OVERWHELMING THE 'OVERWHELM THEORY'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030021-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: June 17, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030021-3
PART II MAIN EDITION -- 17 JUNE 1985
sSHINGTON TIMES 17 June 1985
verwhelming the `overwhelm theory'
.;ol. Gen. Nikolai Chervov, a member of
Soviet general staff whose statements
.are often taken to reflect Soviet policy, has
voiced a predictable Soviet line on strategic
defense, now that the concept's inevitability
is obvious. That line: it you pu
vastly increased missi a It's convinc-
ing,grven what we have come to realize about
the Soviet buildup. But it's probably not true.
For one thing, the laser guns on the most
advanced drawing boards are fast enough to
incinerate as thick a swarm of missiles as
any attacker is likely to be able to amass.
Then, even in the here-and-now, the eco-
nomics of the thing favor defense over
offense. The marginal cost of each unit of our
strategic defense would be far less than the
BALTIMORE SUN 16 June 1985 (17)
marginal cost of new missiles to overwhelm
SDI.
In fact, enough missiles to overwhelm SDI
cannot be built: the closest an attacker can
come is to make it more likely that some
missiles will get through. Right now, the Sovi-
ets know that 100 percent of any missiles
they launch will penetrate. Even a half-
effective SDI would make it twice as costly
for the Soviets to get the same payload
through - as much as to say, a 50 percent
effective SDI would cut the effectiveness of
a first strike in half. This fact alone is a sig-
nificant extra deterrent to a first strike.
When you add to this the fact that SDI may
well be more than 50 percent effective, you
have a worthwhile system, and the "over-
whelm theory" is exposed as so much bluster.
A Mission for India
India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi should logi-
cally follow up his current trip to the United States
and his recent visit to the Soviet Union with a new
effort to stop the conflict in Afghanistan. Just as
the United States is the one country than can deal
with both sides in the Israeli-Arab conflict, so In-
dia is the one nation that can act as an intermedi-
ary between the superpowers on Afghanistan.
It is true enough that India's enmity with Paki-
stan is a complicating factor. But not necessarily
an inhibiting factor. If the Russians were to pull
out of Afghanistan, the United States would be in
a position to curtail its heavy supply of sophisticat-
ed arms to the Pakistani government. India's
self-interest would thus be served.
Mr. Gandhi was obviously not about to unveil
an Afghan initiative during his get-acquainted vis-
it to Washington. To have done so would have
jettisoned all the good will he and his mother, the
late Indira Gandhi, have built in Moscow by refus-
ing (at great moral cost) to condemn the Soviet
rape of another Asian country. It is an enterprise
to be undertaken on home soil once he has sorted
out all the ideas and proposals that came his way
during his visits to the superpower capitals.
An Indian bid to end the Afghan conflict could
come a cropper, to be sure, as many abortive Unit-
ed Nations efforts well illustrate. But Mr. Gandhi's
willingness to set forth his goals during his ad-
dress to a joint session of Congress was a depar-
ture from the Indian habit of trying to wish away
the whole nasty business. "We stand," he said,
"for a political settlement in Afghanistan that en-
sures sovereignty, integrity, independence and
non-aligned status, and enables the refugees to
return to their homes in safety and honor."
Mr. Gandhi's readiness to "do something con-
crete" was welcomed by American officials. Ironi-
cally, many things that have long irritated the
United States - India's assertion that Soviet
troops were "invited" into Afghanistan, its thesis
that Pakistani aid to rebels "provokes" Soviet
cross-border raids, its ludicrous Afghanistan-Gre-
nada equation - may turn into assets if Mr. Gan-
dhi approaches the Russians.
The Kremlin could easily enough say nyet. But
it values India as its most important Third World
ally and it may view Mr. Gandhi as a man who
could fashion a face-saving deal.
The Reagan administration is reconciled to an
Indian tilt to Moscow for the immediate future. Its
aim is to increase U.S. trade, investment and tech-
nological transfer to India so as to build a web of
interests that eventually could improve the politi-
cal relationship. An end to the war in Afghanistan
would fit in well with this policy.
2-E
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030021-3
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030021-3
PART II -- MAIN EDITION -- 17 JUNE 1985
AIR FORCE MAGAZINE June 1985 (17)
The Russian Easter Overture
By John T. Correll, EDITOR IN CHIEF
E VEN before Mikhail Gorbachev ascended to top So-
viet leadership in March, he had taken the fancy of
many in the West. That favorable assessment, along
with the incredibly tolerant standards the world uses to
judge Soviet behavior, practically guaranteed Gor-
bachev an early advantage in the propaganda wars. He
was quick in attempting to exploit it.
His opening round was his Easter speech. which
fooled hardly anyone. In it, Gorbachev announced his
willingness to freeze medium-range nuclear missiles in
Europe at present levels, which would leave the Soviet
Union ahead by a ten-to-one ratio. As the Washington
Post said, "Some moratorium."
It took colossal gall for the Soviets to make such an
offer, having previously availed themselves of a uni-
lateral six-year head start on deployment of these mis-
siles and now having more than 400 of them operational.
That Gorbachev expected-and got-any serious atten-
tion by this ploy is difficult to understand.
The United States soon came under criticism for its
prompt rejection of Gorbachev's moratorium. Some had
seen a praiseworthy concession in his offer: It would
allow NATO to keep in place the limited number of
missiles it already has. Previously, the Soviet Union had
insisted on an absolute monopoly for itself.
The content of what Gorbachev said, we are told by
the editorial writer for the Hartford Courant, was less
important than his conciliatory tone. "More gestures
like Mr. Gorbachev's by both sides and-who knows-
they might even start to get somewhere on nuclear arms
control,", the Courant said. The US rejection was "over-
wrought," in the opinion of the New York Times, which
admonished us to remember "the context in which Mr.
Gorbachev must operate." Since he had not yet had time
to maneuver his own followers onto the Politburo, the
Times proclaimed, it was "small wonder that in this first
pitch to the West he sounded like his predecessors."
The Old Guard who put Gorbachev where he is have
known him better and for longer than have we in the
West. It seems unlikely that they would have elected him
to power had they perceived his ultimate purpose to be
dissolution of their system. Gorbachev, at fifty-four, is
likely to continue as General Secretary for many years.
We should not hurry to make too much of his style until
we see some substance to go with it.
The Soviet Union that Gorbachev heads is the nation
that still occupies Afghanistan and that is consolidating
its resubjugation of Poland. It is the nation that shot
down an unarmed airliner less than two years ago and
the one that showed no remorse when a Soviet sentry
killed an American officer two weeks before Gor-
bachev's Easter speech. It is the nation that persisted,
throughout the era of detente, in a one-sided arms race.
It is also the same Soviet Union that has engaged in
wholesale violations of arms-control agreements.
This outrageous record in itself may be a major reason
why the rest of the world is so reluctant to hold the
Soviet Union to strict account. Gestures of appease-
ment indicate a fear of Soviet volatility and irrespon-
sibility. This is something akin to giving a mad dog the
wide part of the road-except that the Soviets do what
they do with cold deliberation, not madness. When we
make excuses for them or show ourselves eager to make
unreciprocated concessions, we give them no motiva-
tion to act any differently.
The United States has made substantial reductions in
its strategic forces without the compensation of match-
ing reductions by the Soviet Union. While the Soviets
have added relentlessly to their nuclear arsenal, we have
tended to regard our strategic modernization programs
as bargaining chips. Last year. the House of Representa-
tives made its stand on further MX production con-
tingent on perceived progress in arms-control negotia-
tions. The MX vote carried this year only because a
great many congressmen concluded that it would have
barter value in Geneva.
"The Soviets can take pleasure in the expectation that
if they stand pat, we will meanwhile negotiate with our-
selves and probably change our position." observes
Kenneth L. Adelman, Director of the US Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency.
If there was any conciliatory note in Gorbachev's
Easter overture, it is most likely attributable to NATO's
steadfast stand on missile counterdeployments and to
Moscow's perception that the US is serious about strate-
gic modernization. If there is any hope for meaningful
arms control, we will not achieve it by glossing over
questions of reciprocity. verification, and compliance.
We must have more from Mr. Gorbachev than his
winning smile. ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030021-3