MILITARY POWER IN SOVIET STRATEGY AGAINST NATO

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
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II I FC~IR
Military Power in Soviet Strategy
Against NATO
By PHILLIP A. PETERSEN and JOHN G. HINES
The authors are analysts for the United States Department of Defense. They compiled a recent intelligence
report entitled "The Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe", and they briefed the subject at SACEUR's SHAPEX
Conference in May 1982. This article is based on a presentation given at the RUSI in May 1983. The views expressed
arc those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Department of Defense.
The Soviets are sincere in their expressed desire for
security and peace in Europe. Furthermore, should
Soviet efforts toward peace in Europe fail and war
occur, Soviet leaders would strive to avoid the use of
nuclear weapons in achieving their military objectives.
But the security and peace the Soviets envisage is
essentially the security of the gulag and peace borne of
hopeless resignation. Likewise, the Soviets' strong
preference for conventional victory in Europe is
based, among other considerations, on the simple
assessment that while such a war would result in death
and destruction in East and West Europe, it is much
less likely than is nuclear war to lead to massive
destruction in the Soviet Union. Parodoxically, Soviet
military power is central to Soviet hopes for achieve-
ment of peace as they define it just as large, survivable
nuclear forces at tactical, theatre and global levels are
required to support the Soviet preference to limit any
war to the use of conventional weapons alone.
In an attempt to describe and hopefully to explain
this paradox, the following discussion focuses first on
Soviet efforts to establish Soviet peace in Europe by
means other than war. This is followed by an expla-
nation of why and how the Soviets would hope to
achieve victory without nuclear use should war actually
occur in Europe.
The "peaceful" road to hegemony
Marxism-Leninism predicts and, in effect, prescribes,
the inevitability of the triumph of socialism over
capitalism.' Furthermore, Soviet hostility toward
"uncooperative" socialist and communist states indi-
cates that, in the Soviets' variant of Marxism-
Leninism, their model of socialism must prevail.2 The
very legitimacy of rule of the Soviet Union by the
Communist Party and any claim to ideological leader-
ship of world socialism rest on at least the appearance
that the "correlation of forces" is shifting in favour of
the Soviet Union. In service of this prescription, the
goal of the USSR is world hegemony in what the
Soviets have referred to as the "Era of Global Demo-
cratic Peace".
In an effort to provide long-term guidance in the
struggle to attain the Era of Global Democratic
Peace, the late Leonid Brezhnev proposed at a Warsaw
Pact meeting in Moscow in October 1966:
... that the countries of the Pact should draw up a
Strategic Plan giving their long-term domestic and foreign
objectives. This plan would be complementary to the
existing five-year plans, which would become tactical
documents specifying the targets to be reached at each
stage of the Strategic Plan. Its full title was "The Long-
Term Strategic Plan for the Next Ten to Fifteen Years
and the Years After".3
Although the principal target of the Strategic Plan is
the United States itself, the Plan also calls for the
isolation of the US through "Finlandisation" of
Europe; reduction of Western political influence and
economic access to the Third World; and the encour-
agement of insurgency in areas of importance to the
US, such as Central America.4 The foreign policy
section of the Strategic Plan was, in 1968, divided into
four phases: (1) the Period of Preparation for Peaceful
Coexistence, covering the time from the 20th Party
Congress of 1956 to the 21st Congress of 1959; (2) the
Peaceful Coexistence Struggle, which was expected to
last from 1960 to 1972; (3) the Period of Dynamic
Social Change; and (4) the Era of Global Democratic
Peace.5
The main strategic purpose of Phase Three, the Period
of Dynamic Social Change, was, in the words of the
Soviet directive, "to smash the hope of false demo-
cracy" and bring about the total demoralisation of the
West. Our relationship with the United States would be
the vital element in this phase. By fostering belief in our
policy of friendship and cooperation with America, we
planned to receive the greatest possible economic and
technological help from the West, and at the same time
convince the capitalist countries that they had no need
of military alliances. The erosion of NATO began in
Phase Two would be completed by the withdrawal of the
United States from its commitment to the defence of
Europe, and by European hostility to military expendi-
ture, generated by economic recession and fanned by
the efforts of the "progressive" movements.6
'While the original Strategic Plan included approximate
dates for completing each phase,? "... each section of
the Plan is subject to constant revision to ensure that it
takes into account new factors introduced by changes
in the world's political forces and unforeseen advances
in Western technology which necessitate Soviet arms
control initiatives".8 Thus, ". . . the Plan's objectives
were firm but the means and methods of achieving
them were flexible" .s
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While early attainment of the Era of Global Demo-
cratic Peace is the Soviet goal, peace is also the pre-
ferred method for achieving this advanced stage of
Soviet-dominated socialist tranquillity. Peace in this
sense is actually war carried on by political means.
Many in the West who later felt betrayed by very
aggressive Soviet behaviour in the Third World since
the mid 1970s despite outspoken Soviet commitment
to detente, had failed to understand earlier Soviet
explanations of their policy of peace. Brezhnev himself
stated openly in December, 1972 that: "We are realists
and are well aware that influential circles in the
imperialist world have not yet abandoned attempts to
conduct policy from positions of strength ... The
Soviet Union will continue to work for detente and for
consolidation of peace . . .". Brezhnev then added the
important qualification: _
The CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] has
always held, and now holds that the class struggle
between the two systems-the capitalist and the socialist-
in the economic and political, and also, of course, the
ideological domains, will continue. That is to be expected
since the world outlook and the class aims of socialism
and capitalism are opposite and irreconcilable. But we
shall strive to shift this historically inevitable struggle on
to a path free from the perils of war, or dangerous con-
flicts, and an uncontrolled arms race. This will be a
tremendous gain for world peace .... 10 (Emphasis
added by authors.)
In the Soviet view then, the struggle goes on, in fact,
it must go on-but in the nuclear era it must be
peaceful in the sense that a major war, and certainly
nuclear war, is to be avoided.
Of course, private statements by the Soviet leader-
ship were more explicit. As early as June 1961, Nikita
Khrushchev had concluded that:
We must divide the West, not unite it by crude attacks on
capitalism." But that did not mean, he went on, that he
would restrain the international communist movement;
on the contrary, one of the principal objectives of his
policy was to improve the climate for world revolution.
"As Prime Minister of the Soviet Union I could promise
Kennedy many things", he told the Czechoslovakian
President and First Secretary Antonin Novotny. "But as
First Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR
and leader of the world communist movement, my hands
are still free."
Only two months before Khrushchev was to depart
the political scene, he described his foreign policy as
one of "leading America to the grave with one arm
around her shoulder".12 That honest men in the liberal
democracies fail to understand this peace offensive is
not surprising. In 1966 Brezhnev noted that "some
Left extremists misunderstand detente" as well. "They
do not understand", he told Czech leaders during a
Moscow visit, "that it gives us a free hand-a free
hand through almost all the communist movements in
the world .... "13 One can see then that, in its rather
long history, the post-Stalin Soviet peace offensive has
been directed specifically at establishment of a Soviet
peace in Europe achieved by weakening and dividing
the NATO Alliance. The specific goal is political
isolation of individual member states and reduction of
their military potential.
A recent instructive example of the Soviets' specific
use of pacificism to achieve ascendancy over NATO
without war, and military advantage should war occur,
is provided by a Soviet GRU officer who defected in
the late 1970s. Writing under the assumed name of a
famous general, he noted that:
Pacificism is sweeping through the West. It is doing the
same in the Soviet Union. In the West, though, it is un-
controlled while in the USSR it is encouraged from
above. However, both movements have a common aim.
Western pacifists are fighting to stop the installation of
new rockets in Western Europe. Soviet pacifists speak
out for the same cause-against the installation of
rockets in Western Europe.14
There is some sensitivity concerning the nature of the
relationship the Soviets expect to have with Western
European states should Soviet leaders achieve their
goal of hegemony in Europe without armed conflict.
In a public speech made in 1978, CPSU General
Secretary Andropov revealed the essence of that
desired relationship:
The Soviet Union's European policy remains un-
changed.... Our position is clear. Europe must become
a continent of peace and good-neighbourly cooperation.
Here, in Karelia [Soviet-occupied sector of Finland], we
have to emphasise the significance of the Soviet Union's
good-neighbourly ... cooperation with Finland. Soviet-
Finnish relations today ... represent the very kind of
detente which makes for a more lasting peace....
In the final analysis, this is the highly humane purpose
of the foreign policy ... of our Party and of the Soviet
state.15
Peace is the preferred method for attaining hege-
mony because it involves a lower risk to accumulated
Soviet gains. Local wars may be used when they are
perceived not to run a risk disproportionate to expected
gains (for example, Afghanistan).16 Regardless of
whether peace or war is the method applied, military
power plays the central role in achievement of the Era
of Global Democratic Peace. In war, military power
would be applied directly, but it still would be political
in character and serve a political goal. If Soviet
hegemony is to be achieved through peace, military
power must serve to intimidate target states into
accommodation, constituting an iron fist in a political
glove.'? Regardless of how the Era of Global Demo-
cratic Peace is achieved, it would be policed by a
Soviet Army. For even at such an advanced stage of
socialist development the Soviet Army would have to
be retained to guard against any lingering bourgeois
tendencies.18
War with NATO
While the Soviets prefer to wage peace rather than
war, especially against such a technologically sophisti-
cated enemy as NATO, they anticipate that conditions
might arise that would lead to a major war. The
Soviets manifest their concern by maintaining a large
and expensive military force and by constantly refining
an elaborate system of military thought to ensure
development of appropriate operational concepts for
execution in the event of war. The maintenance of such
a large military force is driven by the Soviet assumption
that the only responsible security policy is one that
strives to secure victory in advance. The Soviets prefer
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to achieve a quick victory at the lowest possible level of
intensity and thereby reduce uncertainty and minimise
the costs of war to the Soviet homeland.19 They
understand, however, that this preference requires the
ability to defeat all opponents at every level. This
military posture enhances the Soviets' capability to
limit conflict once it is initiated by enabling them to
apply optimum requisite force in a timely way. More-
over, the capability to secure victory at every level not
only might avoid escalation through domination of the
process, it might even enable the Soviets to avoid war
altogether by so intimidating opponents that they will
seek to avoid an unequal violent struggle through
accommodation to Soviet wishes. The Marxist-
Leninist concept of democratic centralism under which
Soviet society is governed facilitates the development,
deployment and training of forces adequate to support
such an extravagant approach to military force
development. Unlike the Western democracies, in the
Soviet system resource allocation is made by a few
decision makers who are not directly affected by the
costs such decisions impose on other sectors of society.
The Soviets regard peace as a pre-war period,
divided into the time when normal peacetime readiness
obtains, and a crisis period that immediately precedes
the outbreak of war. War itself is seen to be comprised
of two periods, the beginning period of war and the
period of subsequent/concluding operations.20
In evaluating the transition from peace to war, the
Soviets have noted several trends. The time when the
most critical preparation for war must occur has
shifted from the crisis period and wartime itself to the
period of normal peacetime readiness. This conviction
is driven by the perception that the beginning period of
a major war would be shorter, larger in scope, and
much more decisive than has previously been the case.
As a result, the relative levels of readiness of the
opposing sides at the beginning of a war will largely
determine its outcome. This change is due not only to
the development of modern nuclear missile weaponry,
but also to dramatic increases in the mobility, man-
oeuvrability, and lethality of air, missile and ground
general purpose forces.21 Vastly improved technology
not only promises to make the beginning period of war
shorter and more decisive, it also makes the initiation
of war a more important determinant of its outcome.
Because of the power and speed of modern weapons,
first use of force and first use of greater levels of force
can cause significant and possibly decisive shifts in the
military, economic, and political correlation of forces
in a matter of hours, if not minutes.22 The side that is
to be successful must manage the perceptions and
hence the actions of the opponent so as to avert
initiation by the enemy at an unfavourable time and to
ensure initiation by one's own forces at a time when
one's relative advantage is greatest.23
The Soviets have noted that modern technical
reconnaissance makes it extremely difficult to achieve
surprise by denying information about one's activity
to the enemy.24 Surprise must instead be achieved
through manipulation of the enemy's interpretation of
the observed activity. Enemy perceptions may be
influenced through generation of a false peak to a
political crisis and subsequent initiation of hostilities
after such tension has been artifically defused. Surprise
may also be achieved by attacking at a time when the
enemy does not yet believe the crisis has reached a
point that justifies overt military action.25
Moreover, deception required for surprise today
must continuously offer to the opponent a plausible
reason other than impending war for military activity
observed. Such deception must be reinforced by a
stepped-up political offensive designed to fragment the
opposing alliance through intimidation and persuasion
directed at inducing individual members of the NATO
alliance to seize upon more benign explanations for
observed Warsaw Pact military activity. This political
offensive would continue into the beginning period of
war with even greater intensity, still with the objective
of isolating individual members of NATO. Less
benign forms of intimidation would be used to facilitate
a rapid conclusion to the war, before, if possible,
nuclear weapons could be employed by the enemy.26
The Soviets' thinking about war with NATO is
driven by their perceptions of the Alliance as it might
behave under the threat and actuality of war. Ob-
viously, any Soviet strategy for war against NATO
would attempt to exploit perceived vulnerabilities of
the NATO alliance.
The Soviets believe that "until nearly the end of
1960, US leaders adhered to the strategy of so-called
massive retaliation ... and recognised only the possi-
bility of waging a general nuclear war against the
Soviet Union". They noted that "in accordance with
this strategy, the US government put the main
emphasis on the development of nuclear weapons of
strategic and operational-tactical designation, de-
emphasising the conventional armed forces, especially
the ground troops". However, by Soviet assessment,
Soviet successes in the fields of nuclear weapons and
rocketry resulted in the failure of the strategy of
massive retaliation. In the Soviet perception, as Soviet
nuclear strength grew and approached parity with that
of the West, the credibility of a US threat to. employ
nuclear weapons decreased.27
..Against this backdrop of a less credible global
nuclear threat, NATO forces deployed in Europe were
seen to be vulnerable in ways that offered possible
opportunities for exploitation by the Soviets. The
Soviet strategic offensive plan of the late 1960s
". . . considered the German Army the strongest, best
trained and most highly disciplined force in NATO,
with the possible exception of the US contingent".28
Holland, on the other hand, was seen to be one of the
weakest links in NATO. It was believed that ". . . Hol-
land would declare itself neutral in any conflict with
the East, and the Dutch armed forces would not only
support this decision but would actively resist any
attempt by the Western powers to use Dutch ports or
cross Dutch territory".29 The Soviets, nevertheless,
expected Holland to become a battleground. "The
Soviet ploy would be to recognise Dutch neutrality
at once, and then to guarantee its non-belligerant
status by military occupation".30 In addition, after
1963, Warsaw Pact operational plans no longer
recognised the concept of neutrality. The occupation
of Austria is to facilitate operations against the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the occupation of Switzer-
land is to ensure that it does not become a refuge for
defeated Western forces.31 The strategic offensive
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plan ". . . assumed France would never use her nuclear
missiles or its.force de frappe. The plan anticipated the
capitulation of the French Government as soon as the
Warsaw Pact armies crossed the Rhine and parachute
[forces] dropped around its principal cities".32 The
Soviets have since come to recognise a much stronger
French commitment to defence and increased col-
laboration with NATO. However, the fact that
Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands have been
unable to keep their commitments to a stronger
defence may give hope to Soviet planners who would
attempt to paralyse NATO politically before or during
the course of a conflict.33
The Soviets also understand that NATO, unlike the
Warsaw Pact, is an alliance by choice of its members
and major wartime decisions such as nuclear release
require agreement of the allies. Therefore they may
perceive that the confusion and anxiety that would
likely characterise the beginning period of war in
Europe might introduce sufficient delay into the
nuclear release decision process to make NATO
nuclear use ineffective or inadvisable altogether.34
Geography alone would lead one to anticipate that a
successful Soviet high-speed conventional offensive
might cause some NATO members to argue for early
release and others to strongly oppose such action.
Forward defence is seen by the Warsaw Pact to be
vulnerable to the extent that the necessity of early
forward deployment of most NATO forces available
in theatre denies the Alliance the depth and large
reserves required to counter major Warsaw Pact
penetrations early in the war. Most of the forces that
would constitute NATO's strategic and operational
reserves must be brought from the North American
continent.35 Obviously, the extent to which reinforce-
ment might be delayed would be largely determined
by the success of Soviet efforts to manipulate the
perceptions of Alliance members throughout the pre-
war crisis period. Finally, NATO command, control
and communications (C3) facilities and nuclear
weapons systems are vulnerable due to insufficient
mobility, dispersion, and hardening.
Given these NATO vulnerabilities and the changing
global strategic balance, by the late 1970s the Soviets
were able to give serious attention to extended con-
ventional operations. Recent changes in operational
concepts and force structure and the nature of recent
weapons modernisation evident in the Soviet air,
ground and missile forces are interrelated and clearly
enhance Soviet capabilities to execute Pact strategy for
a rapid, destructive conventional offensive as discussed
by Warsaw Pact authors.36 In December 1981, General
Colonel F. Gayvoronskiy, the deputy commandant of
the prestigious General Staff Academy in Moscow,
summarised the major operational elements, required
to execute such operations:
Under present-day conditions when only conventional
weapons are used in the conduct of the offensive, effecting
a penetration could require the application of large
masses of artillery, aircraft, and tanks; thorough sup-
pression of the enemy's numerous anti-tank weapons;
and protection of the attacking force from air strikes,
including strikes by combat helicopters. To increase the
tempo of the offensive and stop the approach of enemy
reserves towards the- penetration sectors, it will be
necessary to make air and missile strikes throughout the
depth of the enemy's defences and make wide use of
airborne (air assault) landings.37
The offensive described by General Gayvoronskiy
would be composed of three major elements: the air
operation, the anti-air operation and rapid, deep
OMG-led penetrations on the ground.38 The air
operation, designed to neutralise the bulk of NATO's
air and nuclear capability in the theatre of military
operations, would in its effect, substitute for an initial
mass nuclear strike.39 Very soon after commencement
of the air operation, Warsaw Pact ground manoeuvre
forces would seek to launch large-scale, one-way raids
by OMGs in conjunction with air assault and airborne
landings into the depths of NATO's defences in an
effort to induce the perception among NATO ' allies
that continued resistance or nuclear escalation would be
futile.40 At the same time, the anti-air operation would
bring to bear, under unified control, ground and air
based air defence systems for protection of aircraft and
missile systems conducting the air operation, ground
manoeuvre forces as they move into the depths of
NATO territory, and Pact operational tactical and
strategic nuclear weapons systems that would ensure
the continued viability of a nuclear option should
NATO attempt nuclear use or should conventional
operations fail.41 Follow on forces would then exploit
to the depth of the theatre of operations to ensure a
rapid conclusion to the war.
The structural and operational refinements developed
since the mid to late 1970s to support this strategy are
too numerous to list completely, much less discuss in
any detail. A few of the most significant developments
should be mentioned. The Soviets consider very he
conventional air, artil ery an missile support to be the
primar a erns the ~uclear weat)ons in su rting
a t -s peed offensive. Consistent with this view they
aye made truly significant increases in the quality and
-range o artillery, missiles an roc cet l'-hers to
soviet forces in Europe and they have placed high-level
emphasis on improving the density, intensity and_
-responsiveness tires under an ambitious new variant
-61- eir re support doctrine called "integrated fire
-Mffruction of the enemy a Soviets see troop
s M es by air ssau an air orne forces against deep
targets as central to maintaining the momentum of a
theatre conventional offensive.43 The Soviets have
formed special air assault units in Europe and have
greatly increased helicopter lift capacity for this
purpose while they have virtually tripled the mobility
and tank killing capability of the seven airborne
divisions based in the Soviet Union.44 Soviet planners
believe that the greatest threat to a Pact o ensuge ,
'NATO air andnuc ear assets. 40 In response, they have
resurrected and refined of the World War II air
operation and the anti-air operation and they have
made significant increases in the quantity and quality
of the offensive air as well as air and ground based
air defence systems needed to execute these operations
in Europe. Finally, the Soviets have restructured their
air and air defence forces better to support the more
complex theatre operations now called for in their
doctrine.46
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Soviet development of less vulnerable, more flexible
theatre nuclear weapons systems and deployment of
those systems in considerable numbers in East Europe
and the Western Soviet Union supports Soviet planners'
preference for achievement of victory at the lowest
possible level of combat intensity. For while the Soviets
reject the Western concept of deterrence (which they
characterise as terrorising one's opponent with the
threat of catastrophic nuclear punishment for military
misconduct-ustrashenij'e) they clearly recognise the
restrainin rzlri enuine readiness-
73-Ti-al it nuc leax war at every level of intensity i
--have on an enemy who is co templating nuclear use of
a ion to more or larger weaponS.47 Hence, unlike_
seek to be able to manage escalation as much as they-
he process at every level.48_
tmng now this concept is being applied in
Europe, we can see that any Soviet military strategy
that seeks to avoid nuclear use requires a nuclear
capability that could survive a nuclear strike and still
deliver a devastating counterblow. The new Soviet
SS-20 IRBM meets that requirement. Because of its
mobility, the SS-20 is much less vulnerable than the
older SS-4s and SS-5s which must launch from fixed
sites. As a consequence, Soviet planners could seek to
extend conventional ations with rester confidence
that O could not seriousl degrade Pact nuc ear
ca t y wt h a surprise nuclear attack during a
conven tong phase. Second, Soviet e o ment of
nuclear artillery to forces in Eurooe49 enables the
Soviets to respond to-717770 -nuclear attack with much
res er n an reduced yield using their own
ow- evel tactical nuclear weapons-even a ter oppq
ing forces have become ecd rater ene rate duttn
o erations. urt hermore the
pro onged conventional
Vat a i ity of nuclear artillery in quantity gives t e
mate
eowtiatofa
assive t eatre nuclear exchange. This represents a
remen ous increase in exi i t y to ompariso o t
`Soy refs' previous nuclear posture which orce there-
-
to choose among three somewhat unattractive alter
hatives in the event of of tactical nuclear
ea oil with conventional
on a ar e
operations only; to initiate chemical warfare
e; or o resort to mass use o relatively inaccurate
rge yie operational an theatre strategic nuclear
sst es.
e inement of the range of possible Soviet responses
to nuclear attack is further improved by their deploy-
ment of longer range, more accurate tactical and
operational missiles such as the SS-21, SS-23 and SS-22
which are replacing the older FROG, Scuds and
Scaleboards.50 As more nuclear capable artillery and
improved missiles are deployed, Soviet confidence that
can dominate escalation at the tactical, operational,
and theatre strategic levels should increase appreciably.
Most important, the Soviets may believe that the NATO
members' perception of this capability should dissuade
the allies from ever agreeing to initiate nuclear use and
hence keep the war at the conventional level where the
Soviets clearly have an advantage in numbers and
speed of reinforcement.
Conclusion
The right of the Communist Party to rule the Soviet
Union and the legitimacy of its claim to ideological
leadership of world socialism rest on fulfilment by the
USSR of the Marxist-Leninist prediction, continually
restated by Soviet ideologues over the past three
decades, that the correlation of forces is shifting in
favour of (Soviet) socialism. This prediction con-
stitutes a prescription that compels the Soviet leader-
ship relentlessly to strive to achieve world hegemony
or forfeit its claim to rule. Because of the unpredict-
ability of the outcome of a major modern nuclear war,
the Soviets prefer to achieve this goal without war if
possible and with limited, low-risk wars if necessary.
Consistent with this approach, in the event of a major
wa, the Soviets would seek to win it at the conven-
tional level through a combination of surprise, speed,
political pressure and superiority at every level of
conflict intensity. Superior military power is the basis-
for Soviet hope o victor without war and -super or
actical the and bal nuclear ca a ilit is tra11
to Soviet hope to dominate nuclear escalation and, if
at .911 ossible to ac ntional
weapons atone should war occur.
1 Soviet ideologues are fond of quoting long passages from
Lenin's Imperialism, the Highest Form of Capitalism, predicting
the crises and ultimate collapse of capitalism and its replacement
by a higher social economic system-socialism. In the context of
one such reference, the author of a recent Soviet book on local
wars, repeated a statement that has been appearing in Soviet
literature for over two decades: "After the Second World War,
when radical changes took place in the world and there arose a
world system of socialist countries, the process of change in the
correlation of forces in the world arena in favour of democracy
and socialism took an irreversible character" (I. E. Shavrov, ed.,
Lokal'nye voyny, istoriya i sovremennost' (Local Wars in History
and in the Present) (Moskva Voyenizdat, 1981), p. 284).
2 The Soviets very bluntly lump their principal "socialist"
competitors with the capitalists. "Powerful and influential forces
in the West are still trying to remake the world in accordance
with their bourgeois ideals of `freedom and justice'. This is
especially true of representatives of the military industrial
complex in the USA and other capitalist countries, as well as
being true of the Maoists who side with them and upon whom the
enemies of peace and detente now rely" (Shavrov, p. 286).
3 Jan Sejna, We Will Bury You (Sidgwick and Jackson,
London, 1982), p. 104. Sejna was the Chief of Staff to the Minister
of Defence in Czechoslovakia and Assistant Secretary to the
Czech Defence Council when he defected in February 1968.
4 Ibid., pp. 103 and 153-154.
5 Ibid., p. 106.
6 Ibid., pp. 107-108.
7 Ibid., p. 106.
8 Ibid., p. 101.
9 Ibid.
10 Leonid Brezhnev, On the Policy of the Soviet Union and
the International Situation Doubleday, Garden City, 1973, pp.
230, 231. In the Soviet view then, the struggle goes on, in fact, it
must go on-but in the nuclear era it must be "peaceful" in the
sense that a major war is to be avoided.
11 Sejna, We Will Bury You, p. 52.
12 Ibid., p. 89.
13 Ibid., p. 112.
14 Viktor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army (Macmillan
Publishing Company, Inc., New York, 1983), p. 169.
15 Yuriy V. Andropov, Izbrannye rechi stat'i (Selected
Speeches and Articles) Izdatel'stvo, Moskva, 1979), p. 287.
16 In summarising a study on local war completed by Soviet
military scientists in 1975, Soviet General of the Army I. Shavrov
asserted an ". . . important conclusion that springs from the
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analysis of the system of local wars and military conflicts after
the Second World War is the growing trend per five-year periods
of the number of victories of the forces of socialism and national
liberation over forces of imperialism and reaction". And lest
there be any doubt that this symptom of the workings of "the
objective law" of the shift in the world correlation of forces is
related to Soviet foreign policy, he explains in the same article
that, "In the second five-year period of the 60s and especially in
the 70s, the number of local wars and conflicts noticeably
declined, which serves as a reflection of the further process of
changes in the correlation for forces in the world arena in favour
of the forces of progress and socialism and of the ever more
sharply rising contradiction between the policy of `from a
position strength' conducted by imperialism and its real capa-
bilities, and as proof of the triumph of the Soviet foreign policy
line for detente" (I. Shavrov, "Lokal'nye voyny i ikh mesto v
global'noy strategii imperializma" (Local wars and their place
in the global strategy of imperialism), Voyennoistoricheskiy
zhurnal (Military Historical Journal-hereafter Vizh.), No. 3,
1975, pp. 15 and 18).
17 It is clear from Shavrov's 1981 book on local wars, that
the Soviets understand the utility of military power in winning
the struggle for the allegiance of newly independent countries
while actually reducing the likelihood of Soviet military con-
frontation with major Western powers. They write that, "The
history of our time has dispelled the aggressors' hopes of
conquering nations fighting for independence, nations that can
rely on help and support from progressive forces eyerywhere.
"Experience has shown that capitalist powers, formerly
engaging in direct aggression, are now frequently forced to limit
the scale on which they use arms and armed forces so as to avoid
a strong international reaction in response. The restraining
factor here has been the emerging political, economic and
military power of the socialist countries and, above all the
rocket-nuclear power of the Soviet Union" (Shavrov, Local
Wars in History and in the Present, p. 229). In 1967, another
Soviet author attributed NATO's movement away from a policy
of "massive retaliation" to one of "flexible response" to the
"sharply increased nuclear might of the Soviet Union" (Col.
V. Samorukov, "Combat operations involving conventional
means of destruction", Voyennoya nrysl', (Military Thought-
hereafter, I'M), No. 8, August 1967, trans. in Selected Readings
from Military Thought; 1963-1973, US Air Force, Studies in
Communist Affairs, Vol 5, Pt I (Washington, DC: US Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1982) (hereafter, Selected Readings, Pt I),
p. 17).
18 Scjna, We Will Bury You, p. 106.
19 "The aim is to teach the military personnel to handle their
weapons and equipment unfailingly so as to enable them, to win
victory in the shortest possible time and with minimal losses"
(Grigory G. Borisov, "For effective combat training", Soviet
Military Review, No. 11, 1982, pp. 14-15). Also see Sejna, We
Will Bury You, p. 53.
20 Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Bagramyan, "Kharakter i
osobennosti nachal'nogo perioda voynyi" (The nature and
peculiarities of the beginning period of war), Vizh., No. 10, 1981,
pp. 20, 21. Also see S. P. Ivanov and M. M. Kir'yan, "Nachal'nyy
period voyny (The beginning period of war), Sovetskaya
voyennaya entsiklopediya (Soviet Military Encyclopedia-here-
after SVE) (Moskva: Voyenizdat, 1978), Vol. 5, pp. 557, 558.
21 Ibid., p. 558.
22 S. A. Tyushkevich, "The methodology for the correlation
of forces in war", VM, No. 6, June 1969, trans. in Selected
Readings from Soviet Military Thought; 1963-1973, US Air
Force, Studies in Communist Affairs, Vol. 5, Pt 11 (hereafter,
Selected Readings, Pt Il), pp. 60, 65.
23 O. Losik, "Lokalni valky a vojenske umeni" (Local wars
and military art), Lidova Armada (Peoples Army-Czech), Vol.
16, 1982, pp. 746, 747.
24 M. M. Kir'yan, "Vnezapnost"' (Surprise), SVE., Vol. 2,
pp. 161, 163; and V. A. Efimov and S. G. Chermashentsev,
"Maskirovka" (Camouflage), SVE, Vol. 5, p. 177.
25 Kir'yan, "Vnezapnost"', SVE, p. 161.
26 Ivanov and Kir'yan, "Nachal'nyy period voyny", p. 555.
27 V. D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, edited by
Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc.,
1968), pp. 54-55.
28 Sejna, p. 114.
29 Ibid., p. 128,
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 121.
32 Ibid., p. 130.
33 Boris Ponomarev noted that the Soviets were "... aston-
ished by the fact that France, which advocates detente, has
recently been in the vanguard of those West European countries
which are increasing their military spending most. This is all the
more surprising since even some NATO military organisation
member countries such as Denmark, Belgium and the Nether-
lands have announced that they are going to freeze or even
reduce their military spending". See "Strong criticism from
Ponomarev", L'Humanite, 18 December 1980, p. 7.
34 The Soviets assessed over a decade ago that, for the side
which ". . . is successfully developing the offensive it will be
advantageous to delay the beginning of the use of nuclear
weapons as long as possible .... In such a case the opposing side
might considerably accelerate the beginning of operations with
nuclear weapons in order to achieve a sharp change in conditions
in his favour. For it is obvious if he does not do this at the
critical moment, then subsequently it will be all the more
difficult to use nuclear weapons with the necessary effect". The
Soviet author then noted that in Western exercises ". . . the use
of nuclear weapons, began in a maximum of four to five days
(Colonel B. Samorukov, "Combat operations involving con-
ventional means of destruction", VM No. 8, 1967, Selected
Readings, Pt 1, pp. 174-175. A NATO decision for nuclear use at
that time might appear inadvisable if the Warsaw Pact has been
able to destroy a large part of NATO's nuclear forces in the
conventional phase. In a recent article in the Polish military press
a Polish military scientist explained that "... the success of an
offensive operation will largely depend on depriving the opposite
side of his (combat) capabilities and, above all, on the elimination
of nuclear missiles during the conventional phase of battle".
(Major (Diploma) Wojciech Michalak, "Lotnictwo w dzialaniach
rajdowo-manewrowych wojsk ladowych" (Aviation in raid
manoeuvre operations by ground forces), Nation,' Air Force and
Air Defence Force Review (hereafter, Polish Air Review), No. 2,
1982, p. 5).
35 In a 1964 Military Thought article, Major General
Dzhclaukhov examined the importance of strategic reserves in
a theatre of military operations and both the necessity and
methods of destroying them. He pointed out the significance of
the "geographic factor" by observing that it is one thing when
strategic reserves ". . . are still located in the depth of the theatre
at a distance of 600-1000 km or more (requiring three or four
days to move them and bring them into battle), and another
matter when they are already in the zone of military operations
and can be brought into battle within 24 hours". He also noted
that, "Reserves formed on the opposite side of natural barriers
still have to. overcome them before they can arrive in the area of
military operations" (Maj. Gen. K. H. Dzhelaukhov, "Com-
bating strategic reserves in a theatre of military operations".
VM, No. 11, November 1964, Selected Readings, Pt I, p. 90),
Also see Captain (1st Rank), A. Korablev "Obespecheniye
strategicheskoy mobil'nosti" (Supporting strategic mobility),
Zarubezhnoye voynoye obozreniye (Foreign Military Review), No.
9, 1981, pp. 7-12, and Maj. Gen. M. Below (DSci), "Views on
NATO's strategic mobility", Soviet Military Review (hereafter
SMR) No. 10, 1980, pp. 39-40. Both articles examine the US
"Rapid Deployment Force" and "Dual Based" units. Relative
to the later, Korablev points out that "REFORGER" experience
indicates the United States can airlift "up to 12,000 men (with-
out heavy weapons and equipment) and 1,500 tons of cargo to
Europe in six to eight days". Further, he points out that to
airlift a complete airborne division to the Persian Gulf region
would require two weeks, while another division would require
30-35 days to arrive by sea.
36 The Soviet Minister of Defence, Marshal of the Soviet
Union D. Ustinov, made explicit the relationship between the
goal of keeping war conventional and developments in Soviet
force structure and doctrine in a July 1982 article in Pravda.
Referring to Brezhnev's June announcement in which the Soviet
president unilaterally renounced first use of nuclear weapons,
Ustinov stated that "This means that now, in the preparation of
the armed forces, even more attention will be devoted to the task
of preventing the development of a military conflict into a
nuclear one; and those tasks, in all their diversity, are becoming
an unalterable part of our military activities.... This establishes
an even stricter framework for the training of troops and staffs,
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for the determination of the composition of armaments, and for
the organisation of still tighter control so as to exclude non-
sanctioned launch of nuclear weapons, from tactical up to
strategic" (emphasis added) ( D. F. Ustinov, "Otvesti ugrozu
yadernoy voyny" (Removing the threat of nuclear war), Pravda,
12 July 1982, p. 4).
37 Gen. Col. F. Gayvoronskiy, "Razvitiye operativnog o
iskusstva" (The development of operational art), Vizh. No. 12,
1981, pp. 28, 29.
38 N. V. Ogarkov, "Strategiye voyennaya" (Military
strategy), SVE, Vol. 7, p. 564. Marshal of the Soviet Union
Ogarkov actually lists six major types of operations as components
of the strategic offensive: air, anti-air, front, airborne, amphibious,
and naval. This article focuses on the first three operations. The
role of the OMG within front operations is discussed in some
detail in Michalak, op. cit., and SZA, "Operacyjne grupy
manewrowe" (Operational manoeuvre group), Zolnierz wolnosci
(Soldier of Freedom), 26 October, 1982, p. 4.
39 Colonel (Diploma) Pilot Alexander Musial, "Charakter,
znaczenie eperacji powietrznch we wspolczesnych dzialaniach
wojennych" (The character and importance of air operations in
modern warfare), Polish Air Review, No. 3, March 1982.
40 "In the event that war begins and for some time con-
ventional means of destruction are used, the general aim of the
offence may be primarily the defeat of the main opposing troop
groupings of the first strategic echelon of the defending side, the
maximum destruction of its operational-tactical and tactical
means of nuclear attack, and seizure of important individual
targets, the loss of which would result in the loss of defensive
stability. In achieving this aim, the drive of attacking troops deep
;nto operational field forces of the defensive side, into areas where
its nuclear rocket weapons and aviation are located, will provide
the possibility for defeating opposing defensive ground forces and
destroying their nuclear weapons before they can employ them"
(Major General S. Shtrik, "The encirclement and destruction of
the enemy during combat operations not involving the use of
nuclear weapons". VM, as translated in Selected Readings, Pt 1,
p. 187). Several sources indicate that the OMG represents the
latest Soviet attempt to accomplish the mission identified by
General Shtrik. See for example, SZA, "Operational Manoeuvre
group", and Colonel (Diploma, Philosophy) Alexander Musial,
"Dzialiania bojowe lotnictwa na korzysc operacyjnych grup
mn.mewrowych" (Aviation combat operations on behalf of
operational manoeuvre groups), Polish Air Review, Nos. 7-8,
July/August 1982, p. 9, and Michalak, p. 9.
41 "Strategiya, voyennaya", SVE, Vol. 7, p. 564; "Protivo-
vozdushnaya operatsiya", SVE, Vol 6, pp. 589-590; Witold
Pokruszynski, "Operacja przeciw powietrzna wojsk OPK (The
national air defence force anti-aircraft operation), Polish Air
Review, May 1982; and Musial, "Aviation combat operations on
behalf of operational manoeuvre groups". p. 10.
42 The term "integrated fire destruction of the enemy"
(kompleksowe porazenie ogniowe przeciwnika) has been used
recently in the Polish military press. In one article, Colonel
Musial relates it in detail to operations by the OMG. See Musial,
"Aviation combat operations on behalf of operational manoeuvre
groups", pp. 12, 13. In another article Col. Musial applies the
same terminology and concept to air support of amphibious
operations, suggesting that integrated fire destruction has general
applicability to fire support of any force moving "from the
depths" to commitment and subsequent exploitation (Colonel
(Diploma) Alexander Musial, "Rola lotnictwa uderzeniowego w
zabezpieczeniu dzialan desantow morskich" (The role of air
support in protecting naval landing detachments), Polish Air
Review, No. 5, May 1982, p. 12. In Soviet fire support doctrine,
fire destruction of the enemy (ognevoye porazheniye protivnika) is
an old term and a traditional concept. The application of the
word "integrated" (kompleksnoye) to fire destruction is new and
apparently has become an educational "code word" that reflects
a serious effort at the highest levels to ensure that all fires are
intensely and continuously coordinated to achieve maximum
destructive effect upon the enemy. For a discussion of the
integrated character (kompleksnyy kjaracter) of contemporary
fire destruction see Colonel R. Portugal'skiy and Major A.
Vorshchov, "Sovershenstvovaniye metodov raboty komand-
uyushchikh i shtabov po organizatsii ognevogo porazheniya
protivnika v nastupatel'nykh operatsiyakh" (Perfection of the
work of commanders and staffs in the organisation of fire
destruction of the enemy in offensive operations), Vizh, No. 3,
March 1982, pp. 11, 12, 18, 19. Integrated fire destruction" is
apparently the capper concept for numerous doctrinal changes in
the areas of density of fire, "firestrikes" and air-ground fire
coordination.
43 The best single discussion on the subject of "troop
strikes" is to be found in Major General I. Vorobyev, "Oruzhiye
i taktika: komandir i sovremennyy boy" (Weapons and tactics:
the commander and modern combat), Krasnaya zvezda (Red
Star), 12 January 1982, p. 2. Air assault troops are apparently
an integral part of the OMG and are routinely involved in the
execution of OMG raid operations. According to Major
Michalak, for example, one of the "principal tasks" of aviation
will be "to land tactical air assault units drawn from raiding and
manoeuvring forces or from the main forces of ground troops
acting in support of the operational manoeuvre group". Growing
Soviet enthusiasm for airborne forces in offensive operations in
general, and their participation in operational raiding in particular,
is readily apparent in more recent Soviet military literature. The
chief of Soviet airborne forces, Lt. Gen. D. Sukhorukov stated
in 1981 that, "Vertical envelopment of the enemy has become an
important manoeuvre without which not a single contemporary
offensive operation will be possible" (Captain A. Oliynik, "High
mastery of the airborne troops", Kraznaya zvezda, 11 September
1981, p. 2). The association of airborne operations in conjunction
with the operational raid is routine in Soviet military writings.
See for example, Lt. Gen. V. Reznichenko, "Razvitiye taktiki
nastupatel'-nego boya" (Development of the tactics of offensive
combat), Vizh., No. 12, 1981, p. 26, and Marshal of the Soviet
Union, Professor O. A. Losik, "Sposoby vedeniya vysokomam-
evrennykh deystviy bronetankovymi i mekhanizirovannymi
voyskami po opyty belorusskoy i vstula-odcvskov opevatsiy"
(Methods of conducting high-manoeuvre combat operations with
tank and mechanised troops according to the experience of the
Bylorussian and Vistula-Oder operations), Vizh,, No. 9, 1980,
pp. 19, 21, 24, 25.
44 Soviet Military Power (Washington: GPO, 1983), pp.
41-42, 46. Also see Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Hines The
Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe, DDB-2622-4-83 (un-
classified) (Washington, DC Defense Intelligence Agency, 1983),
pp. 20-21.
45 The present commander of Group of Soviet Forces
Germany, General Zaytsev, estimated that aviation constitutes
up to 50 per cent of the destructive fire power of "enemy" forces
today. He declared that, as a consequence, the success of ground
operations depends to a significant degree on the outcome of the
battle in the air-(General-Colonel of Tank Forces M. Zaytsev,
"Organizatsiya PVO-vazhnaya zadacha obshchevoy skovogo
komandira" (Organisation of air defence-an important
mission of the combined-arms commander), Voyennyy vestnik
(Military Herald), No. 2, 1979, p. 23). In a recent article in the
Polish military press a Polish military scientist explained that
.. the success of an offensive operation will largely depend on
depriving the opposite side of his (combat) capabilities and,
above all, on the elimination of nuclear missiles during the
conventional phase of battle" (Major (Diploma) Wojciech
Michalak, "Lotnictwo w dzialaniach rajdowo-manewrowych
wojsk ladowych" (Aviation in raid manoeuvre operations of
ground forces), Polish Air Review, No. 2, 1982, p. 5.
46 Soviet Military Power, pp. 40-43, and The Soviet Con-
ventional Offensive in Europe, pp. 16-18.
47 Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, in
his recent book, identifies the strategic nuclear forces as the
main component of the combat power of the Soviet Army and
Navy, "which serves as the principal factor in restraining the
aggressor" (N. V. Ogarkov, Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite
otechestva (Always in readiness to defend the Fatherland)
(Moskva: Voyenizdat, 1982), p. 49). Ogarkov's use of the word
"restrain" (sderzhivat') is typical of the manner in which the
Soviets relate their own concept of the political utility of military
power. In contrast, the Soviets always translate the American
concept of deterrence as ustrasheniye, a derivative of the Russian
verb for frighten or scare. As an example of this usage, Defence
Minister Ustinov quotes the President Reagan's statement on
the subject of "preventing any war with the help of deterrence
(ustrasheniye)" which is, Ustinov charges, based upon the con-
cept of "balance of fear" (ravnovesiye strakha). In essence, the
Soviet concept expresses the need to be able to hold the enemy at
every level of political and military conflict which, in turn,
requires the Soviet forces to be continuously prepared to do battle
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and win at every level of conflict should war occur. The Soviets
further assert that deterrence (ustlasheniye) is a concept associ-
ated exclusively with Western thinking.
48 The Soviets have clearly expressed their need for military
forces capable of waging any type of conflict. "The organi-
sational forms of the army and navy have been improved in
relation of the character of a probable war, the organisation of
the forces of the probable enemy, the conditions in the theatres
of military operations, the requirement of military art, and other
factors. The basis of the structure of military formations lies in
the possibility of conducting combat operations both with the
use of nuclear weapons and with only conventional weapons.
Consequently, a well-proportioned military organisation has
been created, permitting the accomplishment of missions of any
scale under any conditions" (Lt. Gen. M. M. Kir'yan, ed.,
Voyenno-tekhnicheskiy progress i voorvzhennyye sily SSSR
(Military-Technical Progress and the Armed Forces of the USSR)
(Moskva: Voyenizdat, 1982), p. 326.
49 Soviet Military Power, p. 40.
50 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
Multi-National Peace-Keeping Forces
By Major J. C. G. MACKINLAY, 6GR
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official opinion.
Within the space of a year two multi-national forces
have been established in war zones to the north and
south of Israel. On the southern border the Multi-
national Force and Observers (MFO) are deployed in
the Sinai and to the north in Beirut is the Multi-
National Force (MNF). Both forces are successfully
carrying out their tasks and neither was authorised nor
constituted by a United Nations mandate. However,
here the similarity ends, for the MFO in Sinai and the
MNF in Beirut are totally different in their role,
composition and political genesis. In this article the
author, who served six months on the MFO force HQ
in the Sinai and also carried out a comparative study
with the British contingent in Beirut, sets out to show
what their differences are and assess whether the multi-
national concept (if there is such a thing yet) is likely
to open a new chapter in the development of peace-
keeping operations.
The MFO in Sinai
The background
The significance and result of the Camp David
agreement are already well known. The withdrawal of
the Israelis to the line of the 1949 armistice boundary
now running from Eilat to Rafah was a major con-
cession to the Egyptians; nevertheless both parties
were able to see that if the agreement was to survive
national and international vicissitudes in the long
term, a caretaker force would he required to assist in
supervising the mutual observation of the treaty.
However, it soon became clear to all parties that the
UN mandate which would have authorised such a
force was likely to be blocked in the Security Council
by the Soviet veto. Undaunted, the Americans together
with the two parties took the unprecedented step of
convening a multi-national trustee force which became
established outside the framework of the United
Nations.
At the time there were doubts as to the credibility of
a peace-keeping force which lacked the assent of such
a powerful member of the UN. However, as we are
about to see there are (fortuitously), a number of
spectacular advantages to this arrangement which
only became apparent after the force had deployed
to the desert. After the decision had been taken to go
ahead, the embryo phase of the MFO was spent in the
Landmark building in Virginia near Washington.
Here, two important tasks were carried out. The first
was to negotiate the status of the soldiers of the nations
which had agreed to participate-both within the force
and within the two host nations. It is interesting to note
that not all nations agreed to the same status. The
second was to establish a modus operandi and organise
a joint command structure which shared out authority
and responsibility agreeably among the nations.
The importance of this embryo phase in Washington
deserves to be underlined several times. Not only did it
achieve the obvious requirement to convene the force
but it allowed the various key members of the staff to
function together as an entity before the component
units came under command and the force deployed to
the desert. This was a great asset. The national con-
tingents who arrived later were units who already had
well-tried procedures to follow in the execution of
their tasks. The force HQ had to devise a mutually
acceptable operating style which took account of their
differences in experience and attitude.
Geography
The geography of the Sinai was first recorded by
Moses who found it "a great and terrible wilderness".
Since the Exodus of the children of Israel, it has been a
much disputed and fought over triangle of land. Apart
from a few tarmac roads it has changed very little in
appearance. The treaty divided the area into four
zones, three of which were in Egypt and one in Sinai.
The authorised force levels varied in each zone. Zone
C, where the MFO deployed to, starts in the north at
the Mediterranean coast. Moving southwards the
zone crosses the broad margin of the coastal plain.
Here the sand is white and has been blown into: dunes
which lie herring-bone fashion for mile after mile in
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