SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800260001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 24, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washingon.D.020505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
N
Soviet Policy Toward the Cambodian Conflict
Summary
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Since the beginning of this year, Soviet comments on the
necessity for a resolution of the Cambodian conflict have taken
on a new urgency. To some extent, this appears to be an
outgrowth of Gorbachev's desire to improve relations with China
and the ASEAN countries. Moscow also is increasingly
dissatisfied with having to support the crippled Vietnamese
economy. In recent months, the Soviets have taken steps--
including seeking information on resistance leaders, probably to
determine acceptable participants in negotiations--that suggest
they are urging Hanoi to start negotiations for a political
settlement. While recent Soviet actions are not inconsistent
with a campaign simply designed to disassociate Moscow from
Hanoi's actions in Cambodia, we believe that Soviet concern with
the situation and desire for a settlement are genuine. So far,
however, Moscow's reluctance to jeopardize relations with Hanoi
has constrained the Soviets from putting excessive pressure on
the Vietnamese to withdraw. If negotiations do not begin or if
they fail, the Soviets probably still will encourage the
Vietnamese to hold to their promised withdrawal date of 1990.
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A New Sense of Urgency
Until recently the Soviets appear to have been content to
leave the initiative on resolving Vietnam's continued war in
Cambodia--begun in 1978--to the Vietnamese. For example, during
the 1985 and 1986 visits to Moscow of the Vietnamese Communist
Party General Secretary--Le Duan in 1985, Truong Chinh in 1986--
press reports of discussions with Soviet leaders made no mention
of the need to solve the Cambodia question, concentrating instead
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis
Comments and queries are we-lcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Third World Activities Division
SOV M 87-20062X
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on the efforts of the Indochinese states to resist outside
interference. Since the beginning of 1987, however, Moscow
appears to have invested a new sense of urgency in the Cambodia
problem:
-- References in Soviet talks with Vietnam and with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries
to the need to solve the Cambodia situation have increased
dramatically. During Vietnamese Communist Party Secretary
Nguyen Van Linh's May 1987 visit to Moscow, for example,
practically every meeting contained some reference to the
Cambodia problem, according to the Soviet press. The
Soviets also have stressed to foreign leaders Moscow's
interest in achieving and willingness to guarantee a
political settlement to the Cambodian problem.
-- The Soviets agreed for the first time to discuss the
Cambodia situation with China during biannual Sino-Soviet
political consultations in October 1986, and again in
April 1987--a departure from their previous insistence
that they were not in any way involved, and therefore
could not discuss the situation.
-- The Soviets have publicly stated that elements of the
Khmer Rouge--minus the "Pol Pot clique"--would be
acceptable participants in negotiations for a political
settlement. Soviet diplomats in Thailand recently began
inquiring about the strength and composition of the Khmer
Rouge and which of its leaders would have to be removed
for it to become "flexible," according to the US Embassy
in Bangkok. A Hungarian diplomat in Bangkok told US
Embassy officials that the Soviets, without telling the
Vietnamese, were looking into "second echelon" Khmer Rouge
to identify possible acceptable participants in future
negotiations. He noted that the Soviets did not expect
the current Vietnamese leadership to accept the.Khmer
Rouge, but that the Soviets believed that future
Vietnamese leaders might be more flexible and therefore
Moscow was simply preparing itself for the future.
-- Statements by Soviet diplomats imply that Moscow is akin
a more active role in attempting to influence Hanoi.
-- The US Embassy in London reports that Soviet Deputy
Foreign Minister Rogachev said during US-Soviet regional
discussions in March that the Indochinese countries
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recognize the impossibility of resolving their internal
difficulties without normalization in the region. 125X1
Sources of Concern
The heightened Soviet interest in a settlement probably
stems from at least two factors; Moscow realizes that its
association with the problem will continue to harm its relations
with the other countries in the region, and also is increasingly
dissatisfied with having to bear the burden of Vietnam's ruined
economy.
Since his assumption of power in 1985, Gorbachev has placed
special emphasis on improving Soviet relations with China.
Despite purported Soviet movement on the other two "obstacles"--
Afghanistan and the buildup of Soviet troops along the Sino-
Soviet border--the Chinese continue to say that Cambodia is the
most important obstacle to improved Sino-Soviet relations. Even
if, as some Soviets may believe, the Chinese have simply seized
on the Cambodia issue for negotiating purposes, Soviet movement
on Cambodia could put the Chinese in a position where they would
have to respond. Likewise, the ASEAN countries have pressed the
issue; during Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's March visit
to the region and Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi's May visit to
Moscow, ASEAN made Cambodia the dominant issue. The Soviets may
also believe that anti-Soviet feeling among the ASEAN countries
provoked by the Cambodian situation may lead to an expansion of
Chinese influence in the region.
-- According to State Department reporting, an East German
diplomat said in February that the Soviets perceived the
Cambodia conflict as a deterrent to the expansion of
Soviet influence in Asia.
-- In his July 1986 speech in Vladivostok on Asian affairs,
Gorbachev referred to Cambodia as an area of tension. He
called for the improvement of Vietnam's relations with
China and ASEAN as necessary steps toward normalizing the
situation in Cambodia.
Vietnam's continued presence in Cambodia diverts resources
from its domestic economy, as well as costing Moscow military
aid. According to the US Consulate in Shanghai, a Soviet
diplomat said in May that peace in Cambodia would help Vietnam's
economy and ease the heavy aid burden on the USSR. Vietnam's
continued presence in Cambodia also precludes it from receiving
some Western aid that, while unlikely to be significant any time
soon, would still reduce Moscow's load slightly. In addition,
the Soviets have complained repeatedly about Vietnamese misuse of
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Soviet aid--aid which supports,
activities in Cambodia.
directly or indirectly, Vietnam's
No Significant Movement. . .
Recent Soviet actions are not inconsistent with a campaign
simply aimed at disassociating Moscow from Hanoi's activities in
Cambodia. The Soviets may believe that their apparent interest
in a settlement will cast them as a progressive force in the
region and reduce ASEAN opposition to improving political and
economic ties with Moscow as well as make the Chinese "main
obstacle" difficult to sustain. By broadcasting their
flexibility, the Soviets might also be hoping to encourage ASEAN
and China to offer concessions to get negotiations started.
Indeed, to date Moscow has taken no concrete steps toward
solving the Cambodian problem. The Soviets do not appear to have
threatened to cut off military or economic aid to Hanoi; on the
contrary, Moscow has reaffirmed its 1985 promise to double its
economic aid, currently running over $1 billion a year, during
the 1986-90 Five Year Plan. The Soviet press, while carrying
pieces implicitly criticizing Hanoi's misuse of Soviet aid, has
not linked this problem to Vietnamese activities in Cambodia or
otherwise implicitly criticized Hanoi's Cambodia policy. The
Soviets continue to insist that the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin
government must participate in any negotiated settlement.
Although Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech addressed the Cambodian
problem, it contained no new initiatives, and Soviet
"discussions" with the Chinese on the subject reportedly have
been no more than reiterations of standard positions by both
sides. Soviet diplomats stress to third parties that they have
only limited influence over Vietnam and that ASEAN and China have
to make concessions before talks can start.
In addition, Soviet expressions of interest in a political
settlement are not completely new; Moscow has publicly called for
a negotiated settlement for a number of years. Although their
recent public statements go beyond anything they have said before
on the subject, the Soviets had hinted as early as 1985 at the
possibility of some form of Khmer Rouge participation in
negotiations.
. . . But Genuine Concern
On balance, we believe that the new expressions of Soviet
concern with Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia and desire for a
settlement are genuine. The most convincing evidence of
heightened Soviet concern is Moscow's apparent willingness, as
indicated by the extensive discussion of the issue during Linh's
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visit, to make the need for a solution a bilateral issue between
Moscow and Hanoi rather than a purely Vietnamese concern. 125X1
Soviet dissatisfaction with the status of the Cambodian
problem, while sufficient to excite concern, nevertheless is not
yet as important to Moscow as its good relations with Vietnam.
The Soviets are primarily interested in continued access to the
naval and air bases at Cam Ranh which act as a partial counter to
the US bases in the Philippines. Good relations with Vietnam
also greatly expand Soviet influence in the rest of Indochina and
have the potential, if the Cambodia conflict reaches a diplomatic
solution, to help Moscow's efforts to block the expansion of
Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. There is also evidence
suggesting that Vietnam has been used to a limited extent by
Moscow as a surrogate in aiding some Third World countries and
insurgents.) For these reasons, we believe that the Soviets are
unlikely to take drastic action, such as threatening to cut off
aid, to force Hanoi to leave Cambodia. Instead, the Soviets are
likely to:
-- Continue to emphasize to Hanoi the economic advantages of
a diplomatic solution.
-- Continue to look on their own for possible avenues o
dialo ue for Hanoi.
-- Emphasize to the ASEAN countries and to China Moscow's
interest in a settlement, in hopes of both stimulating
concessions on negotiations and reducing regional
opposition to improved relations with Moscow.
If negotiations never get started, or if they fail, the
Soviets are likely to urge Hanoi privately to hold to its promise
to withdraw its troops in 1990--a promise well-publicized by both
the Vietnamese and the Soviets. A Vietnamese failure to pull out
in 1990 would result in a loss of international credibility for
both Hanoi and Moscow, despite probable efforts by the Vietnamese
under those circumstances to nullify the commitment by alleging
continued foreign interference in Cambodia. The Soviets almost
certainly will not, however, break publicly with Hanoi over the
issue.
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At the same time, Moscow will try to elicit movement from
China and ASEAN. The Soviets probably will try to convince the
ASEAN countries that Vietnam has already softened its stance, and
that therefore ASEAN must respond with concessions on
negotiations. Moscow also will continue to press the Chinese to
enter into direct talks with Vietnam to defuse border tensions
and to discuss the Cambodian situation. In addition, the Soviets
are likely to continue to support Hanoi's tough stance against
continuing support for the resistance.
What Would the Soviets Accept in Cambodia?
Moscow is likely to let Hanoi draw the bottom line on which
Khmer Rouge figures constitute the "Pol Pot clique" that must be
excluded from negotiations and on the composition and leadership
of a coalition government. The Soviets appear to have formulated
at least general guidelines on both questions, however:
-- According to the US Embassy in Moscow, Soviet Foreign
Ministry officials recently defined the "Pol Pot clique"
as Pol Pot and his wife, Ieng Sary and his wife, and Son
Sen. This definition is extremely narrow--almost
certainly narrower than Hanoi's--and might be expanded if
negotiations were imminent.
-- The Soviets appear to envisage a neutral, nonaligned
coalition government that would include the leadership of
the Heng Samrin government and the Sihanouk and Son Sann
factions and elements of the Khmer Rouge.
The Soviets have said that they are prepared to join the
other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in
"guaranteeing" any settlement. According to the US Consulate in
Shanghai, Soviet diplomats have said that Moscow's guarantee
would include no Vietnamese colonization of Cambodia.
Nevertheless, the Soviets would be unlikely to support the
removal of Vietnamese settlers already in Cambodia.
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SUBJECT: Soviet Policy Toward the Cambodian Conflict
External Distribution
Dr. Fritz W. Ermarth
Special Assistant to the President for
European and Soviet Affairs, NSC
Room 368, Old EOB
James Kelley
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director, Asian Affairs
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Ronald C. St. Martin
Senior Director, Crisis Management Center
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Richard Childress
Director, Asian Affairs
NSC
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Colonel Tyrus W. Cobb
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
NSC
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The Honorable Donald P. Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
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Paula J. Dobriansky
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
NSC
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Lieutenant General Colin Powell, USA
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
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SUBJECT: Soviet Policy Toward the Cambodian Conflict
External Distribution
The Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
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Lt. Gen. Dale Vesser
Director, J-5 Plans and Policy
Joint Chiefs of Staff
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Lt. Gen. Leonard Perroots, USAF
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John Sloan
DIO for East Asia
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and Military Affairs, DIA
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Craig Alderman, Jr.
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
Department of Defense
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Karl Jackson
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
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SUBJECT: Soviet Policy Toward the Cambodian Conflict
External Distribution
Gordon Bare
OSD/ISA
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The Pentagon
EAP, Directorate for Estimates
DIA/DE-2 Room B6828
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State
The Honorable Michael Armacost
Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
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The Honorable Vernon Walters
US Ambassador to the United Nations
US Mission to the United Nations
Department of State
Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European
and Canadian Affairs
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SUBJECT: Soviet Policy Toward the Cambodian Conflict
External Distribution
Ambassador H. Allen Holmes
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Alan Keyes
Assistant Secretary of International
Organization Affairs
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Office of Soviet Union Affairs
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Director, EAP/ANZ
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SUBJECT: Soviet Policy Toward the Cambodian Conflict
External Distribution
Gen. John Vessey
President's Special Envoy on
POW/MIA Affairs
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Robert Duncan
Director, Office of Economic Policy, EAP
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Robert K. German
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Union and Eastern Europe, INR
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Wayne Limberg
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Murray Zinoman
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Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
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and Research (INR)
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SUBJECT: Soviet Policy Toward the Cambodian Conflict
External Distribution
NSA
Lt. Gen. William Odom, USA
Director, National Security Agency
T532/CDB
Fort Meade, Md
Chief of Soviet Studies
National Security Agency
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FBIS
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