THE NATO CENTRAL REGION AND THE BALANCE OF UNCERTAINTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030029-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: July 1, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030029-5
The NATO Central Region and
by Anthony H. Cordesman
Western security is dependent
on many military balances,
and each presents its separate
hope of peace and risk of war.
A Norwegian depth charge could trig-
ger a low-level naval conflict off the
north Cape and make the local balance
of naval forces critical. Arms smuggling
or assassination could bring Turkey to
the edge of war with Bulgaria or the
Soviet Union and make the Southern
Flank balance critical.
A war could escalate out of a Soviet
invasion of Iran which would suddenly
involve NATO in a conflict to protect
its oil supplies in a region thousands of
miles from Europe. A riot in East Ger-
many or a misfired missile could sud-
denly lead to a conflict in the Central
Region.
Even within a given balance, much
depends on warning and politics. The
Soviet Union may or may not deliberate-
ly initiate a conflict. The USSR may
depend on forces in being, covert build-
up, or overt deployment of the maxi-
mum forces it can bring to bear. The
Soviet Union may use a given balance to
put political pressure on the West or
divide it without resorting to arms. If a
conflict does occur, it may or may not be
limited to a single region of NATO or
even to a single country.
NATO must have the proper mix of
military strength to deal with all these
balances. The West's security is depen-
dent on its ability to create a reasonable
deterrent in every area where there is a
meaningful risk of war. , :>
The Importance of the
Central Region Balance
Two balances, however, are far more
critical than the others. NATO can lose
many small confrontations or conflicts.
It ; cannot, however, risk more than the
most minor loss of territory in the Cen-
tral Region or engage in more than the
most limited use of nuclear weapons
without defeating its purpose. To sue-
coed as an alliance, NATO must succeed
..indeterring a major armored attack on
the Central Region, and it must deter
escalation to nuclear war.
While nuclear deterrence is currently
receiving the most political., attention,
Western unity and security are just as
dependent on deterring Warsaw Pact ar-
mored attacks on West Germany. A lim-
ited or even major defeat on either flank
would be drastic but survivable.'? The
USSR would also face the risk that such
a defeat would unite the West into ac-
tion and the West would fully commit
its immense economic and technical
resources.
The occupation or neutralization of
Germany, however, would shatter
NATO's defense structure, the Europe-
an Economic Community and OECD.
NATO's failure to defend West Germa-
ny might well thrust France into isola-
tion or neutralization; it would force the
smaller European countries to give way
to Soviet political pressure and lead
Asian and Third World countries to
turn away from the West.
Whatever the world's initial reaction
to a Soviet occupation of even part of
West Germany, it seems unlikely that
the West would get a second chance. It
would take years to rebuild NATO's
forces to the point where they could re-
take West Germany after an initial de-
feat, and the pressures to dissolve the
Alliance would be too great.
NATO's commitment to forward de-
NATO cannot use its
total resource inputs
to compensate for
its inferiority in
military outputs.
fense is not the result of a political bar-
gain with West Germany, but rather the
result of strategic realities that are just as
vital to the rest of Europe and the Unit-
ed. States. ` NATO' stands or falls on its
ability to'preserve the ;Central Region.
This has its drawbacks and its advan-
tages. It weakens NATO in .a' war fight-
ing sense because it places a decisive
military objective right at the border of
Soviet-occupied states. The Soviet Union
does not need to occupy Europe or even
all of Germany, and it does not need to
defeat NATO's armies in the sense of
destroying them.
The USSR only has to move its
forces 100-200km further west, and it
.will still be on the edge of victory.
While the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny's industry is still heavily concentrat-
ed in the Ruhr, four of its seven major
industrial complexes are near the Czech
or inter-German border. These include
the complexes ~.,aiound Hamburg, the
Wolfsburg-Hannover. axis, `Nurnberg,
'
. ~
and Munich.
~
Even if Soviet armor can' only move
i00km, it will control at. least 30% of
West Germany's population and 25%
of its economy. If it can reach the
Rhine to the north, it will control at
least 75% of West Germany's popula-
tion and resources. NATO has no op-
tion for defense in depth. Its economy
and its unity are on its front line in the
Central Region.
THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE
CENTRAL REGION BALANCE AND
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
At the same time, the very importance
of the Central Region strengthens
NATO in terms of deterrence. It creates
an "iron linkage" between the balance of
armored forces in the Central Region
and NATO theater and strategic nuclear
capabilities. The USSR cannot consider
the balance of forces in the Central Re-
gion without considering the risk that
any attack on the Central Region will
lead to nuclear conflict.
This linkage is the key uncertainty in
the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance. The
USSR cannot predict the point at which
nuclear escalation will come, and the
risk of such escalation increases in di-
rect proportion to the forces the War-
saw Pact commits to an attack and its
success.
Regardless of NATO's emphasis on
conventional options, the USSR must
still face the fact that NATO could be
forced to nuclear war within hours of a
Warsaw Pact attack. Nuclear escalation
would be almost inevitable if NATO was
caught by surprise and lost its main air
bases and peacetime caserns before it
could execute its dispersal plans. It
could become equally inevitable in two
or three days if the Warsaw Pact suc-
ceeded in creating a decisive break-
through on the Central Front.
The very fact that so many of
NATO's members are bound together in
a common effort to defend West Germa-
ny at its eastern border and that the US
is so heavily committed in terms of con-
ventional and nuclear forces means there
is little chance that a major Soviet inva-
sion of West Germany could end with a
conventional conflict.
This confronts the USSR with over-
whelming odds that the failure of
NATO's conventional defenses in Ger-
many would trigger a nuclear war whose
aftermath is certain in only one respect:
the immense costs to both sides would
be immensely more costly to the Soviet
Union than any foreseeable benefits.
The Price of Nuclear Uncertainty
Once such escalation occurs, the bal-
ance of forces in the Central Region ac-
quires a new and drastic meaning, one
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the Balance of Uncertainty
which is largely measured by each side's
willingness to escalate. Even weak
NATO nuclear forces would still allow
NATO to fight a nuclear conflict that
will involve levels of damage and uncer-
tainty that will transcend the "war fight-
ing" capabilities of both NATO and the
Warsaw Pact.
While it is theoretically possible that
the USSR could win a nuclear conflict in
Europe in the sense of defeating NATO
forces, limiting damage to its own side to
"?cceptable" levels, and preserving
enough of NATO's civilian population
and cconomy to give an attack purpose,
the possibility is not particularly great.
Both sides would have to fight by extraor-
dinarily well-constrained rules and fight
without the slightest miscalculation.
It takes remarkably few ground bursts
against urban targets, or with the proper
fallout patterns, to trigger levels of dam-
age that make a nuclear conflict in Eu-
rope seem almost uncontrollable.
It is no accident that in the vast pool
of strategic literature developed in the
West, there is virtually no serious un-
classified analysis of the full effects of
nuclear conflict on Western and Eastern
Europe. It is also no accident that the
war games of both sides either involve
incredibly careful use of nuclear weap-
ons or simply ignore their short and long
term civil effects.
According to one simulation, nuclear
surface strikes on NATO's main air
bases and dispersal bases in Europe
would kill about 30% of Europe's popu-
lation within five years. Depending on
wind and rain, additional strikes on
NATO's major ports and buildup facili-
ties would increase the figure to close to
50%. The cultural and economic cost
would be as high or higher.
At the same time, NATO strikes on
key military facilities in Poland and
Czechoslovakia might well inflict,
enough casualties to ultimately destroy
both nations' ethnic identity. The econo-
mies and populations of Eastern Europe
are better dispersed but far more fragile
and more dependent on the survival of a
few highly centralized urban facilities.
Further, the USSR must consider its
own vulnerabilities. Its territory is just as
much a military target as Eastern Europe.
It is true that NATO might not climb the
ladder of escalation to that point, but the
Soviet Union must consider that its very
success in a nuclear and conventional
conflict would tend to drive NATO to
strike at steadily more sensitive targets. It
must also consider the uncertain after-
math of even a "successful" war. The
ability to occupy Europe is very different
from a stable or survivable political and
economic victory.
The Uncertainty of
Conventional Options
At the same time, NATO faces its
own balance of uncertainty. It cannot
afford to rely on the theater nuclear
equivalent of minimum assured destruc-
tion. NATO must avoid nuclear conflict
as long as possible and must avoid a
level of conventional weakness that
might allow the USSR to win a limited
conventional war in Germany. NATO
cannot rely on a hair trigger that pre-
sents so many risks that NATO may be
unwilling to pull it.
NATO does, therefore, need a major
conventional option or "battle fighting"
capability. While winning an all-out con-
flict in Europe is beyond NATO's means
and probably beyond a meaningful defi-
nition of "winning," NATO must be
able to fight even theater-wide conflicts
for a reasonable period of time. It must
be able to impose conventional losses
that fill the gap between inaction and
Murphy's law works on both
sides of the
inter-German border.
willingness to use nuclear weapons.
NATO needs strong conventional
forces for other reasons. NATO's unity
is dependent on "flexible response." No
democracy can sustain its support for
NATO if it is asked to live constantly on
the edge of nuclear war. Incidents hap-
pen and mistakes are made. NATO
needs major conventional forces to avoid
relying on bluff or facing the inevitable?,
reality of crises and limited conflicts. NATO cannot abandon hope .or con-
trol with the first nuclear explosion. Con-
ventional forces are essential to uny mean-
ingful battle fighting in nuclear conflict
and to denying the Soviet Union the
option of a nuclear first strike that could
leave NATO with no option other than
massive nuclear war or surrender.
While the West cannot guarantee that'
its social system will emerge intact from
a large-scale nuclear conflict, it can, be
sure that everything it does to create an
unbroken spectrum of risks from a bor-
der crossing to a strategic nuclear, ex-
change will act to keep the peace and
reduce the risk of escalation.
This creates another iron linkage: a
linkage between NATO's having enough'',
conventional forces to support its strate-
gy of forward defense in West Germany',
and NATO's ability to avoid nuclear',
conflict. Both the survival of the Alli-
ance and the avoidance of nuclear war
depend on the ability of NATO conven-
tional forces to keep the Warsaw Pact
from exploiting NATO's unwillingness
to use nuclear weapons at limited levels
of conflict and from occupying enough
German territory to destroy Germany's
economic and political viability.
Understanding the "Balance
of Uncertainty"
It is these linkages between forward
defense, the battle fighting capability of
NATO's conventional forces in the Cen-
tral Region, and the risk of escalation to
unacceptable levels of nuclear conflict
that make up the "balance of uncertain-
ty." It is also these linkages which allow
NATO to be a strong and purposeful
alliance in spite of inferior forces and
war fighting capability.
It is a cliche to say that NATO is a
defensive alliance. Its defensive charac-
ter is shaped by the politics of its mem-
ber nations and by the size of the mili-
tary forces democratic peoples will fund
in peacetime. NATO will be attacked,
not attack.
NATO is also, however, a deterrent
alliance. It is designed to deter war rath-
er than fight wars to some undefined
form of military victory. NATO may
have to fight major battles, but it relies
on deterrence rather than the capability
to win a general war.
NATO relies on conventional forces
to deny the Warsaw Pact the ability to
win a quick conventional victory in the
forward area, and to make nuclear esca-
lation.seem a rational and inevitable re-
sponse to any massive and sustained So
rRer
~ eans.* t N ?. ,
n forces equal totafs
P`abf ' t ,+can dea w ctase"'s
war fiighting scenarios
DETERRENT CREDIBILITY
NATO's force improvement problem
changes radically when its goal becomes
deterrence and preserving the balance of
uncertainty. It shifts from a problem of
trying to close an impossible gap in con-
ventional and/or nuclear capabilities to
one of how "best to maintain and
strengthen an already. effective deterrent.
This, however, still leaves the problem
,,of determining what conventional capa-
bilities are adequate . Evt . a :deterrent
alliance must back the balance of uncer-
tainty, in nuclear forces with a credible
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19,
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Even the most disciplined 1.55-2.64. NATO's estimate of artillery
superiority is 2.9-4- the IISS estimate is
military leader cannot NATO's "horror+`story'"' does, stow-
follow a great tradition. Virtually
ever
,
i Wore the fact that what
g all of the NATO-Pact comparisons is-
might he "limited escala- sued inthe Secretary of,DDefense's,Annu-
"
for the SovietUniOn r -
tion
The Uncertain Value of Global could be "national suicide" ` Posture statement ;tompare, the total
forces of all NATO and Warsaw Pact
"
.
w ; "Horror Stories
for his own country. , countries. They differ from NATO's flg-
The key comparisons which emerge in ures largely in further exaggerating the
balance of uncertainty in conventional
capabilities. The question still remains as
to whether NATO has, or can create,
sufficient conventional forces to keep the
peace in the Central Region.
The question of "how much is
enough?" remains as valid as ever, and
acceptance of NATO's role as a deter-
rent alliance presents new complications
in assessing the balance. The problem
becomes one of how to measure NATO's
Central Region forces in terms of their
relative ability to shape Soviet percep-
tions and deprive the USSR of any in-
centive to attack. Uncertainty becomes
important as well ns capability, and ca-
pability is defined in terms of deterring
any Soviet armored assault on West
Germany rather than fighting the result-
ing conflict.
Deterrence does not lend itself to a
single set of answers. Many different
combinations and levels of forces can
provide a high degree of deterrence. This
is one reason it has proved so tempting
for NATO to set impossible goals for
conventional forces or sustained conven-
tional war fighting capability, even
though there is no practical political
chance that such forces will be provided.
If the goals have been unachievable, they
at least have been fixed and have put
constant pressure on each member na-
tion to provide more resources.
But _it klso helps explain why NATO
has fallen into the trap of seeing the
resulting gap between such goals and
reality as evidence of its weakness. It
explains why most assessments of the
balance end up giving the impression
that NATO lacks the ability to preserve
the peace and in undermining the impor-
tance of the linkage between strong nu-
clear and conventional forces. It explains
why NATO fords it so difficult to set
force improvement priorities and to-
make trade-offs,: where everything must
be improved, no feasible set of force un-
provements seems to matter
THE CENTRAL REGION
"BEAN COUNT"
The Warsaw Pact must
consider that the "peace-
loving" peoples of Eastern
Europe are scarcely the
ideal mobilization base
for offensive war.
NATO publications, in NATO and War-
saw Pact comparisons by the US Defense
Department, and in the recent work of the
International Institute of Strategic Stud-
ies (IISS) are "global" balances which
lump together the forces in the Central
Region with those on both flanks and then
make arbitrary and/or undefined as-
sumptions about what US and Soviet
reinforcements should be included.
Such "balances" have no relevance to
the forces each side could commit in an
actual conflict. Yet they are the primary
data provided to the Congress and to the
public. NATO, for example, focused on
broad force totals which were deliberately
designed to dramatize its weakness when
it published its first major public force
comparisons in May of 1982.
NATO ignored comparative readi-
ness, deployability, and buildup capabili-
ties. It used geographic categories that
made a bad balance impossible and
which had nothing to do with either
deterrent or war fighting capability.
The NATO land force "bean counts"
included the flanks and excluded most
units in the USSR and all NATO forces
outside Europe. The resulting totals gave
NATO 2.6 million men to 4.0 million for
the Warsaw Pact.
The NATO-Pact ratios for other cate-
gories were 84-173 divisions, 13,000-
42,500 tanks, 8,100-24,300 heavy anti-
tank guided weapons launchers, 10,750-
31,500 heavy mortars and artillery,
30,000-78,800 other armored vehicles,
400-700 attack helicopters, and 1,800-
1,000 transport, helicopters.
The NATO aircraft counts-which
for some strange reason excluded allre-
inforcements from outside Europe but
included all aircraft in Russia's three
Western, Volga, and Urals Military Dis-
tricts-gave the Pact 7,240 combat air-
craft to 2,975 for NATO.
The NATO-Pact ratios were 2,288-
2,115 fighter bomber or ground attack
aircraft, 740-4,370 interceptors, 0-350
bombers, 4,200-11,000 antiaircraft guns,
and 2,300-6,000 surface-to-air missile
launchers.
These NATO air figures seem a bit
thick even for comparisons designed to
serve the purposes of political games-
manship. They include most of the stra-
tegic defense forces of the Warsaw
Pact-which almost certainly would not
be committed in bulk to any attack on
NATO even under the worst condi-
tions-and ignore America's impressive
ability to deploy tactical air power based
in the US.
They ignore the fact that both sides
would be short of air bases, air base
protection, and support during the ini-
tial phases of any conflict. The issue is
how many sorties can be supported in
the forward area. Both sides have more
aircraft than they can effectively deploy
in the first 30 days of a conflict.
In broader terms, NATO's balances
not only ignore NATO's peacekeeping
and deterrent purposes; they are counter-
productive. Their intended message is
obviously that NATO should spend more
on defense. Their practical message is one
of hopelessness and that NATO force
improvements do not matter.
The problem with "horror stories" is
illustrated by the reaction of one Dutch
Minister to a similar assessment of the
balance in a SACEUR force goal brief-
ing in the late 1960s: "Why does it mat-
ter if we lose decisively on D + 12 rather
than D+2?" While one may get away
with crying wolf, announcing that the
sky is falling presents unacceptable prob-
It is also interesting to contrast the
force ratios that result from NATO's
numbers with those developed by the
IISS. The IISS figures are equally
tal forces of both alliances, but they do
include all the forces in NATO noun-
tries, and US reinforcements and pro-
vide a meaningful range of buildup
between the NATO and IISS force ratios
by category illustrate how damaging the
gamesmanship in NATO's figures is to
an understanding of the Alliance's
strengths. NATO gives the Warsaw Pact
a superiority in medium tanks of 3.3-1;
the IISS estimates the superiority at
NATO is unique in its tendency to
underestimate its strengths. The most
commonly used numbers on the NATO
and Warsaw Pact balance have nothing
to do with the Central Region balance or
with any other balance that has military
or political meaning.
They ignore NATO's reliance on de-
terrence, they give a false impression of
overall weakness, they fail to single out
the trends and risks that matter, they fail
to identify key uncertainties, and they
fail to give NATO's force improvement
opportunities proper credibility
... - r . ___~ r__--- .A..sY ~. 1 ? matk1T1e1~ t
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Table One
The Central Region Balance in June, 1983
NATO Warsaw Pact
US'
Other
NATO'
Total
Personnel'
Divisions
282,000
743,650
1,025,650
Committed4
Armor
Other
2%
2%
13
8
15
10%
Total
5
21
26
Ready
Reinforcements'
Armor
1%
5
6%
Other
11%
11
22%
Total
13
16
29
Sub-Total
18
37
55
First-Line Reserves'
Armor
2
0
2
Other
8
0
8
Total
10
0
10
Total Divisions
28
37
65
Medium Tanks'
Deployed
2,000
6,905
8,905
POMCUS
1,000
0
1,000
Total
3,000
6,905
9,905
Tactical Aircraft'
Bombers
144
16
160
Fighter/Attack
336
1,370
1,706
Interceptors
90
560
650
Total
570
1,946
2,516
MRBM/IRBM9
0
18
18
Other NATO
USSR' Warsaw Pact Total Standing
535,000 715,000 1,250,000 -224,350
13 12 25 -10
13 19 32 -21N
26 31 57 -31
4 0 4 + 2%
4 0 4 + 18%
8 0 8 +21
34 31 65 - 10
12 0 12 -10
12 0 12 - 4
24 0 24 -14
58 21 89 -24
18,000 7,000 25,000 -16,095
0 0 0 + 1,000
18,000 7,000 25,000 -15,095
0 0 0 +160
530 1,000 1,530 +176
350 1,225 1,575 -925
880 2,225 3,105 -589
525 0 525 -507
'US personnel strengths are active Army and Air Force only. The Soviet side includes Category III divisions at current strengths. Soviet personnel total
410,000 in East Germany, 50,000 in Poland, and 75,000 in Czechoslovakia
'French Army and Air Force totals are included in all categories, even though those forces are not under NATO control and only three divisions are de-
ployed in Germany. Danish and German forces in the Schleswig-Holstein Province on the base of the Jutland Peninsula are technically a part of
NATO's north flank, but are counted in the center sector for purposes of this comparison.
3NATO personnel strengths are active forces only. They include 282,000 Americans, 83,500 Belgians, 5,400 Canadians, 50,000 French, 426,000
Germans (excluding forces with AFNORTH), 700 Luxembourgers, 92,100 from the Netherlands, 65,100 British, and 20,850 Danes, a total of
1,025,650. Warsaw Pact includes Cat III divisions at current strengths. The total reflects 535,000 Soviet forces, 150,300 East Germans, 364,000 Poles,
and 200,000 Czechs.
'Committed NATO divisions are those in West Germany. All US divisions are Army. Three CONUS-based Reforger divisions have one brigade each
forward-deployed in Germany. Warsaw Pact divisions are those in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland. All are Cat I. Division equivalents are
excluded.
'US Ready Reinforcements do not conform to current contingency plans. They reflect what could be committed quickly, rather than what necessarily
would. eight full Army, parts of two Reforger divisions (that show as X and % respectively) and two Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) division/wing
teams. NATO Ready Reinforcements are six French, two Belgian, and three Dutch divisions. Soviet lists are restricted to Cat I and II divisions in the
Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts.
'First Line Reserves do not conform to current contingency plans, which contemplate withholding two or more divisions initially, including the light 82d
Airborne. Instead, they reflect reinforcement by all forces in CONUS and CINCPAC's Army reserve to show the best possible US case: eight Army
Reserve Component divisions and two MAFs (one active, one reserve). Soviet forces are Cat III divisions in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian
Military Districts.
'The United States has replaced all Sheridan light tanks with M-60 mediums. The number of Soviet reserve stock tanks is not ascertainable.
'Aircraft statistics exclude US dual-based forces in CONUS. F-111s count as medium bombers. US aircraft in Great Britain and Spain show.
'US Pershing I missiles are Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs with a maximum range of about 400 miles), so do not count. The 18 "NATO"
MRBMs/IRBMs are French. About one-third of Soviet MRBMs/IRBMs are in European Russia. Another third in Western Siberia could cover
European targets on call.
SOURCE: John Collins, Congressional Research Service.
balance in favor of the Pact by including
all the reserves on both sides. ?
any militarily credible cintingen , and
again are designed to use the worst
sible balance to get the best possible pnd-
get. Their defect is again that the result
ing balances have credibility only where
such credibility is least desirable', iCon-
greys-has learned to ignore them, but the
public, is given the impression of weak-
,"Tile situation is little better when one
compares most counts of the Central Re-
gion balance. The comparisons in Table;'
One are almost unique in summarizing
the force totals on each side in ways
which ; explicitly define the `: forcesthat~
are `counted and show the range of build
They reveal obvious and massive lima-
tations in NATO's ability to fight a gene'
eral war in the Central Region. At the
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same time, they are considerably more
reassuring than the "global compari-
sons" just discussed. While NATO is
clearly inferior to the Warsaw Pact, it
still has an impressive level of deterrent
capability.'
Table One shows that NATO does not
face a massive Warsaw Pact superiority in
manpower. It shows that NATO has sig-
nificant M-Day and ready reserve forces,
and it shows that NATO's inferiority in
tanks is partly offset by a far smaller
inferiority in aircraft. Unlike many counts
of the Central Region balance, it treats
Britain, Denmark, France, and the Unit-
ed States as full members of the NATO
Alliance and counts all the forces they
would deploy in an all-out war.
Above all, Table One begins to give a
tangible feeling for the uncertainties
which affect any analysis of the Central
Region balance and which the Soviet
Union must weigh in considering its ca-
pability to attack West Germany.
The Uncertainty of
Central Region Force Counts
These uncertainties are further illus-
trated in Table Two, which compares
the leading official and semiofficial
counts of the Central Region balance.
Even allowing for differences in date and
definition, it is obvious that there are
many different ways to count the bal-
ance and many different ways to look at
even the simplest data on NATO and
Warsaw Pact forces.
These differences do not, however, il-
lustrate the key trends that shape the
balance of uncertainty. Most of the bal-
ances in Table Two share the same prob-
lems as the "global" balances just dis-
cussed. They have been structured to
emphasize NATO's weakness to support
the case for the largest possible budget
or force goals
While the full range of differences in-
volved cannot . be illustrated without
comparing the supporting text, NATO's
Table Two
The First Balance of Uncertainty:
NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces
in the Central Region
Category
CRS
Estimates
NATO
Estimateb
UK
Estimatec
IISS
Estimated
FRG
Estimates
NATO
1,025,650
n.a.
780,000
n.a.
n.a.
Warsaw Pact
1,250,000
n.a.
950,000
n.a.
n.a.
Soldiers in Fighting Units
NATO n.a. n.a.
580,000
n.a.
n.a.
Warsaw Pact n.a. n.a.
720,000
n.a.
n.a.
Total Division Equivalents
NATO 65 35
n.a.
57;;
28-43
Warsaw Pact 89 95
n.a.
101?
58-68
Division Equivalents Before Mobilization
NATO 26 n.a.
n.a.
27
28
Warsaw Pact 57 n.a.
n.a.
46
58
Main Battle Tanks
NATO 9,905 7,600
7,500
7,000
6,500-
7,500
Warsaw Pact 25,000 25,500
17,500
19,500
19,000-
21,700
Artillery/Mortars
NATO n.a. 4,050
2,700
n.a.
n.a.
Warsaw Pact n.a. 17,500
7,500
n.a.
n.a.
Total Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft
NATO
2,516
1,985
1,250
2,251
1,750-
2,230
Warsaw Pact
3,105
4,590
2,700
3,950
2,800-
3,180
Fighter Bombers
NATO
1,866
1,340
n.a.
1,602
n.a.
Warsaw Pact
1,530
1,580
n.a.
1,350
n.a.
Interceptors
NATO
650
445
n.a.
386
n.a.
Warsaw Pact
1,575
2,595
n.a.
2,050
n.a.
Recce Aircraft
NATO
n.a.
200
n.a.
263
n.a.
Warsaw Pact
n.a.
415
n.a.
550
n.a.
:w of the balance. West Liermany:
Robert Lucas Fisher's Defending the Central
Front. The Balance of Forces, Adelpht Paper
127, IISS, London.'It was published in An-
gust 1976, however,` and is now' seriously
dated. John Erickson and Davin' C. Ishby
have provided numerous studies of Soviet
buildup capabilities and attack capabilities,
and Ishby's Weapons and Tactics of the SoW-
et Army is perhaps the best available assess- eq
rent Soviet for es.;'Neither Erickson .not'
however, attempted "net asset
Ishby
,
ments." John.Collins has done excellent
workIn comparing US and Soviet forces
has not' addressed NATO and Pact capabW..
ties in lull depth.,Phillip Karbeit,,has done
excellent work on tracing the development of
the NATO/Warsaw Pact arms race but bras!
not assessed many aspects of readiness and
buildup capabllif,
'See Table One for definitions and forces counted.
bSee NATO and Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons, May, 1982 AFJ, Figure 6. NATO never
defines what it includes in the Central Region, but seems to exclude all French forces, to
count only NATO committed land forces now stationed in the FRG and Benelux, to count
all Warsaw Pact forces and equipment holdings stocks in East Germany (GDR), Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and in Russia's three Western Military Districts. The NATO count adds
the UK for air forces but excludes France and all US reinforcements. It counts all Soviet
aircraft in the Western Military Districts including strategic defense aircraft.
`British Defense White Paper, Volume One, 1982. Counts only French forces in Germany.
The term "Central Front" used in the British estimate is otherwise never defined. It
seems to compare all Pact forces in the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia against those
in NATO-committed M-Day forces in the FRG, Benelux, and UK.
dThese estimates are taken from the 1980-81 IISS Military Balance, and are somewhat
peculiar in that they lump together the forces in and opposing Norway with those in the
Central Region. They do, however, include France. The IISS counts of the conventional
military balance in the 1981-82 and 1982-83 editions of the Military Balance are useless
because they only provide data for the entire Warsaw Pact-although they break out US,
Northern and Central European, and Southern European forces. The result is militarily
meaningless. -
"FRG White Paper on Defense, 1979. The FRG is the only major source of estimates which
properly defines what it counts. The low end of the range includes all NATO and Pact
forces in the FRG and Benelux versus forces in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
The high end adds all forces in France and Hungary.
24 x* Armed Forces JOURNALinte-natipnat/.fuly 1983
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I Table Three
Central Region Force Trends: Army Manpower
.. and Division Equivalent Forces Stationed in
Benelux, FRG, GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland
No=
Comparative Manpower and Divisions
48 53 58 63 68 73 78 83
1-1 Czechoslovakia
E. Germany
r.~
Poland r ti.
(1~
Soviet Union
Divisions by Type
_ and
Other
Motorized
Rifle
48 53 58 63 68 73 78 83
N cars
48 53 58 63 68 73 78 83
Vears
Source: Adaj)Icd bN (fie author from mork 1).% Phillip A. Karber ol the 1;1)\l
~'No agreement exists over the count of -diN,ision eqLii%,aIcnIs- in NATO.
main ire, t sand
Ai g Rea, .n bslattce ~y f
is sl'. vnger than, ule ~~ gj in '~q
T o indicateaIt itlu~4t4 th I
'fiat NATO cn"
improveipents and =~1 . _
unprovemen y ~e1
d'ies~. T1
rcestuAir,
can udies lid i 3 u
t ,roU 4
and the United Kingdom are only mar-
ginally better, although they seem to be
counting different alliances, particularly
in the case of aircraft. The IISS count is
somewhat better but again does not track
in detail with the other counts, even al-
lowing for the fact that it is somewhat
could only'; provide limited insight into
the actual military capabilities of NATO
and the Warsaw. Pact. Even the moat'
purposeful estimate of the peacetuneull-
ttary strength of _ opppoossing, forces must
select some set of figures and exclude
- , - .
other possible contingencies.'
Counts which define ranges based on
alternative geographic regions and build-
ups must ignore many critical factors like
readiness, training, leadership, "morale,
tactics and strategy---and luck. There
also is no reliable way to weight weapons,
unit, and manpower numbers' to, make
Nevertheless, the problems in most of
the balances summarized in Table, Two
go beyond excusable' limits; yet such
force comparisons' matter."They shape
the West's perception, of the balance.
Further, deterrence differs fundamental-
ly from war in that "victory" is deter-'
`
mined by perceptions of relative strength.
Finally, comparisons like those in Table
Two have played `a key role In shaping
the current perception of NATO's weak-
. .. - ,. _. `~.
ness
credibility . of deterrence from ?a. soviet
perspecive_ While Soviet perceptions un-
gence, war gaming, and analysis, it seems
likely that they are still influenced by
such "bean counts" if,only because the
other factors shaping the balance are so
complex and uncertain. Further,, Soviet
pertions arundou tedl
cep
weakness in the'West
The Uncertainties Posedy NAB O
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Table Three has two major aspects. The
first is that any attack on the FRG and
Central Region involves the major na-
tions of the Alliance.
The US has over 210,000 soldiers in the
FRG and 256,000 soldiers and airmen in
the Central Region. It has also steadily
increased its commitment to forward de-
fense. It had 210,381 military personnel
in Germany in 1972, 224,466 in 1977, and
256,391 in 1982. It has hundreds of thou-
sands of civilians on West German terri-
tory and hundreds of billions of dollars'
worth of economic ties.
The UK has 55,000 men and most of
its modern equipment on the front line.
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands
commit key elements of their forces. It
takes a considerable act of faith, one
bordering on the incredible, to assume
that any massive Soviet attack on these
forces can end without a global or nucle-
ar conflict.
At the same time, the manpower
trends by NATO country track with
other trends in NATO forces. For all
the arguments about burden sharing,
the Alliance's commitment to forward
defense of the Central Region has been
remarkably consistent. NATO has
made remarkably few cuts in its combat
strength in the forward areas of the
Central Region since the foundation of
the Alliance.
The figures for divisions by type also
show that NATO has maintained its
strength and completed its moderniza-
tion to armored forces. These trends are
particularly important when one realizes
that the conversion to armor occurred
during 1958-64, which was also the peri-
od in which the European nations had to
fund their own major equipment pur-
chases for the first time since 1945.
The very cohesion of NATO forces
in the Central Region is itself a power-
ful deterrent uncertainty. For all the
talk of a crisis in US and European re-
lations-and it is worth noting that this
talk has continued for more than a
quarter of a century-NATO has a ba
sic military unity which makes any at-
tack on West Germany an attack on
NATO and which casts serious doubt
on Russia's ability to exploit any short
term political divisions among NATO
countries. NATO may not be a perfect-
ly integrated alliance, but in the words
of Robert Osgood, it has proved incred-
ibly entangling.
different standards m terms o training, ese
The uncertainties imposed by the ammunition stocks, war reserve equip- sessment has ever' n:made `the opm-
Warsaw Pact's reliance on East Europ - inert, combat dservicesupport,' are fiive readiness f ' each N y.
an forces are compounded by those that part, unit integrity and turnover, TO Can only to rats stteh
grow out of the differences between biped arms and land/"itive issues and .muss oncent eft
NATO and Warsaw Pact readiness and host of other factors _ `the extent tti which each rat n;mee
?has a agreed standards and its obi nation
buildup requirements. These differences The FRG, for example, still
Table Four
NATO Divisions
Detailed Breakout, Central Region
as of January 1, 1983
NATO Divisions
Separate Brigades
Armor
Other
Total
or Regiments
Committed Divisions
in West Germany from:
Belgium
0
1
1
0
Britain
4
0
4
1
Canada
0
0
0
1
France'
3
0
3
0
Netherlands
0
2
2
0
US2
2%
2%
5
3
West Germany'
6
5
11
3
Total
15%
10%
26
8
Ready Reinforcements
Belgium
0
1
1
0
Britain
0
0
0
1
Denmark'
0
1
1
2
France'
5
8
13
0
Netherlands
0
1
1
1
US2
1%
11%
13
3
Total
6%
22%
29
7
First-Line Reserves
Netherlands
0
0
0
2
US2
2
8
10
18
Belgium
0
0
0
2
Britain
0
0
0
2
Grand Total
24
41
65
39
'French Army and Air Force totals are included in all categories, although they are not under
NATO control.
'US brigades/regiments include the Berlin Brigade and two armored cavalry regiments
(ACRs). Ready reinforcements are two active brigades and one ACR in CONUS. First-line
reserves are 14 reserve component brigades and four ACRs. (Four separate brigades join
active divisions under the "round out" program. Two replace school troops at Fort Benning
and Fort Knox. Brigades in Alaska and Panama stand fast.)
3Danish and German forces in the Schleswig-Holstein Province on the base of the Jutland
Peninsula are technically a part of NATO's north flank, but are counted in the center sector
for purposes of this comparison.
SOURCE: John M. Collins, Congressional Research Service.
The Uncertainty of Readiness
does not assign men to specific conibat
units in peacetime. It`is also heavily' de;
pendent on reserves'to expand its.cwm
Table Four illustrates 'these differ- bat divisions in wartime and to ill :key
enees. It shows the complex mix of com- support units. (Some ; artillery units have
mitted, ready reinforcement, and first only one-third of their wartime manning
line reserve units in each NATO nation requirements in peacetime.) The Dutch ,
in the Central Region. It also shows that assign reserves to specific units but have
virtually all of the NATO divisions com- sharply cut their force structure and
pared in Table Three are combat ready support capabilities. The British ;also as-
sign reserves to specific equipments, but
orM-Day units
.
The Uncertainty Posed by These NATO units admittedly, differ their reserves are grossly short of heavy
Differences in Readiness and in readiness in many obvious or ,subtle weapons and anti-armor, capabiltttay.
Buildup Capability ways.. Different countries impose very There is no easy way to summarize
f th differences No nearing net s$-
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The US almost deliberately avoids di-
rect investigation of the readiness of its
allies-this borders too close to spying
on its friends. While it has conducted
intense debates over Warsaw Pact build-
up capability since the early 1960s, it has
never conducted the kind of country-by-
country or unit-by-unit analysis needed
to evaluate NATO.
At the same time, enough is known to
say that the 26 committed divisions and
eight independent committed regiments
and brigades in Table Four are generally
ready to fight within one to two days of
preparation, are heavily equipped with
armor and other weapons, and share a
common structure and level of readiness
at least to the point that they are ready to
provide the battle fighting capability that
is the essential buffer between deterrence
and reliance on immediate nuclear war.
In contrast, most of the remaining 39
divisions and 31 brigades in NATO's
Central Region forces are far less well
equipped, far less well armed, and have
far more uncertain training levels and
ability to be committed to combat.
There are excellent reserve, national
command, and rapid reinforcement
units in NATO, but the bulk are either
much lower in quality or will take far
longer to arrive than the committed or
M-Day units.
This is one reason that NATO mili-
tary commanders place so much empha-
sis on combat ready vs. reserve units and
on the weaknesses they can identify
within the political constraints imposed
by national sensitivities. Combat ready
units are not only the primary means of
ensuring that NATO can implement a
forward strategy in the face of an inabil-
ity to be certain of more than 48 hours'
warning; they are the only means of al-
lowing NATO to keep up a broad pres-
sure for combat effectiveness.
It is also a reason why there is so
much criticism of NATO's readiness
and so much emphasis on being able to
fight. Civilians may prefer technology or
impressive "bean counts" to ammuni-
tion and training; NATO officers do not.
Table Five, however, shows that for
all the uncertainties about NATO readi-
ness, such uncertainties in the Warsaw
Pact are even greater. While all of the
NATO divisions shown in Table Three
are more or less combat ready, 11 of the
57 Warsaw Pact divisions are Category
II and III reserve units. Further, all of
the 32 Soviet divisions in the Western
Military District are Category II or III
divisions, and between. 30-60% of the
Pact's non-combat support manpower
would have to be mobilized.
The Soviet Union must evaluate its
own strength in light of the fact that its
own significant combat experience since
1945 has been in Afghanistan and that it
no longer has any significant number of
combat-trained troops. Quite aside from
the issue of the reliability of non-Soviet
Table Five
Warsaw Pact Divisions, Central Region
_ Category
Divisions Total I II III
In Czechoslovakia
Czech
Tank
1
2
2
Motorized Rifle
3
1
1
Total
4
3
3
Soviet
Tank
2
2
Motorized Rifle
3
3
Total
5
5
Grand Total
15
9
In East Germany
East German
Tank
2
2
Motorized Rifle
4
4
Total
6
6
Soviet
Tank
9
9
Motorized Rifle
10
10
Total
19
19
Grand Total
25
25
In Poland
Polish
Tank
5
Motorized Rifle
8
Other
2
Total
15
Soviet
Tank
2
2
Motorized Rifle
0
0
Total
2
2
Grand Total
17
12
Total Committed
Non-Soviet
Tank
12
2
2
Motorized Rifle
17
3
4
Other
2
0
0
Total
31
5
6
Soviet
Tank
13
13
Motorized Rifle
13
13
Total
26
26
Grand Total
57
46
In Western Russia
Ready Reinforcement
4
0
4
0
(all Soviet)
4
0
4
0
8
0
8
0
First-Line Reserves
12
0
0
12
(all Soviet) -
12
0
0
12
24
0
0
24
89
46
13
30
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reserve forces, it also faces the issue of
how well its Category II and III units
can deploy and fight in a theater-wide
conflict.
The readiness of these reserve forces is
now the subject of considerable contro-
versy within NATO, and intelligence ex-
perts do not agree on how to define or
allocate Category I, II, and III classifi-
cations. The term Category I seems to
have different meaning for Soviet units
in Eastern Europe and in the USSR. The
Soviet units in the GDR and Europe
seem to average 95% manning, while
units in the USSR may range down to
85%. Even when manning is high or
even overstrength, this seems to mean a
unit has a special training role and may
actually be unusually short of combat
ready manpower.
The USSR has built up its Category II
divisions to the point where these are
now fully equipped-there have been in-
credible increases in the amount of com-
bat equipment in all types of Soviet re-
The USSR also cannot covertly mobi-
lize more than a few units in the USSR
and can only really determine the combat
capability of Soviet and non-Soviet Cate-
gory II and Category III units by observ-
ing them in combat. It faces the added
uncertainty that World War II and Af-
ghanistan provide little tangible basis for
assessing its own combat power.
This balance of uncertainty again tends
to favor NATO in some important ways.
NATO's best forces are concentrated
where they should be: in positions to
immediately support the forward defense
of Germany, and this includes virtually
all of the forces counted in most of the
pessimistic estimates shown in Table
Two. At least one-fifth of the Warsaw
Pact strength counted in the various esti-
mates in Table Two (a minimum of 3,500
tanks' worth) is in forces which are con-
siderably less ready than most NATO
units counted in the same comparisons.
Warsaw Pact Category 11 and III divi-
sions. Table Six presents the view of
many US experts in delaying the arrival
of Category II units for nearly a month
after M-Day and the arrival of Category
III divisions until M+130. Other US
and most European experts feel differ-
ently. They feel that the USSR would
rely on mass and ignore problems in
training and the ability to fight as a
cohesive unit. They credit Category II
units with almost immediate combat ca-
pability once they fully mobilize-some-
thing that requires 48-96 hours.
NATO estimates of the availability of
Category III units is based on hard-won
political compromises among intelli-
gence experts. Depending on the source,
Category III units are credited with the
ability to achieve readiness in no more
than several weeks and often within one
week.
The resolution of this uncertainty is
critical. If the more pessimistic estimates
are right, the Warsaw Pact's emphasis
on armor and weapons numbers will al-
low it to bring massive firepower and
maneuver capability to bear within days
of the beginning of mobilization. Fur-
ther, the threat will grow steadily worse.
The Pact's massive lead in military pro-
duction has already allowed it, for in-
stance, to increase total tank strength in
the Western Military District by nearly
NATO's total tank strength in the Cen-
tral Region in just the last five years. At
current rates, all Warsaw Pact divi-
sions-except the weakest cadre units-
will be fully equipped by the mid-1980s.
In contrast, most of NATO's reserve
units lack the heavy armor to fight War-
saw Pact divisions. There is no debate
over the NATO buildup ratios in Table
Six, which are optimal estimates for
NATO. Even full deployment of the best
NATO units will not change them.
The US Army reinforcing units whose
equipment is pre-positioned in Europe-
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment to ar
rive by D+9, 3rd Armored Division at
D+ 10, and 1st and 4th Mechanized Di-
visions at D+11---and Dutch M-Day `
and Rim units in the Netherlands, plus
the remainder of the French First Army
The Uncertainty of
Buildup Capability
The resulting uncertainties in buildup
capability are difficult to estimate and
illustrate the fact that NATO runs mas-
sive risks as well as the Warsaw Pact.
Table Six, for example, shows how
critical the uncertainty surrounding the
readiness of Warsaw Pact divisions can
be. The estimates in Table Six are taken
from unclassified work by Col. Daniel
Gans in Military Review' but rely on
hitherto classified intelligence data.
They provide a good picture of the kind
of buildup model used in most NATO
planning.
At the same time, they show how crit-
ical the readiness issue can be. Table Six
assumes that four motorized rifle and 10
tank divisions in the western and north-
tready Central
ern USSR are they can be deployed vagainst so that
entral
Region between M+10 and M+14.
Some NATO experts believe they could
arrive as early as D+4 to D+7. 'Others
believe, however, that they could only be
deployed in ;fully combat ready form by
D+30 to D+40. A few believe that the
USSR would be forced to draw on more
ready units in military districts further
from the inter-German border.
Even more disagreement exists over
the arrival or combat readiness of most
serve units over the last decade-but their manning is only 50-85% of war-
time needs, and training and readiness is
much lower than in the first line Soviet
units in Europe.
East European generally still short some items of mili-
tary equipment and have only 50-75%
of their wartime manpower. Their train-
ing is generally considerably lower than
in Soviet Category I units.
Soviet iet Category III units can range
from near cadre strength to 35% of
manning and now have most of their
combat equipment . Again, the USSR's
vast output of military equipment is al-
lowing it to correct most of its past re-
serve shortages. East European Category
III units , however, are still short combat
and extensive amounts of support equip-
ment and rarely have more than IS-
30% of their manpower.
NATO intelligence estimates have
ten tended to ignore these readiness prob-
lems in calculating the threat, as well as
the fact that Warsaw Pact divisions of
all types are constantly undergoing mas-
sive equipment conversions, and are sub-
ject est to large-scale manpower, turbulence
because of a reliance -
sett ts, almost `all of w must also P i the unit rerve basic +viuch they area t
It is difficult, however, to see how the
Soviet Union can view the situation in
similar terms. The USSR is anything but
reckless in military matters, and its readi-
ness assessments are nearly certain tobe
ultraconservative. It will know the weak-
ness of each Warsaw Pact unit as well as
SACEUR"comes to know privately the
weakness of each NATO" unit under his
command. Its' calculation of the risks of
committing understrength" and rapidly
mobilized units will give it a very different
picture of total buildup capabilities than
cannot significantly alter the immense
superiority in weapons numbers which
the Pact can deploy by rail and road.
Most British reserves are not equipped
to fight Warsaw Pact armor, and the US
cannot deploy additional armored units
from the US in much less than 32 days
or deploy its reserve units in less than 70
days--and these are NATO's only other
major armored reserves. -;,
It is also important to note that the
Warsaw, ;Tact will begin `any buildup
with the elements of four offensive fronts
already deployed in Europe: one in the
GDR, one in Poland to cover the north-
ern front, another at Tabor in Czecho-
slovakia, and a fourth to cover the Dan-
ube Corridor.
4See Col, Daniel Gans, USAR-Ret., "Fight
Outnumbered and Win," Military'Review,
Vols. LX and LXI. Gans' estimate of the
total threat to the Central Region includes
three Category I divisions in the Belorus-
sian, Carpathian, and Baltic Military Dis-
tricts, plus nine divisions in the, Moscow
Military District, one in the Leningrad Mils-
tary District, and one :in the Kiev :Military z
District."Cans also adds four divisions I
Hungary that arrive by M+8. ;He counts
seven Polish Category I divisions vs. 10 for-,
the CRS and five Czech Category I divisions
vs. four for the CRS.,,,
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Table Six
Jhe Build-Up Problem: Illustrative
Estimates of the Impact of Warsaw
Pact i1II. ? Unit Deployments
Main Battle Tanks in NATO Central Region
Cumulative Commitments and Losses
23
21
19-
17-
15 A
13
11
7
5
3
Commitment Notes*:
(D- POMCUS divisions by airlift and
French First Army by road
- Active Army divisions by sealift
Q3 - Reserve components by sealift
Category I divisions by road and
rail
Q - Category 2 divisions by rail
12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 *Replacements from war reserve stocks
7.0
6.0
5.0
Main Battle Tank Ratios
NATO Central Region, D-Day D + 96
1
3.0
2.0 1.0
rc,
-LJ
C4.5
Commitment Notes:
0 - POMCUS divisions by airlift
O2 - French First Army by road
Q3 - Category 1 divisions by road and
railroad
- Active Army divisions by sealift
SO - Dutch and Belgian reserves by
road
l I I I I I _I I I ?- Category 2 divisions by rail
73 - Reserve components by sealift
Main Battle Tank Ratios
NATO Central Region Sectors, D-Day to D + 35
O
n f(, /(ORTHA(---
~U 1
---------------
Oj cEr1A(. souls. 4clor -
HflI
Commitment Notes:
lO - POMCUS divisions by airlift
O2 - French First Army by road
0 - Active Army divisions in first
sealift
?- Dutch and Belgian reserves by
road
Q - Stavka Reserve
The Warsaw Pact has a major surprise
or sudden attack capability, and enough
Category I and II divisions, as Table Six
shows, to create a 3-1 superiority from
roughly M + 9 to M + 30. The arrival of
Category II divisions would raise the
ratio to as high as 7-1. (The ratios would
be even higher if they included the 36
Category III divisions in Table Five,
which could arrive as early as M+30
and which would arrive by M + 130 even
under the most conservative estimates
now available.)
At the same time, at least some as-
pects of the balance of uncertainty do
favor NATO. Any such Warsaw Pact
movements would literally involve the
deployment of over one million men, re-
gardless of what assumption is made
about readiness. Even under worst case
conditions, NATO will find countless
opportunities for conventional "deep
strikes" against key rail and road links
and facilities. Under more favorable as-
sumptions, such NATO strikes could
vastly compound the uncertainties the
Warsaw Pact faces because of nationali-
ty and readiness problems.
There is no question that the Warsaw
Pact has the rail and road capacity to
physically carry out the movements
shown in Table Six, has large numbers of
railway troops, and constantly practices
such offensive buildups under the guise of
dealing with "invasions" by NATO. It
also now regularly practices extensive air
movements from the USSR to fill in the
manpower missing in its forward fronts.
A real-world attack, however, would
be far more massive, could not be con-
ducted on the set-piece and well-pre-
pared basis of Soviet maneuvers and ex-
ercises, and would pose monumental
risks. These include the risk of error and
mistakes of the kind that occurred dur-
ing the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Murphy's law works on both sides of the
inter-German border. The best exercises
in the world still leave many opportuni-
ties for things to go wrong.
Such attacks would also involve forces
so great that the risk of ultimate escalation
to nuclear conflict would rise close to near
certainty. A sudden massive onslaught
would leave no time in which to work out
some "rules" regarding escalation in&
reliance on conventional combat.
The message behind the uncertain
Table Six is, therefore, twofold
NATO, it dramatises the 'need to 'm-
tain large conventional forces in bein
the forward area toAeal with thesis
sudden buildups or, surprise attacks awl
the need for deep strike capabilities that
can halt or disru t the juggernaut the
Soviet Union will lave to m ove. w > ,.
For the Warsaw Pact, every un -
ty regarding its hull up ca a`b'ltty creates:
increased uncei taint.' regarding its s ty
to conduct a successful limited attack k on
the FRG or control the process of nuclear
escalation. It is the cumulative " risk of
Armed Forces JOURNAL Intemational/July 1983
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90TOO155R000500030029-5
trying to execute a massive build up by
reserve and potentially hostile foreign
forces using a peacetime army.
The Uncertainty of Geography
Like uncertainties surrounding readi-
ness and buildup capability, the uncer-
tainty imposed by geography cuts two
ways. As Map One shows, time and dis-
tance affect both NATO and the War-
saw Pact.
Map One shows that the Soviet
Union has seven tank and seven motor-
ized divisions immediately near its bor-
der with West Germany, although at
least four Czech and two East German
tank divisions are equally close. These
forces have at least 6,500 tanks (and
possibly over 7,500), and for all the de-
bate about the nature of first and sec-
ond echelons in attacking Warsaw Pact
forces and the arrival of forces from
units in.the rear or reserves, these forces
give the Warsaw Pact considerable sur-
prise attack capability.
Pact could conceivably
W
arsaw
The
/ begin an attack with the 3rd Shock
Army and achieve significant limited
gains before NATO could move out of
its peacetime caserns. The Soviet Union
`could deploy substantial armored forces
in the event of some crisis or incident or
even launch a large-scale attack with
forces in the forward area and rely on
massive follow-on reinforcement with-
out building up its normal Fronts, or
carrying out the kind of prior buildup or
force movements that would give NATO
clear warning.
NATO has no guarantee that the So-
viet Union will carry out the kind of
attack that would force it to take full
account of the nationality and readiness
ct re or
t
Pact carries out massive prior move-
ments under the cover of some exercise
(and movements close to the FRG on
this scale would make such a cover
thin), it will become vulnerable to
NATO air and missile attack. This cre-
ates a strong linkage between any major
land attack and the need to suppress or
counter NATO air power.
This linkage creates new uncertainties
regarding the ability to implement such
attacks and nuclear escalation-given
the increase in conflict intensity and the
need to strike at dual-capable forces. It
also means lucrative target opportunities
for NATO, whether these are part of
deep strikes or the air/land battle.
Map One also shows that NATO's
current deployments put much of its ar-
mored strength in the forward area, and
that NATO's forces are much better dis-
tributed to reinforce each other than
NATO's national corps zones would
indicate.
Roughly 80% of Egypt's
Soviet-made combat-
deployed tanks had
broken down by the
time Israel successfully
crossed the Suez Canal
in 1973, and comparable
exercise data on the T-62
and M-60A1 show that the
T-62 has a breakdown every
160-200km of operations
vs. every 240-320km
for the M-60A1.
ra
problems in its total forces
the buildup uncertainties raised in dis- German forces are well deployed in
cussing Table Six. It is just as credible forward positions near the front. The US
that the USSR will set the limited objec- also puts substantial forces "in harm's
five of seizing just enough of the FRG to way." :If one includes selected Dutch
try to shatter NATO's unity ' before and British units, NATO puts more than
NATO forces can deploy to their com- half its Central Region tank strength in
bat positions. positions where it can rapidly implement
At the same time, there is little pros- its forward defense strategy
pect that Soviet forces will suddenly There are, however, serious problems
leave their caserns .,and arrive _ at the and uncertainties in _ NATO's deploy-
Rhine' or the Weser. No matter what', ments as well as in the deployments the
scenario "leads to ? conflict, the Soviet Warsaw Pact ,would have to carry out
Union'will"have: to carry out major-divi- to attack. -'British, ? Dutch, and Belgian
sional-sized movements. The average So- force cuts and redeployments leave the
th GDR is located north German plains much weaker than
e
The Uncertainty of
Armored and Anti-armor Force
Strengths.-
viet division ,. in ,
rable:
125km awa y,,from tlie' triter-German "is des'
bordei, and wo-thirds are located more As Map `One- shows, the 2nd Guards The uncertainties affecting nationali-
and'3~t1 Shock Army. e a con- ty, readiness, buildup capability, and ge-
than ?10okm from the border even if one Army
art of t threat that th r limited yo affect any
uncertaineffort to ty in armor and annti-
draws a line (fiat ignoies road lengths { s
The. Soviet armor capabilities. Neither NATO nor
and to Soviet Union also attack. As? Two shows, the
8er
re
o could ar
ts serious the Warsaw Pact is a monolith that easily
se
r ?
as
re
n
on any attic C Y the, forces it `lies; near , terrain all 11Vest Germany p
? use:'t t territory north of lends itself to a.single count of the weap-
the_boriett ?wouidhlmost".certa.:. pro blems;
liave to commit all its : force&':ini;-iy the Helmstedt is'fai less y to defend than ons or that
which allows l`beary counts" each to side
e
GDR,, Western Poland, and C itoslo-. the territory Further south
vakia in a matter of days.' The area around Iiannnver` remains a compared without regard to readiness,
, ..
British forces could nationality, differences in force structure,
This means that unless the Warsaw key problem, since
take 12-48 hours to deploy, forces in the
Netherlands would take at least 48
hours to arrive, and Belgian forces could
take up to four days.
NATO also has serious problems with
its reserves. Ideally, the British Army of
the Rhine should be reinforced with
enough reserves to expand it from 55,000
to 147,000 men. It will take at least 10
days to fully deploy French forces from
France (if these are in fact committed)
and nine days to deploy any meaningful
Danish support to the 6th German Divi-
sion. A French unit would also have to
move over 300km to come to the aid of
even the northern sector of NATO's Cen-
tral Army Group (CENTAG).
While NATO is well deployed in
broad terms, few NATO units are de-
ployed directly at their wartime posi-
tions, and about half the combat battal-
ions in West Germany are 50 to 100km
from the border. NATO requires be-
tween 24 and 96 hours to occupy for-
ward defense positions of the kind that
do most to prevent the loss of any Ger-
man territory and provide the defender
with the most advantage. While these
movements are now far better planned
and more flexible than in the mid-1970s,
they still are complex and make NATO
vulnerable to Warsaw Pact air interdic-
tion and deep strike attacks.
Further, the Warsaw Pact's vast intel-
ligence effort in NATO gives it near-
real-time access to most deployment and
readiness reports. The Soviet Union, for
instance, probably does as good a job, or
better, of tracking every key NATO offi-
cer with low proficiency, marital prob-
lems, or other difficulties as most NATO
countries.
The problem NATO faces is to in-
crease the uncertainty of geography in
ways that maximize the vulnerability of
Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces and min-
imize its own vulnerability in terms of
uncertain warning, movement times, and
the inevitable complication of problems
like civilian refugees. It needs to increase
the uncertainty of geography by increas-
ing its ability to strike at every major
Warsaw Pact movement in :the forward
area in ways which deny the USSR any,
high probability of being able to mass
and penetrate.
,nunuAL IntamationaI/July 1983
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030029-5
Map One
-The Geography of the Central Region Land Balance
WWII I! "IN 11 S. ", MI Mj L11-1911611
Armed Fo. ;s JOURNAL Intemational/Juy 1983
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030029-5
? ?
9.4,
OF-TITO 01
NE TM ERlAN05
US Force Structure in NATO iBrookings Institution, 1974)
and also from US Army materials
Plain
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Armed - _InhlDuAI Inlurnafinn~V 1, Jv 10A7
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or the other uncertainties that can shape
the outcome of a conflict.
Nevertheless, the overview in Table
Seven on the next page provides some
important insights into another critical
aspect of the Central Region balance. It
draws on the work of Phillip Karber
discussed earlier and on trend curves
adapted from the annual Military Pos-
ture report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
While such estimates inevitably have un-
certainties of their own, they still pro-
vide a reasonable picture of the kind of
force ratios and uncertainties that
NATO must deal with.
The Uncertainty of Tank Force
Numbers and Sudden or Surprise
Attack Capability
The first part of Table Seven shows
the trends in the tank balance in the
FRG and Benelux vs. the tanks in the
GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. It
presents a worst case for NATO in that
it excludes 1,000 pre-positioned tanks in
the US, French and British tanks on
their respective national territories, and
Danish armor and does not take account
of readiness. It presents a favorable case
for NATO in that it excludes forces in
Hungary and the USSR.
The force ratios in Table Seven are
not, therefore, atypical of the ratios that
emerge from most force comparisons for
the Central Region. This is confirmed by
the fact that the trends in Table Seven
track reasonably well with the range of
tank ratios in Table Two and the range
of buildup estimates shown in Table Six.
The trends in Table Seven also track
with the trends in tank production. The
USSR is now producing 2,100 tanks an-
nually to 650 for the US, and the War-
saw Pact is now producing 2,500 to
NATO's 1,200. As is the case with most
major arms exports, a much larger pro-
portion of Warsaw Pact tank production
is going to Pact forces than NATO pro-
duction is going to NATO forces.
In fact, counts of tank strength sharply
favor the Warsaw Pact regardless of how
one counts NATO and Warsaw Pact tank
forces. The Pact leads in terms of force
trends, numbers, and modernization. The
'Warsaw Pact has ' increased its tank
?trength far more quickly than NATO,
and trends favoring the Warsaw Pact
have accelerated since the early 1970s.
The USSR reacted to the lessons of its
invasion of Czechoslovakia and the
"",Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973 and to the
.development of improved antitank
' creasing the flexibility of its armored
forces and their ability to carry out
quick; large-scale attacks.
Warsaw Pact tank production out
;paced that of NATO by 2.6-1 during
197882;: much of this production was
used to increase the number of tanks in
FWarsaw Pact forces. Roughly 50% of the
Soviet tanks opposing NATO are now
T-64s, T-72s, or T-80s. The increase in
Soviet tank strength in the GDR was
particularly sharp and reflects shifts in
Soviet doctrine which have no credible
explanation other than an effort to in-
crease Russia's ability to attack West
Germany.
The USSR restructured its Fronts in
Eastern Europe to provide far better air
and mobile infantry and artillery sup-
port for armored movements. It correct-
ed some of the weaknesses in its logistic
and support forces, and has introduced
new concepts of combat unit organiza-
tion like the Operational Maneuver
Groups (OMGs).
The OMG is task-force oriented and
provides far greater and more flexible
integration of combined arms. These
forces are now acquiring helicopter
squadrons and are supported by ad-
vanced command structures. Both they
and the Fronts of which they are a part
have shown a steady improvement in
tactical skills and have largely broken
away from the traditional rigidity of So-
viet force structure.
These OMGs are specially structured
and designed to penetrate NATO de-
fenses in quick thrusts. They are backed
by reorganized fronts which will support
the OMG divisions with massive Soviet
fighter, helicopter, and artillery attacks
and the use of sabotage and special
forces teams.
Each OMG division may have up to
415 tanks (vs. 325 for a regular Soviet
tank division), and some experts feel
they will be supported with special Sovi-
et motorized rifle divisions with 266
tanks rather than 188. These divisions
get the newest Soviet equipment and are
steadily increasing their combat helicop-
ter support.
In any case, changes in the larger So-
viet formations on the inter-German
border have given these armies a special
meaning. The 3rd Shock Army shown in
Map One is a good example. Although
the 3rd Shock Army has less manpower
than the British Army of the Rhine, it
has 2.5 to three times more tanks, six
times more artillery weapons, 1.5 times
more combat infantry, 1.5 times more
logistic lift, approximately seven times
more antiaircraft weapons, substantially
more nuclear delivery systems, and over
30 times as many major chemical war-
fare equipment items. Regardless of
buildup uncertainties, these forces have
substantial sudden or surprise attack ca-
pability.
While British divisions are the worst
equipped in terms of major weapons
strength of any divisions in NATO,
these differences are paralleled through-
out. NATO and Warsaw Pact force r
structures in the Central Region. This is
illustrated by the differences in the num-
ber of tanks and men per nominal divi-
sion shown in Table Eight on p. 48.'
The three main strike groups in the
four Fronts in Soviet forces in Eastern
Europe now can command up to
200-250 battalion-sized combat ready
elements in the first echelon of any at-
tack on the Central Region. This is a
force of up to 9,000 tanks, vs. 3,000 to
6,000 for NATO. For all their deficien-
cies, these forces all probably have 98%
of their combat manpower and have suf-
ficient stocks on hand for seven days of
combat operations.
The USSR does not, therefore, face
the same kind of uncertainties in tank
numbers and armored offensive units
that it faces in the previous balances of
uncertainty. It is steadily improving its
ability to conduct a quick and limited
seizure of West German territory and to
conduct conventional wars at sufficient-
ly limited levels to raise doubts about the
credibility of NATO's escalation to nu-
clear war.
The Uncertainty of Tank Quality
and Support Capability
The Warsaw Pact, however, faces un-
certainties in tank quality and support
capability. While Table Seven shows
that the Warsaw Pact is modernizing its
tank pool more quickly than NATO,
both sides are comparatively slow in
modernizing their total strength. The
earlier generations of NATO tanks were
significantly better. than comparable gen-
erations of Soviet tanks, and this gives
NATO an advantage.
Even the new Soviet T-80 seems to be
anything but a "supertank." It probably
has composite armor in its hull, like all
Soviet tanks since the T-62, and may
'Figures on average division size and equip-
ment holdings differ significantly by source.
The figures shown in Table Eight are typical,
however, and the differences shown do not
vary significantly from source to source. .
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,,Table Seven
A-Central ~, Region 4' Force Trends: Tanks, Armored Vehicles, and
fAnti-Tank Weapons in Army Forces
Stationed in Benelux, FRG, GDR, Czechoslovakia, and
Other Armored Vehicles
18,0001
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
53 58 63 68 73 78
Years
Total Heavy
Antitank Weapons
48 53 58 63 68 73 78 83
Years
18,000
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
lsl Gen
(T-34)
2nd Gen /
(T-54/T-55)
Years
*Includes active and
reserve forces-does not
include USMC and
USMCR equipment.
Armed Attack Helicopters in Combat Units*
Anti-Tank Weapons
Anti-Armor Weapons
per Opposing Tank*
Warsaw Pact
vs NATO
NATO
vs Warsaw
Pact
74 76 78 80
End FY
*Includes active and reserve forces.
Anti-armor weapons include tanks,
ATGM launchers, anti-tank guns, and
Copperhead.
Anti-Armor Weapons
per Opposing Armored
Vehicle*
Poland
(t inns
\%i\ 30. I r?r,p.udI
r "j'.1 rd 2, ,11-I
63 68
Warsaw Pact
vs NATO
"A 1_0
~. W1 arNa"
Pact
It I I I I 1
74 76 78 80 83
End FY
*Includes active and reserve forces.
Anti-armor weapons include tanks,
ATGM launchers, anti-tank guns, and
Copperhead.
Source: Adapted from work by Phillip A. Karber and updated by the author for 1980-83 using the IISS Military Balance and CRS
working materials, and from OJCS, Military Posture, FY 1982 as updated by the author.
Armed Forces JOURNAL international/July 1983
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have such armor in its turret. It does
not, however, have the US M-l's kind of
advanced armor or that of the latest
British tank designs. Like the T-64, it
seems more of an evolutionary effort to
correct the problems of its predecessor
than a serious advance (May AFJ). The
T-62 and T-72 make up the bulk of first
line Pact forces, and even the T-72 re-
tains many of the past defects of Soviet
tanks which have been revealed by the
fighting in the Near East.
While Soviet tanks have superior
cross-country mobility and well-shaped
armor and recent models have thicker
conventional armor than the armor on
NATO tanks, even the most modern
types lack advanced range finders and
fire control equipment. The newest Sovi-
et tanks also have automatic loaders that
require repositioning of the gun and
which severely complicate operation of
the tank.
Although Warsaw Pact tanks are rug-
ged, !:eve not proved particularly
reliable, quality control of critical parts is
pcc:, ~... cots are not routinely cor-
reeted once tanks enter service. Roughly
80% of Egypt's Soviet-made combat-de-
ployed tanks, for instance, had broken
down by the time Israel successfully
crossed the Suez Canal in 1973, and com-
parable exercise data on the T-62 and
M-60A 1 show that the T-62 has a break-
down every 160-200km of operations vs.
every 240-320km for the M-60A1.
Soviet tanks lack flexibility in using a
wide range of ammunition types and carry
only 28-40 rounds (vs. 63 for an
M-60A1). Their guns track slowly, and
their turrets rotate at only 17 ? per second
(vs. 24 ? for an M-60A 1 and 40 ? or an M-
60A2). Even the T-72 and T-80 seem to
have extremely cramped cabins and poor
human engineering, poor "buttoned-
down" visibility, and problems while fir-
ing in defilade. Soviet tanks cannot shelter
behind hills because their guns only de-
press a maximum of 4? (vs. 11 ? or more
for NATO tanks).
While NATO tanks have many design
defects of their own, they are less serious
than those of most Soviet tanks, and
even upgunned and re-engined M-48s
with modern fire control may be superi-
or to the T-80 in tank-vs.-tank encoun-
ters. The Warsaw Pact, therefore, must
regard comparative tank quality as a sig-
nificant uncertainty in evaluating its
own capability.
Further, Warsaw Pact units still lack
the tank recovery, repair, and replace-
ment capability of most NATO divi-
sions. While the Warsaw Pact uses
training sets, rather than divisional
equipment, to reduce tank wear and
emphasizes reliability and crew repair
of minor breakdowns, it designs its divi-
sions to be consumed and replaced rath-
er than sustained as operating divisions.
The Soviet Union has increased its
training for long range penetrations and
its logistic support in recent years, but
recent maneuvers still reveal serious
problems in conducting major armored
penetrations, and Soviet tanks and artil-
lery are still limited by poor cross-coun-
try logistic and service support. There is
also little evidence that Soviet training
makes up for the turnover of its tank
crews and their lack of the kind of expe-
rience with mechanical equipment that
is routine among similar age groups in
the West.
The Uncertainty of Total Armored
Vehicle Strength
The comparisons of "Other Armored
Vehicle" strengths in Table Seven illus-
trate another area of uncertainty. NATO
has only a marginal inferiority in the
number of armored fighting vehicles and
personnel carriers in its forces, and far
more of the NATO vehicles are fully
protected tracked vehicles than those of
the Warsaw Pact.
While the Warsaw Pact has overtaken
NATO in the number of modern ar-
mored fighting vehicles in its forces and
has equipped its other armored vehicles
with better anti-infantry and light anti-
armor weapons, NATO's strength still
remains high. This may change over
time because the USSR is producing
4,800 other armored vehicles annually
(compared to only 850 for the US), and
the entire Warsaw Pact is producing
5,500 compared to NATO's 1,800. But
NATO's existing vehicles are generally
superior in quality and have far more
effective antitank weapons.'
In spite of the upgrading of Soviet
armored fighting vehicles like the BMP,
which proved disastrously ineffective
and vulnerable during the fighting in
1973, the antitank guns (usually rocket
launchers) and missiles on Soviet vehi-
cles still use relatively low-lethality
rounds with awkward guidance systems
requiring prolonged visibility (thus mak-
ing it hard to track a maneuvering target
while on the move), long flight times,
and extremely high operator proficien-
cy-a proficiency rarely demonstrated in
Pact maneuvers or training of Russia's
Third World clients.
Even the most advanced Soviet sys-
tems, like the new BMP, have many
design defects and large amounts of un-
necessary "dead space" where the opera-
tor cannot track the weapon or fire. Ma-
jor weapons cannot be fired in defilade,
'Based on 1978-82 averages. The US pro-
duced only 160 other armored vehicles in
1982 vs. 4,150 for the USSR, and NATO
produced only 1,300 vs. 4,500 for the Pact.
Table Eight
Comparative Tank Strength of NATO
and Warsaw Pact Divisions
No. of Men
Per
Total
Tank
No. of Tanks
Armored
18,300
78
324
Mechanized
18,500
86
216
Britain
Mechanized
8,500
57
148
France
Mechanized
16,000
99
162
FRG
Armored
17,000
57
300
Mechanized
17,500
70
250
Tank-Forward Area
12,500
30
415
Tank-Regular
11,000
34
325
MRD-Forward Area
15,000
56
266
MRD-Regular
14,000
74
186
Tank -
12,000
37
325
MRD
14,000
75
188
SOURCE: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 1981-82, and previous editions. Note
that many disagreements exist between various sources.
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and most are more effective against
hard, fixed targets in built-up areas than
against tanks.
NATO has the option of upgrading or
converting much of its present inventory
of both armored personnel carriers and
armored fighting vehicles to use modern
antitank missile launching systems, and
it would gain far more from such con-
versions than the Pact could gain-given
its need to conduct an offensive with far
greater numbers of tanks.
These trade-offs could range from
keeping more older-model tanks in ser-
vice as new tanks phase in to the pur-
chase of more attack helicopters or deep
strike munitions. They also favor NATO
in that manpower costs tend to dominate
the life-cycle costs of NATO units, and
conversions of constant manpower levels
to more expensive equipment would not
mean major increases in defense budgets.
The Uncertainty of Antitank and
Attack Helicopter Capability
The remaining trends in Table Seven
are less favorable to NATO. They show
that the Warsaw Pact has been far
quicker to acquire "force multipliers"
like attack helicopters and antitank
guided missiles and now has a major
lead in both areas.
While the comparisons of attack heli-
copters and of anti-armor weapon per
opposing system are adapted from JCS
figures which are NATO-wide rather
than based on the Central Region only,
they still illustrate very real problems in
NATO's force improvement programs.
NATO has never collectively come to
grips with the need for attack helicop-
ters. While the recent fighting in Leba-
non and the Iran-Iraq War have con-
vinced all of the countries involved that
added attack helicopters with antitank
guided missiles represent a vital force
improvement-and one worth substan-
tial trade-offs in terms of regular infan-
try-NATO has tended to purchase few
systems and concentrate on a slow-mov-
ing R&D effort.
In contrast, the Soviet Union has seen
the helicopter as a powerful means of
disrupting NATO in the rear, halting
NATO movements, outflanking NATO
armor and air defenses, and supporting
its own breakthrough attempts. It has
steadily upgraded both the number and
firepower of its attack helicopters and
built them into a major force in the Cen-
tral Region.
There is now one Soviet helicopter
regiment per ground army in the Soviet
forces, and this may increase to two by
the mid-1980s. More important, the
USSR is now rapidly deploying one at-
tack helicopter squadron of six NE-24
Hinds per division, and East Europe
seems likely to follow.
The USSR has as many as 600 Mi-24
(Hind) attack helicopters in Eastern Eu-
rope positioned where they could be rap-
idly committed to any attack. This force
may well exceed 1,000 helicopters by the
mid- 1980s.
The USSR also has large numbers of
Mi-8 (Hip) armed lift helicopters. While
these are unarmored and slow maneu-
vering and have problems flying nap-of-
the-earth to avoid short range air de-
fenses, they are adequate for long range
(460km maximum) assaults on NATO
targets in the rear-particularly under
the surprise or sudden attack conditions
which Soviet forces in the GDR regular-
ly exercise.
The USSR again leads the US in pro-
duction. It produces 400-450 annually
compared to 150-160 for the US, and
the entire Warsaw Pact is producing 500
military helicopters annually compared
to 200 for NATO.
The Pact is deploying a substantially
larger proportion of its total production
with its own forces than NATO and has
completely overcome the US' once com-
manding lead in helicopter gunships.
The US led the USSR by 702 attack
helicopters to 0 in 1970. The USSR built
its attack helicopter strength to 400 in
1978 and to 800 by early 1983. It over-
took the US in 1981 and has steadily
increased its lead since.
Russia has a total pool in the Central
Region and western USSR of well over
1,000 M-8C (Hip) armed transports and
Hip E (Gunships) and 1,000 Mi-24 A-F
attack helicopters. The GDR has 70-85
Mi-8 and 24-28 Mi-24s, Czechoslovakia
has 20-30 Mi-8 and 24-36 Mi-24s, and
Poland has 22-30 Mi-8s and 24-48
Mi-24s.
In contrast, the US has only about 575
helicopters in the Central Region. While
US Army and Marine Corps forces have
over 1,000 armed helicopters in world-
wide service, they had a worldwide in-
ventory of only 324 of the newer AH-1S
TOW at the end of 1982, and the first
AH-64 Apaches will not become opera-
tional until early 1985. These are the
kind of helicopters needed for combat in
the Central Region, yet many are com-
mitted to contingencies in the Gulf.
Belgium has 60 Alouette II, some of
which have limited attack capability;
Britain has 90 Lynx/AH-1, some of
which have TOW; Canada has virtually
nothing; the FRG has 84 armed helicop-
ters, only some, of which are BO-105Ps
with HOT antitank missiles; and the
Netherlands has 24 B0-105s which evi-
dently lack anti-armor armament.
Denmark has 12 Hughes 500As but
evidently will not commit any combat
helicopters to the Central Region land
battle. France has 66 Alouette Ills with
SS-11, 118 SA-330-Puma, 154 SA-314F,
and 42 SA-342M with HOT but also
seems unlikely to commit any significant
proportion of its attack helicopter
strength to the forward defense of Europe.
The US Army's efforts to rush the
production of advanced attack helicop-
ters are, therefore, scarcely the result of
an obsession with attrition or advanced
technology. According to US estimates,
NATO has only 400 attack helicopters
in the Central Region. NATO does
seem to retain an advantage in terms of
helicopter maneuverability, protection,
sensors, and antitank weaponry, but it
must make major increases in produc-
tion to take advantage of this opportu-
nity and offset the Soviet advantage in
production.
There also is growing uncertainty re-
garding NATO's lead in technology.
While the performance of the Hind D
and Hind E has been overestimated and
both still seem to lack advanced antitank
weapons, the Hind F seems to represent
a test bed for more advanced laser-desig-
nated missiles, and Soviet armor and
maneuverability have improved steadily
as the result of lessons from the fighting
in Afghanistan.
The Uncertainty of
Antitank Weapons
For all its rhetoric about force multi-
pliers and force improvements, NATO
has treated antitank weapons in much the
same way the British army treated the
machine gun before World War I: as an
exotic weapon to be deployed only to
skilled operators in relatively few num-
bers.
No NATO army in Europe has de-
ployed long range antitank launchers in
densities approaching those of Warsaw
Pact forces.' While NATO has signifi-
cant numbers of missiles, it is curiously
lacking in major antitank launchers for a
force which is defensive in character and
which has made the acquisition of such
weapons a major force improvement
goal since the mid-1960s.
In contrast, the Soviet Union has de-
ployed very large numbers of missile
launchers as well as much larger num-
bers of antitank rocket launchers. It also
has gradually replaced its unreliable,
slow, and cumbersome first-generation
missiles with more advanced second-
generation systems. These include the
AT-4 Spigot, AT-5 Spandrel, AT-6 Spi-
ral, and at least two more advanced
types.
Unlike earlier Soviet antitank guided
missiles-which were slow, could not be
fired at short ranges, required incredible
levels of operator dexterity, and had
poorly designed and highly unreliable
warheads-these newer Soviet systems
share many of the features of the most
advanced Western semiautomatic com-
mand "track target only" systems. The
guidance systems of the AT-4 and AT-5
'The US has such launcher numbers only if
one counts the Dragon, which has limited
effectiveness and cannot penetrate the fron-
tal armor of newer Soviet tanks.
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90TO0155R000500030029-5
are still somewhat awkward and unreli-
able by comparison, but the AT-6 may
be appearing with a laser-designated
warhead in both vehicle and Mi-24
launched versions.
Further, the role of the antitank mis-
sile is somewhat different in Soviet
forces. Soviet maneuvers reveal a heavy
use of such missiles against NATO in-
fantry in other armored vehicles and us-
ing the cover of built-up areas. These
targets rarely move, and Soviet missiles
are much easier to use against them.
The USSR can also screen its superior
tank forces by denying NATO the abili-
ty to advance. It does not have to
achieve the same extremely high attri-
tion ratios against tanks with antitank
guided missiles (ATGMs) that NATO
must achieve.
As a result, the main uncertainties
which affect the balance of antitank
weapons consist of force improvement
options which can shift the balance in
favor of NATO rather than weaknesses
in Warsaw Pact forces:
? First, there is no intrinsic reason why
NATO cannot develop greatly improved
antitank and attack helicopter forces. It
has the resources to do so, particularly if
it is willing to concentrate on a mix of
high-capability and low-cost helicopters
and emphasize antitank missile launcher
numbers rather than missiles.
? Second, NATO still seems to have a
lead in guidance and sensors. In spite of
leave" Soviet antitank guided missiles
and next-generation Soviet systems,
Russia's existing missiles seem to have
far less operational lethality than NATO
systems like TOW and HOT.
? Third, the advantage would seem to
lie with the defender. Well-positioned
defensive forces should be less vulnera-
ble than attacking armor, regardless of
their air defenses and antitank guided
missile suppression capabilities.
It is also clear from Soviet writings
and exercises that the USSR fears
NATO's antitank weapons, regardless of
the shortages in NATO weapons. The
USSR has developed extensive doctrine
on deploying high densities of tanks
against prepared antitank weapons de-
fenses and has restructured its training
to stress outflanking and enveloping
such defensive positions while increasing
its rate of advance to prevent antitank
weapons defense from being properly sit-
ed and deployed.
Even given the ratios shown in the
lower half of Table Seven, NATO al-
ready has significantly enhanced its de-
fensive battle fighting capabilities over
what it could achieve with tanks, and
the USSR must take NATO's superior-
ity in antitank guided missile technology
into serious consideration in evaluating
its chances of success.
The Uncertain Balance of
Artillery Strength
The balance of uncertainty in artillery
also favors the Warsaw Pact. As Table
Nine shows, the Warsaw Pact has a mas-
sive advantage in numbers and in its rate
of modernization.
The USSR has greatly increased its
combat support artillery in recent years,
and its army-level artillery regiments are
being expanded to brigades-an increase
of 30-80%. Its divisions are getting new
self-propelled and nuclear capable guns,
and artillery battalions are being added
to each tank regiment in Soviet tank and
motorized rifle divisions. This has result-
ed in a 30% increase in the combined
tube artillery, heavy mortar, and multi-
ple rocket launcher strength of the Sovi-
et armies and divisions in Eastern Eu-
rope since 1978.
This, however, is only part of the sto-
ry. Warsaw Pact artillery is generally
superior in terms of range, operational
rate of fire, reliability, and barrel life.
Further, a much larger proportion of
Warsaw Pact artillery consists of multi-
ple rocket launchers (MRLs) which can
deliver immense amounts of suppressive
area fire against NATO infantry and
antitank units during the assault or
breakthrough phase of an attack.
The Uncertainty of Artillery Quality
There are some compensating uncer-
tainties. While the amount of self-pro-
pelled artillery in first line Soviet forces
has increased to the point where more
than 40% of the Soviet artillery in East
Europe is now self-propelled (vs. only
'A'Table Nine
.Re ion Torce'Irends: 'Artillery Weapons in Army
lForces"Stationed in'Benelux,,~FRG,4GDR,'Czechoslovakia,- and Poland
FY 1978, VY 1980, and tY
tbe author from "ork by Phillip A. Karber and from MCS, )Vlilifar~i l'odure
,*Source: Adapted by
41982 using CRS and IISS data.
Armed Forces JOURNAL International/July 1989
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030029-5
still use towed weapons. The Pact is un-
likely to fully convert to armored self-
propelled artillery like that common in
most NATO units, although it is con-
tinuing to deploy nuclear capable heavy
artillery brigades armed with self-pro-
pelled 240mm mortars and 203mm
guns. It is also introducing two new
152mm guns, one self-propelled, and a
new 16-tube 220mm multiple rocket
launcher.
The Warsaw Pact does not have fire
computers and targeting aids equal to
those in the best NATO units, has fuzing
and artillery round reliability problems,
and does not have rounds with the same
lethality against soft targets-although
its fragmentation patterns are generally
more lethal against light armored vehi-
cles than those of NATO.'
The need to carry out linear deploy-
ment of artillery in the Pact units that
still use towed weapons leaves 80-85%
of the personnel involved without cover,
and the USSR has not succeeded in
modifying its artillery organization to
remove its dependence on a few highly
skilled officers, NCOs, and technicians.
Soviet writings indicate that Soviet artil-
lery units are highly vulnerable to the
loss of such personnel.
Overcentralization and lack of skilled
personnel make it difficult for Soviet ar-
tillery to shift fires rapidly or adapt to
new tactical conditions. This is com-
pounded by a lack of adequate commu-
nications-a problem Iraqi forces
(which are based on Soviet models)
found crippling during the early phases
of the Iran-Iraq War.
While the USSR is deploying new tar-
get acquisition and command vehicles
like the BMP, ACRV-2, and the MT-LB
radar vehicle, even its best forces have
problems engaging mobile targets.
The Warsaw Pact also has uncertain
ability to sustain its theoretical rates of
firc and to provide the massive ammu-
"ition resupply needed to take full ad-
vantage of its numbers of tubes. Unfor-
tunately, NATO intelligence seems
rather uncritical of the potential weak-
ness of this aspect of Soviet force capa-
bilities, and it is difficult to weigh how
important such problems are, but it
does seem likely they will keep rates of
fire substantially below the levels called
for in Warsaw Pact doctrine and artil-
lery exercises.
The problem of lethality is complex. Many
US manuals that criticize Soviet rounds as-
sess only lethality against exposed infantry.
Most targets in a NATO-Pact conflict will,
however, have either light armor or ground
protection. Some "highly advanced" US
rounds are "advanced" only if the target is
not protected and is vertical or crouched on a
perfectly flat plane. Independent British and
German studies have shown such rounds to
be substantially less lethal against real-world
targets than ordinary NATO or Soviet
rounds.
The Uncertainty of
Artillery Production
Even so, these uncertainties do not
make up for NATO's current deficien-
cies, and the future looks even grimmer
than the trends in Table Nine indicate.
The USSR produced an average of 2,450
artillery weapons annually during
1978-82, compared to 170 for the US.
The Warsaw Pact produced 2,800 weap-
ons compared to NATO's 400.
During the last two years, however,
annual Warsaw Pact production has in-
creased to 3,750 weapons, while NATO
production has dropped to 300. This is
giving the Warsaw Pact a superiority of
12-1, and again, far more of the Pact's
production-particularly of the most ad-
vanced types of self-propelled weapons
and MRLs-goes to Pact forces. NATO
is devoting a heavy proportion of its
total production to export.
The Uncertainty of Relative Area
Fire Capability
NATO has also made many of its
problems worse. Instead of seeking weap-
ons with area fire capabilities or exploit-
ing its technical lead in smart submuni-
tions, it has tried to field direct fire
solutions to killing tanks and artillery.
The result has been expensive artillery
rounds like the 155mm Copperhead laser-
guided projectile. While the US Army
maintains its faith in such systems, such
weapons can achieve only limited rates of
tank attrition because of the limited num-
ber of tubes involved relative to the threat.
Further, they require laser designation or
line-of-sight targeting.
NATO has been equally unsuccessful
in fielding battlefield electronics to deal
with the Warsaw Pact superiority in ar-
tillery numbers. It must still rely on di-
rect or near-direct hits, and a long series
of costly and unreliable targeting and
fire control systems has left NATO with
the need to fire tens to hundreds of
rounds to suppress a single Warsaw Pact
weapon. NATO still has virtually no
hope of survivable exchange ratios
against Pact artillery.
Accordingly, the key uncertainty is
again NATO's ability to take advantage
of a force improvement option. The
FRG has already deployed 176 LARS
110 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs).
Unlike tube artillery, the LARS can de-
liver very high rates of fire over short
periods of time. It also can deliver large
numbers of anti-armor minelets. Al-
though the LARS minelets lack terminal
homing and are not very lethal, they
have the advantage against an attacker
that must move often and along predict-
able paths.
The US Army is now deploying its
own multiple launcher rocket "system"
(MLRS) and is improving it to combine
smart munitions and long range target-
ing capabilities to achieve much higher
lethality against tanks and artillery. The
first MLRS unit became operational late
in May and will deploy to Europe this
summer.
While this US multiple launcher rock-
et system has had a slow gestation and
still falls short of being the perfect "as-
sault breaker," it and similar German
efforts unquestionably offer far more po-
tential than existing NATO artillery.
They give the advantage to the defender,
can increase the balance of uncertainty
in NATO's favor, and offer NATO the
ability to reverse at least some of the
trends in Table Nine.
The Uncertain Balance
of Tactical Air
Table 10 shows the final major bal-
ance of uncertainty, one which partly
reverses the previous trends favoring the
Warsaw Pact but one which also raises
major uncertainties for NATO.
The Uncertainty of Numbers and
Weapons System Quality
The Warsaw Pact lead in aircraft
numbers shown in Table 10 is mislead-
ing, as noted earlier. The Pact totals
include strategic defensive aircraft which
are unlikely to be used against NATO in
large numbers, and the comparisons ex-
clude large numbers of tactical aircraft
which both sides can rapidly deploy
from outside the Central Region.
Both the Warsaw Pact and NATO
will probably be limited more by base
support, munitions, and C'I in the for-
ward area than by aircraft numbers.
While the Warsaw Pact has an advan-
tage in air base numbers-about 45 ma-
jor bases for attack aircraft in the for-
ward area and over 200 bases in Eastern
Europe (vs. a total of around 70 NATO
main operating bases in the entire Cen-
tral Region)-NATO still enjoys a slight
numerical advantage in the number of
bases near the inter-German border
within the normal operating radius of its
combat-loaded attack aircraft. NATO
bases also have substantially better abili-
ty to survive combat damage.
In spite of the "generations" shown in
Table 10, NATO has a distinct advan-
tage in terms of individual aircraft capa-
bility, munitions, and numbers of air-
craft that can directly support the land
battle. Although the allocation of air-
craft by major mission shown in Table
10 indicates the Warsaw Pact has large
numbers of fighters with at least dual
capability in the attack role, few have
the avionics to acquire and hit ground
targets with high lethality.
NATO also draws major advantages
from its superiority in airborne early
warning and control, in electronic war-
fare, and in air-to-air missiles and retains
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 RECCE
EW, AWACS
Interceptors
/ Dual Role FGTR
FGTR/ATK
IR Bomber
/LR ATK
74 76 78 80 83
End FY
US and Soviet Modernization
US/USSR Fighters*
(Central Region)
New Generation
Soviet Aircraft \
Fiscal Year
*US figures include aircraft based in UK: Soviet figures
do not include aircraft based in western military districts.
Air Defense Weapons
Mobile Tactical Surface
to Air-Missile
Launchers*
Manpacked Surface
to Air Missiles*
48 53 58 63 68 73 78 83
Years
74 76 78 80 83
End FY
*USAFR, USANG, USNR,
USMCR included.
74 76 78 80 83
End FY
*Includes active and
reserve forces.
74 76 78 80 83
End FY
*Includes active and
reserve forces.
74 76 78 80 83
End FY
*Includes active and
reserve forces.
Source: Adapted by the author from work by Phillip A. Karber, and from OJCS, Military Posture, FY 1977 and FY 1982, and
updated on the basis of data issued by the IISS, OJCS, CRS and NATO.
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Table Ten
.Xentral Region Force Trends: Combat Aircraft and Air
4 Defense' Weapons Normally Deployed in. Benelux,' FRG,
,France, GDR, Czechoslovakia,, and Poland
48 53 58 63 68 73 78 83 48 53 58
Years
Combat Aircraft Strength
Warsaw Pact
1,500
1,000
500
Allocation to Major Missions
Warsaw Pact Aircraft NATO Aircraft*
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3rd Gen
ISU-17, SU-19,
SU-20, MIG-21 IMP,
MIG33, MIG 27.
MIG-251
01 1 I 1 1 1 1 1
48 53 58 63 68 73 78 83
Years
63 73 75 78 83
Years
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at least some superiority in surface-to-air
missile technology. The Improved
Hawk, for instance, is probably better
than any system yet deployed in Eastern
Europe.
The comparisons of ground based air
defenses shown in Table 10 also include
large numbers of Soviet homeland defense
systems that will probably never move
near the front. They also include large
numbers of short range systems like the
SA-7, SA-8, and SA-9, whose operational
lethality now seems far more limited than
most intelligence experts originally esti-
mated. Neither the radars nor IR seekers
on Soviet equipment have advanced as
quickly as has been expected.
The Uncertainty of Comparative
Production and Deployment
NATO does, however, face a very real
and growing threat. NATO must take
advantage of its force improvement op-
portunities if it is to maintain even the
present balance of uncertainty. For all
the definitional problems in Table 10
over what to count and what belongs in
a given generation, there is no question
that Table 10 is correct in reflecting far
greater Warsaw Pact production and de-
ployment levels.
The Warsaw Pact is producing
700-850 combat aircraft annually to
NATO's 600-650. The Warsaw Pact is
also deploying almost twice as much of
its total combat aircraft production in
Pact forces as NATO is deploying out of
its total production. The Pact is produc-
ing 400-500 military helicopters annual-
ly vs. NATO's 200-300 and again is
deploying more than twice as many in its
own forces.
The Warsaw Pact is producing 28,000
surface-to-air missiles annually to
NATO's 7,200-8,500 and is deploying
three to six times as many in its own
forces-depending on how one counts
man-portable missile systems. The USSR
has also begun to make major improve-
ments in its air defense deployments, sen-
sors, and electronics which vastly outpace
the rate of improvement in NATO sys-
tems. European experts say that the Pact
has recently begun to deploy over 10 times
as many new major short range air defense
systems as NATO.
The Uncertainty of
Tank Killing Capability
NATO also faces the problem that air
power has only secondary value in
strengthening deterrence. The imbalance
in armor, artillery, and potential build-
up capability is so great that NATO
must concentrate on killing tanks, com-
bat units, and the choke points through
which Pact ground forces must move.
NATO must commit its aircraft to
these missions beginning on the first day
of combat. NATO cannot wait to win the
war in the air or to see the effect of strikes
against less immediate interdiction tar-
gets. By the time such attacks can be
effective, the ground personnel on NATO
air bases will be speaking Russian.
This, however, raises grave uncertain-
ties about the value of NATO's present
air power. While NATO has a major
advantage in the range-payload capabili-
ty of its attack aircraft, it faces many of
the same problems with these aircraft
that its artillery faces.
NATO has focused development of its
air power on line-of-sight, direct kills of
ground targets. Thus NATO Tac Air at
best is a force that might generate one
tank kill per pass. More likely, it will
generate about one tank kill per sortie.
Since present weapons require that the
planes overfly their targets against
dense, mobile, forward area air defenses,
the planes are not likely to survive many
sorties.
The US Air Force has the most tech-
nically sophisticated force in NATO. Its
present mix in the Central Region in-
cludes 70 A-10, 85 F-111F, 65 F-tIlE,
95 F-4E, 25 F-4G, 70 F-16A, five
F-16B, 90 F-15C, five F-15D, 20 F-5E,
35 RF-4C, and 40 OV-10. In addition, it
has 50 dual-based F-4E and 55 RF-4Cs.
For all this sophistication, however,
only its 70 A-10 (70 out of over 700
aircraft produced) are optimally config-
ured for killing tanks, and they are hard-
to-fly "day" aircraft which derive from
designs formulated before Russia de-
ployed modern air defense weapons that
move forward with combat units.'
While virtually all USAFE aircraft
can carry large payloads, none have the
kind of modern avionics suite necessary
to use missiles like Maverick against ar-
mor or most hard targets. At present
rates of conversion, USAFE will also
lack such F-16E or F-15E equivalents
until the late 1980s and will not be able
to convert more than half its force before
the year 2000.
The rest of NATO is even less pre-
pared to carry out its most vital mission.
NATO's main first line fighter is, after
all, the F-16. Although this is a fine air
defense aircraft, it was deliberately cho-
sen in a configuration that did not in-
clude advanced attack avionics. Mirage
variants are equally limited at best, as
are all configurations of the Jaguar and
the British and West German variants of
the F-4.
The Tornado is the only aircraft in the
Central Region with the avionics and
capability to carry out precision guided
missile strikes with high survivability,
yet even it is not specially configured for
this mission. While some other Belgian,
British, Danish, Dutch,. French, and
West German fighters can fire missiles
like Maverick, all lack the avionics to
'A growth version of the A-10 that corrects
most of these problems has not been procured.
achieve more than marginal aircraft-to-
tank kill ratios in the forward area,
much less in missions against second
echelon or buildup forces.
This leaves NATO facing a key force
improvement uncertainty and one that
explains much of the thrust behind
"strike deep," the "air/land battle," and
SACEUR's recent conventional force
improvement initiatives. Developments
in standoff weapons and near-zero CEP
smart submunitions could allow NATO
to use its existing fighters and those on
order to strike at key Warsaw Pact
ground targets using smart area weap-
ons that can be fired from survivable
ranges and on a launch-and-leave basis.
(Nov, Dec, Jan AFJs).
Advances in sensors and Cl systems
can allow NATO to locate such targets
on the move and regardless of weather
and provide near-real-time targeting
data to NATO aircraft. The avionics on
virtually all Central Region fighters are
already good enough to allow low-alti-
tude penetration and the use of such
smart area munitions even under poor
weather conditions. Such systems are
suited to a defensive alliance because it is
much harder to locate and kill dispersed
and comparatively static defending
forces than armored units on the move.
NATO can thus correct the critical
deficiencies in its forces and take advan-
tage of the favorable aspects of the balance
of uncertainty in air power. West Germa-
ny has already begun to do this by arming
its Tornados with such weapons, and
many others are under development, in-
cluding light submunition dispensers that
can be fitted to virtually any NATO
fighter. The key uncertainties are those of
timing, procurement quantities, and the
speed with which NATO can adapt its air
doctrine, tactics, and training.
The Uncertainty of Air Defense
NATO will also have to come to grips
with another uncertainty. The rate of
improvement in Soviet aircraft and
ground based air defenses shown in Ta-
ble 10 raises serious doubts about
NATO's ability to cope with massive,
surprise air attacks or to operate effec-
tively in protecting its ground forces and
attacking Warsaw Pact ground targets.
This confronts NATO forces in the
Central Region with yet another set of
force improvement uncertainties. First,
good as the Improved Hawk missile is
now, it must be replaced with a succes-
sor at some point in the 1980s. While it
is not obsolete or ineffective, like the
Nike Hercules, it is growth limited.
NATO can only compensate for the
growth of Warsaw Pact air power, how-
ever, if it procures large numbers of
highly advanced and expensive surface-
to-air missile systems like Patriot and
makes major improvements in its all-
weather, short range air defense systems
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(SHORADS). These improvements have
received only minimal funding in existing
NATO force plans, notwithstanding in-
creasing Congressional support for them.
This raises serious uncertainties about
funding. Deploying Patriot with the nec-
essary electronics will be incredibly cost-
ly relative to NATO's present invest-
ment in air defenses. Coupled to
necessary improvements in SHORADS
and passive defenses, it could add $10-
to $1 S-billion to the investment costs of
the plans now submitted to NATO.
Further, NATO must find some
means of dealing with Warsaw Pact air-
craft. It needs to reduce the vulnerability
of its air bases through improved dis-
persal bases and co-operable air bases
(which Congress has not funded well),
but it will still have less than 200 bases.
V/STOL systems like Harrier cannot
provide a meaningful near-term answer:
even under optimal conditions, NATO
could not acquire large numbers of suit-
able V/STOL aircraft in less than a de-
cade simply because of development,
production, and funding constraints.
Such measures also will not suppress
Warsaw Pact air forces within the time
required to halt an armored attack or to
deter Pact strikes on NATO air bases.
This, in turn, explains the recent empha-
sis on the use of ballistic missiles carry-
ing conventional warheads with smart
submunitions designed for air base sup-
pression as well as halting or killing So-
viet armor moving towards the front
(May AFJ).
While such technologies may seem es-
oteric or some new extension of the arms
race, they are a natural alternative to
early nuclear escalation and could rein-
force deterrence regardless of the grow-
ing vulnerability of NATO air bases.
They are yet another key force improve-
ment option in dealing with the balance
of uncertainty. They also, however,
could add another $10-billion to the cost
of the force improvements NATO must
make by 1990.
Weighing the Balance
of Uncertainty
et Union. Grim as some current trends,
force ratios, and numbers may be, each
member country now has the resources
to create a balance of strength in the
Central Region. NATO can continue to
leave the Soviet Union with no choice
between conventional stalemate and de-
feat, and unacceptable nuclear risks.
The Uncertainty of
"Conventional Wisdom"
The trends in the balance also support
the thrust of NATO's "conventional
wisdom." They show that NATO's pri-
orities do lie in the areas suggested by
SACEUR, by the work done to develop
NATO's key long term force improve-
ment programs, by new initiatives like
strike deep, and by studies like the "Air-
Land Battle 2000."
NATO's uncertainties are not, there-
fore, ones that stem from a lack of re-
sources or options. They stem from the
need to build a political-military consen-
sus around the value of strengthening
deterrence and to revive popular support
for the Alliance.
They stem from the need to build con-
fidence in NATO's mix of conventional
forces and ultimate dependence on nu-
clear deterrence rather than cloak it in
an image of weakness. They stem from
the need to make hard and painful trade-
offs and to stop treating key force im-
provements as ones which can be layered
on existing budgets or as some kind of
"free lunch."
The Uncertainty of
NATO Military Planning
cues of which they are a part. As a
result, they inevitably seek forces which
offer some hope of preserving their soci-
eties even if war occurs. In this sense,
West Germany's high command shares
the same ultimate goal as its anti-mili-
tary "greens."
This helps explain the seeming surreal-
ism of so many NATO war games-war
games that inevitably end with a sudden
termination of conflict by the Soviet
Union; that end with the situation left
hanging and the Pact on the Rhine; that
fight a nuclear war for three weeks using
6,000 weapons only to have the Pact
suddenly seek to negotiate; or which des-
perately try to find out how NATO can
sustain 90 days of defense and then ignore
what will happen on the 91st.
NATO cannot deal with the trends
reflected in the previous tables, however,
by trying to meet impossible force goals.
They require hard trade-offs and clear
priorities. A focus on more antitank
weapons, on multiple rocket launchers,
on smart area munitions, on standoff air
munitions, on new land based air defense
systems, and on deep strike systems can-
not be layered over existing force plans
or the search for 90-day stock levels and
high enough logistic and support levels
to fight massive and prolonged wars.
There is also a point of diminishing
returns in the search for conventional
options. There is no practical prospect
that NATO can ever rely on convention-
al deterrence or means to fight pro-
longed theater-wide conflicts or deal
with the full military capabilities the
USSR can eventually bring to bear.
This must be done through nuclear
deterrence. Thus, the priority is for im-
provements like the ground launched
cruise missile and Pershing II and not
for more divisions, wings of aircraft, or
the other incredibly costly improve-
ments necessary to raise NATO's
present conventional battle fighting ca-
pabilities to a level that , can deal with
another Soviet Shock or Tactical Air
Army.
The first step in this process must be
to rethink NATO's force goals and as-
sessments in terms of deterrence rather
than war fighting. Many senior NATO
officers probably already accept this re-
quirement, but it still seems to present
major problems for NATO planners,
and NATO's rhetoric still does more to
provoke fear of nuclear war than sup-
port for adequate forces.
Western planners have learned to live
with the fact that strategic nuclear war
has no end game: no clear resolution
that ends in victory or even a predictable
termination on equal or favorable terms.
They have not learned to live with the
reality that there is equally little chance
of a predictable outcome of any major
conflict in Europe.
This is partly institutional. No profes-
sional military officer, and particularly
no officer with the heritage of the devas-
tation of World War II, will willingly
trade the ability to win a war for the
ability to make one unbearable to the
enemy.
NATO's military men are really citi-
zen soldiers: they have no ideological,
strategic, or even bureaucratic goals oth-
er than ensuring the survival of the soci-
The balance of uncertainty, therefore,
does not support either fear or compla-
cency. The complex mix of capabilities
and trends that now make up the bal-
ance of uncertainty in the Central Re-
gion indicate that NATO still has great
deterrent strength. While many key
trends are shifting in favor of the War-
saw Pact, NATO still has a remarkably
strong mix of conventional forces in the
Central Region.
It is also clear that NATO has serious
weaknesses, but even where it is weak or
has miscalculated, it still has major force
improvement options. NATO can un-
questionably sustain enough convention-
al capability to make a Warsaw Pact
ttack virtually unthinkable to the Sovi-
The Uncertainty of Resources
NATO's force improvement problems
are further compounded by the problem
of NATO resources. NATO defense
budgets are now mortgaged to the break-
ing point. Even in the mid-1970s,
NATO lived on capital in the sense that
it did not invest enough in new equip-
ment to replace what it consumed. The
oil crisis of 1979 and the resulting world
depression have made-things far worse.
Every. NATO defense budget is now
filled with undercosted programs which
eventually must be paid for.
The end result is that NATO cannot
possibly afford even its existing force
plans with a 3% or 4% real increase in
defense expenditures. The kind of force
costs reflected in NATO force plans are
A-...e,4 Fnrrnc JOURNAL International/July 1983
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030029-5
own way. It has a natural motive to avoid AM General ............... 12, 13 in early June. The MLRS rockets, which
Europe contributes to the problem in its AAI Corporation ........... 30, 31 long field training exercise which began
no desire to assume. - I I "'"A% `v I' - %A V ..? " The firing at Fort Sill capped a week-
as historically unreal as those projected increases in real defense expenditure bears about the Central Region balance if it is to
in US defense budgets and show the absolutely no resemblance to the ability to create the kind of forces that do most to
same widening gap between projected re- buy any given level of defense capability reduce the risk of any kind of conflict.
sources and actual costs. and explains why NATO's defense minis- This, in fact, is NATO's best hope for
This raises the importance of setting ters emphasize both war fighting and arms control: not more forces or force
realistic force goals and accepting NATO's weakness. reductions, but the right forces to deal
NATO's strengths rather than emphasiz- While NATO's politicians may pri- with the balance of uncertainty. ^ ^
ing its weaknesses. The Alliance cannot vately accept reliance on deterrence
deal with its arms race unless it can deal in more willingly than NATO's military Fort Sill Fires M LRS,
honest costs, budgets, and trade-offs. planners, the conventional wisdom of Deploys It to Europe
This leads to the final barrier that democratic politics is that the only way
THE NEWLY OPERATIONAL Mul-
NATO must cross to maintain its to get a bigger defense budget is to avoid
strengths and take advantage of its op- controversy and hard choices and cry tiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS),
fired in a
portunities. NATO politicians are wolf instead. As a result, NATO is poor- made by Vought Corp., was
live demonstration at Fort Sill, OK, in
caught in institutional traps of their ly structured to make hard political
mid-June. Soldiers of C Battery, 3rd
own. Defense ministers must compete choices and has done more to scare its
Battalion, 16th Field Artillery were the
for resources against countless other so- voters than to make the proper resource
first troops trained as an MLRS battery
cial needs and do so in a political envi- decisions.
to actually fire it. C Battery deployed to
ronment where every need is expressed Fortunately for NATO, it can survive
West Germany shortly after the firing to
in terms of artificial crisis. its failure to deal with these problems.
the US Army's first MLRS contin-
Any public declaration of reliance on The Soviet Union faces so many risks man
deterrence presents the risk that they and uncertainties in the Central Region
will be pushed towards fewer forces and that it may never test NATO's capabili-
growing reliance on nuclear weapons. ties as long as NATO remains politically
Realistic budgets mean fights with one's united. In this sense, NATO is the
military and one's treasury on terms no strongest and most successful defensive
other part of government is willing to alliance in history.
use. Domestic programs, after all, are no NATO's leaders can also do a great
more honestly costed or defended than deal even within the present political
military programs. and financial constraints on the Alli-
Further, the Alliance is still politically ance. Western governments have devel-3.'~' ri .
divided as to how to approach deter- oped an amazing ability to ignore their
'r?*.c *?, .,~:+
rence. The US still tends to pursue con- more inconvenient force goals and to fail t' .
ventional war fighting options as a to pay their mortgages.
means of avoiding the risk of strategic Survival, however, is not the same thing MLRS
nuclear conflict. The heritage of World as security. NATO needs a new realism gent in Europe. Plans call for one MLRS
War II has also given the US global battery to support each Army division
increasing its defense effort and collec- Bath Iron Works .............. 81 normally carry 644 bomblets in their
tively shares West Germany's desire to BDM Corporation ............. 35 tactical warheads, carried 100 steel pipes
make the risk of nuclear conflict so high BMY ........................ 87 as ballast during the practice firing. Pre-
that any conflict on German soil will seem Boeing Marine Systems ..... 44, 45 viously, MLRS had been fired only at
ventional capability and a high threshold GIAT ......................... 2 was also scheduled for a chemical war-
of nuclear deterrence. Hughes Aircraft ............... 73 . head as this issue went to press. ^ r ^
---- - - -- - -
peace through an affordable mix of con- FMC Corporation ............. 33 presently undergoing flight tests. Testing
ventional battle fighting capability or EDO Corporation ............. 79 tactical anti-personnel warhead, a termi-
grips with the need to convince its popu- Creusot Loire ................. 17 Army officials, is for 26 batteries to be
lation either that it needs a major con- Detroit Diesel Allison ....... 48, 49 equipped with MLRS. In addition to the
This failure to set clear and common Hughes Helicopters ............ 88
goals for strengthening deterrence has Lockheed/CALAC ............. 61
Setting It Straight
divided the Alliance since the early Lockheed/GELAC ......... 20, 21
1960s. The US has won European accep- Lockheed/LEC ............... 77
AFJ's June preview of the Paris
tance of stronger conventional forces and McDonnell Douglas ........... 63 n
Air Show, we incorrectly identi-
options at a policy level but not in terms Pratt & Whitney of
fied two photos. On page 65, the
of resources. At the same time, the US Canada ............... 7, 69, 85
ith a caption about Hunting
has been internally divided by the fact Raytheon ................. 38, 39 photo with
Engineering Ltd.'s JP-233 airfield at-
its civilian planners have constantly Rockwell/Collins .............. 65
tack weapon was, in fact, a picture of
attempted to prove that minor budget Royal Ordnance Factories ...... 15
Hunting's improved BL-755 ad-
increases or reallocations would provide Sikorsky ..................... 27
vanced airborne anti-armour weapon,
a conventional defense, while its military Telesoft ....................... 5
in use with the Royal Air Force.
services have fought for the far higher Texas Instruments ............. 57 now
And, on page 66, we featured a pic-
force levels they feel are necessary. Thomson-CSF/DSE ........... 67
ture of the General Electric
This helps explain why NATO's politi- Todd Shipyards ............... 25
SNECMA CFM-56 engine, not the
cal debates often have the same surrealism Vought Corporation ............ 29
F-404-GE-400 as noted. ^ ^
as its war games. It explains the fact that Wyle Laboratories ............. 11
NATO's hope to maintain 3% annual
58 Armed Forces JOURNAL International /July 1983
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030029-5