SOVIET AFGHAN POLICY SINCE JANUARY 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800190001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 22, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
22 April 1987
Soviet Afghan Policy Since January 1987
Summary
Since the beginning of the year, Soviet actions have
indicated that Moscow's Afghanistan policy may be moving in two
-different, but not ultimately inconsistent, directions. Soviet
efforts to find a compromise which might enable them to withdraw
their troops while leaving behind a Communist-dominated regime
are coupled with Moscow's apparent intensification of coercive
measures inside Afghanistan and against Pakistan. We believe
these two thrusts indicate that the USSR is:
-- Increasingly anxious to extricate itself militarily from
Afghanistan, but not at the cost of the Kabul regime's
collapse.
-- Reluctant to tolerate the indefinite prolongation of the
status quo, given the various domestic and foreign costs
of Soviet involvement.
political methods.
Aside from the heightened pressure on Pakistan, there is no
indication of a massive escalation of fighting so far this year
that would suggest a Soviet expectation of prevailing by force in
the near term. But there is also no sign that the Soviets are
willing to allow the collapse of the regime in Kabul as the price
of their getting out. Soviet actions since the beginning of the
year suggest that Moscow is groping for a way to strengthen its
Afghan client's position sufficiently that the latter could
survive Soviet withdrawal. Moscow hopes to achieve this by
improving the Afghan Army and regime cohesion while weakening the
resistance and its external support through both military and
-- No longer so sanguine that time is on its side.
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis
Comments and
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Third
World Activities Division
SOV M 87-20046-CX
Copy of Zj
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However, the regime's continued fragility has apparently
forced Moscow to consider the possibility of a coalition
government, as long as the Communist party would have a dominant
role. Therefore, it is pursuing a variegated policy that looks
to a number of possibilities.
Neither of the two new aspects of Soviet policy this year--a
proposal for a coalition with undefined resistance participation
and the use of greater force against Pakistan--has led to a
political breakthrough. Neither, however, is likely to be
abandoned.
In Search of a Compromise?
-Moscow wants to bring Soviet troops home from Afghanistan because
of various international and domestic costs and that, to achieve
this, Moscow is prepared to be flexible:
Moscow's goal of a neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan did not
necessarily include the continuation of Najib's regime or
even Communist domination of a coalition.
-- Also in January, a lecturer in Leningrad criticized those
who were opposed to the government's efforts to negotiate
with the resistance, saying that the Soviet Union was
isolated because of the war and that compromise was
imperative.
The Soviets have taken several actions this year that seem
to bear out the views expressed in such statements:
-- Moscow had Kabul announce a six month ceasefire beginning
15 January and, in a reversal of previous policy, voice
"national reconciliation" proposals that could lead to a
coalition government with resistance participation. The
Soviets took this step despite the reluctance of Afghan
leader Najib and despite the risk that these initiatives
would undermine the morale and unity of the Afghan
Communist party. The ceasefire was spurned by the
resistance and never took effect, and no independent
figures of importance joined in a "national
reconciliation" government.
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-- At Geneva in March, the Soviets had the Afghans offer an
18-month timetable for Soviet troop withdrawal--down from
three years at last summer's Geneva session. The Kabul
regime would be unlikely to survive even an 18-month
timeframe if it were agreed upon and adhered to, and
Moscow has told that a
settlement on the composition of the Afghan government
must precede further reductions in the withdrawal
timetable.
-- The Soviets have told US officials that Kabul has been
informed that the Soviet Army's mission has been
com feted.
Coercion Instead of Compromise?
With the failure of the regime's ceasefire and national
reconciliation initiatives, the Soviets and the insurgents are
squaring off against one another this spring as they have in
earlier years. Because of Soviet hints that they might intensify
military pressure if the initiatives failed, one hypothesis has
been that Soviet operations this year might be particularly
intense. So far, however, there has been no observable buildup of
Soviet troops, equipment, or supplies to suggest Moscow is
planning an extraordinary offensive0. The Soviets are continuing
to improve their military infrastructure and show no sign of
removing combat or support units.
As is usual in the spring, Soviet and Afghan forces have
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conducted a number of medium-size operations. 25X1
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-- Afghan aircraft recently dropped leaflets along the border
warning of further attacks unless the refugee camps were
moved out of the area.
-- In mid-March, the Soviet ambassador in Islamabad told
Western diplomats that recent cross-border attacks were
conducted in "hot pursuit" of insurgents, and hinted that
Stinger training sites might be attacked as well,
frontier.
There is some evidence the Afghan government--presumably at
Soviet direction--is trying to move more forces to the Pakistani
border to stop the flow of insurgent supplies. So far these
-measures have had. no military effect. However, manpower
shortages continue to plague the regime and the US Embassy in
Kabul reports intense public opposition to renewed government
conscription efforts--which were supposedly halted as part of
national reconciliation--and opposition within the regime to
attempts to move KHAD and militia troops from Kabul to the
Direct Pressure on Pakistan
The most visible shift in policy has been a decision to step
up deliberate air attacks against insurgents and refugees across
the border in Pakistan, resulting in greatly increased Pakistani
casualties. While most earlier border violations occurred in
support of ground operations near the border, these new attacks--
probably by Afghan planes, but presumably under Soviet direction-
-were not associated with ongoing operations.
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according to US diplomatic reporting. f
Pakistan has reacted by increasing air patrols near the
border, and may be adhering less closely to restrictive rules-of-
engagement for intercepting intruding aircraft.
-- On March 31, Pakistani F-16s shot down an Afghan AN-26
military transport, which crashed in Afghan territory.
-- On April 16th an F-16 downed an Afghan SU-22 fighter-
bomber, which also crashed just across the border in
Afghanistan.
At the same time, incidents of sabotage and subversion
inside Pakistan have increased in boldness and frequency.
-- On 19 February a bomb blast near a school in Peshawar led
to widespread demonstrations against Afghan refugees.
Coupled with other sabotage incidents in the area, it
appears to have resulted in a permanent deterioration of
relations between Afghan refugees and local Pakistanis,
according to American consulate reporting. In March,
however, the number of incidents in the Peshawar area
declined.
-- On 9 April a car-bombing in Rawalpindi--the first major
act of sabotage attributed by Pakistan to Afghan agents
outside the frontier area--killed 16 13 eo le and wounded
some 40 others.
Publicity for Mujahideen Raids on Soviet Territory
The recent Soviet publicizing of raiding by insurgents
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-the USSR for the-bombings in Pakistan.
We believe that the decision to focus public attention on
these raids was made for political purposes. The publicity
serves the purpose of justifying the Soviet military presence in
Afghanistan as necessary for a forward defense of the USSR's
frontier against alleged hostile intentions by the US, which
Soviet media repeatedly accuse of arming the mujahideen. The
publicity might also have been intended to offset criticisms of
guards had been killed in another attack into Tajikistan.
2 April Moscow media had not reported any incidents. Then an
insurgent rocket attack across the river in early March was
reported on 2 April, and on 18 April TASS stated that two border
across the Amu River into Soviet Central Asia may also point
toward a Soviet decision to intensify coercive tactics. A low
level of insurgent activity into the Tajik SSR has been reported
by Western media for several years, but until
The publicity also played to Soviet concerns about
nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim republics of
Central Asia. Moscow has shown increased concern about the
percolation of fundamentalist Islamic sentiments across the
frontier from Afghanistan.
-- Last November in a speech in Tashkent Gorbachev called for
a "merciless struggle" against covert religious believers
in the party. Following the speech, several Uzbeki party
members--including the party first secretary in
Samarkand--were purged for being practicing Muslims.
-- Party Secretary Yakovlev's speech to the Tajik party
organization this month, with its remark about
"intertwining nationalist and religious views," reflects
views we have seen expressed by other leaders about the
stimulus of fundamentalist Islam on local anti-Russian
nationalism.
-- The campaigns against Islamic observances in the local
parties and against unregistered Muslim clerics are
continuing, especially in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,
further reflecting regime concern about the threat of
radical Islam in the southern republics.
Equivocal Actions
Many other Soviet moves this year are compatible either with
efforts to end Soviet military involvement by probing for a
political compromise or with efforts to force the other side to
accept a settlement on Moscow's terms. Among these are
continuing attempts to strengthen the regime:
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-- The Soviets have continued to implement slow improvements
in the Afghan military. Over the last several months they
have provided the Afghans with more advanced artillery and
infantry fighting vehicles. There has been no significant
improvement in Afghan Army performance, however. Rumors
that the Soviets might withdraw and intense infighting
between Parcham and Khalq factions have further lowered
military morale.
-- With the growth of party factionalism in the wake of the
"national reconciliation" initiatives, Moscow has probably
forced Najib, a Parchami, to make concessions to the
Pushtun-dominated, more unified Khalqis. This pressure
has led to speculation that the Soviets are considering
turning to the Khalqis in the interest of effectiveness,
regardless of what the regime might lose in ethnic
"representativeness."
-- Moscow has intensified its effort to enhance the
international legitimacy of the regime, achieving
diplomatic recognition by Zimbabwe and Cyprus, and
pressing the resumption of air routes between Kabul and
Kuwait. It has also secured visits by the Afghan Foreign
Minister to India in February, I
These moves are consistent with preparations by the Soviets
to take a harder military and diplomatic line on Afghanistan, but
at the same time could be intended to put the regime in as strong
a position as possible for negotiations on the composition of a
coalition.
The Soviets' and Afghans' refusal to set a definite date for
the resumption of the Geneva negotiations until Pakistan has made
a "reciprocal" response to their 18-month timetable proposal is
similarly ambiguous. Moscow could be preparing its
justification--the alleged intransigence of the other side--for
abandoning the path of "reasonableness." However, it could also
intend to explore through other channels, including direct
contacts with Pakistan, the issue of a new Afghan government. The
Soviets have said that a government will have to be agreed upon
before withdrawal can be finally negotiated.
Recent Soviet commentary is also equivocal. It can be read
as an effort to justify to international audiences an intensified
war effort and pressure against Pakistan:
-- The Soviet media have claimed that all elements in
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The commentary is also clearly addressed to the domestic
audience in the USSR. Soviet media continue to stress the
necessity of Soviet involvement while they have become
increasingly frank about the hardships of the war in recent
years, and glasnost has accentuated this. Such realism about the
conflict may reflect the leadership's attempt to deal with an
increasingly polarized public opinion. It could also be intended
to prepare the public for a continued Soviet presence in
Afghanistan.
-- A poll taken in 1986 among 1700 Soviets travelling abroad
found that one-third supported the war, one-third opposed
it, and one-third was indifferent. The survey showed that
opposition had grown among party members and most of the
non-Russian minorities. Only in Siberia was there
substantial support for Moscow's policy.
-- A Soviet diplomat told an American colleague that an
underground antiwar movement had recently been organized
in Moscow to speak out against the war. There have been
reports of other ad hoc antiwar movements in other cities
of the RSFSR, Azerbaizhan, and the Baltic republics.
"fanatical" and uncompromising resistance.
It is possible, however, that Moscow intends this commentary
primarily to persuade Islamabad to cut a deal, both by
encouraging those elements in Pakistan that favor making
concessions to Soviet interests in order to end the country's
refugee problem and by reducing international support for a .
more enthusiastically supported at home.
Pakistan want a settlement but that the United States is
prolonging the conflict to "bleed" the Soviets. The
failure of the ceasefire has been blamed at least
partially on outside influences.
-- Soviet commentary has specifically charged that the United
States instigated resistance attacks on Soviet territory
and Pakistani and Iranian efforts to block the return of
refugees persuaded by Kabul's latest reconciliation
proposals.
-- The Soviets have also claimed that the "national
reconciliation" program has been favorably received by the
Afghans, with many insurgents going over to Kabul's side
or laying down their arms and many refugees returning
home. With so many "true patriots" now allegedly in the
regime fold, Moscow may hope that attacks on the remaining
resistance "renegades" and their "imperialist" supporters
will produce only a reduced international outcry and be
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-discussion of possible political and diplomatic solutions.
changing the nature of the policy debate, forcing a more open
There is virtually no possibility that a national antiwar
movement will emerge, though a significant number of Soviets--
including segments of the elite that Gorbachev is depending on to
implement his agenda of reform--now oppose the war. While there
is little evidence to suggest that the domestic cost of the war
will--by itself--force the Gorbachev regime to reconsider its
commitment to the Najib regime, it may have a catalytic effect in
makes you old."
-- Antiwar sentiments have been reported in letters to the
editor of Komsomol papers, at public lectures, and in
recent articles, books, and films. In a popular film made
in the Latvian republic, a young veteran calls the war a
"dirty business," noting "war doesn't make you mature, it
of the insurgents.
In this context, Moscow's coverage of the war serves the
purpose of steeling the Soviet public for a long, difficult
struggle of attrition from which there is no easy way out--which
we believe is its prime motive. But it also serves the function
of preparing the ground for an acceptable political settlement--
if such is to be had--that does not include the complete defeat
The two main new thrusts of Soviet policy since the
beginning of 1987 have been an apparent willingness to share an
undefined amount of power with insurgent leaders in a government
of national reconciliation and the use of greater force against
Pakistan. Though neither has brought a political breakthrough,
both have served to intensify political maneuvering and excerbate
differences within and between the major actors--not always to
Moscow's advantage. Neither tactic has been abandoned, and
to proceed.
Outlook
Moscow probably does not have a clear picture of how it
ought to proceed or where the situation is forcing it to go. The
Gorbachev leadership almost certainly would like to be rid of the
war, but it has not been able to find a way to end the struggle
on politically acceptable terms. Therefore, it is still casting
around for new ideas--with an air of growing impatience. This
intensified search for a solution necessarily forces the Kremlin
to act in ways that on the surface appear incompatible, while
waiting to see what might work out best--or what turns up. The
divergence between signs of compromise and greater coercion could
also reflect disagreement within the Soviet leadership over how
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pressure on Pakistan might be just beginning to build up, with
more terrorism incidents in the heartland of the Punjab
supplementing sporadic aerial bombings along the Northwest
Frontier.
On the ground, we foresee a continuation of policies
initiated over the last two years. The Soviets will try to
improve the Afghan Army and turn over to it more of the ground
combat, while emphasizing Soviet aerial and artillery firepower
support. As in 1985 and 1986, emphasis will be put on
interdicting insurgent supplies entering Afghanistan by the use
of special purpose forces (spetsnaz) and other combat elements.
While pursuing these efforts, the Soviets are unlikely to
push the idea of compromise so far as to withdraw while--as we
-judge-to be true-for the foreseeable future--the Kabul regime
cannot fend for itself. As long as a politically acceptable
compromise remains a goal that cannot be attained, the Soviet
army seems certain to remain in Afghanistan. Despite the
discomfort and burden of the war there, the Soviet leadership is
not so pressed yet that it must accept defeat. Nor is Gorbachev
compelled to run the major political risks attendant on labelling
defeat "victory" and handing Afghanistan over to American-backed
guerrillas.
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SUBJECT: Soviet Afghan Policy Since January 1987
External Distribution
NSC
1 Robert Oakley
Special Assistant to the President for
Near East/South Asian Affairs
NSC
Room 348, Old EOB
2 Lieutenant General Colin Powell, USA
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The-White House
3 Dr. Fritz Ermarth
Special Assistant to the President for
European and Soviet Affairs
NSC
Room 368, Old EOB
4 The Honorable Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs
NSC
Room 298, Old EOB
State
5 Ambassador H. Allen Holmes
Director of Politico-Military Affairs
Room 6531, Department of State
6 The Honorable Michael H. Armacost
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Room 7240, Department of State
7 The Honorable Richard W. Murphy
Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 6242, Department of State
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r
SUBJECT: Soviet Afghan Policy Since January 1987
External Distribution
8 The Honorable Robert Peck
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Near East and South Asian Affairs
Room 6244, Department of State
9 Ambassador Charles Dunbar
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 5515, Department of State
10 Desiree Millikin
Afghanistan Desk Officer, NEA/PAB
Room 5247, Department of State
11 Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway
Assistant Secretary for
European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6226, Department of State
12 Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 6531, Department of State
Mark R. Parris
Director of Soviet Union Affairs
Room 4217, Department of State
14 Robert H. Baraz
Director, INR/SEE
Room 4758, Department of State
15 Wayne Limberg
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843, Department of State
16 Zalmay Khalilzad
Policy Planning Staff
Room 7330, Department of State
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SUBJECT: Soviet Afghan Policy Since January 1987
External Distribution
DoD
17 Dr. Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Room 4E838, The Pentagon
18 Lt. Gen. Dale A. Vesser
Director, J-5 Plans and Policy
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E996, Pentagon
19 Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Perroots, USAF
- Director, Defense' Intelligence Agency
Room 3E258, Pentagon
20 The Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Room 4E808, The Pentagon
21 Dr. Wynf red Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Politico-Military Affairs
Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 2C238, The Pentagon
22 Col. Walter P. Lang
DIO for Near East and South Asia
Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 2C238, The Pentagon
Other
23 Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA
Director, National Security Agency
T532/CDB
Fort Meade, MD
24 NSA, A2
Room 3NO15
Fort Meade, MD
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SUBJECT: Soviet Afghan Policy Since January 1987
External Distribution
Other
25
NSA - A 055
Room 2A0814
Fort Meade, MD
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SUBJECT: Soviet Afghan Policy Since January 1987
Internal Distribution
26 D/DCI/DDCI Executive Staff
27 ED/DCI
28 Executive Registry
29 DDI
30 Senior Review Panel
31 OCPAS/IMD/CB
32 OCPAS/IMD/CB
33 OCPAS/IMD/CB
34 OCPAS/IMD/CB
35 OCPAS/IMD/CB
36 OCPAS/IMD/CB
37 Vice Chairman, NIC
38 NIC/AG
39 NI0/USSR
40 NI0/NESA
41 PDB Staff
42 ILS
43 NPIC/TFD/STUDB
44 D/NESA
45 C/NESA/SA
46 C/NESA/SA/A
47 C/NESA/SA/PB
48 OIA/TWFD/AB
49 FBIS
50 D/SOVA
51 DD/SOVA
52 SA/SOVA
53 C/SOVA Executive Staff
54 C/ES/CIB
55 C/SOVA/RIG
56 C/SOVA/EAD
57 C/SOVA/NIG
58 C/NIG/DPD
59 NIG/DPD/SI
60 C/NIG/EPD
61 C/SOVA/SIG
62 C/SIG/FSD
63 C/SIG/SPD
64 C/SOVA/DEIG
65 C/DEIG/DED
66 C/DEIG/DID
67 C/SOVA/TWA
68 C/SOVA/TWA/FA
69 C/SOVA/TWA/A
70 C/SOVA/TWA/AFLAME
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71 SOVA/TWA/A Chrono
72 SOYA/TWA/~
73 SOYA/TWA/
74 SOVA/TWA/A
75 SOVA/TWA/A
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