SOVIET FORCE POSTURE: DILEMMAS AND DIRECTIONS

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• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
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Soviet Force Posture:
Dilemmas and Directions
William E. Odom
The Soviet General Staff has embarked upon a
third revolution in military affairs in its history.
The first revolution occurred in the 1920's, the
second in the 1950's, and the third dates from the late
1970's and continues to this day. Each has had a ma-
jor impact on Soviet economic, social, and scientific
policies. Each has to date received priority over virtu-
ally all other aspects of public policy in the Soviet
Union. This primacy of military affairs has become a
powerful -perhaps the most powerful -constraint
and determinant in Soviet political development.
Each of these revolutions has involved a major
change in force development policy. Most states do
not build military forces randomly, or just to be in
fashion, or purely because of bureaucratic momen-
tum. They build toward some mission, to meet some
threat, in accordance with some doctrinal rationale-
that is, with purpose. To speak of force development
policy, then, is to speak of the rationale for developing
specific kinds and sizes of forces. Why have tank divi-
sions instead of infantry divisions? Why ICBM's,
IRBM's, and ABM's? Why chemical weapons? And
why a particular number of each? Why not more? Why
not fewer?
William E. Odom is a Lieutenant General in the US
Army and author of numerous writings on Soviet af-
fairs, including The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization
and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization
(1973). An earlier version of this article was presented
at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies
(Washington, DC), on January 30, 1985. The views ex-
pressed in this article are those of the author and do
not necessarily represent the official position of the
US government.
The Soviet Union has generally been very ad-
vanced in working out new rationales for force devel-
opment. Its unclassified military literature is among
the richest in the world, which is indicative of the
existence of an even more extensive classified analy-
sis. Even a casual familiarity with Soviet military force
structure would convince a reader of Soviet military
literature that there is a strong causal relationship be-
tween Soviet force development policy and actual
Soviet force building. The kinds and numbers of
forces cannot be wholly explained by theories positing
"bureaucratic momentum" (according to which no one
at the top appears able to control the military-indus-
trial complex) or "action-reaction" (according to which
the United States "acts" and the Soviet Union merely
"reacts"). Someone with a plan does seem to be in
charge, even if that someone does not always suc-
ceed in realizing the plan's goals. Traditionally, the
Soviet General Staff has played the key role in plan-
ning Soviet force building, a role that has grown
stronger with time.
Yet, despite all its previous force building suc-
cesses, the General Staff today faces several new
and troublesome challenges with consequences for
nonmilitary areas of policy that are likely to be pro-
found. It has succeeded in designing a doctrine and
force structure for nuclear war at all levels-strate-
gic, operational, and tactical-that the United States
and its allies would find difficult to defeat. The whole
Soviet economy has been giving priority to this task
for well over two decades. Although the costs have
been high, the yields probably appear worth the price
as the Politburo assesses the change in the inter-
national correlation of forces over these decades.
Nonetheless, like Sisyphus who was condemned in
Hades to push a rock up a hill only to see it constantly
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Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions
roll back down, the Soviet General Staff appears to
see the rock of its military labor rolling back to the bot-
tom of the hill, presenting the Soviet military with a
repetition of the same task: another long-term force
building. Not only will this task be costly, but it will
probably place nuclear weapons modernization into a
secondary role as the competition with the West shifts
into areas where the Soviet Union is less well pre-
pared to compete. Moreover, the new force building
may deprive Moscow of continued success in the
political and propaganda aspects of arms control
negotiations by raising questions about the ostensible
Soviet rationale for such negotiations.
The fundamental cause of the new task is new tech-
nology, namely, microcircuitry, directed energy sys-
tems, and genetic engineering. But Soviet success in
dealing with these new challenges can be significant-
ly affected by Western policies. They can make it
easier or harder for the Soviet General Staff to roll the
rock up the hill again. However, as I shall argue
below, the causal relations between some Western
policies and Soviet force development are not what
conventional wisdom has suggested; in fact, they are
the reverse in some instances. For example, contrary
to the view popular in the 1970's, expanded East-West
trade is likely to hurt, not help, arms control. Certain
kinds of arms control agreements could actually con-
tribute to a more rapid buildup of weapons by helping
Moscow out of its force building dilemmas; some
aspects of military competition, particularly in the
quality of weapons, can improve the prospects for
arms control agreements as well as increase Western
security.
To make the case for the centrality of new tech-
nologies in Soviet force development, as well as to
gain some historical perspective on the current dilem-
mas facing the General Staff, it is necessary to review
how the Soviets have handled major changes in force
development policy on two previous occasions.
The First Military Revolution
To understand Soviet military problems, one must
understand Soviet military purposes. At the highest
level of generality, there is little reason not to take key
aspects of open Soviet military policy at face value.
How do the Soviets explain publicly the need for mili-
tary forces? After all, in 1917 it had been Bolshevik
policy to abolish all regular forces and to replace
them with a workers' militia. In the Bolsheviks' view, if
the army were distinct from the working class, it could
be used as an instrument of suppression. However, if
worker and soldier became synonymous, the army
could hardly be used against the working class.
This policy, to be sure, was quickly reversed in
1918 when civil war broke out in Russia. But when
revolution did not spread to the rest of Europe follow-
ing the Bolshevik victory in the civil war, the Bolshe-
viks quickly found a new rationale for their regular
army or an "army of a new type," as they called it. The
Red Army was necessary to defend the fledgling
socialist republic against international imperialism.
Thus, "socialism" would have to be preserved behind
the shield of the Red Army until the international cor-
relation of forces favored the socialist camp. And this
shield would be needed until true peace came with
the final and decisive victory of socialism over
capitalism.'
The Soviet definition of peace is unique and incom-
patible with Western definitions.2 Defense, in this
peculiar Soviet sense, means offense. Peace means
the destruction of all nonsocialist states. If that can be
accomplished without interstate wars, that is, through
internal revolutions, so much the better. The term
"coexistence" also does not mean what most people
in the West would understand by it. In fact, peaceful
coexistence in the Soviet definition is a continuation
of the international class struggle by other than direct
military means whenever possible. This policy was
conceived in the early 1920's as a strategy for avoid-
ing war with the West, which Lenin believed the young
regime would lose. It meant building domestic indus-
trial power to support a military establishment that
could prevail in a showdown. It meant maintaining
"correct" relations with the advanced capitalist states
in order to derive the advantages of economic inter-
action with them. And it meant supporting revolutions
and wars of national liberation in what today is called
the Third World. In other words, peaceful coexistence
was a strategy for irreconcilable struggle, political
and military, with capitalism. Peaceful coexistence re-
mains Soviet policy today.3
' In a speech printed in Pravda (Moscow) on Nov 30, 1920, Lenin stated: "As long as
capitalism and socialism exist. we cannot live in peace: in the end, one or the other
will triumph...."
' Paul Nitze. I was delighted to see, recently discussed this difference in definitions
at some length. See his "Living with the Soviets," Foreign Affairs (New York).
pp. 360-74.
' The policy of peaceful coexistence between socialism and capitalism was
proclaimed by Nikita Khrushchev and reiterated by his successors. Scientific
Communism, A Glossary (published in Moscow in 1975) gives the following official
explication of the term: "The CPSU .. views peaceful coexistence as a form of class
struggle developing in the political, economic, and ideological spheres on the
international arena. By fighting against the outbreak of another world war, and
organizing and leading the worker, national liberation, and all-democratic movement.
the communists ... pave the way to the triumph of socialism in the whole world."
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12
Prominent commanders of the Bolshevik forces in the
Russian civil war, from left to right: Semen Budennyy,
Mikhail Frunze, and Kliment Voroshilov.
If one takes seriously this political rationale as pro-
viding the basis for Soviet military policy, then the
force development of the Red Army in the 1920's and
1930's was remarkably logical and even predictable.
Its development was guided by an extensive doctrinal
review concerned primarily with the implications of
new technologies for future war. Aviation, motoriza-
tion, and chemical weapons had appeared in World
War I. They portended, as Red Army theorists pointed
out, a less clear distinction between the "front" and
the "rear" in war. Bombing of cities, industrial plants,
and military forces deep in the rear areas could be ex-
pected. Motorized forces could conduct much deeper
operations. The new weapons would also require a
well-trained officer corps and a literate manpower
pool for military recruitment. Moreover, an adequate
research and development (R&D) base and an ad-
vanced industrial capacity were imperative for the
underdeveloped Soviet Union.
Problems of Communism July-Aug 1985
The doctrinal review did not go smoothly in the
early 1920's. Debates on almost all aspects of military
policy were acrimonious and conducted openly.
Struggles within the leadership clique affected the
review, particularly Leon Trotsky's removal in 1925 as
Commissar of War. Mikhail Frunze, his successor,
synthesized all views, capped the debate, and estab-
lished the general directions of Soviet military doc-
trine in several short pamphlets, including A Unified
Military Doctrine and the Red Army (1921) and Front
and Rear in Future War (1925).4 The goals were not
modest. The Soviet Union was committed to build mili-
tary power that would ensure the eventual success of
the Bolshevik revolution throughout the advanced
industrialized world.
Soviet actions followed doctrine. The standing Red
Army was reduced to about half a million soldiers in
active units backed by a large militia force-a policy
designed to save manpower in peacetime. The Red
Army became a school for literacy. Officer education
became a top priority, prompting the establishment of
a general staff academy and a host of other meas-
ures.5 In active combat power, the Red Army was
allowed to become quite weak. A foreign observer
might have concluded that the Soviet regime was
quietly disarming itself, a view that would have been
as misleading about Soviet military policy as was the
contemporary view that the New Economic Policy
meant that the Bolsheviks were reintroducing a full-
scale market economy. In reality, the Bolshevik lead-
ers were taking a short-term risk in order to have a
large, modern military force in the future.
By the mid-1930's, the regular forces were being
expanded. New equipment was being produced by
Soviet industry, and operational doctrine for deep
operations had inspired not only the development of
new tanks and airborne forces, but also a massive
effort to build a modern aviation fleet. Before Stalin's
purge of the Red Army's general officer corps in the
late 1930's, there had accumulated a fairly large num-
ber of trained officers as a result of the military's edu-
cation policy. But war came faster than Stalin had
' M V. Frunze, Izbrannyye proizvedeniya (Selected Works). Moscow. Voyenizdat.
1957, pp. 4-21, 133-42.
' Trotsky introduced "literacy" classes into the unit training programs and called the
Red Army a school for literacy. Officers were encouraged to form "military scientific
societies." to publish papers, and to compile their experiences from World War I and
the civil war. A general staff college, later to be named the Frunze Academy, was
founded for senior staff and command training. See A. Yovlev. "The Perfecting of
Military Educational Institutions in 1921-28," Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal (Moscow),
No. 2, 1976, pp. 93-98; and Dmitri Fedotoff-White, The Growth of the Red Army,
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1944
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Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions
Soviet responses to the post-World War / technologi-
cal revolution in warfare, from top to bottom: an early
Soviet aircraft for rapid delivery and parachuting of
troops behind enemy lines; Soviet tanks lining up for a
May Day parade in Moscow; Soviet bombers on their
way to attacking Japanese positions in Manchuria.
expected, and many aspects of the long-range mili-
tary force development program were still incom-
plete. This should not, however, obscure the essential
rationale that guided force development and the clus-
ter of coherent policies that it produced. The policies
were impressively perspicacious in retrospect.
Soviet military historians ascribe an orderly and
"scientific" character to the process of analytical
review in light of new technological, political, and eco-
nomic realities, followed by doctrinal proclamations, a
programmatic building of weapons and forces, and a
working out of what they refer to as operational and
tactical art. While they impute to this process a tidy
causal chain of events that abuses the historical rec-
ord in a number of ways, their writings do show both a
series of actions and a record of policy intention that
appear linked by more than chance correlation. In any
event, this is the approach that Soviet military leaders
have come to believe they should take with regard to
the overall task of force development. In fact, they vir-
tually repeated the process after World War II.
Second Military Revolution
In the late 1940's, the Soviet military found itself in
a position analogous to what it had faced in the
1920's. The economy was largely destroyed by war,
and the number of soldiers under arms was far too
large to maintain. The educational level of all ranks
was too low for modern technology. And three new
technologies-nuclear weapons, rocketry, and cyber-
netics-appeared to affect fundamentally the nature
of future war.
The Soviet response, perhaps not surprisingly, was
also analogous to that of the 1920's. In the process of
rebuilding the economy, the military sector was given
the highest priority. Most of the active duty manpower
was demobilized, bringing the force levels down to
relatively small numbers. The system of military edu-
cation was revamped, in order to bring about a long-
term upgrading of commissioning schools and mili-
tary academies. The nature of future war was rede-
fined in light of the new technologies, and the General
Staff set to work on changes in operations and tactics
necessary to take these technologies into account.
The flurry of activity in the late 1940's and throughout
the 1950's gave birth to much of the present Soviet
doctrine and force structure.
Assuming that the three technologies would
change the nature of future war, Soviet theorists con-
sidered it essential that military doctrine come to
grips with two central effects arising from them: the
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Problems of Communism July-Aug 1985
large firepower that nuclear weapons bring to the bat-
tlefield, and the great range and accuracy in the deliv-
ery of that firepower made possible by rocketry and
cybernetics.
Although a great deal has been written about Soviet
doctrinal development in the 1950's and 1960's, most
Western analysts tended to see Soviet doctrine as
developing along lines similar to those evolving in the
West in response to the same problems. However, as
the Soviets themselves became more explicit and as
the nature of Soviet weapons development became
clearer, Western analysts began to uncover a quite
different picture of that doctrinal evolution.' The over-
all impression one gains from these later interpreta-
tions is that of a pragmatic Soviet effort to master the
new weapons, to make them usable for strategic,
operational, and in some instances even tactical
objectives. This is not to say that there was a Soviet
desire to use nuclear weapons. Rather, it is to say that
the Soviets assumed that these weapons might be
used. In that event, they wanted to know how to use
them purposefully in support of war aims, rather than
viscerally in a sort of hopeless retaliation or bluffing
deterrence.
The post-World War II phase of Soviet force devel-
opment policy was based on three key points. First,
weapons of mass destruction require that one's own
forces be dispersed in order to present few targets
worthy of a nuclear strike. The Soviets solved this
problem by echeloning their forces, that is, by spread-
ing them out evenly to the rear so that no really large
concentrations could be targeted.
Second, breaking through an enemy's defense re-
quires a massing of maneuver forces. The solution to
this problem was found in a high speed of attack, re-
quiring the echeloned forces to move forward at 60 to
100 kilometers per day. This causes rapid accumula-
tion of forces at the front, in close contact with the
enemy's defense, and thereby permits breakthroughs
and allows redispersion by deep operations into the
enemy's rear.
Both of these techniques required the abandon-
ment of a number of traditional principles of military
' For more recent analysis of Soviet military doctrine, see John Erickson, "Soviet
Military Operational Research: Methods and Objectives," Strategic Review (Washington,
DC), No. 5, 1977, pp. 63-73; Peter Vigor, "Soviet Echeloning," Military Review (Fort
Leavenworth. KS), August 1982, pp. 69-74; Amoretta Hoeber and Joseph Douglass.
Conventional War and Escalation' The Soviet View, New York, Crane, Russak, 1981:
Fritz Ermarth, "The US and the Strategic Balance," paper presented at a conference on
US-Soviet Relations, Washington, DC. Mar. 18, 1983. A recent paper by Notra Trulock,
III, and Daniel Goure, "Soviet Perspectives on Limited Nuclear Warfare," Washington,
DC. Nov 16-17, 1984, is notable for the sources it cites-classified Soviet materials
that trace a much earlier Soviet interest in limited and discriminating use of nuclear
weapons than is generally appreciated.
Marshal Vasiliy Sokolovskiy at a USSR Supreme
Soviet meeting in March 1949.
art. In particular, the dispersion of forces made it
impossible to mass them for a "main effort" in one
sector. The high-speed offensive meant either break-
ing through where opportunities occurred or along an
entire front. Placing a concentration of forces forward
for a main effort would put them at risk under the
enemy's tactical nuclear fire.
Third, this doctrine would remain empty theory until
the equipment and weapons systems for implement-
ing the doctrine were produced in sufficiently large
numbers to make its implementation feasible. Thus,
Marshal Vasiliy Sokolovskiy's 1962 volume, Military
Strategy,' was not a statement proclaiming a Soviet
capability to implement this kind of combined arms
offensive with nuclear weapons and rocketry support.
Rather, it was a statement about the technical capa-
bilities of the new weapons, their implications for
future war, and some rough ideas about how the new
problems that they presented could be resolved. So-
' V. D. Sokolovskiy, Voyennaya strategrya (Military Strategy), Moscow, Voyenizdat,
1962. The volume was published in English translation under the editorship of Harriet
Fast Scott with the title Soviet Military Strategy, New York, Crane, Russak, 1975.
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Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions
kolovskiy and his collective of contributors were actu-
ally doing what Frunze had done in the mid-1920's.
They were providing a synthesis of a plethora of clas-
sified discussion, debate, and analysis that had been
conducted in military circles in the 1950's. They were
distilling it into a text for officer general education
about the major directions and problems for Soviet
force development in the future.
If one looked at the Soviet force structure as it
emerged in the 1970's, one saw a growing inventory
of capabilities to implement the doctrine. Therefore, it
is not surprising that more and more references ap-
peared in open Soviet military literature to techniques
for conducting war, nonnuclear and nuclear, at the
tactical, operational, and even strategic levels.8
Again, these references do not mean that the Soviets
necessarily want to conduct war at the nuclear level.
Rather, they indicate that the Soviets realized that
such a war could actually be conducted, and that they
were gaining the means to do it. Those means encom-
passed more than just large numbers of small-yield
nuclear weapons. They include armor-protected in-
fantry vehicles, artillery carriers, air defense carriers,
engineering equipment, tactical rockets, and frontal
aviation.
It is also important to note that strategic defense of
Soviet territory, very much a part of the Soviet doc-
trine in Frunze's day, was not abandoned during the
post-World War II period. It has remained a strong
element in Soviet doctrine and practice. Civil defense,
hardening of command and control, air defense, and
ABM development have been generously supported.
Whether or not these programs would be effective in
an all-out war may be a matter of dispute in the West;
but there is no doubt that the Soviet leadership has re-
mained willing to commit significant resources to the
pursuit of survivability of sufficient command and con-
trol, military forces, and industrial capacity and man-
power to sustain a long and drawn-out campaign even
if nuclear weapons were to be used massively. In
other words, Soviet actions strongly suggest that the
' For older references to Soviet war-fighting capabilities, see the citations found in
the sources in fn. 6. For quite recent examples. see M. A. Gareyev, Frunze-voyennyy
teoretrk (Frunze: Military Theoretician), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1985: and V. G.
Reznichenko, Ed., Taktika (Tactics), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1984. Gareyev offers a
fascinating critique of Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy, in which he argues that the work
was essentially sound in the 1960's but that conditions of war have changed, making
many of the traditional principles and concepts of military art, which Sokolovskiy had
rejected. once again relevant. In other words, Gareyev is saying that earlier Soviet
views on the extent to which nuclear weapons have changed the nature of war and.
thus, of military art have proven to be overdrawn: Soviet doctrine is restoring many of
the old principles As my argument proceeds, the centrality of this latest change in
doctrine will become apparent.
A column of Frog tactical missiles on maneuver in the
Carpathian Military District in autumn 1984.
-TASS from SOVFOTO.
Soviets believe that they can evade the "assured
destruction" imputed in the West to nuclear retaliatory
forces.
Thus, in order to understand why we have wit-
nessed in the last two or three decades the largest
military buildup in history, we must grasp the doctrinal
rationale behind it. The action-reaction theory, the
bureaucratic momentum thesis, and other such expla-
nations miss the critical rationale for the buildup. New
technologies, military experience, and fundamental
policy aims originating in the early years of the
Bolshevik regime were its causes. Actions by the
West represented constraints, not causes.
Direction of Third Military Revolution
If this is the historical record to date, what about
the present dilemmas and future directions for Soviet
force development? To answer this question, we must
begin by looking for three kinds of evidence. First, are
there any new technologies that promise to have ma-
jor implications for the nature of future war? Second,
is there any Soviet doctrinal writing on those implica-
tions? And, third, of course, are there weapons devel-
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Problems of Communism July-Aug 1985
opments and organizational changes that have fol-
lowed from the doctrinal changes?
There is now abundant evidence in all three catego-
ries. The new technologies are microcircuitry, di-
rected energy systems (DES), and genetic engineer-
ing. Microcircuitry helps make possible what are
called "smart weapons," that is, warheads with a vari-
ety of conventional energy munitions that are guided
to targets with virtually no error, warheads that can
seek a target without external assistance and can dis-
criminate between tanks and trucks, and so on. Di-
rected energy systems are also a part of the set of
technologies required for these new families of wea-
pons. They make ranging and guidance possible to a
degree inconceivable in previous decades. Genetic
engineering is less developed for weapons applica-
tion, and precisely what it may yield in this area is far
from clear. What is clear is that drugs for medicinal
purposes could also be used for destructive purposes.
New genes could be cloned for a variety of effects on
the human body, from debilitating to fatal. The Soviets
have made a large commitment of resources to ge-
netic engineering, suggesting that the requirements
of the Soviet General Staff affect policy in this area as
well.
Interest by the Soviet military in the doctrinal impli-
cations of all three technologies dates back to the
early 1970's, and possibly even earlier. When Marshal
Nikolay Ogarkov was promoted to the position of chief
of the General Staff in 1977, a number of other senior
officers also moved into key positions, officers who
were already noted for their writings about changing
technologies and warfare. During the past five or six
years, Soviet doctrinal writings have shown a concern
for exploiting new weapons and technologies. Ogar-
kov himself published a notable booklet in 1982 that
signaled a major shift in direction, although it did not
represent a watershed of the kind seen in the 1950's.9
In this work, Ogarkov spelled out clearly the tasks for
future force and doctrinal development, and he
chided his fellow officers for being slow to exploit new
technologies.
The focal point of this revision of Soviet doctrine is
the "theater strategic operation." Ogarkov argues that
wars before 1600 tended to be a series of regimental-
sized engagements. In the 17th century they became
a series of "brigade" operations, in the 18th century
"division" operations, and by the close of that century,
"army" operations, that is, battles involving simultane-
? N. V. Ogarkov, Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva (Always in Readiness
for Defense of the Fatherland) Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982.
ous operations by two or more divisions, thus requir-
ing an "army" headquarters and staff to coordinate
and control the battle. That form of operation contin-
ued, in Ogarkov's judgment, through the 19th century
until the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, when the Rus-
sian command controlled two armies simultaneously.
This level of command in the Russian and Soviet lexi-
con is a "front," that is, two or more armies under one
commander. By the end of World War II, the Soviet
command structure was managing two "fronts" simul-
taneously as a single operation.
The task today and in the foreseeable future, Ogar-
kov asserts, is to master this multi-front operation or
"theater strategic operation," to use the Soviet termi-
nology.10 Geographically, it would involve an attack on
a front 500 to 750 kilometers wide and proceed about
1,200 kilometers in offensive depth. The current stan-
dard Soviet doctrine for a "frontal operation" is 150 to
300 kilometers of frontage carried to a depth of 300 to
600 kilometers into the adversary's territory. Thus,
two or three fronts conducting side-by-side offensive
actions to at least twice the depth of a front would
roughly cover an area 500 to 750 kilometers wide and
reach an offensive depth of 1,200 kilometers.
Needless to say, the scale and speed of offensive
operations envisioned by Ogarkov are unprece-
dented, and it is highly doubtful that the Soviet Armed
Forces could execute a "theater strategic operation"
of that magnitude today. Thus, Ogarkov's articulation
of the direction of force development and doctrine
should be seen as an aspiration, akin to Frunze's
Front and Rear in Future War and Marshal Mikhail
Tukhachevskiy's 1936 Field Regulations setting the
depth of the offensive operation at 150 kilometers.11
Both were stating goals in light of technological capa-
bilities. The same was true of Sokolovskiy's 1962 vol-
ume. Although somewhat less radical, Ogarkov's little
volume nonetheless sets forth incredibly demanding
new offensive depths and frontages. Perhaps the geo-
graphical scale is less astonishing than the speed.
There will be no pause between "frontal" operations
within a "theater strategic operation," thus shortening
by weeks the time estimated for reaching the
1,200-kilometer depth.12
The stimuli for this change in doctrine, of course,
are the new technologies that permit, in theory, the
communications, control, and accuracy of fire sup-
Ibid., pp. 34-35.
M. N. Tukhachevskiy, lzbrannyye proizvedeniya (Selected Works), 2 volumes.
Moscow. Voyenizdat, 1964
" Ogarkov, op. cit., pp. 35, 36.
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Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions
port for operations conducted on such a scale and at
such a tempo. Changes in Western military doctrine,
as we shall see, are also a factor. Even without these
stimuli, however, it is easy to see how a Soviet strate-
gist would seek this speed and scale. For some time,
he has had the theater fire support means to strike the
"full depth" of the theater-to use Soviet terms-
with nuclear means. Soviet short-range ballistic mis-
siles and frontal aviation are sufficient to execute
such a fire plan.13 The longer Soviet ground forces
require to penetrate to the "full depth" of the theater,
the less effective those deep theater missile and air
attacks will be because the opposing NATO forces will
have time to recover, reorganize, and meet the at-
tack. It is a matter of "leaning into the artillery" which,
military commanders of maneuver forces have al-
ways known, is imperative for a successful attack.
That is, attacking infantry and tanks try to get as close
as possible to friendly artillery falling on enemy posi-
tions so as to cover their assault. Heretofore, Soviet
ground maneuver forces have not been able to "lean
into" theater fire support to the "full depth" of the thea-
ter. In a sense, Ogarkov's "theater strategic
operation" represents an attempt to achieve precisely
this exploitation of deep targeting within the theater.
Although Ogarkov has not spoken as explicitly of
strategic defense as he has of combined arms offen-
sive operations, this should not be taken to indicate a
lack of Soviet interest in the matter in the current rev-
olution in military doctrine. The new technologies also
create new possibilities for active defenses. The as-
sumption by the General Staff that a "theater strategic
operation" can be executed implies a belief in the pos-
sibility of riding out and degrading significantly West-
ern nuclear retaliatory attacks. Moreover, this belief
has inspired efforts in comprehensive strategic de-
fense, a Soviet "strategic defense initiative" that ap-
pears to exceed the ABM limitations now in effect.14
A great deal of organizational change took place
while Ogarkov was chief of the Soviet General Staff.
Much of it appears to have been directed toward an-
ticipating not just the so-called "revolution in military
affairs" created by nuclear weapons but also the
lesser revolution prompted by the latest technolo-
" See Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Theater Nuclear Forces," Ade/phi Papers, Nos. 187
and 188. London. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1983/84, for a
remarkably thorough examination of Soviet capabilities.
" For Soviet strategic defense and space programs, see Soviet Military Power,
Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1985, esp. pp. 46-52. For
organizational changes in all types of Soviet divisions, see ibid. and also W. E. Odom,
"Trends in the Balance of Military Power Between East and West," in The Conduct of
East-West Relations in the 1980s, Part III, Adolph, Papers. No. 191, 1984, esp.
pp. 19-20.
Then Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Ogarkov at a
December 5, 1983, press conference in Moscow at
which he explained the Soviet position at the Inter-
mediate-Range Nuclear Force talks suspended the
month before by a Soviet walk-out.
-Jean-Pierre Ouittard/OAMMA?LIAISON.
gies. To get some idea of the significance of this addi-
tional shift in military affairs, we only need to read the
1984 interview with Marshal Ogarkov published in
Krasnaya Zvezda. Conventional weapons are becom-
ing so efficient and destructive, he said, that a global
war in which nuclear weapons would not be used is a
possibility.15
The trend in the West toward new, nonnuclear
weapons has been under way for more than a decade.
That trend, combined with shifts in US military doc-
trine, has clearly had a role in bringing about changes
in Soviet operational doctrine. In the mid- and late
1970's, the US defense establishment began to grasp
what the Sokolovskiy directions had begot in Soviet
doctrine and force structure. NATO forces would be
facing deeply echeloned Warsaw Pact forces that
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would rapidly grind down NATO defenses through
successive attacks at the forward edge of the battle-
field. The first echelon of Warsaw Pact divisions, and
even the second, might be defeated, but as succeed-
ing echelons-in effect, the next army-arrived, the
NATO defense would be facing fresh forces while its
own were diminished through attrition. The issue for
American planners was whether US forces could af-
ford to let the deeply echeloned forces arrive at the
front in such a phased fashion. US Army analyses
showed that if the fight were carried through long-
range targeting against the follow-on echelons as a
"deep battle," while another battle occurred at the
front, the follow-on forces would not arrive in good
shape, and the estimated battle outcomes would
begin to shift against them. That shift is a function of
the effectiveness-accuracy and warhead power-of
deep targeting. Tactical nuclear weapons could be
used for these purposes, but the concept of echelon-
ment was intended to make forces less vulnerable to
nuclear attacks. In contrast, "smart" conventional
w h
ar
eads and bombs promise to be more efficient for
such "deep attacks." Moreover, as new NATO ground
force weapons-higher speed tanks, infantry fighting
vehicles, and attack helicopters with precision guided
weapons-are fielded in sufficient numbers, this
change, in tactics and operations promises to create
opportunities for ground force counterattacks to tac-
tical, and possibly even operational, depths.
As this new doctrine was taking inchoate shape for
the US Army and Air Force under the name "AirLand
Battle," it galvanized Soviet attention. The Soviet
military had to consider whether this doctrine could
destroy the synchronization of deep echelonment
moving into battle that is necessary to keep the tempo
and to exploit breakthroughs. If weapons and forces
for AirLand Battle are fielded, current Soviet doctrine
is unlikely to cope adequately without changes. This
has provided the second set of stimuli for major revi-
sions of Soviet doctrine, and it is thus not surprising
that Soviet authors are openly pointing out flaws in
Sokolovskiy's concepts of 1962.16
"See Gareyev, op. cit.. Gareyev specifically mentions choosing the direction of the
main effort in the traditional fashion as needing to be revived. Massing and
concentrating forces on a main axis, of course, is precisely what echelonment was
designed to prevent. Massed forces were too vulnerable to a nuclear strike, in the
Sokolovskiy view of war. Insofar as we understand the "operational maneuver group"
concept, it amounts to concentrating forces on an axis of the main effort and moving
them forward ahead of the dispersed echelons of follow-on forces (see Gareyev,
Pp 239-40). Gareyev's critique of Sokolovskiy has a number of other implications that
go beyond the argument in this article, but the thrust is the same: pre-nuclear concepts
of military art cannot be dismissed in the wholesale fashion dictated by Sokolovskiy's
volume.
Problems of Communism July-Aug 1985
One such change had received wide attention in
defense circles in Europe and the United States: the
so-called Operational Maneuver Group." It is a con-
cept for committing the second echelon forces across
the front much earlier and much deeper. In other
words, the scheme seems to be to mass forward ear-
lier to avoid a US "deep attack" and to carry a Soviet
"deep attack" into NATO's rear. While attractive in
theory, this concept puts even greater stress on com-
mand and control, synchronization of movements, fire
support, air support, and logistics. At the same time, it
may offer earlier and more vulnerable targets for the
opponent. The forward massing of forces on an axis of
the main effort, implicit in the "operational maneuver
group" concept is precisely what the Sokolovskiy doc-
trine of echelonment was designed to prevent.18 The
Operational Maneuver Group seems to be a return to
traditional offensive doctrine but on a larger scale and
at a faster pace. It is, of course, a part of Ogarkov's
larger concept, the "theater strategic operation." It
should be understood as one technique in such an
operation for getting maneuver forces dee
er
p
and
sooner to "lean into" the long-range supporting fire.
Although the Soviet General Staff has defined fairly
well the directions for future force development, tak-
ing into account both technological change and West-
ern doctrine and forces, it still faces a number of
dilemmas in attempting to realize these goals. First, it
is already evident that the Soviets recognize the short-
comings in the doctrine that had guided 20 years of
force development and officer training. Now, the
"theater strategic operation" concept places even
greater demands on the Soviet officer corps, de-
mands that probably exceed its already impressive
education and training achievements in the postwar
decades. This bold and unparalleled concept of oper-
ations will undoubtedly require considerable improve-
ments in command and staff training. Is the officer
education system up to another dramatic qualitative
upgrading after having just gone through perhaps the
greatest one in both Russian and Soviet history?
A second dilemma is whether the Sovi
t
i
e
sc
entific
and technological base can support the exploitation
of the new triad of technologies for military applica-
"C W. Donnelly, "The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group: A New Challenge for
NATO," Military Review, March 1983. Pp. 43-60.
"Gareyev, op. cit., esp. Pp. 240-44. Gareyev's revision of Sokolovskiy is an explicit
confirmation of my argument about the nature of the most recent changes in Soviet
doctrine. A return to more traditional principles of military art-even in the age of
nuclear weapons-is, Gareyev says, essential. As a colonel-general, doctor of military
science, and professor, Gareyev writes with considerable authority. His book, which
was tied in with the commemoration of Frunze's 100th birthday, can be taken as
representing the present official line of military doctrine
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Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions
Advanced US combat equipment in operation,
clockwise from top left: (1) a US Army CH-47D
transporting an M198 howitzer; (2) a Ground
Locator Laser Designator for fire control; (3) firing
of a 155mm Copperhead projectile from the
howitzer; (4) the projectile honing in on the target
tank; and (5) destruction of the target.
-US Army photos.
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Problems of Communism July-Aug 1985
tions. Or will it simply bog down under the demands
placed on it by the military? The answer to this ques-
tion is not yet clear, perhaps not even to the Soviet
leadership. The 1960's and 1970's placed heavy de-
mands on Soviet research and development capabili-
ties, which were met in no small part by exploiting
East-West economic interaction. What Soviet scien-
tists could not develop, they usually could count on
the KGB to buy or steal from the West. Today the ac-
quisition of Western technologies is both more diffi-
cult and more necessary because of the increasing
complexity of new weapons. A Soviet T-62 tank is re-
markably simple compared to a T-72 or a T-80 tank to
which computers, laser equipment, and more ad-
vanced metallurgical construction have been added.
In rocketry, aviation, and command and control, the
applied technologies are much more costly and com-
plex to develop and involve many more ancillary tech-
nologies and products that must be developed, bor-
rowed, or stolen from abroad.
The weapons for the future, that is, those that are
highly dependent on the new technologies - microcir-
cuitry and directed energy-can in all probability not
be developed in the USSR without extensive access
to Western economies and R&D communities. The
"
smart weapons," or precision guided munitions,
which Soviet military analysts see as changing the na
ture of war, rely on a variety of innovations in the use
of these new technologies. Most of these innovations
are being made in the West, and moving them into
serial production is not easy, even for Western firms.
Although espionage may give the USSR access to the
new technologies, only extensive cooperative rela-
tions with Western firms that have applied them in
mass production will allow the USSR to achieve a re-
spectable indigenous production capacity. Moreover,
dependence on Western sources of supply, for exam-
ple on high-grade silicon, is likely to grow as the USSR
develops its own production programs.
Third, can the Soviet economy handle the new pro-
duction demands? This is really a twofold question.
Can the economy meet both qualitative and quantita-
tive requirements for the anticipated force develop-
ment and modernization? Again, as in the case of the
S&T base, the requirements of the 1970's were easier
to meet. Future requirements will place higher per
unit costs on industry, and the quality will have to be
much higher for many items. According to the dic-
tates of Soviet military science, new technologies
cannot have a significant impact on doctrine until suf-
ficient quantities of new weapons are available.
All three of these dilemmas must seem cruel to the
Soviet leaders. After a 20-year struggle to get ahead
with forces and a doctrine for nuclear weapons and
rocketry, they find themselves confronted with a new
and analogous struggle to stay ahead. In many cate-
gories of forces they have achieved a clear edge. Yet,
if NATO now proceeds with modernization programs
that lead to fielding many systems with the new tech-
nologies, those leads may well vanish.
In Leonid Brezhnev's last years and under Yuriy An-
dropov's general secretaryship, it seemed that the
Soviet leadership had committed itself fully to under-
take yet another major modernization effort, yet
another 20-year program.19 The doctrinal modifica-
tions were set forth, and there is as yet no sign that
they have been discarded. The rate at which moderni-
zation will go forward, however, may well be in ques-
tion. We will not know this for some time, and the
answer will depend to a significant degree on Western
policies. Trade policy, arms control policy, and force
development policy in the United States and NATO
will either complicate these dilemmas for the Soviet
General Staff or ease them somewhat. Since conven-
tional assumptions about the causal nexus in each of
these policy areas are open to question, some elab-
oration of this point is essential.
Role of Western Policies
Since 1980 many analysts in the West have been
suggesting that US policies were forcing Moscow to
review its basic foreign policy premises and to revise
significantly its commitment to detente. However, an
assessment of Soviet gains from the detente period
and the lack of attractive policy alternatives led me to
conclude that while detente might offer less today to
the Soviets than in the 1970's, it would still be advan-
tageous for the USSR.20 For one thing, the confluence
of Soviet economic needs and a changing political cli-
mate in Europe has made it unprofitable for the USSR
to continue to outdo the hard-line US policy. For
another, the dilemmas in force development policy
have made it necessary for the Soviet leadership to
revive as much East-West trade as possible. Without
this trade, the Soviet Union will have neither the S&T
" While neither was more explicit than offering the usual public statements about
providing the Soviet Armed Forces with all that they need, the clearest action implying
Brezhnev's commitment came with the decision in 1975 to meet economic planning
dilemmas by reducing "investment" instead of defense or consumer goods. Andropov
did not alter this priority for defense even as he tried to shift resources to free up
bottlenecks in energy and transportation. See Myron Rush, "Guns over Growth in
Soviet Policy," International Security (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1982/83, pp. 167-79.
" William E. Odom, "Choice and Change in Soviet Politics," Problems of Communism
(Washington, DC), May-June 1983, pp. 1-21.
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Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions
base nor the industrial capacity for its preferred force
development path.
Detente in the 1970's facilitated Soviet force devel-
opment through arms control agreements and the
arms control process. SALT I did two important things
for the Soviet Union. First, it ratified a large Soviet ad-
vantage in a number of strategic systems. Second, it
closed off US strategic defense programs, giving the
Soviets time to catch up in ABM technology. It thus
permitted the General Staff not to have to choose be-
tween a mix of ICBM and ABM programs and allowed
for the accelerated buildup of the ICBM force without
having to fear that the United States would deploy
ABM's. The Soviets took advantage of the situation to
stay well ahead in ICBM's and to catch up and actually
deploy the one ABM site around Moscow permitted by
the 1972 ABM treaty.
Two American programs, the MX missile and the
B-1 bomber, have both run afoul not because of tech-
nical limits in the SALT treaty, but because of con-
gressional opposition to the programs generated in
part by the political disputes between proponents and
opponents of the SALT process and in part by debates
over practicability. In the case of ABM, the United
States has not deployed even the one site permitted
by the treaty. Yet now, as the Soviet General Staff
faces a second postwar modernization program of
enormous dimensions, it sees a reviving US interest in
strategic missile defense. The Soviet Union's decision
in late 1984 to return to the arms negotiations was to
be expected, and the primary Soviet goal will remain
to defeat the US interest in ballistic-missile and
space-based defenses as effectively as it had de-
feated ABM in 1972.21
Another factor, Western force development policy,
can work either of two ways. If NATO does not go
ahead with developing and fielding significant num-
bers of the more advanced conventional weapons,
the degradation that the Soviets anticipate in their
combined arms doctrine of the 1970's would not
occur. If, on the other hand, NATO fields impressive
numbers of the weapons, the nuclear issue, hereto-
fore the center of arms control attention, would in-
creasingly be pushed into a secondary place. This
trend has been under way for some time. The mega-
tonnage of the US arsenal has been decreasing since
the 1960's as the accuracy in delivery systems in-
creased. Now, as the Soviet General Staff sees it, fur-
ther technological changes could make nuclear
weapons unattractive for military purposes.
There is a certain irony in seeing military force
developers being more effective than arms control
negotiators in reducing the explosive potential of
nuclear stockpiles. There is even greater irony in see-
ing military force developers, through their efforts to
make nuclear weapons practical for tactical and oper-
ational use, become proponents of more limited and
controlled use and perhaps even nonuse of nuclear
weapons. The ultimate irony, of course, would be if
the West were to make arms control concessions of a
kind that would facilitate the modernization of Soviet
military forces while denying NATO forces such mod-
ernization.
Conclusion
Three major propositions arise from this analysis.
Although they might be obvious, they are worth
restating:
There is a direct relationship between arms control
and trade control. For reasons not altogether clear,
there has been a widespread belief among Western
analysts that expanded West-East trade would en-
courage the sort of political change in the USSR that
would generate Soviet interest in effective arms con-
trol and even arms reductions. While there is little his-
torical evidence to support this view, there is massive
evidence in both Russian and Soviet history to refute
it. Military imperatives have governed much of Rus-
sian economic policy at least since the time of Peter
the Great, the tsar who called money the "artery of
war." In the Soviet period, as has been indicated
above, the same has been true even though the ideo-
logical rationale was different. Young Soviet Russia in
the 1920's feared economic isolation from the West
as much as anything else. By concluding the treaties
of Rapallo (1922) and Berlin (1926) with Weimar Ger-
many, Moscow avoided a Western coordinated trade
policy.22 Moreover, the Red Army was able to enlist
large German credits and technical assistance in the
three new military technological areas of the 1920's.
The Soviet aviation industry, motor and tank construc-
tion, and chemical weapons all depended centrally on
" Criticisms of the Strategic Defense Initiative have been appearing almost daily in
the Soviet media since its announcement by President Ronald Reagan. For some
examples. see A. Bovin in lzvestiya (Moscow), June 18. 1985, and the article in
Krasnaya Zvezda, Mar. 8. 1985, attributed to F. Aleksandrov.
" Harvey L. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia 1926-1933, New York.
Columbia University Press, 1966, pp. 50-63. This monograph, based on German
Foreign Ministry documents, sounds surprisingly contemporary in the context of
East-West trade and arms control.
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Problems of Communism July-Aug 1985
A test launch of a US ballistic missile defense rocket on May 28, 1983, from Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands.
-US Army photos.
German aid. Subsequently, in World War II, the Soviet
T-34 tank was considered to be the best.
The infusion of technology from defeated Germany
in the aftermath of World War II gave Soviet military
industry a needed boost, but that boost had begun to
run down by the early 1960's. Within the decade,
Western trade and credit expansion were helping to
support the new Soviet military modernization. In the
1970's, the expansion became accelerated.
It may be, as many critics insist, that it is impossi-
ble to achieve a fully coordinated Western trade pol-
icy or even a narrow Western embargo on strategic
technology exports. If this is true, then it means that
the West can expect both a quantitative and a qualita-
tive arms race for the indefinite future. However, a
trade policy that merely slowed down the diffusion of
technology and credits to the Soviet Union could have
a significant effect. The trade control/arms control
connection is a reality whether or not this is recog-
nized by proponents of arms control and proponents
of extensive East-West trade.23
" See Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Assessing the Effect of
Technology Transfer on U.S./Western Security, Washington, DC, Department of
Defense, February 1985.
A qualitative arms competition between the US and
the USSR is likely to make the use of nuclear weapons
both less attractive militarily and less probable. The
record to date suggests that the qualitative competi-
tion between the superpowers is already having this
effect. As Samuel Huntington pointed out many years
ago, qualitative arms races have tended to be substi-
tutes for war; by comparison, quantitative arms races
have tended to lead to war.24 The point is clear,
although it is at odds with contemporary conventional
wisdom: some kinds of arms control are not good,
even if they are effective in restraining competition.
The Strategic Defense Initiative, as well as many of
the US Army and the Air Force precision guided muni-
tions and target acquisition systems, would seem to
fall into the category of competition that helps to avoid
war, not lead to war.
The connection between arms control and arms de-
velopment is primarily a political rather than a techni-
cal matter, a form of political competition. The past
decade of arms control experience is a compelling re-
" Samuel Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results." in Carl J. Friedrich
and Seymour E. Harris, Eds., Public Policy, Yearbooks, Vol. 8, Cambridge, MA, Harvard
University Press, 1958, pp. 41-80.
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Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions
minder of this proposition. It is difficult to imagine that
the present force levels would be higher than they are
even if there had been no SALT treaties in the 1970's,
and it is possible that without SALT the Soviet military
edge in some categories of forces would not be as
great. (It is probable that Soviet ICBM's would be less
numerous and the Soviet ABM system technically less
advanced.) This need not have occurred. The fault is
not so much with arms control as with illusions that an
essentially political matter like the East-West military
balance can be depoliticized through arms control
negotiations. The Western inclination to change the
nuclear weapons issue from a political into a techni-
cal matter is at the root of the problem. If the West
could control this tendency, the chances for success-
ful arms control would be improved. Both the Mutual
and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) and the Inter-
mediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations are
examples of effective Western competition in arms
control. Both sets of talks have helped to maintain
NATO force levels or redress adverse trends, given
Soviet intransigence on arms reductions. In both
cases, the West understood Soviet force develop-
ments and gave military capabilities first place in de-
signing Western arms control positions. In most other
arms talks in the past, the West let technical factors
take precedence over military and political realities.
In spite of this, the West has new prospects for suc-
cess. The USSR has another force modernization task
before it, one that will be very costly to execute. New
technologies more than Western military policies
have created this task. Yet, this gives the West a new
opportunity to redress the NATO-Warsaw Pact mili-
tary balance significantly. Changes in US land warfare
doctrine are concerned with ways to exploit new kinds
of nonnuclear weapons. To make the doctrine effec-
tive, NATO has to field a modicum of the new weap-
ons systems and show that it can employ them effec-
tively. At the same time, this opportunity could escape
if NATO fails to connect the doctrine rationally to its
arms control and trade control policies.
It may appear to some that the West too is con-
demned to the fate of Sisyphus, destined to respond
to military buildup after military buildup. In one
respect that is true. No single strategy or weapons
system will provide security indefinitely. Security is
maintained through continuous efforts, frequent
reviews, periodic changes in doctrine and strategies,
and rhythmic acquisition of weapons and forces using
new technologies. Security cannot be bought cheaply,
and there are no panaceas to be had, not even in
nuclear forces capabilities. There are, however, more
effective and less effective approaches to building
security for the West. The present juncture, under-
stood from the dynamic perspective of past and po-
tential Soviet force development, seems to offer rare
and genuine opportunities for the West to acquire
security more effectively. The West can make the
Sisyphean task for the Soviet General Staff much
heavier and its own task relatively lighter by under-
standing the rhythm of the competition and by exert-
ing itself in ways that shape the competition. Most im-
portant, however, is that the competition be shaped
into "a substitute for war," rather than "a prelude to
war." The West cannot escape the military competi-
tion, but it can complete in ways that make war less
likely.
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