MOSCOW'S AGENDA FOR THE GORBACHEV-ASSAD SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800180001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 20, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE q - 2Y --7
DOC NO.S'OV /l f7-200 qIY
OIR
P &PD I
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 April 1987
Moscow's Agenda for the Gorbachev-Assad Summit
Summary
General Secretary Gorbachev and President Assad probably
face tough talks during their April summit. Differences over
Syria's military needs and ability to pay for more arms, its
treatment of the Palestinians, and support for Iran, and its
reluctance to embrace the Soviet proposal for an international
conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict will make for difficult
negotiations. The Soviets ^ay take advantage of Assad's growing
isolation in the Arab world and worsening economy to press for
Syrian concessions. Specifically, Moscow appears to want to
improve the terms of trade in its arms sales to Damascus and to
persuade Assad to make incremental shifts in-his regional
policies. The Soviets, as in the past, will avoid pushing Assad
so far that he threatens to downgrade relations or is weakened
within his own regime.
The Soviets probably now will insist on a stronger voice in
determining Syrian military needs and, barring another Arab-
Israeli conflict, the level-of arms deliveries to Syria are
unlikely to match the large influx of Soviet weapons following
the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
Preparations for Assad's Moscow Trip
In mid-February, a 25X1
Syrian military delegation led by Chief of Staff General Shihabi
traveled to Moscow to conduct an initial round of negotiations in
preparation for a visit by President Assad then scheduled for
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis by
the Third World
Activities Division. It was coon na' ed with the Office of Near
Eastern Analysis and the Directorate of Operations. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Third
World Activities Division
SOV M 87-20044X
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March. The Syrian government reportedly viewed the planned Assad
visit as a particularly significant one intended to set the stage
for political, military, and economic relations over the next 10
years. The Syrians initially were optimistic that Moscow would
respond favorably to their urgent requests for military and
economic assistance, even though they reportedly expected the
Soviets to press for movement toward Palestinian reunification
and reconciliation with PLO Chairman Arafat, and some repayment
of Syria's large military debt.
Assad's visit to Moscow reportedly was postponed
until the second half of April to allow for additional military
and economic consultations on areas of disagreement.
Over the past two months, a series of high-level Syrian
delegations have visited the USSR apparently to negotiate future
economic and military cooperation.
Nonetheless, the Syrian press and TASS have announced that
the upcoming visit of President Assad to Moscow will occur during
the second half of April, suggesting that recent negotiations
have yielded enough incentives for a Gorbachev-Assad summit at
this time. (It is also possible that Assad's health requires him
to visit Moscow for medical treatment, although there is little
direct indication that this is a major reason for the timing of
his visit.) The convening of a Palestinian National Council in
Algiers on 20 April suggests that Assad may want to divert some
attention from a possible setback there--in the form of progress
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toward PLO reunification--by making a state visit to Moscow. 125X1
The Debt Question
Thp most crucial issue Gorbachev and Assad will have to
address'almost certainly is the deteriorating Syrian economy,
which has been exacerbated by declining financial contributions
from other Arab countries, and Syria's resultant inability to _
repay its debts or to purchase new weapons.
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Prospects for a recovery of the Syrian economy in the near
term are slim, and Moscow probably realizes that its only hope
for salvaging any payment of the Syrian military debt is to
acquiesce in some refinancing and rescheduling. The Soviets
might be willing to refinance earlier debts at more favorable
interest rates and probably would postpone payments of more
recent debts. The Syrians may cite the Soviets' recent
concessionary rescheduling of Egypt's military debt as cause for
similar treatment. Nevertheless, Gorbachev's emphasis on
improving the USSR's domestic economy and the hard line he
appears to be taking with regard to payments for arms elsewhere
in the Third World strongly suggest the Soviets will not offer
major concessions for future military or economic agreements with
Syri a.
Gorbachev also is likely to press for a stronger Soviet role
in helping the Syrians manage their defense procurement and
financial system.
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Future Arms Deals
Over the past year or so, the USSR apparently has been
reluctant to provide Syria with more weapons, probably because of
concern about Syria's ability to utilize them effectively or pay
for them. The Soviets delivered only about $600 million worth of
military goods last year--the lowest ever during this decade,
when deliveries have averaged over $3 billion per year. Most of
last year's deliveries included only overhauled aircraft and
helicopters and small arms and ammunition, with no major items
such as tanks or new aircraft. Moreover, although Syria is
usually Moscow's first client to receive advanced aircraft, it
has not yet obtained the MIG-29 fighter, which Moscow already has
exported to India and Iraq and has offered to Algeria, Jordan,
and Zimbabwe.
Despite the recent slowdown in Soviet deliveries, Moscow
almost certainly remains committed to maintaining the Syrian
military as among the most capable Arab forces in the region.
Nevertheless, the amount of equipment and the specific weapons
systems Moscow will provide will depend, at least in part, on
reaching agreement on repayment terms or perhaps political
concessions. Barring another Arab-Israeli conflict, the level of
arms deliveries is unlikely to match again the large influx of
Soviet weapons following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon
when Syria suffered large losses of equipment. Moreover, the
Soviets apparently now are insisting on a stronger voice in
determining Syrian military needs and are likely to become more
active in ensuring that equipment already on hand is effectively
used.
Political Disagreements
Despite the years of close cooperation with Assad, Moscow has always treated him with suspicion
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The two sides have long had
differences regarding the Palestinians, Lebanon, an international
conference to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Iran-
Iraq war. Moscow has had no success in altering Assad's policies
and has been so dependent on Syria as its major entre into the
region that it has acquiesced in Assad's activity. Moscow, as in
the past, will avoid pushing Assad to the point of threatening a
rupture in Soviet-Syrian relations or weakening Assad within his
own Alawite regime, but within those limits, the new Soviet
leadership may now be more willing to press harder for Soviet
interests.
Palestinian Unity. Another issue near the top of Moscow's
agenda will be its unhappiness over Assad's efforts to prevent a
reunification of the PLO and to rout the Palestinians in Lebanon
and his continuing efforts to oust PLO leader Arafat.
The Soviets will want to question Assad closely on his
intentions in Lebanon. While they have praised Syrian efforts to
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I I
end the bloodletting, they almost certainly are uneasy about
Syria's expanding hold there, particularly with regard to the
Palestinian presence in Lebanon, the Lebanese Communists, and the
Druze.
Relations with Iran. Moscow has long sought a rapprochement
between the a t parties of Syria and Iraq as an essential
ingredient for Arab unity, and therefore disapproved of Assad's
support for Iran in the Gulf war. Soviet officials probably
recognize that the strong personal enmity between Assad and Iraqi
President Saddam Husayn is unlikely to ever be resolved, but they
periodically host meetings in Moscow between other Syrian and
Iraqi officials. In addition to the standard pitch for Syrian-
Iraqi reconciliation, Moscow is likely to press Syria to reduce
its support for Iran and to cite their common interest in
preventing the growth of Iranian-backed Shia fundamentalism in
Lebanon as the compelling rationale. Assad's recent support for
the Arab League's call for an end to the Iran-Iraq war may
already reflect an adjustment in Syria's policy, but Moscow is
likely to want to see a sustained policy.
For economic reasons of their own, the Soviets are unlikely
to entice Assad to alter his support for Iran with offers to
replace Syrian imports of Iranian oil with Soviet oil. Although
Syria is dependent on Iran as a source of oil, the Soviets would
be likely to advise Assad that a reconciliation with Iraq would
lead to other Arab sources of the needed oil.
The Peace Process and an International Conference. In early
March Moscow dispatched two envoys to Damascus, Amman, and
Algiers to promote the Soviet call for an international
conference on the Middle East.
In talks
with US officials and the Israelis, moreover, the Soviets have
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stressed their openness to bilateral talks between the
conflicting parties and to the Israeli position that the
conference as a whole should not veto any agreements reached in
those talks.
Thus far, the Syrians have not criticized the Soviet peace
proposal despite their differences, but Moscow may seek stronger
Syrian endorsement of a conference. In addition, Moscow may
suggest constructive Syrian behavior to facilitate the process,
such as movement toward PLO reunification, which the Soviets
regard as essential prior to convening a conference. The Soviets
also would hope that a more cooperative Syria would focus
attention on the United States and Israel as the obstacles to
peace in the Middle East. Moreover, Moscow's increasingly public
dialogue with Israel appears aimed at securing Israeli agreement
to a Soviet role in the peace process, but may also be intended
to keep the Syrians a bit off balance. Assad almost certainl
will raise this issue with the Soviets as well. 25X1
Prospects
Assad's last state visit to Moscow in June 1985, which was
also his first summit with Gorbachev, did not go well, primarily
due to differences over the Palestinians in Lebanon. The two
leaders could not agree to a joint communique, and TASS noted the
talks were conducted in an atmosphere of "frankness," a codeword
for disagreements. Both sides probably hope this next summit
will mark an improvement as well as set the tone for relations
over the next few years, although both parties are likely to be
tough bargainers.
Since their meeting, Gorbachev has solidified his control
over foreign policy, putting a strong emphasis on pursuing
policies that will advance his domestic economic goals. He has
made it clear that an improvement in East-West relations and
achievement of an arms control agreement are higher priorities
for Moscow than assertive involvement in regional conflicts.
While not indicating an abandonment of countries like Syria,
Gorbachev's agenda does suggest a harder Soviet line toward arms
clients who have difficulty meeting debt repayments. Moreover,
some of his personnel changes in the foreign policy apparatus--
namely promoting younger and more "activist" specialists who seem
more willing to take risks, such as increasing Jewish emigration,
releasing political prisoners, and openly meeting with Israeli
officials--suggest Moscow will be less understanding of Syria's
policies and economic situation unless Damascus is willing to
offer the Soviets more in return.
This may be difficult for Assad, a leader who has
successfully resisted Soviet pressure in the past. However, he
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is now more isolated in the Arab world, his economy is getting
worse, he is pursuing a risky policy in Lebanon, and he may be
losing control over the Palestinian dissident movement. Moscow
will certainly try to take advantage of these vulnerabilities to
press for its own interests
Until the Soviets are somewhat confident that they will
receive some payment for past military sales, they are unlikely
to part with any new advanced and expensive weapons, perhaps
arguing that the Syrians have not yet been able to absorb the
systems already in their inventory, much less pay for them. One
exception probably is the MIG-29 fighter. The USSR probably
agreed to provide this aircraft to Syria a year or two ago, and,
according to US official discussions with the Israelis, Syrian
pilots are training on MIG-29s in the USSR.
Gorbachev and Assad may also reach
agreement on upgrading existing Syrian air defense radar and
support equipment. Gorbachev probably would drive a hard
bargain, however, before signing agreements to export additional
expensive equipment already in the Syrian forces, such as newer
model T-72 tanks, SS-21 surface-to-surface missiles, and SA-5
surface-to-air missiles.
The Soviets may be less successful in the political arena.
Aside from arms sales, they do not have the leverage to persuade
Assad to take steps he believes are not in Syria's interest.
Nonetheless, they probably will try and perhaps even will press
harder than they have in the past. The fact that the Syrians are
expecting this pressure going into the summit suggests they, on
their part, may at least be willing to negotiate.
? On the Palestinian issue, much will depend on the outcome
of the PNC in Algiers, which, if successful in reuniting
most of the factions, will present Assad with little choice
other than to come to terms with them. If the PNC does not
succeed, Assad will have little incentive to bow to Soviet
pressure unless Moscow decides to link arms sales to its
political agenda.
Syria may be able to get away with token gestures on the
Iran-Iraq war and on the peace process, particularly
because other factors beside Syria also prevent resolution
ot these conflicts.
Whether or not there is a joint communique and, if there is
one, what it says will provide clues to how successful Gorbachev
has been in his summit with Assad. and how relations will proceed
over the next several years.
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SUBJECT: Moscow's Agenda for the Gorbachev-Assad Summit
External Distribution
White House
The Honorable Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
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Dr. Fritz Ermarth
Special Assistant to the President
European and Soviet Affairs
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Paula J. Dobriansky
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
National Security Council
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Director, European and Soviet Affairs
National Security Council
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Robert B. Oakley
Special Assistant to the President
for Near East and South Asian Affairs
National Security Council
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Ronald C. St. Martin
Senior Director, Crisis Management Center
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Dr. Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy
Room 4E838, The Pentagon
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SUBJECT: Moscow's Agenda for the Gorbachev-Assad Summit
External Distribution
Vice Admiral Powell Carter
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E936, The Pentagon
Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Political-Military Affairs
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Colonel Walter P. Lang
DID for Middle East and South Asia
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Richard H. Solomon
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Department of State
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Director of Politico-Military Affairs
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Director of International Security Policy
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Karen Dawisha
PM/SA
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Mark R. Parris
Director of Soviet Union Affairs
European and Canadian Affairs Bureau
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Bruce Burton
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau pf European Affairs
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EUR/SOV
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SUBJECT: Moscow's Agenda for the Gorbachev-Assad Summit
External Distribution
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Acting Director, Regional Affairs
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Bureau
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Ronald D. Lorton
Deputy Director of Analysis for
Near East and South Asia
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Richard Clark
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Analysis, INR
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Robert Baraz
Director of Analysis for the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, INR
Room 4758, Department of State
Wayne Limberg
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843, Department of State
George S. Harris
Director of Analysis for Near East
and South Asia, INR
Room 4634, Department of State
William D. Howells
Director of Political-Military Analysis, INR
Room 6638, Department of State
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