LETHAL LASERS FOR THE BATTLEFIELD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 21, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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kNL
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PACIFIC
DEFENCE
REPORTER
SUPPLEMENTAL CLIPS: WEDNESDAY, 21 AUGUST 1985
AUGUST 1985 Page 34
Lethal lasers for the battlefield
By David C. Morrison - Washington, DC
S ELDOM MENTIONED in the debate
raging today over the laser battle-stations
that may one day patrol the heavens is a
more down-to-earth class of battlefield beam
weapons likely to enter superpower arsenals
long before that real-world 'Star Wars' pre-
views.
Low-powered directed-energy (DE) devices
are already widely used by the military as ad-
juncts to conventional weaponry: laser range-
finders on tanks. laser target designators aboard
helicopters. fighters. and remotely-piloted vehi-
cles. and ring-laser gyro inertial navigation sys-
tems on aircraft and missiles. The US Army
even uses lasers for realistic score-keeping, in
war game exercises at the National Training
Centre in Fort Irwin, California.
The next evolution in military directed ener-
gy; already in advanced development, will see
more powerful versions of these laser adjuncts
coming into use as offensive antimatenel and
antipersonnel weapons. 'Technology in both
the East and the West is rapidly approaching
the point where tactical directed-energy weap-
ons can be mass produced: Major Clark
Campbell predicted in a late 1983 issue of the
Army professional journal, Infantry (Nov-Dec.
1983). Major Campbell has served with the
Combined Arms Combat Development Activi-
ty as Project Director for Directed Energy
Concepts.
Among the DE weapons reported by Camp.
bell are mobile lasers that could 'destroy the
eyesight of soldiers'; particle beams that could
penetrate sandbags or armor, killing all targets
in their range; sonic waves that could 'blur
vision and cause nausea, fear and confusion';
and radio frequency weapons that could pro-
duce 'intense pain from burned skin or heated
bones.
Some of these high-tech weapons are unlike-
ly to be deployed soon. Campbell says, for
example. that research into sonic wave weap-
ons 'has been limited: but suggests that the
atmospheric compression waves generated by
high-powered sound projectors could one day
be harnessed by the military, if not as antiper-
sonnel devices. then for such antimatenel mis-
sions as mine clearing. Because of their bulki-
ness and high power requirements. he says, the
'technology seems to be a long way from pro-
ducing a tactical particle beam system. Radio-
frequency weapons, on the other hand, are
somewhat more likely to emerge within the
next two decades, the Pentagon having already
expressed concern about Soviet research in
this area.
The blinding laser is the only tactical DE
weapon likely to be deployed in the near future
by the US. The military has been exploring
directed energy since the 1950s and building
prototype DE weapons for over a decade. A
1984 study by the Frost & Sullivan market
research firm predicts growth in spending for
military lasers - across the spectrum from
laser designators to 'Star Wars' research -
from $2.5 billion in 1984 to $4.2 billion
in 1987.
In the mid-1970s, Army engineers built the
Mobile Test Unit, a 30,000-watt carbon-diox-
ide laser which was installed in a Marine Corps
LTVP-7 armored personnel carver. The dome-
turreted test vehicle shot down fixed-wing and
helicopter drones in a 1976 test series. Consi-
dered unwieldly and tending to overheat howe-
ver, the MTU was soon retired. A few years
ago, the MTU's electric-discharge gas laser was
donated to NASA's Marshall Space Flight Cen-
tre to test laser propulsion for rockets.
In 1982. the US Army experimented with a
lower-powered battlefield lasef, the close-com-
bat laser assault weapon (C-CLAW). It had
planned to mount the C-CLAW laser on a
Bradley armored personnel carrier in a Si 12
million prototype project code-named Road-
runner. Following sensational press reports in
late 1983. the Army announced cancellation of
the Roadrunner program.
MORE promising technology is being de-
Aveloped under the code name Stingray.
which the Army terms an 'optical and electro-
optical countermeasure system.' Stingray is a
low-energy. tank-mounted device. Funding for
Stingray is set at S21 million for 1985. with a
similar amount for next year. The Army plans
to field a Stingray prototype in 1986 and the
weapon system itself early in the 1990s. Martin
Marietta is the prime contractor for Stingray
while General Electric is developing its laser.
Stingray will 'disrupt enemy target acquisi-
tion and tracking' Army Lt General James
Merryman. Deputy Chief of Staff for Research.
Development and Acquisition, said early this
year in heavily censored testimony before a
Congressional subcommittee. 'The concept is,
you would put something like this on a tank
and you would have the capability to scan
about 45 degrees. You could do that at the
same time that the tank main gun would be
firing at another tank:
Modern tanks, such as the US M-60 Patton
and M-I Abrams, are equipped with a variety
of electro-optical systems: thermal imagers for
night vision, assorted periscopes for command-
er and driver, and auxiliary telescopes for mag-
nification. Laser illumination can attack these
devices either directly, by distorting or fogging
lenses and overloading thermal imagers. or in-
directly, by using them as conduits to focus
intense laser light into the eyes of the tank's
operators.
The Army will not describe specifically
Stingray's laser, but it is known to be an opti-
cally-pumped, solid-state 'slab' laser and to be
somewhat' lower-powered than planned for C-
CLAW. The C-CLAW laser was reportedly
based on the M-I tank's laser rangefinder,
which employs a 100 millijoule laser. Damage
to electro-optics could probably not be effected
at line-of-sight distances farther than five miles;
although eye injury could be sustained at
greater ranges.
The US Air Force has a similar program
underway, code-named Coronet Prince, which
will be slung on a pod underneath aircraft. The
descendant of an earlier program called Com-
pass Hammer. Coronet Prince will use the
same laser as Stingray, but cranked up to high-
er intensities because of the greater distances it
must cover to 'paint' enemy tanks, aircraft and
missiles. Coronet Prince could be used to dam-
age electro-optical display systems and for-
ward-looking infrared (FLIR) imaging devices
of aircraft, spoof the infrared guidance of anti-
aircraft missiles, or injure the eyes of pilots.
Funding for Coronet Prince is currently
planned at S20 million between now and 1988.
when a prototype will be fielded.
Coronet Prince should not be confused with
the Air Force's now-defunct airborne laser lab-
oratory (ALL). Initiated in 1974, the ALL was
a 400,000-watt carbon dioxide laser carved by
a KC-135 military transport aircraft. It failed
during a public test-firing in 1981 but two years
later shot down rive Sidewinder missiles. only
to be consigned to mothballs in 1984 as a
technological dead end. The Congress and
the Pentagon concurred that the 10.6-micron
long-wavelength ALL laser had 'no potential
application. and that research funds would be
better spent on shorter-wavelength. sub-micron
lasers.
While Defence Department officials argue
that tactical DE weapons such as Stingray and
Coronet Prince are designed solely for destro,
ing enemy electro-optics. the eyesight of enem'
troops is unavoidably a secondary target. For
many years the Army has recognised the dan-
ger of unintentionally blinding its own troops
with laser rangefinders and target designators.
relatively low-powered devices widely de-
ployed on a variety of weapon systems to track
targets and guide missiles and artillery shells.
'Compared with viewing a tank searchlight
100 metres in front of the tank. a 1979 army
Environmental Hygiene Agency study noted. a
laser rangefinder 'would appear more than 100
million times brighter: Another study. con-
ducted two years later by the Amy's Combat
Analysts Agency. found that troops sharing a
battlefield with low-power lasers stood a 'better
than 100 per cent chance of being illuminated'
Depending on the wavelength. lasers inflict
varying degrees of harm to the human eye.
Visible and near-infrared laser light passes
through the eye and focuses on the retina. or
fovea, causing blind spots or total blindness.
Ultraviolet and far-infrared laser radiation is
absorbed near the surface of the eye. causing
cortical burns. blisters or cataracts.
'Because of the lasers coming on to the bat-
tlefield. both ours and the Soviets' in the 1985-
90 timeframe. then-Arty Chief of Staff. Gen-
eral Edward Meyer, told a Congressional panel
in 1983. 'we project a large number of injuries
to the eyes. Every soldier on that battlefield is
going to be wearing goggles like tankers do. and
we will have to protect them from lasers all
around because you never know when you are
going to get lased.
'It is going to be a problem with soldiers on
the battlefield wearing goggles all the time:
Meyer concluded. 'It is hard enough to look a
guy in the eye and tell him "Get up that hill".
Now you will have to look through two rose-
colored glasses. I guess. That is going to be a
change in wars:
CONTINUED NEXT PAGE
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SUPPLEMENTAL CLIPS: WEDNESDAY, 21 AUGUST 1985
May/June 1985
Help Limit
Funding
ForStar Wars
Sometime in May the House of Rep-
resentatives will take up the Reagan ad-
ministration's proposal to spend an
additional S3.7 billion in fiscal year 1986
on research for the "star wars" missile
defense program. That figure is almost
three times the S 1.4 billion Congress
approved for fiscal year 1985.
Deployment of a missile defense sys-
tem by either superpower could deprive
the ocher side of the ability to make a
retaliatory strike. As a result, continued
U.S. development of a ballistic missile
defense system threatens to spark a
dangerous turn in the nuclear arms race,
destabilizing the delicate nuclear balance
by escalating the arms race into outer
space and provoking a new buildup of
nuclear arms.
President Reagan contended in his
March 1983 "star wars" speech that his
star wars program would render nuclear
weapons "impotent and obsolete" by
developing an impenetrable defense
system able to destroy Soviet-launched
missiles before they reached U.S. terri-
tory. But the administration's proposal
is flawed for a number of reasons.
First, because of numerous techno-
logical limitations, many scientists, in-
cluding astronomer Carl Sagan, say it is
unlikely the star wars program could ever
be 100 percent effective. Even if the sys-
tem were successful in knocking down
90 to 95 percent of the total Soviet inter-
continental ballistic missile (ICBM)
arsenal, this would still allow some 400
to 800 nuclear warheads to "leak"
through-enough to level all major U.S.
cities, kill half the U.S. urban population
and injure most of the rest.
Moreover, even if a perfect missile de-
fense system could be built, it would not
be able to stop bombers armed with nu-
clear bombs or cruise missiles, both of
which fly low enough to evade a space-
based defense system.
Critics-say that the Soviet Union is most
likely to respond to the U.S. development
of a missile defense system by increasing
the size of its offensive missile force-
land-based ICBMs and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles-and by
further developing its own star wars
program.
Even Paul Nitze, the administration's
senior arms control adviser, concedes
that deployment of a missile defense
system might "encourage a proliferation
of countermeasures and additional offen-
sive weapons to overcome [our] de-
fenses."
The next phase of research in the ad-
ministration's program would lead to
operational testing in outer space by the
end of the 1980s or early 1990s. Such
testing would be a direct violation of the
U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty, which prohibits any testing of
space-based defense systems or com-
ponents.
Finally, the administration's star wars
program is not only dangerous, but ex-
pensive. If approved, it would cost the
U.S. some S 30 billion over the next five
years and billions more in later years. For-
ARMS RACE... CONTINUED
Lary and political consequences.
The history of the arms race is much more complex than
I have suggested here, for it has involved Soviet challenges
to the United States as well as U.S. challenges to the Soviet
Union. Moreover, the ABM Treaty shows that in the past
both sides have been ready to close off some areas of the
strategic arms competition and to keep it under some kind
of control.
Nevertheless, the Soviet atomic bomb and strategic mis-
sile decisions are relevant to any attempt to understand the
likely consequences of the SDI, for they show the Soviet
determination to compete with the United States. The Rea-
gan Administration's approach to strategic defense seems
almost designed to evoke just this kind of atavistic response
Pg. 16
mer Defense Secretary James Schlesinger
believes a full-fledged nuclear defense
system would cost "well over half a tril-
lion dollars and probably [over] a trillion"
to deploy.
In March Common Cause joined with
other groups in sending a letter to mem-
bers of the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee stating that the pending star wars
proposal is costly and destabilizing and
threatens to undermine the ABM treaty.
CC is calling for Congress to restrict star
wars funding at last year's level or lower
and to eliminate all funding for demon-
stration projects that will result in viola-
tions of the ABM Treaty.
The proposal to authorize money for
the program is now being considered
in Congress. CC will also be lobbying
later this year when both the House and
Senate vote on proposals to appropriate
money for the program.
All CC members: Please write to your
representative today urging him or her
to strongly oppose President Reagan's
request for $3.7 billion for the star wars
program. Ask your representative to re-
strict funding for the star wars program to
last year's level or lower. Point out that
the president's program would danger-
ously escalate the arms race and threaten
to violate a major arms control agreement
-the ABM Treaty. Also point out that
its enormous cost would add to the bal-
looning federal deficit.
The address for all representatives is:
U.S. House of Representatives, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20515
from the Soviet Union, rather than to elicit Sovier coopera-
tion in controlling and restraining the arms race. (]
1. Harry S. Truman, 1945: Year of Decision (New York: Douhledas,
1965), p. 458.
2. Election speech, Feb. 9, 1946. in I.V. Stalin. Socbntenu.t, vol. 3. 1946-
1953, Robert H. McNeal, ed. (Stanford, Cal.: The Hoover Institution,
1967), p. 20.
3. Alexander Werth, Russia at lt'ar 1941-1945 (London: Pan Books,
1965), p. 925.
4. Quoted by A. Lavrent'eva in 'Strottel not ogo mira: V mire kntg, 9
(1970), p. 4.
S. Pravda, Jan. 15, 1960.
6. V.D. Sokolovskii, Voenrtwta Srrategita (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1962;,
p. 237.
7. Ibid., p. 16.
8. Krasnata Zt'e:.da, Sept. 23, 1983.
9. Pravda, March 27, 1983.
10. Interviews, Radio Moscow (May 23 and 25. 1984), Forrrs;n Br ad-
cast Informattun Service (June 6, 1984), USSR International Affairs, pp.
AA9, AAU.
33
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SUPPLEMENTAL CLIPS: WEDNESDAY, 21 AUGUST 1985
LASERS... Continued
Work continues on laserproof goggles, but
most filters badly obscure vision and few are
effective across the range of possible laser fre-
quencies. Indicating the seventy of the visual
interference problem is a request for contract
proposals issued early in 1984 by the Army for
the development of goggles, good against vis-
ible and near-infrared laser light, that would
retain at least 50 per cent of normal vision.
That, apparently, is the best result the Army
can expect. An additional problem is that as
reds are filtered out, a soldiers's ability to dis-
tinguish natural and camouflage green is dra-
matically diminished.
Intensified research into the biological effects
of laser weapons will be carried out at a new
Directed Energy Laboratory at Brooks Air
Force Base in Texas. 'The purpose of this facili-
ty: Air Force Maj. General Clifton Wright,
head of the Air Force's Engineering and Ser-
vices Directorate, told Congress. 'is to conduct
radiation experiments on animals to determine
potential effects on humans of exposure to
high-energy radiation: The test subjects at the
59 million facility, he said, would be'primanly
rodents and sheep:
S OME MILITARY experts are no less wor-
ned about the psychological than the phy-
siological impact of battlefield lasers. 'For the
technically unsophisticated soldier experienc-
ing marginal damage from an unseen and un-
identified source. reluctance to return to battle
after recuperation might welt make him an
ineffective combatant.' Lieut-Colonel Douglass
Bacon. a systems manager with the Army's
Training and Doctrine Command, wrote in the
December issue of .tfilitart? Review the jour-
nal of the .Army's Command and General Staff
College.
'Fear is contagious. and rumors spread rap-
idly' Bacon wormed. 'Even if a relatively small
number of soldiers experienced laser eye dam-
age. the reports that would naturally circulate
throughout the forward forces might degrade
the combat effectiveness of these units:
The push to develop battlefield lasers is driv.
en. in pan. by fears of what the other side may
be doing. 'If personnel countermeasure re-
search. development. testing and evaluation
are not continued aggressively,' the Air Force
wamcd in its funding request for the Brooks
directed energy laboratory. 'our adversenes will
be encouraged to develop directed-energy wea-
pon systems with their extensive kill capacity
directed against the human element of our stra-
tegic and tactical systems.'
The Soviets do deploy a variety of battlefield
lasers today. but so far solely as adjuncts. Ac-
cording to General Wickham. 'these are pn-
manly lasers such as rangefinders, but they also
pose an antipersonnel and antiscnsor threat:
LASERS ARE not the only Soviet DE weap-
ons the Pentagon is wormed about. Soviet
'radio-frequency technology has now devel-
oped to a stage: the Defence Intelligence Agen-
cy claims. 'where it could support development
of a prototype, short-range radio-frequency
weapon ... which not only could damage cnti-
cal electronic components but also inflict dis-
orientation or physical injury on personnel.'
Interestingly, British radio researcher Sir
Robert Watson-Watt was approached in 1934
by the UK Air Ministry to assess the feasibility
of a radio-frequency 'death ray.' Watson-Watt
concluded that the'power required was fantas-
tically large (and) that there was no chance of a
death-ray being produced by those Ineans. He
did discover, however, that radio broadcasts at
power levels that were practicable could pro-
duce detectable reflections from aircraft - and
so radar was born.
Radio-frequency weapons would operate
'like a microwave oven: according to Dr Rob.
ert Cooper, director of the US Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency. The Soviets have used
microwave energy on the US embassy in Mos-
cow. Cooper says, and the effect of radio-
frequency weapons would be similar.
The biological effects of microwave radiation
are ambiguous and poorly understood, as the
long-simmering controversy over the micro-
waving of the US Moscow embassy attests.
Low-dose radio-frequency studies on animals
have shown behavioral changes, immune sys-
tem alterations, and neurological effects, but
these findings continue to be controversial.
Nonetheless, in 1982 the American National
Standards Institute dramatically reduced per-
missable exposure limits to radio-frequency
missions. The physical effects of higher levels
of microwave energy are less disputed: tissue
and bone burns, cataracts and - of more
doubtful military utility - temporary sterility.
As for antimatenel applications, microwaves
could either over-heat electronic components
or, at lower intensities, interfere with signal
transmission within equipment.
The US is also researching radio frequency
weapons. 'High-power microwave beam weap-
ons are the newest thrust in the DoD Directed
Energy Technology Program: Air Force Major-
General Donald Lamberson. Deputy and As-
sistant for Directed Energy weapons, told a
Congressional panel in 1983. 'In effects-testing
we have initial evaluations of microwave-in-
duced (component damage). To support beam
generation, we have under development ad-
vanced electron gun and high-emissivity cath-
odes and pulsed-power technology. If expen-
ments verify that appropriate damage mecha-
nisms exist, then the technology has promise as
a weapon system: Funding is not thought to
amount to more than several million dollars
per year - but a drop in the Pentagon bucket.
In any event, optical attack lasers like Sting-
ray will be deployed long before radio-
frequen-cy weapons. Indeed, they may already have.
Unconfirmed reports have circulated that So-
viet-made laser rangefinders or target designa-
tors were used to blind Chinese troops during
the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war. ^
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jl~
SUPPLEMENTAL CLIPS: WEDNESDAY, 21 AUGUST 1985
DI J REPORT July/August t 1985 Pg. 6
DEFINING THE SPETSINAZ THROAT
Gerard Holden
Although the subject has been
relatively familiar in specialist circles
for some years, it is only recently that
discussion of Soviet special forces,
sometimes referred to as Spetsnaz. has
occurred in public fora.
In this article. Gerard Holden, a
researcher at the Science Policy
Research Unit, looks at the
background to the emergence of
Spetsnaz in Western and Soviet
literature. and assesses the evidence on
the nature and role of these forces. He
argues that the Spetsnaz question, as
applied to Britain, cannot be
understood in isolation as a purely
military issue, but needs to be set in
the context of domestic debates over
defence policy.
The author is currently working Qn a
research project for the United
Nations University on European
security questidns with particular
reference to the Warsaw Pact.
During the past few years, the term
'Spetsnaz' has become an increasingly
familiar one in specialist literature
dealing with Soviet military strategy.
'Spetsnaz', or Soviet special forces.
have been identified as an important
aspect of the Soviet threat to the West,
and in Britain the term has recently
become more public in reports of the
attack scenario drawn up for the
'Brave Defender' home defence exercise
planned for September 1985. The term
has entered the debate gradually, but is
now firmly established, and it would
seem timely to look in detail at some of
the ramifications of the 'Spetsnaz'
issue.
Operations conducted by special
forces are often referred to as
'special operations' or 'unconven-
tional warfare'. The terms cover a
field of activities including anti-
terrorist and counter-insurgency
operations by small and highly-
specialised units who may operate in
guerilla warfare cond1,.cns where
there is no easily definablg front-line in
the conflict. utner special forces
operations may be carried oir :rind
enemy lines for the p-, poses of
intelligence-gathering, sabotage, or
seizure of particularly important instal-
lations, all of which are seen as severely
disruptive of an enemy's fighting
capacity. Western units covered by the
terms would include the British Special
Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat
Squadron (SBS). and the USA's
Special Operations Forces (SOF).
Commando-type operations on
enemy-occupied territory are not the
only roles allotted to the world's
special forces. SAS and SBS operations
during the Falklands War, and the US
Green Berets in Vietnam, fit this
pattern, but such forces have also been
used in a variety of peacetime
emergencies, most notably the SAS in
the siege of the Iranian Embassy in
London in 1980.
The USA's Special Operations Forces
include a variety of units from the
Army. Navy, and Air Force. The term
'low-intensity conflict' has come into
use to describe SOF fields of com-
petence. These include dealing with
'terrorism and guerilla insurgencies'
throughout the world, training forces
of other nations as well as conducting
their own operations.' They are also
described as countering major con-
ventional attacks 'through their capa-
bility to deter and defeat an enemy's
rear echelons, and to engage in
unconventional warfare, psychological
operations, counterterrorism. and in-
telligence missions'.2
Standard British policy statements
say very little about the role of the
SAS. Although the regiment is listed in
the annual Statement on the Defence
Estimates, official explanations of its
role are rare. However the SAS and
other British special forces are known
to have operated widely since the last
war in Malaysia, Aden, Oman. Borneo.
the Falklands and Northern Ireland.'
What are Spetsnaz?
Accounts of Soviet Spetsnaz paint a
picture not dissimilar to that of
western special forces. Their wartime
role is stressed, but there are also
reports of their use in peacetime
circumstances and in situations which
the Soviet Union might view as low-
intensity conclicts'. The principal
accounts are by Viktor Suvorov, an
ex-officer of the Soviet military
intelligence organisation, the GRU
(Glavnove Racvedvvate/'nove Uprav-
lenie, or Chief Intelligence Directorate).
Suvorov (the name is a pseudonym to
conceal his real identity) defected to
Britain six years ago, and has since
published three books and other
articles on Soviet military affairs.'
According to Suvorov. Spetsnaz units
are part of the GRU, which is itself a
directorate of the So% ict General Staff.
Spetsnaz units are assigned to Soviet
military districts. groups of Soviet
forces in Eastern Europe. and the four
Soviet fleets. There are also Spetsna7
agents serving in western countries in
pcac?ime, who are foreign citizens
functioning as 'sleepers' until they are
called upon to carry out wartime
duties. In wartime, Spetsnaz units are
described as having five principal
tasks:
(1) Assassination of enemy political
and military leaders.
(2) Neutralising enemy nuclear
facilities by guiding Soviet aircraft
or missiles to them, or destrc',in_g
such facilities themselves.
(3) Neutralising enemy command.
staff, and communication centres.
(4) Destroying important enemy tar-
gets such as airfields. naval bases,
and air defence installations.
(5) Disrupting enemy power supplies
by attacking power stations, stor-
age centres. pipelines, and power
lines.
In order to carry out these tasks,
Spetsnaz would land behind NATO
lines by parachute. submarine. or
boat. Suvorov claims that many
Soviet Olympic athletes are Spetsnaz
servicemen and women who spy out
the land on trips abroad` and that
CONTINUED NEXT PAGE
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