MOSCOW'S RELATIONSHIP WITH RIYADH: PROGRESS AT A SNAIL'S PACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800170001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 17, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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I I r-,/-
Central Intelligence Agency
DATE /-Z2 -8'7
DOC NO SO / M e7 -2-0093X
OIR 3
P $ PD
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 April 1987
Moscow's Relationship with Riyadh: Progress at a Snail's Pace
Summary
countries.
Soviet officials, hoping to increase their influence in the
Persian Gulf and undermine Saudi Arabia's pro-Western
orientation, are optimistic about reviving long dormant Soviet-
Saudi diplomatic relations. For their part, however, the
Saudis--angered by the continuing Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan and critical of other Soviet internal and foreign
policies--have remained cautious, willing to deal with Moscow on
limited matters of mutual interest, but mostly through
intermediaries or direct ambassadorial-level contacts in third
In January the Soviets took advantage of a visit to Moscow
by Saudi Oil Minister Hisham Nazir, who traveled as an OPEC
representative, to press their case for improved relations with
the Saudis. Although the visit went smoothly, it apparently does
not presage a dramatic shift in Riyadh's policy of keeping the
Soviets at arms length. Riyadh now appears less reluctant than
before, however, to consider expanded ties. In keeping this
option alive, Saudi officials hope to project a more nonaligned
foreign policy and to make the United States more responsive to
Saudi concerns. The Saudis may also hope that improved ties and
greater cooperation with Moscow in limited matters of Riyadh's
choosing will promote goodwill and temper Soviet support for
activities inimical to Saudi interests. Progress in improving
relations, however, is likely to be slow, with Riyadh determining
the pace. If relations are normalized, the Soviet diplomatic
presence is likely to be small. Riyadh is unlikely to turn to
This memorandum as prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis by
with a contribution by the
Office of Near East and South Asia Analysis. Comments and
queries-are-welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Third World
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Moscow for major weapons systems or to welcome an expanded Soviet
presence in the Persian Gulf or Arabian peninsula.
Soviet Interest in Saudi Arabia
The visit of Saudi Oil Minister Hisham Nazir to Moscow in
January, like previous visits by Saudi officials in 1982 and
1985, raised questions about the status of Soviet-Saudi relations
and whether the visit portended significant improvement in ties
between the two countries. Although Moscow gave the visit much
attention and Soviet officials expressed optimism about its
impact on Soviet-Saudi relations, the Saudis downplayed the
significance of the visit for bilateral relations. This
typical of the differing approaches of the two countries.
Since the late 1970s, Moscow has been attempting to
reestablish ties with Saudi Arabia after withdrawing its
ambassador nearly 50 years ago. Following the 1973 OPEC oil
embargo and the rise in oil prices, Moscow viewed Riyadh as rich
and powerful enough to be one of the top players in the Middle
East. Later, as oil prices fell and OPEC grew weaker, the
Soviets reportedly began to view Saudi power as leveling off and
possibly waning.
Nevertheless, Moscow remains keen to reestablish ties for
several reasons:
o The Soviets see Saudi Arabia as a key US ally which often
supports US policies hostile to their interests, such as
aid to the Afghan resistance; a Soviet mission in Riyadh
would provide opportunities to influence Riyadh toward a
less pro-US orientation.
o As a major oil producer that relies on oil exports for
much of its hard currency earnings, Moscow would like
better access to information concerning OPEC intentions
and factors that influence the world market price of oil.
o Because of Saudi Arabia's influential role in the Middle
East and in the Islamic world more generally, the Soviets
view closer relations with the Saudis as a key to further
improvement in ties with other Gulf states and as a way to
enhance their prestige in the region and
internationally.
Moscow's courtship of the Saudis has taken many forms. The
Soviets have emphasized issues of common concern, pursued
ambassadorial-level contacts in third countries, urged third
parties to help facilitate better ties, and used occasion
visits by Saudi officials to Moscow to press their case.
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Common Ground
Moscow has tried to play up common positions on regional
disputes with heavy emphasis on a mutual interest in supporting
Iraq. In mid-1983 the Soviets began to lift Saudi crude oil as
war relief aid for Iraq. The arrangement continued in 1986, but
at the end of February 1987 Moscow and Riyadh had not agreed on a
contract to continue the program this year. Moscow apparently
has pressed Riyadh unsuccessfully to service Soviet ships
carrying military equipment for Iraq and to permit Soviet ships
to unload food and eauipment at Saudi ports for transport
overland to Iraq.
The Soviets also claim commonality of interest in supporting
the Palestinian cause and calling for Israeli withdrawal from
territories occupied in 1967. Both countries support the Arafat
faction of the PLO, and Riyadh has been receptive to Moscow's
call for an international conference on the Middle East and to
Soviet participation in the peace process.
Moscow also tries to claim affinity with the Saudis and the
Islamic world in general by virtue of its large Muslim
population. It has paid close attention to overcoming its image
as an atheistic state by increasing official contacts with Muslim
organizations and by attempting to portray an image of religious
freedom for Muslims at home and of friendship toward Muslim
countries abroad. For example, it has pressed for ties with the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) headquartered in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and succeeded after repeated invitations in
arranging for a visit by OIC Secretary General Pirzada to Moscow
in November 1986--the first such trip since the organization was
founded in 1969. During the visit, Soviet Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze pressed Pirzada to side with the USSR on East-West
issues, tried to convince him of Soviet good intentions regarding
Afghanistan, and attempted to solicit his help in promoting
relations with the Saudis. The Soviets also pushed
unsuccessfully for formal links with the OIC in the hope of
obtaining an invitation to the Islamic summit in Kuwait in
January 1987.
Limited Contacts
Since the Soviets undertook to improve relations in the late
1970s, there have been few direct contacts between the two
countries; high-level contacts have generally been limited to
meetings between Soviet and Saudi ambassadors in third countries.
In December 1982, the Soviets and Saudis agreed to use their
respective ambassadors in London or Paris as points of contact on
matters requiring consultations. In January 1987 the Soviet
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Ambassador to Kuwait publicly confirmed reports that Soviet and
Saudi ambassadors had recently met in London and that the two
countries also maintained contacts in other world capitals.
The Soviets have also used third parties in their effort to
improve contacts with the Saudis. Kuwait, until recently the
only Gulf State having relations with Moscow, appears to play an
important role in facilitating Soviet-Saudi communication.
Kuwait's Moscow Embassy has assisted in arrangements for Saudi
visitors in Moscow, and the Kuwaiti Ambassador arranges and
attends Saudi meetings with Soviet officials, hosts receptions
for the visitors and provides official support and media
coverage.
The Soviets have also tried to identify ossible avenues for
gaining entry to the Saudi market for arms.
bilateral relations.
Visits to Moscow
Only three Saudi officials have visited Moscow since World
War II, and they did not travel in their official government
capacity. The Soviets, however, gave the visits high level
attention, and each visit raised speculation overseas that the
Soviet hosts might effectively use such contacts to improve
In December 1982 Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-
Faisal visited Moscow and Beijing with a seven-member Arab League
delegation as part of an effort to explain the Arab peace plan
adopted at the Arab summit in Fez, Morocco, to UN Security
Council members. After General Secretary Andropov met the
delegation, Foreign Minister Gromyko met privately with Prince
Saud for discussions on Afghanistan and other issues. It was
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during this visit that the two sides agreed to use their
ambassadors in London or Paris for future consultations.
In a public statement shortly after Saud's visit, Crown
Prince Abdallah, the King's brother, declared his support for
balanced relations with both superpowers, arousing speculation
that the Soviets had successfully pressed their case for improved
ties. The Crown Prince, however, later told intimates that it
would be inconsistent to welcome Soviet diplomats to Riyadh as
long as the Soviets oppress Muslims in Afghanistan and South
Yemen, according to US Embassy reporting.
A second visit took place in August 1985, when one of King
Fahd's sons, Prince Faisal, headed an 18-member sports delegation
to Moscow in his capacity as chairman of the Saudi youth
organization. The Kuwaiti news agency reported that Faisal spent
two hours in conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy
Kornienko and the head of the Foreign Ministry Middle East
Department Vladimir Polyakov--a meeting arranged and attended by
the Kuwaiti ambassador in Moscow. The Prince announced that
there would be further cooperation and commercial exchange
between the two countries but stated that economic relations are
separate from diplomatic ones.
Following the visit, King Fahd's private secretary scotched
rumors that Faisal engaged in policy discussions and indicated
that the King was irritated that the Soviets had exploited the
visit for political purposes, according to US Embassy reporting.
Polyakov later reportedly described the visit to a foreign
diplomat as solely a youth exchange and not a springboard for
diplomatic relations. Denying that there was any comparison with
US "pingpong diplomacy" in China, Polyakov stated that the
Soviets were ready to set up a diplomatic post in Riyadh whenever
the Saudis say the word and that they would wait for the next
Saudi move.
Most recently, Saudi Oil Minister Nazir visited Moscow in
January 1987 as an OPEC representative seeking support from non-
OPEC producers to stabilize the oil market. Riyadh emphasized
the OPEC purpose and multilateral context of the tour and noted
that Nazir discussed the international oil market in his meeting
with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Although in the past Moscow
has avoided direct cooperation with OPEC, the Soviets used the
visit to publicly support OPEC and Saudi initiatives by declaring
their mutual interests as petroleum exporters in a stable oil
market and by announcing that they would reduce oil exports by 7
percent in support of OPEC efforts. Prior to announcement of the
visit, Moscow had unilaterally set an $18 per barrel price on
Soviet oil exports--the price target pushed by the Saudis at OPEC
meetings in 1986.
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term.
Although Soviet media gave heavy attention to Nazir's visit
and noted that "the positions of the two countries on the
principal urgent problems are the same," private accounts of the
meetings indicate that the Soviets did not make as much progress
as they may have hoped. A Saudi Foreign Ministry official told a
US Embassy officer in Riyadh that Nazir turned down a Soviet
request to open a mission of Soviet Muslims in Mecca to support
Soviet pilgrims on the annual pilgrimage known as the Hajj on the
grounds that the Soviets do not send enough pilgrims to require a
mission. (A counselor in the Saudi Foreign Ministry Directorate
General for Islamic Affairs stated in June 1986 that the Soviets
fix the number of pilgrims at 15-18 annually.) The Saudis claim
that Nazir's visit was exclusively on OPEC business and, as proof
that it did not signify improved bilateral relations, point out
that the week before the visit King Fahd refused visa requests
for several Soviet academics to visit Saudi Arabia. The Deputy
Director of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Near East Department told
a US Embassy officer after the visit that he saw little
likelihood of establishing diplomatic relations in the near
political matters.
During the visit the Soviets made a special effort to
convince the Saudis of their intention to withdraw from
Afghanistan, demonstrating their sensitivity to the importance of
this issue in Soviet-Saudi relations. Saudi Foreign Minister
Saud and King Fahd, however, have emphasized that Nazir was sent
solely on OPEC business and was not empowered to discuss
unofficial contacts may weaken the Soviet case for direct ties.
Assessing Soviet Efforts
From the Soviets' perspective, they have made moderate
progress in their relationship with the Saudis since 1979. In
spite of Saudi refusal to permit a Soviet presence in their
country, Moscow has succeeded in establishing a limited dialogue
with Riyadh in specific areas of mutual interest, using its
embassies in third countries and infrequent Saudi visitors to
Moscow as channels of communication. The Soviets, however, have
been unable to convince the Saudis of the advantages of
reestablishing official relations. Indeed, the mutual
willingness of the two sides to work through third parties and
It is difficult to determine how much progress the Soviets
have made in efforts to revamp their image, to distance
themselves from identification with radical or subversive groups,
and to demonstrate friendliness toward Islamic and other
religious groups. Certainly, Moscow has not yet overcome the
unfavorable impact of its involvement in Afghanistan. On the
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I I
other hand, it may continue to translate its support for Iraq
into additional, although still limited, cooperation with the
Saudis.
Although the Soviets claim legitimate interests in the Gulf,
they have not dispelled the impression that they really have
25X1 little to offer to countries in the region. Their recent promise
to OPEC to cut Soviet oil exports to the West, if implemented,
would have political importance as a sign of cooperation with
OPEC, but the amount of oil involved is too small to have an
economic impact on the oil market. Furthermore, there have been
few opportunities for Moscow to promote economic and military
cooperation with Riyadh. Soviet-Saudi trade is insignificant,
and there are few areas for profitable expansion. Along with its
aversion to a close relationship with Moscow, Riyadh's preference
for high-technology Western military equipment has prevented the
Soviets from exploiting Saudi security concerns, and Riyadh
remains dependent on Western security assistance.
In their attempt to present themselves as desirable
diplomatic partners for the Saudis, the Soviets seem to come
across too loudly and forcefully for Arab tastes. Their frequent
public calls for closer relations appear as indiscreet pressure
tactics, and their public statements concerning contacts with the
Saudis and relations with other conservative Gulf states are
often propagandistic, if not bombastic, in tone. Soviet claims
of good relations with Kuwait and other Gulf states and
references to their success in 1985 in establishing diplomatic
relations with Oman and the United Arab Emirates have little
effect on Saudi policy toward Moscow. Clearly, Moscow will have
to offer more than rhetoric and proclaimed intentions to obtain
an official presence in Riyadh.
Outlook
Although there were hints in the late 1970s--in the wake of
the Camp David accords--that Riyadh was considering
reestablishing relations, the chances for a dramatic breakthrough
in the immediate future are small. Moscow remains an unpalatable
diplomatic partner for a variety of reasons:
o The Saudis are distrustful of Soviet intentions and
believe the Soviets would use an expanded diplomatic
presence in the area as a base for subversion against them
and other Gulf states and as a means to increase their
military presence in the region.
o They see the Soviet military presence in Ethiopia and
South Yemen as a threat to their own security.
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o Riyadh's ideological aversion to Communism remains strong,
and it has expressed strong opposition to the Soviet
policy of gaining footholds in Third World countries
through military assistance programs.
o Saudi Arabia, as a leading Muslim nation, has still not
accepted the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and
continues to insist that Moscow's presence there is an
impediment to expanded ties.
o The Saudis are concerned over the lack of religious
freedom in the USSR and what Riyadh sees as Moscow's poor
treatment of its Muslim minority, which is estimated to
number over 45 million or more than 15 percent of the
total Soviet population.
o King Fahd appears unwilling to provoke conservative
elements within Saudi Arabia by reestablishing ties to the
USSR without having clear gains to show for it.
o The Saudis oppose recent Soviet moves to improve relations
with Israel and have expressed concern that increased
Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union will strengthen
Israel.
o Riyadh is concerned that a rapprochement with Moscow would
The Saudis, nevertheless, appear less reluctant than in the
past to explore expanded ties with the Soviets. They may hope
that improved ties and greater cooperation with Moscow on limited
matters of Riyadh's choosing will promote goodwill and temper
Soviet support for activities inimical to Saudi interests.
Further improvement, however, is likely to be a slow and gradual
process, with Riyadh moving at its own pace. There are several
possibilities that would reduce the obstacles to improved
relations and increase Saudi receptiveness to calls for
normalization. These include: progress on Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan, greater religious freedom for Muslims in the
USSR, Soviet moderation in their policies and actions toward the
Middle East, and a perception that the Soviets are gaining a
position of greater influence there through improved relations
with either Iran or Israel.
Riyadh's desire to lessen its dependence on the United
States, to project a more nonaligned foreign policy, and to make
the United States more responsive to Saudi concerns are areas
that Moscow might exploit. Although the Saudi security
relationship with the United States remains strong, improved
Saudi-Soviet ties would give Riyadh an alternative to the
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conspicuous US presence and limit radical Arab criticism of the
Fahd regime for being too pro-Western. The Saudis are aware of
the US interest over recent--and highly visible--Soviet overtures
toward them and probably believe these developments will make the
United States more responsive to their concerns.
Even if relations were reestablished, however, the Saudis
would remain cautious and fundamentally opposed to Soviet efforts
to expand their influence on the Arabian peninsula. The Soviet
diplomatic presence in Riyadh would be small, other relations
would remain limited, and the Saudis would be unlikely to turn to
Moscow for major weapons systems even if the United States is
unable to provide them.
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SUBJECT: Moscow's Relationship with Riyadh: Progress at a
Snail's Pace
External Distribution
White House
Michael K. Bohn
Director
White House Situation Room
Paula J. Dobriansky
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
National Security Council
Room 368, Old EOB
Robert B. Oakley
Special Assistant to the President for
Near East and South Asian Affairs
National Security Council
Room 348, Old EOB
Colonel Tyrus W. Cobb
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
National Security Council
Room 368, Old EOB
Stephen I. Danzansky
Director, International Economic Affairs
National Security Council
Room 373, EOB
Ronald C. St. Martin
Senior Director, Crisis Management Center
Room 303, Old EOB
Dr. Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy
Room 4E838, The Pentagon
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SUBJECT: Moscow's Relationship with Riyadh: Progress at a
Snail's Pace
Lt. General Philip C. Gast
Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency
Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy)
Room 4E841, The Pentagon
Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Political-Military
Affairs
Room 2C238, The Pentagon
Colonel Walter P. Lang
DIO for Near East and South Asia
Room 2C238, The Pentagon
Rear Admiral William 0. Studeman
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
Room 5C572, The Pentagon
State
Nelson C. Ledsky
Principal Deputy Director
Policy Planning Council
Room 7311, Department of State
Ralph R. Johnson
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Trade
and Commercial Affairs
Economic and Business Affairs Bureau
Room 3831A, Department of State
Alan P. Larson
DAS for International Energy and Resources Policy
Economic and Business Affairs Bureau
Room 3336, Department of State
Thomas J. O'Donnell
Director of International Commodities
Economic and Business Affairs Bureau
Room 3529, Department of State
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SUBJECT: Moscow's Relationship with Riyadh: Progress at a
Snail's Pace
External Distribution
Richard Scissors
Director, 0/Maritime Affairs
Transportation, Telecommunications, and Commercial
Affairs
Room 5826, Department of State
Robert L. Price
Director of East-West Trade
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
Room 3817A, Department of State
Gene Griffiths
Director, Regional Economic Staff
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Bureau
Room 5253, Department of State
Robert Clarke
Deputy Director of Soviet Union Affairs
European and Canadian Affairs Bureau
Room 4223, Department of State
Mark R. Parris
Director of Soviet Union Affairs
European and Canadian Affairs Bureau
Room 4217, Department of State
Edmund M. Parsons
Director of International Economic Policy
Room 5323, Department of State
John Craig
Director, Arabian Peninsula Affairs
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Bureau
Room 4224, Department of State
Wendy Chamberlin
Acting Director, Regional Affairs
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Bureau
Room 5252A, Department of State
R. Rand Beers
Director of International Security Policy
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7430, Department of State
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SUBJECT: Moscow's P?lationship with Riyadh: Progress at a
Snail's Pace
External Distribution
Jerome H. Kahan
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Functional
Analysis and Research, INR
Room 6535, Department of State
John J. Taylor
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence Coordination
Room 6534, Department of State
Robert Baraz
Director of Analysis for the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Room 4758, Department of State
Wayne Limberg
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843
Department of State
Ronald D. Lorton
Deputy Director of Analysis for Near
East and South Asia
Room 4634, Department of State
William D. Howells
Director of Political-Military Analysis, INR
Room 6638, Department of State
Kathleen M. Walker
INR/IC/CD
Room 8646, Department of State
George S. Harris
Director of Analysis for Near East
and South Asia, INR
Room 4643, Department of State
Gary D. Dietrich
Office of Analysis for Near East
and South Asia, INR
Room 4634, Department of State
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SUBJECT: Moscow's Relationship with Riyadh: Progress at a
Snail's Pace
External Distribution
Terence E. Byrne
A. Director of Economic Analysis, INR
Room 8722, Department of State
David R. Konkel
Chief, Trade and Monetary Affairs
Division, INR
Room 8727, Department of State
David Vance
Staff
INR/EC Oil/Fuels
Room 8440, Department of State
Other
D/NSA Special Assistant
ATTN:
Room 9A171
Fort Meade, MD
Director, Office of Intelligence Liaison
Room 6854, Main Commerce
Department of Commerce
Garnetta Phillips
DOE OPSCTR GM-111, Forrestal Bldg
1000 Independence Ave., SW
Washington, D.C.
Douglas Mulholland
Special Assistant to the Secretary
(National Security)
Room 4324, Department of the Treasury
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