SOVIET STRATEGY FOR WINNING NUCLEAR WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00435R000100060014-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: June 15, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/03/15 : CIA-RDP90T00435R000100060014-1
C01$51.DE1c1IAL ?/cituic__
15 June 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/SP
NIO/GPF
NIO/USSR
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Fritz Ermarth
Soviet Strategy for Winning Nuclear War
kindly calls to our attention the following passage in a
commentary by Soviet Central Committee functionary V. Zagladin about the
historic deficiencies of Soviet foreign and military policy, which -- it is
now permitted to assert -- generated large but avoidable costs and risks for
the USSR. Regarding military strategy, Zagladin notes, "...we proceeded for
a long time, for too long, from the possibility of winning a nuclear war."
There are several interesting things about this passage. The author
does not specify the precise time period of which he is speaking, but it is
clear from the overall content of the article that he is talking about the
whole Brezhnev era at a minimum. The language "proceeding from the
possibility" connotes the steady pursuit of a goal that is deemed available
in principle and worth pursuing, but difficult, elusive, perhaps always
receding, and costly. This is the way the majority of the US strategic
intelligence community described Soviet strategy after about 1975.
A number of comments seem in order:
First, it is gratifying to some of us to have Soviet authorities now
admitting -- on this among many other topics -- who was right in some rather
heated Western debates in the past.
Second, some of the Western voices which, in the past, claimed the
Soviets "could not be pursuing warwinning superiority" because it made no
sense, or whatever, are still on the air regarding current and future Soviet
claims and behavior. Those voices should now be judged on their past record.
Third, many Soviet voices -- very probably including Zagladin --
misrepresented Soviet strategy on warwinning in the past, especially after
1976 and the Tula speech. The only reason his afore-cited statement is
itself credible is that a) it is self-deprecatory albeit serving Gorbachev's
interests, and b) more importantly, it is supported by lots of evidence from
Soviet behavior and classified documents.
CO NTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
Conclusion: Soviet public statements about military strategy and
doctrine always mean something. But we should be cautious in the future as
we have been in the past about concluding that they mean literally what they
say.
Attachment:
Zagladin Article
CONFIDENTIAL
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---
T31581.-
FBIS
087
-(SEE 022)
Mon Jun 13 14:21:08 1988
USSR: zieborpommierenswelMamaftiay
TAKE 1 OF 5 ZAGLAIii*ARiICLt
pM1306145188 MOSCOW PRAVDA :IN RUSSIAN 13 ,JUN 88 SECOND EDITION P 6
r ,
(V. ZAGLADIN ARTICLE UNDER THE RUBRIC "WE DISCUSS THE CPSU
CENTRAL COMMITTEE TASES":' "FOLLOWING A COURSE OF REASON AND
HUMANISM"; PASSAGES WITHIN SLANTLINES PUBLISHED IN BOLDFACE)
(TEXT) THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE THESES, WHICH HAVE BEEN
?
SUBMITTED FOR DISCUSSION BY THE WHOLE PARTY AND, ESSENTIALLY, BY THE
WHOLE'PEOPLE, CONTAIN TWO KINDS OF POINTS. ON THE ONE HAND, THEY
SUM UP THE PAST 3 YEARS OF RESTRUCTURING, WHILE ON THE OTHER THEY
OUTLINE WAYSTO FURTHER DEVELOP AND DEEPEN IT. IT IS A PROFOUNDLY
SELF-CRITICAL DOCUMENT WHICH RUTHLESSLY EXPOSES THOSE PHENOMENA OR
PROCESSES WHICH ARE HINDERING THE RENEWAL OF SOCIETY. AT THE SAME
TIME, IT FORMULATES CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS WHOSE REALIZATION WILL
MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO SMASH THE BRAKING MECHANISM WHEREVER IT
OPERATES. THIS REVOLUTIONARY-CRITICAL METHODOLOGY PERMEATES ALL
PARTS OF THE NEW DOCUMENT, WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY A PROGRAM DOCUMENT,
AND EACH OF ITS 10 SECTIONS.
UNDERSTANDABLY, THE MAJORITY OF THE THESES ARE DEVOTED TO
INTERNAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND TO THE CHIEF TASKS OF FURTHER
IMPROVING OUR SOCIETY. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY ALSO RAISE PROBLEMS
OF FOREIGN POLICY. WHY? ABOVE ALL, BECAUSE RESTRUCTURING ITSELF
HAS ACQUIRED OUTSTANDING INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AND HAD A
POWERFUL INFLUENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE. THIS IS NOW
ACKNOWLEDGED BY EVERYONE. AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, BECAUSE
RESTRUCTURING, AS THE THESES POINT OUT, "NEEDED A FOREIGN POLICY
THAT WOULD PROPERLY EXPRESS ITS HUMANIST NATURE." THE RENEWAL OF
THE COUNTRY'S FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITY HAS BECOME AN IMPORTANT PART
OF THE CHANGES WHICH ARE TRANSFORMING OUR WHOLE LIFE.
THERE IS A QUESTION WHICH SOVIET PEOPLE, AS WELL AS PEOPLE
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, HAVE ALWAYS ASKED THEMSELVES IN ALARM: IS THE
THREAT OF WAR AND NUCLEAR CONFLICT INCREASING OR DIMINISHING? THE
THESES PROVIDE A CLEAR, PRECISE, AND UNAMBIGUOUS ANSWER TO THIS
QUESTION: "THE DIRECT THREAT OF A WAR INVOLVING THE MAJOR POWERS
HAS DIMINISHED." THIS IS PROBABLY THE FIRST TIME IN A CONSIDERABLE
NUMBER OF YEARS THAT OUR PARTY HAS DRAWN THIS CONCLUSION, WHICH IS
UNDERSTANDABLY OF AN EXTREMELY CRUCIAL NATURE. IT RESTS ON THE
VISIBLE, *TANGIBLE REALITIES OF THE WORLD SITUATION, WHICH IS GOING
THROUGH A PROCESS OF IMPROVEMENT.
YES, THE RESTRUCTURING OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HAS BEGUN. HOW
HAS THIS BEEN ACHIEVED? THANKS TO WHAT? FOR NOT SO LONG AGO WE
WERE SPEAKING OF A SHIFT TO MORE LASTING PEACE AS SOMETHING
DESIRABLE AND NECESSARY BUT DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE AND SEEMINGLY
REMOTE. IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT OUR. COUNTRY WAS NOT STRIVING TO SECURE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100060014-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100060014-1
FBIS
090
-TAKE 2 OF 5 -- 087 (ZAGLADIN ARTICLE)
Mon Jun 13 14:2947 1988
///D ID
PM! 306145388,
:
7K4VA
(TEXT) WE DID. OF COURSE, SPEAK OF THE DIVERSITY AND THE
CONTRADICTORY-NATURE OF THE MODERN-WORLD. NEVERTHELESS, WE WERE FAR
FROM FULLY AWARE OF IT,. THUS, WE FREQUENTLY SAW DIVERSITY JUST AS A
SOURCE-X1Fr:90MPLEXITIES, AND DID NOT NOTICE THAT IT PROVIDES ,BROAD
SCOPE FOR MUTUAL ENRICHMENT WITH OTHER PEOPLES' EXPERIENCE. THE
EVOLUTION OF THE CONTRADICTIONS OF WORLD DEVELOPMENT CHARACTERISTIC
OF OUR.TIME -- OLD. CONTRADICTIONS WHICH HAVE LONG BEEN IN EXISTENCE
BUT ARE CONSTANTLY-BEING RENEWED -- ALSO WAS NOT ALWAYS CORRECTLY
EVALUATED. AND WE NOTICED SUCH A VERY IMPORTANT NEW CONTRADICTION
AFFECTING THE VERY FOUNDATIONS OF CIVILIZATION'S EXISTENCE AS THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE INTERESTS OF ALL OF MANKIND AND THE INCREASING
EXACERBATION OF GLOBAL PROBLEMS ONLY WHEN THE WHOLE WORLD WAS
ALREADY SPEAKING OF IT.
WE ESSENTIALLY DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE
MODERN WORLD, THIS VERY IMPORTANT FEATURE OF ITS CONTEMPORARY STATE
(ALTHOUGH WE ENCOUNTERED ITS CONSEQUENCES LITERALLY AT EVERY STEP,
ABOVE ALL IN OUR FOREIGN ECONOMIC TIES). AND SOMETIMES WE PERCEIVED
THE THOUGHTS OF PARTICULAR AUTHORS ON INTERDEPENDENCE AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES ALMOST AS CUNNING INTRIGUES BY THE CLASS ENEMY. YES, OF
COURSE, IMPERIALIST FORCES TRIED, ARE TRYING, AND WILL TRY TO USE
THE OBJECTIVE INTERDEPENDENCE OF COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES TO STRENGTHEN
THE NEOCOLONIALIST WEB, FOR EXAMPLE, AND TO SUBORDINATE WEAKER
STATES TO STRONGER ONES. HOWEVER, THIS IS JUST ONE ASPECT OF THE
MATTER. THE OTHER IS THAT INTERDEPENDENCE OPENS UP BROAD PROSPECTS
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS OF COOPERATION AMONG ALL COUNTRIES
AND CREATES NEW AND UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITIES FOR THIS
COOPERATION.
OURS WAS THE FIRST COUNTRY TO SPEAK OF THewrItIMMIRRnMVIROAT. WE
WERE THE FIRST TO ADVANCE THE Demmew.pow-mmemerowdropprommorwirkts*
THREAT AND THE PROHIBITIONmORmA40M*GmA
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HOWEVER, WE WE.44?0.1000Alettalteniflrliii,?4.4"V"IWCM4D';'VE,
SPOKE OF THE DEAOtorloTHRFATIKYFIIIIWErAiVerMISTROP441911411111.111111MOW"
OTHER HAND,
P4411101000001.0111011?118441066601401016110,111101141110,1emrHE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE
THESES POINT OUT: - "IN SEE
PAST WE DID NOT ALW
SECURITY
BE
COUNTRY'S SOCIOECO ?' ? ' .PMENT AND
ltt:ra7P NGIMPERIALISM'S PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS, OF A CERTAIN
AK OF MANY OTHER THIS -- OF OUR NOT ALWAYS ADEQUATE
Rfi
UNDERESTIMATION OF EUROPE'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS, AND OF
INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION TOWARD STATES ON OTHER CONTINENTS -- ASIAN
AND LATIN AMERICAN STATES, FOR EXAMPLE. I COULD ALSO MENTION THE
IMPERFECT METHODS OF OUR POLICY, WHICH DID NOT ALWAYS OPPORTUNELY
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-Arno
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100060014-1