REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF THE LANGUAGE OF "WARNING NOTICES" APPENDED TO SENSITIVE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 24, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/03/07 : CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
The Director of Central Intelligence
WashigunDr.20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #00724-88
24 February 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy General Counsel for Administrative
Law and Management Support
FROM: H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
Acting Chairman
SUBJECT: Request for Review of the Language of "Warning Notices"
Appended to Sensitive National Intelligence Estimates
1. Action Requested: Please review the proposed changes (Attachment A)
for the Warning Notice and Destruction Certificate/Reader Register to be
used on National Intelligence Estimates, Special National Intelligence
Estimates, Interagency Intelligence Memoranda, and Special Interagency
Intelligence Memoranda.
2. Background: The Warning Notice and Destruction Certificate/Reader
Register presently used are shown at Attachment B. We are seeking
improvement in efficiency and appearance of this item.
3. You may contact
questions related to this request.
Attachment: As Stated
to discuss specific
CO IAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Request for Review of the Language of "Warning Notices" Appended
to Sensitive National Intelligence Estimates
PO/NICI
Distribution:
1 - Addressee
1'- 0/VC/NIC File
1 - HFH Chrono
1 - VC/NIC
1 - PO/NIC
(24 Feb 88)
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
-
DIRECTOR OF
CIA SEAL CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
CLASSIFICATION
CONTROLS
ESTIMATE TITLE
(TITLE CLASSIFICATION)
ESTIMATE TYPE
VOLUME NUMBERt VOLUME TITLE
WARNING NOTICE
THE RECIPIENT OF THIS SENSITIVE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE IS REMINDED
THAT ACCESS TO THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE AUTHORIZED ONLY TO INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE
US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHO HAVE BOTH THE REQUISITE CLEARANCES AND A NEED TO
KNOW ITS CONTENTS FOR PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES. NON-INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY OFFICIALS MAY NOT BE SHOWN THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR . THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE
REPRODUCED OR FILED IN AN ELECTRONIC DATA BASE AND ALL READERS MUST SIGN THE
REGISTER ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE. THE REGISTER MUST BE REMOVED AND RETURNED TO
THE PRODUCTION OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL TO CERTIFY
DESTRUCTION OF THE DOCUMENT WHEN THE ESTIMATE IS NO LONGER REQUIRED BY THE
RECIPIENT.
CLASSIFICATION
NIE NUMBER
TCS NUMBER
DATE
COPY NUMBER
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
UNCLASSIFIED
----> NOTE PERFORATED PAGE
BETWEEN COVER AND TITLE PAGE
ESTIMATE NUMBER
TCS NUMBER
COPY NUMBER
THIS REGISTER MUST NOT BE REMOVED UNTIL THIS DOCUMENT IS DESTROYED
IN A MANNER THAT WILL PRECLUDE RECONSTRUCTION IN AN INTELLIGIBLE FORM.
DATE FULL NAME SIGNATURE ORGANIZATION OFFICE
FOLLOWING DESTRUCTION, REMOVE THIS REGISTER FROM THE ESTIMATE AND
RETURN IT TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL PRODUCTION OFFICER
IN ROOM 7E48, CIA HEADQUARTERS.
UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
DESTRuatom Ivan t.E
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
NIE
NOTICE TO RECIPIENTS OF 4/11-88/J1111i (TCS 4519-88/111) Cy, 2,5?
Because of the extreme sensitivity of the attached National Imelligence document, the Director of Central
Intelligence believes it prudent to remind recipients of their responsibility for its safekeeping. In this regard,
the DCI wants the recipients to understand that they are to ensure :Aar the attached document is handled in
accordance with the following procedures:
1. The need to know of any individual within the Intelligence Comrnupity allowed
to read this report must be established.
2. Non?Intelligence Community officials may not be shown the documtnt without
the approval of the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
3. All readers are required to fill in the form below.
? Date Name
!Pinot Prow
First Last
Signature Organization
Instructions: This corer sheet will remain attached until such time as this
document is destroyed. At that time, return this corer sheet to the MC
Production Officer, Room 7E47, CIA Headquarters.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
R
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
0(CiA)ic__
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council 18 February 1988
NOTE FOR: NIO/NESA
NIO/USSR
NIO/GPF
NIO/CT
FROM: AC/NIC
The attached paper from Harry Cochran may be
of interest to you. Harry puts this forth as an
alternative in view of his mission to provide a
challenge to conventional analysis.
H. F. Hutchi son, Jr.
Attachment:
Memo from H. Cochran dtd 17 Feb 88
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NOTE FOR: DDCI
FROM. AC/NIC
1. FYI.
18 February 1988
2. In the event INF does not occupy all of
your time, you may find this of interest pertaining
to Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
Attachment:
Memo from Harry Cochran dtd 17 Feb 88
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
17 February 1988
Memo for: AC/NIC
VC/NIC
This "alternative view" of Soviet intentions on Afghanistan
is another exercise in the "challenge" function. It puts the
pieces together in a way that comes out almost 180 degrees from
judgments in recent NIDs and, I assume, in PDB
items based on these articles. I have not seen NIC memos that may
have been produced since Gorbachev announced a timetable for with-
drawing Soviet forces. The "Whither Gorbachev" NIE did not address
Soviet Afghan policy.
The Administration, as you know, is on record with a sanguine
view of Gorbachev's intentions. Fitzwater allowed that the 8 February
statement "does seem to take a very good step in the right direction."
Redman at State termed it "a positive signal of serious Soviet
intent to withdraw from Afghanistan." One might argue that
Community judgments are no longer needed or wanted. ,Even if this
is true, there remains the possibility of postmortems and political
repercussions should the Administration's optimism prove to be
misplaced in light of the next round of Geneva negotiations in
early March.
This suggests the advisability of taking time to reexamine
the analytic/estimative assumptions underlying the NID's central
message that Gorbachev is "seeking a face-saving way to withdraw
Soviet troops from Afghanistan." Does this mean that the Community's
basic judgment is that Gorbachev intends to liquidate the long-
standing commitment in Afghanistan and cut Soviet losses? That
Gorbachev believes that the US, Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia,
Iran, etc. will in fact halt their military and political assistance
to Afghan resistance forces as required by the draft Geneva accords?
Is the Community saying that the Soviet leaders are so anxious to
free themselves from the Afghan quagmire that they are willing to
present themselves to the world as trusting, gullible innocents?
My alternative view essentially contends that Gorbachev does
not intend to cut Soviet losses and withdraw, and that he is
employing an adroit strategy of indirection and maneuver to isolate
the Afghan resistance from their foreign suppliers and to undermine
the political capacity of the US and Pakistan to continue assistance
to the mujaheddine, thereby reducing the costs of the Soviet commit-
ment and making it more manageable and sustainable over the long
haul.
One need not accept my assessment to sense that the Community,
via the NID items, has climbed rather far out on a limb which
conceivably could be infested with enough termites to produce a
resounding fracture. The question is whether this possibility
deserves the attention and concern of anyone in this building?
Harry Cochran
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
17 February 1988
MEMORANDUM: Squeeze Play on Afghanistan--An Alternative View of
Soviet Intentions
1. Contrary to widespread assumptions in the West, the
Soviets are not seeking a face-saving way to withdraw their forces
from Afghanistan. Their aim is rather to set up the US and Pakistan
for political warfare denunciations of their responsibility for
the failure of negotiations next month under UN mediator Diego
Cordovez. In this way, the Soviets will seek to stimulate growing
opposition in the US, Pakistan, and internationally to further
military and political assistance to Afghan resistance forces.
Moscow's longer-term objective is to gradually isolate the resistance
fighters from their foreign supporters and, by this means, to
reduce the costs of ongoing Soviet military and political commit-
ments, gain time to overcome the weaknesses and vulnerabilities
of the Kabul client regime, and eventually make possible phased
unilateral reductions of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.
2. The Gorbachev leadership's strategy has been based on the
assumption that Pakistan's growing frustration with the presence of
some 3 million Afghan refugees and armed mujaheddine fighters on
its territory constitutes the weakest and most exploitable link
in the foreign front supporting the Afghan resistance. Since
Gorbachev's accession to power three years ago, Moscow has relied
on the calculation that adroit Soviet diplomacy eventually would
be able to pressure and cajole President Zia into breaking with
Washington and striking a deal with Kabul that would allow him
to expel the Afghan refugees, thereby removing a serious threat
to Pakistan's political stability and territorial integrity.
3. A complete withdrawl of Soviet forces has never been
acceptable to the Soviet leadership. They have long recognized
that their weak and ineffective client regime in Kabul could not
hold off the mujaheddine for more than a few months. Soviet
military efforts to stop the flow of weapons to the resistance
have largely failed in the last few years. Gorbachev therefore
recognized early on that the Soviet predicament in Afghanistan
could be eased only through political maneuvers to undermine
domestic and international support for US and Pakistani assistance
to resistance forces. He never entertained the option of
withdrawing Soviet forces and cutting his losses; nor was he
willing to accept the risks and costs of a major expansion of
the Soviet military commitment.
4. Gorbachev's principal objective has been to reduce the
liabilities of what he accepted as an essentially open-ended
commitment required by the imperatives of Soviet security and global
geopolitical interests. In contrast to the stolid, slogging approach
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
-2-
of his three predecessors, Gorbachev has evolved a strategy of
indirection which places much higher priority on political-diplo-
matic maneuver to isolate and divide his adversaries and attack
their political capacity to sustain a long-term challenge to
Soviet predominance in Afghanistan. Gorbachev's most forthright
expression of his resolve to "stay the course" was contained in
his Vladivostok speech in July 1986. He warned that if foreign
intervention in Afghanistan continues, "the Soviet Union will not
leave its neighbor in the lurch. Our internationalist solidarity
with the Afghan people as well as the security interests of the
Soviet Union rule this out absolutely."
5. In view of this unambiguous assertion of Soviet political
and security interests in Afghanistan, it strains credulity to
suggest that Gorbachev may have advocated liquidating the commit-
ment and cutting Soviet losses. It is highly unlikely, moreover,
that he has attempted to carry out a major retrenchment only to
have this course blocked by opposition from senior military and
party leaders. Claims by Soviet officials to Westerners that the
Soviet military is unwilling to concede defeat and that party
hardliners are concerned about the ideological and security implica-
tions of a Soviet withdrawal almost certainly represent the
familiar Soviet tactic of "good cop, bad cops." Gorbachev himself
invoked this hoary ploy in his meeting with nine senior members of
Congress during the Washington summit when he declared, "We have
our conservatives, too." Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, however,
have encountered stubborn resistance to their scenario from
factions within the Afghan communist party, particularly the Khalqis,
who are more doctrinaire and nationalistic than Najibullah's Parcham
faction and strenuously oppose the "national reconciliation" policy.
The Squeeze Play in Action
6. Gorbachev's 8 February statement which for the first time
established a specific date for beginning a Soviet troop withdrawal
was the final move in a two-year scenario designed to set the stage
for a squeeze play. He declared that this action has fulfilled
all the "necessary conditions for signing the settlement agreement
in the very near future." In a transparently unctuous tone,
Gorbachev said "we would not like to think that some states or
political figures might want to be held accountable by the Afghan
nation and other nations for scuttling a settlement." Pravda
declared on 12 February that "Never before has the situation in
and around Afghanistan been as open for a settlement as it is now."
7. The Soviets have thus carefully prepared the ground for
charging that Washington has reneged on its putative pledge to
terminate military assistance to Afghan resistance forces simul-
taneously with the beginning of the pullout of Soviet troops.
They are eagerly anticipating the political dividends of calling
what they view as an American bluff. Pravda observed that the US
and Pakistan have long portrayed Moscow's failure to establish a
withdrawal timetable as the main stumbling block and have exploited
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
-3-
this for years to "block Soviet peace initiatives." The Soviets
are operating on the assumption that Washington will either support
Pakistan's refusal to sign an agreement with the Kabul regime or
contrive other ways to evade a commitment to end assistance to
the mujaheddine. Red Star recently called attention to President
Reagan's State of the Union message which spoke "bluntly about the
administration's resolve to continue supporting the 'freedom fighters
in Afghanistan, as well as in Nicaragua, Angola, and Cambodia.
Pravda pointed out that the White House comment on Gorbachev's
statement "dodged the question" about the timing of a cutoff of
US aid to the resistance.
8. Moscow is ready to aim a similar indictment at Pakistan
for repudiating its commitment to join Kabul in signing the Geneva
accords. According to TASS, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov
told Pakistani leaders last week that a refusal to sign the accords
"would be tantamount to frustrating the entire Afghan settlement,"
the consequences of which would be "a fresh flareup of the armed
conflict and bloodshed." On 16 February, Gennadiy Gerasimov accused
the Zia government of "executing further elusive maneuvers in a
stubborn attempt to obstruct the signature of the Geneva documents"
by insisting on a new "transition government" in Kabul.
9. The timing of Gorbachev's 8 February statement announcing
a long-withheld timetable for withdrawal was decisively influenced
by an assessment that statements by Secretary Shultz and President
Zia in January had played into Soviet hands and created the most
favorable conditions in three years for a squeeze play. In a news
conference on 7 January, Secretary Shultz seemed to imply that the
Administration will contend that it is not obligated by the Geneva
accords to end US military assistance to the mujaheddine 60 days
after the agreements are signed and a Soviet withdrawal is to begin.
The Secretary indicated that Washington intends to wait in order to
ensure that there is "a certain inevitability" and "no turning back"
in the Soviet withdrawal before US assistance ends. He asserted
that if the Administration is satisfied that the Soviet withdrawal
is proceeding on schedule, "Under those circumstances, we will
certainly meet the things that we have agreed to in the Geneva
process."
10. If Secretary Shultz's remarks were ambiguous and open to
different interpretations, President Zia used interviews with
American journalists in the first half of January to lay out his
position in clear and inflexible terms. He bluntly stated that he
would not sign an agreement with the Najibullah regime because he
did not consider it to be "legitimate." Zia also called for the
creation of an "interim government," saying "all factions of Afghans
must get together." Pakistan's official response to Gorbachev's
statement hardened Zia's stance by demanding that the Kabul regime
be replaced by a "legitimate, responsible, broad-based government"
and by contending that this is an "indispensable aspect" of any
settlement.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
-4-
11. The Soviets, of course, are fully aware that Zia is
trapped by the adamant refusal of Afghan resistance leaders to accept
any settlement that does not depose the Kabul regime. This uncom-
promising stance forced Zia to declare last month that he will not
sign the Geneva accords until a "neutral government" replaces the
Najibullah regime. Zia's dilemma is that if he fails to win the
cooperation of the resistance leaders, Pakistan will be left with
3 million refugees and armed resistance fighters on its territory.
Gorbachev's strategy is to exploit this dilemma in order to blame
Zia and US support for him for the collapse of negotiations. This
design explains Gorbachev's blunt statement that "We are convinced"
that Soviet withdrawl is not "linked with the completion of efforts
to set up a new, coalition government in Afghanistan, i.e., with
bringing the policy of national reconciliation to fruition." On
departing Islamabad on 11 February, Vorontsov drove the point
home by declaring that "Any delays in the signing of the Geneva
accords will mean only one thing, and that will be a delay in the
withdrawalof Soviet forces." He smugly added, "we don't know who
will be willing to take that responsibility."
12. In sum, the Soviets are confident that they have succeeded
in maneuvering Washington and Islamabad into a no-win corner. They
believe they have manipulated the Geneva negotiations in a way that
places Afghan resistance leaders in the position of exercising a
veto over US and Pakistani policies. The Soviet scenario, of course,
assumes that the mullheddine will adhere to the stand.they took
in immediately rejecting Najibullah's January 1987 national recon-
ciliation plan that called for the inclusion of resistance leaders
in a coalition government. These leaders played their assigned
role in the squeeze play scenario when they declared that they
"will continue to fight until Najibullah is thrown out and a complete
Islamic government is established in Moslem Afghanistan."
13. If this assumption about mujaheddine behavior proves to
be incorrect and the Pakistanis manage to secure the resistance
leaders' cooperation in a joint US-Pakistani policy, the Soviets
could shift to tactics of forcing an impasse over the timing of
the termination of US military assistance to the resistance.
Shevardnadze made the most explicit statement of the Soviet position
on this issue during his visit to Kabul early last month. He
clearly implied that US assistance must end before Soviet forces
begin to withdraw. He argued that the "obligation on the cessation
of external interference will come into force" 60 days after the
Geneva accords are signed. And he insisted that the US has agreed
to "cease aid to the armed groups waging combat operations in
Afghanistan against the people's authorities." Shevardnadze
then contended that "It is with the coming into force of this
obligation that the withdrawal of Soviet troops will begin."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3
5
14. Finally, if the US finesses the timing issue in a way
that disarms the Soviet scenario, the Soviets will anticipate that
the announcement of a US cutoff of assistance 60 days after the
accords are signed will demoralize the resistance fighters and
aggravate rivalry and open conflict among the seven major resistance
groups. They will also hope that a US cutoff will push the
Pakistanis into curtailing their support for the resistance and
striking a deal with the Kabul regime in order to clear the way
for the return of Afghan refugees and fighters. The Soviets
at that point may inject a further and highly disruptive issue
by adopting Najibullah's two "conditions" for a withdrawal of
Soviet forces: (a) The mujaheddine's training camps in Pakistan
must be dismantled before a withdrawal begins; (b) The Mujaheddine
should extend to the Afghan army the ceasefire that he claimed
one key resistance leader has already offered to Soviet troops
once they begin to withdraw. Najibullah told an American journalist
last month that "We are actually looking for this objective."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/07: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100020007-3