THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES: THE NEXT 18 MONTHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R001100140001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1986
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of
Secret
Central
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
OFNOTIIs our
MARK ON The Terrorist Threat to the
Gulf Cooperation Council States:
The Next 18 Months
COPY 4 2 t
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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NIE 39-86
THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES:
THE NEXT 18 MONTHS
Information available as of 16 January 1986 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved on that date by the National Foreign
Intelligence Board.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
NOTE ON INTELLIGENCE SOURCES .......................................... 3
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 5
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 11
The Domestic Threat ....................................................................... 11
Shia Unrest .................................................................................... 11
Sunni Extremists ........................................................................... 13
Expatriates ..................................................................................... 13
Leftist and Exile Groups .............................................................. 14
The Foreign Terrorist Threat .......................................................... 14
Iranian-Sponsored Terrorism ....................................................... 14
Radical Arabs ................................................................................ 15
The Soviet Union .......................................................................... 15
The Gulf as a Stage ....................................................................... 15
Vulnerability of Targets ................................................................... 16
Handling the Threat ......................................................................... 16
Regional Cooperation ................................................................... 18
Keeping the Shias Down .............................................................. 19
Terrorism Policies ......................................................................... 19
Aid as Insurance Against Terrorism ............................................ 19
Prospects ............................................................................................ 20
Implications for the United States ................................................... 21
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SCOPE NOTE
This National Intelligence Estimate examines the prospects for
terrorism in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf over the next 18 months.
It focuses on the Gulf Cooperation Council states as terrorist targets,
complementing other interagency papers that examine patron-state
supporters of terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Estimate
details the principal internal and external terrorist threats to the GCC
states and assesses the capabilities and strategies of these states in
handling the threat. It examines the implications of terrorism for the
stability of their governments, the implications for the United States in
the region,
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KEY JUDGMENTS
During the period of this Estimate, the Gulf Cooperation Council
states are likely to experience sporadic terrorism similar to that which
has taken place over the past two years. These states share characteris-
tics-including relatively large disaffected Shia populations, strains in
relations with regional states that sponsor terrorism, large numbers of
expatriate workers, and close ties to the United States-that make them
attractive targets for terrorism. Most of the GCC entities with the
exception of Kuwait are unlikely to experience a sharp rise in the
incidence of terrorism.
Incidents that would lead to an increase in terrorism could include:
a dramatic worsening of fortunes for either side in the Iran-Iraq war,
significant deterioration of the Arab-Israeli peace process, US retaliation
against a regional state, or economic collapse in the Persian Gulf.
Terrorism in Kuwait will be driven by the Kuwaiti Government's
continued detention of the perpetrators convicted of the December
1983 bombings in Kuwait, who have links to the Iranian-backed radical
Shia Hizballah in Lebanon and Dawa Party elements throughout the
region, and by deteriorating relations with Syria.
In the past year, sporadic acts of terrorism spread to normally
quiescent Saudi Arabia-the GCC state of greatest importance to US
interests-but Saudi security and political countermeasures are likely to
limit terrorism to infrequent, scattered acts. We judge the Saudis will
continue to be successful in limiting the terrorist threat from their
minority Shia community with a combination of stiff security measures,
some political accommodation, and economic inducements. Their cau-
tious and conciliatory foreign policies also are likely to keep most
foreign sponsors of terrorism at bay.
No terrorist incidents occurred in 1985 in Bahrain, the United Arab
Emirates, Qatar, or Oman
Sources of Terrorism in the Gulf Region
Iran. Iranian-sponsored terrorism will continue to be the greatest
external terrorist threat to the Gulf states. Iran has not launched a full-
scale terrorist campaign against the Gulf states because it is trying to
wean its Arab neighbors away from supporting Iraq, and events in the
Iran-Iraq war will largely dictate Iran's sponsorship of terrorism in the
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Gulf. If, for example, Iran should be backed into a corner by adverse
developments in its war with Iraq-such as destruction of Iran's oil-
exporting capabilities-Tehran will almost certainly use expanded
terrorism in the Gulf as part of its response. Tehran, meanwhile, will
not be averse to maintaining terrorist pressure on the Gulf states
through surrogate groups.
Shias. The principal domestic terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Bahrain will come from the volatile presence of Iranian
and Arab Shias who have developed contacts with radical Shias in
Lebanon and exiles in Iran. The danger of domestic Shia unrest will be
greatest in Bahrain, where the Shias form an impoverished majority that
has little to lose by a change in the status quo. By contrast, in Saudi Ara-
bia and Kuwait many Shias have built themselves an economic stake
and will probably continue to stand against terrorist acts that would
only bring down on them the wrath of the security services.
Sunnis. No significant cases of terrorism by Sunni fundamentalists
have occurred in the region since the takeover of the Grand Mosque in
Mecca in 1979. However, cells of Sunni fundamentalists are growing on
college campuses in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, where economic down-
turns are focusing greater attention on their pet theme of regime
corruption. We think the chances are about even that they may turn to
terrorism to highlight their cause. Sunni extremists also have an intense
dislike for the Shias, and rounds of violent attacks between Shias and
Sunnis in the Gulf are possible and could threaten Westerners.
Expatriate Workers. Strict visa and work-permit regulations,
aggressive deportation policies, and economic inducements will contin-
ue generally to constrain the expatriate communities from extreme
actions. Still, the expatriate worker communities in the Gulf include
many disgruntled individuals, and provide a ready pool of surrogates
for state-sponsored terrorism. Most of the known perpetrators of
terrorist acts in Kuwait, such as the bombing of the US Embassy in
1983, have been expatriates from Lebanon or Iraq who were paid
surrogates or members of terrorist organizations. Moreover, the large-
scale presence of foreigners and their frequent travel strain local
security assets and provide a cover for the insertion and activity of
terrorist operatives.
Leftist Groups. The Saudi Communist Party, the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Oman, the local Bath parties, and other leftist
groups, with operational capabilities that have been markedly reduced
over the past decade, will be unlikely to pose a serious terrorist threat to
the Gulf states during the period of this Estimate.
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Other Groups. The GCC states also will continue to be targets of
meddling and terrorist pressure from Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Palestinian
groups. Of these, Syria will pose the greatest threat. Damascus is using
terrorism-often through Palestinian groups-to extract financial aid
and remind the Gulf states that Syria must be taken into account in
their foreign policy formulation.
Possible New Factors Causing Terrorism
New factors would have to come into play for the GCC states other
than Kuwait to'be subject to increased terrorism in the next 18 months.
Some of the more likely possibilities include:
-A dramatic worsening of fortunes for Iran in the war or a
perception in Tehran that the Gulf states had substantially
increased their support for Iraq. A serious crippling of Iran's oil
export capabilities would make this a likely catalyst for Iranian
terrorism.
- Deterioration of the Arab-Israeli peace process to another round
of armed conflict. Another Arab-Israeli war would heighten
anti-US sentiments in the region and increase the threat of
terrorism against US interests in particular. Significant progress
in the peace process probably also would unleash terrorism from
rejectionist elements throughout the Middle East. Events such as
the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis and the US
diversion of the Egyptian airliner carrying the Achille Lauro
hijackers highlight Arab frustration with the Arab-Israeli con-
flict and increase anti-US sentiments in the region and the
likelihood of attacks directed at US interests. The Gulf states
have kept a lid on potential local outbreaks of violence as a
result of Arab-Israeli tensions, but they may be unable to do so if
the issue is brought closer to home by an Israeli attack on PLO
offices somewhere on the Arabian Peninsula, for example, or US
retaliation against a regional state.
- A dramatic worsening of the Gulf economies-an increasing
possibility, given falling world oil prices. This would increase
the likelihood that disgruntled local elements would take out
their frustrations in the form of terrorism or sabotage.
- Domestic turmoil in any of the Gulf states, which could spur
Iran to reinvigorate its policy of exporting revolution to the
Gulf.
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An event that sparks a surge in Islamic fundamentalism and the
rapid politicization of religious elements-either Shia or Sun-
ni-in the Gulf. Examples include the assassination of Khomeini
or the arrest of popular clerics.
Likely GCC Responses
None of the Gulf states is likely to accede to specific terrorist
demands, nor will they change their foreign policies in response to
terrorism. They will continue to try to plug the gaps in their internal se-
curity capabilities, and take more measures to reduce their expatriate
populati n~ s but serious security problems will remain, especially in
Kuwait.
Regional
antiterrorism cooperation will probably expand, but only moderately.
Significance for US Interests
US interests in Kuwait and elsewhere will remain high-priority
targets, especially for Shia terrorist groups. American diplomats, mili-
tary officials, and businessmen are especially vulnerable and remain
easy prey for potential assassins:
- Given the diminished US presence in Lebanon and the increas-
ing difficulty of attacking US interests there, the attention of
Shia terrorists may turn more to the large US presence in the
Gulf states, especially in response to major outside events-such
as the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis, and US actions
in the Achille Lauro case-that sharply stimulate anti-US
sentiment in the region.
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Sustained terrorist attacks-such as could occur in the wake of one
of the contingencies in this study and that are obviously tied to the US
presence in the Gulf-could adversely affect US relations with Gulf
countries and lead them to decrease the US military presence and draw
away from agreements facilitating US operations in the region.
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Shia Muslim Population as Percentage of Native Population
1
A r
O
O Shia Muslim
percentage
O
Selected oil
pipeline
Oil terminal
Oilfield
ho dery
~ po defined
D h o f a r
People's Democratic
/
I
Republic of Yemen Ad;;, st,e
eeenda, d
y r preehn is (S. Yemen)
not cessajl~utbo'.I. horitativa.
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DISCUSSION
1. The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council share
characteristics that make them attractive targets for
terrorism from several quarters. The conservative
shaykhdoms are repugnant to extremists of all
stripes-leftist, Sunni, Shia. All the GCC states support
Iraq in the Gulf war. Nearly all have large disaffected
Shia populations (see map), stirred by the nearby Shia
revolution in Iran, and large numbers of expatriate
workers whose loyalties lie elsewhere. They are in-
volved in the Arab-Israeli peace process and inter-
regional struggles, increasing their exposure to external
terrorist threats. Most recently, the dramatic decline in
oil revenues is exacerbating the disgruntlement of a
wide range of domestic elements. The monarchies'
close ties to the United States and the vehemently anti-
US rhetoric of extremists make the many US facilities
and personnel-diplomatic, military, and commer-
cial-prime targets.
2. Over the past year the pace of terrorist activities
in most of the GCC states, particularly Kuwait, has
accelerated. No major terrorist incident occurred in
the Gulf in the 12 months following the 12 December
1983 bombing of the US Embassy and other targets in
Kuwait. But in 1985 there were four major terrorist
events in Kuwait, including a nearly successful assassi-
nation attempt against the Amir. (See table 1.)
3. The current round of terrorism in Kuwait ap-
pears to be driven by two factors: the government's
continued detention of the perpetrators convicted for
the December 1983 bombings, who have links with the
Iranian-backed radical Shia Hizballah in Lebanon and
Dawa Party elements throughout the region; and
deteriorating relations with Syria. The royal family
faces a difficult dilemma with the prisoners. It is
prevented from releasing them by public pressure
against such a move as well as by its own commitment
to maintain a hard line against terrorism, but carrying
out their death sentences could unleash a wave of
terrorist retaliation. Doing nothing-so far the least
distasteful option to the Kuwaitis-ensures a contin-
ued high level of terrorist intimidation from Hizballah
and Dawa attempting to force the release of the
prisoners. To complicate matters, the Kuwaitis believe
the Syrians are using Palestinian surrogates for terror-
ism in Kuwait because of Kuwaiti support for Yasir
Arafat, aid to Iraq, and reluctance to provide aid to
Damascus.
4. Terrorism has spread to normally quiescent Sau-
di Arabia. Two Saudia Airlines planes have been
hijacked-in November 1984 and March 1985-and
in May 1985 still-unidentified terrorists set off bombs
in front of two Riyadh restaurants, killing one bystand-
er. No terrorist incidents occurred in Bahrain, the
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, or Oman in 1985, but
the security services in Bahrain and the UAE made
arrests and uncovered cells of radical Shias supported
by Iran, indicating that terrorist assets remain active.
5. The GCC governments generally have followed a
two-track response to this upsurge in terrorism. They
have adopted a harder attitude toward terrorism and
enforced harsher internal security measures, while at
the same time emphasizing their nonconfrontational
policies to state supporters of terrorism, especially
Iran.
6. The primary concern of Gulf leaders is that the
Iran-Iraq war will escalate to include Iranian terrorist
attacks against the Gulf states. Iraqi success in crip-
pling Iran's oil export capability for a prolonged
period or in destroying major economic targets is likely
to result in Iranian retaliation. Still, Tehran wants to
avoid provoking the spread of the war into the Gulf
states and is therefore likely to turn at least initially to
surrogates in the Dawa Party or Hizballah to carry out
such attacks.
7. The principal terrorist and subversive threat in
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain comes from the
volatile presence of Iranian and Arab Shias. The Shias
make up 70 percent of the native population in
Bahrain, about half of the population of Saudi Arabia's
Eastern (Ash Sharqiyah) Province (but only about 5
percent of the total Saudi population), and 30 percent
of the native population of Kuwait. These local Shias
have developed contacts with radical Shias in Lebanon
and exiles in Iran, making them potentially more
dangerous. The Shia threat also exists in Qatar and the
UAE, but not to the same extent. (See map.)
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Table 1
Major Terrorist Incidents Associated With GCC States, 1983-85
3 Sep 83
Pakistan, UAE
Probable bomb aboard Gulf Abu Nidal c
laimed
Air flight from Karachi to credit.
Abu Dhabi caused plane to
crash, killing all aboard.
12 Dec 83
Kuwait
Car bombs against US, French Dawa Party,
Hizballah.
Embassies, Kuwaiti Govern-
ment facilities.
Unknown; Kuwaitis
suspect Iraqis.
Feb 84 France Assassination of UAE Caller claiming credit Abu Nidal claimed UAE
Ambassador protested "UAE links to credit. Ambassador
American imperialism" killed.
and expulsion of
Palestinians from UAE
21 Jul 84 UAE, Lebanon Middle East Airlines flight End Israeli occupation of One Lebanese Shia.
hijacked from Abu Dhabi south.
to Beirut.
Total of 111
killed, including
one American.
Six killed, The car bombs exploded simul-
87 injured. taneously at seven locations in
Kuwait, including the US and
French Embassies and the
housing compound of a US de-
fense contractor. The bombs
were intended to cause massive
death and disruption of vital
Kuwaiti installations, but only
one-fourth of the explosives det-
onated. Those tried and sen-
tenced included 17 Iraqis, three
Lebanese, three Kuwaitis, and
two Palestinians, most members
of the Dawa Party or
Hizballah.
None. Hijacker surrendered in Beirut
after being granted press
conference.
31 Jul 84 Spain Kuwaiti businessman shot and Islamic Jihad claimed One wounded.
wounded. credit.
14 Sep 84 Spain Saudi tourist killed. Islamic Jihad claimed One killed.
credit.
5 Nov 84 Saudi Arabia, Saudia Airlines flight $500,000, assurances Two Yemenis One hijacker Hijackers probably acted alone,
Iran hijacked from Jiddah that Saudi Arabia would killed by had no connection with
to Tehran. "leave North Yemen passengers. terrorist/opposition groups or
alone." state sponsors.
4 Dec 84 UAE, Iran Kuwait Airlines flight Release of prisioner in Shia extremists, probably Two US US, Kuwaiti, and British hos-
hijacked from Dubayy Kuwait charged with members of Hizballah or officials tages beaten and interrogated
to Tehran. 1983 bombings. Dawa Party. killed. during six-day ordeal. Iran
sympathized with hijackers and
exploited incident politically be-
fore "storming" plane to end
hijacking. Plane still not re-
turned to Kuwait.
I Mar 85
Kuwait
Assassination of Iraqi diplomat.
17 Mar 85
Saudi Arabia
Saudia domestic flight from
Jiddah hijacked to Dhahran.
23 Apr 85
Kuwait
Attempted assassination of
Kuwait's most prominent
journalist.
18 May 85
Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia
Bombing of two pizza parlors.
25 May 85
Kuwait
Attempted car bomb
assassination of Kuwaiti
Amir.
Release of prisoners
held for 1983 bombings.
II Jul 85
Kuwait
Bombing of seaside cafes.
That the Gulf countries
"give up their policies
hostile to Arab and
Palestinian nationals."
Two killed. Four unidentified gunmen
killed the Iraqi diplomat and his
son in their home.
One Yemeni. Hijacker killed. Lone hijacker killed at Dhah-
ran by Saudi counterterrorist
forces.
Abu Nidal claimed
credit.
Moderate journalist Ahmad
Jarallah was shot six times with
a submachinegun as he was
leaving his office but was not
killed, Attacker has not been
caught.
Unknown; Islamic Jihad One killed, Explosions occurred during first
claimed credit and later three wounded high-level Saudi visit to Iran
denied responsibility. (Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Fay-
sal) since revolution.
Islamic Jihad originally Six killed, 12 Suicide bomber, later identified
claimed credit. wounded. as Iraqi Shia Dawa Party mem-
her, rammed his explosive-lad-
en car into Amir's motorcade.
Amir suffered minor injuries.
Abu Nidal claimed Eight killed, Bombs were placed under
credit. 89 injured. chairs at crowded outdoor
cafes. Kuwaitis suspect Syria
behind attack.
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8. Long discriminated against by the dominant
Sunnis, barred from political participation except in
Kuwait, often prevented from conducting religious
rites, and deprived of anything near a proportionate
share of the oil wealth, many Shias hold the Gulf
monarchies in low regard. The danger of domestic
Shia unrest is greatest in Bahrain, where the impover-
ished Shia majority would have little to lose by a
change in the status quo.
9. We judge that an upsurge in terrorism in Bahrain
would not necessarily rally the Shias behind the
regime. Instead, we believe a dramatic increase in
terrorist attacks, particularly if prominent members of
the ruling family were killed, might lead Bahraini
Shias to believe that the regime is vulnerable enough
to be brought down. However, we do not believe
terrorism will reach this stage in the next 18 months.
10. In both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the Shias
have built something of an economic stake and have
virtually no chance of forcibly taking and maintaining
control of the government. The Shias generally will
stand against terrorist acts that harm their economic
progress and would only bring down the wrath of the
security services. Disturbances in the Shia community
occur occasionally in Saudi Arabia, however, and
could again be sparked by excessively oppressive
security measures or an economic setback to the
community, such as an unlikely mass Aramco dismiss-
al of Shia workers. However, Saudi sensitivity to this
problem makes major Shia unrest in the Eastern
Province unlikely in the near term.
11. An outgrowth of the Islamic fundamentalist
trend throughout the Middle East is the development
of groups of extremist Sunnis, such as those who took
over the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. Like many
of the Shias, they believe that the ruling families have
become Westernized, corrupt, and impious. In the
case of Saudi Arabia, they regard the Al Saud as unfit
guardians of the holy places, and the senior establish-
ment clerics as stooges of the regime. The goal of the
extremists who took over the the Mecca mosque was to
overturn the regime because of its corruption, West-
ernization, and close affiliation with the United States.
No significant cases of violence by Sunni fundamental-
ists have occurred in the region, however, since the
mosque incident.
12. Cells of Sunni fundamentalists who believe
terrorism is an acceptable means of pursuing their
goals, are growing on the college campuses in Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait. The formative years of their
young members have been dominated by Pan-Islamic,
rather than Pan-Arab, sentiments and news of success-
ful Muslim terrorists, rather than the Palestinian resis-
tance. The economic downturn is focusing greater
attention on their pet theme of regime corruption. We
think the chances are even that some may turn to
terrorism to highlight their cause. They are most likely
to act independently, however, not as surrogates for
states such as Syria or Libya, and could attack US
targets because of close US affiliation with the monar-
chies, especially in Saudi Arabia. In addition, extremist
Sunni elements in the security services could in a
climate of sectarian tension resort to unsanctioned
attacks on the Shia populations in their countries.
13. Another feature of Sunni extremism is an in-
tense dislike for the Shias. For example, the Sala-
fiyin-most prominent in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait-
are radical fundamentalists, who are known to harass
the Shias, reportedly burning Shia mosques in Saudi
Arabia's Eastern Province. As Shia and Sunni funda-
mentalism grows in the Gulf, violence between the
two communities is more likely and could threaten
Westerners.
Expatriates
14. All GCC states have large, in some cases major-
ity, foreign communities. Most foreigners are in the
Gulf to make as much money as possible, are uninter-
ested in domestic politics, and are unwilling to engage
in behavior that would jeopardize their stay. Strict visa
and work-permit regulations and aggressive deporta-
tion policies have kept the expatriate communities
generally quiescent. Still, expatriate worker communi-
ties in the Gulf states include many disgruntled indi-
viduals and provide a ready pool of subornable surro-
gates for state-sponsored terrorism. Moreover, the
large-scale presence of foreigners and their frequent
travel strain local security assets and provide a cover
for the activity of terrorist operatives. Of Kuwait's
population of about 1.9 million, for example, only
650,000 are Kuwaitis. The remainder include some
300,000 to 400,000 Palestinians (Kuwait City has the
world's second-largest urban concentration of Palestin-
ians, exceeded only by Amman), 80,000 Iranians,
170,000 Egyptians, 100,000 Iraqis, 90,000 Syrians,
30,000 Yemenis, and 250,000 South Asians. Most of the
known perpetrators of terrorist acts in Kuwait, such as
the bombing of the US Embassy and other targets in
1983, have been expatriates who were paid surrogates
or members of terrorist organizations.
15. While the financial benefits of working in the
Gulf are lucrative, expatriates are treated as servants
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by their hosts, and this can be galling, especially to
other Arabs. The Saudi saying "Cleanliness comes
from faith, and the cleaners come from Yemen"
typifies this attitude. Disgruntlement can lead to
isolated acts of violence. Yemenis apparently acting
alone commandeered the two Saudia Airlines flights.
In one case, the hijackers demanded $500,000 and
assurances that Saudi Arabia would "leave North
Yemen alone."
Leftist and Exile Groups
16. The Saudi Communist Party, the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Oman, the local Bath parties,
and other leftist groups, with operational capabilities
that have been markedly reduced over the past dec-
ade, currently do not pose a serious terrorist threat to
the Gulf states. Many dissidents who harbored leftist
sentiments in the 1960s and went into voluntary exile
have since returned to their home countries and
occupy responsible positions.
The Foreign Terrorist Threat
Iranian-Sponsored Terrorism
17. For the period of this Estimate, Iran will remain
the greatest external terrorist threat to the Gulf states.
In the short term, Iranian terrorist harassment of the
Gulf states is likely to be aimed at influencing Gulf
regimes to end their support for Iraq. Over the long
term, however, Tehran remains committed to export-
ing its revolution and replacing the Gulf regimes with
something more akin to its own Islamic republic.
Kuwait, because of its weakness and tangible assistance
to Iraq, is the most likely target in the near term.
Bahrain, because of its Shia majority and political
fragility, is Iran's prime target for its more long-term
goal of fomenting Islamic revolution. In fact, Bahrain
is the only Gulf country whose regime revolutionary
Iran has tried to overthrow, with an abortive coup in
1981.
18. Iran, however, currently is seeking improved
relations with the GCC states as part of a strategy to
wean them away from Iraq. Although Tehran contin-
ues to develop assets and threaten them through
propaganda, it has not been directly engaged in a
campaign of terror against them and could not be
directly implicated in any of the past year's incidents.
The relative pragmatists in: Tehran's foreign policy
establishment have largely attempted to employ the
carrot, rather than the stick, with their neighbors
across the Gulf.
ing Iranian oil exports or destroying major economic
targets, even the pragmatists in Tehran would proba-
bly agree that terrorism in the Gulf would be an
appropriate response. Disarray in Iran's power struc-
ture could also lead to terrorism in the Gulf states as
both radicals and pragmatists in Tehran pursue con-
flicting policies. Radicals might find terrorism a useful
means to undercut the efforts of pragmatists to im-
prove relations with the GCC. In addition, Iranian-
backed groups might conduct terrorism against the
Gulf states or US targets there without orders from
Iran.
20. Since the revolution, Iran has built the capabili-
ties of the Dawa Party, the Islamic Front for the
Liberation of Bahrain, and Lebanon-based Hizballah,
but maintains only tenuous control over individual
operations in the Gulf and apparently does not always
have foreknowledge of these operations. While Iran
apparently has not been involved in the planning of
incidents in recent years in the Gulf, such as the
hijacking of Kuwaiti flight KU-221 in December 1984
and the attempt on the Kuwaiti Amir's life last May,
Tehran probably will maintain terrorist pressure on
the Gulf states while pursuing a conciliatory foreign
policy.
21. The radical Shia groups are committed to over-
throwing the moderate Gulf regimes, are active in
Bahrain and Kuwait, and probably have cells in other
Gulf states. Acting independently or at Iran's behest,
they could conduct successful terrorist operations.
Dissident Gulf Shias travel secretly to Iran via Syria
for indoctrination and terrorist training, and Shia
terrorist assets probably are in place in all of the GCC
states except Oman.
22. Of the Gulf states, Oman and the UAE main-
tain the best relations with Iran, and are the least
likely to be targeted for terrorism by Tehran. Econom-
ic factors in particular give the Iranian regime pause
about conducting terrorist acts against the UAE, al-
though operations against other Gulf states may be
staged from there. Dubayy serves Iran as an important
trading partner for both legal and smuggled goods, as a
crucial air passenger link to the outside world and
conduit for reexports, and as an important banking
center. Its importance has been accentuated by Iran's
isolation in the Gulf and the effects of the ongoing war
with Iraq. The UAE is also a window for Iran into the
Arab world. Tehran maintains a sizable and active
official presence in the UAE, as well as terrorist assets,
19. If Iraq succeeds in creating severe economic
and political pressure on Iran by significantly curtail-
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Radical Arabs
23. The GCC states have been targets of meddling
and terrorist pressure at one time or another from
Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Palestinian groups. Syria cur-
rently poses the major threat from this quarter. Gulf
states fear that Damascus is using terrorism to remind
them that Syria must be taken into account in their
foreign policy formulations. Although they have no
suspects, the Kuwaitis believe that Syria was behind
the attempted assassination in April 1985 of a promi-
nent moderate Kuwaiti journalist and the bombings of
seaside cafes in July 1985 that left eight people dead.
It is widely believed in the UAE that Syria was behind
the assassination in Paris o: the UAE Ambassador to
France in 1984 and the wounding of a UAE diplomat
in Rome that same year.
24. Historically, the threat has been greatest from
Iraq, which has demonstrated ambitions of dominating
the Gulf. B hdad's intimidation efforts currently are
dorman
Iraq is not likely to
resort to unprovoism or subversion in the
Gulf as it did in the 1960s and 1970s because it realizes
that trying to subvert the Gulf regimes now will only
play into the hands of Iran and radical Shias. If
Baghdad perceived that the GCC states were dimin-
ishing their support for Iraq, however, it probably
would employ terrorism against them.
25. Libya periodically attempts to meddle in the
Gulf, although its assets are limited. The Qataris
uncovered a Libyan plot in 1982 to disrupt the GCC
summit conference in Doha with terrorism. Qatar
subsequently froze diplomatic relations with Libya.
Over the past year, Libya has increased its support for
the radical Palestinian Abu Nidal group. While the
extent of Libyan influence over the group's activity is
unclear, cooperation with it could give Libya a capa-
bility to sponser terrorism in the Gulf, including
terrorism against US interests.
26. Various Palestinian groups have targeted the
Gulf over the past few years, often as surrogates for
state sponsors, as in the case of the suspected Abu
Nidal assassination of the UAE diplomat on Syria's
behalf. Palestinian groups can easily thrive amid the
cover of the large and loosely controlled Palestinian
populations, especially in Kuwait and the UAE. The
Kuwaiti Government traditionally has permitted non-
combatant Palestinian organizations to operate freely
in Kuwait. The rule of thumb has been that organizing
can be done in Kuwait provided no operations are
aimed at Kuwaitis. This rule was broken when assail-
ants suspected to be Palestinians with Syrian backing
attempted to assassinate the Kuwaiti journalist last
April. As a result, the Kuwaitis have begun to restrict
Palestinian activities.
The Soviet Union
27. Moscow's newly established diplomatic relations
with Oman and the UAE, added to longstanding ties to
Kuwait, make the Soviets unlikely to encourage terror-
ist activity in the GCC states. Ties to Oman and the
UAE took a long time to achieve, and the Soviets
would not risk undermining those relations by support-
ing small groups that are unlikely ever to obtain
power. Moreover, Moscow's desire to cultivate rela-
tions with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar militates
against any interest in supporting terrorist operations
in these countries. At the same time, the Soviets are
likely to maintain their longstanding contacts with
leftist groups in the region, such as the National
Liberation Front of Bahrain and the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Oman, to keep options open in the
event relations with the Gulf states sour. A remote
possibility is that Soviet-backed South Yemen will
engage in terrorism against the GCC states.
The Gulf as a Stage
28, The danger also exists that during times of high
regional tension-over the Arab-Israeli problem or the
Iran-Iraq war, for example-terrorist groups from
outside the Gulf will use the GCC states as an arena in
which to dramatize their cause. The close affiliation of
these states with the United States heightens this
possibility. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have provided
refuge over the years to political exiles as diverse as
Uganda's Idi Amin and members of Egypt's formerly
outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. This, combined with
the volatile demographic mix and active foreign em-
bassies, creates an environment in which sporadic acts
of violence not targeted at Gulf interests should be
expected. The murder of an Iraqi diplomat in Kuwait
last March probably was an example of this type of
violence.
29. The pilgrimage to Mecca occasionally also
serves as a forum where these non-GCC tensions are
played out. Every year nearly 1 million non-Gulf
Muslims descend on Saudi Arabia to perform the
emotionally charged hajj. Iranian and Iraqi pilgrims
clashed in 1984, resulting in one death, despite Saudi
efforts to keep such potentially hostile delegations
separated. The same year Libyan leader Qadhafi
attempted to use the hajj to track down and kill
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continue. None of the countries have budged to
but the Saudi security forces scuttled terrorist demands. Instead, they have turned their
attention to plugging the gaps in their internal security
25X1
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Vulnerability of Targets
30. Terrorists have a wide range of targets to choose
from in the Gulf states: government officials and
facilities; in most cases a large US business, diplomatic,
and military presence; extensive petroleum facilities,
including refineries, pipelines, and production and
export facilities; desalination plants; and electric pow-
er plants. Security around US embassies and consulates
in the region has been increased substantially in the
past few years, making successful attacks against them
much more difficult. However, many potential targets
lack adequate security. Several hijackings in the Gulf
have been carried out with relative ease, indicating
that airport security in the region is flawed. American
diplomats, military personnel, and businessmen re-
main easy prey for potential assassins. Gulf leaders also
are vulnerable. The narrow nature of the political elite
in most GCC countries makes political officials a
particularly lucrative target.
31. Although a well-trained terrorist with a detailed
knowledge of petroleum facilities could severely dam-
age key petroleum installations, unsophisticated at-
tacks against oil pipelines or oil facilities would be
little more than a nuisance. A string of such attacks,
however, could disrupt oil exports and reduce oil
revenues. Repeated attacks would serve to weaken
regime legitimacy by highlighting the -government's
incompetence and inability to protect itself. Worker
sabotage is an important concern in Saudi Arabia-
where Shia employees account for about half of the
Saudi work force at Aramco and much of its security
force-as well as in Kuwait and Bahrain.
32. Besides the oil infrastructure, essential industri-
al facilities such as desalination plants and electric
power plants are vulnerable. For . instance, more than
90 percent of the Gulf's desalinated,-water comes from
56 plants in 29 locations. Within each plant, disruption
of any of several critical elements could shut down the
desalination process. Significant power disruptions
could result from attacks on key electric generating
plants and bulk power distribution facilities. More-
over, damage to certain critical plant components
could require months to repair"or replace.
Handling the Threat
33. Although the Gulf : states are traditionally cau-
tious, their response to the escalating terrorist violence
has generally been firm and this trend is likely to
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7X1
25X1
L~.)A I
Regional Cooperation
Saudi Arabia has signed bilateral
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security agreements with all of the states except
Kuwait, which sees extradition and hot-pursuit provi-
sions as a violation of its sovereignty.
46. A less tangible benefit of GCC cooperation, but
one especially important to the smaller states, is the
image projected of collective self-defense. The recent
escalation in the Iran-Iraq war prompted the GCC to
issue a statement that an attack on any one of the
states would be considered an attack against all. The
more vulnerable states, especially Kuwait, hope that
such an attachment to Saudi Arabia will serve as a
deterrent to states like Iran and perhaps Iraq in the
future. The GCC umbrella certainly will not deter
terrorists bent on conducting operations in the Gulf
and willing to die in the process, but it may give some
pause to state sponsors of terrorism, who must consider
the foreign policy implications of their actions.
Keeping the Shias Down
47. Since the Iranian revolution and its potential
politicization of their own Shia populations, the Gulf
states have combined economic inducements with
stricter security measures to keep their Shia popula-
tions quiescent. This carrot-and-stick approach has
succeeded, especially in Saudi Arabia, where develop-
ment spending in the Shia areas of the Eastern
Province has increased dramatically since 1979. The
recent replacement of the province's unpopular gover-
nor with a member of the royal family's inner circle
and annual visits by the King have contributed to this
success. The tougher security posture throughout the
Gulf includes intensified monitoring of Shia travels to
Syria and Iran, a gradual purge in Kuwait of Shias
from sensitive military and security positions, and
routine arrests and questioning of Shias suspected of
antigovernment activity.
48. Violence leading to terrorist acts could occur
during the emotional Shia holy days in the fall of 1986
and 1987, when the Shias reenact the passion play of
the martyrdom of the Prophet's grandson at the hands
of Sunnis. With the exception of Bahrain, which tries
harder than its neighbors to accommodate its large
Shia population, the Gulf states have outlawed or
severely restricted these Shia rites to minimize the
.emotional frenzy. Religious fervor and excessive secu-
rity measures led to violent clashes between Shia and
Saudi security forces in the post-Iranian-revolution
years of 1979-81. Tensions have since subsided and the
situation is likely to remain calm barring another
explosive regional event with sectarian overtones, such
as a decisive victory for one side in the Iran-Iraq war.
49. The policy of all of the Gulf governments is that
they will not give in to terrorist demands and that
terrorists will be dealt with harshly. The GCC states
are likely to continue to adhere to this policy. If there
is any change, it is likely to be a further hardening of
their position in the face of an increased terrorist
threat. The tough antiterrorism posture is reflected in
the adamant Kuwaiti refusal to accept Hizballah
demands for the release of the imprisoned 1983 car-
bomb terrorists despite the attack on the Amir and
threats of more violence, and in the quick Saudi move
to storm and kill the hijacker of the Saudia flight in
March 1985.
50. The Gulf states couple this firm antiterrorism
policy with foreign policies designed to avoid entan-
glement in the problems of their neighbors, particu-
lary Iran, and thus avoid providing a motive for
retaliation, terrorist or otherwise. Weaker than their
neighbors militarily, the Gulf Arabs have long seen
aggressive conciliation as a necessary element of their
survival. At the same time, they have attached them-
selves to popular causes, such as Palestinian national-
ism. This strategy is currently up against significant
obstacles, notably the Iran-Iraq war, and divisions
among the Palestinians and within the Arab world.
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, for example, have attempt-
ed to support Yasir Arafat and the PLO mainstream
without alienating the more radical Palestinian ele-
ments and Syria.
Aid as Insurance Against Terrorism
51. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular demon-
strate their solidarity with the Arab confrontation
states, stave off domestic and regional criticism, pre-
empt terrorist attacks by Arab radicals, and maintain
important channels of communication through their
aid to the principal adversaries of Israel. (See chart.)
An important, but not overriding, aspect of these
payments is the insurance that it provides against
terrorism. There are, however, potentially dangerous
side effects. The aid to Syria, for example, risks
antagonizing Iraq and vice versa, and a cutback or
cutoff of aid risks terrorist intimidation from the
recipient. Syrian actions against Kuwait are probably
related to the latter's reluctance to provide continued
aid. Kuwait unilaterally cut in half its Arab League-
mandated aid commitments to Syria in 1983, and
remains delinquent in its 1985 payments.
52. Worsening economic problems will complicate
Gulf efforts to maintain generous aid payments to
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S R T
GCC States: Bilateral Foreign Aid
Disbursements, 1980-858
Iraq
b Includes only payments observed from Baghdad aid transactions. Actual
payments probably are higher.
potential adversaries. The Kuwaiti Government has
accepted a National Assembly vote against continued
Baghdad Pact payments to Syria, Jordan, and the
PLO, although it is continuing much of this aid under
a separate rubric for now. The Saudis have cut aid
payments to some of the more peripheral recipients,
but they consider aid payments to Syria, Iraq, and the
PLO of sufficient priority to make them unlikely to be
cut substantially over the next 18 months.
Prospects
53. Terrorist violence in Kuwait is likely to contin-
ue at the same high but sporadic pace over the next 18
months and perhaps spread to some of the other GCC
states. Much of the terrorism will be driven by
Kuwait's continued imprisonment of the Shia perpe-
trators of the bombings in 1983. Kuwait is almost
certain not to release the prisoners, given its hardened
position on terrorism. It may look for ways, however,
to strike a face-saving deal that does not compromise
its public hardline position.
54. In the unlikely event that Kuwait executes the
prisoners sentenced to death, the Dawa Party or
Hizballah can be expected to try at least one spectacu-
lar act of retribution-probably including another
attempted assassination of the Amir or of other Ku-
waiti officials. Given the record over the past year,
such an attack would have a good chance of success.
55. Iran's terrorism policies against Kuwait will be
dictated largely by events in the Iran-Iraq war. Iran is
unlikely to abandon its longer term objective of ex-
porting the revolution to the Arab side of the Gulf, but
its shorter term goal of conciliating the Gulf states and
lessening its international isolation probably will con-
tinue to take precedence. If Iraq severely cripples
Iran's oil export capabilities for a prolonged period or
destroys major economic targets, Iran is likely to resort
to terrorist strikes in retaliation. Iran probably would
first sponsor attacks by its surrogates in the Dawa
Party or Hizballah to carry out such attacks. Tehran
probably will continue its policy of responding in kind
to Iraqi attacks and will not instigate an unprovoked
spread of the war into the Gulf states. Tehran wants to
avoid military involvement in the region by the
United States but may stage anti-US terrorist acts in
the Gulf or elsewhere if it comes under severe eco-
nomic and political pressure in the war.
56. Although Kuwait is powerless to dictate the
course of the Iran-Iraq war, it has more control over its
relations with Syria and may take steps to reconcile
with Damascus. Syrian terrorism is more measured
than that of the fanatic Shia groups and more aimed at
sending messages than sabotaging the regime.
57. If violence in Kuwait increases substantially
over the levels of the past few months, the stability of
the regime is not likely to be seriously affected. Had
the attempt on the Amir's life succeeded, power would
have devolved to the Crown Prince. Unless the gov-
ernment arbitrarily damages the economic well-being
of the Shia and Palestinian communities, they will not
be eager to jeopardize their positions by engaging in
terrorism against the regime. The backlash of over-
zealous security measures is unlikely to threaten the
viability of existing Kuwaiti institutions.
58. In the terrorism scenario with the most dramat-
ic political repercussions, increased terrorist violence
in Bahrain could set off a string of events that would
lead to an attempted Shia overthrow of the regime.
The Saudis fear such an event would cause unrest in
their own Shia population, and probably would move
quickly to put down an uprising in Bahrain. The
completion of the causeway between the two countries
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this year would facilitate such an effort, and this
certainly was in the Saudi and Bahraini leaders' minds
when they approved the project.
59. Terrorist violence in the other Gulf states might
threaten individual leaders, but would not jeopardize
the ruling families' hold on power. It would, however,
embarrass the regimes and highlight their inability to
protect themselves. At a maximum, Saudi Arabia,
Oman, the UAE, and Qatar would dismiss senior
security officials-perhaps as high as a minister-and
conduct a housecleaning and maybe reorganization of
the security services.
60. The GCC states also will continue to be targets
of meddling and terrorist pressure from Syria, Iraq,
Libya, and Palestinian groups. Of these, Syria will
pose the greatest threat. Damascus is using terrorism-
often through Palestinian groups-to remind the Gulf
states that Syria must be taken into account in their
foreign policy formulation.
61. New factors would have to come into play for
the GCC states other than Kuwait to be subject to
increased terrorism in the next 18 months. Some of the
more likely possibilities include:
- A dramatic worsening of fortunes for Iran in the
war or a perception in Tehran that the Gulf
states had substantially increased their support
for Iraq. A serious crippling of Iran's oil-export
capabilities would make this a most likely cata-
lyst for Iranian terrorism.
- Deterioration of the Arab-Israeli peace process to
another round of armed conflict. Another Arab-
Israeli war would heighten anti-US sentiments in
the region and increase the threat of terrorism
against US interests in particular. Significant
progress in the peace process probably also would
unleash terrorism from rejectionist elements
throughout the Middle East. Events such as the
Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis and
the US diversion of the Egyptian airliner carry-
ing the Achille Lauro hijackers increase Arab
frustration with the Arab-Israeli conflict and
anti-US sentiments in the region and the likeli-
hood of attacks directed at US interests. The Gulf
states have kept a lid on potential local outbreaks
of violence as a result of Arab-Israeli tensions, but
they may be unable to do so if the issue is
brought closer to home by an Israeli attack on
PLO offices somewhere on the Arabian Peninsu-
la, for example, or US retaliation against a
regional state.
- A dramatic worsening of the Gulf economies-
an increasing possibility, given falling world oil
prices. This would increase the likelihood that
disgruntled local elements would take out their
frustrations in the form of terrorism or sabotage.
- Domestic turmoil in any of the Gulf states, which
could spur Iran to reactivate its policy of export-
ing revolution to the Gulf.
- An event that sparks a surge in Islamic funda-
mentalism and the rapid politicization of reli-
gious elements-either Shia or Sunni-in the
Gulf. Examples include the assassination of Kho-
meini or the arrest of popular clerics.
Implications for the United States
62. US interests, particularly in Kuwait, will remain
high-priority targets, especially for Shia terrorist
groups. With the dwindled US presence in Lebanon
and the increasing difficulty of attacking US interests
there, the attention of terrorist groups bent on attack-
ing the United States may turn more to the large US
presence in the Gulf states. Radical elements of the
PLO seeking revenge for the raid on Tunis and seizure
of the Achille Lauro hijackers could well choose to
carry out reprisals against US targets in the Gulf
region. Members of the US business community, while
perhaps not the target of choice, are the most vulnera-
ble. The housing compound of a US defense contractor
was one of the seven targets of the 1983 bombings in
Kuwait.
63. At the same time, increased terrorism in the
region would create opportunities for expanded, but
low-profile, cooperation between the United States
and the GCC. These states have already been respon-
sive to proposed antiterrorism assistance, and would
probably respond favorably to offers of equipment
and counterterrorism training. Because the US pres-
ence is in part a lightning rod for terrorism, however,
the Gulf states are unlikely to accept a substantially
larger US official presence unless their survival is
threatened. Sustained terrorist attacks-such as could
occur in the wake of one of the contingencies in this
study and that are obviously tied to the US presence in
the Gulf-could adversely affect US relations with
Gulf countries and lead them to decrease the US
military presence and draw away from agreements
facilitating US operations in the region.
64. Terrorist attacks against oil facilities are unlike-
ly to disrupt oil exports from Persian Gulf states.
Surplus capacity in the Gulf could quickly be put into
service. Loss of the Saudi Petroline, which serves
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inland and Red Sea refineries, or the crude line to the
refinery in Bahrain would cause local interruptions of
product and revenue flows, but would have no signifi-
cant impact on consumers outside the Gulf region.
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