SOVIET SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R000200050001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of S~cret
Central
Intelligence
MnsT~n Fig co~v
oe our--
OA MARK ON
The Soviet Bloc Role
in International Terrorism
and Revolutionary Violence
National Intelligence Estimate
Secfet
NlI~ 11/2-86
August 1986
Copy 5 0 3
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL ...- This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to .. .
DERIVATIVE Cl BY
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Muhipk
STAT
STAT
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NIE 11 /2-86
THE SOVIET BLOC ROLE
IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AND REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE
Information available as of 14 August 1986 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on that date.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 5
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 11
The Soviet Approach to Political Violence ..................................... 11
Soviet Attitudes and Policies Toward Terrorism ............................ 13
Attitudes and Policies of Soviet Allies ............................................. 15
The Middle East ............................................................................... 19
Latin America ................................................................................... 22
The Rest of the Third World ........................................................... 24
The Developed Countries ................................................................ 25
Trends and Implications ................................................................... 25
Outlook .................................................................................................. 26
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate supersedes SNIE 11/2/81, Soviet Support to Inter-
national Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence. In this Estimate,
terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence directed
against noncombatant targets by nongovernment groups or clandestine
state agents, generally to intimidate a target audience.' International
terrorism involves citizens or territory of more than one country.
Transnational terrorism, a kind of international terrorism, means
attacks by terrorists outside their own homelands. Revolutionary vio-
lence is aimed at changing the fundamental political orientation of a so-
ciety by force.
Since the SNIE presented an adequate historical treatment of the
issue, in preparing this Estimate, we have concentrated on the develop-
ments of the past few years. At the same time, we have expanded the
scope of the study to include related activities on the part of:
- The rest of the Warsaw Pact countries. In this Estimate the
term "Soviet Bloc" means the Warsaw Pact countries.
- Other Soviet allies such as Cuba, Angola, Vietnam, and-to the
extent their activities may have been undertaken in conjunction
with the USSR-Libya and Syria.
We have also deemphasized the categorization of groups that
engage in terrorism. The 1981 SNIE distinguished rather firmly
between revolutionary insurgent groups and strictly terrorist groups,
while acknowledging that many insurgent groups use terrorist tactics,
and many terrorist groups have revolutionary goals. In this Estimate we
focus on the nature of the support rather than on the nature of the
groups per se. Our approach is to divide the world's non-Communist
countries into clusters according to their predominant forms of political
extremism:
- The Middle East. Most of the political violence originating in
this region is an outgrowth of three independent-though
overlapping-transnational phenomena: the Palestinian prob-
lem, radical Islamic fundamentalism, and the growing use of
terrorism by states such as Syria, Libya, and Iran. Many of the
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extremist groups of the region routinely attack foreigners and
operate outside their own countries, especially in Western
Europe; thus they are often labeled international or transnation-
al terrorist groups.
- The Rest of the Third World. Most of the political violence
originating in other Third World countries is associated in some
way with rebellion against national governments. The violent
opposition groups operate almost exclusively in their own
countries, although some have bases in sympathetic neighboring
countries, and some attack foreign as well as domestic targets.
Rebel groups in these countries are often able to establish
control over regions or resources-usually in rural areas-
beyond the reach of central government authority, thereby
acquiring the status of insurgent groups.
- The Developed Countries. In general, the democratic Western
countries have strong, stable political systems that, though
governments may fall, are highly resistant to violent change.
Nevertheless, leftwing extremist groups are active in a good
number of West European countries and in Japan. In some
Western countries, violent separatist and Irredentist groups are
also a problem. Many of the rebels in developed countries are
ideologically indistinguishable from Third World insurgents and
would be insurgents themselves if they could, but since it is not
feasible for them to take and hold territory, they do not qualify
as insurgents and are usually called .terrorists.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Soviet leaders' approach to terrorism derives from their
broader view that violence is a basic, legitimate tool of political struggle
to be applied or sponsored in those settings where its use will benefit the
USSR. As a result, the Soviets have no moral compunctions about
supporting foreign insurgent and terrorist groups; the primary consider-
ation is whether the activities of these groups further Soviet interests.
The Soviets support some groups openly and directly, mainly those
with some claim to international political legitimacy, such as the PLO
or the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO). In dealing
with many foreign political extremist groups, though, the Soviets
camouflage much of their involvement by working with and through
allies and radical states. To the extent that some of these states engage in
terrorism or support extremist groups on their own accounts, the precise
Soviet role is further obscured.
Though Moscow's dealings with foreign political extremist groups
are highly differentiated, in general they follow these basic patterns:
- The Soviets support Palestinian and other radical anti-Israeli
and anti-US groups based in the Middle East; most of them use
terrorism as a means of seeking political objectives.
- The Soviets back insurrectionary movements in susceptible
Third World states. Moscow refers to these organizations as
national liberation movements; many of them engage in terror-
ist activities.
The Soviets are not identifiably involved with terrorist groups in
Western Europe and other developed areas where, more often
than not, leftwing political violence interferes with Moscow's
broad regional aims. Such violence does, however, create dis-
ruption that damages Western interests. Another view holds that
the Soviets believe that, in most cases, terrorism in Western
Europe furthers their aims. Moscow expects it to have a
destabilizing effect on Western Europe and to undermine the
US military posture there.2
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- Moscow's East European allies generally follow the Soviet lead
in their own dealings with foreign insurgent and terrorist
groups. In some cases they act as Soviet surrogates; in other cases
they appear to be acting on their own. Other Marxist states in
the Soviet orbit, particularly Cuba, also cooperate with the
USSR in helping favored extremists groups around the world,
but they tend to be more independent than the East Europeans.
In the Middle East, the Soviets and their associates provide much
of the military support for various factions of the PLO. Though
Palestinian "military" operations consist mainly of terrorist attacks, so
long as such attacks are confined to Israel and the Occupied Territories
the Soviets seem rarely to object. Available evidence, however, suggests:
- That the Soviets disapprove of terrorist attacks in Western
Europe by Middle Eastern groups they support and have tried
to discourage these groups from conducting such attacks.
- That the Soviets have avoided direct contact with Middle
Eastern transnational terrorist groups outside the PLO, such as
the Abu Nidal Group, the PFLP-Special Command, and the
Carlos Apparat.
- That, conversely, several East European states-East Germany,
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria-have had direct ties to such
groups. Their reasons appear to have been mainly defensive,
but in some cases they may also have anticipated using the
groups for their own or for Soviet purposes. Moscow certainly
knew of some of these arrangements and presumably acqui-
esced. Another view holds that arrangements made by East
European Communist regimes with transnational terrorist
groups, in particular those arrangements between Hungary and
Romania and the Carlos Apparat, serve a useful political
purpose and further broad Communist objectives, but stresses
that they are not mainly for defensive reasons.3
In the Third World, the USSR and its allies-notably Cuba, East
Germany, and Bulgaria-provide training, weapons, funding, guidance,
and other forms of support to numerous Marxist insurgent and terrorist
groups. Chief among the target countries are Chile, Colombia, El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Sudan. In general, the Soviets and East
Europeans advocate revolutionary violence mainly when that appears
to be the most promising option; the Cubans and Nicaraguans are more
optimistic, viewing violence as a way to create new and promising
options.
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Most of the radical Middle Eastern states-those that use terrorism
as a f oreign policy tool-are fundamentally dependent on the Soviet
Bloc f or military and political support. The list includes Syria, South Ye-
men, and Libya, along with elements in Lebanon; Iran is a notable
exception. The Soviets have supplied these states with large amounts of
military equipment, often without enforcing controls on their end use;
subsequently, some of this equipment has been acquired and used by
terrorist and insurgent groups:
- Even without generous political and military support from the
Soviet Union, states such as Syria and Libya would probably aid
various foreign political extremist groups, but being more
vulnerable to retaliation they would have to be more
circumspect.
- Although the USSR probably does not instigate the terrorist acts
of these states and their surrogates and may not approve of all of
them, neither does it risk straining relations with them by trying
to make them desist. It undoubtedly recognizes that such acts
are usually more damaging to Western interests than to Soviet
ones.
In Western Europe, as well as in other areas where democratic
institutions are strong, the Soviets regard lef twing terrorism as generally
not helpful-indeed often harmful-to their regional objectives. Hence
the Soviet Bloc keeps its distance from indigenous West European
groups such as the Red Army Faction of West Germany and Action Dir-
ecte of France. By criticizing and ostracizing such "criminal terrorist
groups," moreover, Moscow attempts to indicate that, like the Western
countries, the USSR opposes and is trying to fight terrorism.
To date, however, the Soviet Bloc has generally opposed and
obstructed Western efforts to establish effective international counter-
terrorism programs, in part because such programs might impede the
activities of extremist regimes and groups the Soviets back:
- Much of the turmoil around the world is rooted in regional and
local disputes of a political, social, or religious nature and has
nothing to do with Communism. Many non-Communist extrem-
ists, however, have emulated the revolutionary model-and
sometimes the terrorist tactics-employed by so many of the
groups that receive Soviet Bloc assistance.
- Thus the longstanding Soviet support for political extremism in
the Communist cause-and also in the Palestinian cause-has
contributed to the development of an international climate in
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which alienated or frustrated activists of all political stripes tend
to turn to violence readily, rather than as a last resort, and to use
terrorist tactics to magnify their impact.
Declining Trend. The terrorist implosion in Lebanon and the
growth in terrorism of Middle Eastern origin in Western Europe during
the past few years have overshadowed a gradual drop in the amount
and seriousness of terrorist and insurgent activity in many other parts of
the world. Although international terrorist incidents have been increas-
ing in frequency in recent years, spurred by state-sponsored Palestinian
and Shiite extremists, indigenous terrorist activity-especially that
associated with the extreme left-has been in decline not only in
Western Europe but also in Latin America and other parts of the Third
World. In a large number of important countries-Turkey, Italy, Brazil,
Argentina, to name just a f ew-the terrorists of the 1980s are few and
feckless, compared with their predecessors of previous decades.
Outlook
While there is no indication that any massive or global upswing in
terrorist activity is in the offing, we believe that various stimuli will pre-
vent the level of political violence around the world from declining
much further. The pattern of recent years has been that, as political ex-
tremism on behalf of some cause is brought under control in one
country or region, as it usually is sooner or later, political extremism on
behalf of some other cause has broken out somewhere else. Thus, at the
moment the Montoneros and Tupamaros are quiet, while Sikh, Tamil,
and Shiite radicals present major terrorist problems. We expect this
pattern to persist.
Little Change Expected in Soviet Role. We also expect the Soviet
Bloc to continue to support various foreign extremist groups and radical
states. The costs to the Soviet Bloc of providing such support appear to
be slight, whether in terms of money, reputation, influence, or risk.
Often the benefits have also been meager, but in some cases the payoff
has been substantial, for example, a peace initiative stalled, a pro-
Western government besieged. Where the potential costs appear to
outweigh the potential benefits, as in Western Europe, the Soviets
simply refrain from getting involved. Given this situation, the Soviets
have no reason to modify these durable and flexible policies-unless
international developments modify the calculus. In Western Europe, for
example, where the Soviets have generally kept their distance from
extremist groups of all sorts, serious political instability in a country
might tempt them into an adventurous relationship with local leftist
revolutionaries.
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Conceivably, even in the absence of any external impetus, the new
Soviet leadership might decide to modify Moscow's longstanding poli-
cies of supporting foreign political extremists (when it approves of their
goals) and of opposing multilateral efforts to make terrorist activities
crimes under international law. General Secretary Gorbachev has gone
on public record twice in recent months to criticize terrorism, and he
has cautioned both Syria and Libya to avoid terrorist acts that might
provoke the United States. Moreover, the Soviets have hinted they
might be willing to discuss ways in which East and West can cooperate
to combat transnational terrorism. On the other hand, the opportunistic
Soviet conduct during the recent confrontation between the United
States and Libya is one of several indications that, so far, the Gorbachev
regime is quite like its predecessors when it comes to actions, as opposed
to words.
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DISCUSSION
The Soviet Approach to Political Violence
1. Soviet leaders believe that violence is a natural
and often necessary means of political struggle. Gener-
ally, they regard violence as a legitimate form of
political action when used on behalf of causes they
favor or by groups they support, but are likely to
condemn violence as "criminal terrorism" when it is
used on behalf of causes they dislike or by groups they
oppose. Thus the Soviets have few if any moral
compunctions about supporting foreign political ex-
tremist groups-including those that engage in what
we call terrorism; the overarching consideration is
whether the activities of these groups further Soviet
interests.
2. Sophistication and Flexibility. Providing sup-
port to foreign extremist groups is just one of numer-
ous Soviet tactics designed to gain influence and bring
about desired developments-such as the destabilizing
of hostile regimes-in foreign countries. In some coun-
tries it is the chief tactic; in others it is integrated with
alternative tactics, such as diplomacy, trade, aid,
subversion, propaganda, and assisting legal Communist
parties. In still other countries, the Soviets advise
against using terrorist tactics and appear to avoid all
contact with violent leftwing groups because their
activities are viewed as detrimental to Soviet interests.
A few leftwing groups-such as Sendero Luminoso of
Peru-reject the Soviets. In sum, quite similar groups
in different countries attract widely different levels of
Soviet support:
- In the Middle East, numerous radical govern-
ments and groups rely chiefly on terrorism to
keep the fluid situation there from congealing
into a pattern they would dislike. As a way of
maintaining and extending its own influence in
the Middle East, the Soviet Union supports many
of these radical entities-especially the various
elements of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO)-even though in many cases it does
not fully agree with their fundamental
aspirations.
- In many Third World countries, political institu-
tions are weak and governments are potentially
vulnerable to violent overthrow. Where prospects
for a Marxist insurrection look promising-and
where allies such as Cuba are available to take
the lead, actually or ostensibly-the USSR sup-
ports leftwing insurgent groups, which it calls
"national liberation movements." Many of them
employ terrorist tactics. Even where prospects
for the left are not promising, the Soviets may
support such groups if their activities undercut
Western influence. Because Cuba is often an
enthusiastic partner, these practices are especial-
ly prevalent in Latin America.
In Western Europe and other developed coun-
tries, where political institutions are generally
strong and few if any governments are vulnera-
ble to violent overthrow, the activities of leftwing
extremist groups are probably seen by Moscow as
generally not helpful-indeed often harmful-to
their broad regional objectives. To be sure, ter-
rorist attacks by these groups degrade US mili-
tary morale and may complicate US relations
with NATO allies. On the other hand, they also
alienate potential supporters of the legal left
while confirming moderates and conservatives in
their fear of-and need to band together
against-the radical leftist threat. In these coun-
tries, the Soviet Union discourages the use of
violent tactics by the organizations with which it
is in contact and apparently shuns all contact
with indigenous terrorist groups-including those
of the left.
3. In some situations the Soviet Union backs several
competing extremist groups at the same time. For
example, Moscow supports both pro- and anti-Arafat
Palestinian groups, although not necessarily with equal
vigor. In other situations, the Soviet Union may de-
cline to back any extremist groups directly, even
though its allies do so. In Peru, for example, the Soviets
have no apparent contact with the Revolutionary
Movement Tupac Amaru, but Cuba has praised the
group publicly, and Nicaragua has reportedly trained
some of its members. Furthermore, Tupac Amaru has
reportedly furnished guerrillas for the America Battal-
ion, the multinational combat unit established by the
Cuban-backed Colombian insurgent group M-19.
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4. In deciding whether or not to support a particu-
lar group directly, Moscow considers a number of
factors:
the USSR may be sensitive to the possibility that, as a
superpower trying to subvert Third World states, it
will be regarded as an imperialist.
- Whether the group appears able to deliver what
it promises. The Soviets do not necessarily insist
that the group have prospects of success; it may
suit the USSR for the group simply to be a
destructive or destabilizing influence. But the
Soviets generally do not waste their time or
money on groups that talk without delivering.
- Whether the group appears likely to succeed
without Soviet backing. If they think so, the
Soviets may try to lump on the bandwagon,
offering support in return for future consider-
ations. Even when they doubt that a group will
succeed, the Soviets may hedge their bet by
offering a little aid.
-Whether providing support for a given group
would iniure larger Soviet equities-for example,
a valued relationship with the government op-
posing the group (as in Peru) or a carefully
. nurtured public posture of reasonableness (as in
Western Europe).
- Whether, alternatively, providing support for a
given group would enhance larger Soviet equi-
ties-for example, by taking pressure off a belea-
guered ally such as Nicaragua or by forestalling
any resolution of the Palestinian problem that
excluded a Soviet role.
- Whether Soviet assistance to a given group is
likely to become publicly known and, if so,
whether it can be made to seem legitimate before
the world community. For instance, Moscow
justifies its well-known support for the South-
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) on
the grounds that SWAPO is recognized by the
United Nations as representing the people of
Namibia.
5. Plausible Denial. In many ways, the Soviets'
support of political violence is like their conduct of
espionage: they cannot realistically conceal that they
do it, but in specific instances they may want to be
able to make a plausible denial. Thus the USSR usually
tries to work with and through allies and surrogates so
that its own role is camouflaged. The impression to be
conveyed is that a diffuse international revolutionary
brotherhood-largely but not entirely Marxist-is sup-
porting insurgencies that have arisen spontaneously as
a consequence of legitimate grievances. In some cases
6. By allowing or arranging for surrogates to deal
with foreign insurgent and terrorist groups, Moscow is
sometimes able to maintain correct (if not necessarily
cordial) relations with the very governments these
groups are trying to overthrow. In addition, the Soviets
may also maintain more or less overt relations with
any legal, ostensibly nonviolent Marxist parties in these
countries. It is likely that Soviet intelligence services
have recruited agents of influence in these countries as
well. Thus, concealing its role as a supporter of violent
opposition groups in a given country permits the USSR
to exert pressure or influence there in several ways at
once. It also offers the opportunity to orchestrate
subversive cooperation among the varied opponents of
the target government. At the same time, Moscow is
able to deny any responsibility for the terrorist activi-
ties of the more violent groups that its allies are
supporting.
7. Measured Support. Soviet assistance to political
extremist groups is always measured, never unreserved
or open-ended. Usually, Moscow requires that a group
earn its aid by demonstrating both operational effec-
tiveness and growing indigenous and international
support. If a group serves Soviet interests by simply
creating unrest or even by merely presenting a threat,
Moscow may apply less rigorous standards.
8. In some Latin American countries-Honduras,
Venezuela, Ecuador-the number of Marxist extrem-
ists receiving any sort of Soviet Bloc or Cuban support
seems very low, relative to the number needed to pose
a realistic revolutionary threat. Providing support at
such low levels may seem almost perfunctory, even
ritualistic, as if it were lust something done for the sake
of Communist tradition. Perhaps that is a factor in
certain cases. But we believe that in most cases it
simply reflects the recognition by Moscow and its
allies that most countries are not ripe for revolution,
and that it may take years for revolutionary conditions
to develop. Meanwhile, the Soviet Bloc strategy is to
keep alive even small, weak Marxist revolutionary
groups-to arm, train, and support them, on a modest
scale, until local conditions become more favorable.
When (if) that occurs, these groups are in place, able to
recruit more insurgents, absorb more support, build a
clandestine support network of their own, and-
because of their head start-perhaps even seize the
leadership of a popular rebellion.
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The East-West Dichotomy Over Terrorism
Superficial similarities in rhetoric mask fundamental
differences in the ways that the East and the West view
terrorism. At bottom, the Western position is absolutist,
while the Eastern position is situational.
In the West, though this is often not admitted,
terrorism is basically a moral issue. The well-known
difficulty of achieving widespread agreement over
what is meant by the term terrorism stems mainly from
efforts to define it in morally neutral terms, when the
definers themselves think of it in moral terms. That is,
they regard certain types of violent acts as intrinsically
wrong no matter what the goal (at least outside a
combat situation). For example, most Western citi-
zens-and their governments as well-hold that it is
always wrong to attack "innocent" civilians or officially
protected persons such as diplomats.
Individually, many East Bloc citizens probably share
the repulsion Western citizens feel toward terrorism,
but their governments regard terrorism as basically a
tactical issue. The fathers of Communism held that,
under appropriate circumstances-that is, where it
would promote the Communist cause-it was not only
permissible but advisable to foment terror. Most of the
time, they thought, terrorism was counterproductive.
Modern Communist leaders apparently think roughly
the same way. We judge that they rarely approve of
terrorist acts anywhere that arouse public outrage,
regardless of the groups committing the acts or the goals
they are trying to reach. Public outrage over the acts of
Marxist-Leninist groups or Palestinian groups is general-
ly not helpful to their causes.
aware o estern views o w at is permissible in a
political cause, and it must be an important consider-
ation in determining the tactics they advise their client
groups to use or avoid. Undoubtedly, the Soviet willing-
ness to join formally with other countries in internation-
al agreements to outlaw skyiackings (but not other forms
of terrorism) was based in large measure on the convic-
tion that skyjackings would almost never help a Marxist
revolutionary cause. 0
There probably are other limited areas of terrorist
activity, such as attacks against diplomats, which for the
same reason the Soviets might be willing in principle to
agree to outlaw as international crimes. In general,
however, the Western view that violence is rarely
justified except in combat situations is incompatible
with the Soviet view that violence is justified whenever
it produces the desired results.~~
Soviet Attitudes and Policies Toward Terrorism
9. Here is what General Secretary Gorbachev had
to say about terrorism during his address before the
27th Session of the CPSU Congress in February 1986.
Undeclared wars, the export of counterrevolu-
tion in all its forms, political assassinations,
hostage taking, hijacking of aircraft, explosions
in streets, airports, or railway stations-this is
the loathsome face of terrorism, which those
inspiring it try to disguise with various kinds of
cynical fabrications. The USSR rejects terror-
ism in principle, and is prepared to cooperate
actively with other states in order to root it out.
The Soviet Union will resolutely protect its
citizens from acts of violence, and will do all it
can to protect their lives, honor, and dignity. C
10. This condemnation of terrorism, while propa-
gandistic, is unprecedentedly explicit fora Soviet
leader. Nevertheless, if the Soviets actually have moral
reservations about the use of terrorist tactics as this
statement suggests, it has not been discernable in their
conduct to date. It is more likely that the statement
reflects growing Soviet concern over accusations that
Moscow is somehow to blame for much of the terror-
ism that afflicts the world. As such, it was a continua-
tion of Gorbachev's earlier arguments that the causes
of tension and unrest around the world cannot be
attributed to the Soviet Union. Indeed, in mentioning
"undeclared wars and the export of counterrevolu-
tion" Gorbachev was trying to make the counterargu-
ment that this terrorism is actually the result of US
policies
11. A Tactical, Opportunistic Approach. Despite
Gorbachev's comments, the Soviet Bloc continues to
back a wide range of political extremist groups that
routinely use such terrorist tactics. The Soviets rarely
ackr-owledge that groups they support have been
guilty of terrorism. Either they deny that such groups
have been responsible for any terrorist activities that
may have occurred, or they assert that the violence
was legitimate (or at least defensible) in context, and
therefore not terrorism. On the other hand, they are
quick to cry terrorism when their own interests have
been directly attacked, and they frequently condemn
as terrorist the violent activities of groups and govern-
ments of which they disapprove
12. Taken as a whole, the evidence indicates that
Soviet reservations about terrorism have less to do with
its propriety than with its utility. Soviet disapproval of
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terrorist tactics such as hijackings of civil airliners and
attacks on diplomatic facilities appear to be based
primarily on the judgment that such tactics are usually
counterproductive. Moreover, the Soviets have occa-
sionally been victimized by such terrorism themselves.
The Soviet claim to oppose other types of terrorism,
such as assassinations of political leaders or the explo-
sion of bombs in streets or other public places, is less
credible. For example, several groups receiving Soviet
Bloc sunnort routinely explode bombs in public places.
13. If we cannot take the word of its leader as a true
measure of the Soviet Union's policies toward terror-
ism, we can draw relevant conclusions from a long
period of consistent Soviet behavior. In general:
- The Soviets are reluctant to restrict the tactics a
Marxist (or Palestinian) insurgent group might
The Soviet Policy Toward Political Assassination
The Soviet view of violence as a legitimate form of
political action is also demonstrated in the USSR's long
history of involvement in assassinations of political
enemies outside its borders. The targets have generally
been Soviet and, latterly, East European defectors and
emigres rather than foreign figures. Moscow's willing-
ness to employ assassination has varied sharply over the
years: from 1926 to 1960 there were more than 40
documented cases of Soviet political assassinations or
kidnapings in the West; while from the early 1960s to
the late 1970s there were none-althou h some ma
have occurred without our knowledge. ~~
use in its own homeland against the government
it is trying to overthrow or against allies of that
government. The Soviets do not explicitly advo-
cate terrorism, but they believe that all is fair in
"wars of national liberation." For Soviet-backed
groups, terrorism seems to be basically a local
option. The Soviets probably advise them that
their terrorism should not be so vicious, indis-
criminate, or ill considered as to alienate the
masses, energize the opposition, or compromise
the legitimacy of the revolutionary government
they hope to establish-in other words, that their
actions should not be counterproductive. But
they are not expected to adhere to a code of
conduct that excludes terrorism.
- The Soviets often frown on leftwing terrorism in
a nonrevolutionary situation, because in their
experience it discredits the "progressive" forces,
alienates many of their prospective supporters,
and strengthens their adversaries in the govern-
ment. On the other hand, the Soviets may sup-
port or encourage terrorism in certain nonrevolu-
tionary situations: to disrupt a target society, for
example, or to punish a government for adopting
policies that offend the USSR.
-The Soviets also appear to disapprove, in general,
of transnational terrorism-attacks by political
extremists outside their own homelands-of the
sort currently identified with Abu Nidal, even
though this terrorism has been on behalf of
causes-or governments-Moscow supports.
Conceivably, the Soviets have privately approved
of particular transnational terrorist events-or
even had some part in them-but we have never
obtained any evidence of it.
- Finally, the Soviet Bloc has strongly opposed
most Western efforts to make international ter-
rorist activities a crime under international law,
because this might cramp the style of Marxist
14. Following are some examples of the Soviet
approach toward terrorists that demonstrate the wide
range of Soviet policies in this area. According to
considerable and pursuasive, athough not always con-
clusive, evidence:
- Moscow furnishes funding, equipment, weapons,
training, and guidance to numerous Marxist in-
surgent groups in Latin America and Africa that
rely heavily on terrorist tactics-attacks on civil-
ian targets and noncombatants, sometimes in-
cluding women and children. Some of these
insurgents
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groups, presumably with Soviet approval, help
defray operating expenses through robberies, ex-
tortion, and kidnapings of foreign businessmen
and diplomats.
- The USSR provides maior military and political
support to several radical regimes-most notably
those of Syria and Libya-that routinely engage
in, and back groups that engage in, transnational
terrorist activities. When, owing to their terrorist
activities, these governments have found them-
selves threatened or isolated, the Soviets have
often provided additional military equipment
and expressions of political support.
- The Soviet Union foments terrorist activities by
the Afghan intelligence service in Pakistan's bor-
der regions in order to punish Islamabad for
supporting the Afghan rebels and to induce it to
cease that support.
- Moscow evidently disapproves of the nihilistic
new-left terrorists of Western Europe typified by
the Red Army Faction (RAF) of West Germany,
Action Directe of France, and the Communist
Combatant Cells of Belgium and has no apparent
contact with them. The harm they do with their
attacks on NATO installations and personnel does
not make up for how much they discredit the left
and alienate moderates, thus damaging wider
Soviet equities in Western Europe.
- The Soviets also appear to avoid all direct contact
with transnational terrorist groups such as the
Carlos Apparat and the Abu Nidal Group-
although deeply clandestine relationships with
such groups cannot be ruled out. Here the reason
appears to be one of image rather than ideology:
the Soviets do not want to be identified as
backing groups that quite so openly flout interna-
tional standards of civilized behavior.
- When Palestinian groups under Moscow's influ-
ence have conducted transnational terrorist cam-
paigns, the Soviets have urged them to stop.
Soviet disapproval may have helped dissuade
groups such as the Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine (PFLP) from renewing interna-
tional terrorist activities. On the other hand,
several Palestinian groups supported by the Sovi-
ets-Fatah, for example-have recently con-
ducted transnational attacks without forfeiting
Soviet aid.
Attitudes and Policies of Soviet Allies
15. The East Europeans. For the most part, the
East European members of the Warsaw Pact have
been following general Soviet guidelines with regard to
supporting (or not supporting) insurgent and terrorist
groups around the world. The Soviets give them a good
deal of latitude, however, as to how much and what
kind of support they will render to which groups.
Bulgaria and East Germany are more involved than
the other East European states:
? Bulgaria seems to function mainly as a Soviet
surrogate in dispensing goods and services to vio-
lent political extremist groups. Through its trading
firm, Kintex, it is particularly active in the profit-
able gray arms market, both buying and selling
weapons. Some of them-usually via middle-
men-end up in the hands of insurgents and
terrorists in numerous countries.
? East Germany, however, is the most active of the
East European states in promoting and supporting
Marxist-Leninist revolutions abroad. This appears
to be largely voluntary-a way for East Germany
both to please the Soviet Union and enhance its
role on the world stage.
? Furthermore, East Germany can better afford
such largess than Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Hungary, whose contributions to the cause of
foreign revolutionary violence are consequently
smaller.
? Unlike the other East European states, Romania
operates independently of the USSR in its limited
dealings with foreign revolutionary and extremist
groups.
16. The International Gray Arms Market. This is
the name given to a cluster of cutout mechanisms used
to separate arms suppliers from their ultimate consum-
ers, so they cannot be blamed if the arms are subse-
quently misused. Trading firms of the East European
governments, especially Kintex of Bulgaria, are heavi-
ly involved in the gray arms market, which is a source
of many of the small arms and light infantry weapons
used by insurgents and terrorists. Generally, private
arms dealers and brokers serve as middlemen for these
trading firms, on whose behalf they buy Western-
made weapons that via other middlemen the trading
firms can resell-at a profit and for hard currency-to
radical states and groups. The trading firms also use
such middlemen to market Eastern-made weapons to
radical states and groups with which the East Bloc
governments do not wish to be directly identified.
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East European Dealings With Transnational Terrorist Groups
According to a number of reports from independent
sources, some of indisputable authenticity, in the early
1980s certain East European governments established
limited cooperative relationships with transnational ter-
rorist groups based in the Middle East. Only one of
these governments-Romania-is reported to have in-
stigated any terrorist activity; generally they seem to
have entered into these arrangements in order to keep
track of, prevent local attacks by, and maintain some
control over terrorists who were operating in their
countries anyway. Thus they appear to be similar to
reported look-the-other-way arrangements in effect
during the same period between various terrorist groups
and many West European governments including
France, Italy, and West Germany.
- During the mid-1970s, the Romanian Govern-
ment reportedly displayed consternation over sug-
gestions that the infamous international terrorist
Carlos (then an associate of the PFLP Special
Operations Grou was o eratin free3 from Ro-
manian soil. however,
the Romanian security service,
- In 1981, after Budapest discovered that the Carlos
Apparat had been transferring weapons and
17. Contacts With Terrorists. Like the USSR, the
East European countries appear in general to avoid
direct involvement with the indigenous new-left ter-
rorists of Western Europe. On one occasion, the
Bulgarian Government even extradited four wanted
members of the Red Army Faction to West Germany.
On the other hand, there is persuasive-though not
conclusive-evidence that, after Italy's Red Brigades
kidnaped US Army Brigadier General Dozier in 1981,
the Bulgarian intelligence service, working through an
Italian agent of influence, offered to trade weapons
and funds for information the group obtained from
Dozier. For reasons not clear, this arrangement was
never consummated. If the offer was genuine, howev-
er, it demonstrates that the Bulgarian Government, at
least an element of that government, was willing to
deal with such terrorists when it stood to benefit. (At
edge, the Hungarian regime,
made a formal arrangement
with the terrorists. The group was given freedom
of movement, allowed to operate workshops and
other facilities, and permitted to transship weap-
ons to the West on flights coming from the Middle
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East via Moscow. Carlos himself spent 25X1
considerable time in Hungary an was said to
have been in the country as recently as October ,
1984. In return, the Carlos Apparat was to report
on Arabs in Hungary and desist from activities
there while foreign dignitaries were visiting.
- A similar arrangement was worked out 25X1
with the East German Government, but although
agents of the Carlos Apparat occasionally operated
out of East Berlin,- the East Germans never al-
lowed them the freedom of action they expected.
As recently as August 1983, though, the group was
implicated in an attack on the French cultural 25X1
center in West Berlin-an attack presumably 25X1
staged from its base in East Berlin. 25X25X1
- According to several apparently independent re-
ports, the East Germans have also allowed the Abu
Nidal Group to stage attacks out of East Berlin
against representatives of Fatah, the Palestinian
group headed by Yasir Arafat, with whom Abu
Nidal has been feuding for a decade. (It is not
clear why East Germany, which like the USSR
supports Fatah, would facilitate attacks by the
Abu Nidal Group against Fatah representatives.)
The Carlos Apparat is said to have shipped weap-
ons through Bulgaria with government knowledge
-the same time, of course, it also demonstrates ,the lack
of existing East Bloc ties to the Red Brigades).
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had reportedly established limited cooperative ar-
rangements with the Carlos Apparat and the Abu
Nidal Group, two transnational terrorist groups based
in the Middle East. Except for Bucharest, which,
targeted agents of the Carlos 25X1
Apparat against certain issident Romanian emigres in
Western Europe, there is no indication that these
governments exercised any direction over these
groups. We suspect that, instead, the East Europeans
sought to monitor and constrain the activities of these
groups in their own countries and to ensure that they
would not be implicated in any terrorist acts these
groups committed elsewhere.
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East European Dealings With Transnational Terrorist Groups (Continued)
but does not have any specific arrangements with
the Bulgarian service. In general, Bulgaria's in-
volvement with transnational terrorist groups
seems limited to weapons sales through third
parties. during
the early 1980s the Bulgarian Government asked
the PFLP to provide training to a Turkish terrorist
group.
According to the fragmentary evidence in our posses-
sion, the Soviets played no part in making these alleged
arrangements. Some reports indicate, moreover, that
Moscow has maintained ahands-off attitude toward
them.
when t o Hungarians approac e t e Soviets for advice
on how to reconcile their arrangement with the Carlos
Apparat with their new membership in Interpol, the
Soviets declined even to offer advice. Yet, it is possible
that in some of these cases East European officials may
have been acting at Soviet behest. We would be unlike-
ly to obtain evidence of this; even leaders of the
government in question would not necessarily be fully
aware of the Soviet role. If the Soviets did want to
support or use groups of such ill repute, they would be
likely to try to work through controlled East European
cutouts. Since the working relationships between Soviet
intelligence and security services and their counterparts
in Eastern Europe vary from country to country, this is
more feasible in some countries than others:
- The relationship between the Soviet and Roma-
nian services is poor, and Ceausescu is known to
keep close tabs on it-as well as on what his
security services are up to. The Romanians are
very unlikely to have been acting on behalf of the
Soviets or without the knowledge of Ceausescu.
- The relationships between the Soviet services and
other East European services are warmer, in some
cases, much warmer. Yet there are some signifi-
cant differences among countries. While the East
German services cooperate closely with the Sovi-
ets, they also operate independently, and they are
believed to do very little of consequence without
the knowledge and approval of Honecker. Wheth-
er the reported East German dealings with inter-
national terrorists were self-initiated or at the
behest of the Soviets, the East German leadership
probably would have been fully informed.
-The Bulgarian and Hungarian services also work
closely with the Soviets, but they appear to oper-
ate on a longer leash from their own governments
than the Romanian or East German services. Their
top leaders would not necessarily be aware of
particular joint operations between their services
and those of the Soviets. Alternatively, they could
be aware and just look the other way.
On the face of it, there does not appear to be much
reason for Moscow to take the risk of becoming in-
volved even indirectly with such essentially self-moti-
vated, erratic, and uncontrollable elements as the Carlos
Apparat. If the Soviets wished for some reason to
conduct terrorist acts, they have much more covert,
reliable, and effective assets available. Although Carlos
attended Lumumba University in his youth and at one
time was reportedly at least considered for recruitment
by the KGB, the Soviets have publicly expressed disap-
proval of the terrorist activities with which Carlos later
became so prominently identified.
'iCarlos was placed on the official
19. The available evidence suggests that the Soviets
had nothing to do with setting up these arrangements,
although the East European governments probably
believed they were acceptable to Moscow. Certainly,
the KGB (thus some Soviet leaders) must have been
aware of them. On at least one occasion, the Soviets
reportedly tried to pass information, via an East
European government and its contacts in the Carlos
Apparat, to the Armenian terrorist group ASALA,
warning it not to conduct any activities in East Bloc
territory. It is possible-though not documented-that
in some of these cases, the East European governments
were acting as Soviet surrogates.
20. Compared with the Soviet Union, Cuba and
Nicaragua appear to have less respect for the objective
conditions that (the Soviets believe) must obtain before
a Marxist revolution can succeed. Basically, Cuba and
Nicaragua seem to think that a revolution can be lump
started-that the right mix of leadership, organization,
training, discipline, political agitation, and violence
can succeed even in less-than-ideal circumstances.
Until the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua in
1979, the Cubans were well in front of the Soviets in
promoting Marxist insurgencies in Latin America.
Since then, Moscow has moved closer to Havana's
position. Nevertheless, Cuba continues to support a
number of Latin American groups that, judging by the
lack of Soviet interest in them, Moscow believes to
have no realistic prospects. The level of Nicaraguan
support to Marxist revolutionaries in Latin America is
much lower than Cuba's, but that is apparently the
result of a lack of resources, an inability to conceal
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Libya. In general, the Soviets have neither sought nor
exercised much influence over the activities of Libya
with regard to insurgent and terrorist groups. For all his
reliance on Soviet arms, the mercurial, ambitious, and
financially independent Colonel Qadhafi considers
himself in competition with both Communism and
Christianity. Thus he forms and nurtures African insur-
gent groups for his own reasons-chiefly a desire to
dominate northern Africa and garner influence in the
Third World. Similarly, he encourages and supports
terrorist acts by Palestinian and other groups-especial-
ly the Abu Nidal Group-as a means of striking out at
his enemies, notably Israel and the United States.
Except, perhaps, for providing weapons, the Soviets
have had nothing to do with the main sort of Libyan
terrorism in Western Europe, the murder of Libyan
dissidents by government agents. Officials of Libyan
People's Bureaus have coordinated these attacks, in
some cases carried them out.
Libya has been cooperating in a limited fashion with
the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Communist countries
in helping Marxist insurgent groups in parts of Africa
and Latin America, chiefly by providing money, weap-
ons, and scholarships. In many places, however, espe-
cially in the Caribbean, Libyan agents appear to be
working at cross purposes with the Soviets and Cubans.
In general, they have been much less discriminating
than the Communists and much more eager to promote
violence in unpromising circumstances. Before crude oil
prices crashed, when Tripoli had money, it seemed to
be available to lust about any anti-Western or antide-
mocratic extremist group that would send representa-
tives to Libya, at Libyan expense, to receive training in
paramilitary tactics and the tenets of Qadhafi (but
neither Marx nor Lenin). During the recent confronta-
tion between Libya and the United States, the Soviets
offered Libya both materiel and rhetorical support but
not what it needed-a commitment to defend Libyan
territory from US reprisals. Tripoli has not earned such
an open-ended commitment
Syria. Although it receives considerable Soviet aid,
especially military aid, Syria provides little practical
help to the cause of Communist revolutions around the
world. Damascus is involved in a wide variety of
terrorism on its own behalf, however: its agents have
murdered dissident Syrian emigres (mostly from the
Muslim Brotherhood) in several West European coun-
tries; it has been the chief supporter of the Abu Nidal
Group and the Carlos Apparat, as well as of some of the
most militant of the Palestinian groups; it has instigated
terrorist attacks against Middle East governments whose
policies it opposes; it has allowed Shiite extremists from
Iran and Lebanon to run terrorist recruiting and train-
ing sites in the part of Lebanon its forces control. Most
recently, it has been implicated in terrorist bombings in
West Berlin and in an effort to blow up an El Al airliner
departing from London's Heathrow Airport. It is the
substantial support provided to Syria by the USSR that
enables the Assad regime to pursue these policies, which
under other circumstances would be extremely reckless.
assistance at higher levels, and a perception of vulner-
ability to US reprisals rather than of any ideological
differences between Managua and Havana.
21. Vietnam has provided small quantities of weap-
ons from its huge stockpile of captured US arms.
Moscow brokered at least one of these transactions.
Hanoi reportedly has also provided instructors for
insurgent training in Cuba and may have furnished
training to a few Latin American insurgent cadre in
Vietnam. North Korea's main contribution to foreign
political violence over the years has been the stream of
saboteurs and assassins it has tried to infiltrate into
South Korea. In 1983, moreover, North Korean agents
killed several South Korean Government officials by
bombing ahigh-level South Korean delegation during
its state visit to Rangoon. As regards support for
foreign extremists, North Korea has provided guerrilla
training in its own country to members of a number of
Third World insurgent groups. From time to time,
moreover, North Korean instructors have also been
reported as conducting paramilitary training of leftist
guerrillas abroad, sometimes in places like Angola and
South Yemen, where Soviet influence is strong. In
general, though, there is little evidence that North
Korean dealings with Third World revolutionaries are
coordinated with the USSR. In view of the warming of
Soviet-North Korean relations in recent years, closer
cooperation among them cannot be ruled out in the
future.
22. Some Soviet Marxist allies are only involved
with foreign extremists in their immediate neighbor-
hoods. With Soviet Bloc help, Ethiopia provides shel-
ter and assistance to insurgents in neighboring coun-
tries (Sudan, Somalia) whose governments furnish
sanctuary and assistance to Ethiopian separatist
groups. In collaboration with the USSR and Cuba,
Angola offers haven and help for SWAPO and the
ANC.
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23. Coordination. New leftwing revolutionary
groups-or political activists thinking of embarking
upon an insurgency-might be able to shop around for
support, perhaps obtaining help from Cuba after being
turned down by the Soviets or East Germans. Indeed,
it would appear to be the rare anti-US group that
could not obtain at least some support from Cuba or
Libya. Once a number of Soviet Bloc countries be-
come deeply involved, however-perhaps one country
providing training; a second providing weapons; a
third providing doctors, nurses, and teachers; a fourth
providing money; a fifth providing safehouses and
sanctuary-there is a need to coordinate the aid, as
well as what is demanded of the recipients in return.
We have little information about the coordinating
process, but it is probably much more complicated
than the Soviet representative simply issuing orders.
Nevertheless, since the Soviets are the ultimate source
of much of the wherewithal, they obviously have
considerable influence over what happens to it. But
also apparently important are the equities, capabili-
ties, limitations, and inclinations of the other states
involved.
The Middle East
24. Some years ago, working with and through its
Marxist government, the Soviet Union used South
Yemen as a base from which to promote leftwing
rebellions in a number of Middle Eastern countries,
particularly North Yemen. These insurrections went
nowhere. Since around 1982, the Soviets have been
trying to regularize relations with the governments
they had been trying to subvert. Support for Commu-
nist parties and liberation groups throughout the re-
gion has been somewhat deemphasized in favor of this
more diplomatic approach, which can be expected to
continue only so long as it pays dividends.
25. Unsubstantiated reports have occasionally sur-
faced alleging Soviet involvement with the Armenian
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), a
transnational terrorist group that originated in Beirut.
According to reporting from more reliable sources, the
Soviets have had little or nothing to do with ASALA,
which is among the extremist organizations they refer
to as "criminal terrorist groups." Similarly, occasional
reports allege Soviet involy m n wi h
Eastern extremist rou s.
a suspecte Soviet KGB
o 'cer a een observed in conversation with a
senior member of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary
Faction (LARF). Much has subsequently been learned
about the once shadowy LARF, however, without
illuminating any Soviet hand in its activities. In fact,
the only Middle Eastern extremist groups known to
have received significant Soviet support in recent
years are the paramilitary components of the PLO.
26. The Wellspring of Terrorism. The Palestinian
extremists have contributed more than any other
group to the proliferation of the terrorist ethic during
the past two decades. They have offered a terrorist
option to several weak but vicious Middle East regimes
and have exposed a number of Middle East and West
European governments as irresolute. Their example
has both inspired and educated extremists from other
ethnic groups-notably Armenians and Shiites-who
have consciously emulated their tactics. They have
provided both weapons and training to terrorists from
dozens of countries and from across the entire political
spectrum. They have served as role models to disaf-
fected youths all over the world, suggesting not only
that terrorism is a reasonable reaction to political
frustration but also that terrorists are glamorous and
heroic figures to whom normal laws and ethical
considerations do not apply.
27. The Soviets and the Palestinians. The USSR
has long been a staunch supporter of the Palestinian
cause. Under Moscow's guidance, the other members
of the Soviet Bloc have also aided the Palestinians.
Although Arab states provide most of the financial
underpinnings to the various Palestinian guerrilla
groups, the Soviet Bloc provides much of the military
assistance and training (along with other forms of aid
such as academic scholarships). The training is in both
conventional and unconventional military techniques.
The latter are useful not only in military combat but
also in terrorist operations-the chief distinction being
not the technique but the target and context. Judging
by target and context, what the Palestinians call "the
armed struggle" in Israel and the occupied territories
consists mostly of terrorism. Moscow appears to accept
Palestinian terrorism inside the Israeli-occupied terri-
tories as justified but to disapprove of it elsewhere-to
the point that during the 1970s the Soviets reportedly
cut off aid to the PFLP because of its involvement in
transnational terrorism. Another view holds that the
Soviets probably never went so far as to cut off aid to
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) to express disapproval of PFLP involvement in
transnational terrorism.4
28. It must be noted that the Palestinians do not
actually need to get paramilitary training from the
Soviets. They can also get it from various Arab
regimes, and they are capable of conducting such
training themselves. Perhaps as valuable as the mili-
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Soviet Bloc Training of Insurgents
and Terrorists
Personnel from numerous foreign insurgent and ex-
tremist groups have undergone military and paramili-
tary training in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as
well as in other Communist countries. The curricula
have ranged from ideological indoctrination and various
academic courses, through basic military science and
infantry training, to advanced instruction in specialized
conventional and unconventional warfare techniques
and intelligence methods-and how to teach the same
material to others.
Typically, the students are the cream of larger groups
that have already received preliminary training in their
own regions. Various factions of the PLO, for example,
conduct training in several Middle Eastern countries.
The ANC has training bases in Angola and Tanzania.
Would-be insurgents from numerous Latin American
countries often receive their first formal military in-
struction at camps in Cuba or Nicaragua. Many of the
teachers at these local facilities are graduates of courses
in the Soviet Bloc.
Training Facilities. Most of the sites in the Soviet
Bloc that we have identified as providing training to
personnel from foreign extremist groups are located at
known military installations where indigenous military
personnel, along with personnel from the armed forces
of Soviet allies, are trained. Following are some well-
documented examples in the USSR:
-The Simferopol Army Barracks, located near Se-
vastopol in the central Crimea, is the site of a
school for Foreign Military Personnel. It has pro-
vided instruction in small unit tactics, artillery,
engineer and chemical operations, antitank weap-
ons, and communications to students from several
African countries, as well as the PLO. During the
1970s, as many as 3,000 foreign students were
tary training is the sense imparted to the homeless
Palestinians that they are accepted as equals among
the world's "progressive" peoples. Indeed, the Soviet
Bloc has accorded the PLO some of the recognition
and privileges normally associated only with sovereign
governments and helped to persuade the UN General
Assembly to grant it special status as well.
29. The fragmentation of the PLO that occurred in
the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon presented
the Soviets with a problem, since its policies had been
based on a unified Palestinian front. Moscow's re-
sponse was to try to paper over the split and to urge
the antagonists (whose agents have been murdering
each other all over Europe and the Middle East) to
submerge their differences for the sake of the Palestin-
trained there at once. Personnel from foreign
insurgent and extremist groups composed only a
small portion of the student body.
The Odessa Combined Arms Military Training
School, located on the northern coast of the Black
Sea, houses the United Red Banner Higher Mili-
tary Institute. It provides classroom instruction on
artillery, armor, communications, engineering,
chemical warfare, and basic military science to
students from various Third World countries asso-
ciated with the USSR, including Cuba, Angola,
and Mozambique.
The Odessa Army Barracks, located about 30
kilometers north of the Odessa Combined Arms
Military Training School, serves as the field train-
ing area for students at that installation. It is the
site of the Odessa Foreign Personnel Training
Center, the field counterpart of the Red Banner
Institute. In addition to conventional infantry
training, the center reportedly offers various sorts
of guerrilla warfare training.
The Solneehnogorsk Combined Arms Training
Complex, located about 60 kilometers northwest
of Moscow, is a maior Soviet ground force training
center. Several sources have reported that students
from various Latin American, Middle Eastern,
and African insurgent and extremist groups have
received training at this installation under GRU
auspices.
The Moscow Army Barracks, located about 30
kilometers east of Moscow, has been identified as a
training site for paramilitary elements of the KGB.
Established in the late 1970s, it was used originally
to train counterterrorist units in preparation for
ian cause. To try to ensure that, if some faction
decisively wins the intramural struggle, it will be on
good terms with that faction, Moscow has continued to
provide aid to all elements in the dispute, thereby
forfeiting much of the leverage its support might
otherwise bring.
30. Arafat Still Supported. Because the portion of
Fatah loyal to Yasir Arafat remains the largest of the
guerrilla groups and because Arafat retains the alle-
giance of more Palestinians in the occupied territories
than any other Palestinian leader, the Soviets have
continued to recognize Arafat as the head of the PLO
and to provide his organization with arms, training,
and financial support-albeit at reduced levels since
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. On the other hand, it
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Soviet Bloc Training of Insurgents
and Terrorists (Continued)
the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. Subsequently, Cu-
bans, Angolans, Ethiopians, and Palestinians have
reportedly received training at this installation,
which appears to be oriented toward urban ~~ar-
fare operations.
- The Special Center in Moscow, which is run by
the GRU, trains foreign students-who must be
approved by the International Department of the
CPSU Central Committee-in politics, subversion,
intelligence methods, topography and map read-
ing, diversionary tactics, and "methods of anti-
partisan struggle." We do not know whether these
courses are taught right at the center or whether it
organizes and manages courses taught at other
locations.
-Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Mos-
cow is sometimes cited as a place where foreign
terrorists go for training. Some citizens of Third
World countries who attended Lumumba Univer-
sity may have subsequently turned out to be
terrorists, although training offered there appears
to consist primarily of academic subjects and
ideological indoctrination.
The Question of Terrorist Training
The essence of terrorism lies not in its violence, which
is not markedly different from the violence encoun-
tered in military combat (or in nonpolitical crime), but
in the target, the context, the motivation, and the goal.
Although both soldiers and terrorists use weapons and
explosives, terrorists do so outside a combat situation
and against noncombatant targets. Nevertheless, many
of the activities of terrorist groups are hardly distin-
guishable from normal military activities. Like military
units, terrorist groups must be concerned not only with
operations but also with personnel matters, logistics,
intelligence, security, and public affairs. Most terrorist
'groups, in fact, characterize themselves as military
organizations.
Thus, much conventional military training is directly
applicable to terrorist activities. It is well documented
that personnel from numerous foreign terrorist groups
(that is, extremist groups that employ terrorist tactics)
have received such training in Soviet Bloc countries. On
the other hand, certain terrorist activities have no direct
military counterparts-the skyjacking of civil airliners,
for example, or the conduct of a hostage/barricade
incident, or the assassination of a civilian target. We
have no recent evidence that training in this sort of
activity is offered in Soviet Bloc countries.
Between such terrorism-specific activities and con-
ventional military activities, however, lies a vast array
of unconventional warfare techniques. The improvisa-
tion of explosive and incendiary devices from household
ingredients, the preparation of command-detonating
and time-detonating systems, the sabotage of transport,
power, and communications facilities, the raid, the
ambush, the abduction, the hit-and-run attack-these
are the staple techniques of rural insurgents and urban
terrorists alike. Even in the West, unconventional war-
fare schools commonly teach such techniques, and we
believe that those in the Soviet Bloc are no exception.
Whether this constitutes "terrorist training" is a matter
of context and interpretation.
is clear that Moscow prefers other groups to Fatah-
especially the Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP), the most avowedly pro-Soviet and
doctrinaire Marxist of the Palestinian groups and
among the least active in the terrorist arena. DFLP
students reportedly are offered military and other
forms of training not made available to students from
other Palestinian groups.
31. The Soviet Bloc has also resumed aid to the
PFLP, which spawned most of the international Pales-
tinian terrorist groups and which has from time to
time offered training and weapons to terrorists from
Western Europe and other parts of the world. The
concern that the Soviets would cut off aid again may
have been a factor in dissuading the PFLP from
resuming its international terrorist activities. But the
Soviet Bloc does not appear averse to the PFLP (or
other Palestinians) passing on its terrorist expertise to
others.
e oviet Union
may view t e as a use u surrogate in the event
it wants some terrorists to obtain training but does not
want to be directly involved
32. The Soviets and East Europeans also offer mi-
nor support, chiefly training, to other, lesser Palestin-
ian guerrilla groups such as the PFLP-General Com-
mand (PFLP-GC), Sa`iga, and the Syrian wing of the
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), but the support of
local Arab patrons, especially Syria and Libya, is very
important to these groups. Of course, many of the
weapons they get from Syria and Libya originate in
the Soviet Bloc.
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33. The Soviet Union, along with many of its allies,
provides limited funding, training, weapons, and
equipment directly to certain Latin American revolu-
tionary groups. Moscow's chief contribution, however,
is the military, economic, and political support it has
long rendered Cuba and now provides Nicaragua.
Havana and (to a much lesser extent) Managua train
the bulk of leftwing Latin American insurgents and
terrorists, provide safehaven for their leaders, strate-
gists, and dependents, help them acquire and smuggle
weapons, provide them with funds, medical support,
intelligence, and false documentation, offer advice
and encouragement, and facilitate contacts and ar-
rangements among their organizations. Without the
Soviet Bloc assistance and backing, neither country
would be as able to perform its vanguard role in
promoting revolution in Latin America.
34. Nevertheless, while both Cuba and Nicaragua
are heavily dependent on the Soviets, their regional
policies are also driven by the revolutionary zeal of
their leaders, by hostility toward the United States,
and-on Cuba's part-by a desire to be seen as a
leading Third World state. Indeed, Havana has occa-
sionally wanted to go further than Moscow iri support-
ing the pursuit of armed struggle. The relationship
between Moscow and Havana is complex:
- In addition to economic ties and shared ideology,
the Soviet Union and Cuba are bound together
by mutual geopolitical objectives, prominent
among which is a desire to promote revolution-
ary change in Latin America. In pursuit of this
goal, Soviet and Cuban officials exchange infor-
mation, debate strategies, and coordinate general
lines of policy. Sometimes they also work closely
together; in many cases they work independent-
ly. For the most part, the Soviet Union supplies
the funds for operations run by the Cubans.
- Although Cuba plays a vital role in Soviet strate-
gy toward Latin America (and Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca as well), it is allowed latitude to pursue
initiatives of its own, so long as this is accom-
plished in a fashion that complements Moscow's
agenda. Thus Cuba enjoys the freedom to back
revolutionary groups of its own choosing, some-
times even when these groups are rivals of groups
backed by the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, this
latitude does not extend to Cuban operations that
would create important difficulties for the Soviet
Union. Moscow's equities in Peru, for example,
not only prevent it from supporting Marxist
extremists there but probably lead ~it to restrain
Havana as well.
35. The success of the Sandinista revolution in 1979
led to the belief, not only among the Nicaraguans and
Cubans but also among the Soviets and East Europe-
ans, that conditions were ripe for leftist revolutions in
several Central American countries. They greatly
boosted their aid to Central American insurgent
groups, especially in El Salvador. In addition, Moscow
urged the pro-Soviet Communist parties of the region,
which were generally engaged in nonviolent forms of
political action, to establish combat units and loin in
the revolutionary struggle. Since then, however, left-
wing extremist groups throughout the region have
suffered a considerable number of military and politi-
cal reverses. The increasing US involvement in Central
America, along with the US operation in Grenada,
demonstrated that under certain circumstances the
United States would forcefully oppose Communist
thrusts. Accordingly, both the Soviets and Cubans
appear to have recognized that the conditions in most
Central American and Caribbean countries are not as
conducive to revolution as they had thought
36. At present, four strains of Cuban and Soviet
Bloc involvement with Latin American extremist
groups may be distinguished:
- Ensuring the survival of the Sandinista regime in
Nicaragua.
-Supporting the Marxist insurgents in El Salvador.
-Overthrowing the Pinochet regime and reestab-
lishing aleftist government in Chile.
- Balancing limited support for a wide range of
Marxist elements in other Latin American coun-
tries with improvement in state-to-state relations,
especially with the recently established democra-
cies.
37. The Soviets and Cubans seem to be trying to
intensify the insurgent threat throughout Central
America. In part, this is probably intended to prevent
Washington from focusing its attention solely on Nica-
ragua. Concurrently, local states are induced to think
twice before supporting counterrevolution in Nicara-
gua. Thus extremist groups in Guatemala, Honduras,
and Costa Rica have been encouraged to unite with
other like-minded groups and to undertake terrorist
attacks against government and establishment targets
in the hope of destabilizing their governments. On the
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other hand, the insurgent groups of El Salvador have
been advised to avoid an all-out confrontation with the
Salvadoran military, because they might stimulate
greater US support for the government. They have also
been criticized by Havana for terrorist attacks such as
the kidnaping of President Duarte's daughter, because
it brings them bad publicity and alienates liberal
sympathizers in Western countries.
38. In South America, the Castro regime has been
on a diplomatic offensive of late, downplaying support
for leftwing extremist groups in many countries in
favor of establishing friendlier relationships with the
governments they oppose. Judging that the circum-
stances in most of these countries are not favorable for
revolution-either because the governments are strong
or because the left is weak and divided-Havana has
continued to offer training and limited funding to
would-be guerrillas from some of these countries but
seems to have advised most of them-except in Chile
and Colombia-to bide their time. This has left a bit
of an opening that Qadhafi has tried to exploit, by
offering aid to extremist groups independent of that
furnished by the Soviet Bloc and Cuba. So far, there is
evidence that Cuba resents this Libyan meddling but
not enough to modify significantly its current policy of
modest restraint.
39. On the other hand, the Pinochet regime in
Chile has been the obiect of Cuban subversion since
Pinochet took power by overthrowing Salvador Allen-
de in 1973. Of late, the Cubans have even been
enlisting insurgent groups from other Latin American
countries in the anti-Pinochet crusade. For example,
Argentinian Montonero exiles in Cuba reportedly staff
a training base in Cuba where Chilean leftists receive
training in guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics. The
trainees are shuttled in and out of Cuba via Buenos
Aires and, if caught in Chile, are instructed to say they
were trained by Montoneros in Argentina. Meanwhile,
Havana has urged the Montoneros in Argentina to
work legally within the system.
40. The America Battalion. M-19, the Cuban fa-
vorite among the several large Colombian insurgent
groups, is reportedly not only working to unify the
Colombian leftwing opposition (an unlikely proposi-
tion) but has also spearheaded the establishment of the
America Battalion, a multinational guerrilla force
reportedly composed of members of several Latin
American insurgent and terrorist groups. Besides M-
19, groups reported to be involved include Alfaro
Vive, Caraio-. of Ecuador, the Revolutionary Move-
ment Tupac Amaru of Peru, and the MIR of Chile-
all groups that reportedly receive support and guid-
ing in Colombia near the Ecuadoran border
41. The idea that revolutionaries from several coun-
tries should loin forces is hardly a new idea in Latin
America. It dates from the early 1800s when the
Spanish colonies won their independence. More
recently:
? In 1974, at the urging of Havana, four South
American insurgent groups-the Montoneros of
Argentina, the Tupamaros of Uruguay, the MIR of
Chile, and the ELN of Bolivia-reportedly ioined
forces in the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta
(RCJ). How real this organization was is debatable,
although credit for several terrorist acts was
claimed in its name. It has not been heard from
since 1977.
? In 1976, again with Cuban encouragement, left-
wing extremists in El Salvador, Honduras, Guate-
mala, and Nicaragua formed the Revolutionary
Party of Central American Workers (PRTC), an
organization that still exists, on paper, although
only the Salvadoran branch is active militarily (it
is one-the smallest-of the five components of
the FMLN).
42. Whether the America Battalion is really any-
thing more than an M-19 unit with a few foreigners
attached remains to be seen. If it is real, whether it
will survive the operational setbacks, personality con-
flicts, disagreements over ideology, goals, and tactics,
and other centrifugal forces that cause such organiza-
tions to splinter and resplinter also remains to be seen.
But if it is real and if it survives, it may develop into a
significant adversary in Latin America.
43. In many Latin American countries, the Soviets
and Cubans may be supporting local Marxist-Lenin-
ists, but they are not at present promoting revolution.
In part, this is probably because the governments of
these countries do not now appear vulnerable. In
addition, though, Havana and Moscow regard some
countries-for example, Uruguay, Panama, and Mexi-
co-as hospitable, convenient sites where leftwing
insurgents from other countries can meet to plan and
coordinate their activities. Reportedly, they regard
other countries-Argentina, Bolivia-as valuable stag-
ing areas for operations into Chile. Presumably, the
Soviets and Cubans understand that the relatively
tolerant attitudes of the governments of these countries
toward the activities of revolutionaries from other
countries would quickly wither if they were beset by
leftwing insurgencies of their own.
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The Rest of the Third World
44. Africa. Soviet Bloc support of political extrem-
ist groups in Africa has diminished in the 1980s,
compared with previous decades. In part, that reflects
success: rebel groups previously backed by the Soviets
in such countries as Angola and Guinea-Bissau are now
in power. Indeed, the Soviets now spend more effort
assisting counterinsurgency operations in these coun-
tries than in promoting Marxist insurgencies elsewhere
in Africa-although Soviet military aid to radical
South Africans and Namibians doubtless will increase
as conditions in southern Africa continue to deterio-
rate
45. African National Congress. In southern Afri-
ca, the Soviet Union and its allies provide the bulk of
the weapons and military training received by the
African National Congress (ANC). In addition, Mos-
cow strongly influences the South African Communist
Party (SACP), whose members in turn strongly influ-
ence the ANC's policies and activities by virtue of
dominating ANC leadership positions. Most ANC re-
cruits are trained in Angola, sometimes by Cuban and
Bloc instructors. Some senior ANC cadre have re-
ceived training in several East Bloc countries, includ-
ing the USSR, Bulgaria, and East Germany. The Soviet
Bloc also provides the ANC with food, clothing,
medicine, weapons, and explosives. Despite its depen-
dence on Communist aid and its numerous Commu-
nist leaders, however, the ANC is still better described
as a black nationalist organization than a Communist
one; moreover, in recent months, ANC leader Oliver
Tambo has reportedly been trying to limit Soviet
influence over the ANC. And although the Soviets
supply the ANC with weapons and explosives, the
available evidence does not suggest that Moscow has
much input over how they are used
46. SWAPO. Like the ANC, SWAPO has long been
dependent on the Soviet Bloc for weapons and mili-
tary training. The USSR and several of its allies
provide a wide range of military equipment suitable
for use by conventional infantry units. Equipment
destroyed by South African raids on SWAPO's bases in
Angola seems to be expeditiously replaced. In addi-
tion, Soviet, East German, and Cuban officials furnish
SWAPO other forms of assistance, including transport,
tactical advice, and training. Troop training is con-
ducted in Angola, but senior cadre have been sent to
the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany for train-
ing.
47. Ethiovian Border. For years, the Marxist re-
gime in Addis Ababa has been involved in proxy
conflicts with the Governments of neighboring Sudan
and Somalia. Both Sudan and Somalia have supported
Ethiopian separatist movements, while Ethiopia-with
Soviet Bloc help-has reciprocated by supporting Su-
danese and Somali insurgent groups. East German
instructors reportedly have helped train both Sudanese
and Somali rebels at camps in Ethiopia. Soviet and
Cuban instructors reportedly have helped train Somali
dissidents at such camps
48. Asia. The Soviet Bloc does not appear to have
been involved in most of the terrorism and nonmili-
tary violence in Asia in recent years. Reported Soviet
efforts to establish contact with the New People's
Army (NPA) in the Philippines seem to have been
halfhearted and ineffectual. Neither the Tamil sepa-
ratists in Sri Lanka nor the Sikh separatists in India
appear to enjoy any Soviet Bloc support. Nor is there
any evidence the Soviets are involved with the ex-
treme leftwing groups like Chukaku-ha that occasion-
ally mount terrorist attacks in urban areas of Japan.
The story is different, however, in Pakistan.
49. Al Zulfikar. Although the Soviet Union general-
ly keeps its distance from pure terrorist groups, it has
been directly involved with one such organization-Al
Zulfikar, which was founded by the sons and support-
ers of the ousted and executed former Prime Minister
of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The Soviets apparent-
ly hoped that even if Al Zulfikar proved unable to
overthrow General Zia the group might present a
threat big enough to make the Pakistanis reduce or
cease their support of the Afghan insurgents. In deal-
ing with AI Zulfikar, the Soviets worked through the
Afghan intelligence service, which is controlled by the
KGB. During the early 1980s, Soviet personnel in
Afghanistan reportedly participated directly in train-
ing and deploying Al Zulfikar members who were to
return to Pakistan to try to destabilize the Zia regime
through a campaign of sabotage and subversion.
50. The campaign failed. The group's major terror-
ist actions, two assassinations and a skyjacking, were
highly unpopular in Pakistan, while the skyjackers
presented the Soviets and Afghans with a dilemma by
taking refuge in Kabul. After the Afghan Government
refused to prosecute or extradite the skyjackers, the
Summit Seven countries imposed a civil air embargo
on Afghanistan (the only time this sanction has ever
been implemented). By late 1982 it had become clear
that Al Zulfikar was more of an embarrassment than
an asset, and the Soviets began disengaging from the
group. In response to the declining Soviet support, the
members of the group in Kabul moved to Libya and
Syria, while other elements of the group reportedly
continued to be harbored by India. Since then, the
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group has been decimated by a disastrous operational
failure in Vienna and the drug-induced death of the
younger Bhutto in Paris. During the past two years the
group has been inactive
members of Al Zulfikar may have resurfaced
in Kabul, which may or may not presage renewed
terrorist operations
51. In addition to manipulating Al Zulfikar, Afghan
intelligence agents have mounted a large number of
terrorist attacks in the border regions of Pakistan,
where Afghan insurgent groups have established safe-
havens and operational bases. Bombs targeted against
cinemas, restaurants, offices, and lodgings have
claimed many lives. Afghan Government agents may
also be involved in the spread of banditry and kidnap-
ings elsewhere in Pakistan. Soviet advisers are known
to assist the Afghan intelligence service in planning its
strategy and operations.
The Developed Countries
52. There is very little evidence of any Soviet or
East European involvement with the terrorist groups
of Western Europe or other developed countries.
Whether they be the nihilist new-left groups-like the
RAF in West Germany, the Communist Combatant
Cells in Belgium, or Action Directe in France-or the
ethnic separatist groups-like the Basque ETA in
northern Spain or the Provisional IRA in Northern
Ireland-the Soviet Bloc countries seem to keep their
distance. Several West European countries-particu-
larly Italy and the United Kingdom-have been able
to induce terrorists to confess in exhaustive detail by
offering them lenient sentences, and there have been
no Soviets in their stories. For its part, the Soviet Union
calls such groups "criminal terrorist groups" in distin-
guishing between them and the "national liberation
groups" whose violence it asserts is iustified.~
Since the late 1970s, the USSR has sought
to weaken the Western alliance and concomitant
support for improvements in NATO strategic and
conventional forces by portraying itself as reasonable
and peaceable. It has also invested a lot of effort,
money, and propaganda in support of the legal left in
Western Europe. And it hopes to acquire both technol-
ogy and investment from West European sources in
the coming years. All of this is jeopardized by leftwing
extremist violence, which tends to discredit the left in
general while pushing frightened moderates toward
the right. Finally, the Soviets undoubtedly realize that,
with the possible exception of parts of southern Eu-
rope, the democratic Western countries are not no~v
vulnerable to leftwing rebellion.
54. Turkey an Exception. Notwithstanding the
above, there is probably some substance to the numer-
ous reports and allegations of Soviet Bloc involvement
with Turkish terrorists over the years. Evidence
brought out in connection with the trial of would-be
Papal assassin Mehmet Ali Aica, for example, indicates
that the rightwing gangster/terrorist gang known as
the Gray Wolves had operated openly in Bulgaria,
albeit as gangsters not terrorists. During the 1970s, the
KGB reportedly ran a program in Turkey designed to
stir up discontent over the US military presence there.
Both the leftwing and rightwing extremists who all but
fought a civil war in Turkey in the late 1970s got their
weapons from Bulgarian sources. After the military
regime stifled the prospects of the radical left and
reestablished political stability in Turkey, the Soviet
Bloc backed off from supporting leftist extremism in
that country.
55. Nevertheless, it is evident that the USSR and its
East European allies have treated Turkey more like a
Third World country than like a part of Western
Europe. This case illustrates that, when they have
nothing to lose and stand to gain from a change in the
status quo, the members of the Soviet Bloc will
promote and exacerbate political unrest and violence
even in Western Europe, perhaps even when they
know the left has no realistic chance of ending up on
top.
Trends and Implications
56. In recent years, although Soviet Bloc efforts to
promote Marxist-Leninist revolutions around the
world have continued, the overall level of leftwing
revolutionary violence has been slowly dropping. This
may seem paradoxical, given the rising international
concern about it, but consider the following develop-
ments of the past decade or two:
- The victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua was a
notable Communist success, but leftwing revolu-
tionary challenges-some considered very serious
at the time-have been beaten back in Portugal,
Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Guatemala, and other countries. Their advances
have been slowed or halted in places like El
Salvador and Colombia. The number of countries
truly threatened by leftwing revolutionaries to-
day is rather low.
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-Terrorist assaults in West Germany, Spain,
France, Italy, Northern Ireland, and other coun-
tries have been stymied or repulsed, and some of
the groups involved have been all but obliterated
by arrests. True, terrorists still operate in many of
these countries, but not at the levels common in
the 1970s; and terrorist atrocities still take place
in such countries, but not with the frequency of
the 1970s.
- As counterterrorist security measures have im-
proved, statistically significant declines have oc-
curred in the number and frequency of airplane
hijackings, occupations and barricades of diplo-
matic facilities, letter bombings, and other for-
merly common terrorist activities.
- Many international terrorist groups-the Arme-
nian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
(ASALA), the PFLP Special Operations Group of
Wadi Haddad, the Japanese Red Army, the
Carlos Apparat-have been disbanded or be-
come much less active. They have generally not
been replaced; only one international terrorist
organization-the Abu Nidal Group-now oper-
ates on a broad international scale, although new
pretenders such as Hizballah bear watching.
57. The halting decline in the fortunes of the
violent left has been obscured by developments on the
terrorism scene outside the Soviet orbit, including:
- A large and blatant increase in terrorism spon-
sored by states such as Syria, Libya, and Iran.
- The disintegration of the PLO and the prolifera-
tion of small groups of Palestinian terrorist mer-
cenaries whose activities are no longer con-
strained by a desire to promote the interests of
the Palestinian people.
- A major increase in ethnic and religious terrorism
on the part of Sikh, Tamil, and especially Shiite
Muslim extremists.
- The development of Lebanon as a land beyond
the law where radical governments and groups
have cooperated to create a veritable theme park
of terrorism.
58. The increases in Arab, Iranian, Sikh, and Tamil
terrorism have little or nothing to do with Commu-
nism. Nor does much of the other political violence
that occurs around the world. Instead, this violence
stems from local and regional disputes of a political,
ethnic, or religious nature. Still, in a wider sense, the
Soviets do bear some responsibility for the volume of
the violence and the readiness with which politically
aggrieved groups turn to it. The Marxist-Leninist and
Palestinian groups the Sovet Bloc does support have set
powerful examples that non-Communists and non-
Palestinians consciously emulate, both organizationally
and operationally. The Soviet rhetoric that justifies the
violent activities of Marxist-Leninists and Palestinians
also helps other extremist groups rationalize their
violence and makes them less receptive to nonviolent
alternatives that might, over time, also alleviate their
grievances.
Outlook
59. The world appears to have reached a roughly
steady state of political violence. As guerrilla or terror-
ist groups in one region are brought under control-or,
occasionally, achieve their objectives-guerrillas or
terrorists arise somewhere else, in a pattern that almost
inevitably will persist. Moscow and its allies will
continue to contribute to many of those who choose
the violent option
60. The financial cost of supporting foreign political
extremist groups is not significant, compared with the
benefits the Soviets evidently feel they receive from
such programs. Once committed, moreover, the Sovi-
ets and their allies have demonstrated considerable
staying power. They are usually patient and reliable
supporters, although broader policy considerations
may spur change in specific cases-in Zimbabwe, for
example, Joshua Nkomo no longer enjoys Soviet back-
ing. In view of the historical durability of these
policies, only some major shift in the cost/benefit ratio
will lead the Soviets to modify their attitudes and
activities in this area.
61. In the Third World, Soviet support for insur-
gent and terrorist groups is seldom encumbered by
conflicting policies and goals. If the Soviets wanted to
provide more support to such groups-or such support
to more groups-there would be little to stop them.
Hitherto, they have probably calculated that, at least
at first, the added effort would not bring them much
besides additional turbulence in the targeted societies.
While the Soviets have hardly been opposed to turbu-
lence in non-Communist societies, they have not gone
out of their way to create it except in the pursuit of a
specific goal (such as the overthrow of the Pinochet
regime). A more adventurous approach is conceivable:
the Soviets could step up their efforts to disrupt
currently stable non-Communist societies in the hope
that opportunities for leftist advances would be gener-
ated where there are none now. If a moderate govern-
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ment were to discredit itself by responding to leftist
extremism with not enough skill or too much repres-
sion, the Soviets might benefit. We have seen no
evidence, however, to suggest that the ne~v Soviet
Government is thinking along these lines.
62. In the Developed World, where the Soviet
Bloc is not known to support groups that engage in
political violence, the only substantial change can be in
the direction of a greater willingness to do so, either in
specific countries or more generally. Considering that
their policy of restraint is not principled but only
tactical, one of the following developments could
conceivably induce the Soviets to change it:
- Serious political instability in a Western country,
coupled with improved prospects that the left
could come to power there through violence. In
the past, during periods of civil turmoil, leftwing
extremists in countries such as Portugal, Greece,
and Turkey have received Soviet Bloc aid and
encouragement.
- An unanticipated opportunity to acquire some-
thing of value, such as intelligence, from a West
European terrorist group. After the Red Brigades
kidnaped US Army General Dozier, the Bulgari-
an intelligence service, probably at the behest of
a Soviet service, tried to arrange through an
intermediary to trade weapons and other logistic
support in return for any information of military
intelligence interest Dozier might have been
providing his captors.
- A desire to retaliate against particular Western
countries for activities inimical to the interests of
the USSR or its allies. Moscow would almost
certainly use Third World surrogates. A possible
precedent is the probable Soviet sponsorship of
the Afghan intelligence service's operations in
Pakistan.
stimulus the new Soviet leadership might decide to
take a new tack. Nothing in Soviet conduct during the
first year of the Gorbachev era suggests this has
happened. Throughout the period of the US confron-
tation with Libya, for example, the Gorbachev regime
displayed the same unprincipled, tactical approach
toward Libyan terrorism as previous regimes. The
Soviet Government apparently made little or no effort
to rein in the Libyans, even when provided specific
warnings, and it tried to profit as much as possible
from the confrontation while not becoming directly
involved. Much of its propaganda served to iustify
Libyan conduct and bolster its reluctance to change
that conduct.
64. On the other hand, there have been some
changes in the way the Soviets talk about the issue:
- A portion of Gorbachev's speech during the
CPSU Congress in Februar~~ 1986 ("the loathe-
some face of terrorism") was quoted earlier in
this Estimate.
- According to the Soviet news agency TASS, when
Qadhafi's deputy, Maior Abd al-Salam Jallud,
visited Moscow in May 1986, Gorbachev used a
statement criticizing the US bombings to admon-
ish the Libyans against provoking the United
States further, lest it strike again. Specifically, he
cited "the need for adherence to principle and
consistency in the condemnation of those pretexts
that imperialists use and, first of all, terrorism in
any of its forms."
- In several official but private forums the Soviets
have recently indicated a willingness to discuss
ways in which East and West can cooperate to
combat transnational terrorism.
65. Whether these indications are anything more
than another example of the Gorbachev public rela-
tions offensive remains to be seen. If the Soviets are
63. Neither these nor other external developments
that might lead to a change in the Soviet attitude
toward providing support for foreign extremists seems
likely to materialize, at least not in the short term. It is
conceivable, though, that even without any particular
sincere, it will not be difficult for them to demonstrate
this in concrete ways. It would be too much to expect,
however, that they will ever renounce their "right" to
promote Marxist-Leninist revolutions abroad.
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