MY NOTES FOR THE DPB PRESENTATION, 14 JULY 1988

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00435R000100070004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 21, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
21 July 1988
NOTE FOR: Sy Weiss
FROM: Fritz Ermarth
Chairman
SUBJECT: My Notes for the DPB Presentation,
14 July 1988
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Here are the notes I used for my presentation
somewhat abridged from the version you saw,
including a few points I wanted to but was unable
to make, and a few which came up in discussion
(e.g., China).
I hope they are of use to you and your
client.
Attachment:
As stated
rth
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SE/RET
NOTES FOR PRESENTATION TO THE DPB, 14 July 1988
"Gorbachev's USSR for the US Defense Planner"
Disarming self-criticism from the Soviets; but who will be disarmed?
Defense planner must take the long view. Russia beginning another period of
reform, one of many going back to Middle Ages. Political drama is real even
though largely rhetorical, so far. Past pattern has been eventual
counterreform, preservation of a system that is autocratic, xenophobic,
backward but powerful enough to threaten. Not yet clear what will emerge.
Can't know for years. Must remember that Western patterns of decent society
rooted in culture going back to Roman Empire. Russia missed all this;
cannot recreate in a generation.
Meanwhile, West must preserve strategic/institutional structures for defense
(e.g., TRIAD, bases, NATO), while getting sensible deals on security
issues. Structures can last, deals may not. Soviet policy aims at
dismantling "Cold War" structures that secured the West, claiming that only
by doing so can Russia finally, really reform. For us to go along means
gambling on an internal and external liberalization without precedent in
Russian history.
Who is Gorbachev?
Enigmatic mixture of visionary and machiavellian, like Khrushchev. Knows
system is really sick, but has incentive to exaggerate this. Seeks more
just, democratic, tolerant society within Leninist one-party system, above
all more productive and efficient. Believes collectivist ideal of Russian
peasant culture, but "modernized". Can't be too sure what is conviction and
what is ploy. Stalin and Khrushchev used visions to get power.
Some unsavory features: Long-time apparatchik, no reformist before 1985
(unlike many of his supporters), authoritarian personality, Russian
nationalism underneath, contempt for Western leaders. Some dissidents
asking whether Gorbachev really stayed "clean" during years of stagnation
and corruption; the KGB knows.
Clearly focused on competing with the US and West.
Truly liberal and humane intelligentsia (e.g., Sakharov) bets on Gorbachev.
Small minority. Now have a voice, but little power. Being used by
Gorbachev. Will they be betrayed as before?
Reform and the Power Struggle
In Soviet Russian conditions, reform requires draconian power at the top.
Brezhnev let power erode out of the Kremlin; Gorbachev needs to get it
back. Radicalizing agenda and mobilizing popular pressures to legitimize
assault on the bureaucracy is his strategy to become a good, but fearsome
tsar (not the first to use this strategy).
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Watch power struggle. New phase: "all power to the Soviets". Transparent
power grab, end-run of apparatus. Also need to show toughness toward
troublemakers (e.g., in Armenia). Until power consolidated and apparatus
purged, Gorbachev can offer little except rhetoric, plans, and media
excitement. He needs to neutralize Ligachev and put his man over the KGB.
Yeltsin and Andreyeva cases showed his vulnerability and also ability to
bounce back. But he has a program, the initiative, and the power of the
General Secretaryship.
Reform and the Economy
No significant results yet, except trouble. Some early boon to consumers is
clearly needed. Prognosis unclear. No communist system yet has
conclusively reformed; jury still out on China. Most of population has bad
attitudes: Cynicism, rob the state, resentment of neighbor's wealth,
resentment of power but fear of disorder, ethnic hostility, conservatism of
partocracy. Free the farmer less viable option than in China; Stalin killed
all the farmers. Real reform means redistribution of economic power and,
eventually, political power; inevitable challenge to the system. Thus,
awful obstacles to real reform.
Only safe assumption for defense planner however: Some increase in
efficiency/productivity is possible while system is preserved. USSR will
become a more effective competitor within lifetime of major US defense
programs. Alternative of sharply weakened USSR is possible (through
protracted internal crisis or social revolt), but don't count on it. Old
saying: "Russia is never as strong or as weak as she looks."
Foreign Policy: "New Thinking" for Old Goals
Gorbachev very successful in creating new image, deflating threats. Accepts
adversaries' agenda, but turns it effectively against him (like JiuJitsu).
Better tactics, rhetoric, propaganda. Implicit revision of ideology toward
compromise. Clear objective of avoiding "shocks" that have derailed detente
,in the past; hence focus on "dangerous military activities." Substantial
but not yet permanent returns already.
Reality "on the ground" shows much continuity in objectives, priorities,
even inhibitions of Soviet foreign policy; its architecture.
Acceptance as superpower. Access to technology and capital via
detente. The syllogism of "peace = arms control" toward the West. If
arms control flags, USSR has no foreign policy toward the West.
Toward Europe, mainly the peace theme. "Common home" hasn't yet
translated into new geopolitical line, new German policy, or willingness
to let East Europe go.
Third World policy still rests on arms transfers and Leninist clients,
but increasing emphasis on "normal" relations with major countries.
Open to settlements, but preserving clients where feasible. Reluctant
about new commitments, but no real test yet. (Maybe in Philippines?)
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Seeks detente with China, as did Brezhnev, but more flexibly. (China
more flexible because of self-confidence and Western strength, not
sentimental about Gorbachev.)
Many Soviet inhibitions remain intact: German division, East Europe,
Japan's islands, relations with Israel. May see some give on latter soon;
Middle East will be an early test of "architectural change". But foreign
policy shifts on scale seen in 1922 (Rapallo), 1935 (Popular Front), 1939 Z
(Hitler-Stalin Pact), or 1954-55 (Khrushchev's New Look) not yet seen.
Should not rule out more fundamental, positive change of Soviet policy. But
expect little change in basic aim of post-war policy: Get US out and USSR
into dominant position on periphery of Eurasia. Dismantling the Cold War
structures will do this, unless USSR collapses or truly liberalizes or
Europe and Japan become strong military guarantors...none of these likely.
Military Strategy and Arms Control: A New Strategic Architecture?
Politically serious debates going on.
Constrain military for economic revival and military modernization in
long term.
Civilian academics seeking self-limiting slogans to promote this
internally, and appeal to the West: "reasonable sufficiency" and
"defensive defense". Military OK appeal to West, but fear internal
impact, loss of their influence.
Perhaps most important shift predates Gorbachev: Marginal but
significant shift of emphasis from nuclear to advanced conventional arms
(Ogarkov). Conventional the usable, cutting edge, but expensive.
Nuclear still needed for pre- and intra-war deterrence and politically.
New combination more effective.
Arms control politics, process, agreements can help implement all aspects.
More predictable future, more relaxed West. Discredit US nuclear
guarantees; block most revolutionary US technological options (e.g., SDI,
CDI).
But what outcome: A benign alternative is plausible (and energetically
advertized). More threatening alternative also plausible: Continued Soviet
conventional dominance (based less on active forces, more on mobilization
base, geography), robust if reduced nuclear forces (at some lower levels,
"superiority" may again become possible), plus erosion of NATO
defenses/cohesi on.
Conclusi on
Unless USSR falls into debilitating crisis, expect clearly more formidable
foreign policy challenge throughout the Gorbachev era and probably enough
economic/technical progress to keep USSR as militarily credible as it has
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been since World War II. All against the backdrop of efforts to reform and
take away image of threat. Western steadiness is key variable in maximizing
prospect of good outcome, avoiding profound East-West instabilities.
How do we keep the strategic and institutional structures of defense
intact? Need not deny some real change already, possibility of more. But
reminders about history and focus on long-term uncertainties are vital.
Have to be extremely wary about the political and psychological impact of
detente atmospherics. Russia does not have to become Number One militarily,
technologically, economically to pose clear and present danger to the West,
especially if latter is disorganized and off guard. Very real prospect of
instability in the Soviet empire is a danger and case for vigilance.
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