EMERGING TECHNOLOGY FOR CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010003-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Emerging Technology far. Conventional
Deterrence
by Dr James A. Tegnelia
trengthening NATO's conventional
way to prevent the nuclear escalation
is military conflict, it relies on the de-
logies" to produce conventional
k. The US has already adopted the
rLand Battle doctrine to exploit these
technologies and now NATO has
adopted the "follow-on-forces attack"
(FOFA) concept which can apply these
technologies to extend the battlefield
towards the enemy rear. The tt~o are
said to be compatible, but not id~eniical.
The AirLand doctrine pertains to US
world-wide commitments. FOFA over-
laps with it only as concerns the deep
battle in Europe. In the following article
Dr James Tegnelia, US Assistant Un-
der-Secretary of Defense for Conven-
tional Initiatives, explains the rationale
behind the new US strategy, the struc-
tural changes involved and the status of
the hardware connected with it (for a
detailed description of the weapon sys-
tems involved, see IDR 8/1984,
pp.1053-1066). - Ed.
One basic fact concerning the threat
to NATO, which has not changed since
the alliance was formed, is that, in all
phases of conventional warfare, the
Warsaw Pact possesses numerical su-
periority. To overcome this disadvan-
tage, deterrence was provided primarily
by US nuclear forces. Later, this ap-
proach was changed to a strategy of
"flexible response" with deterrence
maintained by a combination of nuclear
weapons and by high quality conven-
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pensers (TMD) delivered by aircraft are unload-
the cylindrical SFWs which then descend by
achute. When the parachute is released (upper
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tional forces. In the 1960s, when this
strategy was adopted, NATO enjoyed
qualitative superiority in all components
and, with nuclear weapons, overall
force superiority.
Today these NATO advantages have
all but disappeared. The Soviets have, at
a minimum, attained strategic parity,
while gaining numerical theatre nuclear
superiority. They have increased their
conventional lead by improving the
quality of their ground and air forces.
These considerable qualitative im-
provements include improved ground
forces in every category, improved air-
craft and advances in tactical missiles.
These, together with alarming devel-
opments in Soviet small munitions, air
defense, and chemical warfare capabili-
ties, negate any edge previously held by
NATO. Shorter Soviet system-devel-
opment times and accelerated deploy-
ment of increasingly sophisticated
weapon systems, new operational con-
cepts such as the operational
manoeuvre group (OMG) and organi-
Compari>~on with low yield nuclear weapons
Skeet target engagement T(iSM search/attack footprint
S/M FOV
at 500m
altitude
? The diagram shows that against certain targets
"'smart" submunitions can be as effective as low-
yield nuclear weapons in hitting shard-armoured
target and cause less lateral damage. On the left, the
Skeet engagement is compared to that of a 0.1 kilo-
ton fission weapon and a 1 kiloton enhanced radia-
tion warhead (neutron bomb). Based on a MLRS
missile load this represents, however, a greater num-
ber of Skeels than that demonstrated in Assault
Breaker. At right is an illustrative TGSM footprint for
the same area. The current MLRS program involves
less submunitions than Assau/t Breaker and will use
hit-to-kill TGSMs.
-- The Army has chosen the MLRS Pauncher for
its surface- launched JTACMS and has apre-RFP
out to industry for a missile which must be compati-
ble with the MLRS launcher. This early artist's im-
pression shows a missile similar to a T-22 fired from
an MLRS launcher. In all probability the two pod
containers would not be side by side in the same
launcher as shown, (see drawing at right) but the
basic system would be dual capable with individu-
ally configured canisters. -
644 INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW 5/1985
JTACMS development and fielding schedule
current year
quarter
Development
nee ner
Development testing
Initial production
Production testing
L~nti-personnel/anti- materiel
(APAM) production
tees nee
1.Operational testing/development testing; 2. Initial operational capability
zational changes, such as the linking of
strengths. Under these conditions, and
bearing in mind that NATO as a defen-
sive alliance will have to fight outnum-
tional deterrence requires a strategy
superiority on the battlefield by employ-
tions incorporating emelrging Western
lysts that the Soviet Union prefers to
to war. Equally obvious is the Soviet
to restrict the use of nuclear weapons to
that a conventional attacl< against a nu-
the Soviets believe, be neutralized, the
Soviet Union would have the advantage
in a short, conventional-only battle
Soviet military power have been gear
to achieving a high level of confiden
Dmitrii Ustinov explained:
"...this means that now, in the preps
preventing the development of a mi
those tasks, in all their diversity,
military activities....This establishes
of troops and staffs, for the det
urination of the mix of weapons, and
the obligation of still tighter control
nuclear weapons, from tactical up
Pensive around a concept for rapid a
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-~
1
1
ATOC/ENSCE ~\
~
.~ -~i.~~
- ~~ b r~ss-GS
1 . ~ ~ _~,; M~
GACC~~+..~lh'i.~.-'fin :
\\~ ~1 %~i
1 The airborne Precision Location Strike System
(PCBs) offers an improved capability for locating
ground emitters. Data is transmitted through the
ground station (GS) to the Airborne Tactical Opera-
tions Center (ATOC), Enemy Situation Correlation
Element (ENSCE, the Air Force version of the Joint
Tactical Fusion Program), the Ground Attack Con-
trol Capability (GACC) and the Core Tactical Opera-
tion Center (CTOC). PLSS has the potential for real
time target location cueing.
~ The approximate US DoD schedule for the Joint
tactical Missile System (JTACMS).
port is a key element in their approach
to ground attack.
Tactical aviation, both qualitative and
quantitative, has been improved ac-
cordingly. Similarly, the greater range
and accuracy of the tactical ballistic
missiles, the SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23,
have led to the Warsaw Pact being able
to strike against NATO deep targets
and have enhanced the Soviet potential
for the suppression of NATO"s air
and nuclear assets. Supporting these
options, Soviet electronic warfare is de-
signed to introduce critical delays or
confusion into NATO C3 systems which
have been carefully studied for vulner-
abilities.
The Soviets have made major adjust-
ments in order to achieve by conven-
tional means what they have previously
sought to achieve with nuclear weap-
ons. By rapid ground operations, sup-
ported by air and tactical missiles the
Soviets would concentrate numerically
superior forces at critical points, ech-
eloned in depth, to ensure penetration
and a sustained advance into the NATO
rear areas.
Rapid ground operations
The Soviets. have developed the
weapons to support theses fast
manoeuvre elements. Their modern
forces have the BMP, improved tanks,
self-propelled artillery, and helicopters
for command and control, recon-
naissance, fire support, and greatly in-
creased mobility of the air-assault com-
ponent of the force. Moreover, the Sov-
iets now have the fighters, fighter-
bombers, and transport aircraft to pro-
tect and support their force and to de-
liver airborne forces for early seizure of
primary objectives.
The latest trend in Soviet military
thought gives full recognition to the po-
JTACMS/MLRS launcher compatibility
tential of new conventional weapons.
Former Chief of Staff Nikolai Ogarkov
recently observed: "...rapid changes in
conventional means of destruction
make many types of weapons global,
and permit the sharp increase (at least
by an order of magnitude) in destruc-
tion... so as to approach in effectiveness
weapons of mass destruction. The sharp
increase in the combat range of con-
ventional weapons makes it possible for
the whole of a country's territory...to
become involved immediately in active
combat actions.'"
Soviet air and anti-air operations
An air operation against NATO's air-
defense system in Central Europe would
employ penetration corridors to reduce
aircraft losses.
An air operation, involving massed
strikes on the first days of battle, would
be accompanied by use of electronic
jamming to "blind" NATO air-defense
radars and associated communications
in order to facilitate the subsequent de-
struction of NATO air-defense systems
by missiles and aircraft. For mobile tar-
gets, such as aircraft, which could not
be accurately located, tactical air com-
munications with controllers would be
jammed. Other targets such as air-
defense batteries would be designated
for simultaneous jamming and destruc-
tion.
Artillery and tactical ballistic missiles
armed with improved conventional
munitions would initiate the strategic
operation and, to the extent that
weapon inventories allowed, the Sovi-
ets would initially strike an enemy's air
defenses and airfields with means other
than aircraft.
NATO's response
A deterrent based primarily on a nu-
clear response has disappeared and
probably cannot be realized again.
Is there then any possibility of
achieving a conventional force capabil-
ity to match that of the Warsaw Pact?
This would consist of matching the
Warsaw Pact gun for gun and tank for
tank, requiring, of course, more expen-
diture on conventional weapon systems
and ammunition. Even more serious
would be the requirement for a greater
number of uniformed personnel, signi-
fying not only more men in arms, but
many more US troops in Europe and,
given demographic indicators, a return
to the draft.
Another option might be to increase
the rapidity with which NATO could re-
inforce its forward defenses. As far as
the US is concerned, this would require
some increase in uniformed personnel
and means for rapidly moving people
and equipment to Europe after warning
of an attack. Vast amounts of air lift, in-
volving substantial costs, would be
needed in addition to much improved
air defenses to ensure access to points
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of debarkation in Europe and the survi-
vability of air-transported equipment
and troops.
Still another option is a NATO offen-
sive strategy. The Warsaw Pact conven-
tional threat could be deterred by the
threat of a NATO conventional counter-
attack. This suggestion cannot be taken
seriously because of the large forces re-
quired and the most fundamental point:
NATO is a defensive alliance. As such, it
is committed to a forward defense in
Europe, with sufficient capability to
counter-attack only to regain lost terri-
tory following a Warsaw Pact attack.
The only viable conventional option
is to equip existing NATO forces with
modern weapons; weapons which are
more effective for all parts of the con-
current echelon battle, i.e. they must be
effective for the central battle and for
the attack on follow-on forces. This
combination of forces is what gives the
Soviets their numerical edge.
NATO's technological
opportunities
Enhanced deterrence from conven-
tional forces in the last part of this cen-
tury is attainable by putting to use the
West's greatest asset, the ability to ex-
ploit high technology.
It is true that a great amount of
modernization has been taking place.
New tanks have appeared in NATO
forces, better communications exist,
and vehicles, helicopters, aircraft and
other weaponry have been added to the
inventory. Although these improve-
ments will continue, they will not in
themselves redress the imbalance of
conventional forces. No matter how
good and well equipped NATO forces
are, they still stand to be overwhelmed
by numerically superior Warsaw Pact
forces.
The answer to this problem is partly
operational and partly technological.
New technologies can improve the ca-
pabilities of our forces. Today we have
in hand the means for a new dramatic
breakthrough in the course of warfare
through the exploitation of the micro-
processor or chip. The chip gives us the
capability to improve our systems
greatly. It provides new capabilities for
airborne radar and other sensors allow-
ing the acquisition of targets at great
ranges with high degrees of resolution.
It enables the processing and transmis-
sion of intelligence and targeting data
with unprecedented speed and effi-
ciency, giving commanders consider-
able flexibility in battlefield manage-
ment. It leads to terminally guided sub-
munitions which can increase warhead
lethality. In sum, modern electronic sys-
tems enable the ground commander to
observe and influence the battle at close
and stand-off ranges; ranges well into
the enemy rear. It brings depth to the
battlefield and can enhance the effec-
tiveness of those forces engaged in the
close-in battle.
Giving depth to the battlefield means
NATO commanders can have the ability
accurately to attack Soviet ground.
6:J0 INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW 6/1995
forces at ranges from a few to several
hundred kilometres; modern weapons
can destroy, disrupt and delay forces
moving to contact. They can also be
used to attack command and control
nodes, transportation choF:e points, air-
fields and other vital targets. These
weapons can be launched either from
aircraft or by ground systems.
With the ability to attack deep and
effectively, NATO forces can, for the
first time, offset the numerical superior-
ity of the Warsaw Pact b~y conducting
the echelon battle concurrently with the
front-line battle. If NATO c;an disrupt or
delay follow-on forces, it can influence
the time and place of their commitment
and their combat power. The objective
would be to deny the enemy the initia-
tive by undermining his tactical plans
and denying him the opportunity to
mass at critical points. This can be done
by attacking follow-on manoeuvre ele-
ments and by going after critical targets
whose destruction would impede those
elements. In this way NATO forces in
direct contact would be facing a level of
enemy force against which they could
survive a_nd ultimately prevail.
There are critics who maintain that
Soviet tactics are changing, that there
will be no force echelonment by Pact
armies, and that deep-attack tactics are
therefore, ineffective. Soviet tactics are
in fact changing. The use of operational
manoeuvre groups is one example. The
Soviets, however, can only bring so
much combat power to bear at the front
at one time no matter which tactics are
applied. In the Soviet rear there are just
so many roads, so many bridges, so
much bivouac room and so many air-
fields. Some type of echelonment, some
type of follow-on force movement will
be necessary to commit such large
forces to battle. There will be targets
that are vulnerable under any tactical
plan.
US AirLand Battle
The United States Army and Air
Force are presently engaged in devel-
oping joint doctrine designed to exploit
these new technologies. In May 1984,
the Chiefs of Staff of the US Army and
Air Force in a 34-point agreement set
the following goal: To provide opera-
tional commanders an integrated, capa-
ble and flexible air-land battle force for
use against an enemy aggressor.
The AirLand Battle concept which is
the focus of this new doctrine holds
three basic tenets. First, the close battle
must be fought and won. The close bat-
tle is the traditional battle between
manoeuvre forces, supported by air as-
sets and other indirect fire weapons.
This battle follows the doctrine of for-
ward defense, denying enemy penetra-
tion and holding at the political borders.
The second part of the AirLand Battle is
the rear battle. In this phase operational
commanders seek to protect their rear
areas from enemy air and other inter-
dictive forces thereby enabling support
of the close battle. The third part of the
concept is the deep battle. In this
phase, the battle is taken to the enemy's
rear by air-launched and ground-
launched weapons to engage, destroy
and disrupt follow-on forces and other
targets previously described.
Pursuant to the new US doctrine,
Army and Air Force would jointly fight
in all three parts of the AirLand Battle at
the same time, making maximum use of
available combat power. The US Air-
Land Battle doctrine, developed for
world-wide use, is fully compatible with
the concept of "follow-on forces at-
tack'" (FOFA) embraced by NATO.
High technology now offers the
Army a new role directly in the deep
battle. Current doctrine sees the Army ;`
influencing the battlefield by deep at-
tacks with air support out to distances
approaching 100 kilometres. For the
first time, the ground commander will
have the capability simultaneously to
engage forces in contact as well as fol-
low-on echelons.
Studies done by the US Army reveal
that for the close-in battle, high densi-
ties of ground forces will occur on D-
Day; they will also occur out to a dis-
tance of about 100 kilometres. By D +
36 hours, a maximum target density will
occur at about 50 kilometres from the
FLOT within range of both Army and
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Air Force assets. Knowing this will al-
low for the joint management of the
battle and the most efficient use of force
capabilities to fight the deep battle. If
we can manage an air battle from an
AWACS with targets moving at the
speed of sound, we should certainly be
able to do the same with ground targets
moving at 60 kilometres per hour.
AirLand Battle summary
AirLand Battle can be characterized
by the following features:
1. An enlargement of the battle space.
2. An emphasis on shared sensors and
inter-operability of command and
control.
3. Establishment of the requirement for
stand-off weapons.
~ The General Dynamics TGSM used in Assault
Breaker had infrared guidance. The currently funded
TGW for MLRS will use millimetre-wave sensor
technology (see /DR 2/1985, pp.255-257).
4. Joint doctrine, tactics, training and
testing.
Technical Requirements
? Surveillance: NATO must detect
enemy force deployments and deter-
mine intent as early as possible. NATO
must be able to assess the situation and,
in particular, to determine enemy vul-
nerabilities. At all stages both classical
intelligence means and theatre-level
reconnaissance, surveillance and target
acquisition sensors will be used to de-
termine the assessment of the situation
as well as the location and classification
of important targets.
Targets must be classified and
tracked in near real time, i.e. with lag
times measured in the order of a few
minutes. In most cases it will not be
necessary to track each target individu-
ally. While high value or critical node
targets should be detected and located
as precisely as possible, manoeuvre
units or moving targets should be ag-
gregated into groups or clusters, such
as companies and battalions, appro-
priate for the engaging weapon. Ac-
curate assessment of the enemy situa-
tion and the precise location of second
echelon targets requires that informa-
tion from many sensors and souirces be
availab-e.
The most important new sensors are:
1. Synthetic aperture radars mounted on
high altitude aircraft such as the TR-1.
2. Precision emitter-location systems
such as the Precision Location and
Strike System (PCBs), also carried by
high altitude platforms.
3. Moving Target Indicator radars, such
as JSTARS, carried on board a C-18
aircraft.
? Data fusion: Information from these
sensors is correlated at fusion centres
that combine all information and pro-
vide situation reports and projections to
the commander and to his planning
staff. With this information, the com-
mander identifies groups of targets for
attack by all his available air and ground
assets.
? Weapons systems: The delivery of
weapons or weapon systems to the tar-
get is the third important function of
deep attack systems. The term
"weapon" can refer to a missile 1:hat de-
livers munitions to the target, or it might
mean an aircraft that delivers a missile
containing submunitions. The ;systems
must be flexible, survivable, and re-
sponsive. Flexibility is necessary so that
they can be employed in the various
theatres in which US forces operate.
Clearly the equipment must be able
to survive enemy attack, given numer-
ically inferior forces. In general, surviva-
bility can be achieved with weapon-
delivery platforms which have stand-off
capability. Survivability can also be
achieved with platforms and weapons
that can operate over enemy territory.
These systems must also be able to
deal with short-warning attacks and
time-sensitive targets. The Pact forces
will attack rapidly and then exploitation
units will move quickly to take advant-
age of the situation. Therefore, all of the
functions described above must be
capable of being performed quickly and
the equipment for "follow-on forces at-
tack" must be closely integrated on the
battlefield.
Weapons now in development, such
as the MLRS-TGW, can destroy an ar-
moured company in a variety of deploy-
ments, from a few to tens of kilometres
from the FLOT. Other weapons, such as
the Joint Tactical Missile System
(JTACMS), will be able to attack a
wide variety of targets out to about 100
kilometres.
Status of technologies
? Survei//ance: The TR-1 high altitude
tactical reconnaissance aircraft is in
production, and first units have been
deployed in the European theatre
equipped with passive electronic inter-
cept sensors. The advanced synthetic
aperture radar for the TR-1 has been
successfully developed and demon-
strated and is entering production. This
long range high resolution radar can
detect and classify fixed targets in near
real time.
The Joint Surveillance and Target At-
tack Radar System (JSTARS) radar
combines the synthetic aperture, fixed
target indication and MTI modes with a
weapons guidance mode. These techni-
ques have been demonstrated by two
different contractors as part of the US
Pave Mover program. In tests at White
Sands, mounted on an F-111 aircraft, it
was demonstrated to have the capabil-
ity to detect and track armoured vehicle
targets in all modes. In tests as part of
the Assault Breaker program, the weap-
ons guidance mode with. missiles and
aircraft was also demonstrated. The
JSTARS Army and Air Force program
to develop an operational system will
begin this spring.
? Data fusion: The Battlefield Exploi-
tation and Target Acquisition (BETA)
system is being tested in Europe; BETA
correlates and fuses information from
diverse sensors as required for locating
echeloned targets. To provide a perma-
nent operational capability, the BETA
technology is being incorporated into
the Joint Tactical Fusion Program
(JTFP). The Army and the Air Force
have agreed to the requirements for
JTFP and are in the process of combin-
ing the Army All Source Analysis Sys-
tem (ASAS) and the Air Force Enemy
Situation Correlation Element (ENSCE)
programs to develop the operational
system.
To facilitate the command and con-
trol function in the Air Force, the archi-
tecture of the Ground Attack Control
Capability (GACC) concept, based on
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Validation
Pre-FSEDr
FSED
LRIPZ
Production
1. FuII-scale engineering
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
existing developmental equipment, has
been established. This will make it pos-
sible to track and engage time-sensitive
targets. The GACC is analogous to the
Command and Reporting Center (CRC)
presently in operation for controlling in-
terceptors and fighters.
The US Tactical Air Command has
developed an operational concept for
the GACC which provides the capability
to: a) integrate sensor data for attacks
against targets in the enemy rear area;
b) determine the most effective means
of attack; c) draw upon assigned and
available resources to attack the targets
and d) control the attacks against those
targets. The basic structural interface
between the Army and the Air Force
will be preserved. The Air Force is cur-
rently pursuing "modular control equip-
ment ' required to build the command
and control capability necessary for
second echelon attack in coordination
with the Army.
? Weapons delivery: The technology
for weapon delivery systems is mature
and has been demonstrated. One sys-
tem is the JTACMS to be initiated this
spring. JTACMS can be surface-
launched from a mobile transporter-
erector launcher, the MLRS launcher
having been chosen for this system.
The technology for precision guid-
ance of such missiles is available and
has been demonstrated. Low cost, high
precision inertial navigation systems
were incorporated into early missiles
and flown as part of the demonstration
program at the White Sands missile
range. The basic navigation systems for
ballistic or cruise missiles can be aug-
mented by external means such as
JSTARS radar, PLSS or GPS.
For cruise missile delivery systems, a
terminal seeker can also augment the
inertial navigation system. For some tar-
gets, such as hardened fixed installa-
tions, precision terminal guidance is im-
portant. Terminal seekers are in produc-
tion for both the US Air Force Maverick
missile and the GBU-15 glide bomb
program. Both man-in-the-loop visual
and autonomous imaging infrared
seekers are used in these applications.
A wide range of submunition candi-
dates exist, from cluster bomblets to
precision terminally guided submuni-
tions. Area bomblets already in the field
can be very effective when delivered ac-
curately against many types of targets.
Sensor-fuzed munitions, for example,
f
2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Q
warheads such as SADRAIVI and Skeet
fuzed by relatively inexpensive sensors
are in development. Sensor-fuzed
munitions, accurately deliv~sred, are ex-
tremely effective against any target type.
These can be dispensed from a variety
of air or surface-delivered munition car-
riers. The most mature submunition
concept which has been demonstrated
is the autonomous hit-to-kill submuni-
tion. Such terminally guided submuni-
tions, after being dispensed from the
carrier vehicle, select an individual tar-
get within their field of view and
manoeuvre to engage these targets se-
lectively.
The terminally guided submunitions,
as well as the sensor-fuzed munitions,
can employ a number of different au-
tonomous target acquisition techniques
including infrared and millimetre wave
radars. System engineering factors for
employment from a particular dispenser
or munition may dictate tFle submuni-
tion field of view or potential counter-
measure susceptibility, but the technical
capacity is already in hand to make
such system-design trade-offs. The
technologies involved in these submu-
nitions can also be applied to a wide
variety of weapon systems. For exam-
ple, munitions based on this technology
can be launched from any one of many
candidate platforms ranglnq from mor-
tars to cannon or rocF;et artillery
(MLRS), as well as long range missiles
(JTACMS) or from aircraft dispensers.
? Summary of status: The status of the
technologies that form the basis of
these new conventional cakrabilities are
as follows:
a) The military concept has been devel-
oped and is technically and operation-
ally feasible.
b) The sensors and sensor platforms re-
quired to detect, identify, and track
echeloned manoeuvre units .at short and
long range are either in production or
under development.
c) Battlefield correlation and fusion of
multi-sensor information is (being dem-
onstrated in Europe.
d) Air-launched and ground-launched
missiles for delivery of weapons to tar-
The European Security Study (ESECS),
Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe,
MacMillan Press, London, 1983. The ESECS Steer-
ing Group's report considered this estimate, which
was contained in a supporting paper, to be a "'mini-
mum .The group itself advanced the figure of S20
billion as a median estimate, p.30. - Ed.
p
The Air Force has con-
tracted for the opera-
tional development of
the Avco Systems sen-
sor-fuzed weapon
(SFW) which is now in
full-scale engineering
development (see /DR
8/1984, p.1061), and is
said to be in a phase of
"technological matura-
tion." Its approximate
development schedule is
shown in the chart.
gets in any echelon have been demon-
strated and are under development for
production in five years or less.
e) Unguided submunitions for large
area engagement and destruction of
unarmoured and lightly armoured tar-
gets are in production in Europe and in
the US.
f) Smart submunitions of various kinds
have been demonstrated and are either
in engineering development or ready for
engineering development.
g) Technology for submunition lethality
is sufficient for the near term threat, and
can be improved to match the evolution
of the threat.
Conclusion
There remains the question of
whether all these new developments
can indeed be funded by NATO
members. Although costs of individual
systems may be high, all of our studies
indicate that resultant savings in con-
ventional ammunition, force structure
and logistics assets over the long term
will make them affordable. In the report,
Strengthening Conventional Deterrence
in Europe issued by the European Secu-
rity Study group (ESECS) In 1983, it
was estimated that all of the systems
described would be developed for Cen-
tral Europe for about S10 billion." We
estimate that the program cost, includ-
ing procurement, would be between
S20 and S30 billion. This would repre-
sent atotal NATO cost, stretching over
a decade or more.
Modern weapons technologies, in-
cluding microelectronics, provide us
with the potential for improving our
conventional forces, thereby affording a
higher degree of conventional deter-
rence.
A few modern conventional weapons
can be as effective as one small nuclear
weapon. This reality produces the en-
hanced deterrence. These weapons
have been successfully tested and will
be deployed to our operational forces
before the close of this decade.
The United States military establish-
ment will continue to seek exploitation
of the new technologies and will ac-
quire the resulting weaponry. It will do
little good for the United States to pur-
sue these new technologies unilaterally.
Therefore, multi-national programs such
as MLRS-TGW have been established,
and the US looks forward to establish-
ing others. N
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010003-5