AN AGENDA FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00435R000100100004-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 28, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
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AN AGENDA FOR U.S.?:OVIET RELATIONS
Prospects for Cooperation ill a Time of Global Change
by
Richard H Solomon
Director
Policy PlaAning Staff
Department of State
(.
I appreciate this opportmilty to address personnel of the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Today's occasion
reciprocates the presentation that Ambassador Mendelevich made
to the U.S. Department of State's "Open Forum" in April of this
year, on the occasion of the'second round of Soviet-American
policy planning talks. His remarks were warmly received by the
"Open Forum" audience. I hope I can live up to his
pathbreaking example.
My remarks today are oriented to the future -- the future
of US-Soviet relations
in a\yorld undergoing dramatic changes.
To put the future that we art planning for in some perspective,
let me begin with a brief no4e on some history. The State
Department's Policy Planning Staff was established in the
spring of 1947 by then-Secret
his in-house "think tank."
ary of State George Marshall as
The staff's first director, the
distinguished Sovietologist G'
noted economist and defense ex
orge Kennan, and his deputy, the
pert Paul Nitze, were present at
the creation of America's post-
war foreign policy. They were
charged with developing policies for the economic
reconstruction of Europe. And t
assessing the significance for t
Union's
hey were also concerned with
he United States of the Soviet
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expanding international activity, particularly in Eastern
Europe. Their labors produced the Marshall Plan and the basic
concepts for America's post-war defense strategy.
Today, forty one years later, we are again at the beginning
of a new iRternational era. And the Policy Planning Staff has
a very different agenda from that of Kennan and Nitze -- one
oriented to the profound scientific, economic and political
changes that are transforming the global system. One indicator
of the depth of these changes is that US and Soviet policy
planners are now able to sit down together and assess the
meaning of these changes, for the world and for U.S.-Soviet
relations.
One of our concerns, as we look toward the future, is the
"new political thinking" put forward by Chairman Gorbachev and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Their bold and far-sighted
program of reform in the Soviet Union has captured the interest
and the hopes of many Americans. What kind of change will
Perestroika, glasnost', and demokratizatsia bring to your
country? What does it mean for us when we are told that Soviet
foreign policy is no longer governed by the theory of "class
struggle"? And do the concepts of "reasonable sufficiency" and
"defensive defense" offer real prospects for diminishing the
military confrontation that has burdened our relationship for
the past forty years? The form and substance you give to such
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concepts will have an important impact on our own approach to
arms control, and to the evolution of our relations.
Our frank and free-wheeling exchanges with Ambassador
Mendelevich and his colleagues have enhanced our understanding
of this "new thinking". And in our current, third round of
consultations we are able to ask the question: In what ways
can our two countries cooperate so as to move us beyond the
confrontations of the Cold War era? This challenging question
requires "new thinking" on our side as well as yours.
Our "dialogue of planners" is designed to help answer this
question. We cannot allow rigid policy guidelines, outdated
concepts, or stereotypes to prevent us from developing new ways
of meeting the profound changes that are taking place in the
world. Today, I would like to share with you two aspects of
this dialogue: first, our assessment of the global trends that
require us all to adjust to a new future; and second, the kind
of agenda for U.S.-Soviet relations that could move us away
from confrontation and toward cooperation.
THE NEW. ERA OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES
Secretary of State Shultz, in a recent series of speeches,
has .explored the transformation of our economies from the
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agrarian era to the industrial age to what is now emerging as
an era of information technologies. As policy planners, what
is particularly interesting about today's "information
revolution" is its profound impact on global economic,
political and security trends.
We and our Soviet planning colleagues seem to agree on the
general characteristics of this emerging era, both its trends
and countertrends. I might summarize these developments as
follows:
? Scientific and economic power are dispersing widely
around the world. Countries such as China, India, and Israel
are getting into the space launch business. South Korea,
Brazil, and Singapore are major producers of electronic
products. At the same time, the gap between the advanced
countries and the less-developed, between those participating
in the information revolution and those who are not, continues
to widen. Even as China and India become self-sufficient in
grain production and develop high-tech industries, a major
portion of the African continent is increasingly burdened with
the threat of famine, and its people still live centuries away
from the world of computers, industrial robots and satellite
communications.
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currency values or the information that crosses sovereign
borders through electronic means, and as they find that
problems of security or ecology can be dealt with only through
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cooperative measures with other states.
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? This trend toward global interdependence is also
producing a worldwide culture of common information and
material products, shared music and common cuisine. At the
same time, we also see parochial trends of language,
nationalism and religious fundamentalism that are helping to
fuel unresolved ethnic conflicts and regio
eA"-ert:Att,s
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? We see a world-wide trend toward political
decentralization and a stress on human rights. Military
regimes and highly centralized governments are finding that
they cannot deal with the challenges and opportunities of this
emerging new era without major political and economic reforms.
,From Argentina to El Salvador, from the Philippines to South
Korea, there is a continuing, if unstable, pattern of
al disputes.
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democratization.
the Soviet Union
Marxist-Leninist
And in the Communist world -- in China and
-- we find concurrent efforts to adapt
political institutions to this new era.
? And finally, despite the advances in material well being
offered by this era of spreading high-tech capabilities, there
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are also sources of greater insecurity: the proliferation of
highly destructive weaponry -- aircraft, missiles, chemical
weapons -- and the emergence of new threats to personal
security -- the international drug trade, terrorism and
ecological damage.
Ambassador Mendelevich and I, in our productive exchanges,
largely agreed on this assessment of global trends. Yet we had
significant differences in our policy approaches for dealing
with these challenges. Our contrasting views could be
described roughly as the difference between a "top down"
approach to problem solving and one "from the bottom up." It
is the difference between a "Comprehensive System of
International Security" and day-by-day cooperation to combat
terrorism or to constrain the international arms trade.
Despite these differences, our shared analysis of global
trends provides the basis for a U.S.-Soviet agenda aimed at
building the foundations of a more cooperative relationship.
Let me describe how I see this agenda.
AN AGENDA FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
The changes now underway in Soviet foreign and domestic
policies have dramatically expanded the working agenda for
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U.S.-Soviet relations adopted at the Geneva Summit in 1985.
Our dialogue in all four areas -- human rights and humanitarian
affairs, arms contro, regional problems, and bilateral issues
-- is now intensive and increasingly focused on practical
achievements.
And what is just as important as the practical issues we
are working is that we are gradually eroding the mistrust of
the past and laying a foundation of mutual confidence. Over
time this will help us expand our agenda of cooperation. If we
learned anything from the experience of detente in the 1970s,
it was that trust cannot be manufactured by vague "agreements
in principle" or by high sounding exchanges between leaders.
It must be built from the bottom up, issue by issue, and it
must be fortified by continuing efforts to solve concrete
problems. The foundation of mutual confidence will be built by
more agreements of the sort now helping to avoid incidents at
sea and more treaties of the INF variety, not by new "codes of
conduct" or abstract commitments to "peaceful coexistence."
In assessing prospects for new forms of US-Soviet
cooperation, we must recognize that we are dealing with a
Process, one that will be prudent, practical and evolutionary.
We are not heading for utopia. The fundamental differences
that have divided us in the past are not going to disappear as
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if by magic. Our two nations will continue to have conflicting
interests; and our peoples will have differing values and
outlooks. Yet to the extent that we succeed in identifying
common interests and creating practical solutions to concrete
problems, we can build a foundation of public support for
cooperative efforts. And hopes are high in many quarters that
this is the new direction on which our relations are headed.
Let me develop this perspective in more detail, in terms of
the four-part agenda':
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First, human rights. Human rights is always high on our
agenda, because our values as a nation make this a entral
factor in American public images of other countries. Public
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support for cooperative activities that our two governments
might undertake rests on concrete progress in the human
dimension of our relationship. In this area, as in others, the
United States favors a realistic, problem-solving approach.
In our bilateral discussions on human rights, our starting
point is the plight of the individual -- the divided spouse,
the refusenik, the religious believer, the dissident in a
psychiatric hospital, the imprisoned human rights activist.
Our interest then extends to the larger legislative,
administrative and juridical framework in which the fundamental
rights of the individual can be realized.
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As we look at the recent pattern of Soviet human rights
performance, we see a moving, shifting picture, not the grim,
frozen image which was so long in our mind's eye. This is a
vital area which you are now addressing in the context of your
own political and legal reforms. We welcome this process, and
understand that it is still in a formative stage.
We have engaged in a practical, official dialogue on human
rights and humanitarian affairs with you for the past two
years. This process is now expanding beyond governmental
channels to involve parliamentarians, lawyers, psychiatrists,
and other interested private citizens.
There is still great room for further developments both in
your reforms and in our dialogue. Your efforts will be an
important source of the trust and confidence we hope to build
into the relationship in the coming years.
Next, security and arms control, a major area of
cooperation and progress in our relations.
The recent achievement of the INF treaty affirms the value
of a concrete, practical approach to problem-solving.
Unfortunately, other Soviet arms control proposals have been
substantially less practical. One example is the notion of
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creating a non-nuclear world by the year 2000. We, too, look
forward to a future free of the threat of nuclear
annihilation. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev
have agreed that a "nuclear war cannot be won and must never by
fought." Yet, while we share this lofty goal, the United
States and its allies are not about to cast aside -- even
rhetorically -- the system of nuclear deterrence that, like it
or not, has kept the peace for more than forty years.
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We seek a safer, more secure world. History would not
look kindl on us if, in the interests of eliminating nuclear
weapons, e
warfare. We want not only major reductions in nuclear arms,
but also a more stable balance in conventional arms at the
lowest possible levels. We want reductions that are verifiable
as well as stabilizing.
only made the world safer for
conventional
This is not to say we can be complacent about the risks of
nuclear weapons. Since the 1960's, the US stockpile of nuclear
weapons has been unilaterally reduced by 33 percent and our
total megatonnage by 75 percent.
In the next few years, we should complete the negotiation
on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive forces. And we
should give serious thought to other measures which would give
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real content to the goal of "strategic stability" -- in part by
considering whether strategic defenses can be used one day to
enhance stability.
We are learning from the experience of INF verification
that the process of building trust is dynamic and
evolutionary. Patterns of openness and cooperation on
sensitive military matters are growing as we implement the
Treaty. Direct ?contacts between our military officials,
especially those that have occurred at senior levels in recent
CAW
months, w44.1 have effect in building confidence and
making possible further efforts to solve practical problems.
I mentioned at the outset of these remarks the global trend
toward proliferation of high-tech weaponry. The Iran-Iraq war
taught us all many lessons about the destructiveness and the
ready availability from many sources of high-performance
-aircraft, missiles of all varieties, and even chemical
weapons. Arms control is no longer the exclusive concern of
the major powers-- not that it ever was. Yet, the example of
our concrete achievements in limiting nuclear and conventional
weapons will be a powerful example to others.
We now face many additional challenges to cooperate --
among ourselves and with others -- in efforts to limit or
eliminate the proliferation of this advanced weaponry. We also
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must cooperate in dealing with such unconventional security
threats as terrorism and the international drug trade. As we
confront these issues, we will have to resolve a variety of
daunting problems, such as appropriate organizational forms for
restricting the international arms market, and the most
effective ways to verify the absence of chemical weapons. And
then there are the substantial costs of verification and
peacekeeping forces which support our efforts to resolve
regional conflicts.
Which brings me to the third element of our cooperative
agenda -- regional conflicts. Over the past two years we have
achieved levels of mutual understanding that were quite
unimaginable at the time we decided in Geneva in 1985 to embark
on regional experts consultations. And we have made
significant progress on some of the conflicts that have long
fueled distrust in our relations -- most notably Afghanistan
and Southern Africa.
Yet we must be clear-eyed about what we have accomplished
and what remains to be done. We are making some progress in
disengaging the East-West confrontation from several of the
many regional conflicts that continue to trouble our world.
This is no small achievement, although much work remains to be
done in such areas as Korea, Indochina, and Central America.
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We look forward to further bold and far-sighted Soviet
decisions such as the one your leadership made regarding
Afghanistan. We await signs of "new thinking" in your approach
to Central America, as well as indications of Perestroika in
Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam.
We have been less successful in promoting political
settlements among the warring parties to regional or local
disputes. Moscow and Washington can not determine the outcome
of internal political settlements; and an approach which
assumes we can impose settlements is bound to fail. Yet we
should persist in our efforts to promote national
reconciliation, realizing that our influence will be limited,
and that other parties may usefully substitute for our
involvement.
The United Nations can play a role in facilitating the
resolution of such conflicts, but two things must happen
first. The parties to a dispute must genuinely want the help
of the UN; and UN member states -- especially those on the
Security Council -- must agree on concrete actions for
peacemaking.
We can draw satisfaction from the fact that we have now
moved a number of regional disputes from overt conflict to a
process of political resolution. Yet a challenge for the
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future will be whether we can prevent U.S.-Soviet differences
from becoming caught up in regional conflicts yet to emerge.
And that test will have an important bearing on our ability to
broaden our cooperative agenda.
Finally, the bilateral dimension of our agenda has produced
most of the agreements that have been signed at ministerial
meetings and summits in the past two years. None have been as
dramatic as the INF Treaty, but taken together they form the
building blocks of a more constructive relationship.
As perestroika advances, we are finding new areas of common
interest for practical cooperation. Cultural and scientific
exchanges have expanded dramatically in the last two years.
And our bilateral trade and economic relations are also likely
to expand as the Soviet economy shifts toward a market
orientation.
We must recognize, however, that economic success in
today's world does not come with membership in this or that
international organization. It is based on being competitive
in a rapidly changing global marketplace; it comes with
producing goods and services that are world class in quality.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we draw great hope from the remarkable
progress made in our relations since the Geneva Summit of
1985. We now have before us more opportunities to resolve a
broad range of problems that have long troubled our
relationship, and to build new patterns of cooperation. Next
January, a new American administration will have a rich agenda
for U.S.-Soviet relations, and a strengthened foundation of
public support for continuity along the path begun three years
ago in Geneva.
All the same, we must be realistic about the limits of
cooperation. What are the limits? First and foremost, we will
remain competitors, with competing interests in some very
fundamental respects. We are certainly not going to abandon
our alliances. We will continue to have differences of view
about how to organize national economies and the international
economic order. And we will continue to have different views
about the relationship between the state and the individual.
Yet, as Ambassador Mendelevich suggested last spring, we have a
special responsibility.t manage our differences so that we
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compete withe a. ? and we must seek
new opportunities to transform our relationship from that of
opponents to partners.
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Second, the dispersal of economic and scientific power and
the growing multipolarity of the world may create additional
tensions in our relations. As the Soviet Union seeks, for
example, to enhance its relations with Europe, it is likely to
create the impression that it sees no place for the United
States in a "common European home." By the same token, the
Soviet Union is likely to look with suspicion on U.S. relations
with Soviet allies, particularly during a period of profound
ferment in Eastern Europe. Rapid change always heightens
uneasiness; and our dialogue will be all the more important for
dispelling mistrust.
Third, other countries are bound to react in unexpected and
not always positive ways to new forms of U.S.-Soviet
cooperation. Some are likely to exaggerate in their own minds
the extent of U.S.-Soviet "collusion," and they may seek to
resist our cooperative efforts.
Recognizing these limitations on U.S.-Soviet relations, it
is our planning task to identify areas of cooperation which
will enhance our national interests and international
security. Our common goal must be to attempt to redirect our
competition into areas that are less threatening to our mutual
security, and to find cooperative ways to build the better
world we each seek.
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