GORBACHEV AND THE EAST BERLIN PCC MEETING: PROSPECTIVE INITIATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800250002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 26, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
26 May 1987
Gorbachev and the East Berlin PCC Meeting:
Prospective Initiatives
Summary
Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev probably will use
the annual Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Coma~ittee westing
of party and governeent leaders in East Berlin at the end of this
month to press for Mestern moveeent on INF and in the Yienna
discussions on a Mandate for new conventional arms control talks,
and for US flexibility on SDI. A sore draeatic move, such as the
announcewent of a unilateral withdrawal of soave Soviet forces
frog Eastern Europe, is less likely but cannot be ruled out. As
in the past, the Yarsaw Pact leaders will probably endorse
creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe, giving special
attention to a,arosaective nuclear-free corridor along the inner-
6ersan border.
There is a good chance, however, that Gorbachev will try to
upstage President Reagan's visit to West Berlin next month by
addressing specific 6er~an concerns, possibly an offering on the
ewigration of ethnic 6erwans frow the USSR, expressing a
readiness to discuss contentious Berlin issues, or touching on
issues related to the question of 6erwan reunification. Nt
consider it unlikely that Gorbachev will propose a fundawental
SOVM-87-20060X
EURM-87-20081
This memorandum was prepared in the European Assessments Division of the
Office of Soviet Analysis and West European Division of the Office of European
Analysis. Comments and questions are welcome and should be directed to the
Chief, European Assessments Division, SOVA
Chief, West European Division, EURA
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change in Four Power rights in Berlin, but he could suggest a
number of measures that would appeal to Nest Berliners and Nest
Germans. We cannot exclude the possiblity of an initiative on
German reunification as has been bruited in the Nest European
press but doubt that it would be more than a public relations
gesture even though it might include a call for peace treaties
with both Germanys or allude to Moscow's 1952 reunification
proposal. A German initiative would appeal to Moscow for the
likely fissures it would expose within NATO, but it would also
seriously risk complicating Soviet relations with its East
European allies and would at a minimum require intense intra-
Narsaw Pact and Soviet-East German bargaining.
The West European Context
The Western media, particularly the West German press, are
rife with speculation that General Secretary Gorbachev will use
the 28-29 May PCC session to make some dramatic new proposals on
contentious East-West issues, including the German question.
Last year Gorbachev initiated a wide-scale, highly publicized
campaign to strengthen West European voices in the East-West
dialogue. Repackaging familiar themes, the Soviets argued that
their relations with Western Europe should move forward on a
track parallel--not subordinate--to that between Moscow and
Washington. They also stressed the need for an "innovative and
positive" role in East-West relations by West Europeans having
"common" concerns with the Soviets on European issues.
The campaign appealed to West European sensitivities on both
pan-European and bilateral issues. As it got underway, Moscow
released a flurry of arms control "initiatives," expressed an
eagerness to continue the CDE/CSCE process, and held out
prospects for better trade relations.
An Arms Control Initiative?
During the past two months, Soviet and Bloc officials have
raised with Westerners the ossibilit of a Gorbachev initiative
at th P
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Since the beginning of the year, we have heard rumors of a
planned unilateral Soviet troop withdrawal from Eastern Europe.
At first the stories had Gorbachev announning during his April
Prague visit that two divisions would be pulled out of
Czechoslovakia. This month the rumor is a PCC announcement of
some withdrawals from East German .
In our view Gorbachev will probably concentrate on
repackaging previous initiatives. He may announce a new draft on
permitted SDI activities to be tabled in Geneva, promise imminent
removal from Eastern Europe of the SS-12s without preconditions,
elaborate on the Budapest Appeal, or urge the West to accept
other Soviet and East Bloc proposals such as those for the
creation of nuclear or chemical weapons-free corridors or zones
in Europe. We cannot, however, rule out that Gorbachev will
announce Soviet. readiness for unilateral troop withdrawals. He
may tie the withdrawals to his call during his Prague visit for
an East-West ministerial conference to push for an early
agreement on a mandate for new force reductions talks in the
Atlantic to the Urals area.
Whatever the substance of Gorbachev's statements in East
Berlin, they will be packaged to appeal to Western public
At the
same ime, oscow inten s to multiply Washington s difficulties
by frequent and highly-publicized initiatives that will keep the
United States off balance and force it to react to Soviet
initiatives or risk appearing to Western publics as cynical and
uninterested in reducing East-West tentions.
Playing the German Reunification Card?
Rumors of a Soviet initiative on German reunification have
repeatedly surfaced over the ears some b the Soviets
themselves.
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In mid-May
the OS em assy in onn reported that, according to an FRG
official, Soviet Germanist Portugalov, in a complete about face,
had been "whispering" favorably about German unity. In a January
newspaper article Portugalov had denounced Chancellor Kohl's
preelection rhetoric on reunification.
Last week a West German newspaper touched off the latest
avalanche of media speculation with a story that Gorbachev
intended to announce in Berlin an initiative on German
reunification. It quoted an unnamed FRG official as saying Bonn
had been expecting such a proposal for months. The paper also
claimed a confidential government poll showed 71 percent of the
West German respondents would welcome unity in a nonaligned
Germany. Government spokesmen have denied that Bonn has any
evidence to support this story, and the East Germans have
predictably labelled the whole affair as "idle fantasy."
Moreover, at a press conference last week Soviet Foreign Ministry
spokesman Gerasimov forecfully reaffirmed Moscow's position of
two separate German states.
The Soviets are keenly aware of the power and fascination
the idea of reunification holds for many West Germans.
A Soviet move on reunification woul d be l i kely to touch off
an intense debate in West Germany. The press and the opposition
would demand that the government make every effort to test Soviet
intentions. If Moscow only hinted that it was rethinking its
position, many West German politicians and journalists would call
for expanded dialogue and cooperation with the Soviets to
influence their decision. The discussion of reunification
probably would increase neutralist sentiment and undermine
support for NATO, which polls show to be widespread but
shallow. Many publicists would revive the argument that the
Western powers prevented reunification in the 1950s and continue
to put their ,own securit.y interests ahead of German national
aspirations.
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unity.
Although the Kohl government would prefer to avoid such a
national debate, it almost certainly would feel constrained to
welcome signs of Soviet flexibility on the German question. Bonn
probably would call for a unified Western position on any Soviet
offer while also exploring Moscow's thinking through independent
channels, including East Berlin. The Kohl government would
insist that any reunification scheme include provisions for free
elections, perhaps with international observers. Like former
chancellor Adenauer in the 1950s, he also would be likely to
insist that any reunified German government maintain the option
to form a military alliance with the West. Much of the
opposition, however, would counter that such a precondition was
unacceptable to Moscow and thus doomed any prospect of German
On balance, we think it is unlikely that Gorbachev will
propose an initiative on reunification at this time. Even though
he may view a divisive debate on reunification in the West as
desirable, doing so would foment controversy in the Warsaw Pact
as well as in NATO. Such a gesture would greatly disturb East
German leaders who know full well that they would not survive
politically in a unified Germany. Moscow's other allies--
particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia--also would be reluctant
to support any Soviet nods toward reunification. Indeed, a
revival of the German question might immobilize both alliances
and possibly threaten Gorbachev's other initiatives, which are
aimed at distancing the West Europeans from the United States.
writer suggesting Gorbachev would even offer to tear down the
Berlin
The coincidence of the PCC meeting in East Berlin and the
750th anniversary of the city has led some press commentators,
academics, and Western officials to speculate about the
possibility of a Soviet initiative directed toward the city, one
Berlin Wall.
In our view a major Berlin initiative during the PCC is
unlikely. In practice, the Soviets continue to adhere to their
definition of the city's special status, including the toleration
of special Western Allied access to East Berlin (see Appendix
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B). They continue to protest to the Western Allies actions by
Bonn and West Berlin officials they claim violate the 1971
Quadripartite Agreement. Moreover, earlier this year the Soviet
diplomatic representative in West Berlin told the US Minister
there. that Moscow wishes to maintain the Allied air corridor
regime to Berlin because its existence provides justification for
the Soviet role in the city. We doubt that Gorbachev is prepared
to reopen the fundamental questions pertaining to Four Power
rights in Berlin or surrender any rights arisin4 out of the
wartime treaties and associated agreements.
The Soviet party secretary responsible for Bloc relations,
Vadim Medvedev, reiterated in East Berlin late this month the
standard Soviet position on Germany: that the territory of the
former German Reich now contains "two sovereign states, the GDR
and FRG, and the special entity of West Berlin." He also
described statements that West Berlin is a part of the FRG as
"absolutely untenable arrogance." Medvedev's remarks were
clearly directed at the speeches emphasizing West Berlin's ties
to West Germany made by West German Chancellor Kohl and West
Berlin Mayor Diepgen on the occasion of West Berlin's kickoff of
the 750th anniversary celebration last month. They were probably
also meant to reassure the East German regime, fearful that
speculation about German reunification would be destructive to
its long, uphill struggle to create a sense of nationhood. As a
further sign of its displeasure, Moscow also canceled the
attendance of Soviet mayors at an international gathering of
mayors in West Berlin this month.
Gorbachev may, however, offer some p a i u es that hold out
the prospect of some improvement in West Berlin's situation in
the context of the overall East-West relationship. He could, for
example, suggest tangible improvements for the city's residents,
including greater freedom of movement between the eastern and
western sectors or propose that West and East Germany consult
about establishing direct air links between West Germany and East
Berl-in's Schoenefeld airport.
Trade
Although the economic aspect is a major element in the FRG-
Soviet relationship, a trade initiative is an unlikely avenue for
overshadowing President Reagan's trip to Europe and Berlin.
There is nothing comparable to the gas pipeline issue outstanding
for Gorbachev to build headlines on. Instead we expect the
Soviets to continue pushing for expanding joint ventures and
increased high-technology imports during the next near in a
typically business-as-usual manner.
West German journalists and politicians, on the other hand,
have strongly emphasized the prospects for closer economic ties
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economic ties.
with Moscow. In his Davos speech, for instance, West German
Foreign Minister Genscher argued that Gorbachev's economic
reforms opened the possibility of vast new markets for Western
business. The press is devoting much attention to talks between
West German businesses and the Soviet government on forming joint
ventures. West German newspapers have carried a spate of
interviews with leading officials in Bonn and Moscow on bilateral
Soviet-West German economic cooperation.
The enthusiasm for expanded trade stems from political--
more than economic--considerations. Although the West Germans
believe greater trade is needed to foster East-West detente,
economic realities do not seem to portend a ma,ior increase in
increased emigration.
The principal human rights dispute between the West Germans
and the Soviets centers on emigration of ethnic Germans from the
USSR, but some of the force has been taken out of this extremely
emotional issue by a recent increase in the number allowed to
move to the FRG. Further, Moscow apparently has indicated to
Bon n. that this trend will continue. The West Germans probably
are even more reluctant than in the past to stress Soviet
domestic human rights violations for fear of jeopardizing the
Human Rights
change in the low-key efforts of both sides on these issues.
potentially destabilizing changes. We anticipate no significant
On the related issue of inner-German visitation and
emigration, the Soviets could push East Berlin to make
concessions, but they would get little credit for it and would
antagonize the East Germans, who want to control the pace of such
agreement.
The Bottom Line
The PCC has traditionally been a venue for highlighting
Warsaw Pact positions on aspects of the East-West relationship.
At a minimum, Gorbachev will use it to boost his image in Western
Europe of reasonableness, flexibility, and concern. He probably
also hopes to further perceptions in West Germany that a new
phase of East-West detente is possible and lower fears of Moscow
as a military threat. He may calculate that both perceptions
would promote a more negative public image of the United States
in West Germany, especially in light of a growing belief that
Washington is pressuring Kohl into an ill-considered INF/BRINE
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At the very least, Gorbachev will probably offer vague
proposals that will seek to further the long term Soviet
objective of attenuating West German ties to NATO and sowing
divisions within the Alliance without detracting from the
immediate desire for an INF accord. The principal risk to the
Soviets in the media hoopla surrounding Gorbachev's presence in
East Berlin at the PCC session is that he will not fulfill the
West German public's expectations. This could lessen public
pressure on Kohl to show greater flexibility on issues of concern
to Moscow.
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Appendix A
The "Stalin" Proposal for a Reunified Germany, 10 March 1952
After several years of intra-Allied correspondence on
reunifying Germany, the Soviet Union submitted a draft peace
treaty that proposed an all-German government for a united
Germany. The draft treaty provided for a remilitarized Germany
with an economy unfettered by any restrictions, such as those
imposed after the First World War. The core of the draft treaty
consisted of seven political conditions.
? Germany is re-established as a unified state.
? All armed forces of the occupying powers must be
withdrawn from Germany not later than one year from the
date of entry in force of the peace treaty.
Simultaneously all foreign military bases on the
territory of Germany must be liquidated.
? Democratic rights must be guaranteed to the German
people...[who will] without regard to race, sex,
language or religion enjoy the rights of man and basic
freedoms including freedom of speech, press, religious
persuasion, political conviction and assembly.
? Free activity of democratic parties and organizations
must be guaranteed in Germany with the right of freedom
to decide their own international affairs, to conduct
meetings and assembly, to enjoy freedom of press and
publication.
? The existence of organizations inimical to democracy and
to the maintenance of peace must not be permitted on the
territory of Germany.
? Civil and political rights equal to all other German
citizens ...must be made available to all former members
of the German army, including officers and generals, all
former Nazis, excluding those who are serving court
sentences for commission of crimes.
? Germany obligates itself not to enter into any kind of
coalition or military alliance directed against any
power which took part with its armed forces in the war
against Germany. '
The United States, after consultations with London and
Paris, argued that no treaty could be discussed until conditions
conducive to free elections had been created and a free all-
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German government had been formed. Moreover, the Soviets were
suggesting a united Germany within the borders established at the
Potsdam conference, but that conference had deferred territorial
questions until a peace settlement. Most importantly, the
Western Allies objected to the provisions for a German military
as limiting Germany's freedom to join in association with other
countries, such as the proposed European Defense Community.
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Appendix B
Western and Soviet Differences on the Legal Status of Berlin
Even though the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement (QA) removed a
number of contentious issues that had made Berlin the frequent
focal point of East-West tensions, it did not resolve fundamental
differences between the Western allies and the Soviets on the
legal status of the city. Instead, the Four Powers agreed to
make "practical improvement" in the city's situation "without
prejudice to their legal positions."
The West's Position
Britain, France, and the United States contend they occupy
Berlin jointly with the Soviet Union as equal partners with equal
rights. They therefore postulate
? The Western presence in Berlin is an "original" right
based on the wartime treaties and rights.
? Access to Berlin by the powers derived from their
original right.
? Soviet withdrawal from the Allied Control Commission
(Kommandatura) in 1948 led logically to tripartite
control of the Western sectors.
? The Soviet Union cannot unilaterally transfer its right
in its sector to the East Germans; therefore, East
Berlin remains subject to quadripartite authority.
? Western original rights take precedence over East German
sovereignty because those rights predated the creation
of the East German state.
The Soviet Stance
Soviet leaders have argued since the late 1940s that they
have supreme authority in the city and have granted the Western
allies limited rights of residence. They also claim that the
city has always been part of their occupation zone. Based on
these positions the Soviets maintain
? There is no original Western right in the city; Moscow
tolerates the Western allies there for the moment.
? There are no Western transit rights to Berlin except
those freely granted by the USSR, for military
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movements, and those granted by East Germany for
civilian travel.
? Because the Soviet Union holds full occupational
authority in Berlin, it has legitimately handed over its
rights in the Soviet sector of the city to East
Germany. Quadripartite authority, therefore, is limited
to the Western sectors.
? West Berlin is a "separate political entity" and all
actions of the Western allies and West Germany in the
city are illegal unless Moscow agrees to them.
? The QA must be interpreted restrictively and that which
is not expressly permitted by the accord requires Soviet
assent.
? Inasmuch as the Western allies have no original rights,
they cannot claim priority over East German sovereignty.
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SUBJECT: Gorbachev and the East Berlin PCC Meeting:
Prospective Initiatives
External Distribution:
Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Fritz Ermarth
Special Assistant to the President
Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs,
National Security Council Staff
Room 368, Old EOB
Lou Michaels
Director, Crisis Management Center
Room 303, Old EOB
Peter Sommer
Staff Member, National Security Council
Room 361, EOB
Ty C ob b
Staff Member, National Security Council
Room 361, EOB
Nelson Ledsky
Staff Member, National Security Council
Room 368, EOB
Barry Kelley
Intelligence Program, National Security Council
Room 300, EOB
Paul SeBraf
Director
White House Situation Room
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State
Mr. Robert German
Director of Analysis for the Soviet Union & Western Europe, INR
Room 4F58
Department of State
Mr. Mark R. Parris
Director of Soviet Union Affairs
Room 4217
Department of State
Ambassador H. Allen Holmes
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7327
Department of State
Jenonne R. Walker
Deputy Director, Bureau Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7325
Department of State
Mr. John Evans
Deputy Director of Soviet Union Affairs
Rm. 4217
Department of State
Mr. Charles H. Thomas
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and
Canadian Affairs
Room 6226
Department of State
Mr. Bill Courtney
Special Assistant, Office of Under Secretary of State
Room 7240
Department of State
Mr. Richard Solomon
Director
Policy Planning Staff
Room 7311
Department of State
Mr. Ray Caldwell
Director, Office of European Security and Political Affairs
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6227
Department of State
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Mr. Barry Lowenkron
Policy Planning Staff
Room 7316
Department of State
Mr. David Johnson
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6515A
Department of State
Mr. Richard A. Clarke
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Analysis, INR
Room 4F58
Department of State
Mr. Ray Firehock
Chief, Intelligence Division, ACDA
Room 5499
Department of State
Mr. Algis Avizienis
INR/SEE/EE
Room 4752
Department of State
Mr. Harry J. Gilmore
Director, Office of Central European Affairs
Room 4232
Department of State
Mr. William Bodde
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Room 6226
Department of State
Mr. Wayne Merry
Officer in Charge, Berlin and GDR Affairs
Office of Central European Affairs
Room 4228
Department of State
Rozanne L. Ridgway
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6226, Dept of State
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D oD
Mr. Darnell M. Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, DoD
Room 4D840
The Pentagon
Mr. James Morrison
Director of Regional Policy, DASD/ISP
Room 1D469
The Pentagon
Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Political/Military Affairs
Room X238
The Pentagon
Mr. John Kachold
OASD/ISP/Regional Policy
Room 1D469
The Pentagon
DIA
DB-3 Western European Policy
Bolling AF Base
Other
Byron Jackson
Director, Office of Intelligence Liaison
Room 6854 Main Commerce
Department of Commerce
Douglas Mullholland
Special Assistant to the Secretary (National Security)
Room 4324
Department of Treasury
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