SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON A NEW US-USSR SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800660001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 2, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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DATE DOC NOSO Y `I\ 2-0) Z-51
OIR
P$PD
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
2 December 1987
Soviet Perspectives on a New US-USSR
Scientific Cooperation Agreement
Summary
Assuming the upcoming Washington summit goes well, we expect the Gorbachev
regime to pursue, and perhaps attempt to accelerate, talks leading to a new
intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in basic science. We believe the Soviets have
multiple objectives in seeking such an agreement:
? Support Gorbachev's economic modernization program.
? Enhance military capabilities.
? Advance basic science.
Such an agreement would be an added step in improving Gorbachev's domestic and
international reputation. Gorbachev probably sees such an agreement as a means of
further enhancing his image as a world leader interested in coo eration and able
to deal effectively with the United States on complex issues. 77 25X1
While we are certain that from Moscow's perspective the benefits significantly
outweigh the risks, the Soviets probably are apprehensive about the costs of resuming
scientific cooperation. Their concerns probably focus on an agreement's implications for:
? Continuing technological dependence on the West.
? Giving the US access to the Soviet S&T complex.
? Potential transfer of science/technology to the United States.
At present, discussions on a formal agreement restrict cooperation to the basic
sciences. But we believe the Soviets are likely to push the boundaries toward engineering
and industrial applications. We expect them to use the definitional differences and
ambiguities associated with the term "basic science" to promote their interests. Moreover,
we are certain that their intelligence services will exploit any agreement, as they have in
the past, to acquire militarily significant US scientific know-how and technology. The
Soviets know that their ability to satisfy their objectives will depend not just on how the
terms of cooperation are defined, but also on how an agreement is implemented and its
activities are subsequently managed. 25X1
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This typescript was prepared by Office of Soviet Analysis, and Office of Scientific and 25X1
Weapons Research. Comments and queries are welcome and should be directed to the Chie , Defense Industries Division, SOVA~~
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7
Background: Bilateral S&T Cooperation During the 1970s
organized activities, and some 3,000 publications resulted from these exchanges.
At the May 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow, highlighted by the signing of
the SALT I Treaty, the US and USSR concluded an Agreement for Cooperation in the
Fields of Science and Technology that covered a broad spectrum of activities in the basic
and applied sciences. This agreement was one of 11 bilateral agreements signed between
the two countries in the early 1970s that provided the framework for expanded exchanges
in various areas of science and technology (see table 1). During the 10 years in which the
S&T Agreement was in effect, more than 1,000 US scientists participated in more than 400
Table 1
Areas of Cooperation under the 1972
Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement
Physics
Microbiology
Chemical Catalysis
Forestry
Water Resources
Computers In Management
Metrology
Science Policy
Electrometallurgy
Corrosion
Polymer Sciences
Heat and Mass Transfer
Earth Sciences
Soyuz spacecraft in 1975.
Expanded S&T cooperation under these bilateral programs became a centerpiece of
US-Soviet relations, a symbol of detente, and a central element in Moscow's drive to obtain
Western know-how, technology, and credit to help modernize the Soviet economy. The
high point in bilateral cooperation was the rendezvous and docking of the Apollo and
Shortly thereafter, cooperation began to fade with the cooling of the political climate
and mounting US concern over the problem of the potential transfer to the Soviets of US
technology. Soviet intelligence services were exploiting the bilaterals to gain access to and
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acquire militarily significant scientific know-how and technology . Participa-
tion in exchange programs also declined as indignation over human rights abuses in the
USSR (treatment of dissidents, restriction of Jewish emigration, curbs on scientific
freedoms) became an issue within the American scientific community. In reaction to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Soviet complicity in the imposition of martial law in
Poland, and the KAL incident, the United States terminated (or allowed to lapse) several
cooperative programs. The United States then did not act to renew the basic S&T
Agreement when it expired in 1982. As a result, the level of joint S&T activity fell and by
the autumn of 1983 stood at less than one-fifth of what it was in 1979. The number of
formal agreements dropped from 11 to seven.
US reviews of the exchange programs point to positive results for both sides in almost
all scientific fields. However, there was also a general concern that the Soviets had not
always lived up to the spirit of the agreement. Reciprocity was lacking in terms of access to
Soviet facilities and qualified scientists. Overall, the distribution of benefits from the
agreement was heavily weighted towards the Soviet Union.
As a consequence of the general understanding on exchanges reached by President
Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Geneva and Reykjavik summit meetings,
interest in improving scientific cooperation has been rekindled. Over the past two years,
new cooperative programs have been initiated, and some old ones have been revitalized.
More importantly, the Gorbachev regime has taken some steps to address what had been a
major stumbling block from the US perspective: the human rights issue. Although many
factors contributed to the sharp decline of cooperative efforts during the late 1970s and
early 1980s, the arrest and internal exile of Academician Andrey Sakharov in 1980 was the
final catalyst in the demise of official US cooperation in S&T. His recent release is one
signal that Moscow now is eager to resume increased bilateral scientific exchanges.
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objectives.
On 5-6 October 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union held exploratory talks
in Moscow on a new intergovernmental basic science agreement (not to be confused with
the agreement between the US and USSR academies of sciences). The Soviet delegation
was led by officials of the State Committee for Science and Technology and included
representatives from the USSR Academy of Sciences. The topics proposed by the Soviets
lead us to believe that they are pursuing a mix of economic, military and scientific
Soviet Objectives for a New Agreement in Basic Sciences
reputation.
Gorbachev is pursuing a new agreement to raise the quality and productivity of Soviet
science and make it competitive with the West. Whereas the previous agreements were
based on a narrow perspective of "modernization on the cheap" with emphasis on
technology transfer, the present approach to an agreement reflects a commitment to
revitalizing the Soviet S&T establishment itself and then using this sector as a catalyst to
modernize the Soviet economy (see table 2). We believe the Soviets also hope that a new
round of scientific exchanges with the United States will enhance their military capabilities,
advance basic science, and improve Gorbachev's domestic and international
Table 2
Soviet Proposed Topics for Bilateral Cooperation
New Materials
Corrosion
Catalysis
Welding
Membrane Technology
Industrial Lasers
Biotechnology
S&T Information
Theoretical Physics
Mathematics
Biology
Physiology
Chemistry
Heat Engineering
Earth Sciences
Technologies based on New
Physical Principles
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Support Economic Modernization. Moscow's main objective for this cooperation
agreement is, in our opinion, to focus activities on applied areas that are critical for rapid
S&T advance. Indeed, the Soviet delegation's entering position during the October
discussions was that cooperation should be both in basic science and in applied technolo-
gies--as was the case under the original S&T cooperation agreement. Furthermore, many
of the topics proposed by the Soviets center on areas in which--by their own admission--the
USSR appreciably lags behind the United States. Gorbachev has made faster scientific and
technological progress the linchpin of his economic revitalization program. Such an
agreement would support Gorbachev's strategy to use science to help modernize the
economy and meet the technological challenge of the West. Because of Gorbachev's S&T
policy and strategies, we believe the Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for
Science and Technology (GKNT) will be under tremendous pressure to push the
boundaries of cooperation and avenues of activity into applied areas (see box). The
continued efforts of the Soviet delegation during the October 1987 talks to press for
applied topics, despite ostensibly agreeing to US insistence on basic research, tends to
confirm our suspicions.
The whole Soviet scientific establishment, including the Academy of Sciences-the principal
performer under the proposed agreement-is being restructured and reoriented towards more applied
research and new technology development. The Academy of Sciences, although still the nation's
leading performer of basic research, is becoming increasingly more applications- oriented. Within the
Academy, departments have been created and institutes reorganized or created to specialize in
machinebuilding processes, automation, and computer sciences.
applied R&D now comprises 40 to 50 percent of the Academy's total work.
Also indicative of Soviet intentions was their proposal that research be conducted
under the auspices of interbranch scientific and technical complexes (MNTKs, to use the
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Russian acronym). As new national-level organizations, the complexes are charged with
spearheading the development of many critical new technologies. Their responsibilities
span the research-to-production cycle. Basic research is not the primary, much less the
sole, focus of their mission. The inclusion of these complexes under an agreement would
serve to steer cooperation towards applications-oriented research.1
Enhance Military Capabilities. The Soviets are also keenly interested in pursuing
research areas and deriving scientific benefits that could have possible military applicati-
ons. Many of their proposed topics focus on dual-use technologies and on research areas
that could improve Soviet defense production capabilities or weapons system designs.
Some of the MNTKs that would head cooperative efforts are known to have ties to the
defense industries, or include institutes that conduct research under contract for the
military. While the Soviets will undoubtedly try to exploit any agreement to enhance
defense capabilities, we do not believe this is the primary force behind their negotiations.
To acquire sensitive scientific information and COCOM-controlled technology, they will
more likely rely on an already aggressive programmed collection effort and well-estab-
lished acquisition mechanisms
Advance Basic Science. There is genuine Soviet interest in negotiating an agreement
to advance basic science, but we do not believe that this is Moscow's primary objective.
Under Gorbachev there is heightened concern about the status and direction of Soviet
basic science. There is a new appreciation of basic science as the source for fundamentally
new technologies. Moreover, Gorbachev is determined to bring Soviet science up to world
levels. As one way to overcome its deficiencies, the USSR is expanding its foreign S&T
cooperative efforts. Through an agreement with the United States, the Soviets also hope to
refurbish their international prestige as a world leader in basic research. They also seek to
better monitor trends and capabilities in US basic science. The Soviets have traditionally
1 We note that complexes exist-but were not identified-for several topics tabled by the Soviets.
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used such information to develop forecasts and prioritize their own scientific efforts in both
civilian and military areas. Their dependence on such information was illustrated in a
recent Soviet press article which emphasized that they had fallen behind the West in
membrane technology--an area proposed by Moscow for cooperation--because its re-
searchers did not have access to what was going on in the West and therefore were not able
to draw up realistic forecasts.
Obtain Political Benefits. General Secretary Gorbachev would like very much to
obtain a scientific cooperation agreement with the United States during the remaining
period of the Reagan administration, when the two countries are making progress on arms
control and other bilateral issues. An agreement on scientific exchange with a President
who has made denial of military-related technology to the USSR a fundamental element of
his foreign policy would help gain suppport for Gorbachev's foreign policy program among
conservative elements in the Kremlin. Gorbachev probably also sees the process of
negotiating such an agreement as a means of enhancing his image as a world leader
interested in peaceful cooperation. Moreover, he would like to use an agreement and the
improved political climate to increase access to the influential US scientific
community.
Soviet Concerns
published statements by Soviet political and
scientific leaders indicate that they strongly favor a new round of scientific exchanges with
the United States. At the same time, there is good evidence suggesting that they also worry
about the possible costs of resuming cooperative activities. Based upon the experience of
the 1970s, they are probably approaching a new agreement with a sense of pragmatism and
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caution. From Moscow's perspective, the results of the past agreement were not all
positive, nor did they fully yield the expected benefits. In general, Soviet concerns likely
focus on at least four issues:
? Continuing technological dependence on the West.
? US access to the Soviet S&T complex.
? Potential science/technology loss.
? Possible defection of Soviet scientists.
S&T Dependence on the West. Although the Gorbachev regime has emphatically
stressed that Soviet scientists be supplied information on Western scientific advances, there
is a concern that this scientific interaction can reenforce Soviet dependence on the West.
The leadership is worried about scientific and technological mediocrity and unneeded
mimicry, and Gorbachev has warned that catching up with the West should not be
interpreted as copying the West. By allowing Western trends and standards to dictate
Soviet S&T forecasting and determine future avenues and priority areas for research,
Moscow fears relegating itself to permanent second place in developing new areas of
science and technology. During his April 1986 visit to East Germany, Gorbachev called
upon "scientists, designers, and inventors to stop looking at average levels as the
guidepost... abandon the position of imitation, and direct your efforts at developing and
producing fundamentally new products that will be the best in the world." Party Second
Secretary Yegor Ligachev in a November 1985 speech similarly criticized Soviet scientists
for following the tracks of foreign researchers, emphasizing, that "it is impossible not to see
that while we go for what is considered new today, others move further ahead and away at
the same time.... This immediately predetermines a technological lag."
US Access to Soviet S&T Complex. Moscow knows that the United States obtains
access to institutions and scientists and learns a good deal about Soviet scientific
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capabilities through the exchanges. US participants gain information on specific research
projects, experimental results, and how Soviet R&D is organized and managed.
Possible Defection of Soviet Scientists. The Soviets are clearly leery about the
opportunities for defection or recruitment of Soviet researchers. They protested loudly in
December 1984 when Artem Kulikov, an Academy nuclear physicist, defected while on an
extended research visit to a US laboratory under the auspices of an exchange agreement.
As a result, the regime pushed for US assurances that such incidents would not be allowed
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to reoccur under future cooperative programs.
Under the new arrangements, whenever a top Soviet scientist is invited to visit the United
States, he will be accompanied by a second scientist selected by the Soviets.
Moscow's Net Assessment
The Soviet leadership almost certainly believes that the gains from a new agreement
significantly outweigh the potential losses, given the USSR's technological lag. They would
clearly prefer an agreement that encompasses applications-oriented research, because this
is where they are weakest and can obtain more immediate benefits. Nevertheless, in
October the Soviet Union reluctantly accepted the US approach to restrict cooperation to
basic science, reflecting their strong interest in an accord. Even within such a framework
Soviet leaders probably calculate that they can secure significant gains.
Indeed, during the recent exploratory talks the Academy of Sciences' foreign
relations chief announced plans to double or triple the volume of scientific exchanges with
the US National Academy of Sciences. Moreover, based on the perceived political
benefits, the Gorbachev leadership might enter into a basic science agreement even before
substantive areas are defined.2
2 The 1972 S&T Agreement was signed without specifying in advance the range of topics.
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At the same time, the Soviets are likely to seek to push the boundaries of cooperation
toward basic engineering and industrial applications. We expect them to use the definition-
al differences and ambiguities associated with the term 'basic science" to promote their
interests. The Soviets know that their ability to satisfy their objectives will depend not just
on how the terms of cooperation are defined, but also on how an agreement is
implemented and its activities are managed. We expect that Moscow will try to maximize
its access to key US scientific information and institutions. While obviously concerned
about US access to unique Soviet facilities and sensitive locations--a major sticking point in
past exchanges--Moscow may be more flexible on this issue. The Gorbachev regime's new
flexibility along these lines, already evident in the draft arms control agreement, may
portend their willingness to ease US concerns over reciprocity.
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