G,A. Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee
of the USSR Council of Ministers for Cultural Relations eign
Countries, who stayed in Addis Ababa as a guest of the ey iet Embassy,
left on Sept. 2 for the USSR via Cairo after a sh9 stay in the
Ethiopian capital. (Moscow, TASS, English, . 2, 1960,
1510 GMT--L) (UNCLASSIFIED)
SOVihT-FINNISH PACT--A contract,Xer supplying eight Finnish tankers to
the Soviet Union from 1964965 was signed Sept. 2 between the Soviet
Sudoimport organization the Finnish company Rauma Repola. The new
order is an addition . the contract drawn up in May 1960 during the
fourth Finnish in20. trial exhibition in Moscow. Then agreement was reached
for 15 Finnis ?xegtkers during the period 1961 to 1963. The contract
comes with' he scope of the third five-year agreement which was signed
in the umn of 1959.in Helsinki. (Mbscow, TASS, Russian, Sept. 2, 1960,
1645e --L) (UNCLASSIFIED)
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September 12, 1960
Honorable Franc Le E. Walter
House of Representatives
Washington 25 D. C.
Dear Francis:
I have given a great deal of thought to your letter of
2 September 1960.
One purpose of ray telephone call to you on 2 September,
was to thank you for inserting in the Congressional Record the full
text of my address before the Veterans of Foreign Wars at Detroit
on 22 August 1960.
Another purpose was to call attention to an AP report of a
statement which you made to the press on 1 September, and which
was widely circulated throughout the country, that "The FBI gave
the CIA certain information which certainly should have deterred
the hiring of at least one of those two men," referring to the two
NSA defectors. The AP added "He declined to amplify."
I feel sure that this statement was made on the basis of a
misunderstanding since it has no basis in fact. No such Information
was given to the CIA by the FBI, or by anyone else, and there was no
particular reason why it should have been so given since the question
of the screening of these two men for employment by NSA was not a
matter over which the CIA had jurisdiction or responsibility.
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Subsequentlyon September 7, 1960 Department of
Justice gave out the following statement:
"Reports that the FBI had furnished unfavorable
Information to the Department of Defense of Mitchell
and Martin prior to its employment of them are erro-
neous. The pre-employment investigation of these men
was conducted by the Department of Defense and not by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In response to the
normal inquiry made by the Department of Defense in the
course of its investigation, the FBI reported that it had no
information in its files concerning these men.
In my telephone call to you, I also expressed regret that your
statement was tied in closely to another statement attributed to you
by the Associated Press that "The CIA will be the first target of
inquiry."
I sincerely hope that you will find occasion to correct the record
as regards the prior furnishing of information to this Agency about the
NSA defectors.
I should welcome an opportunity to discuss with you certain
other comments in your letter, rather than attempt to deal with them
by correspondence. You and I have had many good talks together, and
since we have both spent many years of our lives in trying to expose and
defeat the subversive communist menace, it is unfortunate there should
be the misunderstanding which your letter indicates.
There is one further point, however, that I would wish to clarify.
This relates to the statement in your letter regarding CIA'reluctance
to convey to the Congress any information regarding its personnel, as
well as its activities in the field of national security. . .
The Congress itself has set up, in the Senate and the House,
subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees and of the Armed
Services Committees, for CIA matters. We have appeared many times
before these committees and certain other committees to which we have
responsibilities, such as the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. In 1959
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8 such appearances and so far in 1960 16 appearances.
orrnly responded to requests from these committees,
Imes I have taken the initiative in asking the committees
to hear me, I do not recall a single instance during appearances before
these committees when we have failed to answer fully and frankly their
questions with respect to CIA activities. I feel sure that if you would
inquire of Representative Cannon or Representative Kilday, the re-
spective chairmen of the two subcommittees I have mentioned, they
would beer out what I have said.
Certainly I agree with you that there can be no monopoly what-
soever in the mobilization and deployment of the resources of the
country in meeting the Communist menace. In my speech at Detroit,
which I gather you viewed favorably, I tried to emphasize this view-
point and the need for a far broader understanding by the country of
the grave issues which face us.
AWD:at
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - DCI wThasic
1 cc - DDCI
1 cc - ER
1 cc - Legis. Counsel
1 cc - IG
Faithfully yours,
?(Sig.i.1) ALLEN W. Blita.:;
Allen W. Dulles
Director
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C?14C-RESSIRtiav ---,M14144111715'',....lease 2004105/13 Ifeik-RDP90T00782R000100020001-1
PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS
Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public
bills and resolutions were introduced and
6evr_sra11y referred as follows:
By Mr. WALTER:
H. Res. 642. Resolution to authorize the
Committee a T -'niprin to
conduct a full anti complete study of Chh
Intelligence agency, of the United States, to
the Committee on Wiles.
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])Nf,
RI,C01(1; SEP 11960
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?OTHORIZING COMMITTEE ON UN-
AMERICAN ACTIVITIES TO CON-
DUCT A FuLL.. DilliserE
STUDY or;'
CE
AGENCrI3V 'T TED- STATES
(Mr. WALTER asked and was' given
permission to address the House for 1.
minute.)
Mr. W4kThR. Mr. Speaker, I have
tit resolution calling for
a full and complete study of each in-
telligence agency of the 'United States.
I have long felt that the Congress of
the United, States shOilld be more fully
informed regretting' the SevMil intelli-
gence agencies a the" (Icilerlifffent which
are vital In the life:and-death struggle
in which weore? engaged -with the inter-
national ConnnutilSt'conspiracy.
While I1eftthre that the' Committee
on Un-American ACtivities presently
has Jur1s41ction And' the truthbrity to
conduct the ..vithreh I propose, be-
cause of tliq ria v if the stbject mat-
ter and also bid an7 riegtfo' ns of
possible p. no ilaP ing in jurisdic-
tion with ? ees, I feel that
it is soun " '-fot.rtie to submit a
resolutiOn:Q Iltfte--in which the
Committee -Atheiltair Activities is
specifically directed to Make this study.
I want to point (?).1t that the resolution
requires that extreine? caution he taken
in order tOjtvoid any possible clisclosure
of confidential' information or of tech-
our intelligence
niques employed by
agencies. ,
Is there ihiPliCation or conflict in the
powers iurisdietions, and functioning there
of
our intelligenee agencies? Are
sfeas inwhiclitrei.e 'should be either
an extended activity or a withdrawal of
activity by these agencies? How can
their efficiency be improved? Is the in-
formation acquired adequately safe-
guarded from unauthorized disclosures?
Is this informatIon made available for
maximum practicable utilization by
policymaking agencies of the Govern-
ment?
These and other questions ()tight to be
carefully and jucliCiously exPlored by the
representatives of the people. In my
judgment, the Committee on Un-Ameri-
can Activities is specially equipped to
make this study and I accordingly ex-
pect to press for early approval by the
House of my resolution.
.der
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HOLD FOR RELEASE UPON INTRODUCTION OF RESOLUTION
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Congressman Francis E. Walter (D-Pa.), Chairman of the Committee on
Un-American Activities today introduced a resolution in the House of Repre-
sentatives calling for a full and complete study of each intelligence agency
of the United States.
Commenting on his resolution, Congressman Walter stated, "I have long
felt that the Congress of the United States should be more fully informed
respecting the several intelligence agencies of the Government which are
vital in the life-and-death struggle in which we are engaged with the interna-
tional Communist conspiracy.
"While I believe that the Committee on Un-American Activities presently
has jurisdiction and the authority to conduct the study which I propose,
because of the nature of the subject matter and also to avoid any questions
of possible partial overlapping in jurisdiction with other committees, I feel
that it is sound practice for me to submit a resolution to the House in which
the Committee on Un-American Activities is specifically directed to make this
study.
"I want to point out that the resolution requires that extreme caution
be taken in order to avoid any possible disclosure of confidential information
or of techniques employed by our intelligence agencies.
"Is there duplication or conflict in the powers, jurisdictions and
functioning of our intelligence agencies? Are there areas in which there
should be either an extended activity or a withdrawal of activity by these
agencies? How can their efficiency be improved? Is the information acquired
adequately safeguarded from unauthorized disclosures? Is this information
made available for maximum practicable utilization by policy-making agencies
of the Government?
"These and other questions ought to be carefully and judiciously explored
by the representatives of the people. In my judgment, the Committee on
Un-American Activities is specially equipped to make this study and I
accordingly expect to press for early approval by the House of my resolution."
The resolution reads as follows:
RESOLUTION
"To authorize the Committee on Un-American Activities
to conduct a full and complete study of each
intelligence agency of the United States.
AppritemsVettReditaiet209VINaltgAclingiNiaaNii0MKGRZW-lacting as
a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized and directed to conduct a full
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-2-
and complete study of each intelligence agency of the United States
in order to analyze the organization and operation of each such agency
for the purpose of determining the efficiency of such organization and
operation and to determine whether such efficiency can be improved
through elimination of duplicate activities and functions, or in any
other manner. As used in this resolution, the term 'intelligence agency
of the United States' means any executive department or agency of the
United States conducting intelligence activities and any unit within
any executive department or agency of the United States conducting
intelligence activities.
"In the conduct of the study authorized by this resolution, the
committee or subcommittee shall exercise extreme caution so as not
to reveal any information with respect to the organization or methods
of operation of any intelligence agency of the United States, or any
other information, the revelation of which may impair the continued
effectiveness of the operations of such agency or may be detrimental
to the security of the United States.
"For the purpose of carrying out this resolution the committee
or subcommittee is authorized to sit and act during the present Congress
at such times and places within the United States, including any Common-
wealth or possession thereof, or elsewhere, whether the House is in
session, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, and to
require, by subpena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such
witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence,
memoranda, papers, and documents, as it deems necessary; except that
neither the committee nor any subcommittee thereof may sit while the
House is meeting unless special leave to sit shall have been obtained
from the House. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the
chairman of the committee or any member of the committee designated
by him, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman
or member.
"The committee shall submit a progress report to the House as soon
as practicable during the present Congress, together with such conclusions
and recommendations as it deems advisable. Any such report which is
made when the House is not in session shall be filed with the Clerk of
the House."
-oo0oo-
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"JASIIINGION POST SEP 2 1960
A i) 'I1MES HFRALD
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Rep. Waiter Asks Probe
Of Intelligence Agencies
,Aciatid Preu
rt.:. Francis -E. Vv'aiter seta tip safeguards against
Pli.) asked the House yester-
tay for authority to nivesti-
ote all United States intent-
ience agencies.
Walter, chairman of the
iciuse Committee un
Un-
trnerican Activities, intro-
bleed a resolution to author-
""a full and complete
tudy" of each agency.
The move ? apparently was
rompted by the disappear-
ince of two mathematicians
ImpleYed.by the National Se-
iurity Agency. Both are be.
iievedi to have defected to the
omniunists.
Walter said yesterday ..that
their disappearance showed
weaknesses in the Nation's
oecurity system. Earlier . this
week, House' Majority Leader
.john W, McCormack (I)-Mass.)
'sired Walter to 'investigate
the diaappegyme of the two
NBA men:
House approval of the Wal-
ler resolution, 'almost certain
to be granted, would permit
an investigation to start at
any time.
In submitting the resolution,
Walter said he felt that Con-
'peas should have more infor-
mation about activities of in-
telligence agencies "which are
vital in the life-and-death
struggle in which we are len-
gaged. with the International
Communist conspiracy."
..,..Yridter,fald the resolution
any disclosure of confidential
information or techniques of
Intelligence agencies. It would
authorize the Committee to
go into these questions:
"Is there duplication or con-
flict in the powers jurisdic-
tions and functioning of our
Intelligence agencies? Are
there areas in which there
shouid be either an extended
activity or a withdrawal of
activity by these agencies?
How can their efficiency be
improved? Is the information
made available' for mytimum
practicable utilise ti on by
policy-malFing agencies of the
Government?"
-Walter told newsmen he
specifically has in :dud '.:at
the outlet of thelprobe to look
Into the Calais). Intelligence
Agency, along with the Na
done! itecutity Agency and.
intelligencearnui,of .the
tary serviqes.', . ?
He tectiebtlid that the CIA
will be the chief target of the
Inquiry.
The rilL *Ater ,declared,
was not called in to. make a
pre-employmenj ,investigation
of the two NSX loyes w#9
Cup '
Waiter added,
**aye,
should
have de
at least one of those.two men.
He
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lerr
SPY PROBE
? ? ri''INGTON ? ? JI
'AS (AP) - -R.EP 'T'7` LT (D-PA) AS KED CONGRESS TODI
Y TO I T I -
GAT E ALL If. S INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
ALT ER 9 CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON un-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
I NT RO DUCEI) A ?PJSOLUTION TO,...A_UTHOR E FULL AND COMPLETE STUDY" OF
1'A ('r A
k...1 't
P CY
THE MOVE ? APPARENTLY AS PROMPT ED BY THE DISA PPEARANC E. OF T
MAT HEMAT IC I ANS EMPLOYED BY THE S UPER S ECR ET NATIONAL S ECIJEITY AC ENCY.
BOTH ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE DEFECTED TO THE commIsTs.
JALT ER SAID YESTERDAY THEIR DISAPPEARANCE S HO'nED DEAKHESSES IN THE
NATION '5 SECURITY SYSTEM. FARLI ER THIS JEEK, HOUSE jORITY LEADER
1-''CCORNACK (1)- MASS ) AS KED ALTER TO INVESTIGATE THE DISAPPEARANCE
OF THE T A) NAS MEN.
HOUSE APPROVAL OF THE ..j.ALTER RESOLUTION!, ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE
GRANTED, ..,JOULD PERMIT AN. INVESTIGATION TO START AT ANY TIME.
IN SUBMITTING THE RIM OL UT I ON ,'.1P1 LT ER SAID HE FELT THAT CONGRESS
SHOULD HAVE MORE INFORMATION ABOUT ACTIVITIES OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
"AiICH ARE VITAL IN THE LIFE-AND-DEATH STRUGGLE IN 'dHICH 'flE ARE
ENGAGED JITH THE INTERNATIONAL CON':';UNIST CONS PIRACY. "
HE ADDED THAT HE DELI EVED THE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE
HAS AUTHORITY TO MAKE THE PROPOS ED INVESTIGATION. BUT HE SAID
BECAUSE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER HE YJANTED TO OBTAIN SPECIFIC AUTHORITY
OF THE HOUSE TO MA KE THE STUDY.
.jALTER SAID THE RESOLUTION SETS UP SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ANY DISCLOSURE
OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OR T EC HNIQUE'S OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.
ITJJJJTI1QIZPTHE COMMITTEE TO CO INTO THESErs
?Is THERE DUPLICATION OR CONFLICT IN THE PM.J.T.RS JURISDICTIONS AND
it FUNCTIONING OF OliR INTELLIGENCE, AGENCI ? ARE THERE AREAS IN.SICU
JTHZRE SHOULD BE EITHER AN EXT ENDED ACTIVITY ORANITUDRAIAL OF
. ACTIVITY BY THESE AGENCIES? HON CAN THEIR EFFICIENCY BE IMPROVED?
IS THE INFORMATION MADE AVA ILA 7LE FOR MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE. UT I LI ZATION
BY POLICY- MA KING AG ENC I ES OF Uri.' GOV 7. NL'IEMT "
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;;E&CD/E.R15:TP 9/1
1 1 1
'444av
\ INQUIRY.
T IIE Fri, ?fALT ER D ECLAR ED ) .)AS NOT CALLED IN TO IIA 1.< 7 T I-IE C L EA a AN C 7
INVEST I GAT I ON 07 T I-NE T A) Nan 7.1.PLOYES :.;Ii0 DIS A PPEAR ED .
"T HE 7717" .JA LT ER ADDED, "GAVE THE CIA C ERTA I N I NFOR n TI 0 N 'UHIC H
' CERTA II.?;LY S ';0 LID HAVE D ET ERR ED THE HIRING OF AT LEAST ONE OF THOSE
T _.:'0 NEN . " FR: DECLINED TO AM PL I FY .
EX PI->, ES SING CONCERN A 13 o uT THIS, -.IA LT ER SAID "IT MAY :.' EL L THE THAT
CONGRESS SHOULD REaUIRE THROUGH LEGISLATION THAT ANYONE EMPLOYED 7Y
THE GOVERNNENT SHOULD FIRST PF: INVESTIGATED AND CLEAR ED FY THE FPI . "
ER2-:,-; P 9/I
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?AS NGT ON -- ADD SPY PROBE ( )
IN AN INTERVIEDJALTER SAID HE SPECIFICALLY HAS III I-JD AT THE OUTS TT
OF THE PROBE TO LOOK INTO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEI:CY. ALONG :4ITY.
THE N66 PLUS TNT INTELLICENO ISOFTUE VARIOUS MILT TARY S ER VI C
LE ADDED, I-10 .`/E_,V ER THAT THE SCOPE OF THE RESOLUTION IS S MFF I C I ENTLY
1720AD TO PERMIT THE COMMITTEE TO LOOK INTO ANY AGENCY DEALING HIT!'
I NT EL L I G C E
HE INDICATED, II0L'JF:JP,R, TIIAT THE CIA 'JILL T L-"7 C 1 TA"?
;
- OF
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UPI- 107 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 :Atool 0782R000100020001-1
(SECURITY),
REP, FRANCIS Es WALTER,ID'PA., SAID TODAY THAT TWO MISSING EMPLOYES
OF THE SUPER-SECRET NAI.IIQUali.,UalaiLLAGENCY HAD N 0 T BEEN CLEARED
BY THE FBI BEFORE THEY WERE HIRED.
WALTER ASKED THE HOUSE TO DIRECT THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN
ACTIVITIES, WHICH HE HEADS, TO INVESTIGATE ALL GOVERNMENO
INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCIES, INCGUDING THE NSA.
HE INORODUCED A REJ11,zillIagswIlAZIWAIZING THE COMMITTEE T0 M44440:0ULL
AND COMPLETE STUDY" OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. HE SAID HE EXPECTED
THE HOUSE TO ACT UPON IT BEFORE ADJOURNING.
THE COMMITTEE LAUNCHED A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY THIS WEEK INTO THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF NSA MATHEMATICIANS BERNON F. MITCHELL AND WILLIAM He
MARTIN.
WALTER TOLD UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL HE WAS "ASTOUNDED TO ND"
THAT NEITHER MAN HAD BEEN CLEARED BY THE FBI.
FILE ON ONE OF THEM
9/1--.'DP245PED
HE SAID THE FBI HAD A
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UPI-111
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ADD 1 SECURITY (UPI-107)
THE INQUIRY 'INTO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF MITCHELL AND MARTIN WAS
REQUESTED BY HOUSE DEMOCRATIC LEADER JOHN W. MCCORMACK WHO SAID HE
HAD INFORMATION WHICH "LEAVES N 0 DOUBT" THAT THEY HAD FLED TO RUSSIA
WITH VALUABLE INFORMATION ABOUT U.S., CODES.
IN INTRODUCING THE IllaaLlairzwutuglay,4NT9,74LIGENcE
AGENCIE.454 WALTER SAID HE HAD FELT FOR A LONG TIME THAT CONGRESS "SHOULD
BE MORE FULLY INFORMED" ABOUT THEM.
HE SAID HE BELIEVED THE COMMITTEE ALREADY HAD AUTHORITY TO MAKE AN
INVESTIGATION, BUT ASKED FOR A SPECIFIC DEIRECTIVE TO AVOID ANY QUES-
T N OF OVERLAPPING THE JURISDICTION OF ACOTHER-HOUSE COMMITTEE.
WALTER SAID THE PROPOSED INVESTIGATION WOULD COVER THE CENTRAL
IIGENND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AS WELL AS
THE NSA.
THE RESOLUTION DIRECTS THE COMMITTEE TO ANALYZE THE _ORGANIZATION
AND OPERATION OF EACH AGENCY. IT REQUIRES THAT "EXTREME CAUTION" BE
TAKEN TO PREVENT ANY POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
OR INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES USED.'"*P
tiessmemetzwerscatesq*Mia042001064/7
1--DP252PED
00.04.1,41.04111.10$,MO.,..4.00.4*40... .
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leir4
Statement given out by the Justice Department - September?, 1960
Reports that the FBI had furnished unfavorable information to the
Department of Defense of Mitchell and Martin prior to its employment
of them are erroneous. The pre-employment investigation of these
men was conducted by the Department of Defense and not by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. In response to the normal inquiry made by the
Department of Defense in the course of its investigation, the FBI
reported that it had no information in its files concerning these men.
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 Approved ForReWase2904/N/13tbee
intelligence
I Agencies
Inquiry Set
Vinson Committee
Acts as Walter
Schedules Hearing
By John G. Norris
Sports Reporter
Chairman Carl Vinson
(D-Ga.) of the House Armed
Services Committee named
a three-man special subcom-
mittee yesterday to conduct
a "complete investigation"
of Government intelligence
agencies.
Stressing that his Commit-
tee has jurisdiction over the
Pentagon's intelligence units
and the Central Intelligence
Agency, Vinson seemed to be
suggesting to the House Un-
American Activities Commit-
tee that it stay 0.14 of the case
of the two National Security
Agency defectors.
Chairman Francis E. Wal-
ter (D-Pa.) of the Un-American
Activities group, already has
announced plans to call NSA
officials Sept. 16 for question-
ing about the defectors.
President Eisenhower, com-
menting on the incident, said
it means that the Administra-
tion must review its "entire"
security procedures "to see if
there is any one way we could
better it." "We must be always
on the alert, very alert," he
told a news conference.
Congressman Walter, how-
ever, told newsmen that the
President "has made it abun-
dautly clear he doesn't want
to cooperate" with his group
in trying to eliminate subver-
sives from Government. He
cited a White House refusal to
furnish the names of many
Federal "security risks," hold-
ing non-sensitive, non-policy-
making jobs, who were fired
earlier hut reinstated as the
result of a Supreme Court de-
cision.
Administration officials pri-
vately have expressed concern
over the possibility of a free-
wheeling House Un-American
Activities Committee probe
into the defection of NSA code
clerks Bernon F. Mitchell and
William H. Martin. They fear
that a renewal of a McCarthy-
type loyalty investigation?
involving top secret intelli-
gence agencies this time in-
stead of the State Department
?could do untold harm.
Vinson's announcement that
three veteran members of the
House Armed Services Com-
mittee who already are privy
to many defense secrets nd
procedures will inves
case was viewed as to
conduct a "more
and pertine
the whole station,
compromising vital
secrets.
Meanwhile, . it developed
that the Rep. Wayne L. 'Hays
(D-Ohio) may have been the
Congressman Mitchell and
'Martin said they visited 18
months? ago to warn that the
Unite,40*Ates "was sending
pla Crier RusSi,a.'
s, interviewed by tele-
phone at his home in Flush-
*, Ohio, said two men
vis-
his Capitol office then
th suck:, a y. He said
they rept' themselves
is CIA m
d
com-
plained e Americantn
flights, but,Afrged that their
identity mot be revealed lest
they lose their jobs "and their
families would suffer."
To the best of his recollec-
tion and that of Mrs. Hays,
the Congressman said neither
of the men looked like the
p u b 1 ''
stroo 'graphs of
Mitch. He said
he ha1 k es "some-
Wherei in Wash-
ingtdrit but i. recall them.
Hays A saillt eported the
inciden0 ta tr* ouse Foreign
Affairs 'C?hmitfee, of which
he is a mernber and a subcorre
mittee chairman. He said that
becavask; r,!:if his position, Gov
ernmeMployes often brink.
complaintsiitei Because
this?awl I from disi
couragine c ormants?he
said he didn't report the mat
ter to the CIA.
8 SEPT E E,'R
14-k1Dtbgq*07112RSMOT00020001-1
erence, ..Iitchell an Martin
said they had gone to a Con-
gressman who had publicly ex.
pressed concern over the State
Department concealing from
his Committee agile later re-
vealed facts abo=he Ameri-
can C-130 plane shot down over
Russia in , r 1958
They did name
of the --go t clip-
pings la The on Post
files showed- sys had
made a pro e the time.
The--,t s said in
M osco eytlwere
in Hays office, Assistant Sec-
retary of State William Ma-
comber had phoned the ,Con-
gressman and askedhiRto "re-
frain from further Ipublic tfis-
cussion of the C-130 incident."
Hays said he didn't recall any
such call from. Macomber and
"certainly wo dill have dis-
cussed it with two strangers."
The Mitchell-Martin statement
did not indicate that Macomber
----if he made such a call?knew
about their presen in Hays,
office.
Vinson said his ommittee
already has gathered consider
able data in the NSA ease
"without publicity," and that
to make the "thorough" probe
that is warranted, he has or-
dered a speeial subcommittee
to get to work "without delay."
"The Committee on Armed
Services has jurisdiction over
these matters. ' Vinson said in
a statement. "And the Com-
mittee will exercise. its juris-
diction. This is the Committee
charged by the Congress with
the responsibility for looking
,into matters of this nature."
Rep. .1.11 .1 Kilday (Tex.),
ranking Democratic member
of Vinson's Committee, w a s
named chairman of the speciall
subcommittee, along with Rep,.
Leslie J. Arends (Ill.), ranking
Republican, and Rep. Porter
Hardy Jr. (D-Va.). Kilday said
he had not yet set a date for
a first meeting
On the final day of the spe-
cial session last week, Walter
introduced a resolution au-
thorizing his group to investi-
gate the NSA defection case.
It was not passed. Subse-
quently, the Un-American Ac-
tivities Committee announced
it was subpoenaing the NSA
personnel chief and his rec-
ords for closed door testimony
Sept. 16, after the,Pentagon
had refused its instigators
access to the r0c6rds of the
case.
Yesterday, Walter asserted
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that more than 1000 "security ,
risks" now hold Government
jobs, and that President Eisen-
hower has refused since last
January to supply their names.
He showed neWsmen corre-
spondesice he has had with
the White House, in which he
has tried to obtain the names
of all employes ? who were
separated from the service
under the loyalty program but
rehired after a 1956 Supreme
Court decision which per-
mitted the restoring of em-
ployes fired from non-sensi-
tive jabs.
Walter rev jais! fruitless
correspondenceNtitter,?!: Presi-
dent Eisenhower told a news
conference 'that no problem
has engaged his attention over
the years more kbanf making
airtight the NatioYs?security
proceedings.
Walter said that on Feb. 19,
1960, David W. Kendall, spe-
cial counsel to the President,
refused his request for the
names of those rehired after
the 1956 decision, declaring
that the President "has con-
cluded that it would not be in
the national interest."
Again on April 19, Walter
said, the White House again
refused to furnish the names
on the same ground as before.
He said that many of those
rehired hold what he consid-
ered sensitive jobs, some in
the Pentagon.
In calling the persons in-
volved "security risks," Walter
defined the term as coveri ?
members of Communist',
Communist front organiz*
tions, homosexuals, alcoholics
and persons who associate
with known Cominunists.
Kendall, in declining to re-
lease the names, said the dis
closure of adverse informa
tion "ofte? includes allega?
tions thai iire unfounded or
rebuttable Walter declar,d
in a letter to the White House
that his Committee investi-
gators have collected data
from which he concludes that
the rehiring of the persons is
"a danger to the security of
the Nation." rle said he wants
to queg.i0 ltie individuals he-
hinta rs to help pre- ,
pare. n preventing
Communist infiltration of the
Government.
In another development. t:te
-Justice Ikpartment declared
ill a formal statement that re-
irTts that tihel FBI- had furn-
ig`hed thdl Pentagon unfak dr-
-able information on Mitchel:
and Martin prior to their e,fl
ployment was erroneous ti
said the erliplOyMellt ii
vestigation on the two was con-
ducted by the Defense Depart-
ment, not the FBI.
Walter has been quoted as
saying that the FBI had in-
formed the Pentagon before
they were hired that one was
a homosexual, A--. Defense
spokesman said that "I am in-
formed there is not" anything
in the personnel -risetrrd, of
!ei-
ther Mitchell - indi-
'cating homOs us-
tice Dep . to
say whethe
sequent to
! indicated S
'mation. ?
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GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
7 September 1960
I am enclosing herewith a copy of the letter
from Congressman Francis E. Walter to Mr. Gates,
dated August 31st. Late last eveniV we received
a wire advising us that the hearing had been post-
poned until September 16th. A copy of this wire is
also enclosed herewith.
Sincerely,
CENT BURKE, JR.
Enclosures
The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
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AND Ilt.baLS HERA LD MEP 2 /9Ki
Approv*FirPel4,a4P:e,g,W1?,45118:.:.:.q1K-F9P
44,
82R000100020001-1
104 INDEPENDENT NEwSPAPER mr)Nr. AY, SEPTEMBER 12, Deo PAGE Al4
A-
Ilarn(sing Intelligence
Intelligence and counterinieflew.:11..o agencies
0! the Government nocessarilv do much of thtir
v.ork in secrecy. Nevertheless, the; must be sub-
jected to s reasonable measure of demoeralie
control. They need the whip of criticism -if they
are to function at full eilleienc); and they need
the reins of congressional regulation b keep them
on the route they are supposed to tr-r.vel. Let
altoe.ether undirected, they could he June a menace
to freedom.
A thorough study of intelligm'e activities is
urgently needed, therefore--along with an equally
thorough study of counter-intell4,nce activities.
it veins altogether unlikely, liov.el.cr. that such
Ftuconducted with the recpww(..!etachnient,
nonpartisanship and penetration---can he expected
in the midst of a presidential elefe ion campaign
fr.orn any committee of Congress.
Of the 20 standing committees of Inc House
of Representatives, the House Committee on Un-
American Activities seems, by all odds, the least
apt for such an undertaking; and of all the 437
members of the House, Rep. Francis Walter seems
to be the least qualified to direct the study. For
one thing, this committee is a partisan in the cold
war waged by the FBI against the CIA. For an-
other, too often it has been a hunter of heresy,
not a student of security in the broad sense. Fresh
evidence of this was offered by Mr. Walter's asser-
tion the ?other day that more than 1000 security
risks now hold Government jObs.
The House Armed Services Committee. headed
by,Rep. Carl Vinson .is, of course, much more
rikonal and responsible; and has much 'mere' claim
tOlurtsdiction. But something more .is .required
today than a mere examination of personnel clear-
ance procedures and operating methods. What.
i4wanted is an over-all evaluation of. the effects
ofitie Intelligence agencies on national security.
Ckni.natiOnal freedom. -
thing onght:.to be curtained from this evalua-
althOugh",much will have to be kept in -
dence--kePt, this is to say, from publication.
e evaluators: Willneed to find out what, for
ple;:ttiC4'.itelng. undercover,. how re-.
fully :iind.iCeurately It is garnering the
satin of outstanding Americans whose judgmer;
would command universal respect. Perhaps the:?.?
ought. to be selected, as in some past instances,
jointly by the President and congressional leaders.
They should be men of such stature that they can
be trusted no less than Mr. Dulleseand Mr. Hoover
with access to all manner of classified information.
And' they ,should be outside the pull of political
partisanship.
Such a commission ought to be recreated
least once a decade?to pass judgment
on. 'the performance of those agencies which, by.
reason of their duties, must function without the
con.gressional scrutiny and public t-iticism which
serve so usefully to keep the rest of the Govern-
ment on a proper course. Such a twoe.ission could
do its work without the hamperirez ? nduence of
a permanent ?vatehdog committe of Congress.
Reporting peLiodically to Congress and the country,
it could strengthen security and strengthen public
confidence in the indispensable 1:tsruments. of
security.
tion ,for, 'Pp* decisions, how effectively
evaluators 1l1 h4ave to judge the ,extent to'' ,
the cOUtiter,htt.elligence activities :of' the
is distinguished from its law-enforcement
tie.i,llhaveServed' security or impaired free-
.7171:,.alsO:will. need to find out what. ho
:beenkn?* Lot 86 years---.the extent to yihich
BI tflthtime of eottnter?ititelligexice, hs
lied 401114:045'? On law-abiding citizens siniply
use tildr-"expressett heterodox opinions or.
?
joined.organtotions of? which the FBI disapproved.
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K
on LD,
Dear Senator Fulbrigh
001-1
1960
Thank you for forwarding a copy of the letter of
Z6 Augst 1960, which you received from Mr. Wallace Taft Berry,
complaining of an approach made to hint by a representative of
This Agency prior to Ms visit to the Soviet Union this summer.
I have ascertained that Mr. Berry was indeed visited in May of
this year by a CIA representative, but that he was not requested
to make observations in our behalf nor to secure information of
any kind.
directives under which we operate includes
the duty ott obtaining within the United States from institutions and
from private individuals who are potential sources of foreign intel-
ligence, inform.ition which might be of value to our national security.
Accordingly, on a selective basis, our representatives do occasion-
a.Uy call upon travellers to certain areas of the world with a view to
determining their itinerariee and capacity for observation as Li. basis
for possible interview upon their return. Information of this kind
obtained in the normal course of travel has provided data of sub-
stantial value, particularly in areas where access is occasional or
limited.
In the case of Mr. Berry, our records are clear that
initial interview, which I have mentioned, disclosed that
is qualifications nor his itinerary were such as to make
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t, C -
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Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DC1
1 -
DDCI-
1. - DWI
1 - IG
1 Legis. Counsel
1-00
Retyped: AIND/ji
re there is no tsat.ntiouto
e are carte ditional
glad to iurMsb you orally.
Faithfully yours,
:mg (12 Sept. 60)
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WASHINGTON STAR
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naiu U 2
CIA Asked Him to Spy
hi Russia, Tourist Says
CHICAGO, Aug. 31 (AP).?A
young business executive says
:the Central Intelligence Agency
asked him to spy during a tour
of Russia.
Robert Berlin, 28ryear-old
`ACe president of a sales corn-
,
Ipkny, said in an interview in
Ithe Chicago American that the
!CIA approached him in June.
-1058, as he prepared for a trip
? Which included 10 days in Rus-
sia.
., He refused ? becanse of the
risk involved, he said, and -be-
;cause he did not think it was;
'? right 'for a tourist to spy. --
Mr. 'Berlin said he has Just
now ievealed the . CIA's con-
? tact with him because the
"United States Government has
protested that same hmerican
tourists in..Rua have peen
culled spies and 'ejected from
the country.
-- Ur. Berlinsaid .s CIA *agent
visited ittim and "asked me if
I would. conside.r making cer-
. tain mental observations while
? tv.att? traveling in Rtir4ia and
he asked if I would submit a
copy of hir Itinerary for tin
He WWI not. offered money.
Mr. Berlin said, but "that prob
ably would have come up if
would have accepted the jab"
"ir found out later that some
one -who identified himself as
being from the CIA
ray neighbors about , back"
n
ground re
and ptitetoctioned
i
"I also- heard, they :tided to
check my high. eglipohypoord."
Atri3trlin otteldirefed
the CIA request fetWito days
and then =based tctilliihmit
report on his trip. He heard
nothing further' fmalthe CIA,
he said. ?,e *1
The American said CIA head-
quarters in Wathington had no
comment to make On Mr. Ber-
lin's story, iltbotaith i? CIA
spokesman said. "Igs our bust-
MU to seekInformation "%ere,
ever we can get It.lust suilhe
Russians try to get information.
And it is is,10t easter for ping
tei tat it', ? - '
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IA Should Do Ifs Own
rr HE STATEMENT OF Robert Berlin.
a Chicago sales company executive,
that he was asked by a representative of
? the central intelligence agency to serve
it an espionage agent on a tour of Russia
tWo yea te jigooptiggests that there is con-
, enterable stupidity in the operatiohs or
--.1taking espionage agents of tourists
" would be the surest possible way to defeat
. the administration's hopes- of improving
understanding between the Russian and
American peoples by having Americans
fleck to Russia as sightseers and get ac-
Ouainted with individual Russians.
:ir
MATEUR SPIES CAN BE depended on
to blunder Ind get caught, and whert-: ?
?
eyer this happened, the Russian govern..
ent would make loud propaganda of it:
ri fact, the soviet. government was busy
terdif trill* to make important prop:,
arida out of its own unsubstantiated
rge that American tourists have teen?
caught a few American
visitor's spying, 4ts
strengthened. So .
not succeeded bt
can business tray
temporary agents.
.greatly
CIA /mai' 7
THE CMCAGO EXECUTIVE, Berlin,
says he based his refusal to work for,
the CIA largely on the ground that he
doesn't think it is Tight fat' e+rists to spy.
This is a valid morel scruple. Applying
It to Russia seems a little .quixotic, tho,
because every Russian who visits this
country, or any other, na **diplomat,
lournalist, a commerciartiOnt, an enter-
tainer, or a tourist, actually comes as a
spy for his governifient.
Individual Russians dvet take trips
abroad on their own in' We, If they go
abroad, it is because *goterrunent
expects to get soMethi oi4 of the 'trip.
Americans can go on ij,esentIng?i
?sinhobtiOnit thinned
that way Lit thnCIA
ing4 eying
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?
CIA Asked.
Him to Spy,
Tourist ays
071,
CHICAGO. Aug. 21 (AP)--A
young business exectlitive says
he was asked by the Central
Intelligence' Agency to spy
during a trio to Russia but re-
fused.
The CIA approached Rob
ert Berlin, 28, 1,1e,e president
of a sales company, in June
1958 as he prepared for a
,trip, which included 10 days
in Russia, 13(!rlin said yester-
day.
Herlin said he refused be-
cause of the rjsk Involved
land because be does not think
iit right for a tourist to spy.
In an interview with Chi-
cago's American. Berlin geld
;lic revealed the request be-
cause the U. S. Government
has protested that some Amer-
lean in- Russia hitie
'been called spies and d.
Berlin said a CIA
,ited him and asked 4,1t. he
!would considet ?making 1- ?-
thin observittiabs"
!while he was traveling.** us-
:sia and also requested 1/1
of hi, itinerary.
In Washitiron the oxik ad,.
no comment on Berlin'e'sterY,
Chicago's American said. The
newspaper, however, voted,
a spokesman as eayhtg that;
w?it's our business to seek in.'
fortnetion wherever we ear4
get It, just as the Rusidans4 ?
to get information, And',
t la a lot etuder lot Was to
?1 it." -
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SP 2 19r,0
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NM FS
Circ.: nu 38 295
or.nt t Othor
roitoe PAf,
Dat(Pt
Questionable Timing
ea REVELATION of Robert Berlin, s
young Chicago business executive, that
two years RR() he rejected s Central intelli-
gence Agency request to spy during a tour
of Russia leaves at, least one pertinent ques-
tion imanswered
From the evidence at nand it does not
appear that he was exited to do anything
very sneaking or coinplicated but only to
make certain mental observations and submit
a written report. But if he considered the
activity spying, his refusal 'cannot he criti-
rtzed ?it was a matter between him and his
conscience
Entirely another matter. however, was his
timing in disclosing the incident. ',Why It
was necessary, or even artvisatbk, for him to
mention it at all isn't clear, since he, bad
refused the request?one. Incidentally, which
the CIA was quite as justified in making as
he was in declining He could have closed the
case without the fanfare. and the puzzle is
why he didn't.
Mr. Berlin explained he revealed the con-
tact lust now because the U.S. Government
has protested that some American tourists'in
,Russia have been called spies and ejected:
It seems inconceivable that he Intended to
'aid the Soviet Union in any way. Yet, since
his statement tends to uphold the Red con-
tention, It seems equally inconoelvable.that
he should not have recognized that the prin-
cipal effect of his belated announeernent
?Noulti. be. to support Premier Khrushcbev's
hand
?
?
-s
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1 196U
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1REFUSED TO SPY,
I AMERICAN SAYS
He Liiiks CIA !Wind To
Toth, Of Russia
Two missing U.S. experts said to
have taken data more important
then first believed ?Page 2
Chicago. Aug. 30 0B?A young
business executive said today the
Cential Intelligence Agency asked
him to ? spy during a tour of
Russiii. ?
*bed' 28-year-old vice
t di. a sides company,
sa d in an interview in the
cago, American that the CIA ap-
promthed him in Jone, 1958. as he
prepared for a trip which in-
luded ten days in Russia.
He refused because of the risk
involved. Berlin said, and be-
cause he did? not think it was,
right for a tourist to spy.
Visit Recalled
Berlin sold he has just now re-
vealed the'CIA"8 contact with him
because the United 'States Hew:
tin said, but "that probably nizetki
have come up U I would have
accepted the job."
"I found out later that someone
who identified himself as being
from the CIA . questioned my
neighbors about my background
and reputation.
' Report Refused
"I also heard they tried to cheek .
my higbekhool record."
? Bali% .said he considered the
CIA request for two days and
then refused to submit a report
on his trip. He beard 'nothing fa-
ther from the CIA, he said. ?
The American said CIA. head.
quarters in Washington had no
comment to make on Berlin's
story ,although. t CIA spokesman
, "It's our business to seek.,
Information wherever we can get'
It, just as the, Russian try to get,
information. And it is a lot easier
for them to der EL-
erranent has protested that seine
American tourists in Russia have
been called spies and ejected from,
the country. ,
Berlin said a CIA agent visited' .
him end "asked peifIwouIt ,
consider making certain mental;
observations *idle I was traveling`
'ha Russia. ahd he asked lf I would -
Submit .copy of my, Itinerary .
for tho
He Was not dieted money, Bet-
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CA. A y,-X (1 CA) r ???
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Jo Spy or .Not to Spy,?
read the story of Robert Berlin's refusal to spy for the C i a Russia
and got the feeling he considers himself a hero for d . "to.aid. his
country.
I can't understand his explanation. He sAid 1140 Amifican avelers.
rr being embarrassed by .
the questions of 'Russian
authorities; blurtin7"
mit the request to spy will
,erve to strengthen 'os-
ow- and there
will he miu h !nom ques-
joullig in the future.
he request of the CIA .
" Itirlked too dangerous," he'
said. Other people placed ?
Ms position probably
would have agreed to help
ince they might realize the '
i5 necessary. Berlin's
" confession" wifl aggro-,
vote the chances these oth-
ers will take. ?? '
our Presidenrs decisions
frequently are based min. ?
formation he gets from the
CIA. Berlin ins4verttly
did Putsia a bit f
- muse he Likely: Me
' off the source of this.
formation. "
I hope no one Isla naive
he can't see the importance
of counter intplligence-
is not a pleasant chore but
is essential.
I believe the real motive .
for Berlin's action was to
see his name and picture in
the newspapers. I am re- .
minded of an old saying:
. "If you could have been
silent, you would have been '
a wise man." ?
JOSEF HIPPELE
(Editor's note?This is one ?
? of many letters received on
.Mr. Berlin's refusal of a re-
quest by a CIA officer- to re-
port cartels Lel his obsetvII-
dons on it tour of Russia. 411
, vedette !mut Berlin's ex
-
mit o ?41A 'ffiction.),
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CIA-Tourist Incident
I am amazed that a citizen
of the United States feels he
is above doing something for
his country during these
times. Robert Berlin report-
ed that he was asked by the
CIA to ''keep his eyes open"
while on a tour in Russia.
He knows the record of Rus-
lana entering our country.
The Russian feels honored to
so serve his , country. But
apparently Mr. Berlin feels
his citizenship does not and
should not make any ,de-
mands on him. We are at
war?the most vicious type
ever devised by a group of
men little if any above ani-
mals. It is time every citi-
zen feels It is an honor and a
cluty to help his country in
every way he can by "keep-
ing his eyes open" every-
where he goes, and pass any
helpful bits along to the right
authorities. Some great man
has said?"When we are at
peace we have privileges anti
responsibilities: when we are
at war we have only responsi-
bilities." According to Mr.
Berlin, Le was not asked to
spy in the real meaning of
that word, but to "keep his
isms open." In other ?words,
he was asked to observe life
In the USSR. '
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?
Prof and Business Man
Help Ease World Tension
(11{1(7,1(4).
stands in I:?tte?:? ti e press
htite, two recently
how to eontribi.te to the
etis:rm horsiors iltetwtpri the
U. S. and the Soviet 1,7n100.
In allglVt'r to a I)aity News edi-
rial n ov]ot "st
114, Po%vors spy ti ii. Nob-
vrt Burly,- young Ch !rag? -
ti VC, stilted that when in 195$
lie planned a tour to Eurcpe, in-
cluding' 10 days in the Soviet
Union, he was approached hy the
CIA to act. 83 an agirit for the
1. (Odle in the USSR. He was
(oh l that tourists CK/1 sometimes
do a better job than off'cial
?agents. At that time he refused,
but realized later, as he said In
this letter, that there must have
been 'more .daring tourists ?
who have been in the- Soviet
,Union, and helped, to use your
words, 'Soviet stage managing."
,Robert " Eisner, Profebsor of
F;Conomics at Northwestern Frti.
versity. wt,o{e from Paris, Fra?aa?
to answer an edit ii jii to thi
N. V. Times that try 1'e
touriO. to the 1.7SSt lays tile
self open to spy chartres the
if hc se much as diicuss..-: eeti-
nomit?s with a So-iet
tikes pictures, et...
"1- he -professor :mit hi: tvtic
virlio were in lidowoiA doritt tht?
trial, found such sLiteniells ab-
solutely untrue. net, as .?rell
other tourists they met lit Mos-
cow. ?Nere 'met with frieiallines:t
and courtesy, he said. Ho ended
his letter us follows: .?
"It would certainly he most
-unfortunate if the influential
voices of the - Atnericanpre
were to be used, unjuistifiahly,
tO frighten of discourses -Ameri-
cans .from part icitstting peace-
ful and mutually enIfIgliten'-nt
contacts with Citizens 4t the So-
viet Union."
? .
"fts"
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i.NQUIRER
C;rc.: m.. 203,960
S.. 277,547
ron, Edit
Page Par
Date:
Other
al)
Was 'CIA' Worker Bancifklet? *trig Spy tr. tan,
CHICAGO, Aug. 31 (UPI) ?
Hobert Berlin, 28, vice presi-
c,nt of a sales company, told
(-,,i,?ago's American that in
;.'fis a man who identified
b..mself as a Central Itate111-
rrice Agency worker asked
..7n. to spy for this Country
, ,? a. trip to Russia.
f,rTlin said he received a
,ephor e call about a week
t,..rnre his departure on a
I ,vtl? month tour of Europe
Asia, and. the caller, met
him In his Chicago office.
He sbowed credentials stat-
ing hc?wpi a CIA agent..
Berlin said that the caller
"asked me if I would con-
sider making certain mental
observations while I was
traveling in Russia, and he
asked if I would submit a
copy of my itinerary for the
trip." ToUrists, the man told
hint, often were better at tic-
qUirint 'information than
trained agents.
After a daY.to think it ovgr,
Berlin said, he decided
against accepting the sisal
merit for several reasons,
the main one being the risk
involved. He said he told the
agent that he did not feel it
was right for a tourist to spy.
Berlin said the miltterwas
not preksed and he neve
heard from the. roan again.
He 'said he disccvered iater
that soMeone who denUf1ed
iditeelf its being'
?
CIA "cjiestloned nty neigh-
bors about my Ifttickground
end r utagon.1
No zoney offer rodeA
Berl said, but he kid "that
pro ly would have: come"
up MI would have accepted
the b."
Ti American said that in
blngton, CIA headquar?
had no comment to make
e story, but a' spokes-
said it was "our bust-
we re-1:r wSeeacaningrt it,atiLnt
sti the Russians try to get in- '
fOrmation. And it is a lot'
limier for them to get it.at
,
AUG 3 I
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-
.5 MOINES (Iowa)
RIBUNE
front
Pan.*
f)cite:
e, 127,523
Fdlt 0th.,
Pomo Pope
Snubs CIA:
No Tourist
Should Spy'
mcAGO, ILL. va A
?)n g business executive
he WAS asked by the
Central Intelli-
gence Agency
i;(e1A) to spy
during a trip
to Russia but,
refused.
The CIA ap-
proached Rob-
ert Berlin, 28,
yice - president
Of a sales com-
pany, In June,
1958, as be
prepared , f o r
""u" art' overseas
trip that included 10 days in
Russia, Berlin said Tuesday.
Berlin said he refused be-
cause of the risk involved
and because he does nOt think
it's right for a tourist to 'spy.
"A lot of people have told
me 1 would get la trouble tell-
ing this story,?but I believe
in expressing what I think,"
Berlin said. ?
?? Prote,sts
in an interview with the
Chicago American, Berlin.
aid he ditclosed`the request
because the U S. governs:lent
has - pegestai that Aimee,
Arneri tourists in Russia!.
have been called spies, am;
expelled from the omit*. .
Rerlin.sahl a CIA agent
visited him and asked if
he woo consider, Magni
"certain mental observe-
".tions" while he was travel-
ing in Russia and also re- .
quest./ a copy of his
crazy.
The agent told hint thati
tourists ;often Are bettor at;
acquiring information than? ?
trained Agents, '13erlitt sA1fii3eoved For Release
No Money Offer
- lie said-fre was not?offeredl
money but "that prObably/: --"?-
,.?would have come up if
"would have accepted thel
job."
"I found out later that
.someone wbo identified !
himself as being from the ;
CIA questioned my neigh-
bors skint My. background
And reputation."
? After Cansidering the CIA,
request two days, Berlin said,
lie turned,itdown and heard!.
nettling -further from the,
agency.r- ? 4.
In Idiftudil V-C..????the ?
C1 .II4
Pftifetit'6/1.-11Zr.,..4
atory,i the Chicago Amer.}
ican said.!`'."The newspaper.
however, cilloted a spokesman
as saying'? ?
'It't put business to :seek
informatt.oklyhtqvc,r w4,can
get ft, lust aS, ther-Russkina
try to get InfOrntation.- And
if Is a lot edger fnr then* to
get it." ?
90T00782R000100020001-1
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, .
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(Ch.tC:47
A.ugust Jl 1960
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 :CIA-RDP90T00782R000100020001-1
r
t.45 P.M. over WIS (Chicago),
NI snolad 111i:it to direct what I have to say tonigb3 to a cidif401121 I've never
etet. ills name is Robert Berlin. Fiefs 28. 114 lives Ufa near north side bachelor,
Apartment. Yie's vice president of a Sales coopeny at emo West 116nolines here "
CJIicago.
*Ifd like, too9 to,Oirect these remarks to the egny friends I have on the Chicago
;,.e.ICAN, a newapap,or thAt left night heedlinld on the front page Mr. Berlinta story.;
',411.1iva t:7z4.t ilia story, if.trus, is one be 'Would not have revealed and which
not, b?avo printed. Tee, I know about freaffime of the rrosa. Mr. Berlin ?
15.1r ag te:;.dliAe before hia trip to the 033R ke WWI approachod 14 a nen claim-
Lr i'1,4 an scent of our raper secret and incredibly valuable CENUAL INIELLIGLNCE
After proper credentials were shown be wasAiked if he would Use his good
^ j. to ik? certain moatal &serrations while he was in the tlaa and report .them
o-J-) big retvxn.
*Tourist's, be says he Was tele', are often better at acquiring infornaticU than
our trained agents. After thinking over this request from his goverment Berlin
3suidtd to refuse'. And why did he run out of i7 The in reason was the risk
Involved. Me also said be didn't think it was right that a tourist should spy.
mile said be wax offered no money but ? thstiuntlgthave cone.if 66 60
" , -
accepted the Joh, soeethiag I rather question. leowarilfor, 0009 saver
accepted a peony for being President of the Mai hsfelt.this wasone way he could repay the country that bad do ie so nuchzer SIM. '
wHerbert Philbriak makes a voila' Feint
kin nothing except expenses but epssitia6W
country you de so et your GM risk. /lion
a rod by your own fellow Antarleaust what 70uderma? at your own rink, end.just
because you lows your country.
.113037-46.14:. Berlin telling his itory
11106t.effl6tiral 61-301,16t, PrePAganalt6L.,
where they engaged in a spy sears'
6ce6rgad.to the 421,1,0404n again thWire
saying that tM not only paid
to Ma, Lf Yoa'-'de this for your'
caught' by the reds or are exposed en.
insent it can be
ial3y that&
flof elpjtase ,,, 2004105113 clpkto-R719110euTOtin07t8.172R0001001:02000,:t-10 t
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.aei-inv red, in
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4 A: th:1:
',"4!;v%.1. tea** Seit,!
tons3, Isra(,17efl 14-steepti
*sr cpon t rttpo:71, back bi.te,
tie 'and vv
lc he t4-tow?.,1:-,'out
the res4u,-#1.1rottr.i,
? to fesvar 'ottCe tho troll
side ito
e ase1,4rarita, acke
tior. ? lit- nriart
Aro i:ciesi.thAn I
'11.0
r 1 oat
4
11 Toullx tog bowa aporp.w. 'Lhsr,e7.,-. yquilt.pQ-lian 1.:c.- Bele ,-1,1 yes.re. hs.A.ainil
bean done about t'l.fm try. t,tif..., .1,,;.: '..., it:.-od nadi m1,-,/ tiz ---): t -All
made axsafakts ors, eirron ati.zciaec ,1 tie im,e, vim ;:z at the C.I.?: 0 k ; , c In ow.
Pk, Beath. coMO 'leto the ettlwitiGYA. CUM t'd iwaftara 45 latektn - 451' tora,--,1,-, Frp1001
youth dologations.
"Her again nobert Berlin c-rw cun be aide imiat .r,.,r.
- ? ' 1-17 (Ialistingvisbable ?Am Gr toircian Aewspapor) said Vaat cthor itioritma t.
quote when Ow/ 24-4cLed that, 4:ki niZt to thorn vas* ?plc, :?,13,r
to. Ath Mr. Zanies filir Wanton to bolster
hi a roopriatlivdb&ta oerlotolliconoo0
fiotat for ord ' lilt to taXit -to 'Aarrican
diffirults too* for 'orm,toaristri to find ary Eunsi&ne. lithe, '