POSSIBLE SNIE ON SOVIET UNILATERAL FORCE CUTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00435R000100050021-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: May 12, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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12 May 1988
MEMO FOR: NIO/GPF
SUBJECT: Possible SNIE on Soviet Unilateral Force Cuts
I think this is a needed effort. I recommend inclusion of two aspects as
yet uncovered by your key questions and outline.
First, the estimate must cover the internal political struggle that would
inevitably attend (or is currently attending) any Soviet decision on a
unilateral force cut, whether the motivation be economic, military, or
political-diplomatic. The issue of unilateralism in arms control or
reduction has already become something of a political macho test within the
Soviet leadership, with Gorbachev's apparent partisans seeking to develop
the rationale for it and the military, presumably with conservative
political backing, against it. My guess is that Gorbachev does not have the
political clout necessary for such a move at present; he may or may not come
out of the current round of political infighting with such power. But this
is something the estimate must clearly address.
Second, without delving into a detailed statement of our collection posture
(which the DO would rightly object to), I think the estimate should record a
judgment as to how much "warning" of a Soviet decision or announcement we
might expect to get. With all the blather that glasnost has generated, we
might get a fair degree of warning.
Let me make a couple of suggestions about the approach. I think the SNIE
ought to be very short. Clearly it must be based on assessments the full
explication of which could be very lengthy, i.e., a) how Gorbachev might see
the Soviet economy profiting from unilateral force cuts, and b) how Soviet
security requirements might, with appropriate adjustments, still be met.
These should not be contained in the estimate but published elsewhere and
summarized in the estimate. If they don't now exist, they've got to be
done. Furthermore, I believe strongly that the substance of the problem
should be argued through in a series of conferences and briefings involving
the authoritative analysts and agency reps before somebody sits down to
draft the SNIE. If the substance of this project, including disagreements
about it, is collectively understood, the SNIE could be drafted on a weekend.
cc: VC/NIC, NI0s/USSR, EUR, ECON, SP, DIR/AG
SE
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The Director of 9entral Intelligence
Washingto4D.C2MM
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM:
MG Larry D. Budge, US
National Intelligence Officer
for General Purpose Forces
NIC# 01712-88
11 May 1988
SUBJECT: Possible SNIE: Likelihood and Im lic Hong of a Soviet
Conventional Arms Control "Breakout"
1. Several convergent circumstanet.es may have put the Soviets into a
position where unilateral conventional\ arms reductions or deep cut proposals
will serve their national interests and place the US in a reactive posture:
o The massive procurement of Soviet armaments from the early
1970s to the 1980s has provided a large modernized combined
o Retention of obsolescent arms provides a huge-SO-v.et/.14arsaw
Pact inventory of relatively less effective, man-intensive
weaponry ripe for. retirement.
o The Soviet economy is not respooding to perestroyka, forcing
Gorbachev to examine unproductive sectors of the Soviet
economy for cuts/transfers.
? Perestroyka will create unprecedented demands for skilled
Slavic technicians coincident with a declining manpower pool.
? Gorbachev's public relations blitz seeks to portray a less
threatening, more accommodating, civilianized Soviet Union.
? The recent INF agreement and publicity regarding possible 50
percent cuts in strategic arms have led to heightened
expectations among the Western public that further
conventional cuts are in the offering.
O Western (particularly US) econoMies would be considerably
improved at this time by reduced defense expenditures.
CL BY Signer
DECL OADR
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? -.7. - ? SECRET
2. The foregoing circumstances appear to offer the Soviet leadership a
significant opportunity to take the initiative in conventional arms control
with little apparent cost. Deep cuts n old equipment provide some immediate
returns in operations and maintenance unds and skilled manpower which could
be transferred to more productive economic sectors. Offers of, or actual,
deep conventional arms cuts might place a transitional US administration in a
position where hasty responses could erode the conventional imbalance even
further in the Soviets' favor, particilarly in Central Europe, and no response
would further erode the US image in wcrld opinion. A SNIE outlining possible
Soviet initiatives, their effect on Soviet warfighting capability, and
probable allied reaction to these iniciatives would enable US policymakers to
draw up and coordinate in advance wiqi allies alternative responses to a range
of major actions by the Soviets in conventional arms control. An alternative
format might be a typescript coordinated within the NIC rather than the
Intelligence Community. Draft Key Questions and Terms of Reference are
attached.
3. Would appreciate any comment or suggestions which ou might have to
include feasibility, format, and possible drafters.
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SNIE: Likelihood and Implications of a'Soviet Conventional Arms Control
"Breakout"
KEY QUESTIONS
I. Does the next year or so provide an unusual opportunity for the Soviets
to profit from deep conventional arms control initiatives--diplomatically,
economically, militarily?
II. What significant cuts might the Soviets propose/unilaterally take, and
what would the results be on the military balance? What are the
likelihoods of various initiatives and why?
III. What are likely reactions of NATO/other Allies of the US to some possible
US responses?
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SNIE: Likelihood and Implications ofka Soviet Conventional Arms Control
"Breakout"
TERMS A REFERENCE
SCOPE NOTE
I. Background:
o Recent arms control activity'
o Soviet foreign relations factors
o Soviet economic factors
o Allied expectations
o Western economic factors
II. Soviet Conventional Arms Reduction Opportunities (Category and Effects):
Naval arms
-- Inset: Surface SLCMs and nuclar weapoRs'-free :zones
? Air Arms
-- Inset: The integrated air d frse support package
o Ground Arms
Inset: The corps-brigade reorgAnization
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? Other
? Warsaw
--
Arms
Pact-wide
Inset: A
effects
Rand study on Central European conventional arms cuts
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III.
Likelihood
of Various
Soviet Initiatives (above)
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IV
Overall Implications for NATO and US
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S CRET
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