ZAIRE: PROPSPECTS FOR THE MOBUTU REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R001200100001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1986
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
CO?NCT GIVE?GUT
Oa MARK ON
Zaire: Prospects for the
Mobutu Regime
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume II?Annexes
,..Secfer
NIE 65-86/11
November 1986
Copy 506
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, and the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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....SECT-ZET
NIE 65-86/11
ZAIRE: PROSPECTS FOR THE
MOBUTU REGIME
Volume II?Annexes
Information available as of 7 November 1986 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on that date.
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CONTENTS
Page
Annex A: Obstacles to Economic Growth A-1
Annex B: The UDPS: A Continuing Irritant B-1
Annex D: Status of the FLNC D-1
iii
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ANNEX A
OBSTACLES TO ECONOMIC GROWTH
Zaire's hopes for more rapid growth rest on its
ability to boost exports and remove the foreign ex-
change constraint on essential imports. We foresee,
however, only modest export growth through the end
of the decade that, when combined with growing debt
service obligations and little new external capital, will
constrain real import growth to a rate far below the
level needed for sustained economic recovery
Dim Export Picture
If Zaire is to meet its longer run debt obligations and
still have currency to fund development programs, a
healthy export performance is critical. Unfortunately,
world prices for major exports?copper, petroleum,
diamonds, and cobalt?remain very low and most
commodity experts see little prospect for a turnaround
anytime soon.
export earnings are likely to be lower
in 1986 and 1987 than either of the two preceeding
years because of unanticipated declines in the world
price for copper and cobalt?which together account
for about 50 percent of total exports.' Coffee earnings,
which were expected to increase sharply as a result of
high world prices, are likely to be significantly below
projections because of ill-advised government policies
and marketing problems. Revenues from petroleum
exports, which in 1985 accounted for 17 percent of
total exports, are expected to fall drastically in 1986
because of the sharp decline in world prices
Although slow export growth
probably will resume in 1988, we believe prospects for
a rapid rise in earnings through 1990 are poor because
of Zaire's dependence on primary commodities and
structural constraints that exist within each major
export industry. Moreover, more than 40 percent of
Zaire's mineral exports are shipped through South
' The world price for copper, which accounts for 37 percent of
Zaire's exports, has fallen from 64 cents per pound in January 1986
to 59 cents per pound in August 1986.
low demand is likely to keep copper prices around their current
level for the remainder of 1986. The world price for cobalt fell
sharply from $11 per pound in January 1986 to $3.70 in August
1986 because of oversupply and substitution. Cobalt prices, how-
ever, increased sharply in September to $6 per pound, and commod-
ity experts believe the price of cobalt may continue to rise into 1987.
A 1-cent-per-pound change in average annual copper prices repre-
sents approximately $5 million in Zairian export earnings, while a
$1-per-pound change in cobalt prices represents approximately $37
million in revenue.
Africa, and any disruption of these routes would have
an immediate negative impact on export revenues.
Growing Debt Burden
Servicing the $5 billion debt is a key obstacle to
growth because it is absorbing an increasing share of
the country's scarce foreign exchange.
debt repayments in 1986 will be 25
percent of export earnings and about 50 percent of
government revenues. By contrast, in 1982 the shares
were only 16 percent and 10 percent respectively.
Given the problems in meeting debt servicing re-
quirements, Zaire has turned to debt rescheduling.
While this has reduced the burden in the short term, it
has only delayed the problem and increased the
overall size of the financial burden. We see little
alternative to continued annual reschedulings of
principal and interest payments. Without annual re-
schedulings, debt service ratios would range from 55 to
60 percent compared to 25 to 30 percent with resched-
uling. We calculate that annual reschedulings through
the end of the decade at similar terms as in 1985 will
will add at least $1.5 billion in capitalized interest to
total debt by 1990. According to international finan-
cial sources, a comprehensive multiyear rescheduling
is unlikely, given current lender attitudes.
Domestically, we believe the effect of debt service
on the budget has been compounded in recent years
by Kinshasa's moves to hold down spending and
deficit financing in order to reduce inflation and stay
in compliance with IMF performance targets.
debt service, salaries, and
nondiscretionary expenditures now represent 80 per-
cent of total government spending, leaving only 20
percent of the bud et for public investment and
operational expenses
Limited Outside Capital
External sources of funds are likely to be limited in
the foreseeable future. Although international finan-
cial statistics show that the World Bank and bilateral
donors have responded to Kinshasa's reform efforts by
providing increased aid over the past three years, we
judge their own budget constraints make it unlikely
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that these donors will increase aid sufficiently to fuel a
recovery. At a recent World Bank Consultative Group
meeting, new aid commitments for 1986-88 were far
short of the amounts needed to fund Zaire's five-year
(1986-90) investment plan aimed at achieving an
annual real GDP growth of 3.5 percent. Even given
present aid levels, the net flow of funds is negative.
Indeed, according to World Bank statistics, in the past
two years Kinshasa paid out roughly $440 million
more to medium- and long-term creditors than it
received in new loan funds. Further, reporting from
international financial observers holds little hope that
commercial banks or private investors will be willing
to put much money into Zaire over the next several
years. Despite an improved climate for foreign busi-
nesses?profits and dividends are being remitted for
the first time since the mid-1970s?many foreign
investors remain deterred by the country's weak infra-
structure and history of corruption and economic
mismanagement.
Stagnant Import Capacity
We estimate that foreign exchange shortages caused
by declining exports, growing debt obligations, lack of
foreign reserves, and lower-than-expected IMF inflows
will force Kinshasa to cut back on essential imports this
year, thereby slowing economic activity. Moreover, we
estimate that slow export growth, continued high debt
service payments, and the large service account deficit
will lead to long-term import restraint, with real
import growth averaging only about 2 percent per
year, not nearly enough to fuel an economic recovery.
With foreign exchange reserves covering only two
weeks of imports and prospects of little new credit,
Zaire has no real means to further expand import
capacity. With the population growth at nearly 3
percent annually, the slow pace of economic growth
also implies a continuation of the decade-long decline
in per capita real GNP.
A-3
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ANNEX B
THE UDPS: A CONTINUING IRRITANT
The Union for Democracy and Social Progress
(UDPS) has been the only internally based Zairian
opposition group in recent years. It was formed in late
1981 by 13 former members of the Zairian parliament
who hoped to press Mobutu into allowing an officially
sanctioned opposition party. The leaders of the group
were members of the Baluba tribe based in southern
Zaire, and, although their objectives appeared to enjoy
widespread sympathy, their popular support was con-
centrated in their home regions. Despite their limited
support, however, Mobutu feared the UDPS's political
potential, and in 1982 arrested the 13 leaders and later
that year rusticated them to their home regions.
Over the past five years, although the UDPS has
continued low-level activity and probably gained some
support, it has been unable to capitalize on widespread
discontent with government ineffectiveness and falling
living standards to gain a significant following. We
believe this largely reflects Mobutu's successful efforts
to suppress the UDPS through co-optation and coer-
cion, as well as a hesitancy among Zairians to provide
more active support because of a fear of government
retribution. Mobutu has co-opted nine of the original
13 leaders, periodically harassed the remaining four
leaders and UDPS followers, and used his security
service to penetrate the group at the grassroots level.
Despite the UDPS's ineffectiveness, however, Mo-
butu apparently continues to see it as a potential
threat. The recent popular uprisings in the Philippines
and Haiti, in particular, seemed to shake Mobutu, and
he moved quickly to demonstrate his authority by
cracking down on the UDPS and small religious groups
such as Jehovah's Witnesses. Mobutu reportedly is
concerned that some military and security officials, as
well as many lower ranking members of the ruling
party, increasingly sympathize with UDPS goals.
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ANNEX D
STATUS OF THE FLNC
The Angolan-based Front for the Liberation of
Congo (FLNC), at one time Zaire's principal opposi-
tion group and dominated by the large, Shaba-based
Lunda tribe, has been inactive since it invaded Shaba
region in 1978. Nonetheless, the Zairian Government
contends that Angola is rearming the group in an
effort to press Mobutu to end his support for
UNITA?a claim we find unsubstantiated. We esti-
mate there are 2,000 to 3,500 combat-age FLNC
males in Angola, only a small portion of whom are
readily available for military operations.
The FLNC's military capabilities have significantly
deteriorated in the past seven years because of inade-
quate Angolan support, ethnic divisions, leadership
struggles, dispersion to numerous camps in the interi-
or, and UNITA's control of much of Angola's border
with Zaire
Harsh living conditions in Angola
and the return to Zaire of former Prime Minister
Nguza?a Shaban who claims substantial support
within the FLNC?reportedly has led a number of
senior FLNC military commanders and several hun-
dred of their supporters to consider returning to Zaire
under Mobutu's amnesty program. FLNC elements in
Zambia?numbering several thousand?suffer from
many of the same problems as their Angolan counter-
parts and, in our view, pose even less of a potential
military threat
Nevertheless, the FLNC remains a potential threat
to Mobutu, particularly if Luanda decides to provide
the group substantial support. We cannot confirm or
deny Zairian claims that the Angolan Defense Minister
met with FLNC leaders in Angola last December and
told them to prepare for operations against Zaire. Even
so, a dearth of discernible FLNC activities near the
Angola-Zaire border leads us to believe that the Zair-
ians are well off the mark in their recent allegations
that Angola has provided small arms, jeeps, and other
logistic support to FLNC units in northern Angola in
preparation for an attack on western Shaba region. In
our judgment, however, Luanda could with little
difficulty put together a small unit of FLNC to
conduct small-scale, cross-border paramilitary activi-
ties that would send a clear signal to Mobutu. Attempts
to form a larger force would require substantial funds
and would be complicated by ethnic divisions, the
dissidents' lack of a charismatic leader, and the need
to establish bases in areas where UNITA forces are
present.
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Table 2
Principal Zairian Dissident Groups
Leader Ethnic and Regional Primary Base of
Power Base Operation
Membership a
Front for the National Liberation None; numerous Shaba region (former Angola and northwestern 4,000 to 6,000
of the Congo (FLNC) factions Katangan gendarmes). Main Zambia
support comes from Lunda
tribesmen
Congolese National Movement,
Lumumba Faction (MNC/L) ,
Francois Lumumba
Shaba region
Brussels and Congo
150
Coalition of National Unity (CUN)
President Lieutenant
General Mbumba
(former president of
FLNC)
Composed of MNC/L
and FLNC cadres
Tanzania
200
Congolese Liberation Party (PLC)
Antoine Kibingu
Marundura (former
FLNC Central
Committee member)
Bovira and Bafulero tribes
of eastern Zaire
Eastern Zaire and Tanzania
50 to 100
Popular Revolutionary Party (PRP)
Laurent Kabila
Eastern Zaire
Eastern Zaire and Tanzania
200
a No reliable figures are available; numbers are approximate.
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Armed Strength Foreign Support
Origin and Significance
1,000, primarily
based in Angola
Angola, USSR, Cuba (no
military support since 1981)
FLNC grew out of the Katangan secession movement led by Moshe
Tshombe in the early 1960s. Katangan gendarmes formed the FLNC in
1975 and with Angolan and Soviet support invaded the Shaba region in
1977 and 1978. Since 1978, however, the group has been inactive
because of inadequate external support, ethnic divisions, leadership
struggles, and UNITA's control of much of Angola's border with Zaire.
In the past few years, FLNC cadres have been integrated into Angolan
military units to fight UNITA.
Unknown
Libya (small amount of
funds, arms, and training)
MNC/L was founded by Francois Lumumba, son of Patrice Lumumba,
in the mid-1960s. Reportedly responsible for the bombs set off in
Kinshasa in early 1984.
100
Libya (small amount of
funds, arms, and training)
Formed in mid-1984 when the Tanzanian-based factions of the FLNC
and the MNC/L merged Libyans reportedly forced a merger by
threatening to withdraw aid to both groups. Although potentially the
most capable Zairian dissident group, it has yet to carry out a military
operation. Group suffers from ethnic division, leadership problems, and
a shortage of funds. Maintains contact with PRP and PLC.
50 Libya (small amount of
funds and arms)
Formed in early 1984 when Antoine Marundura split from the
Tanzanian-based faction of the FLNC after disagreements with
Mbumba. Maintains contact with PRP and CUN.
50 to 100
Probably Libya (small
amount of funds and arms)
Formed in early 1960s and has long been active in antigovernment
activity. Only group to operate inside Zaire in recent years. Probably
responsible for recent rebel attacks in eastern Zaire. Maintains contact
with PLC and CUN.
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