OGARKOV TELLS HOW SOVIETS CAN WIN WAR IN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030012-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: July 23, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030012-3 -
FEATURES/COLUMNISTS
WASHINGTON TIMES Pg. 1
23 July 1985
Ogarkov tells
how Soviets
can win war
in Europe
By Yossef Bodansky
SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov is the Soviet Union's most
important man in uniform.
He has formulated and implemented a new, compre-
hensive "grand strategy" for the Soviet Union holding
that not only are nuclear wars winnable by the side that
strikes first and without warning, but that, through a
massive lightning strike by modern conventional forces.
NEWS ANALYSIS
Soviet forces could achieve victory over NATO without
a single nuclear weapon being fired.
This Ogarkov "grand strategy" will dominate Soviet
defense policy until the next century.
By the mid-1970s, the Soviet military had achieved the
capability of mounting sudden, strategic deep offensives
without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. Based
on his high-level experience with U.S. attitudes in the
SALT I negotiations, Marshal Ogarkov realized that
American political and military leaders would agonize
over, and perhaps even forgo, making a decision to esca-
late unilaterally to the use of nuclear weapons in the
event the Soviets launched a non-nuclear invasion in
Europe.
Marshal Orgakov argued that, if the Soviets would
capitalize on the emotional biases of the United States,
they could complete the occupation of Western Europe
in the non-nuclear initial period of
war before Washington could decide
whether to resort to nuclear weap-
ons to stop the Soviet advance.
In other words, the deeper into
Western territory the Soviets could
penetrate in the initial non-nuclear
stage of the war, the less likely the
Americans would be to use nuclear
weapons to stop them.
Furthermore, reasoned Marshal
Ogarkov, if the Soviets, having in the
first instance a clear nuclear superi-
OGARKOV ... Pg. 2-F
PART II -- MAIN EDITION -- 23 JULY 1985
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Pg. 9
23 July 1985
France is rethinking
its `inde endent'
p
defense posture
New consensus raises hopes
for European cooperation on defense
By William Echikson
Special to The Christian Science Monitor
Paris
France's defense plans are being revolutionized.
Instead of Gen. Charles de Gaulle's "independent" policy,
which reserved French forces for the defense of French national
territory, France now proposes to help guarantee West Ger-
many's defense.
In recent weeks, all of Dance's political parties except the
Communists have announced support for a plan that would
throw French forces into the fray at the beginning of a European
conflict. President Francois Mitterrand and West German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl discussed the issue briefly at a meeting
last week and are scheduled to explore it further at a special
summit in August.
The change in thinking brings France closer to the NATO alli-
ance. It also raises new possibilities for European cooperation on
defense, including the possibility that France would extend its
nuclear umbrella to West Germany.
"A new national consensus is being created," says
Dominique Moisi, director of the French Institute for Interna-
tional Affairs. "Many of the old ambiguities about our relation-
ship with Germany and our defense are being reduced."
General de Gaulle's "fortress France" strategy long had
looked unworkable. During the 1970s, then-President Valery
Giscard d'Estaing began suggesting that French independence
would have little substance if West Germany were overrun.
During the early 1980s, President Mitterrand edged closer to
a more European concept of defense, activating the security
clause in the 1963 Franco-German friendship treaty and creating
the rapid action force, which could intervene quickly in
Germany.
Still, de Gaulle's legacy proved difficult to overcome. Mr.
Giscard d'Estaing's Gaullist allies, upon whom he was depen-
dent for a parliamentary majority, ruled out any strategic shift.
And Mitterrand did not move too fast out of fear of undermining
the national consensus on defense.
Now the old consensus has shifted. In
late June, the Gaullists abandoned their
archaic doctrine. In early July, the Social-
ists joined them, even declaring that the
FRANCE ...Pg. 2-F
1-F
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PART II -- MAIN EDITION -- 23 JULY 1985
F-20...from Pg. 4-SR
ent radar and would dispense with jam-
ming equipment, bomb racks and other
equipment for air-to-ground attack. As
General Dynamics figures it, that would
make its plane about $2 million cheaper
than an F-20. General Dynamics says its
specially configured F-l6C should be
compared with the F-20, but Northrop
draws comparisons between its plane and
the regular F-16C.
Still, despite all the lobbying, there are
more questions than answers. What if the
Air Force decided to purchase fewer than
396 F-20s? Would Northrop be able to
make enough foreign sales so that the
price would not go up?
Is the mission of continental air de-
fense sufficiently important that a new
type of aircraft needs to be purchased to
funnel more planes to the Air National
Guard, especially
now that the Air
National Guard
Association has
said it does not
want the planes
unless there are at
least two squad-
rons of F-20s in the
active Air Force?
The new Gen-
eral Dynamics of-
fer also deserves
scrutiny. The offer
has led to mislead-
ing press reports
that a price war
has been encour-
aged. But General
Dynamics execu-
tives say that they
have not cut into
their profit mar-
gin. As a June 17
letter to Orr and
Air Force Chief of
Staff Gen. Charles
A. Gabriel states,
the cost saving "is
achieved by the in-
clusion of selected
mission-specific
systems and the re-
moval of other
equipment."
Would the Air
Force and General
Dynamics seek to
add more sophisti-
cated equipment
to the stripped-
down plane once it had been purchased?
The company's new proposal advertised
that "future systems, such as sensors and
avionics, can be easily added.... " If
JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY
13 July 1985 (23) Pg. 69
Test aircraft covers for
B-1 B's mechanical hitch
By Hugh Lucas in Washington
THE US AiR FORCE, introducing the new
Rockwell International B-1B bomber to its
operational force at a ceremony attended by
senior officers and an audience of 45 000 at
Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, had one
problem. The bomber was in Nebraska, with
mechanical trouble.
So instead of the first production B-IB
taking part in the ceremony, a test aircraft
had to be flown from California to fly over
the gathered crowd.
The scheduled aircraft had been grounded
at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, the day
before, where it had gone to be displayed to
Strategic Air Command headquarters
personnel.
A spokesman said that parts in its air-
conditioning equipment had become
detached and some could have entered the
engine intake during flight.
As it was, he said, two of the engines
sustained damage during the flight just
before touchdown at the base near Omaha.
The programme had been cancelled in 1977
by President Carter in favour of building up
the air-launched cruise missile force.
President Reagan then restarted it in 1981 as
part of his massive continuing military
build-up.
Rockwell is to reach a production rate of
four aircraft per month in September 1986
and continue until 1989 when the 100-aircraft
order is to be completed, unless more are
authorised. It is to be joined by the Stealth
bomber, now under development by
Northrop Corp, in about 1992 as part of the
Pentagon's 'triad' weapons strategy.
Dyess will eventually be the base for 29
B-IBs for an operational wing of 24, which
will train all the pilots.
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
29 July 1985 (23) Pg. 16
Latest worry for the Pentagon: Evi-
dence that its newest fighter planes,
with their sharp maneuvering ability,
can build up such high gravitational
forces as to cause blackouts among
pilots. Some recent crashes are blamed
on the phenomenon.
some F-20s were purchased, would the
price for the specially tailored F-16C
stand? General Dynamics has condi-
tioned-the offer on an Air Force commit-
ment to fill its active inventory with F-16s
and not F-20s, but that may still be an
open question.
Both planes are likely to compete for
the Air Force's close air support mission.
But is either plane well suited for that
mission?
Finally, should the Air Force conduct a
"flyoff" between the tailored F-16C and
the F-20 instead of having the two air-
craft compete primarily on the basis of
cost?
Those questions may not be answered
before a commitment is made. But one
thing is not in doubt. "Northrop has done
a masterful job," said a defense industry
executive. "Whatever happens with the
plane, it's a major accomplishment that
they have gotten this far." ^
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PART II -- MAIN EDITION -- 23 JULY 1985
FRANCE-L. .from Pg. -
French nuclear force should have a role in
West Germany's defense.
A follow-up poll in the French daily Le
Monde showed that a majority of the pub-
lic agreed with this position.
Why the change in attitude?
The French fear West German paci-
fism and neutralism. In the French view,
the furor two years ago over the installa-
tion of United States Pershing missiles in
West Germany underlines the tenuous na-
ture of Germany's Western connection.
By offering a stronger military commit-
ment, the French hope to strengthen that
connection.
For different reasons, this argument
appeals both to right- and left-wingers.
Pierre Lellouche, a colleague of Mr.
Moisi's at the French Institute of Interna-
tional Relations, argues in a new book
that France must contribute more to
Western defense through West Germany
because of reports of growing Soviet mili-
tary strength. He says a 'weak, divided
Germany under constant Soviet pressure
also exposes France to Soviet pressure.
In another book, Regis Debray, a for-
mer Mitterrand adviser who is an outspo-
ken critic of the US, argues that France
and West Germany must forge a closer
defense partnership so that Europe can
gain greater independence from the two
superpowers. In his view, a weak, divided
Germany exposes France to both Soviet
and US pressure.
Money is the second motivating force
behind the strategy switch. Budget cut-
backs mean French defense expenditures
are not rising as much as expected, and
French officials admit privately that
France no longer can afford the cost of a
purely independent defense policy.
Hardest hit are the conventional
forces. Since France depends on its nu-
clear "force de frappe" for its primary de-
fense, the Mitterrand government decided
back in 1982 to reduce the number of foot
soldiers as well as the amount of conven-
tional equipment purchased.
Now the Armed Forces chief of staff,
Gen. Jeannou Lacaze, has revealed that
the Armed Forces will have 35 billion
francs ($3.9 billion) less to spend than
forecast through 1988. That translates
into a further 25 percent across-the-board
cuc. Instead of a planned 1,200 tanks,
there will be only 800. And so on.
Even the modernization of the "force
de frappe" may have to be slowed. Gen-
eral Lacaze suggests canceling develop-
ment of a new multiple-warhead subma-
rine-launched missile and of a new
land-based mobile missile.
Only a stronger defense partnership
with West Germany could ease these
looming deficiencies, French officials say.
France and Germany are producing an at-
OGARKOV ... from Pg.1-F
ority, threatened to escalate the con-
flict into an all-out nuclear attack on
the North American continent, they
would further complicate and pro-
long Washington's agonizing over
whether to use nuclear weapons.
This would buy more time for the
Soviet armed forces in which to com-
plete their non-nuclear occupation
of Europe.
The man who has sculpted those
forces is a professional soldier,
utterly loyal to Russia and the Soviet
system, and in return enjoys the total
trust of the "nomenklatura;' the
high-ranking, privileged bureau-
crats.
Earlier this month, Marshal Ogar-
kov's de facto supreme military
position was recognized publicly -
when the Kremlin reappointed him
first deputy minister of defense and
commander-in-chief of the Warsaw
Pact forces.
tack helicopter and an antitank missile to-
gether. French officials say a long list of
other projects, including a European
fighter plane, also is being considered.
But the French admit that this cooper-
ation faces big obstacles. They say that
the West Germans are pleased with the in-
creased French concern for their defense
- until it infringes on their relations with
the US. As far as the West Germans are
concerned, neither the Rapid Action
Force nor even the "force de frappe"
would provide a suitable replacement for
West Germany's basic defenses in
NATO.
"The Germans do not say exactly what
they want from us," complains one
French official. "They just don't know"
. The French also face problems. Join-
ing in West Germany's defense means
drawing closer to NATO, yet no one here
seems prepared for a French return to the
alliance's integrated military structure,
from which de Gaulle withdrew in 1967.
For the sake of "independence," French
officials say the subject remains "taboo."
Although Western defense officials
have long said NATO can live with such a
public pretense as long as the French co-
operate in private, the same officials fear
French and NATO strategies remain
incompatible.
As NATO talks more and more about
fighting a prolonged conventional war,
French strategy continues to stress the
early use of nuclear weapons. French de-
fense spending focuses on modernizing
the nuclear "force de frappe," NATO and
West Germany are emphasizing pur-
chases of conventional arms.
"We have made tremendous progress
on security issues with Germany in the
last year," concludes Moisi of the Insti-
tute for International Relations. "But
much ambiguity remains."
Nikolai Vasilyevich Ogarkov was
born on Oct. 30, 1917, in the Kalinin-
skaya Oblast in central Russia. He
finished vocational high school in
1937 and joined the army the follow-
ing year. In 1941 he graduated from
the Kuybyshev Military Engineer-
ing Academy and was posted to the
Karelian front against Finland
where, as a senior fortifications
engineer, he used slave and forced
labor supplied by Yuri Andropov.
This was the start of a 42-year
relationship with a man who later
rose to the highest ranks of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU), serving as a Central Com-
mittee secretary in the 1960s, then
KGB chief and finally, as CPSU gen-
eral secretary, becoming the nation's
top leader.
During the war, Mr. Ogarkov
accumulated diversified combat and
command experience in staff and
engineering posts in the Kola penin-
sula against Finnish-German forces.
After the war, he opted for a mili-
tary career, returning for advanced
courses at the Kuybyshev academy.
Until 1957, he served in senior com-
mand and staff positions in the Far
Eastern military district. In 1959, he
graduated from the Voroshilov Mili-
tary Academy of the General Staff,
a key event in the career of a future
senior commander of the Soviet
Armed Forces.
In December 1961, Mr. Ogarkov
was promoted from commander of a
motorized rifle division in East Ger-
many to chief of staff and deputy
commander of the important
Belorussian Military District and, in
mid-1963, to first deputy com-
mander of that district. These posts
gave him valuable experience in
command and control of combined-
arms formations.
After Mr. Ogarkov was made com-
mander of the very important Volga
Military District in December 1965
- which contains the supreme com-
mand post at Zhiguli near Kuyby-
shev (a city forbidden to foreigners)
on the Volga River, which would be
the supreme headquarters in the
event of nuclear war - he resumed
his close cooperation with Mr.
Andropov, who had become the KGB
chief.
The Zhiguli command post was
entirely rebuilt under Mr. Ogarkov's
overall supervision - a post for
which his engineering background
made him particularly qualified. In
recognition of the excellence of his
work, and with the rank of colonel
general, he was made a candidate
member of the Central Committee.
Gen. Ogarkov's brilliance in
trickery and deception operations
was displayed at this time, when he
began preparations for military
OGARKOV...Pg.4-F
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WASHINGTON POST 23 JULY 1985 Pg. 11
No 'Smoking Gun' on Nicaragua
Administration Says Hard Proof of Terrorism Must Stay Secret
By Joanne Omang
WaAmew Pad Staff wrmr
- The Reagan administration ap-
pears to be relying on newly cap-
tured documents and on the testi-
mony of a defector from the guer-
rilla forces in El Salvador to con-
vince a skeptical Congress and the
.public that Nicaragua should be
held responsible for past-and fu-
ture-attacks on U.S. citizens in
Central America.
However, the State Department
acknowledges there is no "smoking
NEWS
ANALYSIS
gun" in the publicly
available material that
links the leftist San-
dinista government of Nicaragua to
alleged terrorist training centers or
to particular terrorist acts. They
say classified reports do provide
that evidence but cannot be dis-
dosed, even if the secrecy weakens
public support.
In the administration's campaign
for support, officials are working
hard to replace the term "leftist
guerrilla" with the much more neg-
ative word "terrorist" in the public
mind, depicting the Sandinistas as
the center of an international broth-
erhood of bomb-throwers and the
Salvadoran rebel forces as Exhibit
A in that brotherhood.
Asked early last week for all
aavailable supporting evidence for
]'resident Reagan's July 8 assertion
that Nicaragua was "a focal point
for the [world] terrorist network,"
the State Department's Office of
Public Diplomacy provided a 21/2-
inch stack of unclassified documents
to The Washington Post.
The same documents, plus clas-
sified evidence, are "indications"
that the Sandinistas support and
"may be directly involved" in prep-
arations for future attacks on U.S.
personnel in Honduras, administra-
tion officials said later in the week.
The unclassified documents in-
cluded several recent and not-so-re-
cent public "white papers" and
briefing transcripts that outline ad-
ministration views, two newspaper
articles on international leftists liv-
ing in Nicaragua-reprinted from
The Miami Herald by the conser-
vative Cuban-American National
Foundation-and two unbound re-
ports.
One report is an untitled set of
analyses of the "debriefing" of Na-
poleon Romero Garcia, alias Miguel
Castellanos, who was identified as a
former central committee member
of the guerrilla Popular Liberation
Front-one of the five groups mak-
ing up the El Salvador guerrilla co-
alition-and the political-military
commander of its San Salvador unit.
He was arrested April 11 and de-
cided to cooperate with the Salva-
doran government, the document
said.
The other report, entitled "Anal-
ysis of Documents Captured by the
Salvadoran Army, April 18, 1985,"
outlines papers it says were cap-
tured with Nidia Diaz, a senior com-
mander of the Central American
Workers' Revolutionary Party,
PRTC. by its Spanish initials, anoth-
er group in the coalition.
A faction of the PRTC claimed
responsibility two months later for
the June 19 shootings of 13 people,
including six Americans, at a San
Salvador cafe, and the administra-
tion last week blamed those mur-
ders indirectly on Nicaragua.
Reagan's national security affairs
adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, said
Friday that the charges "derive
from our knowledge, which is very
concrete, that Nicaragua does sup-
port the PRTC." He and other of-
ficials declined to discuss any ev-
idence of Nicaraguan activity in
Honduras.
The Nidia Diaz report includes
copies of letters from the guerrilla
coalition to the Sandinistas discuss-
ing aid flow to the coalition, al-
though. not specifically to the
PRTC. The papers include a discus-
sion of the meaning of the U.S. in-
vasion of Grenada in October 1983,
lists of Salvadorans being sent to
training courses in communist bloc
countries, a training diagram of a
surface-to-air missile, and a revo-
lutionary handbook.
The report also includes a copy of
an April 1984 meeting agenda that
lists "possibility of Honduran doc-
umentation," "relations with Hon-
duran military" and "possiblity of
communications network" involving
Honduras and Managua.
A document copied in the report,
entitled "Territorial Efforts That
the Party Will Make," includes un-
der "Eastern Front" the notation,
"to continue directing the work in
the interior from the refuge located
in Honduras."
These, a State Department of-
ficial said, were part of the admin-
istration's proof of Nicaraguan ac-
tivity in Honduras, but "not the
smoking gun" indicating terrorist
planning. That information remains
classified, he said.
The guerrilla coalition has de-
nounced these descriptions of the
Diaz papers as lies and forgeries.
Testimony from the defector Ro-
mero, like that of the Diaz report
and earlier defectors, described Ni-
caraguan aid to the Salvadoran
guerrilla coalition in general, rather
than to any specific group.
"According to Romero, materiel
given to the insurgents by Eastern
European countries is collected in
Cuba before being sent on-mostly
by air-to Nicaragua, where the
Sandinistas retain control over the
warehouses," one document said.
"Romero said that requests for
arms shipments are presented by
the Farabundo Marti National Lib-
eration Front [the guerrilla coali-
tion, or FMLN] leadership to a spe-
cial department of the Sandinista
government for approval, but that
the Cubans are actually in control."
For example, "he [Romero]
claimed that the FMLN was re-
quired to submit an operational plan
to the Sandinistas" on the use and
transport from Nicaragua of sur-
face-to-air missiles the Sandinistas
had reportedly authorized. But the
SAMs never arrived, Romero told
his debriefers.
Instead, "according to Romero,
the Sandinista leadership is divided
over aiding the Salvadorans," the
report said. Nicaraguan Defense
Minister Humberto Ortega, Inte-
rior Minister Tomas Borge and
Foreign Affairs Coordinator
Bayardo Arce "agree with the Cu-
bans, who see aid to the FMLN as
the 'proper role'. for Nicaragua in
NICARAGUA... Pg. 4-F
1-F
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was appointed deputy minister of
defense. In January 1977, he was
promoted to marshal of the Soviet
Union and appointed chief of the
general staff and first deputy minis-
ter of defense. He was also made
Hero of the Soviet Union.
All of his promotions and honors
came earlier than would have been
expected and were unprecedented.
Marshal Ogarkov worked tire-
lessly for the modernization and
professionalization of the Soviet
military forces. His engineering and
command experience puts him in
the unique position of being able to
comprehend the latest scientific-
technical developments and to follow
the development of military doc-
trine, science and the art of war.
Furthermore, Marshal Ogarkov
entered the general staff deter-
mined to make a major impact. His
first task was to complete formula-
tion of a unified "grand strategy" for
the Soviet Union, He established a
small group of senior general staff
officers and theoreticians from the
main military academies to function
as his think-tank, studying the chal-
lenges of warfare in the future.
Ile himself is a prolific writer on
military theory and strategy. His
many articles and monographs, dan-
gerously neglected by Western mili-
tary strategists, provide a clear
pictureof' his sophisticated strategic
thinking and the depth of his mili-
tary knowledge.
Marshal Ugarkov was responsible
for the Zapad-81 military exercise,
in which the Soviet military forces
confirmed their ability to conduct a
non-nuclear, strategic deep offen-
sive. In this exercise, Soviet forces
were able to move in just a few days
across distances exceeding the dis-
tance between Minsk and Paris.
Subsequently, the Soviets have
committed themselves to winning
total victory in the non-nuclear ini-
tial period of war as their preferred
form of warfare if they go to war in
Europe. This is demonstrated by the
fact that the Soviets have profoundly
reorganized their entire armed
forces. The senior combat com-
manders have been entrusted with
unprecedented battlefield authority,
and they are assigned diversified
weapons ranging from air force
through chemical troops to tank
armies.
The Soviet Air Force, the fleet and
other forces were reorganized and
stripped of power in order to facili-
tate Marshal Ugarkov;s new combat
command structure.
Marshal Ogarkov envisages a t at-
t1e fought in the future as a series of
swift and massive engagements in
which huge combined-arras
superunits advance rapidly, despite
NICARAGUA... from Pg.3F
support of the 'international prole,
tariat,' " it quoted Romero as say-
ing.
None of the documents provide
any testimony or indications that
Nicaragua is being used as a train-
ing base by international terrorist
groups. The Miami Herald articles
name many European and Latin
American leftist revolutionaries in
Managua who were denounced as
terrorists in their home countries,
but quote western sources there as.
saying the city appears to be less a
headquarters than "a tropical sand-
and-surf watering hole for the in-
ternational revolutionary set ... a
winter barracks for over-repressed
guerrillas."
One key member of Congress
took a wait-and-see approach to the
available proof. "These are very
serious charges," said Rep. Dante
B. Fascell (D-Fla.), chairman of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee.
"We need more than this before we
start flying off the handle."
MAIN EDITION -- 23 JULY
OGARKOV ... from Pg.2-F
exercises intended to restore the
land battlefield as the prime form of
warfare. Some of the initial tests of
new weapons and tactics and the
development of the airborne forces
for the exercise were conducted in
Volga Military District in strict
secrecy. Gen. Ogarkov devised for
these exercises a major deception or
"maskirovka" project that would on
the one hand intimidate Western
observers by demonstrating the
might and sophistication of the
Soviet military and, on the other
hand, persuade NNI'O observers
that it was futile to consider the
Rhine as a defensive line.
Gen. Ogarkov had a special
floating bridge built and invented it
totally bogus "First Guards Bridge-
Laying Division" to lay it. An empty
train and truck caravan were raced
across. Until the defection of a
Soviet officer 10 years later, the West
was convinced that the bridge was
genuine.
Gen. Ogarkov's outstanding per-
formance brought him to the Polit-
buro's attention. In April 1968 he was
promoted, ahead of schedule, to gen-
eral of the army and was named first
deputy to the chief of the general
staff. His main assignment was
reactivation of the Chief Directorate
of Strategic Maskirovka - the
GUSM, or 13th Directorate in
charge of "strategic deception."
The Russian term "maskirova"
includes camouflage, concealment
and deception, and it does well to
consider the expertise, flair and tal-
ent for maskirovka of the Soviet
Union's commander-in-chief against
NATO.
As chief of strategic deception,
Gen. Ogarkov expanded his close
work with the KGB, and he and Mr.
Andropov personally were involved
in some of the most daring decep-
tions and disinformation operations
against the West. Many of these took
place during the 1969-71 SALT I
negotiations where Gen. Ogarkov,
while head of strategic deception,
was the top Soviet military delegate.
One would have thought that this
might have told the American SALT
negotiators something about Soviet
intentions.
Defectors from Soviet military
intelligence, the GRU and the KGB
credit Gen. Ogarkov personally with
the clever maneuver by which he
succeeded in drawing the United
States into self-exposure of its intel-
ligence capabilities by establishing
the precedent that all future negoti-
ations would be based solely on data
provided by the American side.
In recognition of his contribution
to SALT I, Gen. Ogarkov was ele-
vated to full membership in the Cen-
tral Committee. In March 1974, he
mounting casualties caused by a
massive use of guided munitions by
Marshal Ogarkov believes most
scientific-technological effort
integrating high technology into
Every new industrial facility and
most agricultural systems are built
putting a further strain on Eastern
Last month, Marshal Ogarkov
he a chilling, but not daunting,
eral, the master of strategic decep-
is a believer in pre-emptive first
strikes. U.S. strategic planners and
forces to carry out a pre-emptive
confirmed as commander over those
verv forces.
Yo.ssc.f Bodanskv is an analyst for
Mid-Atlantic Research Associates.
4-F
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030012-3
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030012-3
The
PART II -- MAIN EDITION -- 23
JULY 1985
AIR FORCE MAGAZINE
July 1985 (23)
Perception
Is the Reality
T HE fundamental fact of NATO is
that it is primarily a political al-
liance rather than a military one. It
is based on voluntary participation
by nations who did not surrender
their sovereignty to join.
This has been its greatest
strength, enabling it to endure for
thirty-six years. It has also been the
source of its often-cited disarray
as independent-minded members
quarrel with each other on points of
both major and minor consequence.
Leading off an April 23 Aero-
space education Center Round-
table on NATO, Joseph J. Wolf, di-
rector of the Atlantic Council,
compared the Alliance to the Kon-
Tiki raft: "It wallows partly under
water most of the time, but it
doesn't sink." Despite the tensions,
the Roundtable panelists said,
NATO still has the strong support of
member governments and a major-
ity of the citizens in Europe and in
the United States.
Even political pronouncements
by leftist factions may be less signif-
icant than they sound. "There has
been a pattern of opposition parties
being more extremist while they are
in opposition than they are when
they are in power," said Wolfgang
Pordzik of the Washington office of
the Konrad Adenauer Siftung.
A great many of NATO's real prob-
lems have to do with the diverse inter-
ests, the intentions, and the commit-
ments of the member states.
"In NATO, the perception is the
reality," said Russell E. Dougherty,
AFA Executive Director. To deter
an adversary from aggression, "you
have to deny any perception of suc-
cess if the other side uses its forces.
In o:-der to do that, you have to pre-
pare a fighting force." Consensus to
fel.. that deterrent force depends
on convincing people that it is nec-
essary to do so-another percep-
tion.
The biggest perception issue of
the lot, however, is the credibility of
the US guarantee to use its strategic
nuclear weapons, if need be, to pro-
tect Western Europe. Doubts about
the continued validity of that guar-
antee stem from an "irreducible dif-
ference" in strategic interests, said
Dr. Jeffrey Record of the Institute
for Foreign Policy Analysis.
In the beginning, the NATO na-
tions pledged themselves to regard
an attack upon one as an attack
upon all. Over time, confidence in
this principle has diminished.
"As the nuclear balance shifted
from one of substantial [US] nuclear
superiority over the Soviet Union to
one of parity, it became less and less
credible to believe that an American
President would risk the homeland
of the United States on behalf of any
other entity than the United
States," Dr. Record said. As close
as US and European interests may
be, they are not identical. "It is in
our strategic interest to confine any
war in Europe to the European the-
ater," Dr. Record said. "Under-
standably, the Europeans take a dif-
ferent view."
"If there is war in Europe, con-
ventional or nuclear, the Europeans
are not sure who will win-.but they
are certain who will lose," said
Gen. William Y. Smith, USAF
(Ret.), former Deputy CINCEUR
and rapporteur for the Roundtable.
The best evidence of US commit-
ment'to defend Europe is the pres-
ence of US troops on European soil.
"It is extremely important for rea-
sons of deterrence and European
confidence in the American guaran-
tee that Americans get killed in the
first hours of an attack on Western
Europe," Dr. Record said. "It might
also be important for some Europe-
ans to be in the Persian Gulf so that
when the first battalion of Marines
is wiped out defending European
- Pg. 125
NATO may be an untidy
alliance, but it endures
and gets the job done.
oil, a few Europeans will get shot in
the process."
A recurring question about Euro-
pean defense is what the French-
who polled their forces out of
NATO in 1966-would do in the
event of conflict. "I would suspect
that, in time of crisis, their territory
and their forces would be made
available to the Alliance," said Lt.
Gen. George M. Seignious, USA
(Ret.), president of the Atlantic
Council. He expressed concern that
France, as a free agent operating
outside of the NATO structure,-
"could preempt the use of nuclear
weapons."
"The French may be a little diffi-
cult at times, but they're even more
difficult for the Russians, aren't
they?" said Air Vice Marshal
Ronald Dick, the British Defense
Attache in Washington. "There's no
question in my mind that the French
would use [their strategic forces,
and I'm sure the Russians under-
stand that, too. The presence of this
volatile, unpredictable, separate
nuclear entity on the end of the Con-
tinent seems to me to be more bene-
ficial than too difficult for us to deal
with." A key element is perception.
Perception also figures in more
NATO problems, particularly the
testy question of its financial sup-
port. Many Americans feel that the
Europeans do not bear their full
share of the expense. Europeans
point out that they increased their
defense spending by twenty-three
percent in the 1970s while the US
was cutting back on its own. The
end of the argument is nowhere in
sight.
Despite some of the percep-
tions-and because of others--
NATO is still getting the job done
after thirty-six years. And it is still
demonstrating its ability to muster
up cohesiveness and determination
when it has to have them. ^
Ll-F
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030012-3