GORBACHEV'S POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800380001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 9, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE 4-I.
DOCwncy/Y'sR7r g2
Central Intelligence Agency
OIR
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
9 September 1987
Gorbachev's Policy Toward the Middle East
Summary
General Secretary Gorbachev and his foreign policy team have
yet to produce major substantive shifts in Soviet policy toward
the Middle East, but the tactical flexibility they have exhibited
in implementing longstanding policies and pursuing new
opportunities has earned Moscow recognition in the region as a
force to be reckoned with once again. One of Gorbachev's most
important innovations to date has been a greater willingness than
his predecessors to risk upsetting the USSR's primary Middle
Eastern client, Syria, in the pursuit of broader Soviet goals in
the Middle East. This has been most evident in Moscow's
expansion of Soviet contacts with Israel and efforts to reunify
the PLO under Yasir Arafat. The Soviets continue, however, to
provide strong military support to Syria and other Arab arms
clients. Beyond the Levant, Gorbachev has removed a major
obstacle to improved relations with Egypt by compromising on
Cairo's military debt, expanded the Soviet diplomatic and
economic presence among the conservative Persian Gulf Arab
states, and capitalized on rising tensions to gain a security
role in the Gulf through leasing three oil tankers to Kuwait and
providing naval escorts for them in and out of the Gulf.
Balancing the often conflicting goals of escaping from
policy cul-de-sacs Moscow faces in the Middle East without
alienating longtime Soviet friends in the region and jeopardizing
-more recent gains with the Gulf Arabs -will be Gorbachev's most
difficult task. He thus far apparently has calculated that the
heavy dependence on Soviet arms of such Soviet friends as Syria
and Iraq gives Moscow ample maneuvering room, but a
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Soviet
Analysis Comments and queries are welcome and
may be addressed to the Chief, Regional Policy Division
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miscalculation could be costly. The risky double game the
Soviets are now playing by exploring Iranian overtures for better
relations could pay big dividends, but it could just as easily
lead to severe damage to their position with Iraq and Kuwait
while producing only meager dividends with Tehran. As with past
Soviet leaders, Gorbachev's successes in the explosive Middle
East will in many instances be determined as much by events on
the ground and US actions as by any policy he adopts.
Continuity of Interests
For all his professions of "new thinking" in foreign policy
and Moscow's more adroit image-building in the Middle East, the
basics of Soviet policy toward the region remain the same under
Gorbachev as under his predecessors--with a fundamental goal of
expanding Soviet influence and presence in the region while
limiting that of the US. Obtaining a role equal to that of the
United States in any negotiations to resolve the Arab-Israeli
conflict continues to be a central part of Soviet policy, as does
strong support for the Palestinian cause as Moscow's entree to
such negotiations. Moreover, Gorbachev has attempted--as his
predecessors did--to increase Soviet influence with the key
regional targets of opportunity, Egypt and Iran, without serious
damage to Moscow's interests in Libya, Syria, and Iraq.
Syria remains the linchpin of the Soviet position in the
Middle East, and Moscow continues to provide it and the other
major Soviet arms clients in the region, Iraq and Libya, modern
weapons systems--albeit not always at the pace and price the
Arabs want. Despite Gorbachev's lament in his dinner speech
during Syrian President Assad's visit to Moscow in April over the
"billions spent for military purposes" in the Middle East, Soviet
arms sales to the region in 1987 are on pace to reverse a four-
year downward trend. Syria obtained its first MIG-29s this
summer, Iraq continues to get enormous amounts of weapons from
Moscow, Libya in July received its first delivery of ground
-forces equipment in a year, and Algeria recentl received its
first MI-17 helicopters.
Changing Tactics
Gorbachev and his foreign policy advisers--primarily Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov,
and CPSU International.-Department Chief Dobrynin--have, in our
view, pursued Soviet interests in the Middle East more vigorously
and imaginatively than their predecessors. As is the case in
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many other regions of the world, the changes they have instigated
in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy have done much to alter
the image Middle Easterners had of the USSR as heavy-handed,
inflexible, and relevant only because of its military power and
ability to supply arms. Their primary achievement to date is
that the Soviets--perhaps more than at any time since the early
1970s--are now generally accepted by regional states as having a
role to play in the Middle East, even if this has not always
translated directly into increased Soviet influence in specific
countries and on particular issues.
One of Gorbachev's most important innovations in Soviet
policy toward the Middle East has been his greater willingness to
risk upsetting Syria's Assad in the pursuit of broader Soviet
goals in the region. Although previous Soviet leaders had their
differences with Assad, they often bent over backwards to avoid
antagonizing him. Since Syria under Assad's rule has been at
odds with most of the important players in the Middle East--Iraq,
Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and PLO chief Arafat--this meant that
Soviet leaders frequently tailored their policies toward these
players with Syrian interests uppermost in mind. Gorbachev has
been much less willing to let Assad's views crimp Moscow's
maneuvering room, perhaps calculating that Syria's increasing
isolation in the Arab world and mounting economic problems make
it more difficult for Assad to turn elsewhere for support.
Israel and the Peace Process
Gorbachev's expansion of the USSR's dialogue with Israel is
the most telling example of his determination not to let hardline
Arab views dictate Soviet policy. His comments during Assad's
April visit that the absence of diplomatic relations between the
USSR and Israel "cannot be considered normal" and that the notion
the Arab-Israeli conflict can be resolved militarily "is
completely discredited" were strikingly blunt-statements for a
Soviet leader-to make in public in the presence of his Syrian
counterpart. Equally as galling to Assad-had to be Gorbachev's
_further refinement in the same speech of the official Soviet
position on the timing of restored relations with Israel ("in the
framework of," rather than after, an Arab-Israeli settlement).
Gorbachev and his foreign policy team appear determined to
find a way to correct the major blunder Moscow made in 1967 by
breaking relations with Israel. This left.. the US as the only
superpower able to talk with both sides in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. This search for innovative ways to remedy a major
Soviet weak spot may be due, in part, to the influence of
Shevardnadze, whose tenure began in the same month as the first
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serious Soviet feelers to the Israelis, and Dobrynin, who
reportedly has long favored restoring ties. Dobrynin and other
"Americanists" who have risen under Gorbachev also are keenly
aware of the impact such issues as Jewish emigration from the
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The slow pace in recent months of Soviet moves toward
improved ties probably is due in part to Prime Minister Shamir's
opposition to giving the Soviets a role at an international
conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict. A Soviet consular
delegation came to Israel in July only after much delay, and
Moscow has sharply restricted its mandate. The two officials in
the delegation who could discuss policy were recalled to Moscow
after only two weeks, and the Soviets rebuffed Israeli efforts to
send a similar delegation to the USSR. Such gradualism also has
the benefit from Moscow's standpoint of giving the Arabs time to
get used to the idea of increased Soviet-Israeli ties before
reestablishing full diplomatic relations.
Israeli acceptance is only part of the Soviet problem in
arranging an international conference. Most of the moderate Arab
regimes have endorsed an international conference, but Syria,
while giving lip service to the idea, has never been keen on
it. And as long as Assad is at odds with PLO leader Arafat, the
Soviets cannot count on their clients being unified at such a
conference. In April Moscow took a major first step toward
overcoming this obstacle by helping arrange the tentative
reconciliation of major PLO factions at the Palestine National
Council meeting in Algiers. But the Soviets have gotten nowhere
in their efforts to convince Assad to mend fences with Arafat,
and the prospects for movement here are not good. Even'if the
Kremlin succeeded in getting Assad and Arafat to an Arab-Israeli
peace conference, we believe Moscow does not possess the leverage
to convince them to sign an agreement that did not meet their
major objecti-jes.
Arab disunity and Israeli reservations will not prevent the
Soviets from continuing to hawk their current scheme of a
preparatory meeting to arrange an international conference. It
was Shevardnadze's main theme at last year's opening of the UNGA
session and is likely to be a major chord there again this year,
as well as at his mid-September meeting with Secretary Shultz if
regional issues are discussed. Shamir's continued refusal to go
along and the unabated Assad-Arafat feud preclude for now the
convening of the type of international conference the Soviets
would like to see. But Moscow's constant hype of its proposal
and periodic repackaging of it--which Shevardnadze could do once
again this month--are designed to put Israel and the US on the
defensive and portray them as the main stumbling blocks to a
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settlement. These moves also reinforce the Kremlin's claim that
it supports political settlements to regional conflicts
worldwide.
Leniency on Arms Debts
Another innovation under Gorbachev has been the Soviets'
increased willingness to compromise on the large military debts
owed them by Arab countries. The Soviets appear to have decided
that, rather than push for all the money that is owed them--which
they realized would not be repaid in any case--their overall
interests would be better served by writing off part of these
debts. Most noteworthy was Moscow's renegotiation this spring o
Egypt''s longstanding debt of approximately $2.5 billion.
IThe one
complication is that other clients are likely to cite Moscow's
concessions on the Egyptian debt as precedent in their future
negotiations with the Soviets.
The debt agreement with Cairo could turn out to be one of
Gorbachev's most significant achievements in the Middle East. It
removed a major impediment to improved bilateral relations and
may open the way for some limited Soviet arms sales to Egypt.
Moscow realizes that President Mubarak is not about to abandon
Egypt's close ties to the US or return to dependence on Soviet
arms, but it probably believes the debt rescheduling will
complicate Washington's relations with Cairo. First Deputy
Foreign Minister Vorontsov's visit to Cairo in September will be
the first high-level exchange since the debt agreement and may
result in an announcement that Egypt will allow the reopening of
Soviet consulates in Alexandria and Port Said.
Persian Gulf
Gorbachev's success in expanding the Soviet diplomatic and
economic presence among the conservative Gulf Arab states,
although primarily a result of the footwork done by his
predecessors and of these states' all but inevitable coming-to-
terms with contemporary international politics, is nonetheless
impressive in light of the"USSR's past exclusion from most of
these countries. The unprecedented regional security role Moscow
obtained this spring, when it leased three Soviet oil tankers to
Kuwait and began escorting them in and out of the Gulf,
underscores how far it has come. Although the Soviets have been
unable to crown their'diplomatic progress by normalizing
relations with the most important of the Gulf conservatives--
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Saudi Arabia--the trend toward ending Moscow's isolation from an
important area of the Middle East is unlikely to be reversed.
The Kremlin's response to the most recent tensions, in the
Gulf, however, has complicated its relations with Iraq. Up until
quite recently, Gorbachev had continued Moscow's policy--adopted
in 1982--of tilting toward Iraq in its war with Iran and
maintaining a tough stance toward Tehran until Iranian leaders
took concrete steps to prove they were genuinely willing to
improve relations with the USSR. Now, however, the USSR and Iran
have a shared concern in getting US forces out of the Gulf, which
has prompted them to increase contacts and downplay their still
substantial political differences over Afghanistan, Moscow's
military support for Iraq, and Tehran's suppression of the Tudeh
(Communist) Party. The Kremlin, which has long seen Iran as the
key country in the Gulf region, clearly decided it could not pass
up an opportunity to gain influence in Tehran at a time when the
Iranians are feeling increasingly vulnerable.
The Soviets are likely to probe Tehran's willingness to
follow up its public claims of significant improvement in
bilateral relations with concrete steps. This was probably the
reason they invited Iranian Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani to visit
Moscow in November. Progress in the economic sphere would be
likely to come first, although we believe Iranian claims that oil
pipeline and railroad projects linking the two countries are
imminent are highly exaggerated. At any rate, either project
would entail major costs for both sides and require long lead-
times to complete.
The Soviets' maneuvering room with Iran is likely to be
limited by their almost certain skepticism about the depth of the
Khomeini regime's change of heart toward the USSR and by a desire
not to undermine the important gains they have made with Iraq and
the conservative Gulf states in the past few years. Shev.ardnadze
will have a lot of explaining to do later-this month when the
Iraqi and Kuwait foreign ministers come to Moscow.. The Kremlin's
equivocation on a follow-up sanctions 'resolution at the UN and
statements that Tehran has shown flexibility on the issue have
angered the Arabs. The risky double-game the Soviets are playing
could pay big dividends, but it also could just as easily lead to
severe damage to their position with the Arabs while producing
only meager dividends with the Iranians.
Prospects '
How to take advantage of opportunities in the Middle East
without jeopardizing the assets they already have is not new to
Soviet leaders, but it is a balancing act that Gorbachev will
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have to perform particularly well if he is to achieve his goal of
breaking Soviet policy out of the dead ends in which it was
mired. His degree of success will be affected by a number of
variables over which the Kremlin has little or no direct
control. These include:
? The US ability to shore up its credibility with the Arabs.
The Arabs' willingness to moderate their feuds.
? Arab perception of the need to rely on Soviet support and
the risks of doing so.
? The longevity in power of Shamir and his supporters in
Israel.
The longevity in power of Khomeini and his supporters in
Iran.
? The course of the war between Iran and Iraq.
A central part of Gorbachev's strategy will be gaining US
acknowledgment of the USSR's legitimate role in the Middle
East. Appeals for such an acknowledgment and for US-Soviet
collaboration have been prominent in Moscow's reaction to the
recent tensions in the Gulf and its efforts to arrange a
preparatory meeting for an Arab-Israeli peace conference. These
appeals are certain to be voiced often in the various US-Soviet
talks planned for the next few months.
It is far too early for a judgment on the ultimate success
or failure of Gorbachev's Middle Eastern policy. To date, he has
scored some important gains, although many could prove ephemeral.
His most significant achievement thus far, however, may be a
perceptual one: changing the USSR's image from that of an odd
man out to that of a relevant player in the region.
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SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Policy Toward the Middle East
External Distribution
White House
The Honorable Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Room 298, Old EOB
Lt. Gen. Colin L. Powell
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Dr. Fritz Ermarth
Special Assistant to the President
Room 368, Old EOB
William H. Courtney
Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC
Situation Room, The White House
George Van Eron
Director Secretariat
Room 381, Old EOB
Peter R. Sommer
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
Room 368, EOB
Colonel Tyrus W. Cobb
Director, Eur-bpean and Soviet Affairs
National Security Council
.-Room 361, Old EOB
Paula Dobriansky
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
National Security Council
Room 368, Old EOB
Robert B. Oakley
Special Assistant to the President
for Near_East and South Asian Affairs, NSC
Room 438, Old EOB
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SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Policy Toward the Middle East
External Distribution
Dennis Ross
Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs
National Security Council
Room 351, Old EOB
Peter W. Rodman
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs (Foreign Policy)
The White House
Michael K. Bohn
Director, Situation Room
West Wing, White House
John Desch, NCOIC
Ops WHSSS/NSC
Room 303, Old EOB
Dr. Darnell Whitt
Intell1gence Adviser to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy
Room 2E812, The Pentagon
Vice Admiral Powell Carter, USN
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E936,
The Pentagon
Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN
_DTIC
Room 5D523
The Pentagon
Rear Admiral William 0. Studeman, USN
OP-009
Room 5C564
The Pentagon
Lt. General Dale A. Vesser, USAF
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E996
The Pentagon
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SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Policy Toward the Middle East
External Distribution
Vice Admiral Jonathan T. Howe
Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E872, The Pentagon
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Command, Control, Communications/Intelligence
Room 3E172, The Pentagon
Peter P. Herrick
National Warning Staff
Room 1C921
The Pentagon
Major General Schuyler Bissell, USAF
AF/IN
Room 4A932
The Pentagon
Lt. General Sidney T. Weinstein, USA
DAMI
Room 2E466
The Pentagon
Colonel David R. Brown
Executive Secretary
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room 3E880, The Pentagon
Colonel Jeffr-ey A. Levy, USAF
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E977
The Pentagon
Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Political-Military Affairs
Room 2C238, The Pentagon .
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SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Policy Toward the Middle East
External Distribution
Department of State
The Honorable Michael H. Armacost
Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
Room 7240, Department of State
The Honorable Vernon A. Walters
US Ambassador to the United Nations
US Mission to the UN
Department of State
Richard H. Solomon
Director, Policy Planning Council
Room 7311, Department of State
Sherrod McCall
Policy Planning Staff
Room 7330, Department of State
Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway
Assistant Secretary of European and
Canadian Affairs
Room 6226, Department of State
Alan L. Keyes
Assistant Secretary of International
Organization Affairs
Room 6323, Deyartment of State
Richard W. Murphy
-Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
Room 6242, Department of State
Thomas Simons
Deputy Assistant for Secretary of State
European/Canadian Affairs
Room 6219, Department of State
Edward Dje.rejian
Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 6242, Department of State
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SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Policy Toward the Middle East
External Distribution
Marion V. Creekmore
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 6244, Department of State
Roscow Suddarth
Deputy' Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 6242, Department of State
Ambassador H. Allen Holmes
Director of Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7323
Department of State
Karen Dawisha
PM/SA
Room 7815, Department of State
Mark R. Parris
Director of Soviet Union Affairs
European and Canadian Affairs
Room 4217, Department of State
Bruce Burton
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
European Affairs
Room 4219, Department of State
Stephen Young=
EUR/SOV
-Room 4225, Department of State
Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director of Intelligence and research
Room 6531
Department of State
Richard Clark
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Regional, Analysis, INR
Room 6535, Department of State
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SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Policy Toward the Middle East
External Distribution
Curt Kamen
DAS, INR
Room 6535
Department of State
Robert German
Director of Analysis, INR/SE
Room 4.758, Department of State
Martha C. Mautner
Deputy Director of Analysis for Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, INR
Room 4758, Department of State
Wayne Limberg
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843, Department of State
Jonathan Kamin
INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843
Department of State
April Glaspie
Director, Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Affairs
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 6250, Department of State
John Craig
Director, Arabian Peninsula Affairs
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 4224, Department of State
David Dunford
Director, Egyptian Affairs
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 6251A, Department of State
Philip C. Wilcox, Jr.
Director, Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs..
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 6247, Department of State
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SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Policy Toward the Middle East
External Distribution
Peter Burleigh
Director, Northern Gulf Affairs
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 5246A, Department of State
George S. Harris
Director of Analysis for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, INR
Room 4634, Department of State
Gary Deitrich
Chief, INR/NESA/NAP
Room 4634
Department of State
Janean L. Mann
Chief, INR/NESA/NAP
Room 4634
Department of State
William D. Howells
Director of Political-Military
Analysis, INR
Room 6638, Department of State
Lt. Gen. William E. Odom
Director, National Security Agency
T532/CDB, Fort Meade, MD
Special Assistant to the Director, NSA
T532/CDB, Fort Meade, MD
GCO/NSA
PO 522
2W111 Fort Meade, MD
D/NSA Special Assistant
042
Room 9A171, Fort Meade, MD
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