ZIMBABWE: NEW HORIZONS, OLD CHALLENGES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R001200140001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1986
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY.
- no NOT WE OUT
OR MARK ON
Zimbabwe: New Horizons,
Old Challenges
ret
NIE 72.1-86
July 1986
Copy 4 6 4
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N I E 72.1-86
ZIMBABWE: NEW HORIZONS,
OLD CHALLENGES
Information available as of 3 July 1986 was used in the
preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by
the National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
Socialist Vision and Realities ............................................................ 7
The First Six Years ........................................................................... 7
Mugabe's Agenda .............................................................................. 8
Political .......................................................................................... 8
Economic ....................................................................................... 8
Military .......................................................................................... 9
Foreign Policy ............................................................................... 9
Key Variables .................................................................................... 9
Domestic Challenges ......................................................................... 9
Factionalism .................................................................................. 9
Corruption ..................................................................................... 10
Dealing With ZAPU ..................................................................... 10
The Dissident Threat .................................................................... 10
Economic Constraints ................................................................... 12
Foreign Policy ................................................................................... 12
Regional Role ................................................................................ 12
Mozambique .............................................................................. 13
South Africa .............................................................................. 14
Global Relations ............................................................................ 14
USSR .......................................................................................... 14
Cuba ........................................................................................... 16
The United States and the West .............................................. 16
Nonaligned Movement ............................................................. 16
Scenarios ............................................................................................ 17
The Most Likely ............................................................................ 17
Alternative Scenarios .................................................................... 17
Radical Change ......................................................................... 17
Regime Fragmentation ............................................................. 17
Implications for the United States ................................................... 17
Annex B: The Zimbabwean Armed Forces ........................................ 23
III
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SCOPE NOTE
The constitutional arrangement for contemporary Zimbabwe was
prescribed in December 1979 by the Lancaster House Agreement,
which ended the "liberation struggle." The government of Prime
Minister Robert Mugabe, which came to power democratically in 1980,
has been widely perceived as a "success story," in which a radical
socialist liberation movement adapts to and accepts a democratic
constitution and a largely capitalist economy and abandons socialist
doctrine in favor of pragmatic solutions. Recently, the Mugabe govern-
ment has become more authoritarian, and Mugabe once again speaks of
far-reaching prosocialist policy changes in the offing. This Estimate
looks at Zimbabwe on the eve of the expiration of some of the Lancaster
House-mandated constitutional safeguards and examines the most
likely course of the government over the next two years in domestic,
regional, and international contexts.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Over the next two years, we believe Prime Minister Robert
Mugabe, a self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist, will continue to move
incrementally toward his goal of establishing a one-party, socialist state.
The central government will be likely to play an increasing and more
direct role in the country's economy. But Mugabe will not attain his
ideal of a socialist state during the period of this Estimate because of
economic constraints and his own reluctant realization of the important
role of the private sector.
Mugabe has consolidated power and created some of the political
and economic instruments necessary for an accelerated implementation
of socialism by:
- Isolating all political opposition and neutralizing potential rivals
within the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).
- Strengthening party control over the bureaucracy and develop-
ing an extensive grassroots infrastructure.
- Increasing government intervention in the economy and ex-
panding social welfare programs.
- Solidifying ZANU's political control over the security forces
through the creation of the 5th Brigade and the Presidential
Guard, whose officers and men come strictly from ZANU party
ranks, as well as by filling all key Army and police command
positions with ZANU loyalists.
Mugabe faces major obstacles in carrying out his agenda, and
several key variables-internal and external-will affect both the pace
and extent of Zimbabwe's movement toward a one-party, socialist state.
These include:
- The level of economic growth.
- The increasing levels of factionalism and corruption within the
regime.
- The ability of ZANU to reach a political accommodation with
the opposition Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) that
will meet Ndebele demands for some form of power sharing
and undercut antigovernment dissidence in Matabeleland.
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- The extent and nature of Zimbabwean involvement in regional
conflicts, especially in South Africa and Mozambique.
- Harare's relationship with the USSR and the nature of their
political, military, and economic ties.
The Mugabe regime will attempt to increase state intervention in
some sectors of the economy despite increasing costs, such as:
- A long-term decline in economic growth as the government's
interventionist policies take effect.
- Increased budget deficits, a weakening of the currency, and
increased inflation and corruption.
- Driving off potential foreign investors, reducing capital inflow,
and placing a further burden on the country's limited resources.
- Reducing the likelihood of any new agreement with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund.
In the foreign policy field:
- Harare and Pretoria appear to be moving toward a more
confrontational relationship. Nevertheless, we do not expect
Harare openly to allow its territory to be used by the African
National Congress (ANC) or other South African insurgent
groups as a base for launching attacks on South Africa over the
next two years. The ANC's military wing will continue to
operate covertly inside Zimbabwe, however, which will force
Harare to crack down on ANC guerrillas from time to time in
an effort to avoid South African reprisals. Periodic crackdowns
and other measures to control ANC activity will be unlikely to
placate Pretoria, however, which could easily-if it so desires-
increase pressure on Zimbabwe by utilizing its military and
economic leverage against the Mugabe regime.
- In our estimation, the cool relations extant between Zimbabwe
and the USSR will improve, but military, economic, and party-
to-party ties to Moscow and other Communist governments will
probably remain limited. Mugabe might be forced to rely
increasingly on the Soviets as a source of security assistance if
Harare were to become bogged down in a seemingly unending
military commitment in Mozambique, if Zimbabwe experiences
repeated South African cross-border raids, or if other sources of
assistance dry up. Although Harare will be unlikely to enter into
any major arms relationship, we believe Zimbabwe and the
USSR will sign a military aid agreement-including air defense
equipment-within two years.
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- Although the debate within the government over the extent and
nature of Zimbabwe's commitment to Mozambique has yet to be
settled, we expect Harare.to continue to provide some form of
military aid to the Machel government. Harare will be unlikely to
repeat the large-scale counterinsurgency operations of last year,
although it will probably conduct limited operations along the
Beira and Tete transportation corridors with a reduced force of
some 4,000 to 5,000 troops. Mugabe probably now recognizes the
need for reconciliation between Maputo and the insurgents and
will show less inclination to wage aggressive counterinsurgency
campaigns on Maputo's behalf.
We expect relations between Zimbabwe and the United States to
continue to deteriorate over the next few years, primarily because of
differences over the South African issue. Other factors adding to this de-
terioration will be improved Zimbabwean relations with the USSR and
Mugabe's posturing and drawing Zimbabwe closer to radical, anti-
American Third World positions on international issues. Mugabe's
assumption of the chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement this
summer will accelerate Zimbabwean acceptance and advocacy of
radical positions on international issues hostile to US interests
Although Harare is mindful of its dependence on Western econom-
ic aid and investment, US attempts to link Zimbabwe's political
behavior to the level of economic assistance will be viewed by Harare as
unwarranted interference in its affairs and largely disregarded. More-
over, any further curtailment of aid by the United States would have lit-
tle immediate impact. Over the longer term, the Mugabe government's
commitment to improving social welfare and the resulting need for
Western economic assistance to maintain vigorous economic growth will
be a moderating factor in Zimbabwean-US relations.
One alternative outcome, judged considerably less likely, which
would have a negative impact on US interests, would be a more rapid
and radical implementation of socialism that entails the devastation of
the private sector of the economy, vastly increased social spending, and
a burgeoning foreign debt. In this contingency, escalating hostilities
with South Africa, a major military presence in Mozambique, and the
absence of other sources of military aid would force Mugabe to seek
large-scale security assistance from the USSR.
Another alternative outcome, judged somewhat more likely, would
be a fragmentation of the ZANU regime into contending factions,
which would probably lead to protracted instability and present
enhanced opportunities for extensive external meddling.
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Ethnic Composition in Zimbabwe
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DISCUSSION
Socialist Vision and Realities
1. Since assuming leadership of an independent
Zimbabwe in 1980, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has
remained unwavering in his commitment to build a
socialist society under his ruling, Shona-based Zimba-
bwe African National Union (ZANU). While Mugabe
has taken some initial steps toward implanting social-
ism, these efforts have disappointed the few party
hardliners who favor a more rapid transformation.
There continues to be a wide divergence between
pronounced socialist goals and actual political and
economic policies. This dichotomy results from un-
realistic expectations and Mugabe's need to expand
ZANU's domestic control and to address economic
problems.
2. Mugabe is a self-avowed Marxist-Leninist who
appears personally dedicated to the socialist platform
that ZANU adopted when it was an independence
movement. Socialism is seen by Mugabe as a method
by which the state can control the allocation of scarce
national resources to maximize benefits for society and
as a system compatible with his African and Christian
values. He believes, however, that the private sector
plays a valuable role in the economy and that Marxist
principles must be implemented through a gradual
process.
3. Mugabe is adept at balancing competing de-
mands within ZANU, relying on collective decision-
making to build a consensus within the party. His style
is to move slowly and cautiously on controversial
issues, often delaying decisions until he has patiently
lined up the needed support. Nevertheless, Mugabe is
the primary driving force in ZANU and he retains
firm, if not always active, control of the party and
government.
The First Six Years
4. In order not to jeopardize ZANU's tenuous hold
on power, Mugabe did not immediately pursue poli-
cies that would aggravate internal tensions or upset
external relationships:
- He made no attempt to impose a single-party
state but sought accommodation with opposition
leader Joshua Nkomo and his Ndebele-based
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and
reconciliation with whites.
- There was no wholesale nationalization of the
private sector, and state intervention was largely
confined to utilizing and expanding regulatory
practices inherited from the Smith regime.
- Mugabe made no move to break up the large
white commercial farms, and a program to reset-
tle 160,000 black families has achieved less than
a fourth of that goal.
- Internationally, he succeeded in obtaining more
than $2 billion in Western aid and signed an IMF
standby agreement in 1983.
- Harare continued to maintain economic and
unofficial political relations with South Africa, its
single most important trading partner ' and larg-
est investor.
5. Nevertheless, beneath his veneer of political and
economic pragmatism, Mugabe also gradually laid the
foundation for implementing his vision of a socialist
society. He began the process of isolating all political
opposition outside his party by expelling Nkomo from
the Cabinet in 1982 and Quietly neutralizing his rivals
within ZANU in 1984 by creating a new party Central
Committee and Politburo loaded with his handpicked
supporters. ZANU undertook initial efforts to develop
an extensive grassroots infrastructure throughout the
country-with the notable exception of Matabele-
land-to politicize the population. ZANU's efforts to
strengthen party control over the governmental bu-
reaucracy-an essential step in order to implement
fully ZANU's policies-began to take shape. Emphasis
has been placed on appointing senior civil servants
whose loyalty is first to the party. Emergency regula-
tions continue to be used to circumvent judicial de-
crees unpopular with ZANU and to imprison its
opponents.
6. Mugabe started developing a solid basis for a
loyal military force and, to a lesser degree, a profes-
sional and competent military. The government now
feels comfortable with its current military leadership,
' About 20 percent of Zimbabwe's trade was with South Africa in
1985. (u)
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having successfully weathered a potentially disruptive
ethnic and political shakedown. Shona and Ndebele
rivalries, which occupied center stage in the first years
of military development, are less of a problem after
the reduction of the number of former Zimbabwe
People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) guerrillas loyal
to opposition leader Nkomo, the removal and arrest of
senior ex-ZIPRA officers last year, and the reassertion
of government control over the all-Shona 5th Brigade.
The 5th Brigade, the Presidential Guard, and the
North Korean-trained People's Militia-whose loyalty
is first to the ruling party-were created to solidify
ZANU's political control over the military. Although
heavyhanded repression has diminished in the past
year, these units, along with ZANU's youth wing, will
continue to operate against dissidents, to be used to
intimidate political opponents, and to mobilize the
party's rank and file.
7. The government also has stressed gradual social
and economic reform. Social spending has increased
by more than 75 percent since 1980 with the number
of children in school tripling and the government
instituting free health care for low-income families to
improve living conditions in the neglected rural areas.
Harare continues to make a concerted effort to expand
agricultural marketing facilities and credit for com-
munal farmers, to increase agricultural productivity,
and to lessen dependence on white commercial farm-
ers
8. While maintaining relations with the West, Mu-
gabe has moved to establish strong political and eco-
nomic ties to China, North Korea, several East Euro-
pean countries, and leading Third World
"progressives," including Cuba and Nicaragua. During
its brief tenure on the UN Security Council, Zimba-
bwe displayed a pro-Third World and anti-Western
bias, cosponsoring the resolution condemning the US
intervention in Grenada in 1983 and failing to con-
demn the Soviet shoot down of the South Korean
airliner. Athough generally cool toward the USSR-
because of Soviet military support and political favor-
itism to ZAPU during the war for independence-
Mugabe began to improve relations after his visit to
Moscow in late 1985
Mugabe's Agenda
9. Despite the slow pace of change in his first six
years, Mugabe has grown increasingly self-confident.
Over the next two years, we believe Mugabe will try to
make major strides-with mixed success-toward im-
plementing his socialist goals.
10. Mugabe is determined to create a one-party
state with or without the cooperation of opposition
parties and will use ZANU's 1980 and 1985 election
victories as partial justification. Dismissing the failures
of other African one-party regimes, he sees ZANU as
the sole entity capable of overseeing the transition to
socialism. Mugabe will undertake measures-both le-
gal and extralegal-to circumvent constitutional obsta-
cles. We expect he will get the parliamentary support
in the next year needed to abolish the 20 seats
constitutionally reserved for whites. Moreover, deci-
sionmaking power will continue to be transferred
away from Parliament to ZANU's Central Committee
and Politburo. ZANU literature calls for increased
training and education to develop a party vanguard
that will spearhead the transition to socialism. We
anticipate more determined efforts to improve party
organization, discipline, and the development of an
elitist party structure. The party will seek further
control over the day-to-day life of individuals, includ-
ing active involvement in social and private organiza-
tions, but we doubt it will make much progress.
11. Mugabe sees increased party and governmental
control as the key determinant of national resource
allocation as ZANU moves to restructure the economy.
According to party pronouncements, the government
is willing to accept joint and private management
based on the principle that the private sector will be
guided by ZANU toward contributing to national
goals.
12. The government has said in its new five-year
development program that it plans to direct foreign
investment only into areas where the state lacks the
resources to invest, especially those that enhance the
national development plan. This process would in-
clude increasing the degree of ownership and control
of the means of production by the state and local
investors. This progressive increase in state ownership
and control is part of a strategy for speeding up the
establishment of a national economy, according to the
party's 1985 manifesto.
13. These policies-if prosecuted vigorously-prob-
ably would increase pressures on foreign investors for
disinvestment. Foreign owners of existing investment
in Zimbabwe, however, appear in general to be more
optimistic now than in previous years when the econo-
my was hit by drought and, before that, the civil war.
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Moreover, we do not believe that Mugabe's political
and economic agendas will be pushed far enough
during the period of this Estimate to reverse signifi-
cantly this attitude. Nonetheless, his policies will con-
tinue to have a negative impact on levels of new
foreign investment, and the government will be hard
pressed to find the investment capital it requires. The
negative perceptions created by Mugabe's rhetoric
have already limited private investment.
14. Despite increasing fiscal pressure to limit spend-
ing, ZANU is publicly committed to improving the
rural standard of living. This includes expanding
extension services to small farmers, improving road
networks, and providing credit facilities. The party has
stated its intention to continue the land redistribution
program in a more concerted manner. All land ac-
quired by the government in prime agricultural areas
is to be left intact in large-scale productive units but
reorganized as state farms or agricultural cooperatives.
In recognition of the positive role played by white
commercial farmers, the party has said it is prepared
to protect and support the efficient ones, but we
believe new government policies will slowly begin to
affect them adversely. However, the majority of white
commercial farmers, having remained throughout the
civil war and prospered since independence, are likely
to remain in Zimbabwe over the next two years at
least
Military
15. Further development of loyal and responsive
armed forces-as tools for supporting government
policies both at home and abroad-will remain Muga-
be's priority for the military. Professional and techni-
cal development, especially training and the acquisi-
tion of modern weapon systems on concessional terms,
will be emphasized, focusing largely on the South
African threat. We believe Zimbabwe will increasing-
ly look to the East for help in acquiring arms and
developing an integrated air defense system, both for
political reasons and because Harare doubts the West
would be responsive to its defense needs, especially
against the South African threat. The Air Force will
probably concentrate on acquiring early warning ra-
dar, communications equipment, interceptor aircraft,
surface-to-air missiles, and antiaircraft artillery, and
the Army will seek to improve its antiarmor capabili-
ty. Nevertheless, the British will be likely to continue
to play an important training role for the Army
because the military holds their past performance in
high regard and has chosen to build on the British
model it inherited. (See Annex B for details on Zim-
babwe's armed forces.)
Foreign Policy
16. Mugabe's socialist leanings, ZANU's origins as a
liberation movement, and Zimbabwe's role in southern
Africa will continue to set the tone of Harare's foreign
policy. This perspective causes Harare to seek to
define foreign policy dogmatically on issues such as
nonalignment and sovereignty, often resorting to mor-
al posturing and stands on principle-regardless of the
political or economic consequences. As Mugabe as-
sumes the chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement
later this year, he is likely to espouse stronger Pan-
Africanist and nonaligned foreign policies as he en-
deavors to move closer to "progressive regimes" and
increases its rhetorical support for the struggle against
South Africa. ZANU will move to develop stronger ties
to Communist and working-class parties in the name
of socialist solidarity.
Key Variables
17. Mugabe faces major obstacles in carrying out his
agenda, and several key variables-internal and exter-
nal-will affect both the pace and extent of Zimbab-
we's movement toward a one-party, socialist state.
These include:
- The increasing levels of factionalism and corrup-
tion within the regime.
- The ability of ZANU to reach a political accom-
modation with ZAPU that will meet Ndebele
demands for some form of power sharing and
undercut antigovernment dissidence in
Matabeleland.
- The level of economic growth, as affected by
government's management of the economy, ex-
ternal factors affecting its performance, and the
possible departure of the pragmatic and capable
Minister of Finance Bernard Chidzero.
- The extent and nature of Zimbabwean involve-
ment in regional conflicts, especially in Mozam-
bique and South Africa.
- Harare's relationship with the USSR and the
nature of their political, military, and economic
ties.
Domestic Challenges
Factionalism
18. So far, Mugabe has been able to contain sim-
mering tribal, personal, and ideological rivalries within
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ZANU. Although the Karanga are the largest Shona 2
subgroup, Mugabe and his fellow Zezuru-the second-
largest subgroup-have dominated ZANU since inde-
pendence, largely by allying with the third-largest
subgroup, the Manyika. The Zezuru, Manyika, and
other non-Karanga traditionally have banded together
to deny the Karanga top leadership positions. Sub-
ethnic frictions among the Shona resurfaced prior to
the first postindependence ZANU party congress in
August 1984 when behind the scenes machinations by
the Zezuru enabled them to keep control of party
leadership positions at the expense of the Karanga.
More recently, tribal frictions between the Karanga
and Zezuru became public following parliamentary
debate over irregularities in the Transport Ministry.
19. Mugabe will find it increasingly difficult to
dampen tensions within ZANU. Dissatisfied elements
could seek to challenge his leadership, keeping the
party in turmoil and disrupting ZANU's agenda. As
the regime further consolidates its power at the ex-
pense of the political opposition, we expect ZANU to
become an increasingly factionalized party with sub-
ethnic divisions among the Shona reinforcing personal
and political rivalries. ZANU politics will be more and
more characterized by subethnic alliances, political
maneuvering, and infighting as each faction attempts
to increase its power.
Corruption
20. Although corruption in Zimbabwe is not severe
by African standards, it is becoming a political issue.
The growing number of officials under investigation
and continuing reports of high-level malfeasance high-
light the steady growth of corruption since indepen-
dence. Popular resentment has begun to surface, and
Mugabe is being criticized privately for failing to
punish senior government officials under a leadership
code he has promised to enforce. Few party officials
will be disciplined, although the leadership code is
likely to be used to crack down on political opponents
from time to time. We do not believe the issue will
reach a level where it threatens the regime's stability
over the next two years, but corruption will increase,
damage Mugabe's credibility, undercut the effective-
ness of his economic restructuring, and prompt popu-
Dealing With ZAPU
21. ZANU's reliance on heavyhanded tactics, un-
compromising attitudes by party hardliners, and Mu-
gabe's lack of forceful leadership in seeking a political
accommodation with ZAPU and its Ndebele support-
ers have made for protracted negotiations. The princi-
pal stumblingblock, however, is Mugabe's belief that
unity should be primarily on ZANU's terms and that
ZAPU should be the one to make all major concessions.
22. ZAPU is divided over the wisdom of merging
with ZANU. Nkomo alone cannot bring an end to the
antigovernment dissidence because any ZANU dictat-
ed merger would be unlikely to address the tribal
grievances that fuel the violence. In addition, sources
within both parties speculate that unity might create
two splinter groups of hardliners that refuse to join the
new combined party. We believe that some form of
political merger between ZANU and ZAPU will occur
during the period of this Estimate; however, such an
agreement is unlikely to address fundamental Ndebele
demands for power sharing, and many rank-and-file
ZAPU members will reject such a merger.
23. The regime's reliance on force to suppress the
dissidents has served only to fuel tensions between the
Ndebele and the Shona and has created opportunities
for South African meddling, such as support for pro-
ZAPU dissidents. Nevertheless, we expect that the
government will continue to use the Army both as a
military tool to stem highly visible dissident activity
and as a political tool to demonstrate ZANU's power.
This will not resolve the essentially political and ethnic
problem, however, and probably will divert scarce
financial resources from economic development.
24. Antigovernment dissidence in Matabeleland be-
gan in March 1982 following the ouster of Nkomo
from the government and the arrest of two top ZAPU
aides. The violence has continued unabated, with the
dissidents-estimated to number between 600 and 800
men-attacking local ZANU party officials and sup-
porters in Matabeleland and the Midlands, destroying
schools and other public property and causing several
millions of dollars in damages. According to
South African support for cer-
lar dissatisfaction.
' The Shona are an ethnolinguistic group composed of six basic
tribal subgroupings: Karanga, Zezuru, Manyika, Korekore, Ndau,
and Kalanga.F___1
tain dissident elements, which are often referred to as
"Super ZAPU," reached a high point in early 1983 but
declined by the beginning of 1984. The government
has become increasingly concerned, however, that
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Real GDP Growth
Percent
Current Account
Million US $
Foreign Debt Service
Percent
Price Increases
Percent
Manufacturing Output
1980 = 100
Foreign Debt
Billion US $
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Pretoria may once again be providing support to the
dissidents. Security officials reported earlier this year
an increase in sightings of heavily armed groups
carrying RPG-7 rocket launchers and light machine-
guns near the Botswana-South African border. These
groups may have been responsible for a number of
recent attacks in southern Matabeleland. We expect
dissident activity to continue at current nonregime
threatening levels, although South Africa could, if it
decided to do so, heighten the level of violence by
increasing military support to dissident elements.
While such dissidence will not threaten the regime, it
could result in a quasi-insurgency that would devour
additional resources, further handicapping economic
development, increasing ethnic polarization, and slow-
ing down the implementation of Mugabe's agenda.
Economic Constraints
25. Mugabe must reconcile strong political pres-
sures for rapid improvement in black living standards
and for greater government control of the economy
with the need to reduce unnecessary spending because
of foreign exchange shortages and to preserve the
productivity of the private sector, which generates
most foreign exchange earnings. White rule provided a
small share of the black population with good jobs and
high living standards, although the number of black
university graduates was much higher than in sur-
rounding black countries. Since independence, relative
deficiencies in skills and education have held the rise
of blacks into the ranks of business management and
professional occupations to a slower pace than might
otherwise have been the case. Zimbabwean GDP of
$2.3 billion in 1985, about $285 per capita, is roughly
in line with most other African countries, but the
figures mask a major disparity between the small,
mostly white upper middle class and a large mass of
poor blacks.
26. The Zimbabwean economy has averaged a
growth rate of only about 1 percent annually since
1982. Although low growth during this period was
largely the result of an unusually severe and lengthy
drought, it also reflected Harare's decision to maintain
foreign exchange allocations to importers at no more
than about $1 billion a year in order to reduce current
account deficits.
27. Chronic foreign exchange shortages will contin-
ue to impede growth for the foreseeable future.
Manufacturing is heavily dependent on raw materials,
and all sectors of the economy depend on imported
capital equipment and machinery. Zimbabwe's ex-
ports, however, consist mainly of farm and mineral
products that are subject to fluctuations in internation-
al commodity prices and, in the case of agricultural
products, to the vagaries of weather. Increases in
exports large enough to relieve foreign exchange con-
straints are unlikely over the next few years.
28. As a result, we believe that economic growth
will average no more than about 3 percent annually
over the next two years, with a further decline in the
growth rate over the longer term as government
interventionist policies begin to take effect. Expansion
at this rate will not be sufficient to meet the govern-
ment's aspirations for rapid increases in black employ-
ment, education, and income. The perception in the
government that economic growth is constantly falling
short of desirable levels will probably heighten the
predisposition of senior officials toward greater gov-
ernment interference in the economy to protect or
expand employment, but limited resources will ham-
per the government's ability to do so. Any significant
increase in government ownership and operation of
businesses would probably lower economic growth
because of the inefficiencies
private management
29. Sharply rising budget deficits reflect the dispar-
ity between Harare's efforts to improve black welfare
and the economy's ability to generate the revenue to
pay for rapidly expanding social services. The growth
in spending for education, which is the largest single
budgetary line item, has exceeded the increase in
defense expenditures since 1980 by 80 percent, and
other social spending has followed suit. In total, bud-
getary increases have topped 20 percent annually since
1980, and annual deficits more than doubled to almost
$500 million in 1985. As a result, government debt to
domestic and foreign lenders also has more than
doubled to about $2.5 billion, and interest expendi-
tures have more than tripled to about $400 million,
one-fifth of the total budgetary outlays. The govern-
ment is not at the point where it feels compelled to cut
expenditures sharply, however, and we do not expect
Harare to request an IMF standby agreement in the
next year.
Foreign Policy
Regional Role
30. Following his landslide election victory in July
1985 and the consolidation of his political base, Mu-
gabe assumed a more prominent leadership role in
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Despite a decline in the cost of oil imports, we
estimate that requirements to conserve scarce foreign
exchange will hold economic growth in Zimbabwe to no
more than 3 percent annually during 1986-88. A rising
service ratio on foreign debt-about 30 percent in
1986-will absorb much of the roughly $100 million in
annual savings from lower oil prices. Another drought
like that experienced during 1982-84 would sharply
reduce prospects for growth
In addition to the possibility of recurring drought,
government policies designed to hold down farm sur-
pluses may slow agricultural growth. Relatively strong
extension and marketing institutions in Zimbabwe and
favorable pricing policies led to substantial crop sur-
pluses in 1985 and 1986. Harare is reluctant, however,
to export surpluses because of the loss it would have to
bear on commodities that it had purchased at subsidized
domestic prices, which exceed the going rates on inter-
national markets. As a result, the government an-
nounced minimal price increases for major farm com-
modities in 1987 in order to depress production
incentives and cut surpluses that have led to significant
storage problems. Except for drought years, we expect a
continued effort by Harare to control farm surpluses.
Prospects for strong growth during 1986-88 by min-
ing and manufacturing in Zimbabwe are poor. A likely
downturn over the next year or so by the economies of
southern African affairs. He appears to be responding
to overtures from African and Third World govern-
ments who see him as a potential leader in the
forefront of the struggle against apartheid, and we
believe Mugabe would like to assume a more activist
role in the region. We anticipate relations between
Harare and Pretoria to undergo periodic crises and
Mugabe's anti-South African rhetoric to become more
strident. Although we do not expect Mugabe to push
policies in the near term that would bring Zimbabwe
into open confrontation with Pretoria, increasing tur-
moil in South Africa could lead Pretoria to strike at its
neighbors
31. Mozambique. In large part, the decision to
participate militarily represented an effort by Mugabe
to repay President Machel for Mozambican assistance
to Zimbabwean guerrillas during the Rhodesian civil
war and reflected his growing concern over the threat
to Zimbabwe's important supply and transportation
links through Mozambique. The Zimbabwean Army
last year estimated the cost of maintaining its troops in
Mozambique at about $15 million a month, and
major Western countries that import Zimbabwean min-
erals, which are in competition with large, efficient
South African mines, will slow the growth of minerals
exports by Zimbabwe. Manufacturing will suffer from a
scarcity of raw materials as a result of foreign exchange
shortages and from the impact of racial problems on the
rate of growth in South Africa, which is Zimbabwe's
main market for manufactured goods.
Controlling the budget deficit will be a major prob-
lem during 1986-88. Costs rising from Harare's efforts
to increase black education and welfare and its military
intervention in Mozambique have kept budget deficits
above 10 percent of GDP for the past several years.
Even if Zimbabwe cuts defense costs by reducing its
military commitment in Mozambique, Harare's push to
expand education and a continuing heavy drain for
subsidies to government corporations will keep expendi-
tures high.
Government spending will be a major factor in
boosting inflation. A near doubling of inflation to about
20 percent, for example, will accompany a decline in
growth in 1986. The incentives that led to this surge-
increases in administered prices for food, fuel, and
industrial products in an effort to cut budgetary outlays
for subsidies-probably will spur repeated increases in
government controlled prices. Harare also will continue
to feel heavy pressures to increase farm and civil service
wages during 1986-88.
equipment losses are draining the Army's resources at
an alarming rate.
32. Last summer, spurred on by appeals from Ma-
chel and the declining Mozambican security situation,
Harare nearly tripled the number of its troops in
central Mozambique-to about 9,000 men-and be-
gan undertaking joint counterinsurgency operations
with the Mozambican Army. Since January, there has
been growing debate within the military and the
government over Zimbabwe's role in Mozambique.
Senior Zimbabwean officers now assess the Mozambi-
can Army as an undependable ally. They deeply
resent the Mozambican Army's inability to occupy and
hold positions captured by the Zimbabwean forces and
have complained that the Mozambican Army appears
to think it is Harare's-not its own-responsibility to
defeat the insurgents. Zimbabwean commanders also
fault Maputo's military for its inadequate training,
poor morale, and chronic supply shortages. Citing
these problems as well as other concerns, the Zimbab-
wean Army in mid-February ordered all its forces to
cease offensive operations immediately and to limit its
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actions to defending transportation and supply lines
along the Beira and Tete corridors. On Mugabe's
personal orders, however, Zimbabwean forces recap-
tured the Mozambican rebels' headquarters at Goron-
gosa in April 1986.
33. Although the debate within the Zimbabwean
Government over the extent and nature of its commit-
ment to Mozambique continues, we expect Harare to
sustain some military aid to the Machel government.
The Army will be likely to keep some 3,000 to 4,000
troops in central Mozambique to protect the Beira and
Tete corridors, and an additional 800 to 1,000 men at a
forward airfield in either Mozambique or eastern
Zimbabwe to launch intermittent but limited raids
against the insurgents. We do not believe Harare will
repeat last year's large-scale sweep operations
34. South Africa. Harare has pursued a mixed
policy of accommodation and confrontation with
South Africa. Despite Mugabe's strident public attacks
against South Africa and apartheid, his government
maintains a private dialogue with Pretoria. Indicative
of this two-track policy was the government's handling
of the strain in relations that resulted when landmines
planted by the African National Congress (ANC)
exploded in South Africa's northern Transvaal Prov-
ince near the Zimbabwean border last fall. Despite
bellicose public posturing by Harare and Pretoria,
both governments were quietly able to defuse the
crisis, but South Africa's inclusion of Zimbabwe in its
anti-ANC raids in May 1986 has worsened relations.
35. Harare and Pretoria appear to be moving to-
ward a more confrontational relationship, although we
expect working-level relations to continue in some
form. Some elements within the Mugabe government
favor a more activist role in assisting both the ANC
and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) guerrillas and have
already given limited military aid to the PAC. Others,
including key security officials wary of Zimbabwe's
vulnerabilities, are counseling a more cautious ap-
proach and the danger of underestimating South
African resolve.
36. Mugabe's political affinity for the PAC over the
more capable ANC probably will buttress the propo-
nents of restraint over the short term, and we expect
Mugabe to continue to place Zimbabwe's interests
first. Nevertheless, we believe Mugabe's desire to play
a role in toppling the Pretoria regime and in securing
the gratitude of an eventual black majority govern-
ment in South Africa will bring about a deterioration
in bilateral relations.
37. Mugabe's ability to restrict South African liber-
ation groups within Zimbabwe may well be the pivot
on which Harare's relations with Pretoria will turn.
We do not expect any major reduction of Zimbabwean
restrictions on PAC and ANC military personnel so
long as Harare feels vulnerable to South African
retaliation. Although Harare only allows the group's
political wing to operate in the country, ANC guerril-
las have nonetheless managed-with some apparent
low-level government support-to increase their oper-
ations. The ANC's military wing will continue to
operate covertly inside Zimbabwe, however, which
will force Harare to crack down on ANC guerrillas
from time to time in an attempt to avoid South
African reprisals. Moreover, periodic crackdowns and
other measures to control ANC activity will be unlike-
ly to placate Pretoria, which could easily-if it so
desires-increase pressure on Zimbabwe by utilizing
its military and economic leverage against the Mugabe
regime.
38. The Mugabe government is well aware that its
military forces-although some of the best in the
region-do not provide an effective deterrent against
South Africa. Top government officials also are fearful
that South Africa will step up its destabilization efforts
inside Zimbabwe by supporting opposition elements or
conducting unilateral covert operations. Such actions
would probably act to catalyze support for moving
toward a more confrontational approach in dealing
with Pretoria. Although Harare has sought, since 1980,
to reduce its economic dependence on Pretoria, South
Africa still remains a major trading partner, Zimbab-
we's largest foreign investor, and primary transporta-
tion route for its exports. A Zimbabwean Government
study last spring concluded that, despite efforts to
increase the use of road and rail connections through
Mozambique, Zimbabwe had become increasingly re-
liant on South Africa to move imports and exports, and
that only 16 percent of the country's surface traffic
was not subject to Pretoria's control.
39. USSR. Mugabe has recently been moving to
improve Zimbabwe's heretofore cool bilateral relations
with the USSR. Until Mugabe's visit to Moscow last
December, Harare's relations with Moscow had been
proper but restrained. Mugabe's suspicions of Soviet
intentions in southern Africa and Moscow's close ties to
Nkomo and ZAPU during the war for Zimbabwean
independence acted as a barrier to improving rela-
tions. The visit appears to have allayed some of
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Security Situation for Zimbabwe
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Mugabe's concerns, however, and laid the groundwork
for future discussions on expanding political, econom-
ic, and military cooperation.
40. Mugabe signed agreements in Moscow on eco-
nomic and technical as well as party-to-party coopera-
tion. The economic agreement appears to be a stan-
dard framework for discussions of possible future
activity, while the protocol formalizes previous low-
level party-to-party contacts. Early this year, both
countries exchanged military delegations as a followup
to general discussion concerning military assistance
that began in December. Zimbabwe has also approved
Moscow's request to increase its diplomatic mission by
Zimbabwean security officials that Havana had little
to offer in either expertise or equipment. Zimbabwe's
desperate need for technical and financial assistance to
host the Nonaligned Movement summit, however, will
make it difficult for Harare to limit future Cuban
involvement in the near term.
44. The United States and the West. Although
Mugabe appears to desire amicable relations with
Washington and the West because of the importance
of Western assistance a to Zimbabwe's economic suc-
cess, the long struggle to overthrow the white minority
regime-which many Zimbabweans believe was sup-
ported by the West-colors their world view and often
causes Harare to define foreign policies dogmatically
two persons, to 32.
41. Improvement in bilateral relations is likely to be
a gradual process, however, with each side being very
sensitive to the moves the other makes. Mugabe will
remain skeptical of Moscow's intentions in Zimbabwe,
while the Soviets, fully cognizant of Mugabe's suspi-
cions, are likely to move cautiously in their efforts to
improve relations. Moreover, we doubt that Mugabe,
as the chairman of the Nonaligned Movement, will
want to draw too close to the USSR, thereby jeopardiz-
ing his nonaligned credentials. Moscow, however, will
continue to be alert to opportunities that it can
effectively exploit to promote closer ties. Mugabe
might be forced to rely increasingly on the Soviets as a
source of security assistance if Harare were to become
bogged down in a seemingly unending military com-
mitment in Mozambique, if Zimbabwe experiences
repeated South African cross-border raids, or if other
sources of assistance dry up.
42. We believe Zimbabwe will be reluctant to enter
into any major arms relationship with Moscow because
of concerns over increased Soviet political influence.
Nevertheless, we expect Harare to sign an arms agree-
ment with the USSR within the next two years in order
to acquire badly needed air defense equipment-
including radar and surface-to-air missiles-as well as
other small-scale military aid.
43. Cuba. Mugabe's visit to Cuba in October 1985
and the subsequent exchange of high-level delegations
is indicative of the expanding cooperation between the
two countries. Mugabe is impressed with Cuba's assis-
tance programs, although a number of his advisers
remain wary of long-range Cuban intentions. They
probably view limited aid programs, however, as a
safe way to satisfy Havana's repeated calls for expand-
ed cooperation. Mugabe agreed early this year to
accept low-level educational and medical aid as well
as limited Cuban security training-despite a belief by
on issues of nonalignment and sovereignty.
45. Harare's bilateral relations with the West are
likely to be characterized by periodic outbursts of anti-
Western sentiment and charges of interference in
Zimbabwe's internal affairs. Consequently, Mugabe's
policies, both at home and abroad, will continue to
alienate Western governments, raise human rights
concerns, frighten off foreign investors, and lead to a
further deterioration in Harare's relations with the
West. The key determinants of US-Zimbabwean rela-
tions will be Harare's jealous guarding of its own
version of nonalignment and a fundamental difference
of views on the situation in southern Africa. We expect
Zimbabwe to remain highly critical of US policies in
southern Africa, which it sees as tacit support for the
Pretoria regime. Moreover, Zimbabwe is likely to
oppose the US policies on Central America and arms
control.
46. Nonaligned Movement. Mugabe is scheduled
to assume the chairmanship of the Nonaligned Move-
ment (NAM) for the next three years following the
movement's summit in Harare this August. Cuba-
probably with Soviet encouragement-played a key
role in the NAM's decision to have Mugabe serve as its
next chairman. Despite Mugabe's initial reluctance,
Cuba appealed to his desire to keep international
attention focused on southern Africa and to be seen as
a Third World leader. Cuba and other radical NAM
members believe they will be able to get Mugabe to
adopt strident anti-American and anti-Western posi-
tions on such issues as South Africa, Central America,
and the world economy because they think that
Zimbabwe lacks the diplomatic experience to manage
the organization effectively and that Mugabe lacks the
skills necessary to bridge differences among members.
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pressures on Mugabe to meet rising expectations and
fulfill preindependence promises to redress social in-
The Most Likely
47. We believe Mugabe will continue to move
incrementally over the next two years toward his goal
of establishing a one-party, socialist state. Despite
substantial political and legal obstacles, we expect a
single party state to be proclaimed by ZANU within
the period of this Estimate. It will fall short of a true
power sharing arrangement with ZAPU and do little to
quell the antigovernment dissidence in Matabeleland.
As the legal opposition begins to fade away, however,
we anticipate greater-and more open-divisions
within ZANU, although Mugabe probably will ward
off challenges to his preeminence
48. The central government will be likely to play an
increasing and direct role in the country's economy
through the use of joint ventures and the creation of
new parastatal enterprises. In addition, high social
spending will make budget deficits and corruption
worsening problems. Harare's socialist rhetoric will
drive off potential foreign investors and place a fur-
ther burden on the country's limited financial re-
sources.
49. We believe relations with Pretoria will deterio-
rate, but we do not expect Zimbabwe openly to allow
insurgent groups to use its territory to attack South
Africa. Zimbabwe will continue to lend military sup-
port to Mozambique, however, mainly to protect the
vital transport facilities on which Harare depends.
Mugabe probably now recognizes the need for recon-
ciliation between Maputo and the insurgents and will
show less inclination to wage aggressive counterinsur-
gency campaigns on Maputo's behalf.
50. We also expect Harare's anti-Western criticism
to become increasingly strident after Mugabe assumes
the chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement and
draws closer to so-called Third World progressives,
placing an additional strain on relations between
Washington and Harare. Zimbabwe will be likely to
expand political ties to the Communist Bloc-the
USSR in particular-over the next two years. More-
over, we believe Harare will sign a military assistance
agreement with Moscow within the period of this
Estimate, but we doubt Mugabe will seek a major
military client relationship with the Soviets
51. The volatility of the key variables leads us to
examine two alternative outcomes, which we consider
less likely but plausible, given the increasing domestic
justices.
52. Radical Change. This scenario envisions radi-
cal elements within ZANU encouraging Mugabe to
push for a rapid transformation to socialism, undertak-
ing massive social spending, and substantially running
up external debt. Moderates such as Minister of Fi-
nance Chidzero and skilled white technocrats within
the government would be replaced, large-scale disin-
vestment and abandonment of assets would ensue,
large numbers of whites would flee the country, and
any political opposition would be repressed and a one-
party system quickly and unilaterally imposed. Harare
might also provide arms, bases, and military training
to South African liberation groups in Zimbabwe. Esca-
lating hostilities with South Africa (whether initiated
by either side), a continuing major military presence in
Mozambique, and the absence of other sources of
military aid would most likely force Mugabe to seek
large-scale security assistance from the USSR. He
might also cater to Soviet interests in his chairmanship
of the Nonaligned Movement, undermining limited
US leverage and jeopardizing Western economic assis-
tance programs.
53. Regime Fragmentation. Another alternative
outcome, judged somewhat more likely, would be a
fragmentation of the regime into contending factions.
As the political fortunes of the government's oppo-
nents begin to fade, factionalism within ZANU could
increase dramatically, leading to instability and ulti-
mately to the party's fragmentation. If such a schism
were to occur, ZANU would probably divide along
tribal lines with the Zezuru and Manyika uniting
against the Karanga. If the Karanga formed an alli-
ance with the Ndebele, this would cause protracted
instability and disrupt Mugabe's efforts to advance
socialism, preempt any activist regional role for Zim-
babwe, and present opportunities for extensive exter-
nal meddling.
Implications for the United States
54. In the most likely scenario, we expect relations
between the United States and Zimbabwe to continue
to deteriorate. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe will remain
important to US policymakers because:
- The success of Zimbabwe's experiment with mul-
tiracial democracy and a mixed economy with a
substantial private sector could serve as a model
for conflict resolution and development in South
Africa.
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- Over the next several years, Harare will continue
to be an important political and military actor in
the region.
- Major Soviet inroads would provide Moscow with
a useful platform from which it could support
pro-Soviet forces in the region and in South
Africa in particular. ~
- Harare will be increasingly active internationally
and will speak for the Nonaligned Movement for
the next three years.
55. Harare will find itself increasingly at odds with
US foreign policy goals in Africa and the Third World.
We expect Soviet influence to grow slowly, but this
growth would be accelerated if relations between
Pretoria and Harare were to become more confronta-
tional or if US-Zimbabwean relations deteriorate more
sharply than we now anticipate. Although Harare is
mindful of its dependence on Western economic aid
and investment, US attempts to link Zimbabwe's
political behavior with the level of economic assistance
will be viewed by Harare as unwarranted interference
in its affairs and largely disregarded. Moreover, any
curtailment of aid by the United States would have
little immediate impact, and any future economic
consequences would be unlikely to deter Mugabe from
pursuing his socialist policies. Over the long term, his
commitment to improve social welfare and the result-
ing need for Western economic assistance to maintain
vigorous economic growth will be a moderating factor
in Zimbabwean-US relations
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ANNEX B
The Zimbabwean Armed Forces
Independence and Integration
The 42,000-man Zimbabwean military establish-
ment descends from elements of the former 38,000-
man Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF), 35,000 guerril-
las from Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National
Liberation Army (ZANLA), and the 20,000 guerrillas
from Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe People's Revolution-
ary Army (ZIPRA). The three groups are all represent-
ed in the new unified national military, which in-
cludes both the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and
the Zimbabwe Air Force (AFZ), but former ZANLA
are predominant.
Suspicion and caution characterized the new gov-
ernment's approach to integration of the two guerrilla
armies and the former Rhodesian conventional force
into a single military organization. Mugabe had to
place high priority on this delicate and dangerous
issue. During the early 1980s, the three forces were
kept separate to avoid conflict. Mugabe realized,
however, that to prevent internal violence, these forces
would have to be either demobilized or permanently
integrated into the armed forces.
The RSF personnel were the easiest to demobilize.
By disbanding the reserves and terminating the draft,
Army personnel strengths dropped and other former
RSF personnel resigned, dissatisfied with the new
government. Demobilization and integration of the
55,000 insurgents proved more complicated. Initially,
the government intended to integrate about 19,000
guerrillas into the new Zimbabwe National Army and
demobilize the remaining 36,000 into a nation-build-
ing program emphasizing agricultural projects. The
failure of these projects and sporadic violence between
former ZANLA and ZIPRA personnel caused Mugabe
temporarily to abandon demobilization and integrate
the remaining men into the Army.
Demobilization began again in 1982. A program
that combined cash incentives with the provision of
educational and employment opportunities encour-
aged soldiers to leave the Army. By the end of 1982, a
total of over 22,000 men had been demobilized and
ZNA numbered approximately 45,000.
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Army
Strength: 40,000
Major Units: five infantry brigades, one Presidential
Guard Brigade, one parachute group, one commando
battalion, one mechanized infantry battalion, one horse
mounted infantry battalion, one separate infantry bat-
talion (ex-ZIPRA), one tank regiment, one armored car
regiment, one field artillery regiment, and one air
defense artillery regiment.
Major Weapons: 61 medium tanks, 230 armored
personnel carriers, 140 armored reconnaissance vehi-
cles, 40+ field artillery (100 mm and over), 40+ field
artillery (under 100 mm), 18 multiple rocket launchers,
6 recoilless guns/rifles (100 mm and over), 58 recoilless
guns/rifles (under 100 mm), 6 mortars (100 mm and
over), 1,650 mortars (under 100 mm), 364 antitank
weapons, 80 air defense artillery (under 23 mm), 35 air
defense artillery (23 mm and 37 mm), 30+ SA-7
missiles.
People's Militia
Strength: 23,000
Major Units: eight infantry brigade headquarters, (35
infantry battalions being organized).
Paramilitary Police
Strength: 3,000
Strength: 2,000+
Major Units: one ground attack squadron, one light
bomber squadron, one helicopter squadron, one trans-
port squadron, one light support squadron, two training
squadrons, two antiaircraft artillery squadrons.
Major Aircraft: 10 to 12 attack, 6 to 7 bombers, 9 to
11 light strike, 15 to 20 transport, 24 to 28 trainers, five
utility, five to 10 utility helicopters, and 20 to 27
helicopter gunships.
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As relations between the ZANU-dominated govern-
ment and the Zimbabwe African People's Union
(ZAPU) opposition worsened in 1983, the government
embarked upon a new campaign aimed at reducing
ZAPU influence within the Army. By February 1984
as few as 8,000 former ZIPRA guerrillas remained,
about 20 percent of ZNA strength. While most former
ZIPRA guerrillas were formally demobilized, several
thousand deserted and a number of these joined the
dissidents in Matabeleland. By the beginning of 1984,
total military strength stabilized at about 42,000 men.
The demobilization program formally ended with an
ethnic and political force composition more comfort-
able for the ZANU government. Whites and former
RSF blacks probably amount to no more than 15
percent of the force, and former ZIPRA guerrillas to
no more than 18 percent.
Force Development
Army Organization
Between 1980 and 1985 the armed forces, particu-
larly the ZNA, underwent considerable reorganization
and training. The ZNA has retained basically the same
Rhodesian-British staff organization and unit structure
that existed prior to independence. By mid-1984
brigade organization had been pretty much standard-
ized, with each of the five brigades and the new
Presidential Guard Brigade controlling three infantry
battalions. The infantry totals 18 battalions of about
900 to 1,000 men each. With the exception of the
Presidential Guard Brigade, each brigade has organic
engineer, signals, maintenance, intelligence, medical,
educational, and finance units.
Elite Units. The elite specialized units in the ZNA,
manned largely by former RSF personnel, both black
and white, include the 1 Parachute Group, 1 Com-
mando Battalion, 1 Mechanized Battalion, and Grey's
Scouts. Most of the remaining white Rhodesian officers
and noncommissioned officers in the ZNA are in these
units. These units have shouldered more than their
share of the burden, not only against the dissidents in
Matabeleland but also on external operations in Bots-
wana and Mozambique. Overall, these units have
proved their competence and effectiveness time and
again on combat operations. The government tends to
depend heavily upon these units for the more critical
military operations because it views them as apolitical
career soldiers. Many members of these units are
simply building time toward retirement. In the next
five years many will retire and their expertise will be
difficult to replace.
Ethnicity. True integration is not likely to be
achieved in the military. Former RSF members are
likely to remain in elite units. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and
4th Brigades are a mix of former ZANLA and ZIPRA
combatants but are commanded almost exclusively by
ex-ZANLA fighters. The 5th Brigade and the Presi-
dential Guard Brigade represent the government's
effort to build a politically reliable force; they are
entirely ZANLA. The 5th Brigade, equipped and
trained by the North Koreans as a combined arms
brigade (1981-82) initially was accountable directly to
the Prime Minister. In early 1983, when the brigade
deployed to Matabeleland, its antidissident operations
resembled a rampage against Ndebele noncombatants.
The atrocities, since attributed not only to its Shona
makeup but also to the unit's low levels of discipline,
training, organization, and leadership, resulted in a
relook at ethnic units and North Korean training. The
5th Brigade was placed under the direct control of the
Army Commander, stripped of its organic armor and
field artillery assets, and retrained by the British.
Similarly, the all-ZANU Presidential Guard Brigade,
trained and advised by the North Koreans (1982-83)
and the Chinese (1984), has since also received training
from the British Military Advisory Training Team
(BMATT).
Air Force Development
The Air Force has gone from a small but highly
efficient organization staffed exclusively by whites,
utilizing old but reliable Western aircraft, to a mostly
black force employing a mixture of aircraft. Overall,
capabilities have declined and are likely to improve
only gradually. The July 1982 sabotage of Thornhill
Airbase, which destroyed and damaged a large per-
centage of the AFZ's aircraft, increased suspicions
about the loyalty of remaining white members of the
AFZ. The investigation of the Thornhill bombing
resulted in the arrest of six senior officers, all of them
white, for suspected collusion with South Africa in the
attack. While they were later acquitted, the damage to
white morale had been done. A large exodus of white
pilot and technical personnel from the AFZ in 1983,
resulted in a barely operable force.
In July 1983, Pakistani Air Marshal Daudpota and
60 Pakistani Air Force advisers took command of the
AFZ. The Pakistanis were expected to not only train
the required number of black pilot and technical
personnel to fill the vacancies but also groom black
officers to command the Air Force, and in January
1986 a Zimbabwean took command of the AFZ.
Recruitment standards were lowered to increase the
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number of blacks in the Air Force, but relatively few
black pilot personnel fully qualified. Of 32 pilot
personnel who returned from training in Romania and
North Korea in 1984 and 1985, only four were even
marginally qualified.
A large percentage of the AFZ's fixed-wing ground
attack aircraft, transports, and helicopters remain
grounded because of a shortage of pilots and poor
maintenance. A major test of the Air Force's capabili-
ties came in late 1985 during Zimbabwean operations
in Mozambique, and the Air Force was criticized for
its poor performance.
People's Militia
The paramilitary militia will become an increasing-
ly important adjunct to the regular Army. The Peo-
ple's Militia was originally envisioned as a reserve
force of lightly armed personnel organized with a
brigade headquarters in each of the eight provinces,
controlling 28,000 militiamen who would perform
local area security and reinforce the ZNA and police
in antidissident operations. A worsening dissident situ-
ation in Matabeleland caused the government to accel-
erate militia training in 1983, and the total strength of
the People's Militia had reached about 23,000.
It now appears that the government will work
toward a total force of about 80,000. All militia
personnel are expected to be ZANU members. The
mission of the militia has been substantially expanded,
and in 1985 it was formally placed under the direct
control of the ZNA as the reserve arm of that organiza-
tion. In March and April 1985 militia personnel were
trained in the use of medium and heavy weapons, to
include antiaircraft guns and mortars, and in June
1985, militia and units assumed duties vacated by the
ZNA 3rd Brigade when that regular unit was deployed
to the operational area in Mozambique. Militia person-
nel also have been attached to the ZNA brigades
operating in Mozambique. The relatively low level of
militia training will prevent the militia from becoming
a major factor in Zimbabwean military operations for
several years, but it does enable the ZNA to stretch its
resources, especially on external operations.
Foreign Military Assistance
Further development of the Zimbabwean military
will be heavily dependent upon foreign military assis-
tance. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, the
United Kingdom has been the largest source of mili-
tary aid. Since 1980, purchases from the United
Kingdom have included jet trainers, fighters, bombers,
land rovers, and an approach radar system. The most
important British contribution has been its training
program. Immediately after independence the
BMATT ran an individual training program to turn
former guerrillas into regular soldiers. During 1981
and 1982, the British continued to provide battalion-
level advisers to conduct unit training. Since 1983, the
BMATT has concentrated on upgrading the quality
and curriculum of the ZNA's numerous military
schools. The most successful of these efforts has been
the Battalion Battle School Course. All of the ZNA's
infantry battalions have rotated through the school at
least once, and the course has proved extremely
effective in upgrading the combat capabilities of the
ZNA. The high quality of the British program has
contributed not only to the relatively orderly transfor-
mation of the ZNA, but also to a pro-Western senti-
ment among many ZNA personnel. Other military
equipment and supplies have been provided by West-
ern Europe, Canada, and Brazil.
Among Communist countries, North Korea and
China have been the major donors. In 1982 and 1983,
Zimbabwe accepted a major North Korean grant of
armor, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and other
weapons with which to equip the 5th Brigade. Be-
tween 1981 and 1983, Korean advisers trained the 5th
Brigade, Presidential Guard Brigade, and People's
Militia. However, the ZNA has been generally dissatis-
fied with both the quality of equipment and training
provided by the North Koreans.
In 1983 China provided Zimbabwe, on a grant basis,
a number of field artillery pieces, armored personnel
carriers, tanks, and antiaircraft guns. China currently
is delivering 10 to 12 F-7 fighter aircraft to Zimbabwe.
A small Chinese military team provided field artillery
and tank gunnery training and advised the Presiden-
tial Guard Brigade during 1984. The Chinese advisers
were evidently well accepted by the Zimbabweans,
and the BMATT, which has taken over training from
the Chinese, recently gave the Chinese instructors high
grades for the quality of their training. A small
Chinese Air Force team is presently in Zimbabwe to
assist with the F-7 fighter aircraft
Smaller quantities of military hardware, primarily
ammunition, have been provided by Bulgaria, Hunga-
ry, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Likewise, Zimbabwean
military personnel have undergone training in Bulgar-
ia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, and
Yugoslavia.
Until quite recently, military relations between the
Soviet Union and Zimbabwe were almost nonexistent.
In 1984 the Soviets made a token delivery of about $4
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Selected Military Assistance to Zimbabwe, 1985-86
China Pilot and technician $16 million
training
Eastern Europe Artillery and armor Unknown
training
Small arms and None
ammunition
Contract signed for None None
10 helicopters
million in small arms and ammunition. More recently,
a Soviet military team visited Zimbabwe, and an AFZ
delegation visited Moscow in March to discuss the
possibility of obtaining air defense equipment, which
would include fighters, SAM missiles, and early warn-
ing radar.
Growing Pains
The Zimbabwean armed forces face a number of
difficulties in force development. Since independence,
a major portion of the ZNA has been heavily commit-
ted to combat operations, first against Zimbabwean
dissidents in Matabeleland and later against antigov-
ernment insurgents in Mozambique. These campaigns
have strained the military's scarce resources, depleted
equipment, and devoured funds to purchase new
weapons and equipment. Currently, most of the ZNA's
black commanders are relatively young and lack
experience, and their recent actions in Mozambique
have highlighted these and other ZNA weaknesses.
Capabilities
The Zimbabwean military can defend its territorial
integrity against any neighbor except South Africa.
The armed forces could provide little defense against a
purposeful conventional South African attack. Against
a small-scale unconventional South African incursion,
the Zimbabwean military has a limited capability to
intervene and block. Within Zimbabwe the armed
forces can conduct limited joint conventional or coun-
terinsurgency operations with some success. Its ability
to project such offensive operations across its borders is
limited by inventory and logistic constraints. Defen-
sive operations abroad, limited in scope such as those it
conducts along the Mutare-Beira line of communica-
tions, are within its capabilities
The Air Force has only a marginal operational
capability. It suffers from a shortage of close air
support and transport aircraft and qualified pilots and
maintenance personnel. An air defense capability is
almost entirely lacking.
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