DIMINISHING THE NUCLEAR THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
DIMINISHING
THE NUCLEAR
THREAT
NATO'S DEFENCE
AND
NEW TECHNOLOGY
THE BRITISH ATLANTIC COMMITTEE
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
DIMINISHING
THE NUCLEAR
THREAT
NATO'S Defence and
New Technology
"The West needs aStrategy." -Lord Carrington,
Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, 1983.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
DIMINISHING THE NUCLEAR THREAT
NATO's defence and new technology
Page
FOREWORD By Marshal of the RAF the 5
Lord Cameron of Balhousie
INTRODUCTION 9
CHAPTER I POLITICS AND POLICIES
Five ways the deterrent requires
improvement, and how the new
technology could help.
1. Cost
2. The nuclear dimension
3. Outside Europe
4. Star Wars
5. Arms Control
CHAPTER II THE NEW TECHNOLOGY 27
How it could affect the battlefield
CHAPTER III THE DEFENCE NEEDS
Remedying NATO's battlefield
weaknesses
1. Overall Strategic
2. The Air/Land Battle
3. Maritime
Implications for Britain
CHAPTER IV IS THE WEST CAPABLE OF 49
TAKING THE R[GHT DECISIONS?
The need for a logic of priorities
1. NATO
2. Britain
PROPOSALS 59
THE ARGUMENT 61
This report does not necessarily represent the views of all members of
the British Atlantic Committee or its Council.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
By Marshal of The Royal Air Force The Lord Cameron,
President of The British Atlantic Committee
In 1980 The British Atlantic Committee asked me to chair a Group
which would report on "A Global Strategy" for NATO. This was a
task which the BAC was unusually qualified to undertake. NATO is
our business; we are fortunate enough to have among our ranks a
good number of members who have served NATO in the highest
appointments; U.K. permanent representatives, military
commanders, officials who have worked the machine from the inside
and know it, so to speak, inside out. 'There can be few groups in
Britain with more concentrated experience of NATO's problems.
The need to look afresh at these problems at that time was brought
to a head by the challenges which the Alliance was facing in two new
dimensions: the non-military threat, and the Soviet adventures
outside Europe. These challenges were seen by different member
countries in conflicting ways, causing such tensions in the Alliance
that even its survival could not be taken for granted. Those of us who
believed in it had to argue the case for active unity against the
centrifugal pressures of fifteen governments.
At the same time, a third dimension was opening up: the home
front. Never before in its 30 years had the public so actively debated
the raison d'etre of NATO, and demanded explanations for some of
its policies. Here again the BAC was in the middle of things, for our
business has been not only to tell people about NATO, but to listen
to their reactions; even the best salesmanship needs consumer
research. The majority of every member country endorses the
principle of the Alliance. But aspects of its policies have caused
doubts among responsible electors who are, after all, NATO's
masters. The BAC is thus uniquely placed to help to keep NATO
policies in step with British public opinion, as well as influencing that
opinion.
The present document brings this work up to date. It seeks to find
a way through the turbulence of pressures which NATO should be
considering in the light of the new military technology, and to chart a
way forward which will command the respect of the Alliance as a
whole. Numerous studies have been made of particular aspects of the
new technology, but few have attempted to illuminate, let alone
integrate, its many implications -political and economic as well as
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
military - into a single strategic conspectus. This has been our
purpose.
The main issues are now emerging. The doctrine of "flexible
response" needs to be replaced. The new technology offers the
opportunity to do this. But it could be expensive; and conventional
weapons costs are already rising astronomically. Meanwhile the
threat to the world's stability lies increasingly outside Europe.
This may sound to some like an insoluble concatenation of events.
But we know that it is not so. We know, for instance, that NATO is
not well organised, let alone stripped for action. Though it spends
considerably more on defence than the Warsaw Pact, the end product
is a smaller amount of hardware. We are not clear about our strategy,
let alone how to implement it. We know, in other words, that we can
do better.
In a real sense, NATO has succeeded; but there are now new and
different pressures bearing on it. We must see clearly what needs to
be done, and then work more harmoniously and purposefully to
achieve it. In this endeavour, if we get it right, I have no doubt that
we will have the public on our side. This paper is a contribution to the
urgent task of getting it right.
It has been agreed by the following Group under my
Chairmanship:
General Sir Hugh Beach
Sir Frank Cooper
Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker
General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley
Hugh Hanning
Brig. Kenneth Hunt (Vice-Chairman)
Prof. Sir Ronald Mason
Major-General Christopher Popham
CAMERON.
London, February 1984
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organis~,ation
WP Warsaw Pact
PGMs Precision Guided Munitions
VSTOL Vertical or Short Take-off and Landing
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
SSN Nuclear attack submarine
SSK Diesel attack submarine
ASM Air to surface missile
SSM Surface to surface missile
EW Electronic warfare
C3 Command, Control and Communications
ECM Electronic Counter-Measures
IFF Identification Friend or Foe
S/O Stand-Off
GIUK Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap
FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area
RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle
(N)AEW (NATO) Airborne Early Warning
Battlefield nuclear weapons: Those confined to the area of the
immediate tactical struggle, with
ranges up to 100 kms.
Theatre nuclear weapons: These can also be delivered to the
battlefield, but their ranges are
greater.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
INTRODUCTION
TOWARDS WORLD ORDER
Developments in science and technology have been so fast and far-
reaching in their implications for war and peace that they demand a
reconsideration and restatement of the basic purposes of the West.
The aim, transcending even that of disarmament, which can only
be a palliative, must surely be the pursusit of peace through systematic
progress towards world order. This is easy enough to advocate but
exceptionally difficult to put into practice. It involves understanding,
controlling and using science and technology -mastering them, and
not allowing them to run away with the world.
The principal danger to peace today is that we live in an age of
world anarchy. This is something fairly new. From the end of World
War II to the 1970's, a degree of order was assured by the hegemony
of the United States. The arrival of the Soviet Union as asuper-power
changed that. So too did the large increase in the number of
sovereign, but not necessarily orderly, states coupled with the
widespread access to arms and technology. Today a visitor from Mars
would be amazed at the way in which the human race, equipped with
the ability to kill millions of its members either by nuclear or
conventional means, conducts its affairs with less understanding and
regulation than exists in the average parish.
Against this background, a real improvement in world order is a
modest enough ambition in all conscience. It might be defined as
moving step-by-step towards the acceptance and observance of codes
of conduct, understood by all and preferably enforceable, designed to
diminish and prevent organised violence. At the moment, this
situation simply does not exist. The need for it to exist is widely
recognised.
Deterrence means preventing war -not simply nuclear war but
conventional war. It has unquestionably kept the peace for more than
a generation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the
Warsaw Pact. Deterrence is a form of implicit communication which
declares simply to any would-be aggressor that the price to be pair; for
aggression would be unacceptably high. In recent years, partly
because of international politics and partly because of the rapid
growth and far-reaching effects of the explosion in science and
technology, doubts have grown in the West about the credibility of
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
the deterrent. This, in turn, has tended to create instability, not least
because the West is an open society whereas the East is a closed
society, in which these questions are not open for public debate and
discussion. There is, therefore, a need for recognition and
restatement of the meaning and practice of deterrence; for, like other
mechanisms, it has developed weaknesses with the passage of time.
These need to be explored and remedied. The growth of science and
technology provides an opportunity to ensure effective deterrence in
the future. There must be explicit and convincing communication
about it both within our own NATO nations and to any would-be
aggressor.
Flexible Response
At the core of present doubts are questions about the continuing
validity of NATO's military doctrine. At present NATO's
conventional forces are so inadequate relative to Warsaw Pact forces
that the risk of the West having to resort to nuclear weapons to repel
aggression at an early stage in any conflict is high.
Conversely, no one could conceivably seek a situation where it was
possible to wage a long drawn-out conventional war; the toll would be
horrifying. What is required is a situation which makes it clear and
beyond reasonable doubt that the risks and price of any form of
warfare are unacceptably high. This situation is not being achieved
under the present NATO strategy of Flexible Response, which is now
more than twenty years old and which has been neither re-examined
nor seriously re-stated during that time.
Flexible Response was adopted in 19671argely at the urging of the
United Statcs, which wanted a longer period to assess the scene
before putting American cities on the line as part of the strategic
nuclear exchange. The doctrine envisaged a graduated raising of
NATO's level of response to an invasion, rather than sudden
escalation to the strategic level. It would start with conventional
forces, and if these proved inadequate, it would ascend to battlefield
and then long-range theatre nuclear weapons, in both of which
NATO was then superior. At that time it was hoped there would be
a substantial increase in NATO's conventional capability and this
would remove, or at least postpone, the necessity of initiating the use
of nuclear weapons. But this increase did not materialise. On the
contrary, the conventional balance has tilted still further against
NATO, so that today Flexible Response signifies the early use of
battlefield nuclear weapons. At the same time the WP has acquired
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
nuclear parity at all levels, so that this doctrine has ceased to retain
much credibility as a deterrent, and needs to be replaced.
Where Technology can help
Technology now offers a genuine opportunity to reform strategy and
re-inforce deterrence. By acting as a force multiplier, it can
increasingly roll back the West's present over-dependence on nuclear
weapons. These weapons will not disappear; they cannot be
disinvented. But it should be possible to create a credible non-nuclear
deterrent which is an essential part of deterrence. This will mean
structural changes for the Alliance. It must affect traditional ways of
thinking in NATO's armies, navies and air forces. It could also have
significant effects on the relationship between the United States and
Europe. But well thought-out and organised change is the life-blood
of any living and vital organisation.
None of this will diminish the need for a substantial strategic
deterrent to match that of the Soviet Union. Equally, it will not
diminish the need to bring about reductions on both sides in the
current super-abundance of such weapons. Nor, as we argue in
Chapter 1, does it affect the issue of "first use", for which theatre
nuclear weapons will still be needed. But a greatly enhanced
conventional capability would ease the appalling dilemma of having
to decide whether to initiate an early exchange of nuclear weapons.
No-one can win a nuclear war.
Hence, technology offers the prospect of removing the need to
deploy such a comprehensive spectrum. of nuclear weapons as both
sides now possess, and enables us to think clearly and positively for
the first time about a minimum deterrent. The present weapon
arsenals are far in excess of the needs of deterrence. There is no
security requirement for weapons to include "every rung of the
nuclear ladder". The concept of controlled, step-by-step, escalation
is impractical nonsense in an unpredictable and largely
uncontrollable and chaotic situation. The world would, in fact, be a
safer place if some of these rungs were removed now. They merely
encourage theories of nuclear war-fighting. The West possesses too
many weapons systems and means of delivery for the task it is trying
to achieve. So too does the Soviet Union.
Other weaknesses
By bringing to an end the present concept of Flexible Response, and
its over-reliance on nuclear weapons in large numbers, technology
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
can make good this central weakness of deterrence. Meanwhile,
there are other weaknesses; and here too technology can help. One is
the danger of surprise attack. Another is the extension of the East-
West conflict to arenas outside Europe, where political
understandings, let alone guidelines, do not exist. Another is outer
space. Technology can be invoked in these areas too -for example,
through satellite and other forms ofreal-time surveillance - to reduce
the danger of miscalculation.
Inevitably, technology carries with it Promethean problems of its
own. Fears have been expressed that it could turn the West's
conventional weakness into excessive strength and so increase the
risk of war. Some of these fears, currently being circulated, are
spurious. NATO is and always has been an Alliance committed to a
defensive strategy; but recognition of this fact beyond those directly
concerned with planning tends to be obscured by the notion
propagated around the pacifist camp-fires that the Atlantic Alliance
is aggressive in character like the Warsaw Pact.
It is remarkable that this idea has remained credible even while
unilateral nuclear disarmers have conceded that the conventional
resources of the Alliance are inadequate to sustain defensive
operations. Perhaps the fact is so plain as to defy serious argument to
the contrary: the military forces of NATO, including those of the
United States, altogether lack the means to wage anything but a
limited defence with conventional arms in general war and, given the
political aims in consonance with popular will among the member
nations, will continue to lack them. The consequence is that, in the
event of war, the choice of time, form and principal lines of opening
will lie with the Soviet Union, which itself commands now the means
for sustained offensive action.
Ability to strike back
Widespread public acceptance of this within the Alliance has not,
however, led to general agreement as to the form which
strengthening of conventional arms should take. Anxieties
concerning the event of nuclear war have prompted some outside the
consensus of pacifism to advocate what may be called a policy of
absolute defence: that is, exclusive reliance on weapons systems
capable only of defensive operation; for example, the anti-tank
guided missile as against the tank with its capability for offensive and
defensive action. Such a policy would commit NATO's forces to
defeat by progressive attrition.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
In seeking to improve the potential of the Alliance to defend itself
by conventional military action, the ideas in this paper are rooted in
the view that means must be disposed for limited or local offensives:
to strike back, for example, at enemy airfields and their associated
defences involved in operations against the Alliance or, at shorter
ranges, to counter-attack enemy armoured formations on the ground
with the aim of destroying them and recovering where practicable the
territory of nations attacked. There is thus a need to maintain the
capability currently disposed, albeit inadequately, by the tactical
strike aircraft, the tank and the submarine. Against the trend of rising
costs in military research, development and production, as also in
man-power, the question to be addre~~ssed is: how can a stronger
conventional defence be provided within the conceivable limits of
member nations' defence budgets?
Genuine fears
Strengthening NATO's conventional capability does, however, raise
genuine questions of a different kind. For example, if the West's
strategy did threaten the large-scale use of conventional missiles to
eliminate Warsaw Pact airfields, how could the Soviet Union be
certain that their appearance on its radar screens did not mean a
nuclear first strike? What form of agreement and inspection would be
needed to avert such a misunderstanding? How is Moscow to be given
sufficient reassurance to obviate the adoption of a "Launch on
Warning" posture which could undermine the whole purpose of
deterrence? Equally, how could Moscow reassure the West?
These issues cannot be shirked; for deterrence is an open concept,
not a closed one like war. It means nothing if a potential adversary
does not understand it; and therefore it can and should be discussed
with him, once it has first been thoroughly examined and understood
by ourselves. This is not the case today. Technology will certainly
pose greater arms control problems in the years ahead. It is time to
identify and take a view of them now. They will only be solved
internationally by systematic East-West consultation in which
Europe as well as the United States should play a full part.
Dialogue is essential
Without resolution and consultation, no amount of gadgets will be of
any avail: indeed, they could be counter-productive. As a central
contribution to world order, we need to establish between ourselves
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
and the Soviet Union the basic rules of co-existence: guidelines for
confidence and conduct; clearer understanding of what each side
considers intolerable, and crisper mechanisms for crisis management
if these guidelines should break down. For these purposes the present
level of communication, epitomised in the pre-printed hand-out, is
worse than nothing. Exchanging messages is no substitute for face-to-
face dialogue and discussion.
In this advocacy of world order there is nothing radical or Utopian.
Its central importance to peace is going to be brought home to us
sharply in the next decade when the two superpowers find themselves
confronted with a world from which their nuclear hegemony has
vanished, and their interests are threatened by small powers or
terrorists with nuclear weapons.
Efforts to prevent this happening have broken down since
Afghanistan. It is in the interests of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact
that they should be revived, and incorporated in a new non-
proliferation regime, along with progress in disarmament by the
superpowers. This will only be possible through closer cooperation
between the superpowers which, in turn, will involve recognition that
the logical alternative to the use of nuclear weapons is a new level of
world order.
We make no excessive claims for technology. It is not a magic
wand, an elixir, or Beachcomber's celebrated "Snibbo" which
claimed to be able to cure anything from foot-rot to cliff erosion. But,
in our judgement, it has a very large potential for good or ill, and for
war or peace. Deterrence is concerned exclusively with the
prevention of war. Its credibility needs to be restored. Technology
should be understood and used positively for that purpose before it
runs away with us.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
POLITICS AND POLICIES
Five ways the deterrent requires improvement, and how the new
technology can help.
Technology's potential can only be constructively considered in the
context of a framework of politics and policies.
The overriding aim must be the prevention of World War III. This
can be achieved only be effective deterrence -the prevention of
nuclear or conventional war -and by progress in arms control.
Deterrence has worked for nearly 40 years. The notion that peace
has been preserved by deterrence has lately been challenged by the
so-called peace movements ("so-called" because it can be strongly
argued that their policies will create instability and have exactly the
opposite effect to what is intended). Too often this scepticism about
deterrence has been rebutted rather defensively. Nobody can
absolutely prove, it is said, that peace has been due to deterrence.
True; but it is beyond all reasonable doubt. It does not take a
Thucydides to reach this verdict. During this century two major wars
occurred in Europe before 1945, and scores of wars have occurred
outside Europe since then. It is customary to ignore the appalling
damage and casualties that these conventional wars created. The
Battle of the Somme between lst July 1916 and 19th November 1916
resulted in 11/a million casualties. The British alone on 1st July lost
21,392 dead and 35,493 injured. One out of every seven of the 5'/z
million British subjects who took part in World War I was killed. Yet
the total death toll was only 17.7% of the 55 million killed in World
War II. Two conclusions can be reached. Deterrence must aim to
prevent conventional war. The concept of a long drawn out
conventional war is totally unacceptable as a basis for strategy.
Post-war Europe's freedom from war has been a unique
phenomenon. The reason why there has not been a third world war
must lie in an ingredient which is present. today but was absent in 1914
and 1939, and is certainly absent today outside the North Atlantic. By
elimination it is clear that this ingredient is the knowledge in the mind
of a potential aggressor of the consequences of any aggression.
Preventing miscalculation
This is precisely what was missing in 1914 and 1939. The Kaiser and
Hitler miscalculated. They did so because there was no clear
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
deterrence, and no trans-atlantic and European Alliance. There was
no warning of the possible consequences. Today that warning exists.
If it were removed, by the collapse of NATO, the trans-atlantic link
would be broken, and Europe would degenerate into an anarchic
group of nations lacking cohesion, as in the early parts of this century.
Once again the rule of the strongest would prevail, pressure would be
applied and liberties would be taken with the weak on a piecemeal
basis. With such a prospect it is not relevant to argue that Russia is a
defensive power with no more territorial ambitions. The fact is that in
this world of international anarchy, without a clear "no entry" sign
there is no assurance that the Soviet Union would not come into
North Norway, for example, as she did into Afghanistan. As things
are, she treats NATO with respect. There is no room for
miscalculation.
Deterrence .. .
What comprises this deterrence which thus commands Russia's
respect? It is the totality of consequences which would follow a Soviet
aggression in Western Europe. It is sometimes implied by Western
strategists that these consequences would be exclusively military. But
any attempt to see the view westward from the Kremlin windows
must recognise that a large segment of this deterrent is not military at
all but political, social and economic. The Politburo is deterred from
aggression by the knowledge that it would have to pay a crushing non-
military as well as military price for any territory gained. It would lose
all Western economic aid, all financial credit, all grain imports (which
currently comprise one-third of Soviet consumption), as well as
technology for its pipeline, and endure a multitude of other
developments, including possible insurrection in Eastern Europe and
guerrilla warfare in Western Europe. The Soviet Union would incur
worldwide isolation, its image in the Third World would be destroyed
and its economy wrecked. These prospects alone are a formidable
deterrent. They are even more formidable when complemented by
the military component of the Alliance.
..and Reassurance
In contemplating deterrence, we should never lose sight of the aim.
That aim is peace. Victory is not an option. Unfortunately ~ this
obvious fact is the subject of a strange astigmatism in some quarters.
Some say: "Of course there can be no victory. Just the same, we might
as well keep trying for it." Some would seek to break the Soviet
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
economy in an arms race. Others think of fomenting insurrection in
Eastern Europe. But NATO is and must remain a defensive alliance
and its relationship with the Warsaw Pact should be one of mutual
security. To reinforce this relationship, every artifice of reassurance
needs to be brought to bear.
Yet it would be idle to deny that in the West serious questions have
been raised about the effectiveness of the deterrent, and about
nuclear and conventional strategy, and about arms control. In
essence, these doubts centre around the issue of over-reliance on
nuclear weapons and perceived weaknesses in conventional
weapons. It is necessary to look at them and see how far technology
can help to remedy them.
What is inherently defective in the present system? We propose to
deal briefly with five main areas:
1. COST
Perhaps the most continuing cause of concern is the sheer cost of
weapons systems, particularly conventional ones. NATO has always
been unwilling to pay the price to match the Warsaw Pact in
conventional weapons -particularly tanks, guns and aircraft; hence
the doctrine of Flexible Response. Today, the cost of conventional
weapons is escalating at such a rate that strains are opening up all over
the Alliance; and the Warsaw Pact, with its longer assembly lines and
cheaper unit costs, is becoming relatively stronger. The problem is
strikingly illustrated by the fact that, during the last twenty years, the
number of fighting ships in the Royal PJavy has fallen by well over a
half, and the number of combat aircraift in the Royal Air Force by
nearly a half in the same period. This trend is evident in other
countries as well. Shortages of logistic preserves, particularly missiles
and ammunition are well known. It seems beyond the bounds of
possibility for the West, on the basis aF existing policies, to allocate
resources in such a way as to halt this trend, let alone reverse it.
In this context, new technology is something of a two-edged sword.
Some of it is very expensive. It raises, too, sharp dilemmas in terms
of industrial policies. On the other hand, as we shall show, it has the
welcome quality of a powerful force multiplier.
2. T'HE NUCLEAR DIMENSION
Cost escalation, unless checked by new policies, forces greater
reliance to be placed on battlefield nuclear weapons at a time when
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
such a policy is becoming illogical, dangerous and unlikely to be
totally credible to a potential aggressor. It is illogical because the
Warsaw Pact can now match the West in these weapons, which it
could not do when Flexible Response was introduced in 1967. It is
dangerous because such a recourse would devastate Europe, and
contains the high risk of nuclear escalation.
The contradiction contained in Flexible Response is now emerging
into the spotlight of public opinion. An increasing number of people
are unhappy with a defence policy over-biased in terms of vast
numbers of nuclear weapons which are unnecessary for deterrence,
are incapable of use in large numbers, and have little practical
significance.
Today there is strong public support for NATO, and rejection of
unilateral disarmament. Yet there is a risk that current disquiet may
develop into dissent in one or more members of the Alliance,
burgeoning eventually into outright disaffection. There is no real sign
of this at the moment. Yet disquiet must be recognised, because if it
is not, it could fester into the greatest danger of all - a Soviet
miscalculation based on the illusion that public opinion in one or
more sectors of NATO had become disenchanted with the Alliance,
and the political and public reaction to aggression had weakened.
Technology to raise the Threshold
For this reason alone it is important to resolve some of the
contradictions in NATO's defence policy, and thereby not only
increase deterrence but also enhance the willingness of the politicians
and the public to support it both morally and tangibly. Defence
requires greater credibility, and political and public unity, than
currently exist. The use of technology can raise the nuclear threshold
and offer, for a limited period, a more credible conventional defence
against the Warsaw Pact, and thus diminish the risk of early resort to
the use of nuclear weapons.
The need for a strong Western strategic nuclear deterrent to match
that of the Soviet Union would be unchanged; and the case for a
British strategic force would remain as strong as ever. Equally, some
theatre nuclear weapons would be needed, though in much smaller
numbers, to demonstrate the ability to retaliate. But it is now time to
question -
(i) whether the West needs slavishly to match the Soviet nuclear
armoury at every level. The complaint that one side or another
should not be allowed to have a "monopoly" of some particular
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
nuclear weapons system is particularly illogical and has little to
do with deterrence.
(ii) Whether the forward location of nuclear warheads any longer
makes either military or political sense. From their present
dispositions, the Warsaw Pact could destroy many of these
delivery systems in quick time. The weapons themselves would
present the Allies with the dilemma of "use them or lose them".
At the same time, Allied resources are currently diverted to the
conventional effort of protecting as well as supplying these
advanced depots.
First Use
There has been much discussion in the last year or two about "First
Use"; that is, being the first to use nuclear weapons in an existing
conventional conflict. There is no serious basis for arguing that if it
proves possible to raise the nuclear threshold, this would constitute
grounds for a declaration of no "First Lase". Such a declaration would
be either meaningless or undesirable. Either the Soviet Union would
not believe it -let alone make it a fund~.amental planning assumption
- so that it would be meaningless; or if they did believe it, then it could
encourage them to reconsider the possibility of conventional war, and
so it would be undesirable. The West should not give way on the
"First Use" issue.
As already remarked, NATO is a purely defensive alliance. it
seems to have been totally forgotten that the Heads of Government
at the Bonn Meeting in June 1982 made a public pledge that none of
its weapons, conventional or nuclear, would ever be used except in
response to attack. This is the fundamental truth to which we must
stick. In Europe particularly, the real fire-break is between peace and
any kind of war, and it is the breaching of this fire-break above all that
we must prevent.
Battlefield Nuclear Weapons
Many people question whether, in this age of nuclear parity, nuclear
weapons can ever be rationally used at all. Obviously their use in
large numbers would bring about unim~iginable destruction. It is also
salutary to remind ourselves of the damage that ten middle-yield
nuclear weapons could do. The right conclusion to draw is that there
is asuper-abundance of nuclear weapons deployed on both sides.
It is also argued that the "First Use" of any nuclear weapon would
escalate any conflict out of control. Thos would certainly be true if a
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
barrage of battlefield nuclear weapons were involved; such an
exchange would not only be extremely devastating in its own right,
but would almost certainly trigger off a major nuclear response.
Again, this argues strongly for the withdrawal of battlefield nuclear
weapons on both sides.
Demonstrative Use
Any East-West hostility in Europe would fall into one of two
scenarios: one in which Russia deliberately committed aggression,
and one where a chain of exceptional circumstances led to some kind
of hostility. The deterrent has ensured that the Soviet Union cannot
afford a war, and does not want one. If some kind of hostility broke
out by accident, then it would become necessary to make it
unmistakably clear that it had got to be stopped, and that the Soviet
Union had misread or miscalculated the situation. Essentially this
would be a matter for diplomacy; but time would be needed to ensure
that the situation did not escalate out of control.
Nevertheless, in any circumstances, the West should certainly
reserve the right to use the nuclear weapon in a strictly limited role,
with the purpose not of fighting a war but of conveying to the Soviet
Union that it had embarked on a course of action which would not be
tolerated. Clearly, any such use might provoke reciprocal action,
which argues strongly for any use by the West to be of the most
limited kind, and probably of a demonstrative nature.
3. OUTSIDE EUROPE
This area again presents a major weakness of the deterrent
philosophy. Where nuclear weapons exist in significant quantity, a
deterrent has worked and is well understood in an institutional
framework. This situation barely obtains outside Europe, to which
must be added the fact that there are few political understandings,
force is difficult to apply, and in some areas, law and order is at a
discount. The record has shown that there is considerable scope for
miscalculation, not only between the super-powers but also in smaller
conflicts. Cuba, the Congo and the Middle East are the classical
examples of the 1960's, and thereafter there is a long list; South-East
Asia, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and the continuing turmoil in
the Middle East are but a few examples. Problems of this kind will be
with us for the foreseeable future. Not enough has been done to
generate an effective dialogue within the West, let alone between
East and West. It is here that the real threats to world peace are at
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
their strongest. There is an urgent need for all these issues to be
addressed, and effective dialogues to take place.
What kind of part can technology play here? Clearly, the role is
more limited than in the institutionalised arrangements between East
and West; but there is certainly a great deal more scope for using
modern techniques for surveillance, as well as other means of
acquiring intelligence. Much more could be done in terms of
establishing warning measures and, when necessary, by the provision
of well-equipped international forces, in which NATO members
should be ready to play a part. The crux of the matter, however, lies
in the need for East-West agreement, in the context of world order.
It is these apparently localised issues which present a real risk of a
serious conflagration. It is therefore in tlhe interests of both East and
West to establish guidelines and procedures outside the NATO area.
Lack of such mechanisms was manifest throughout the 1970's as the
Soviets essayed a series of colonial adventures culminating in
Afghanistan, and at the same time strengthened its nuclear
armaments. The West became anxious, tried limited diplomatic
pressures and responded with its own nuclear rearmament. The last
was an understandable reaction, yet it had no bearing on the real
problem in hand. It did not get the Red Army out of Afghanistan.
The myth of nuclear diplomacy
Nuclear diplomacy and deterrence in situations of this kind are a
myth. Of all the instruments available for dealing with Soviet action
outside Europe, nuclear weapons are amongst the least relevant.
They sometimes seem to be treated as sovereign coinage in a market
where they have little or no value. Above all, they contribute nothing
to the introduction of clarity which is today's most urgent need in
East-West relations - rather the reverse. The most potent
instruments of pressure available to the V~Jest are simple conventional
military capabilities together with such steps as truly cohesive
political and economic action, pressure for Human Rights, stronger
broadcasting (soon to include TV) inside the Soviet Union and other
miscellaneous but powerful levers dependent upon the situation, and
above all on the united pressure of foreign states. These are dynamic
weapons. If they were consolidated into a coherent arsenal of
activity, and clearly related to a known code of conduct, at last some
clarity would be introduced into East-West relations. If the scope for
miscalculation is to be removed, particularly outside Europe, it will
not be by nuclear body-building exercises but through the evolution
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
within NATO nations of techniques for clarifying, defining and
following up East-West guidelines if there are violations: a tall order
but a necessary one. Conflict is certain outside Europe. There is an
urgent need to diminish the risk of larger conflicts as well as to
encourage the observance of law and order.
4. STAR WARS
If the European deterrent can be outflanked in Africa, Latin America
or Asia it could also be outflanked in space. This brings us to the
fourth weakness of deterrence. Unregulated competition in space
would give a further impetus to the arms race by arousing new fears
of a first strike. These fears would foment suspicion, exacerbate
international relations and destabilise the deterrent. The fear would
be that one side could wipe out the satellites on which the other
depended for warning against surprise attack, and for navigation,
targeting and command/control/communications, military and civil,
in the event of such an attack. There is no doubt that a great deal is
at stake. Some 70 percent of all US military communications overseas
are by satellite. The first target in a global war is likely to be the eyes
and the ears of the other side. But are these fears of a first strike
rational? Do they justify an acceleration of military programmes in
space? There is the potential of "directed energy" weapons, using
either a particle beam or a laser beam to impinge sufficient energy on
the target to destroy it. This capability has recently been advanced in
the United States through the energising of alaser by amicro-nuclear
explosion. The Soviet Union has tested conventional anti-satellite
missiles.
In the atmosphere, though laser weapons have been tested
successfully at very short range, the energy loss is such that it is hard
to foresee them developing an early long-range capability. In space
there is no such loss, and a beam could travel enormous distances at
the speed of light. The problem has been to project an energy source
of sufficient power into space. But it may be possible to overcome this
lack by space shuttle techniques. Both superpowers could have the
capacity to deploy anti-satellite weapons (ASATS) by around 1990.
A fantasy
Could the use of space in this way affect the military balance? Could
it produce a new defensive system which would be so effective as to
destroy deterrence? In President Reagan's "Star Wars" speech of
23rd March 1983 he apparently envisaged a capacity to shoot down all
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
incoming ICBMs through directed energy weapons. But later in 1983,
the laboratory fantasy seems to have been treated more prudently.
This is just as well; for it is only a fantasy. The truth is that there is a
fundamental qualitative and quantitative difference between doing
something once and being absolutely certain of having the ability to
do it with a 95% success rate against a large number of targets.
Existing international agreements prohibit the stationing of
weapons of mass destruction in space and interference with other
states' satellites. They do not constrain the deployment and testing of
non-mass destructive anti-satellite or anti-aircraft weapons in space.
By other standards, space is still relatively unspoilt. There is still a
flexibility in attitudes. The arms space race should be curbed now and
attempts made to convert it into cooperation. Satellite surveillance is
one of the great stabilising forces in the world today. As such it
benefits both sides. Both therefore have an interest in maintaining
that attitude, and in promoting it cooperatively, providing each can
be sure that the other is not cheating. Can this be done?
Calling it Off in Space
The Russians, having taken an initial lead in ASAT technology, now
fear being overhauled by the US programme directed from the new
Space Command.
They have proposed a treaty calling for a ban on the testing and
deployment of weapons in space and the elimination of all existing
ASAT systems. The US has disputed whether such an agreement
could be verified. A major problem is the large overlap between civil
and military uses; the ability to perform an in-orbit rendezvous could
be almost identical with the collision technique of an ASAT.
Yet the only military value of an ASAT capability would be one of
a scale which could knock out virtually every one of literally hundreds
of satellites simultaneously. This aim is in practice unrealistic; but any
attempt to achieve it must involve a massive ASAT programme which
could not be camouflaged as civil in intent. This offers a reasonable
scenario for verification. Coupled with the enormous cost of such a
programme, which must reduce its attractions to the military of both
sides, the space race could, if prudently handled, peter out for the
same reasons as the ABM race: a project which is in theory
technically feasible but which weakens deterrence, is militarily
unnecessary, diplomatically dangerous and economically ruinous. It
therefore offers little rewards to either side. There is much to be said
in favour of a Treaty which would forbid the testing in space, or
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
against space objects, of any weapon that can destroy, damage,
render inoperable or change the flight trajectory of space objects.
5. ARMS CONTROL
The fifth major problem, already mentioned, arises from the use of
technology to redress the conventional imbalance: namely, the
possibility that it may actually over-correct the inferiority of the
West, or be genuinely felt by Moscow to be doing so. Thus, finally, it
has to be asked: what deters, and what is considered to threaten?
The technology exists for the West to produce conventional
weapons capable of inflicting enormous damage on the Warsaw Pact,
not least by striking at its support forces, or second echelon, and its
air-fields and military concentrations, communications centres, and
logistic support centres deep in Eastern Europe. It may be suggested
that aircraft provide this capability at the moment; but they would
suffer large casualties, and are at present inadequately armed with
stand-off weapons. Failure of such strikes would increase the risk of
an early resort to theatre nuclear weapons.
Yet present technology can provide the ability, through precision-
guided conventional munitions with multi-purpose war-heads, to
bring about great damage and delay to any aggressor. Would such a
capability be stabilizing or de-stabilizing? Would it alarm the
Russians? Would it reduce the risk of an early resort to theatre
nuclear weapons?
Legitimate Soviet Fears
The Russians should have nothing to fear from NATO's conventional
weapons so long as NATO remains a purely defensive Alliance. No
Soviet leader could rationally fear a NATO conventional attack in the
way that they feared Hitler or Napoleon. This kind of technology
could never give NATO the conventional capability to invade the
Soviet Union.
What the Russians fear is devastation of their homeland. It has
happened twice in this century. It is a legitimate fear. It is heightened
by the West's over-dependence on theatre nuclear weapons. The US
Committee on the Present Danger stated strongly its belief in a Soviet
"Window of Opportunity" during the 1980's largely because of the
strength of the Soviet land-based nuclear forces. It is just as possible
that Moscow's strategists are equally concerned about an American
"Window of Opportunity" resulting from the increasing strength of
United States strategic underwater nuclear forces.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
More reliance on conventional technology would require a
clarification of the intentions and expectations of each side. If the
West plans to strengthen its conventionau defences, it should be ready
to explain to the Russians why it is doing so. In particular it would be
essential to demonstrate that all the changes were for defensive
purposes, and aimed at redressing Soviet conventional superiority, so
as to allow more time before being faced with the possible need to
resort to nuclear weapons.
Yet there are problems. One is illustrated by the Pershing II
missile. This has two of the three critical elements liable to generate
Soviet fear: it is nuclear and it has a short flight-time. It does not have
the third ingredient -the capability to reach Moscow from West
Germany. But the Russians claim to believe that it does. If it were
given conventional warheads, not only would the third problem
remain, but there is no known way of distinguishing a conventional
missile in flight from anuclear-carrying one. The same is true of
aircraft. Some kind of guidelines and internationally recognised
procedures are urgently required. With conventional weapons, such
as technology can now supply, it would not be easy for either side to
reassure the other that these could not be converted to dual-purpose
at short notice. But the other two criteria should be carefully
considered. Is it possible to give reassurance about range, by
reciprocal on-site inspection? Would this be accepted? As to flight-
time,there is avery strong case in favour of cruise rather than ballistic
missiles, since these provide, subject to location or launch point,
significantly longer warning time.
Indeed, it is arguable that confining a.ll cruise missiles to carrying
conventional loads would be a considerable step to clarifying the
whole position as to what weapon might be nuclear and what might be
conventional In a significant number of cases there is no way of
telling. This is a neglected and deplorable situation. We would
suggest that there is an outstanding need for full examination of this
problem, which seems to have been largely ignored.
Chemical Weapons
Finally, the Soviet Union has a large capability in chemical weapons.
This is an exceptionally destabilising factor because it is essentially a
unilateral threat to the West, and particularly Europe. The nature of
the threat is such that renewed efforts should be made to prohibit the
production and possession of such weapons. The Soviet Union must
recognise the risk that its possession of these weapons runs the major
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
risk that the West would be forced to resort to retaliation by nuclear
weapons. The Soviet Union's chemical weapons present a much
under-estimated threat to peace and are a positive incitement to
nuclear escalation.
The way ahead
To recapitulate: NATO is a defensive organisation. Its first and only
true task is to stay at peace with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact countries. To do this it must deter aggression, which means
preventing war by making it clear to any aggressor that the price to be
paid is unacceptably high. Nuclear weapons and conventional forces
are both essential ingredients of deterrence.
The deterrent has been weakened by the belief that it relies over-
heavily on nuclear weapons. This view is shared on both sides of the
Atlantic. So too is the belief that technology offers an opportunity to
strengthen our conventional defence capability. This would make the
deterrent more credible, raise the nuclear threshold, and make a
contribution to restoring public confidence in public policies.
Change would take years, not months. It would bring in its train
new domestic and international problems. These need to be
identified, examined and resolved. This paper now examines some of
the practical possibilities as a contribution to seeking a way forward
which will enhance the cohesion of the West, be understandable to
the East, and contribute to the security of all.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
THE NEW TECHNOLOGY
How it could Affect the Battlefield
Technology has long been identified as a majorforce multiplier. New
explosives chemistry and mechanical ~?ngineering made the major
contributions to weapons systems in World War I. In World War II,
physics and electrical engineering provided revolutions in capabilities
such as surveillance, communications and rocketry.
Today it is the wide range of electronics systems which is at the
centre of change: remote sensing, surveillance and communication by
space vehicles; tactical surveillance, precision-guided munitions, and
electronic support and counter-measures in the air, land and
maritime environments. These reflect 1:he West's technological lead
which, if properly exploited, can advance our ability to meet the
threat of numerically superior force and so enhance total deterrence.
In all of this, the key technological capabilities are those of sensors,
of signal/image/data processing and of communications into a
command and control function. The semiconductor device and circuit
and digital electronics are strategic technologies in both the civil and
defence sectors of the West. Active and passive sensor technology is
now capable of exploiting a great variety of characteristics and
parameters of targets -shape, size, temperature, radar cross-section,
speed and direction, electromagnetic emissions and so on - so that,
inter alia, a major force multiplier of the past, viz. surprise, is much
more difficult to develop and sustain. Exploitation of target
characteristics is also at the centre of developments in accurately
guided missiles. Here, typically, thermal and/or acoustic signals are
received by an appropriate sensor, and advanced signal processing
via digital electronics provides for the necessary discrimination and
guidance. As was so dramatically brought out in the recent
confrontations in the Lebanon and South Atlantic, the guided missile
brings an entirely new dimension to vulnerability on the electronic
battlefield, so that a force based on more conventional systems is
having to consider a range of expensive counter-measures if
investment is not to be wasted.
The tactical management of resources, of exploiting interactions
between various systems - in short, of tactical command and control
- is lending itself increasingly to automation, with information
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
technology (the coupling of advanced computers to
telecommunications) having major force multiplication properties
which come from sensible and sensitive combinations of various
assets. Essential to future developments in information technology
will be the evolution of artificial intelligence - so-called expert
systems, which will be able to absorb increasingly complex
information and will thus be instrumental in further changing the
man-machine interface. There is a need to recognise the impact which
opto-electronics may have on the battlefield, and in particular the
laser sensor damage weapon against relatively unsophisticated
sensors.
To get the best out of this technology, there must be a clear
dialogue between demand and supply. The operational requirement
must be articulated, but it must be within the range of feasibility. This
means that it must be both effective and survivable. If it is not
survivable it will not justify the very large sums of money which such
projects can consume.
It is thus appropriate first to summarise the broad categories of
artefacts which technology can offer between now and the end of the
century, recognising that they are likely to be equally available within
a short time to the Soviet Union. In Chapter 3 we consider how these
opportunities offered by technology relate to the operational
requirements of NATO.
The central contribution of the new technology is by way of force
multiplication. We must continue to base our response to threats not
on matching of numbers but on the exploitation of asymmetries in
technology capabilities between the West and the Warsaw Pact.
1. Surveillance
For NATO the first application of the force multiplier should be to
counteract the primary advantage of any adversary: surprise. A sine
qua non of deterrence is thus not only the ability to provide real-time
warning of mobilisation, but also the capability to assess the
combined significance of intelligence from many sources. NATO has
command and control needs not only in the military but also the
political arena. Its arrangements need constantly testing, to guard
against allowing the increasing flow of data to choke the assessment
apparatus.
Adequate strategic surveillance is thus fundamental to deterrence,
and therefore to stability between East and West. The advance of
satellite and airborne technology now affords a breakthrough in the
science of preventing surprise attack.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
At the tactical level, too, surveillance is a vital ingredient of defence
and therefore deterrence. Even in the absence of strategic surprise,
the WP might well, in the present state of NATO`s defences, reckon
that it could achieve victory through tactical surprise. Better tactical
warning is essential to prevent NATO forces from being
overwhelmed by a surprise localised threat.
Here, the emergence of Remotely Piloted Vehicles, based on
microelectronics, could eventually opera the way to a new and cheap
form of reconnaissance and target acquisition.
2. Night Fighting
A second opportunity offered by technology, of possibly decisive
importance, lies in the field of all-weather night-time fighting. The
development of thermal imaging systems, based on a standard series
of modules for variations in ranges, offers a way to meet a wide
variety of applications in a truly effective way. The capability to turn
night into day on the battlefield is still a long way off; but if it is
considered to be an operational requirement, as it should be, it is one
which NATO could attain long before the Warsaw Pact. Britain leads
the world in important applications of thermal imaging night sights,
and this should be a priority for further development.
3. Weapons
In weaponry, the aim of present developments is to provide "fire-
and-forget" precision delivery at short ranges, and completely
autonomous target detection, recognition, homing, fusing and attack
at longer ranges. Here the problem of cost-effectiveness is critical.
The objective should be the delivery by a single missile of large
numbers of autonomous weapons each capable of taking out a
militarily significant target, such as a tank or communication facility.
This terminal guidance is, in the present state of the art, not cheap;
but it is getting cheaper in real terms. With mass production and
standardisation of weapons as between land, sea and air targets, we
can expect a marked improvement in the relationship between
"smartness" and cost. Care needs to be taken to find the most cost-
effectivesensor package for detecting a target against its background,
which will probably include decoy shapes and sounds, and destroying
it. In such an environment the best results may well come from
deploying a mix of sensors.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
4. Command and Control
In tactical command and control, a difficult balance has to be struck.
Technology will provide the means for an unprecedented degree of
oversight of the battlefield. The risk is that this oversight will be
extremely vulnerable, and lead to over-centralisation, and thus be
unworkable in practice. With the enormous increase in data
available, attention needs to be focused on network management,
filtration and message routeing to ensure that the right people get the
right information. Considerable precautions need to be taken against
disruption by enemy electronic warfare. Redundancy of
communications links will be needed to provide survivability. The
agility, flexibility and programmability of modern EW devices is
essential. NATO has systematically under-invested in command and
control of electronic warfare equipments. The position needs urgent
remedial action.
Many of these assets will in due course be available to the Warsaw
Pact. As things stand today the WP enjoys massive advantages which
we identify in the following chapter. These include superiority in
combat aircraft and armour, a degree of airborne as well as ground
control which the West cannot begin to match, and the capacity to
strike with up to 4,000 helicopters well behind the NATO front line.
To these assets the new technology will certainly add the ability to
immobilise the majority of Western airfields, to destroy our
command, control and communication centres, and decimate our
manned platforms as surely as we could theirs.
It is time to recognise that what this portends is a battlefield of
unprecedented confusion.
The ability to see further and hit further would not only cause
enormous destruction but also dictate dispersal, placing acute strains
on C3 facilities. More and more decisions would devolve on battalion
and operational flying commanders, and delegation would be
essential to survival. Further confusion would be caused by the tempo
of events: the process of acquiring and hitting targets which currently
may take four hours could soon be performed in four minutes.
The Battlefield of Chaos
In this way it seems probable that the arrival of highly precise
weapons systems in the 1980s and 1990s is ironically likely to
engender a highly imprecise situation, in that the level of destruction
will be very high, so that disruption, not least of C3, could merge into
chaos. With due anticipation this totality of effect could benefit the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
defender. It is true that confusion could confer certain obvious
benefits on the side with an advantage iin sheer numbers. It could also
be skilfully exploited by diversionary tactics, recalling those which a
failing German army used so effectively in the Ardennes in 1944 and
for which WP planners have awell-trained capability.
1. But chaos could be turned to the West's advantage. Successful
aggression, in contrast to defence, requires lengthening lines of
communication, logistics, reinforcement and not least air cover. The
vulnerability of all these targets offers the defender a technological
opportunity perhaps greater than the aggressor. The weakness is
inherent in offensive operations, and. open to exploitation if it is
recognised.
With this prospect of a battlefield of chaos, the long-term emphasis
of NATO must be on survivability; on massive firepower, particularly
in stand-off form; on the ability to fight in all weathers and at night;
and on human initiative. Field Marshal Slim cogently argued that a
nuclear battlefield would resemble jungle warfare in the premium it
placed on initiative down to the lowest level, and survivability in
conditions of maximum confusion. The same is likely to be
increasingly true of conventional warfare. The more complex,
destructive and accurate it becomes, tl-~e closer to a state of disorder
it is likely to approximate.
2. Two further advantages could accrue to NATO with the
intelligent adoption of new technololry. One is the fact, already
noted, that it could undoubtedly injure most the side most dependent
on manned platforms.
3. The other is that the West's technological base, being more
creative than that of the WP, is also more flexible. This should enable
it to opt for those scientific opportunities which will favour the
defence.
The central question for decision-makers is thus: where and how
the capability to see further and hit further can be most productively
applied to strengthen the West's defences, and with them its capacity
to make war unacceptable to an aggressor. This we now consider.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
THE DEFENCE NEEDS
Remedying NATO's battlefield weaknesses
1. OVERALL STRATEGIC
What then are NATO's military requirements for new technology?
The most comprehensive single weakness is the likelihood that a
conventional invasion by the Warsaw Pact could at present only be
successfully halted by the use of nuclear weapons.
Raising the nuclear threshold
Clearly a contradiction in NATO's strategy would be resolved if it
were able to defend itself against a conventional attack without resort
to nuclear weapons. That this has not been achieved so far is in some
measure due to Western lack of commitment. With a combined
wealth twice that of the Soviet Union, the European members of
NATO alone could have at least greatly strengthened their
conventional capability. It cannot be denied, however, that the
Warsaw Pact, because it is an empire, enjoys ill-gotten advantages
over an alliance of democracies: it can pay its troops practically
nothing, it can devote three times the percentage of its wealth to
defence, and it can deploy immensely long assembly lines for its
hardware. The West by closer international integration, could reduce
these disparities; but from the birth of NATO, it has been unwilling
to do so. At a time of financial exigency it looks less likely than ever
to spend more on doing so now. Thus, if the nuclear threshold is to be
raised by greater conventional capability, and with it the level of
safety in which we live, the onus rests heavily on technology.
To what aspect of Western defence should it be most urgently
applied?
Particular weaknesses
The greatest generic weaknesses of the West, which together
constitute the above disequilibrium, can be expressed in terms of the
WP's advantages. These include:
1. The WP's recently acquired ability to launch a major attack
with a very short warning time.
2. Its 3:1 superiority in armour and artillery.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
3. Its 2:1 superiority in the air.
4. Its consequent ability to destroy much of NATO's ground
radar in the opening hours of war, which would leave only NAEW as
the means of carrying through surveillance for, and control of,
NATO's air defence systems.
5. Its superiority in electronic warfare equipment, in service, to
most of the NATO countries which it faces.
6. Its ability to dominate the air environment through massive
S/A missiles of ranges now approaching 200 miles from the FEBA.
7. Its developing ability to mount clandestine operations deep
behind NATO's front line, and in any European country of the
Alliance, using diversionary brigades. These are formations specially
trained in such operations and equipped with the languages, uniforms
and weapons of NATO nations as part of this subterfuge. They
represent a threat to sensitive political and military targets in nations'
home bases as well as in the rear of the battle area.
8. The ability of its transport air force, in combination with
fighter escort and EW aircraft, to deriver parachute formations to a
depth of several hundred miles inside NATO territory. At the shorter
ranges it has several thousand helicopters capable of carrying large
numbers of troops.
9. Its chemical warfare capability, unmatched in the West.
10. Its submarine fleet whose ~iumbers, speed and evolving
quietness poses a far greater threat to Allied shipping than that of the
German navy in 1940-4.
11. Its satellite surveillance of the Atlantic which, linked to those
submarines and to long-range aircraft with stand-off missiles, raises
major questions about the means of transatlantic reinforcement.
Missiles v. Platforms
There can be no doubt that in an age afpredsion-guided munitions of
increasing range, the dominance of the platform on land, air and sea
is sharply declining. On land and in the air, where Soviet strength lies
in its massive array of platforms, this can only benefit the West. At
sea, the boot is on the other foot, to the extent that the West's
reinforcement strategy has been heavily dependent on platforms.
Even here, however, the Soviet are vulnerable; in the cruise missile
age, the powerful Soviet surface fleet could be made to face
insuperable problems in trying to reach the Atlantic through the
Greenland/Iceland/UK gap.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
Because of this asymmetry, the new technology, based on radars,
lasers, passive electromagnetic sensors, infra-red, acoustic and
optical sensors and imagers, could in Europe confer on NATO much
greater advantages than on the WP. If wisely handled it could be
more cost-effective than the present systems. The tank, for example,
is still irreplaceable as a form of mobile firepower; but the idea that a
tank, which can now cost over ?lm. is the best answer to another tank
has ceased to be true ever since reliable wire-guided anti-tank
weapons have been available for around ?2,000 (now ?4,000).
Likewise the use of an aircraft, costing up to ?15m. and with a life
expectancy of perhaps half a dozen missions in a hostile environment,
can only be viewed as cost-effective, compared with a missile, against
exceptional targets, such as mobile ones. As to warships, the
Falklands told its own story: six major ships out of twenty-three were
sunk, and sixteen might have been seriously damaged if all the
Argentinian fuses had gone off. In the long run -over two decades -
missile technology, if prudently deployed, could be actually cheaper
in real terms than one depending on costly platforms with high
unserviceability rates, maintenance costs, and expensively trained
crews.
Strategic Options
In strategic terms this potential presents the West with a number of
options.
(i) The one currently favoured by NATO's Supreme Allied
Commander Europe is to acquire the ability to dislocate the Warsaw
Pact's second echelon theatre reserve and strategic reserve as they
moved up to replace the first echelon. This would be done through
the interdiction by precision-guided missiles of choke-points dictated
by the terrain where armour could be concentrated, together with
bridges, airfields and other strategic control centres. To achieve this,
SACEUR has called on NATO members to raise from 3% to 4%
their targetted annual increase in defence spending for the next eight
years. It is doubtful whether this is likely to be supportable within the
Alliance.
(ii) Some, while recognising the force of this strategy, consider
that prior attention must be given to halting the massive momentum
of the first echelon. If this means making less imaginative use of new
technology which has yet to be deployed, they say, so be it. The first
need is to stop the machine in its tracks, hopefully by every available
tactical device available on the shelf now - particularly in short-range
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
target acquisition, in concealment, and in night fighting -but also by
an increase in the quantity of basic consumables proved necessary by
the colossal rate of attrition in recent wars elsewhere.
(iii) Defence in depth. This could combine elements of both
strategies. Since it is plain that WP planning envisages attack in
depth, it makes little military sense for NATO to stake its strategy so
exclusively on holding the WP on the German border, regardless of
the consequences of a breakthrough. Physical obstructions and
demolitions can and should be used much more to delay an advance;
but they will never halt it. The weakness of such a forward strategy is
that it is a standing invitation to the WP to go for a quick victory.
Worse, it is likely to present, early rather than late, the need for a
decision on the use of nuclear weapons; it thus lowers, rather than
raises, the nuclear threshold.
To the Warsaw Pact the picture would be much less inviting if the
WP first echelon faced the prospect of rieavy fighting 50 miles further
from its main airfields, radar and supply dumps, while its second
echelon was being disrupted by smart weapons in a way which would
have been impossible in the 1970's. An exclusively forward strategy
may be politically attractive, but militarily it is so irrational that it
could amount to the difference between success and disaster.
Sensitivities within the Alliance about the German border are an
abiding political factor. Obviously any NATO strategy must aim to
hold an attack as far forward as possible. But the new technology, by
adding strength to the Alliance, can help to reconcile the needs of a
forward strategy with defence in depth. If this new factor can prompt
a dispassionate return to this debate in NATO, it will not be before
time.
Meanwhile the new technology offers NATO an unprecedented
capability for taking the counter-offensive. Previously the WP has
had little to lose by a conventional attack, and NATO has had to
concentrate on ensuring that it has little to gain either. The new
opportunity for acounter-offensive capability, without breaching the
nuclear threshold, should be exploited. It would compel the WP to
switch resources from the offensive to the defensive. A significant key
to deterrence is the ability to counter-attack; and the basis of the
strategy should be the conventional stand-off missile.
2. THE AIR/LAND BATTLE
In the previous chapter we noted the pervasive climate of chaos which
would characterise any European battle. We now consider what
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
would be its main features and the particular weaknesses of the West
in coping with them.
The most salient problem on land, lying at the heart of all NATO's
inferiority, is the shortage of war stocks. The extent of the shortage is
not publicly realised. NATO countries are supposed to possess
twenty-eight days' of stocks, but at current expectations of attrition in
some vital respects they have about seven days'. There is a grave
weakness in surface-to-air missiles -meagre enough on the central
front, but acute in Norway and Turkey. Supplies of basic
ammunition, vehicle stocks and spares are dangerously low. The
serviceability rate of armour and artillery, already outnumbered,
cannot be put above 75%; and the prospect of significant seaborne
reinforcements within less than a month is low.
Against this force, the Warsaw Pact could at present, without
reinforcements from Soviet Russia, deploy some 20,000 tanks,
enjoying massive air cover. Its initial target would be the Allied
ground radars and AEW systems. Ground radars would at present be
hard put to survive for more than a few hours, and they require
protection as a matter of high priority. AEW, composed of some 30
Nimrods and E3As, would become an immediate target for WP
aircraft; and if they are to survive they should be equipped with an
element of self-defence, notwithstanding the weight of air defence
provided for them. This air battle for the eyes and ears of the surface
forces would precede, and could heavily influence, the outcome of
the land battle.
The Air Battle
The air defence environment of the WP is of great strength and
sophistication. Operating against a concentration of missiles, the
SAM 5 and SAM 10 and their successors with ranges up to 200 miles,
as well as large numbers of supersonic interceptors, NATO aircraft
would be in an environment more hostile than any known to airmen
even in the grimmest raids of World War II. The utility, in sheer terms
of cost-effectiveness, to put it no higher, of using so large an
investment as a tactical strike aircraft more than 50 miles beyond the
FEBA would be justified only for exceptionally high-value targets.
In meeting this imbalance of air power, new technology could play
a vital role. With medium-range ground-based or air-launched
missiles it will be possible, as it is not now, to immobilise the WP's 40
main airfields from which the bulk of its air cover by land and sea
would operate.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
This would not be a simple task. WP airfields are today much better
protected than they were 10 years agog. The operational viability of
those in the Kola peninsula, along the ]Baltic and on the central front
has been progressively extended. Nevertheless, cratering and area-
denial fused warheads could immobilise airfields with significant
effect on the air/land battle.
We cannot agree with those in the US Air Force who believe that
airfields can be made survivable against really determined
bombardment. No amount of hardening, by shelters, will avail if
there is no airstrip to fly off.
Here is a mission -the persistent disruption of the Warsaw Pact air
force -which could have a decisive effect on the land battle. This in
turn would provide a deterrent comparable, in the calculations of any
Soviet strategist, with the use of nuclear weapons. The probability of
fighting without some local superiority in the air would be even more
daunting in its way than the mere possibility of encountering tactical
nuclear weapons.
The new technology, as already observed, will cut both ways.
NATO's forward airfields, under conventional or chemical attack,
are unlikely to remain operational for more than a day or two. But
when it comes to the most effective counter -Vertical and Short Take
Off and Landing -the West's air forces enjoy a technological and
operational advantage in quality and quantity over the Warsaw Pact.
The Harrier, in the Falklands, showed the way ahead. Properly
developed, the VSTOL concept could give NATO the capability of
sustaining at least an element of a:ir power after massive WP
interdiction. Problems of significantly extending range and payload
for VSTOL aircraft have so far defied solution, although the Harrier
II has twice the range of Harrier I. Such range is needed not for deep
penetration but for flexibility in the deployment ofstand-off missiles.
It seems that scientists and technologists have not been challenged
sufficiently, because of lack of funds and official interest. Further
progress would richly repay investment., both in the European theatre
and outside it.
Manned Aircraft
Manned aircraft will retain important roles. A high priority must be
the defence of the ground radars and AEW aircraft feeding the
NATO command with information of developments 200 miles over
the ground horizon. Their survival will require more self-defence
capability and more interceptor aircraft than are at present available.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
Elsewhere the targets of the manned aircraft will be not dissimilar
from those of earlier wars, but their mode of operation will be
revolutionised by the stand-off weapon. The effect of this weapon has
not yet been fully assimilated by Western policymakers. To bring the
lesson literally home; for Britain, the defence of the Home Base
would bear little visible relation to the dogfights of 1940. An enemy
aircraft which penetrated within 100 miles of the British coast would
already have got through. The task of the defence must be to prevent
him from penetrating so far, and if this failed, to harass him
sufficiently to confuse his guidance system. This could be done, for
example, by ADV Tornados against Backfire bombers seeking to
penetrate the GIUK gap.
Likewise over the land battle, smart stand-off missiles must be the
main weapon, with ranges of up to fifty miles. These need to be able
to destroy in a single sortie a considerable number of targets to justify
the exchange rate. With multiple, self-guiding warheads, aircraft
could account for high-value mobile targets which would be hard to
destroy in any other way.
The combat aircraft, thanks to its speed and flexibility, has
qualities of survival in the missile era. But these should not be
exaggerated. The Bekaa Valley raids showed that ground-based
missiles can sometimes be finessed by aircraft; but it would be
extremely unwise to deduce on that basis that air forces had managed
to put the clock back to the days before the Israeli Air Force was
checked by missiles in one day of October 1973. In the first place the
Syrians, untried in the skills of counter-measures, were not prepared
for the use of drones to flush out their radars. The arrival of Russian
advisory reinforcements makes it unlikely that this could happen
again in the same way, and it certainly would not on the European
front. Secondly, the environment over the Lebanon was benign
compared with that which could be expected over Central Europe.
Thirdly, the Israelis prudently moved the emphasis of the
reconnaissance function from the manned aircraft to the unmanned
drone. Even against the inexperienced Syrians they had no wish to
risk manned aircraft for tactical reconnaissance. It has to be
recognised that tactical battlefield reconnaissance is no longer a
viable role for the manned aircraft in a sophisticated air environment. .
The Land Battle
The aerial support provided by stand-off missiles along the lines
indicated above would greatly alleviate the task of the men fighting
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
against odds on the ground. If WP airfields, transport and supply
centres and choke-points could be disrupted, the problem of halting
a blitzkrieg would become much more manageable. Yet still, in a real
sense, NATO's armies are unable ro defend themselves. Sheer
numbers of weapons are lacking. Somf; commanders report that they
would prefer ten Milan anti-tank weapons now, rather than two
smarter ones in ten years' time. They argue that the cost of weapon
systems increases exponentially as a function of the depth of the
target. Pitted against heavy odds, they say that it is not technology
which they need, but money to buy more of the same, with merely
incremental improvements. The initial demand is therefore less for
quality than for quantity.
In varying degrees as between different NATO countries, Army
priorities include: more vehicles, guns, assemblies, spares and
combat supplies; more tracked anti-aircraft weapons and anti-tank
missiles; greater concealment and deception against infra-red and
radar; more reliable protection against: electronic counter-measures;
greater tactical warning capability; more medium-lift helicopters;
and more men, in the shape of available trained reservists.
Three Pressing Needs
Qualitatively, three of the most urgent: operational requirements for
new technology are:
1. Protection against electronic and infra-red scanning to enable
headquarters, fighting units, stores, supply parks or VSTOL sites to
function effectively.
2. Secondly, for counter-attack, major improvements in vehicles
in respect of mobile firepower and survivability.
3. Thirdly, the task of the battle groups would be greatly
facilitated if the development of RP~Is for fighting units, recently
discontinued, could now be resumed. There is in general an urgent
need for target acquisition, early warning and response systems.
Information about enemy capabilities and intentions is vitally
important to the commander of the weaker side. This controversial
subject deserves more attention.
In this century, aircraft have become the most effective means of
conducting both strategic and tactical reconnaissance. Surface and
airborne radars have enhanced scouting with eye and camera. The
rapid advance of air defence weaponry, conferring a formidable
efficiency in area protection, combined with the introduction of radar
homing missiles, has already reduced the reconnaissance viability of
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
the aircraft except where, as in the case of the NATO Early Warning
system, technology permits an aircraft deep in its own air defence
zone to survey an expanse of air and surface at a distance
simultaneously. Fortunately, strategic surveillance is now being
conducted with increasing efficiency by satellites, despite the
intermittent restrictions of weather conditions. Neither satellite nor
early warning aircraft will be immune to physical attack indefinitely.
A parallel capability in aerial reconnaissance persists in both the ,
strategic and tactical spheres. Assuming that manned aircraft will not
be able to fill this role without intolerable loss in men and machines,
an option to hand is the remotely piloted vehicle. Development is ,
already beyond the crude form of pilotless vehicle, the drone, and the
tethered "spy in the sky". Some cruise missile technology will assist in
further development. Arguably, it might be possible now to develop
a programmed missile for strategic reconnaissance; but there would
then also be a need to identify the role of the missile to avoid giving
a false signal of nuclear attack. However, it seems likely that a vehicle
able to respond to post-launch instructions during deep
reconnaissance will require much effort.
Tactically, at sea or over land, there is a prospect for early
development of a capability to reconnoitre at low-level point and
linear targets by remote pilotage. The need arises across the tactical
spectrum; and since range is likely to prove the most difficult area to
incorporate, the case for bringing first into production vehicles for
short-range reconnaissance is strong.
To date, technology has provided remarkable advances for the
technical supply and signal corps. Improvement in the above three
areas would give similar advantages to those engaged directly in
combat.
In addition, as mentioned earlier, NATO possesses no answer to
the Warsaw Pact's huge stock of chemical weapons, and in the event
of their use, in violation of international obligations, would be almost
bound to have recourse to nuclear weapons.
The US at the moment possesses a limited stockpile of elderly
chemical weapons. The UK has virtually no CW capability, and none
of the other NATO countries have any defence against chemical
warfare. In a few years, when the US stocks have deteriorated, the
West could be caught without any chemical capability or means of
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
delivering it; NATO has no delivery system comparable with the
WP's Scud and Frog missiles and aircraft sprays. Such could be the
devastation of a Soviet chemical blitz, particularly at airfields, ports
and other transport centres, that NATO now needs the option of the
same kind of deterrent which inhibited Hitler from the use of these
weapons. Either CW must be abolished by verifiable convention,
which the British government has been trying to achieve, or the West
must have its own chemical deterrent.
The need for choice
Contemplating this exorbitant shopping list, it is clear that we cannot
have everything. Nor is this necessary. As already observed,
deterrence has worked, so far, more efi~ectively than in any situation
in history. The present situation is tf;nable. What it lacks is the
assurance that the Warsaw Pact would suffer unacceptable damage
even if nuclear weapons were not employed. This is at present not the
case. With a little effort it could be achieved, so long as we make the
right choices.
Clearly the new technology provides a major advance in certain
areas. Any such capability to confront the WP with totally
unacceptable damage deserves the prime attention of our
technologists. We have already identified several candidates for high
priority. In the Land/Air battle thesf: include stand-off missiles,
RPVs, better EW and counter-EW equipment, longer-range VSTOL
and night-fighting capability. Budgets being limited, however, there
could be dangers in the unchecked pursuit of novelty at the sacrifice
of basic essentials.
3. MARITIME
We have observed that the declining role of the platform in the missile
era tends to benefit the West on land and air and the Warsaw Pact at
sea. Certainly the prospect of reinforcing the land battle in Europe by
ships sailing in convoy across the Atlantic looks more incredible every
year. Subject only to bad weather and tr-e destruction of satellites and
reconnaissance aircraft, commanders sitting in Moscow can observe
every vessel in the area, and communicate their observations to
submarines, and long-range aircraft such as the Backfire.
Not only the practicality of the whole reinforcement mission is in
doubt, but its very purpose. It has never been expected that large-
scale convoys could reach Europe until about thirty days after the
start of a conflict. With the present imbalance on land described in the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
previous section, coupled with the reduction of warning time since
the days when Flexible Response was introduced, the need to bring
the land and naval strategy into line has become urgent.
The vulnerable surface ship
Ships are more vulnerable even than aircraft to the electronic
revolution. They are larger targets; their speed has not advanced
comparably with aircraft; and they do not look likely to benefit so
much as airborne platforms from the new means of evasiveness, such
as "Stealth" and ECMs. Techniques in signature reduction, such as
changing the vessel's profile, can equally be applied to the incoming
missile. The detection, identification and tracking of surface vessels
has become a relatively simple task, and even well-defended ships are
vulnerable to a growing range of target-locating and terminally-
intelligent sea-skimming missiles.
The convoy system which saved Britain in World War II depended
on three main factors. Long-term speed was greater than that of
submarines; the convoy was able, more or less successfully, to
function as a moving fortress controlling an area of sea; and the whole
convoy could lose the attackers by manoeuvre. None of these
conditions would seem to apply in the age of satellite surveillance,
stand-off missiles and nuclear submarines. The latter, though noisier
than diesels, are benefiting from quietening technology, and
improvements in tracking devices have not brought any major
breakthrough; the rate of submarine "strikes" during NATO
exercises is seldom high.
Convoys .. .
In deep water the submarine is actually becoming harder to detect.
The sonar signatures of submarines are decreasing.
In shallow water the diesel, with its very low signature, is mainly
vulnerable to non-acoustic detection, e.g. when snorting, although in
certain conditions it has been detected by SSNs (nuclear-powered
submarines) using active sonar at over 15 miles. Passive sonar has
encountered insuperable limitations, so that new efforts are being
made to inject more power into active sonar.
Satellite-based technology to detect radar images likewise yields
results only on submarines close to the surface. This continuing
relative invulnerability of the submarine, of course, spells greater
stability at the strategic nuclear level, with its assurance of a second
strike capability. but it is bad news for convoys.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
...and Warships
Concurrently, the ability of surface warships to defend themselves
was hardly impressive in the Falklands. Not only would Britain have
lost or sustained serious damage to a majority of its vessels if all the
warheads had exploded, but HMS Invincible, the aircraft carrier,
could have been sunk by a submarine if its torpedoes had worked.
With better fuses, Argentina would have won a notable victory.
Nor were her forces even modern by WP standards. Against a
range of around twenty-five miles for the Exocet, the WP's latest
missiles can travel 250 miles, and this will soon be extended to over
600. Again, except for a few Canberras, the Argentinian air force was
operating near the limits of its combat radius, with consequent
impairment of performance. Had its bases been 300 miles from the
Falklands instead of 400, the Task Force would hardly have survived.
What is more, all of these aircraft had to over-fly their targets except
the missile-armed Super Etendards, which were unscathed. There
are disturbing lessons for NATO here.
Moreover, a whole dimension of naval warfare to be expected in
the North Atlantic was missing in the Falklands: that of air-sown
mines in the blockade of ports, to which no satisfactory answer has yet
been found.
A further blow to the convoy concept is that the West now simply
lacks merchant hulls. The US today possesses a mere 600 merchant
ships against 6,000 in 1939. The "Red Duster" has suffered a similar
decline. Flags of convenience are different from maritime marines.
Thus we have to ask: Are there enough such ships available, with
loyalty to NATO and prepared for such an operational role?
All in all, a large weight of evidence might seem to suggest that a
naval reinforcement strategy for NATO is becoming increasingly
unrealistic. And even if the massive t~isk of earmarking convoys in
peacetime were to be put in hand, would that materially strengthen
the West's deterrent? The time may have come for the whole Alliance
to think the unthinkable and to concentrate instead on the increased
prepositioning of supplies in Europe.. with the corollary of troop
reinforcement by airlift. But this view needs to be qualified. We
consider the options in the section on the Royal Navy (below).
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
IMPLICATIONS FOR BRITAIN
THE ARMY
For Britain, the main problem on land is that the shortage of war
stocks, itemised in the preceding section is particularly acute. Britain
has awell-trained but inadequately equipped army. Making good
these shortages must be a high priority.
As to new technology, it would be quite wrong to suppose, as some
appear to do, that it offers us a cheap way of defending ourselves
without nuclear weapons. Much of the strategic hardware is beyond
the means of any but a superpower, and is likely to remain so because
it does not lend itself to long production lines.
Tactical hardware is inherently cheaper, and will cheapen further
as it comes into NATO service, providing it can be standardised
between Services, and hopefully between Allies. Even so, it will
clearly call for some restructuring of forces, and reallocation of roles
between the Services, which is bound to add to cost.
We must reject the temptation to advance speculatively on a broad
front, with an open-ended R and D commitment. Our approach must
be highly selective, concentrating on specialisations: among them,
thermal imaging for night fighting, VSTOL, and C3 technology. The
merit of these particular disciplines is that Britain already leads the
world in many aspects of them; that they embody a high degree of
commonality between conflicts in Europe and outside it; and they
also have a large commonality between the military and the civilian
market.
Outside Europe
Such are the principal needs of the British Army in the NATO area.
But at a time when the challenge from the Soviet Union is worldwide,
and the danger of miscalculation in the Third World is chronic, we
believe that its talents and those of the other two Services, should not
be confined to Europe. Their experience in political and para-
military operations, in areas where Allied interests are sometimes
today at risk, is exceptional in the Alliance. It is in NATO's interests
that these talents should be available for such situations.
The operational requirement Out-of-Area is none the less valid for
being hard to define. To describe it as "the unexpected" may sound
nebulous; but the unexpected happens in the Third World with
monotonous frequency, sometimes to the detriment of the Atlantic
Community. Without knowing the times or places, we can be certain
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
that in the coming years appeals will be made to us from friendly
governments in trouble; from countries which need help in
restructuring their security forces; from one of the numerous new
"micro-nations", such as Grenada; from victims of natural disaster;
from Allied citizens in peril; and continuously from international and
regional groupings which require Borne military stiffening with a
sophistication beyond their means. In all these scenarios, the new
technology can help by multiplying flexibility and mobility. This kind
of assistance at second hand need not be a burdensome commitment.
To bottle up every available British solider on the Central Front
would be a misuse of assets which wou[d not serve the Alliance well.
We should consult with our Allies on tlae subject.
In doing so we should be able to give them firmer assurance of
reinforcement by reservists in the event of war. With this in mind, we
should end the situation whereby we are one of the few members of
the Alliance to make no provision for civilian defence of the home
front. Most NATO countries have total mobilisation under which
almost every able-bodied person not in the regular Services is
committed either to home or civil defence. The order of battle for the
Central front, particularly against diversionary tactics, depends
heavily on the Heimatschutzen or German Home Guard. There is a
good case for the formation in Britain of a volunteer home defence
force - a resuscitated Home Guard -charged with helping to defend
this country's nerve centres against a conventional attack. This could
simultaneously strengthen our civil defence capability.
ROYAL AIR FORCE
For the RAF, as we have suggested, there is no shortage of roles: but
these will change. There is already a major expansion of their
function in the Eastern Atlantic. There is vital air defence and close
support work over the land battle. And there is the wider mission of
delivering stand-off missiles beyond the battle area. Of this last
function it has been reasonably calculated that eight modern aircraft
could soon do more damage to a target then 290 B-17s (Flying
Fortresses) in World War II, owing to the greater accuracy and
survivability which the stand-off missile confers. There also remains
a role outside Europe.
The RAF will need to take in the implications of these
developments. Of recent years they have acquired a somewhat
"stealth"-like immunity to detailed scrutiny. They have tended to
elevate the platform at the expense of 1:he weapon. They are inclined
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
to order an aircraft and leave till later the question of its armament,
and thus to some extent its role. This is understandable, given the
procurement system and the need to acquire the costliest item first;
but it is necessary to think in terms of a total weapons system. The
RAF are known to be reconsidering dispassionately which roles can
only be done by maimed aircraft -and we believe this should rule out
overland strategic reconnaissance and long-range interdiction in
Europe -and how to equip those aircraft with survivability. In this
connection the advanced VSTOL should be receiving greater
attention.
THE ROYAL NAVY
For the Navy, the adjustments necessitated by new weapons have
already caused debate and a Ministerial resignation. It has been
argued that the government was wrong to order in 1981 the reduction
of its escort fleet by some 25% in the long-term, and the phasing out
of several of its larger warships, and that the Falklands has confirmed
this. The proposal was certainly greeted with dismay by our Allies,
and would have found us barely able to launch the operation at all had
the war occurred later than it did. But as an object lesson in systems
analysis it totally vindicated the government's apprehension about
the utility of the point defence system, in the shape of highly
expensive escort vessels, relative to the submarine and long-range
aircraft. To draw any other conclusion from the evidence would be
unwise. The experience has proved salutary in concentrating
designers' minds on ways of improving the cost-effectiveness of
escorts which can cost over ?150 m. today, but which seem to be
nearly as vulnerable as the ships they are supposed to protect. There
is a need for a cheap vessel, modest in speed but powerfully armed,
which could serve the purpose both of inshore defence in a European
war and the promotion of stability outside Europe.
Three main threats
The defence of merchant shipping calls for a mix of systems to be
deployed against the three main threats.
Against submarines, and recognising that there is unlikely to be
any major breakthrough in ASW technology in the next two decades,
the main emphasis should be on area and barrier operations. This will
involve the interception of transitting submarines in the Norwegian
and Barents Seas; establishing a barrier in the GIUK gap; and the
destruction of submarines in the shipping band itself.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
This last should take the form of area searches principally by
aircraft and towed array frigates; sowir-g the GIUK gap with mines
equipped with the latest technology of remote arming and some form
of IFF; and sensor nets for alerting aircraft to the passage of
submarines.
Of the other two main threats, Soviet surface warships, vulnerable
at the GIUK choke-points, should be countered by the development
of ASMs and submarine SSMs. The air threat is best met, as on the
Central front, by the use of airfield denial weapons, particularly the
conventional cruise missile. But in addition, air defence barriers over
the GIUK gap and approaches to the Channel will also be needed.
Within this conspectus the escort ship, or towed array frigate,
retains a significant role. But air defence based on maritime
platforms, and centred on the aircraft carrier, cannot be considered
cost-effective in an environment of missiles with a decreasing radar
cross-section and increasing range.
The Americans, after major reductions in the 1970s, are again
looking towards a 600-warship navy, and seem confident in the power
of the carrier group complete with frigate screen, seaborne E2Cs for
surveillance and long-range combat patrols of F-14s. Whether or not
the concept is sound -and the system is now being questioned in
senior American naval circles - it is one which Britain simply cannot
afford. Rather than seeking to emulate our narrow transatlantic
success in World War II, we should continue to concentrate on
maximising the benefits of our geography in the ways outlined above.
Independent sailings
Such tactics, complementing those of the Americans, could reduce
merchant shipping casualties to manageable proportions. But the
task would be greatly facilitated to the extent that merchant ships
were equipped to protect themselves. This could not be done in large
numbers; but the concept of independent sailings by fast, high-value
merchant ships furnished with sonar helicopters and anti-missile
missiles is undoubtedly correct. Here, speed is of special value
because, although the Soviets have deal-time surveillance and
communications at sea, they do not have real-time targetting under
satellite surveillance; and this must give a valuable advantage to the
fast vessel. The concept is correct because of the extreme
vulnerability of convoys, the length of time they would take to
assemble, and the shortage of merchant shipping available. More
study should be given to the question of what equipment packages
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
could be made available to merchant ships, particularly high value
vessels, and the legal and administrative consequence of doing so.
Home Waters
Within home waters it is worth considering the possibility of an
Exclusion Zone, which would seek to exclude enemy warships from
the Straits of Dover north to the Norwegian coast and west to the
Western Approaches. If this could be accomplished, economies
could be effected, in that the area could be patrolled by smaller,
cheaper ships than those required in the Atlantic.
This concept would intimately involve our Allies, and would
suggest the establishment of a new NATO Command, which would
coincide with the area of shore-based air defence, as distinct from
organic air.
It should be possible to keep most Soviet warships out of such an
Exclusion Zone. The Tornado, and cruise missiles, would counter
any surface formations and enable our own submarines to deploy
right up to the front line. Such an area should exclude Soviet SSNs,
though not necessarily diesel-powered SSKs completely.
Persistent disruption of WP airfields must be the key to air control.
Some enemy stand-off aircraft would get through; but with better
surveillance and the help of EW, it should be possible to cope with
them.
All these developments spell changes for the Royal Navy's role,
but no diminution of it. Control of home waters must be its first
province, and it should be conducted with due recognition of the
vulnerability of the surface ship. The Navy needs to go more
underwater, as it is beginning to do. On the surface it requires
cheaper platforms with smaller hulls, fewer crews and more
firepower. Such attributes would be equally suitable for a supporting
role outside Europe.
All in all, the maritime theatre is as ripe as any for the observation
of Henry Kissinger that "NATO is reaching a point where the
strategic assumptions on which it has been operating, the force that it
has been generating, and the joint policies it has been developing will
be inadequate for the 1980's".
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
IS THE WEST CAPABLE OF TAKING
THE RIGHT DECISIONS?
It should by now be clear that, as indicated in the opening chapter, the
new technology requires nothing less than a total review of NATO's
strategy. Our primary recommendation, therefore, subsuming most
of the others, is that the time has come for a third NATO Review. We
have ventured to anticipate some of the principles and policies which
we believe that NATO's future strategy should contain. (Others were
delineated in the BAC's publication "'A Global Strategy"). What
concerns us now is whether the West's decision-making machinery,
international and national, is capable of assimilating the evidence and
processing it into the right decisions.
At the international level, the "disarray" within NATO over the
last few years has reflected a new era in which NATO has suddenly
become of interest to the public because of inadequate political
leadership and concern about out-of-date policies. The neutron
bomb and the ground-based cruise missile issues provided a vivid
reminder that the people of NATO now have to be carried along with
any major decisions. NATO needs not only to have a sound strategy,
but also to be seen to have one, and this development is both healthy
and unlikely to be reversed. While public opinion throughout the
Alliance has been implicitly solid behind. NATO, it has lately asserted
the right to question particular decisions.
NATO should welcome, not fear this debate, Common interests,
not to say commonsense, may begin to overcome the ascendancy
alike of national and sectional interests. Supposing, for instance, that
the perennial question of standardisation were ever to be launched
into the public arena - a not impossible and highly desirable
contingency - it could well be that a large majority in any poll would
vote to end the system whereby NATO, for example, produces 15
types of escort ship against only four in the WP. There are more
taxpayers than there are beneficiaries of weapons production. They
pay, and they are beginning to exercise the right to have an opinion,
and to require greater access to the facts on which to base it. But at
present, even after two years of the "peace" debate, NATO's public
relations are still not geared to this need.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
Little thinking has been done
Looking forward in this context, the public would be astonished if it
knew how little collective thinking the Alliance has done about the
new technology. Nor is it certain that the NATO machinery is
equipped to undertake the task. There is a real danger that any
creative thinking will be submerged in the Sargasso Sea of
international bureaucracy unless it is taken seriously at the highest
political level.
Still less has there been detailed study of the allocation of effort -
andbenefit -arising from the new technology. The forum simply does
not exist in which this crucial question might be under discussion. The
consequence is that at this moment, the new technology is simply
inheriting the system of predominantly nationalistic catch-as-catch-
can which has be-devilled NATO for years. There is not, in any
serious degree, a sharing of research, or even the intention of sharing
it. Nor has there yet been any serious attempt to allocate
specialisation between countries - a difficult though worthwhile
subject to explore.
A Wasteful System
The absence of any system was illustrated in Britain by the recent
Harm/Alarm debate. It may be argued that the decision, hotly
contested both politically and industrially, to adopt the British anti-
radiation missile (Alarm) against the American one (Harm) was
sensible in the circumstances. But it had all the classical hallmarks of
the old NATO criteria: the national weapon was more expensive and
less developed than its foreign rival - in fact not even off the drawing
board -but it was adopted. The plea that "we must preserve our
technological base" is legitimate. But with the advent of the new
technology and the enormous proliferation of choice it presents, the
Alliance will not be able to go on like this.
Here is a subject which can only be effectively handled atheads-of-
government level after thorough preparation. Many attempts to deal
with it, and the attendant questions of specialisation and burden -
sharing, below that level have proved abortive. Sectional interests
militating against standardisation and the two-way street are
powerful, not least in the US Congress. Only at the summit level can
these be trumped by an agreed Alliance strategy which would impose
concessions on each member country in the greater interests of all.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
Strategic Planning
If this is true of hardware, it is even more true of higher strategy. In
the last two years the incapacity of NATO for coordinated strategic
thinking has been publicly exposed. We ruched a position where the
Americans appeared to lose patience with Europe, and the
Europeans, when they complained, had no clear or positive proposals
of their own. Having thus lost influence with Washington, they could
hardly have been surprised at America's adoption of policies at
variance with their own views. The situation is more serious than
many Europeans seem to realise, with Washington simply
discounting Europe in the formulation and execution of its policies.
The greater part of this estrangement is due to misunderstanding
and lack of real communication and dialogue. There is scope for
honest debate between the representatives of all sides, but the debate
has never been properly joined. It should be taking place regularly, at
the highest level, and serviced by an international staff tasked with
the conception of creative ideas, designed to identify options.
Nowhere is this more necessary than in relation to the new
technology. For example, Americans resent Europe's reluctance to
spend more on defence; Europeans resent America's failure to treat
arms control with the necessary priority. It is quite conceivable that
linking these issues might give scope for mutual concessions. This is
a concept well worth pursuing. However, at the moment NATO lacks
any adequate systems and processes, for conceiving strategic
concepts, let alone germinating them, or reconciling differences
creatively.
Agenda for a NATO Review
A whole group of other issues, already raised in this paper, demand
attention at top level. One is that of defence in depth, if only because
of its political implications. Another is the burden-sharing
consequences of technology. Yet another is the question of Out-of-
Area operations. Europe, with the exception of France, works to
ignore them; the British work to evade them. The United States has
become increasingly concerned about them. The fact that these issues
are so various and so complex need not be daunting; on the contrary,
it could increase the scope for productive log-rolling between friends.
But the first requirement is to establish the necessary apparatus which
would enable Summit meetings to be productive. Simultaneously, the
case for a third NATO Review to consider some of these issues, after
a gap of fifteen years, is now overwhelming.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
2. WHAT SHOULD WE DO IN BRITAIN?
At the national level, changes are equally needed. The 1981 measures
did at least revive the principles of systems analysis. But subsequent
events suggest a lack of realism and of urgency which is inappropriate
in face of the problems now posed by escalating weapons costs.
On the hardware side, for example, the White Paper on the
Falklands barely seemed to recognise that the Navy faces a problem,
let alone the risks so bravely taken. "No fundamental design defects"
it said, "have been identified' in our warships. Procurement policies
and practices -over the whole field -have returned to the pre-
Falklands norm, despite the quick, productive and superb efforts
made in 1982 which produced such an effective return. Complacency
rules again.
Likewise the structural problems of political early warning remain.
The organisation in Whitehall is still not right. Governments do not
clearly formulate or answer difficult questions about objectives or
methods. The logic of the British political system, as it operates in this
field, recalls that of the Irish level-crossing keeper, who kept the gate
half open because he was half expecting a train.
The Logic of Priorities
Faced with the escalation of costs, and having no more commitments
to cut, Britain in the 1980's needs a logic of priorities. Only the super-
rich can afford to muddle through without one. In evolving one,
technology can help, but it cannot relieve us of the effort of deciding
what we want to do. Continuing evasion of the issues cannot provide
a policy, let alone a system of priorities.
While the Falklands may not happen again, the same cannot be
said of the economic and industrial pressures which forced Britain to
review her defences in 1981 against a background of an overloaded
programme. The lack of any logic of security priorities at that time
was conspicuous. Hasty efforts had to be made to decide unilaterally
whether reductions in Army or Navy planned programmes would do
less damage to the Alliance. There was no long-term strategy behind
the decisions.
What about our Allies?
In fashioning a logic of priorities, the views of our Allies should be
considered. It is the cardinal tenet of British policy - as it has been the
centre of the case against unilateral disarmament -that to weaken
Britain's contribution to NATO would encourage our Allies to follow
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
suit. But there is no evidence that our European Allies have any
policies or priorities. The truth is that no-one wants to talk about
these matters, and in consequence it is widely considered that all
countries will pursue a negative self-interest -downwards. This is
almost certainly a false assumption. What is needed, to provide a
logic of priorities for Brtish defence, is a candid discussion among
Allies about the choices which Britain and other countries, for
reasons of cost, will be unable to avoid in the years ahead, with special
reference to the possibilities of a more businesslike approach to
burden-sharing in NATO.
At present Britain is shouldering four major strategic
commitments: the maritime contribution in the Eastern Atlantic, the
land/air contribution to the Central Front, the defence of the United
Kingdom base, and the strategic nuclear deterrent. To this must be
added a large contribution to the flanks of NATO and Out-of-Area
activity. Against a background of all-volunteer forces and a
consistently poor economic growth record, with the prospect of an
end to the oil boom, these commitments are far more ambitious than
any of our (mainly wealthier) Allies attempt. Something will have to
give.
Outside Europe
The problem is made even more difficult by the question of what
contribution Britain should make outside Europe. NATO nations
individually are more or less convinced that somebody, somehow,
should be doing more to protect their interests in the Persian Gulf,
the Indian Ocean and Africa. They are equally convinced that it is
nothing to do with NATO. This situation is unlikely to change.
Through the heritage of history Bril:ain has a political entree to
many areas outside Europe. Moreover, our Radio services are among
the most respected in the world; our military are welcome in many
countries to take part in exercises or to provide advisors; and our
educational system has many overseas admirers.
Yet the BBC overseas services has be~.en threatened with its eighth
cut in 10 years at a time when there are over 60 million short wave
radios inside the Soviet Union and many millions more in other
countries: strict cash limits are placed on military involvement in
overseas exercises and on the crucial overseas training assistance
programme: and much has been done to price Britain out of the
overseas educational market.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
There should be an About Turn
There is a breeze, if not a wind of change, blowing. The birth of the
Fifth Airborne Brigade modestly recognised the importance of
"outside Europe." The accent on flexibility and mobility, made
possible by new technology, is now more in evidence. In 1983 several
naval formations have been active outside the Atlantic.
In terms of overall deterrence Britain could develop this line of
thinking in consultation with her Allies. If it proved unwelcome to
some of them, so were Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan. It is not
unreasonable to ask them to recognise that their interests,
precariously dependent as they are on African and Asian
commodities, would best be served by sanctioning the readiness of
BAOR personnel and units to operate Out-of-Area. They showed
admirable patience when major NATO-assigned units were diverted
to the Falklands. They could surely do the same in areas where their
own interests -oil and raw materials in particular -are at stake. A
small British investment can produce a large return for the West as a
whole.
If foreign policy were more decisive than it is in the formulation of
defence policy, then these missions would carry more weight in the
logic of Britain's defence priorities. The key phrase is "to act on
invitation". There is no requirement for a large opposed landing
capability. We did not reckon to have one throughout the 1970's, and
it is right to argue that a capability for another Falklands is not a basic
requirement. But a capability to intervene, or train, on request, is
something quite different. The decision whether or not to intervene
will always be difficult. But shortage of invitations is not likely to be
a problem.
Europe should agree
NATO would not be unduly depleted. No doubt it should be agreed
that BAOR would not fall permanently below a minimum level: say,
35,000. But the fact is that with the force multiplication effect of the
new technology, this number can today achieve incomparably more
than the four divisions and a tactical air force equivalent fighting
capability arbitrarily negotiated by Eden 30 years ago. Properly
equipped in ways indicated earlier, it would be far more effective than
it was then. It is a matter of real, but ignored fact, that the Army has
counted its contribution in heads and the Royal Air Force in fighting
capability. It is easy to see which is wrong.
Finally, the influence which Europe individually or collectively can
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
exert on the US will be directly proportional to the amount of effort
which it is prepared to display in sharing; America's burdens outside
the NATO area. This has been the missing piece in the transatlantic
dialogue; for if Europe has nothing to offer but advice, that advice
will not carry much weight, particularly if it is critical. Any
improvement in the level of European effort would greatly
strengthen the Atlantic linkage.
The Home Front
A more broadly based security policy would have major domestic
repercussions. The response to the 1931 changes gave notice that
vigorous sectional opposition can be expected to greet almost any
change. To ride out such opposition, the balanced strategy within
which it is taken should be as clearly conceived and presented as our
government can make it. It must be able to stand up to not only
sectional Service and industrial interests but also to the Treasury. The
Treasury does not really pretend, or see any need, to understand the
mechanics of defence and foreign policy. It does not, for example
appreciate how wasteful and inappropriate to long-term defence
projects is the annuality system of budgeting. It simply cares about
the cash, not the consequences.
A logic of priorities thus calls for strengthening the apparatus for
conceiving and executing strategy. 1`dothing less will suffice if
capabilities are to be matched with commitments; if individual
Services are to accept new roles and discard old ones; if the Treasury
is to cooperate more sympathetically inthe conduct of security policy;
and if the whole is to be embodied in a defence strategy that is both
cost-effective and affordable.
In any country this search for cost-effectiveness is an uphill
struggle. Britain's defence establishment is of the highest calibre.
Defence equipment is admirable in quality. But we cannot continue
to carry all our commitments without reforms of the system.
Its convolutions were exposed during the Falklands war, when
eminently satisfactory results were achieved by leap-frogging
committees and telescoping the normal process of weeks, months, or
even years into a few days.
Industry
No-one can complain about the amount of investment. Over 50% of
Britain's total scientific research goes into defence, while most of our
Allies devote less than 10%. Of the defence budget, 48% now goes
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
into equipment, which is a far greater proportion than that of any of
our Allies. Yet we have major equipment gaps, particularly on land
and sea; we have been slow to develop and procure missiles; and our
export record has not reflected this degree of investment.
Some would point the finger of blame at British industry. It is not
adventurous. Ship procurement and design has shown some of the
worst features of a nationalised industry -notably expense and lack
of imagination. The case for privatisation is very strong, as is the
transfer of all ship design to industry.
British Aerospace have great talent; but again, is it right that they
should be the only effective source of British missiles at such a critical
juncture in the development of technology? Britain's poor record on
missiles suggests strongly that a greater element of competition would
be beneficial. If we are right in believing that the stand-off missile
should be at the centre of Britain's strategy in the 1990's, can we be
satisfied with the record of the present system for producing it?
The Procurement System
Industry may pass the blame back to the procurement system to
which it has to work. It would say, for example, that Service staffs
rotate too rapidly and have little understanding of industrial
problems; that all the procedures are tedious, time-wasting and
lengthy; that staff requirements are too narrow, giving little scope for
either creative or economical thinking; and that the Ministry is
endlessly injecting new specifications.
Some changes have been made, notably through the "cardinal
point" system which lays down only a minimum of parameters for an
operational requirement. Industry is being brought in earlier to the
procurement process. More changes are needed, including greater
reliance on industrial and scientific research staffs. Thinking about
defence should not be a Whitehall monopoly. Private research staffs
should be pressed for an answer to fundamental questions, such as:
"If you had the contract to defend Europe by fighting almost entirely
at night, how would you do it?"
The Services
This in turn raises the perennial problem, common to all
governments, of the organisation of the still very large Ministry of
Defence and its establishments. As with any such organisation there
is a built-in resistance to change. Each Service, with the best possible
will, naturally fights its own corner, and so does each "arm" within
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
each Service. Tribalism has been, and must always tend to be, an
inherent obstacle to technological progress. Any transfer of a mission
from one Service to another, or from orie corps to another, is always
bound to cause resistance. Better mechanisms are needed to
overcome the system.
Allied with this has been the axiom '`only the best will do". This
precept can be, and recently has been, pursued too far, at the expense
not only of quantity but of adequate equipment for those with less
forceful lobbies.
Many solutions for this problem have been suggested. One
proposal of the Jacob-Ismay report in the 1960's which was never
introduced was the notion of a single Service above one-star level.
This at least recognised the problem. Another approach would be the
abolition of the single-Service budget, and its replacement by a
defence functional budget. A new look its required. Whatever course
is adopted, a primary object should be to ensure that a senior officer
is not penalised for advancing views which elevate the defence of the
country above the interests of individual services. In this and other
ways the voice of the Centre, representing Defence and the taxpayer,
needs to be further strengthened.
Certainly servicemen destined for high rank should be better
prepared than they are at the moment. For the present system
requires them not only to execute policy, at which they are superb,
but in very large measure to make it. It may be a mistake to assume
that men of action will be the best policy-makers. Moreover, policy
cannot be made effectively by people who change jobs every two
years or so. Tenure, analysis and technology are the names of the
game. The system needs to reflect these: requirements. The case for
review is overwhelming. But as long as the present system prevails,
we need to widen the horizons of our Service leaders and their ability
to think analytically from an early stage in their career.
Costs
Pruning the organisation will save money -but not enough. The
question must be asked: Can we afford this new technology? Some
proposals have suggested a percentage :increase in NATO's defence
spending. The political outlook for such an increase is not
encouraging. It has also been suggested that the 3% annual rise
prescribed for NATO should be raised to 4%, and that this would
cover new technology, but NATO is not: observing the 3%, let alone
?
4 ?.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
We believe that the extra resources should be found not in
increased taxation but in ruthless weapons system selection plus
greater efficiency. In this paper we have been continuously conscious
of cost. We have called for more quality and more quantity, on a
selective basis. This will require real economies; but we have
indicated how these economies might be achieved.
To list some of them:
1. Rejection of the concept of the gold-plated weapon, still very
much a feature of British equipment.
2. Fewer types of ships, vehicles, aircraft and other weapons
systems.
3. Greater emphasis on missiles than on platforms.
4. A determined effort to produce a basic missile system for use on
sea, land and air.
5. An assault, eventually at summit level, on international
standardization and collaboration, particularly in Europe.
6. Service Staffs to be better trained for the tasks of policies and
priorities, fewer in number, and to remain longer in their jobs.
7. Real competition between defence contractors.
8. More attention to exports and investment in projects by
industry.
9. A much healthier ratio between initial investment and
production expenditure.
10. More ruthless decision-making procedures.
11. Ending the wasteful tyranny of annuality.
12. Cuts in overheads, including individual training costs, and the
progressive transfer of research and development to industry.
In addition, the greater use of civil resources could prove an
administrative quantum jump comparable to those in the scientific
sphere. The Falklands showed the value of civilian ships -around 50
of them - in a military operation, and this precedent deserves more
attention than it received in the White Paper on the subject. In the
air, in-flight re-fuelling could be increasingly performed by civil
aircraft. Stand-off missiles could be launched almost as easily from a
civil aircraft, or merchant ship, as from a combat platform built
specially for the purpose. There are tens of thousands of civil vehicles
in use which could readily be acquired in an emergency.
These and other innovations would bring a new realism and
credibility to Britain's defence posture vis-a-vis the taxpayer and a
greater impact to our contribution to NATO, and thereby command
greater public support.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
For the creation and execution of such a strategy, what is needed
most is the vision at the top to seize the opportunity offered by the
new technology, and a conscious decision to put it to work on the real
needs of our security. The rest will follow.
PROPOSALS
NATO
NATO should move towards a strategy in which the first use of
nuclear weapons is no longer an essential part of the deterrent. This
is quite different from a declaration of no first use, which would not
be sensible.
It should do this by (a) removing battlefield nuclear weapons,
whose role could now be fulfilled by conventional weapons (b)
exploiting the new technology to acquire acounter-attack capability
based on strategic conventional weapons, particularly cruise missiles
and other stand-off weapons, and precision-guided munitions.
This would involve recognising the new primacy of the missile in
modern warfare relative to the "platform" on land, sea and air.
Implicit in this would be the greater use of new opportunities in
surveillance, target acquisition and C3.
The new strategy would improve the credibility of the deterrent
and thus the stability of world peace.
NATO should now seriously consider a strategy of defence in
depth in response to these technological developments.
There is a need for a third NATO review, which would encompass
this whole subject, not least its arms control and Out-of-Area
implications.
New machinery is needed for consultation, strategic planning and
the servicing of Summit conference, which could, if this were done,
beneficially be held more often.
An attempt should be made to reach agreement whereby the
European countries spend more on conventional defence if the US
adopt a more flexible approach to nuclear disarmament.
The public of NATO, having lately reaffirmed its support in
principle for the Alliance, should be seen as a potentially helpful
force in the strategic debate. It should prove an ally in the search for
a more logical strategy, for example over the problem of value-for-
money, and standardisation in particular.
Outside Europe, NATO countries should be prepared to recognise
the fragility of the deterrent, due to the scope for miscalculation, and
act on its implications.
An immediate effort should be made to halt the arms race in space.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
U.K.
1. Policy
UK defence needs a logic of priorities. Based oncost-effectiveness to
NATO, this would give a high priority to defence of Western
interests, and promotion of stability, outside the Atlantic area. It
could involve double-earmarking some elements of BAOR.
Industry should be brought in early on staff targetting, and greater
competition should be introduced in procurement. We welcome both
trends in the Ministry of Defence.
MoD planning should place more emphasis on missiles and less on
platforms than it has been doing in the past.
Major targets for investment should include longer-range VSTOL,
night fighting equipment, information technology, and artificial
intelligence systems.
Greater use should be made of civilian resources. A whole range of
reforms in Whitehall could achieve major economies.
2. Army
A considerable inventory of war stocks is needed to bring the British
Army up to the standards of its Allies. (This also applies to the other
two Services.)
Night fighting equipment and training should have a high priority,
and so should the introduction of RPVs.
3. Navy
The Type 23 should set the pace for more drastic economies in ship
design. The Navy now needs a vessel which can serve offshore both in
home waters and Out-of-Area: simple and powerfully equipped with
stand-off missiles. The concept of an area around the UK, from which
most WP aircraft and warships could be excluded, should be
considered.
The whole concept of the convoy may now be out of date, and
attention should be paid to the concept of high-value independent
sailings.
4. R.A.F.
The role of the RAF remains as vital as ever, though the function of
the manned offensive aircraft is changing, and is likely now to become
that of a lifter and deployer ofstand-off missiles. The stand-off missile
is vital for the future. Since it could be fired from even a civil aircraft,
the operational options thus require extensive study.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
INTRODUCTION
The West's object should be the promotion of peace not merely
through disarmament, which is not an adequate strategy, but through
a deliberate advance towards world order, based on clearer
guidelines for East-West conduct. The most effective instrument of
world order at present is the deterrence provided by NATO; but it
has its own weaknesses, and is beset by mew challenges.
One of these weaknesses is NATO's own strategy of Flexible
Response, which is no longer credible. Technology can help to
provide anon-nuclear and thus far more credible defence, if wisely
deployed. It can thereby remove the need for the enormous quantity
of nuclear warheads on each side, which in terms of deterrence are
counter-productive. The change should be made openly and
discussed with the Soviet Union. It should be accompanied by clearly
understood rules of East-West co-existence.
I. POLITICS
This will have the desirable effect of raising the nuclear threshold. It
will not remove the need for a nuclear capability, nor the option of
First Use; but it will remove the raison d'etre for each side slavishly to
emulate the other, and the present senseless obsession about the
other side having a "monopoly" of some species of weapon. It should
also mean the removal of forward-based nuclear warheads.
Of the other vulnerable points in deterrence: (a) Technology can
help to remove miscalculations in the Third World by surveillance,
warning measures and the equipment of international forces. (b) In
Space, surveillance can be a powerful stabilising element; thus any
race to achieve a Star Wars capability would not only be chimerical
but could cause a grave weakening of deterrence. (c) Deterrence,
unlike defence, implies Arms control. The new technology offers
NATO a "counter-punch" conventional capability, which is much
safer than the present strategy. However, it raises questions on which
the Soviet Union should be reassured.
II. THE NEW TECHNOLOGY
Electronic innovations offer advances in target acquisition,
communications and precision-guided munitions which, if properly
exploited, would help the West to offset the Warsaw Pact's
superiority in numbers. They can provide a major force multiplier in
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
the areas of weapons systems, surveillance, night fighting, and
command and control It has to be accepted, however, that the WP is
also developing such capabilities: but NATO's defensive
conventional capability would be greatly improved as an added
deterrent.
Because of the new accuracy, fire power and reaction speed, any
future battle in Europe is likely to be chaotic. The West's emphasis
should be on survivability, firepower instand-off form, and the ability
to fight in all conditions.
III. NATO's DEFENCE NEEDS
To counter the WP's heavy superiority in hardware, the new
technology should be embodied in a new strategy of defence in depth.
This would not mean abandoning the present forward strategy
completely, but it would eliminate the worst feature: the need to
make a nuclear decision early.
In the air the WP's superiority is best met by exploiting the new
ability to knock out WP airfields. This could be reciprocated; but the
West is ahead in VSTOL, which should be pursued as a high priority.
The role of the manned offensive aircraft in Central Europe either in
long-range strategic bombardment or reconnaissance is now greatly
limited. But there remain vital roles for it, especially with stand-off
missiles, and also outside Europe.
On land the West badly lacks basic war stocks: guns, ammunition,
tracked anti-aircraft weapons, better vehicles. These must not be
ignored in the quest for new technology, which should be channelled
selectively, particularly into stand-off missiles, EW and counter-EW
equipment, VSTOL and night fighting.
On sea the prospect for strategic reinforcement is, to put it mildly,
overcast. The Falklands environment was benign compared with
what might be expected in the North Atlantic, with 600-mile stand-off
missiles, Backfire bombers, quieter submarines, air-sown mines
around ports, and total surveillance of the whole ocean from
Moscow. Nevertheless reinforcement could get through, particularly
individual sailings by fast armed merchant ships.
The needs of the Alliance call for a more active response to the
Soviet challenge outside Europe. This is a role for which Britain is
better qualified than any other of the Allies, and in fulfilling it, new
technology could be a major asset.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
IV. (1) ALLIANCE MACHINERY
The Alliance has not paid enough collective attention to the new
technology. Unless it does so soon, w~e could waste a great deal of
money without conceiving, let alone achieving, a clear result. The
problem needs to be addressed atheads-of-government level. At the
same time NATO needs a third Review to consider the interaction
between strategy, technology, Fast-West relations and arms control.
Meanwhile NATO should welcome the new public voice in the
wider debate, since it could help in introducing more rational
procedures.
(2) UK MACHINERY
Britain needs a logic of priorities in its defence policy, and we
consider what it should be. Such a strategy would be easier to sell to
the taxpayer than the present succession of financial circle-squaring
exercises. It would therefore facilitate the streamlining of defence
procedures which, as we show, are at present very wasteful. If our
recommendations on the subject were adopted, the problem of cost
presented by the new technology would largely solve itself.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0
Printed by Needham Printers Limited, London EC2A 4BA
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010008-0